Proxy voting report - Aegon Asset Management

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Proxy voting report - Aegon Asset Management
Proxy voting report
                                         Quarter 2 2021

                                     Total                    For               Against                Abstain
April                                  67                     29                  30                     14
May                                   136                     84                  40                     23
June                                   68                     37                  24                     10
Total may not always sum due to multiple votes at meetings.

April
Votes against
Company                             Details
Rio Tinto Plc                       Approve the Remuneration Report for UK Law Purposes
                                    Our major concern centred on the decision to treat the departing executives (who left in
                                    response to the Juukan Gorge Rock Shelters destruction, as good leavers. The Company
                                    argued that, whilst fully recognising the gravity of destruction, it was mindful that the
                                    individuals did not deliberately cause the events, did not do anything unlawful, or engage
                                    in fraudulent or dishonest behaviour. Whilst there may have been legal ramifications
                                    should they have been treated as bad leavers, the destruction of the rock shelters has
                                    done serious reputational damage to the company. It is questionable whether it was
                                    appropriate for good leaver status to be granted. Accordingly, we voted against.

                                    Approve the Remuneration Report for Australian Law Purposes
                                    As above.

Piaggio & C SpA                     Approve the Remuneration Policy
                                    Our concern centred on the provision enabling the company to pay discretionary bonuses
                                    to reflect transactions or outstanding performance. Variable remuneration should be
                                    structured in such a way that only outstanding performance is rewarded at the top end,
                                    without the need for additional remuneration. The levels of performance target disclosure
                                    is also poor.

                                    Approve the Second Section of the Remuneration Report
                                    Further to our concerns regarding insufficient disclosures, as last year, the CEO received a
                                    maximum bonus for 2020. This was paid, despite a reduction in revenue (the previous four
                                    years had experienced year on year growth), and similarly a fall in EBITDA (again following
                                    four years of growth). The performance target range has not been disclosed. However,
                                    given that the targets would have been set pre-pandemic, the target range did not appear
                                    challenging. As a result there was a disconnect between pay and performance.

                                    Appoint Directors – Against/For
                                    Under the voto di lista system, various slates of directors are proposed, for which
                                    shareholders may only vote for one. We voted in favour of Slate 3 which had been
                                    submitted by institutional investors and was best positioned to represent our views. We
                                    voted against the other two slates

                                    Appoint Internal Statutory Auditors – Against/For
Proxy voting report - Aegon Asset Management
Proxy voting report
                               Quarter 2 2021

                      Under the voto di lista system, various slates of internal auditors are proposed, for which
                      shareholders may only vote for one. We voted in favour of Slate 3 which had been
                      submitted by institutional investors and was best positioned to represent our views. We
                      voted against the other two slates.

                      Authorise Share Repurchase Program and Reissuance of Repurchased Shares
                      The Company was seeking an authority to purchase back up to 20% of the issued share
                      capital. We are generally comfortable with amounts up to 10%, and look closely at
                      authorities above this level. Whilst 20% is in accordance with the maximum permitted
                      under Italian Law, it exceeds amounts that investors normally tolerate, since dividends or
                      greater levels of investment are often the preferred use of excess capital. The concern is
                      exacerbated given the current economic environment.

                      Deliberations on Possible Legal Action Against Shareholders if Presented by
                      Shareholders
                      As no specific proposal on legal actions had been made at the time of voting, it was not
                      possible to assess the content of such deliberation.

Covivio SA            Approve Remuneration Policy of CEO and the Vice CEOs
                      Our concern centres on the vesting schedule attached to the LTIP which allows for
                      significant levels of vesting for below average performance. This does not promote
                      outstanding performance. We voted against the policy which formulises the structure.

                      Approve Compensation of Christophe Kullman, CEO, Olivier Esteve, Vice CEO and
                      Dominique Ozanne, Vice CEO
                      We voted against the compensation paid to executive directors in respect of 2020. The
                      LTIP grant was not reduced to reflect the significant fall in share price. This can lead to
                      unjustified windfall gains. Our concern is exacerbated given the less than challenging
                      performance targets attached - significant levels of vesting for below average
                      performance.

MTU Aero Engines AG   Elect Rainer Martens to the Supervisory Board
                      Of the six Board members, the Chairman has been on the Board for 14 years. Two others,
                      Juergen Geissinger and Joachim Rauhut, have been on the Board for 15 years and 11 years
                      respectively. We did not regard either to be independent on grounds of tenure. However,
                      neither were standing for re-election. The only board member standing for election this
                      year was Rainer Martens. He has been appointed to the Board over the past year, and was
                      until 2018, the Chief Operations Officer of the Company. As a former executive, and in the
                      absence of a sufficient gap between leaving the company, we did not consider him to be
                      independent. Given the lack of sufficient independence on the Board prior to his
                      appointment, the election of Rainer Martens further exacerbated our concern.

Basic-Fit NV          Approve the Remuneration Report
                      Our concern centred on the treatment of outstanding and future LTIP awards. In response
                      to covid, any outstanding or future awards containing 2020 and/or 2021 performance
                      years will be excluded when determining whether the required targets have been met.
                      Whilst we understand the effect covid has had on the company, both over the past year
                      and the long-term implications, shortening performance periods by removing financially
                      poor years does not align the interests of participants with those of shareholders, or the
                      wider stakeholder community. We voted against the report which highlighted changes to
                      inflight awards.
Proxy voting report
                                  Quarter 2 2021

                         Approve Revised Remuneration Policy for Management Board Members
                         Our concern centred on the treatment of outstanding and future LTIP awards. In response
                         to covid, any outstanding or future awards containing 2020 and/or 2021 performance
                         years will be excluded when determining whether the required targets have been met.
                         Whilst we understand the effect covid has had on the company, both over the past year
                         and the long-term implications, shortening performance periods by removing financially
                         poor years does not align the interests of participants with those of shareholders, or the
                         wider stakeholder community. We voted against the amended policy which formalised the
                         changes.

                         Reelect Hans Willemse to Supervisory Board
                         The three man Audit Committee included Hans Willemse, who is a shareholder
                         representative of AM Holding BV, an entity controlled by Rene Moos which controls over
                         15% of the outstanding shares. As such he cannot be considered to be independent, and
                         accordingly should not be a member of the Audit Committee. Since an opportunity to vote
                         on his election is only provided every three years, we voted against his re-election.

