Proposed Amendments to the National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management 2011 - Submission to Ministry for the Environment
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Proposed Amendments to
the National Policy
Statement for Freshwater
Management 2011
Submission to Ministry for the Environment
4th February 2014
2
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Trustpower is one of the nation's largest electricity retailers/generators. Trustpower's New
Zealand based generation portfolio (which it both owns and operates) derives primarily from
renewable energy sources that comprise 38 hydroelectric power stations across 20
hydroelectric power schemes and two wind farms spread throughout the country. A plan
showing the location of Trustpower's schemes is attached. The value of Trustpower's
generation assets resides within its resource consents and, in particular, within its water
permits, which are required for every dam, diversion, abstraction, use and discharge of water
associated with each facility.
1.2 Consenting electricity generation activities under the Resource Management Act 1991 ("RMA")
is the primary regulatory process that any project (new or existing) must follow. In this regard,
Trustpower has 578 resource consents and 4027 consent conditions that it must comply with
across all of its schemes. The number of both consents and consent conditions has increased by
259 and 2621 respectively in the six years ending 28 February 2013. This is a direct consequence
of the new generation projects that Trustpower has consented, and of the reconsenting of
existing schemes under the RMA. The majority of Trustpower's consents are permits for the
take, use, damming, and diversion of freshwater.
1.3 Trustpower is committed to responsible and effective electricity generation and to applying best
industry practice to its activities. It acknowledges the importance of the environment to its
continued operations and has adopted a set of environmental policies which encourage the
practical minimisation of any adverse environmental impacts associated with its activities.
1.4 The proposed amendments to the National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management 2011
("NPS-FM"), released in November 2013, are the next step in the reform process following the
March 2013 release of the Freshwater reform 2013 and beyond. The proposed amendments
require councils to account for all water takes and sources of contaminants to inform decisions
on the setting of freshwater objectives and limits. In addition a National Objectives Framework
("NOF") is proposed, which introduces minimum water quality states ("National Bottom Lines"),
which must be defined for ecosystem health and human health. Additional values and limits are
to be defined for specific water management areas by the local community.
1.5 The NPS-FM defines National Bottom Lines for each of the attributes of the two compulsory
values (ecosystem health and human health). These National Bottom Lines set the minimum
level at which the compulsory values are provided for, and assist councils and communities by
providing clarity on the minimum acceptable states required. This aims to reduce costs and
litigation associated with the preparation of regional plans.
1.6 The NPS-FM proposes an exceptions regime that allows a regional council to set a freshwater
objective below a National Bottom Line in narrowly defined situations. Exceptions are provided
to recognise circumstances where it is neither feasible nor possible to improve water quality to
the required level.
1.7 It is essential that Trustpower be involved in the finalisation of the NPS-FM and in subsequent
planning processes, as it can offer solutions to ensure that the reforms are balanced, and
achieve environmental outcomes without comprising the Government's Energy Strategy or
other initiatives through unintended consequences of the wording of the NPS-FM.3
2. TRUSTPOWERS UNIQUE PORTFOLIO
2.1 A number of Trustpower’s electricity generation schemes are embedded into the local energy
supply network and form a vital element in sustainable energy supply within New Zealand. The
location and scale of Trustpower schemes, along with a commitment to local supply (so as to
ensure that electricity is consumed as close as possible to where it is generated) is a key and
somewhat unique feature of Trustpower’s generation philosophy and portfolio.
2.2 Trustpower differs from other electricity generators in the following ways:
(a) its assets are typically moderate in scale and output;
(b) the schemes are relatively numerous and complex;
(c) the capital investment in individual schemes is modest in comparison to other large
generators; and
(d) the schemes are spread throughout a number of districts and regions in New Zealand
often serving provincial areas where other large generators are not represented.
2.3 As a result, changes to national policy can have a significant cumulative impact across our
business when implemented at a local level.
3. SUMMARY OF TRUSTPOWERS CONCERNS
3.1 Trustpower's key concern is that it will be required to defend its schemes against allegations
that the schemes do not comply with the National Bottom Lines in circumstances where those
non-compliances are caused by the water quality of the water entering the schemes.