                         Grant Board Authority to Issue Additional Shares up to 10% of the Issued Capita
                         The Company was seeking two separate general use authorities to allot shares on a pre-
                         emptive basis and then to disapply those pre-emption rights. In aggregate, the amount
                         being sought represents 20% of the issued share capital. This exceeds the amount that we
                         normally tolerate for overseas companies as it is too dilutive to our interests. We voted in
                         favour of one (up to 10%) and against the other (for the further 10%).

                         Authorise Board to exclude Preemption Rights from Share Issuances
                         The Company was seeking two separate general use authorities to allot shares on a pre-
                         emptive basis and then to disapply those pre-emption rights. In aggregate, the amount
                         being sought represents 20% of the issued share capital. This exceeds the amount that we
                         normally tolerate for overseas companies as it is too dilutive to our interests. We voted in
                         favour of one (up to 10%) and against the other (for the further 10%).

CLS Holdings Plc         Re-elect Anna Seeley as Director
                         We have consistently voted against Anna Seeley's election for a number of years. Whilst
                         the Board composition has improved in recent years it remains below market practice.
                         Given that she is not independent (the daughter of the founder) and we question the
                         contribution she makes, we voted against her re-election.

Eurofins Scientific SE   Approve the Remuneration Report
                         Our primary concern centred on disclosure. No detail of required performance, or actual
                         performance achieved had been provided. We were therefore unable to ascertain
                         whether targets were challenging and satisfy ourselves that there was a link between pay
                         and performance. Furthermore, no detail of grants made during the year has been
                         provided. Furthermore, the LTI provides for three types of award, one of which does not
                         require the achievement of pre-determined performance targets upon vesting.

                         Increase the Authorised Share Capital and Amend the Articles of Association
                         Approval was sought to increase the authorised share capital from EUR 2,500,000 to EUR
                         3,500,000. However, it is proposed that the entire increased authority be available for
                         issue (for a period of five years) on a non pre-emptive basis. This would significantly
                         exceed the amount that we tolerate for overseas company, and would be potentially too
                         dilutive to our interests.
Proxy voting report
                             Quarter 2 2021

                    Approve the Creation of Class C Beneficiary Units and Amend the Articles of Association
                    The Company had circa 64.5 million Class A Shares, and 63.5 million B Loyalty Shares. It
                    was proposed to create Class C shares that may be allocated to any holder of a fully paid
                    up share. To be eligible to receive class C Shares, holders of fully paid up shares must have
                    held for two years. The holding of the various classes of shares can be cumulated
                    therefore deviating from the one-share, one vote principle. Given that additional rights
                    would be disproportionate to initial capital outlay, we voted against the creation.

RELX Plc            Approve the Remuneration Report
                    Our concern centred on the operation of the annual bonus plan in 2020, and in particular
                    the discretion exercised by the Remuneration Committee in response to covid. Given the
                    likely affect upon the events business, it was decided to exclude this from the calculation
                    of group financials for the year. As a consequence, a bonus was paid equal to
                    approximately 70% of the maximum available. Had the business not been excluded, no
                    bonus would have become payable. Such an approach did not align with the wider
                    stakeholder experience.

Amplifon SpA        Appoint Internal Statutory Auditors – Against/For
                    Under the voto di lista system, various slates of internal auditors are proposed, for which
                    shareholders may only vote for one. We voted in favour of Slate 2 which had been
                    submitted by institutional investors and was best positioned to represent our views. We
                    voted against the other slate which was submitted by Ampliter Srl, a 42% shareholder.

                    Approve the Remuneration Policy
                    Our main issue concerns the ongoing provision for the payment of discretionary bonuses
                    in addition to the normal bonus plan.

                    Approve the Second Section of the Remuneration Report
                    Discretion had been used (in respect of the period under review) and an additional bonus
                    equal to EUR 2 million paid to the CEO. This was to reflect the increase in shareholder
                    value between 2017 and 2019. We strongly oppose such payments since a well structured
                    remuneration package should adequately incentivise and reward individuals. Other areas,
                    including a lack of sufficient disclosure of performance targets attached to the normal
                    bonus and the LTIP, also cause concern.

                    Authorise Share Repurchase Program and Reissuance of Repurchased Shares
                    The Company was seeking an authority to purchase back up to 20% of the issued share
                    capital. Whilst 20% is in accordance with the maximum permitted under Italian Law, it
                    exceeded amounts that investors normally tolerate, since dividends or greater levels of
                    investment are often the preferred use of excess capital.

UOL Group Limited   Approve the Grant of Options and Issuance of Shares Under the UOL 2012 Share Option
                    Scheme
                    The Company was seeking shareholder approval on an annual basis for the following
                    year’s share option grant. However, the Company had not disclosed the performance
                    targets (if any) that govern exercise, and provides no information regarding vesting
                    periods. Given this lack of sufficient information, we voted against.

                    Approve the Issuance of Equity or Equity-Linked Securities with or without Preemptive
                    Rights
                    The Company was seeking an authority to allot up to 20% of its issued share capital on a
                    non pre-emptive basis. This exceeded the amount that we normally tolerate for overseas
Proxy voting report
                                    Quarter 2 2021

                           companies as it is too dilutive to our interests. Our concern is exacerbated since the shares
                           currently trade at a significant discount to NAV, and no assurance of any issuance price
                           (relative to NAV) had been provided.

Atlas Copco AB             Reelect Staffan Bohman as Director
                           Staffan Bohman is a member of the four person Audit Committee. Having served the
                           Board for 18 years, we do not consider him to be independent and accordingly should not
                           be a member of a committee which should be fully independent.

                           Reelect Johan Forssell as Director
                           Johan Forsell was not independent by virtue of being a shareholder representative of
                           Investor AB. He was also a member of the Audit Committee which should be entirely
                           independent. Investor AB had three representatives on the Board which was
                           disproportionate to their shareholding.

                           Reelect Hans Straaberg as Director
                           Hans Straaberg was not independent by virtue of being a shareholder representative of
                           Investor AB. He was also a member of the Audit Committee which should be entirely
                           independent. Investor AB had three representatives on the Board which was
                           disproportionate to their shareholding.

                           Reelect Hans Straaberg as Board Chairman
                           As above.

                           Approve the Remuneration Report
                           Our concern centred on the discretionary bonus paid to the CEO in recognition of his
                           efforts during the year. This as inappropriate since the company had received government
                           funding to pay employee salaries. A significant salary increase had also been
                           implemented. The decisions made by the Remuneration Committee did not reflect the
                           wider stakeholder experience.

Wihlborgs Fastigheter AB   Re-elect Helen Olausson as Director
                           Our concern centred on the composition of the Audit Committee which included Helen
                           Olausson who had been on the Board for 14 years. We would therefore question her
                           independence particularly since her entire tenure has overlapped with the Executive
                           Chairman. Having previously abstained on her election, we voted against this year.

                           Re-elect Johan Qviberg as Director
                           Our concern centred on the composition of the Audit Committee which included Johan
                           Qvlberg who had been on the Board for 17 years. We would therefore question his
                           independence particularly since his entire tenure has overlapped with the Executive
                           Chairman. Having previously abstained on his election, we voted against this year.

British American Tobacco   Approve the Remuneration Report
Plc                        We have long been concerned at the extremely high bonus payments that are consistently
                           paid under the annual bonus plan. Despite these payments, TSR continues to lag both the
                           tobacco sector and the wider market. There appears a disconnect between pay and
                           performance. We were also concerned at the benefits package for the CEO which stands
                           out amongst his peers.

                           Re-elect Dimitri Panayotopoulos as Director
Proxy voting report
                                    Quarter 2 2021

                           As Chairman of the Remuneration Committee, he had been aware of our concerns for a
                           number of years but failed to address them.

Epiroc AB                  Reelect Ronnie Leten as Director
                           Our concern centres on the Chairman’s membership of the Audit Committee. Ronnie
                           Leten previously served as President and CEO of Atlas Copco until 2017, from which Epiroc
                           demerged in 2018. He is also one of two shareholder representatives on the Board of
                           Investor AB which controls 17.12% of the company stock and 22.74% of the voting power.
                           Since he was clearly not independent, we did not consider his membership of the Audit
                           Committee to be appropriate – there was sufficient financial expertise and experience
                           elsewhere on the committee.

FDM Group (Holdings) Plc   Approve the Remuneration Report
                           Our concern centred on the treatment of 2020 annual bonuses. The original targets were
                           set in March and based upon the 2020 budget, which was set towards the end of 2019. At
                           the end of the year, the Remuneration Committee exercised discretion and awarded
                           executive directors bonuses which were in line with the average bonus paid to
                           "bonusable" staff (70% of the maximum), despite not meeting the original targets. We are
                           fundamentally opposed to companies paying bonuses when original targets are not met.
                           Our concern here was exacerbated since executive directors are major shareholders.
                           There were consequently no retention or motivational issues.

Intesa Sanpaulo SpA        Approve the Second Section of the Remuneration Report
                           Following the onset of covid, targets attached to the annual bonus plan were revised.
                           Whilst the size of the bonus pool was reduced, executive directors have nevertheless
                           received sizeable bonuses in a year in which had the targets not been changed, no bonus
                           would have been paid. We are strongly opposed to changes to inflight arrangements.

                           Amend the POP Long-Term Incentive Plan
                           Approval was sought to amend the LTIP, approved in 2018, under which call options vest
                           based upon the achievement of performance targets measured between 2018 and 2021.
                           Given the exceptional events of the past year, the Board did not consider it likely that the
                           option would be in the money and was proposing to amend the plan by lowering the
                           strike price from its current value to its pre-covid level of EUR 2.5455, and to delay by one
                           year the 12 month period over which the exercise price is calculated. At the beginning of
                           the covid pandemic, the European Central Bank requested that banks not pay dividends in
                           respect of either 2019 or 2020. The Company considered that this had had a negative
                           effect upon its share price and was making these amendments in an effort to neutralise
                           this. Whilst we had some sympathy with the company’s situation, we are strongly
                           opposed to amending grants retrospectively.

Royal Unibrew A/S          Allow Shareholder Meetings to be held by Electronic Means Only
                           Approval was sought for shareholder meetings to be held as virtual-only events. Whilst
                           there are benefits to being able to attend meetings by electronic means, virtual-only
                           meetings may hinder exchanges between management and shareholders.

Schneider Electric SE      Approve Compensation of Jean-Pascal Tricoire, Chairman & CEO
                           Our concern centred on the discretion exercised by the Remuneration Committee in
                           respect of the operation of the annual bonus plan. Despite beating revised guidance which
Proxy voting report
                                    Quarter 2 2021

                           was issued in July, the original targets set in February were not met. As a result, a bonus
                           marginally below target was paid. Whilst we acknowledge that the company has
                           performed well in challenging circumstances, we are strongly opposed to inflight changes.

                           Approve the Remuneration Policy of the Chairman & CEO
                           We continue to be concerned at the operation of the LTIP, and in particular the way in
                           which individual performance measures are treated. Under the TSR measures,
                           outperformance can be offset against underperformance of other measures. This is not an
                           approach we favour as all performance targets should be measured independently of each
                           other.

Telenet Group Holding NV   Approve the Remuneration Report and policy
                           Our concern centred primarily on the structure of the annual bonus plan. Whilst the actual
                           targets were not disclosed, the company stated that bonuses begin to accrue for achieving
                           10% of target. This is significantly below other companies resulting in a very real risk of
                           reward for failure. The majority of LTI awards were not subject to performance thereby
                           exacerbating our concerns.

                           Approve Change of Control Clause Re: Performance Shares, Share Options, and
                           Restricted Share Plans
                           Approval was sought for the change of control clause to be included within the various
                           grants made under share plans in 2020. The Company was requesting that in the event of
                           a takeover, all outstanding awards automatically vest. Given the absence of any
                           performance targets governing the majority of awards, participants will immediately
                           benefit from any takeover premium. This risks reward for failure.

Glencore Plc               Approval of the Incentive Plan
                           The Company was proposing to move away from a conventional LTIP to a Restricted Share
                           Plan under which annual grants of shares with no requirement for the achievement of pre-
                           determined performance targets would be made. We are generally against these plans,
                           but may occasionally approve them should the discount (to reflect the increased expected
                           value) be sufficient and if the company has made a compelling reason. In this case neither
                           had been made. Indeed, the annual grant was being increased from 200% to 250% of
                           salary.

                           Approval of the Remuneration Policy
                           We voted against the policy since it formalised the incentive plan which we fundamentally
                           opposed.