3.2 Trustpower's further concern relates to the perceived likelihood that councils and communities
will look to Trustpower to take action so as to enable the catchment to reach water quality
targets, rather than to focus on other land and water users that are contributing to, or have
caused, the poor water quality in the particular waterbody. Such poor water quality may, for
example, be caused by land use activities in those upstream catchments, or from the taking of
too much water for consumptive uses from the upstream tributaries.
3.3 Of particular concern is that the methods imposed by councils and communities to reach these
water quality targets will be increasing flushing flows or compensation flows. These methods
do not improve water quality for contaminants such as nitrates (which are typically associated
with the land uses surrounding a waterbody) and therefore are not appropriate solutions to the
problem. Trustpower requires policy certainty, which is critical to investment decisions.
Trustpower seeks national guidance to avoid the need to repeatedly defend its schemes against
allegations of non-compliance in circumstances where it did not cause the non-compliance and
where its actions cannot resolve the underlying cause of the degraded water quality. As
proposed, there is potential for the amendments to lead to continual erosion of value during
any reassessment of schemes, or the rendering of schemes financially unviable to continue to
operate.
3.4 Likely increased electricity demand in the mid to long term will require the enhancement of
existing schemes, as well as development of new schemes. The proposed amendments to the
NPS-FM will be in place, and have effect, for the next 20-30 years. It is therefore important to
keep in mind how the proposed amendments will affect future developments and demands, as
well as the current state of the environment. In other words, while demand for new generation
may be low now, demand for generation will increase over the mid to long term and it will be4
essential for New Zealand to continue to meet its electricity demands through renewable
sources (particularly new or enhanced existing hydroelectric generation).
3.5 Trustpower is supportive of the Government's focus on reforming the freshwater management
system. Despite this general support, Trustpower has some very real concerns about how the
proposed amendments will affect major users of freshwater (in particular hydroelectricity
generation), including:
(a) Trustpower being required to defend its schemes against allegations that the water
quality does not comply with the National Bottom Lines in circumstances where those
non-compliances are caused by the quality of the water entering the scheme.
(b) Related to (a) above, the narrow scope of the currently proposed exceptions regime.
(c) Concerns relating to barriers for involvement in the proposed collaborative processes
through which the NPS-FM will be implemented by councils and communities and the
ability of stakeholders to engage.
(d) The lack of guidance on accounting for water takes.
(e) Water bodies being split into multiple freshwater management units.
(f) The lack of detail in the NOF as it currently stands.
3.6 These concerns are described in detail below.
4. IMPACTS ON EXISTING SCHEMES
4.1 As outlined above, Trustpower's key concern is the potential impacts that the proposed
amendments will have on its existing schemes. The majority of its schemes are long established
within the environment. It is far more efficient to maintain and enhance existing energy
generation infrastructure than the significant economic and potential ecological implications of
constructing a new scheme. However, undertaking the enhancements of existing schemes
requires investment certainty, which in turn requires greater certainty as to the parameters
around which the schemes will be able to operate.
4.2 Once the values, uses, attributes and attribute states have been decided upon by councils and
communities, these states must then be achieved within the timeframe set by the NPS-FM. The
NOF does not provide direction on how the set objectives will be achieved, that is, which FMU
stakeholders should bear the burden of bringing the FMU up to the required state, or what
proportion of the responsibility each stakeholder must take. The chosen management options
and limits are likely to be the most contentious aspect of the NOF process.
4.3 As stated above, Trustpower has no control over the quality or quantity of the water it receives
from upstream, and it should not be required to fix a problem caused by upstream land use.
Similarly, Trustpower has little, if any, control over downstream land uses, or how downstream
water or discharge permits are exercised. Trustpower is concerned with the very real possibility
that upon any reassessment in relation to the resource consents for existing Trustpower
schemes, the proposed amendments will result in changes to the scheme's operating limits.