Hexagon AB                 Reelect Sofia Schorling Hogberg as Director
                           The three person Audit Committee is chaired by the Company Chairman, Gun Nilsson, who
                           is a shareholder representative of Melker Schorling which controls circa 23% of the shares
                           and 44% of the voting power. Sofia Schorling Hogberg is also a shareholder representative
                           of Meiker Schorling. Despite previously expressing our concern, the composition of the
                           Audit Committee remains unchanged. Having a majority of the committee being
                           shareholder representatives is a serious concern. We therefore voted against the two non-
                           independent members, and Gun Nillson in his role as Company Chairman.

                           Reelect Gun Nilsson as Director
                           The three person Audit Committee is chaired by the Company Chairman, Gun Nilsson, who
                           is a shareholder representative of Melker Schorling which controls circa 23% of the shares
                           and 44% of the voting power. Sofia Schorling Hogberg is also a shareholder representative
Proxy voting report
                               Quarter 2 2021

                     of Meiker Schorling. Despite previously expressing our concern, the composition of the
                     Audit Committee remains unchanged. Having a majority of the committee being
                     shareholder representatives is a serious concern. We therefore voted against the two non-
                     independent members, and Gun Nillson in his role as Company Chairman.

                     Reelect Gun Nilsson as Board Chairman
                     The three person Audit Committee is chaired by the Company Chairman, Gun Nilsson, who
                     is a shareholder representative of Melker Schorling which controls circa 23% of the shares
                     and 44% of the voting power. Sofia Schorling Hogberg is also a shareholder representative
                     of Meiker Schorling. Despite previously expressing our concern, the composition of the
                     Audit Committee remains unchanged. Having a majority of the committee being
                     shareholder representatives is a serious concern. We therefore voted against the two non-
                     independent members, and Gun Nillson in his role as Company Chairman.

                     Approve the Performance Share Plan for Key Employees
                     Approval was sought for a PSP designed for the benefit of key employees, including
                     executive directors. However, the company had failed to disclose any detail of required
                     performance (or indeed if any was required), or target and maximum award levels.
                     Without such key information, we were unable to support.

Synthomer Plc        Re-elect Alex Catto as Director
                     We have consistently voted against the election of Alex Catto for a number of years. He
                     has been on the Board for 40 years, is clearly not independent (as acknowledged by the
                     Company), and we struggle to see the benefit he brings. Whilst the shareholding he
                     represents has been maintained at 2.04% over the past year, it is not of a sufficient size to
                     justify an ongoing board position.

The Weir Group Plc   Approve the Remuneration Report
                     The Remuneration Committee had exercised discretion on the vesting of the 2018
                     restricted share award and reduced the award by 5%. Given that the dividend underpin
                     had not been met (one of four underpins), we did not consider this reduction to be
                     sufficient. Our concern was exacerbated since the company made a full grant in 2020
                     despite a significant fall in share price.

                     Approve the Remuneration Policy
                     The policy new the restricted share scheme which we are fundamentally opposed to.

                     Re-Elect Clare Chapman as Director
                     As chair of the remuneration committee, she has been aware of our concerns for a
                     number of years, yet failed to address them. Having abstained on her re-election last year,
                     we escalated our voting this time.

Zur Rose Group AG    Transact Other Business (Voting)
                     Since no information had been provided, we were unable to make a considered vote.

Votes abstained
Company              Details
Proxy voting report
                                     Quarter 2 2021

Koninklijke Ahold Delhaize Approve the Remuneration Report
NV                         Our primary concern was the vesting schedule under the LTIP. 60% of the award vests for
                           average/target levels of performance. This does not encourage outstanding performance.
                           Our concern was exacerbated since disclosure of performance targets, both under the
                           LTIP and the annual bonus pland, was poor. Since it was our first time voting, we
                           abstained.

Eiffage SA                  Reelect Dominique Marcel as Director
                            The Audit Committee comprised of four members, of whom two were standing for re-
                            election this year. Of the two, Dominique Marcel had been on the Board for 12 years and
                            therefore we did not consider him to be independent. Indeed, the company
                            acknowledged that his independence has been compromised on the grounds of tenure.
                            Given our preference for a fully independent committee, we abstained on his re-election
                            (it was our first time voting).

Sthree Plc                  Re-elect Anne Fahy as Director
                            Our concern centred on her previous role as Chair of the Audit Committee at Interserve
                            Plc, which fell into administration in early 2019. Anne was appointed to the Board of
                            Interserve in 2013 and chaired the Audit Committee for a number of years. Given her role
                            as Audit Committee Chair at SThree and whilst the investigation into the financial
                            statements (by the FRC) covering years 2015-2017 remained ongoing, we abstained on her
                            re-election.

MRV Engenharia e            In case there is any change to the Board slate composition, may your votes still be
Participacoes SA            counted for the proposed slate
                            No changes have been proposed at the time of voting. We were therefore unable to
                            support a request to approve unknown changes which could negatively affect the board
                            composition.

                            Resolution 6 – which asks if cumulative voting is used would we like our votes to be cast
                            equally and resolution 7.1-7.7 which is the allocation of our votes between the director
                            nominations
                            We have a strong belief in the principle of one share, one vote. We therefore would not
                            want to participate in cumulative voting.

American Campus             Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Officers' Compensation
Communities, Inc            Since we last voted, there had been an improvement in the structure of compensation.
                            However, whilst 50% of the Long-Term award vested dependent upon performance, it was
                            measured over a one year period. The award is simply an extension of the annual bonus
                            plan and does not promote sustained long-term performance.

Lancashire Holdings Ltd     Approve the Remuneration Report
                            Our primary concern centred on the structure of LTIP, the majority of which vested upon
                            performance measured over three separate one year periods. This did not align with our
                            long term interests. Furthermore, the targets simply replicated the exact targets under the
                            annual bonus plan. Participants were therefore being rewarded for the same performance
                            twice. Since it was our first time voting we abstained.
Proxy voting report
                                      Quarter 2 2021

London Stock Exchange       Approve the Remuneration Report
Group Plc                   Whilst the EPS targets attached to this measure under the PSP have been strengthened
                            reflecting the acquisition of Refinitiv, they remain significantly below market expectations.
                            There is therefore risk of pay versus performance disconnect, and of of significant reward
                            for failing to meet market expectations. The CEO has also received a 25% salary increase
                            following the acquisition. We would expect an increase of this magnitude to be phased
                            over a number of years and subject to the successful integration of the acquisition.