Such reassessments may lead to the imposition of minimum flow or compensation flow5
obligations on Trustpower schemes,1 potentially in order to allow a downstream user to
continue to discharge into the waterbody. If a more onerous minimum flow or compensation
flow requirement is imposed on the consents for a hydroelectric scheme in order to achieve a
particular standard within a water body, this could have significant impacts on the generation
and economics of that scheme, undermining investment certainty, and potentially rendering the
scheme financially unviable to continue to operate. Such obligations would be particularly
unsuitable because they put the onus of rehabilitating the issue on a user that has not been a
significant contributor to it. The responsibility for managing the effects of water takes and
discharges should rest with those who cause the effects.
4.4 The example given in paragraphs 8.2-8.3 below, regarding Trustpower's Kaimai hydroelectric
power scheme, demonstrates the wide range of values that can affect a waterbody with a hydro
scheme on it, and therefore show the potential vulnerability of Trustpower's assets.
4.5 Trustpower's schemes operate subject to existing resource consents that have been considered
under the RMA, often following contested hearings before the council or Environment Court.
As such, the limits and controls set within the resource consents were set so as to achieve the
purpose of the RMA, namely sustainable management. That remains the fundamental test
against which all subservient regulations, including national policy statements, must be
measured.
4.6 Trustpower seeks that the NPS-FM provides appropriate recognition that existing schemes have
existing environmental management s including mitigation measures, that have been
established through participatory public processes and that the benefits deriving from the
regime may be lost through the application of the National Bottom Lines, without any proper
weighing of the costs and benefits of any particular suite of consent conditions. For
hydrologically modified catchment, particularly those involving diversion schemes, other
resource users can be reliant on both the existing hydroelectric generation infrastructure and
the existing flow regime.
4.7 Primarily, however, Trustpower seeks that those contributing to the issue should be
proportionately "responsible" for bringing it up to the required attribute states, for example,
that the NOF directs significant contributors to declining water quality to alter their activities to
improve water quality, instead of forcing other catchment users, with less or no impact on
water quality, to mitigate those effects. It is important to ensure that other users are not held
accountable for breaches that they cannot control or did not cause. In effect this is analogous to
the provision for exceptions to be made where natural processes cause the National Bottom
Line to be breached (see section 5 below).
Suggested solution
4.8 Trustpower suggests the following policy be inserted, so as to recognise this key concept of
proportional responsibility:
Policy CA2A
By every regional council ensuring that resource users are responsible for any breaches
of the National Bottom Lines that their activity causes but are not held accountable for
breaches that they cannot control or did not cause. Where responsibility for breaches
is to be shared among resource users, then the responsibility for mitigating or
remedying those breaches is shared on a proportional basis.
1
Minimum flows are a limit set to provide flow in a water body for specific values. Compensation flow is
a specific flow required to be discharged by a dam operator to provide for downstream water body
values.6
4.9 To recognise that existing hydro schemes have environmental management regimes that have
been through a comprehensive process and which have been set to accord with the values of
the freshwater management unit ("FMU"), Trustpower suggests that:
(a) Policy CA2(c) be deleted and replaced with the following policy as a preference:
Policy CAX
By freshwater management units included within Appendix 3 being excepted
from the application of Policy CA1 and CA2, in recognition that these units have
already been subject to a comprehensive process for establishing their values
and setting limits that accord with these values. These freshwater management
units will still be subject to the other provisions of this NPS.
(b) The following policy should also be inserted:
Policy CAX
By Appendix 3 including any freshwater management unit within which there is
significant hydroelectricity generation infrastructure, which contribute to:
a) the annual production of electricity;
b) electricity security of supply; and
c) the achievement of renewable energy targets.
This policy applies to infrastructure in a catchment that forms part of a hydro
scheme that:
a) represents significant capital investment of $10 million or more;
b) has resulted in a high level of hydrological modification, which in turn
has modified the environment;
c) enables social and economic benefits; and
d) is subject to an existing environmental management regime including
mitigation measures that have been established through participatory
public processes and that the benefits deriving from the regime may be
lost through the application of the bottom lines.
(c) The definition of FMUs be amended as follows:
"Freshwater management unit” is the water body, multiple water bodies or
any part of a water body determined by the regional council or in Appendix 3
as the appropriate spatial scale for setting freshwater objectives and limits and
for freshwater accounting and management.
5. EXCEPTIONS REGIME
5.1 The proposed amendments allow a regional council to set a freshwater objective below a
national bottom line in narrowly defined circumstances. The discussion document outlines that
such exceptions are required to recognise circumstances where it is neither feasible nor
possible to improve water quality to the required level.
5.2 Exceptions able to be decided by regional councils can be proposed where a FMU:7
(a) is contaminated from natural processes (such as a native bird colony nesting above a
river that causes E.coli levels to breach National Bottom Lines); or
(b) has been subject to historical activities that have created lasting impacts on water
quality, the reversal of which is not reasonable, either physically or ecologically, even
in the long term.
5.3 Exceptions are also proposed where water quality is affected by significant existing
infrastructure, such as where FMUs cannot meet bottom lines due to established
hydroelectricity generation infrastructure. There are currently no exceptions listed within the
proposed NPS-FM. It is proposed that this type of exception is only to be used in limited
situations and is to be decided by the Government at some later stage. The Government will use
the following criteria in its assessment:
(a) The need for an exception must arise because of limited efficient or effective
management options for significant existing infrastructure.
(b) The significant existing infrastructure affecting the water body must enable economic
benefits that have a significant impact on national or regional GDP.
(c) The economic benefits can only be realised if the objectives for the water body are set
below national bottom lines (ie, setting a long-term objective at or above bottom lines
will not provide the same of similar economic benefit).
Concerns
5.4 Preliminary technical advice received by Trustpower is that there is real risk that some of the
water bodies on which Trustpower's existing schemes are located would fail to meet the
relevant National Bottom Lines within the proposed NOF.
5.5 For example, in its current state, Lake Rotorangi and the lower Patea River (between which the
Patea Hydroelectric Scheme is located) may not achieve the proposed National Bottom Lines for
total nitrogen, phosphorus and dissolved oxygen, which are part of the compulsory national
value for ecosystem health. In addition, Lake Matahina, above the Matahina Hydroelectric
Scheme, may also be at risk of failing to meet some of the National Bottom Lines. These
contaminant levels are caused by water entering the hydro lake from upstream land uses,2 and,
as noted above, not only does the hydroelectric scheme not contribute to the contaminant
levels; flushing flows from hydroelectric schemes also cannot be used to remedy the
contaminant levels. In both cases, those schemes will be at risk of requirements for increased
minimum flows / compensation flows or other measures considered necessary to achieve the
National Bottom Lines.
5.6 This issue has recently been traversed by the Otago Regional Council’s Proposed Plan Change 6A
(Water Quality), which sought to manage containments in drainage, runoff and leaching (non-
point source) via water quality limits and a rule framework. Due to the involvement of
Trustpower in the process, a specific permitted activity rule was reintroduced to allow the
"passing through" of contaminants from a dam when the dam operator did not contribute to
the contaminant load. The relevant provision is attached in Appendix 1 and forms part of a suite
of provisions expected to be approved by the Environment Court as part of a draft consent
order resolving appeals on the plan change. This rule framework does not seek to adopt a
generic water quality framework and recognises the different treatment of certain activities and
their discharges, depending on the circumstances.
2
In the Patea situation, the contribution of the upstream wastewater treatment facility discharge, and
surrounding geology causing high silt runoff.8
5.7 However, because of the narrow nature of the exceptions regime, there is no certainty for
Trustpower that these water bodies will be able to qualify for exceptions. This is of particular
concern because the storage of water for electricity generation does not usually directly
contribute to water quality, and certainly does not in those areas where the cause of degraded
water in the storage lake is that the water is degraded when it enters the lake.
5.8 The concept of an exceptions framework stemmed from a recommendation by the Land and
Water Forum, which sought to ensure that catchments with hydrological assets would be
exempt from water quality limits:3
Recommendation 5
Further work is required to fully populate and finalise the sets of numeric and narrative
objectives.
... This further work should review and refine the following:
... (c) the classification of waterbody types, in particular for lakes, wetlands estuaries
and hydrologically modified catchments.