ASML Holding NV             Approve the Remuneration Report
                            We were concerned about both the vesting schedule of historic awards which rewarded
                            underperformance, and the absence of sufficient information regarding performance
                            targets governing the vesting of variable forms of remuneration. Without such
                            information, we are unable to satisfy ourselves that there is an appropriate link between
                            pay and performance.

                            Approve Amendments to the Remuneration Policy for Management Board Members
                            The Company was seeking to increase the individual limit capping annual awards under
                            LTIP. Whilst the increase was not significant, we were concerned with the vesting schedule
                            which rewarded under performance. The proposed increase served only to exacerbate our
                            concern.

Votes against & abstentions
Company                     Details
Zurich Insurance Group AG Approve the Remuneration Report – Abstain
                          Our primary concern centred on the vesting schedule attached to the Long-Term Incentive
                          Plan. Vesting of awards was split equally between 3-year average ROE, cumulative cash
                          remittance and relative TSR. Our particular concern related to the proportion of award
                          that vests for achieving median levels of TSR relative performance (100% of target award),
                          and performance at the third quartile (below median - 50% of target award). Whilst this
                          was not an issue since the company had been performing well, it could lead to significant
                          reward in periods of underperformance.

                            Transact Other Business – Against
                            This is a resolution enabling voting on issues raised at the AGM. However, since there was
                            no information provided at the time of voting, we were unable to support it.

Santos Limited              Approve the Amendments to the Company's Constitution to Insert New Clause 32A –
                            Against
                            This was a requisitioned resolution under which the proponent was seeking to amend the
                            Articles by inserting a new clause 32A which would allow shareholders to place resolutions
                            for consideration on the agenda of a shareholder meeting if they relate to a material risk.
                            Whilst the resolution had some merit, as structured the definition of “material risk” was
                            too broad and may significantly increase the administrative burden of the Board. No
                            guidance had been provided by the proponent detailing the threshold that was needed to
                            trigger an issue of material relevance. The company has numerous engagement and
                            consultation routes available to shareholders to express opinions. We voted against the
                            proposal which was in line with management recommendations.
Proxy voting report
                              Quarter 2 2021

                     Approve Capital Protection – Abstain
                     This was a requisitioned resolution under which the proponent was requesting that the
                     company disclose information showing how it will facilitate the efficient managing down
                     of oil and gas operations and assets. The Company had put forward reasons as to the
                     current and future demand for its existing products and is well placed to pursue global
                     demand for low-carbon gases. The Company was focused on its future as a clean fuels
                     company producing zero-emissions LNG, hydrogen and other clean capture and storage. It
                     had also been taking appropriate steps to keep the market and shareholders informed of
                     its operations, projects and how the business is dealing with the impacts of climate change
                     on product demand. Whilst we did not agree with the proponents request that the
                     company provide annual reporting, we felt that the issue is important and the company
                     should give it further thought. We therefore abstained.

Sika AG              Reelect Christoph Tobler as Director – Against
                     The three person committee includes Christoph Tobler who had been on the Board for 16
                     years and we therefore did not consider him to be independent. The appropriateness of
                     his continued membership was further questioned since he was not considered to be a
                     financial expert. Given that there is sufficient experience and financial expertise elsewhere
                     on the committee, we voted against his re-election.

                     Appoint Justin Howell as Member of the Nomination and Compensation Committee –
                     Abstain
                     We also abstained on the re-election of Justin Howell. He Chairs the Remuneration
                     Committee and has been aware of our concerns for some time yet failed to address them.

                     Approve the Remuneration Report – Against
                     The structure of the LTIP continued to cause concern. Vesting of awards was split equally
                     between ROCE and relative TSR, both of which were measured over a three year period.
                     Under the TSR measure, 50% of the award vests for performance at the third quartile,
                     100% at the median, and 150% for achieving a top ranking. Having such a structure
                     (rewarding underperformance) does not incentivize outstanding performance, and can
                     result in a pay versus performance disconnect in future.

                     Transact Other Business – Against
                     Since no information had been provided, we were unable to make a considered voting
                     decision. We therefore voted against.

Teleperformance SE   Approve Compensation of Daniel Julien, Chairman & CEO – Against
                     Our primary concern centred on the decision to amend the performance targets attached
                     to both the annual bonus and the 2020 annual LTIP grant in the light of the covid
                     outbreak. As a result of reducing the targets, the annual bonus was paid in full in respect
                     of 2020. This did not reflect the experience of all stakeholders, particularly a proportion of
                     employees that were made redundant.

                     Approve Compensation of Olivier Rigaudy, Vice CEO – Against
                     Our primary concern centred on the decision to amend the performance targets attached
                     to both the annual bonus and the 2020 annual LTIP grant in the light of the covid
                     outbreak. As a result of reducing the targets, the annual bonus was paid in full in respect
                     of 2020. This did not reflect the experience of all stakeholders, particularly a proportion of
                     employees that were made redundant.

                     Approve the Remuneration Policy of the Chairman & CEO – Against
Proxy voting report
                                    Quarter 2 2021

                           Approval was sought for the approval of the remuneration policy for the two executive
                           directors for the next year. Whilst there were no changes proposed to the existing policy,
                           it was clear that the quantum available had not been matched by a sufficient stretch of
                           required performance.

                           Approve the Remuneration Policy of the Vice CEO – Against
                           Approval was sought for the approval of the remuneration policy for the two executive
                           directors for the next year. Whilst there were no changes proposed to the existing policy,
                           it was clear that the quantum available hads not been matched by a sufficient stretch of
                           required performance.

                           Re-elect Alain Boulet as Director - Abstain
                           Our concern centred on his membership of the Audit Committee. The Committee
                           comprises of three Non-Executives, all of whom are deemed to be financially literate.
                           However, Alain Boulet (Committee Chairman) had served the Board for 9 years, and
                           therefore we considered that his independence had now been compromised. Whilst we
                           have no objections to his continued board membership, we did not consider it appropriate
                           for him to sit on the Audit Committee.

                           Re-elect Stephen Winningham as Director – Abstain
                           Our concern centred on his membership of the Audit Committee. The Committee
                           comprises of three Non-Executives, all of whom were deemed to be financially literate.
                           However, Stephen Winningham had served the Board for 10 years, and therefore we
                           considered that his independence had now been compromised. Whilst we had no
                           objections to his continued board membership, we did not consider it appropriate for him
                           to sit on the Audit Committee.