5.9 Despite this, the currently proposed exceptions framework is surprisingly strict and indicates
that there will be narrow scope for exceptions in the finalised NOF. In particular, Trustpower is
concerned that the criterion requiring regionally or nationally significant economic benefits
outlined in paragraph 5.3(b) above is likely to preclude smaller schemes and distributed
generation from being eligible for exceptions. This is inconsistent with other national
documents including:
(a) The National Policy Statement on Renewable Electricity Generation, which requires
recognition of the importance of renewable electricity generation, irrespective of the
size or scale of the generation. For example (emphasis added):4
The contribution of renewable electricity generation, regardless of scale,
towards addressing the effects of climate change plays a vital role in the
wellbeing of New Zealand, its people and the environment.
... central government has reaffirmed the strategic target that 90 per cent of
electricity generated in New Zealand should be derived from renewable energy
sources by 2025...
Including specific policies, such as:
Policy F:
... regional policy statement and regional and district plans shall include
objectives, policies and methods (including rules within plans) to provide for
the development, operation, maintenance and upgrading of small and
community-scale distributed renewable electricity generation from any
renewable energy source to the extent applicable to the region or district.
(b) The New Zealand Energy Strategy 2011-2021, which encourages renewable energy
generation as a means to respond to New Zealand's energy challenges. For example:5
3
Land and Water Forum, 2012. Second Report of the Land and Water Forum: Setting Limits for Water
Quality and Quantity Freshwater Policy- and Plan-Making Through Collaboration. Wellington. Page 17,
Recommendation 5.
4
National Policy Statement for Renewable Electricity Generation 2011, Preamble, page 3; Policy F,
page 7.
5
New Zealand Energy Strategy 2011-2021, Priority: Diverse resource development, page 6.9
Priority: Diverse resource development
Area of focus: Develop renewable energy resources
... New Zealand already has a substantial renewable energy base to build on.
The Government's approach is to ensure market incentives and the regulatory
framework support further investment in appropriate renewable projects by
removing unnecessary regulatory barriers.
5.10 In relation to the criteria set out in the discussion paper for the consideration by the
Government of potential exceptions, Trustpower is concerned that the criteria are unduly
narrow. In particular:
(a) The first criterion requires that the need for an exception must arise because of
limited efficient or effective management options for significant existing
infrastructure. This criterion is narrow and should be broadened to provide greater
flexibility for an exception to be sought in appropriate circumstances (for example
where there is debate as to whether the existing infrastructure is considered
"significant").
(b) The second criterion requires that the significant existing infrastructure affecting the
water body must enable economic benefits that have a significant impact on national
or regional GDP. This criterion is considered to be overly restrictive. It is unlikely that
any Trustpower schemes have a significant impact on national GDP, and as few as
50% of Trustpower's schemes may have a significant impact on Regional GDP.
Further, as stated above, the New Zealand Energy Strategy and National Policy
Statement on Renewable Electricity Generation both require recognition of the
importance of renewable electricity generation, irrespective of the size or scale of the
generation.
5.11 Accordingly, Trustpower is concerned that the criterion requiring regionally or nationally
significant economic benefits outlined in paragraph 5.3(b) above is likely to preclude smaller
schemes and distributed generation from being eligible for exceptions. Such an approach is
inconsistent with the National Policy Statement on Renewable Electricity Generation, which
requires recognition of the importance of renewable electricity generation, irrespective of the
size or scale of the generation.
5.12 Trustpower is also concerned with the exceptions not being promulgated at the same time as
the NOF, because this has the potential to result in the NOF being given effect to on water
bodies that should be subject to an exception. This lag in implementation of the exceptions
regime would create issues for reassessments of hydroelectricity resource consents.
Suggested solution
5.13 Trustpower suggests that:
(a) The suggestions set out in paragraphs 4.8 and 4.9 above are adopted, in particular
inserting a policy enshrining the concept of proportional responsibility.
(b) That the Government's exceptions criteria are amended as set out below:
The need for an exception mustmay arise because of limited efficient or
effective management options for significant existing infrastructure.