Hikma Pharmaceuticals Plc Re-elect Dr Pamela Kirby as Director - Abstain
                          As Chair of the Remuneration Committee, she had been aware of our concerns regarding
                          the structure of remuneration for a number of years, yet had failed to address them.

                           Approval of the Remuneration Report – Against
                           Our concerns centres on the operation of the Executive Incentive Plan, which provides
                           significant reward for performance measured over a one year period. Furthermore,
                           threshold performance, which triggers 25% vesting, is consistently set below the previous
                           year's outcome. There is potential for significant reward for relatively poor performance.

Umicore                    Approve the Remuneration Report – Against
                           Our concern centres on the provision for the CEO to receive an annual option over
                           140,000 shares. Whilst the value of the grant fluctuates according to the prevailing market
                           price, there is no requirement for subsequent performance targets to be met. Our
                           opposition to this method of incentivization centres on the influence that external factors
                           beyond the control of management can have on a company’s share price, thereby risking
                           underserved reward.

                           Reelect Thomas Leysen as a Member of the Supervisory Board – Abstain
                           We abstained on the Chairman of the Remuneration Committee. He had been aware of
                           our concerns regarding remuneration for a number of years and had failed to address
                           them.
Proxy voting report
                                       Quarter 2 2021

May
Votes against
Company                      Details
Planet Fitness, Inc          Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Officers' Compensation
                             Our primary concern centred on the structure of Long-Term Incentives. Only 30% of the
                             award was subject to pre-determined performance targets. To ensure that there is a
                             reasonable link between pay and performance, we expect at least 50% of the award to be
                             subject to fully disclosed performance targets measured over a period of three years. With
                             regard to disclosure, vesting (of the performance related element) was dependent upon
                             three year adjusted EBITDA and upon three year store sales. The actual targets, though,
                             had not been disclosed so we were unable to assess their challenge. Given that the
                             structure remains unchanged and there was a very real risk of significant remuneration in
                             periods of underperformance, we voted against.

Atlantica Sustainable        Authorise the Issue of Equity without Pre-emptive Rights (Additional Authority)
Infrastructure Plc           Approval was sought to allot up to 20% of the issued share capital on a non pre-emptive
                             basis. The authorities were being sought under two separate resolutions – each seeking
                             10%. The Company was incorporated in the UK but listed on NASDAQ. When considering it
                             as an overseas company, the amount being sought significantly exceeded the amount we
                             consider to be acceptable. No specific purpose had been stated for the amount being
                             sought, other than to generally provide additional flexibility to pursue strategic
                             transactions and to finance growth with equity. Since the aggregate amount was
                             considered to dilutive to our interests, we voted against the additional authority (for 10%).

Allianz SE                   Approve Discharge of the Supervisory Board for Fiscal Year 2020
                             The five person committee included the Chairman, Michael Diekmann, who was formerly
                             the Chief Executive, and two employee representatives. In addition to being a member of
                             the audit committee, it should also be noted that Michael Diekmann chaired all the other
                             three key sub-committees (remuneration, nomination and governance). Since none of the
                             directors were standing for re-election this year, as last year, we voted against the
                             discharge for the supervisory board.

Barclays Plc                 Approve Market Forces Requisitioned Resolution
                             Filed by a group of retail shareholders coordinated by Market Forces, an Australian non-
                             governmental campaign group, requesting the Company to set short, medium and long-
                             term targets and to phase out the provision of financial services to fossil fuel projects and
                             companies, following a timeline aligned with the Paris Agreement. The shareholder
                             resolution has been co-filed by a coalition of retail investors. The strategy seemed very
                             clear, was measurable and will be reported on annually. Furthermore, they were using a
                             transparent methodology to enable shareholders as well as other stakeholders to monitor
                             the progress. Consequently, it was not appropriate to support a shareholder resolution to
                             change a strategy that has only just been introduced, furthermore, the company has
                             already committed to clear disclosure surrounding their strategy.

First Industrial Realty Trust, Elect Director John Rau
Inc                            We last reviewed the governance of the Company in 2018, and raised concerns regarding
                               the composition of the Audit Committee and, in particular, the membership of John Rau.
                               He had served 23 years and was not deemed to be financially qualified. Given our
Proxy voting report
                                Quarter 2 2021

                       preference for the committee to be entirely independent, we abstained on his re-election.
                       Upon review this year, John Rau continued to be a member having now served 26 years.
                       We voted against his re-election since there was sufficient experience and skill sets
                       elsewhere on the committee.

BAE Systems Plc        Approve the Remuneration Report
                       Whilst making progress last year, the Company reverted in 2020 to setting a range for the
                       EPS measure under the annual bonus plan which was less than the outcome of the
                       previous year. Bonus pay-outs, as a result, continue to be extremely high which is in stark
                       contrast to long-term shareholder returns. Of further concern was the vesting of the CEO's
                       LTIP award. For retention purposes, the award, which was due to vest at approximately
                       35% was allowed to vest in full, subject to continued employment until 2023. We do not
                       believe in retention payments since rarely achieve their purpose and can simply be bought
                       out by the new employer.

Lonza Group AG         Transact Other Business
                       Since no information had been provided at this time, we were unable to make a
                       considered vote.

Rio Tinto Limited      Approve the Remuneration Report for UK Law Purposes
                       Our major concern centred on the decision to treat the departing executives (who left in
                       response to the Juukan Gorge Rock Shelters destruction, as good leavers. The Company
                       argued that, whilst fully recognising the gravity of destruction, it was mindful that the
                       individuals did not deliberately cause the events, did not do anything unlawful, or engage
                       in fraudulent or dishonest behaviour. Whilst there may have been legal ramifications
                       should they have been treated as bad leavers, the destruction of the rock shelters has
                       done serious reputational damage to the company. It is questionable whether it was
                       appropriate for good leaver status to be granted. Accordingly, we voted against.

                       Approve the Remuneration Report for Australian Law Purposes
                       Our major concern centred on the decision to treat the departing executives (who left in
                       response to the Juukan Gorge Rock Shelters destruction, as good leavers. The Company
                       argued that, whilst fully recognising the gravity of destruction, it was mindful that the
                       individuals did not deliberately cause the events, did not do anything unlawful, or engage
                       in fraudulent or dishonest behaviour. Whilst there may have been legal ramifications
                       should they have been treated as bad leavers, the destruction of the rock shelters has
                       done serious reputational damage to the company. It is questionable whether it was
                       appropriate for good leaver status to be granted. Accordingly, we voted against.