The significant existing infrastructure affecting the water body must enable
economic and social benefits that have a significant impact on national or
regional GDP.10
The need for an exception from one or more of the National Bottom Lines has
arisen because the cause of non-compliance with one or more of the National
Bottom Lines is not caused by and is beyond the control of the person seeking
the exception.
(c) That Appendix 3 is amended to include exceptions for:
(i) Patea Hydroelectric Power Scheme, with respect to the total nitrogen,
phosphorus and dissolved oxygen attributes and the ecosystem health and
human health (secondary contact recreation) values; and
(ii) Matahina Hydroelectric Power Scheme, with respect to the total nitrogen
attribute and the ecosystem health and human health (secondary contact
recreation) values.
6. IMPLEMENTATION AND THE COLLABORATIVE PROCESS
6.1 The discussion paper refers to a new collaborative planning process being implemented, as an
alternative to the existing Schedule 1 RMA process. The collaborative process revolves around
councils partnering with stakeholders and the community when setting and implementing the
NOF. The new collaborative process is discussed in the March 2013 Freshwater reform 2013
and beyond discussion paper, and is proposed to be introduced through separate amendments
to the RMA.
Concerns with the barriers to involvement in the collaborative process
6.2 Trustpower has significant concerns with several aspects of the implementation of the NOF
through the proposed collaborative process (as described in the March 2013 discussion paper).
Those concerns are outlined in detail in Trustpower's feedback on the Freshwater reform 2013
and beyond discussion paper.
6.3 Of particular relevance, Trustpower has significant infrastructure throughout New Zealand
including 9 of the 11 regions, and is always looking to expand renewable sources, in accordance
with policies within the New Zealand Energy Strategy (see 5.9(b) above). Trustpower would
therefore want to be involved in discussions on a large range of water bodies. However,
Trustpower has no guarantee of involvement in collaborative processes. Councils will have the
final say as to who is included and Trustpower has had previous experience of being excluded
from collaborative groups in similar situations. In particular, Trustpower applied to be included
in two of the Canterbury Zone Committees and on the Canterbury Regional Committee. We
understand one of the key reasons Trustpower was turned down was because it is not a "local"
resident in the area, despite having extensive existing assets and multi-use development
interests in the region. The Government is relying on community and council collaboration for
the NOF to be applied in an equitable manner, however in its current form the NOF does not
include systems to ensure this. An understanding of how the NOF will be implemented through
the collaborative process is essential and should be released prior to, or at the same time as,
the NOF reforms, not later.
6.4 Given its nationwide generation asset portfolio and its broader potential development
opportunities, Trustpower would aspire to be represented on all or a number of collaborative
groups nationwide; however, this would require significant resources. This is an issue that
would be faced by many other key stakeholders, for example New Zealand Fish & Game, the
Department of Conservation, the Environmental Defence Society, Fonterra Co-operative Group
Limited, New Zealand Federated Farmers and Horticulture New Zealand.11
6.5 Trustpower is greatly concerned that the resourcing, timing and cost implications of the
proposed collaborative planning process have not been fully assessed and considered. Parties
will need to become involved in many collaborative groups, which will stretch resources and
have the potential to result in disengagement by parties. This has the potential to undermine
the rationale and integrity of the collaborative process.
6.6 In addition, given the uncertainty as to how the collaborative process will operate, Trustpower
has concerns regarding the scope of the power of the collaborative group, whether there are
appropriate checks and balances in place and whether decisions made through the
collaborative process are subject to appeal. An understanding of how the collaborative process
will be implemented is essential to the functioning of the NOF.
Suggested solution
6.7 Trustpower suggests the following in relation to implementation and the collaborative process:
(a) The NOF is not finalised until the details of the collaborative process have been
confirmed in legislation.
(b) Following the confirmation of the details of the collaborative process, further public
consultation is undertaken in relation to the NOF and how it will be implemented
under the collaborative process.