ANTA Sports Products   Authorise Reissuance of Repurchased Shares
Limited                The Company was seeking to reissue repurchased shares for an amount up to 10% of the
                       issued share capital. This amount was in addition to the general authority to allot shares
                       on a non pre-emptive basis. The aggregated amount was excessive and could potentially
                       be too dilutive to our interests.

Teradyne, Inc          Elect Director Edwin Gillis
                       Despite previously expressing our concerns to the company, Edwin Gillis and Paul Tufano
                       continue to be members of the Audit Committee. Having served 15 years and 16 years
                       respectively, we do not consider them to be independent on grounds of tenure. Given our
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                                 Quarter 2 2021

                        strong preference for the committee to be entirely independent, we voted against their
                        re-elections.

                        Elect Director Paul Tufano
                        Despite previously expressing our concerns to the company, Edwin Gillis and Paul Tufano
                        continue to be members of the Audit Committee. Having served 15 years and 16 years
                        respectively, we do not consider them to be independent on grounds of tenure. Given our
                        strong preference for the committee to be entirely independent, we voted against their
                        re-elections.

Astrazeneca Plc         Approve the Remuneration Policy
                        We voted against the policy since it facilitated the increased PSP awards. The annual
                        bonus potential was also being increased, but within the already approved maximum.

                        Amend the Performance Share Plan
                        The Company was seeking approval to increase the annual grant size from 550% to 650%
                        of salary. We did not consider this to be appropriate since the cap had only recently been
                        increased, and as currently positioned was well aligned with GSK.

Ascential Plc           Approve the Remuneration Policy
                        The Company was proposing to replace its conventional LTIP with a one-off grant of ten
                        times salary for the CEO, and 8.75 times for the FD. 60% of the grant was not subject to
                        performance, with initial vesting starting immediately. The plan breached established best
                        practice on a number of fronts.

                        Approve the Ten-Year Equity Plan
                        We voted against the policy since it facilitates the operation of the Ten-Year Equity Plan.

Rentokil Initial Plc    Approve the Remuneration Policy
                        We voted against the policy since it facilitated the increased grant levels under the PSP.

                        Amend the Performance Share Plan
                        Approval was sought to increase the anual grant size from 250% to 375% of salary. Whilst
                        the company has been a good performer and the management team is well respected, we
                        did not consider it an appropriate time to be significantly increasing variable pay. The
                        proposed increase follows several years of remuneration creep.

St. James’s Place Plc   Approve the Remuneration Report
                        We continue to be concerned at the EPS targets attached to the LTIP which are not
                        reflective of external broker forecasts. There is a significant risk of reward for perceive
                        poor performance in future.
Proxy voting report
                                  Quarter 2 2021

Royal Dutch Shell Plc    Approve the Shell Energy Transition Plan - Against
                         Shell had voluntarily committed to put forward an advisory vote on their climate transition
                         strategy. The Company will offer shareholders an advisory vote on their energy transition
                         strategy on a triennial basis, as well as an annual advisory vote thereafter on progress in
                         executing the strategy. Whilst welcoming the decision by Shell to submit its transition
                         plan, we voted against since absolute targets had not been provided, and there was a
                         reliance on nature-based solutions and CCS.

                         Request Shell to Set and Publish Targets for Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions – For
                         This was a requisitioned resolution (by Follow This) requesting Shell to set and publish
                         GHG emission targets that are consistent with the goal of the Paris Climate Agreement (to
                         limit global warming to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to
                         limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C). The quantitative targets should cover the short,
                         medium, and long term greenhouse gas emissions of the Company’s operations and the
                         use of its energy products (Scope 1, 2 and 3). The Company should report on the strategy
                         and underlying policies for reaching these targets and on the progress made, at least on
                         an annual basis. We voted in favour (against management recommendations) and
                         requested that the company detail where it is not Paris-Aligned in its climate strategy.

BOKU, Inc                Approval of the Remuneration Report
                         Our concern centred on the PSP awards granted to Executive Directors during 2020. These
                         were granted in two tranches, with a total value equal to approximately 130% of salary
                         and 120% of salary for the CEO and FD respectively. However, only 50% of the award was
                         subject to the achievement of pre-determined performance targets (adjusted EBITDA). It
                         was proposed that the 2021 grant be made on similar terms. The absence of performance
                         targets determining vesting is a fundamental breach of established best practice, and does
                         not align with a well-structured remuneration package designed to deliver shareholder
                         value.

Burlington Stores, Inc   Report on Pay Disparity
                         This was a requisitioned resolution requesting that consideration of salary ranges of all
                         employee classification be considered when setting target CEO compensation. However, it
                         was unclear how a report would provide any meaningful information beyond what is
                         currently provided within its compensation report. We voted against with management
                         recommendations.

Nexity SA                Approve Compensation of Julien Carmona, Vice-CEO
                         In response to Covid, the Company had amended the 2020 annual bonus targets. As a
                         result, the bonus paid out at 71% of max, despite failing to meet the previous year's
                         performance. We strongly oppose changes to inflight awards.

Gentherm, Inc            Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Officers' Compensation
                         We opposed the amendments made mid-year to the annual bonus in response to Covid.
Proxy voting report
                                    Quarter 2 2021

Kilroy Realty Corporation   Elect Director Edward Brennan
                            Edward Brennan had been on the Board for 17 years. We consider this length of tenure
                            compromises his independence, and accordingly he should not be a member of a
                            committee which should be entirely independent. There are several other fully
                            independent Non-Executives who could be appointed to the committee in his place. As
                            last year, we voted against his re-election.

                            Elect Director Scott Ingraham
                            Scott Ingraham had been on the Board for 13 years. We consider this length of tenure
                            compromises his independence, and accordingly he should not be a member of a
                            committee which should be entirely independent. There are several other fully
                            independent Non-Executives who could be appointed to the committee in his place. As
                            last year, we voted against his re-election.

                            Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Officers' Compensation
                            Whilst making improvements to certain aspect of NEO service agreements, the Company
                            had failed to address the severance payment (US$36 million) which could be paid to the
                            CEO. This is deemed to be too excessive and is equal to over 900% of salary and target
                            bonus.

Republic Services, Inc      Report on Integrating ESG Metrics into Executive Compensation Program
                            This was a requisitioned resolution requesting that the Board consider incorporating ESG
                            metrics into its compensation programs. We voted against the proposal (in line with
                            management recommendations) since the company currently manages its ESG risks well,
                            has good disclosures and had set measurable targets.