7. ACCOUNTING FOR WATER TAKES
7.1 The proposed amendments require councils to establish and operate water quality and quantity
accounting systems. This will involve assessments of all water takes and all sources of relevant
contaminants, with measurements, models and estimates to be recorded at the level of the
FMU. Councils will have the discretion to determine the size of a FMU that is appropriate for
setting objectives and for freshwater accounting. The accounting is aimed at informing the
decision making process for councils to set freshwater objectives and limits.
7.2 Trustpower supports the focus on accounting for and monitoring of water takes and encourages
the facilitation of increased research into the nation's water bodies. However Trustpower is
concerned about the lack of guidance on the level of detail required when accounting is
undertaken.
7.3 In addition there is scope for a wide disparity in what is monitored, particularly in light of
estimates being factored into accounting and the discretion of councils in setting appropriate
levels of detail for the significance of water quality and quantity in each FMU. This is likely to
lead to inconsistency in accounting between councils.
Suggested solution
7.4 Trustpower suggests that specific guidance on monitoring and accounting requirements be
released for councils, and further consultation on any such guidance documents also be
released for feedback from industry.
8. WATERBODIES BEING SPLIT INTO MULTIPLE FMU’S
8.1 Trustpower has concerns with the determination of FMUs, and the potential for these to be set,
without regard to the potential implications the setting of the FMUs will have on existing hydro12
schemes. There may be situations where one water body is split into multiple FMUs. The
practical difficulties for Trustpower will include multiple collaborative processes, a range of
objectives and drivers determining limits that our schemes will need to achieve. For example
there will be different standards for stakeholders at different points along the water body, and
this may lead to changes to a minimum flow or compensation flow. Altering the minimum flow
or compensation flow of a hydroelectric power scheme has the potential to have significant
economic impact, and can also result in the inefficient operation of the scheme.
8.2 The Kaimai River catchment provides an example of this. The Kaimai is a complex scheme with
numerous diversions, ephemeral streams without minimum flows, lakes, structures and
surrounding land uses. The upper catchment is native bush with restricted access, and
downstream from this area is becoming increasingly dairy-farmed (with associated declining
water quality). The middle catchment has high recreation use, with the lower river flowing into
the Tauranga Harbour. Due to the complex range of uses and drivers, there is the potential to
be several FMUs within the catchment.
8.3 Trustpower owns and operates the Kaimai Hydroelectric Power Scheme. The Kaimai Scheme
has a total annual output of 165GWh, and generates sufficient electricity to power
approximately 20,600 typical New Zealand households per year. The development of this
Scheme has resulted in a recreational area that is easily accessed and utilised for fishing,
kayaking, picnics and camping. The recreational releases from the dam provide flows for rafters
and the Kaimai Canoe Club.
8.4 Accordingly, Trustpower is concerned that a water body divided into multiple FMUs may result
in different standards applying to different parts of a water body, or may result in standards
applying to parts of a water body that may have unintended consequences.
Suggested solution
8.5 Trustpower suggests the following in relation to water bodies being split into multiple FMUs:
(a) The suggestions set out in paragraphs 4.8 and 4.9 above.
(b) The suggestions set out in paragraph 9.7 below.
9. NATIONAL OBJECTIVES FRAMEWORK
9.1 The proposed amendments introduce a NOF to assist councils in setting freshwater objectives
already required by the NPS-FM. The NOF provides a framework for choosing values and uses
that protect the freshwater environment while allowing allocation of water and its ability to
absorb what is discharged into it.
9.2 Trustpower supports the concept and intent of the proposed NOF, particularly the increased
national guidance promoting consistency of implementation throughout the different regions.
However, Trustpower has concerns relating to the implementation of the NOF.
Unpopulated attribute tables
9.3 The NOF attribute tables are currently only partially populated. For example, for the value
'ecosystem health' in lakes, attributes for 'chlorophyll a' and 'nitrate toxicity' are included in the
proposed NOF, but attributes for 'pH' and 'dissolved oxygen' are not (these are highlighted as
potential attributes for consideration in the 2016-2019 reforms). These tables are expected to
continue to be populated over the next decade as scientific consensus is reached.13
9.4 Action needs to be taken to ensure that, in the absence of nationally set values, councils do not
adopt an overly precautionary approach that would hinder development in the interim period
until the tables are populated. Rather than defaulting to a prohibition on water take, or such a
tight limit so as to effectively prohibit or prevent water takes, consideration at the resource
consent level (for example the adoption of limits in consent conditions), or a similar process
would be preferable.
Suggested solution
9.5 Trustpower suggests that policy CA1(e) is amended as follows:
Policy CA1
By every regional council applying the following processes in developing freshwater
objectives for all freshwater management units:
[...]
(e) formulating freshwater objectives:
(i) in those cases where an applicable numeric attribute state is specified
in Appendix 2, in numeric terms by reference to that specified numeric
attribute state; or
(ii) in those cases where the attribute is not listed in Appendix 2, in
numeric terms where practicable, otherwise in narrative terms, having
particular regard to the values and the need to avoid pre-empting the
consensus setting of numeric attribute states over time; and
(iii) on the basis that, where an attribute applies to more than one value,
the most stringent freshwater objective for that attribute is adopted;.
Hydroelectric power generation value
9.6 The current hydroelectric power generation value needs to be modified because it does not
capture schemes that rely on diversions. The boundaries of the FMU will be critical to the
usefulness and application of the hydroelectric power generation value. In the proposed
version, it does not appear that the FMU are likely to fit neatly around Trustpower schemes.
For example, Lake Coleridge itself has no hydraulic gradient or flow rate qualities that are
considered suitable for hydroelectric power generation, however it does when combined with
what could potentially be a separate FMU (the Rakaia River).
Suggested solution
9.7 Trustpower suggests that the value be replaced with the following:
The freshwater management unit (including in combination with other units) has
physical qualities that are suitable for power generation as required to provide a
reliable and secure supply of electricity where either:
(a) the physical qualities, including the continued availability of water (levels, flow
and allocation), for existing power generation are retained, maintaining the
potential generation output; or
(b) the physical qualities, including hydraulic gradient, volume of water, and flow
rate, required for new power generation would be retained, and water storage for
power generation may also be possible.14
10. NEXT STEPS
Exposure draft
10.1 The process chosen for this reform means there will be no hearing or Board of Inquiry, and
therefore the only opportunity for engagement by stakeholders is through a one-off submission.
Trustpower therefore considers it appropriate that the Ministry release an amended version of
the NPS-FM following consideration of submissions on the discussion paper. This would allow a
further, limited opportunity for the public to comment and identify any major concerns or
drafting issues.
Discussions regarding content of submission
10.2 Trustpower’s portfolio is unique with its numerous small scale and distributed generation
assets. As a result the implications of the proposed amendments are significant to Trustpower.
We would like to request a meeting with MfE officials to discuss the matters outlined in this
submission in further detail.
[withheld]
______________________
[ withheld
[ withheld] ]15 Map of Trustpower’s schemes in New Zealand
16
Appendix 1: Proposed Plan Change 6A (Water Quality) Regional Plan: Water
for Otago
Rule 12.B.1.10
[Moved substantially unchanged from 12.12.1.1] The discharge of any contaminant, excluding settled
sediment, present in water impounded by a dam that is not permitted by Rule 13.2.1.3, to water in a lake
or river, is a permitted activity, providing:
(a) The purpose of the dam is not used for the storage of contaminants; and
(b) The presence of the contaminant does not result from the damming activity or the
activities of the dam operator has not caused the contaminant to be discharged into
the dam from which it is discharged; and
(c) The discharge, after reasonable mixing does not give rise to all or any of the following
effects:
(i) The production of any conspicuous oil or grease films, scum or foams, or
floatable or suspended materials; or
(ii) Any conspicuous change in colour or visual clarity; or
(iii) Any emission of objectionable odour; or
(iv) The rendering of fresh water unsuitable for consumption by farm animals; or
(v) Any significant adverse effect on aquatic life; and
(d) The discharge ceases when an enforcement officer of the Otago Regional Council
requires the discharge to cease to provide for clean-up operations and prevent
adverse effects on the environmentYou can also read