Times China Holdings        Approve the Issuance of Equity or Equity-Linked Securities without Premptive Rights
Limited                     The Company was seeking an authority to purchase back up to 20% of its issued share
                            capital on a non pre-emptive basis. A further 10% was sought in relation to the issue of
                            repurchased shares. This significantly exceeded the amount that we normally tolerate for
                            overseas companies as it is too dilutive to our interests. Our concern was exacerbated
                            since a maximum discount (to the prevailing market price) at which shares would be
                            issued has not been disclosed.

                            Authorise the Reissuance of Repurchased Shares
                            The Company was seeking an authority to purchase back up to 20% of its issued share
                            capital on a non pre-emptive basis. A further 10% was sought in relation to the issue of
                            repurchased shares. This significantly exceeded the amount that we normally tolerate for
                            overseas companies as it is too dilutive to our interests. Our concern was exacerbated
                            since a maximum discount (to the prevailing market price) at which shares would be
                            issued has not been disclosed.

Shandong Weigao Group   Approve the Issuance of Equity or Equity-Linked Securities without Preemptive Rights
Medical Polymer Company for H Shares
Limited                 As in previous years, the Company was seeking an issuance request to allot up to 20% of
                        the issued share capital on a non pre-emptive basis. This exceeded the 10% limit that we
                        tolerate for overseas companies. Our concern was exacerbated since the Company did not
                        provide a maximum discount to the market price at which shares may be issued. Given the
                        potential dilution, and consistent with previous years, we voted against.
Proxy voting report
                                      Quarter 2 2021

A-Living Smart City Services Approve the Issuance of Equity or Equity-Linked Securities without Preemptive Rights
Co Ltd                       for Domestic Shares/Unlisted Foreign Shares/H Shares
                             As in previous years, the Company was seeking an authority to allot up to 20% of its H
                             Shares on a non pre-emptive basis. This exceeded the 10% limit that we consider to be
                             acceptable for overseas companies and is potentially too dilutive to our interests. Our
                             concern was exacerbated since there was no stated maximum discount to the prevailing
                             market price that the shares may be issued at.

Perficient, Inc              Elect Director Ralph Derrickson
                             The three-person committee included Ralph Derrickson who had served the Board for 16
                             years. We did not consider him to be independent based on tenure, and should not,
                             therefore, be a member of a committee which should be entirely independent.

                             Elect Director David Lundeen
                             The three person committee included David Lundeen who had served the Board for 23
                             years. We did not consider him to be independent based on tenure, and should not,
                             therefore, be a member of a committee which should be entirely independent.

                             Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Officers' Compensation
                             Grants of long-term incentive awards continue to vest entirely based upon tenure alone
                             with vesting in equal tranches starting on the first anniversary. As a minimum, we expect
                             at least 50% of grants to be subject to challenging performance targets which are
                             measured over three years. As currently structured, significant reward could be realised
                             for factors outside of management control and could result in a pay versus performance
                             disconnect.

Illumina, Inc                Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Officers' Compensation
                             The Company had amended both the operation of the annual bonus plan and the EPS
                             targets attached to all outstanding LTI awards. Given the deteriorating financials, a pay
                             versus performance disconnect existed.
Proxy voting report
                                     Quarter 2 2021

Hong Kong Ferry Holdings    Elect Ho Hau Chong as Director
Co Ltd                      Two Non-Executives were standing for re-election this year, and we did not consider
                            either to be independent. Since the both sat on the Audit Committee which should be
                            entirely independent, we voted against their re-election. The Board is in need of
                            refreshment since all Directors have long tenures.

                            Elect Wu King Cheong as Director
                            Two Non-Executives were standing for re-election this year, and we did not consider
                            either to be independent. Since the both sat on the Audit Committee which should be
                            entirely independent, we voted against their re-election. The Board is in need of
                            refreshment since all Directors have long tenures.

                            Approve the Issuance of Equity or Equity-Linked Securities without Preemptive Rights
                            Approval was sought to allot up to 20% of the issued share capital on a non pre-emptive
                            basis. This exceeded the 10% limit that we tolerate for overseas companies. The Company
                            had also failed to provide a maximum discount to the market price at which shares may be
                            issued.

                            Authorise the Reissuance of Repurchased Shares
                            In addition to the general 20% authority, the Company is also seeking a further authority
                            to reissue shares (up to 10%) which had originally been purchased in the market. Our
                            concern centred on the net effect of purchasing and reissuing shares and the resultant
                            dilutive NAV effect.

STORE CAPITAL Corporation Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Officers' Compensation
                          The Company had made inflight changes to both the annual bonus plan and all
                          outstanding LTI awards. As a result, the 2020 bonus was paid in full, and the 2018 LTI
                          award vested near maximum levels. Had these changes not been made, no variable
                          compensation would have been paid. Given deteriorating financials, there had been a
                          clear disconnect between pay and performance.

HSBC Holdings Plc           Find an Equitable Solution to the Unfair, Discriminatory but Legal Practice of Enforcing
                            Clawback on Members of the Post 1974 Midland Section Defined Benefit Scheme
                            This was raised for the third year in a row from former employees of the Midland bank
                            who perceived that they had been treated unfairly by the practice of taking state
                            deduction from pensions paid to the members of the post 1974 Midland Bank DB scheme.
                            Whilst we had sympathy with the perceived unfairness - to remedy this now would also be
                            unfair to retrospective pensioners and to the staff who are now on much less lucrative DC
                            schemes. In addition, this was fairly normal practice at the time and was clearly disclosed.
                            We have therefore voted against, once again.

Tongcheng-Elong Holdings    Elect Jiang Hao as Director
Limited                     The Board comprised of an Executive Chairman, Chief Executive, and seven Non-
                            Executives. Of the Non-Executives, three weare shareholder representatives, and one,
                            Jiang Hao, was until 2019 an Executive Director. There were only three independent
                            Directors on a Board of nine. Whilst Hao Jlang did not sit on any of the key board sub-
                            committees, his membership of the Board exacerbated its imbalance.

                            Approve the Issuance of Equity or Equity-Linked Securities without Preemptive Rights
                            Approval was being sought to allot up to 20% of the issued share capital on a non pre-
                            emptive basis. This exceeded the 10% limit that we tolerate for overseas companies. The
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