POLICY BRIEF Key Middle East Policy Issues for the Biden Administration
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POLICY BRIEF
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE NEW
ADMINISTRATION
Key Middle East Policy Issues for
the Biden Administration
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Ph.D., Fellow for the Middle East
Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, Ph.D., Fellow for the Middle East
A.Kadir Yildirim, Ph.D., Fellow for the Middle East
Kelsey Norman, Ph.D., Fellow for the Middle East, and Director, Women’s Rights, Human Rights, and Refugees Program
This brief is part of a series of policy recommendations for the administration of President Joe Biden.
Focusing on a range of important issues facing the country, the briefs are intended to provide
decision-makers with relevant and effective ideas for addressing domestic and foreign policy
priorities. View the entire series at www.bakerinstitute.org/recommendations-2021.
Countries within the Middle East continue the reassertion of U.S. diplomatic efforts in
to be beset by civil and armed conflict. the region, especially in re-engaging with
The region also faces a number of other Iran and ending the war in Yemen. As the
important challenges, ranging from effective GCC moves beyond the bitter rift that pitted
governance to religious pluralism to three member-states against a fourth,
geopolitical rivalries. This policy brief explores Qatar, between June 2017 and January
some of the most pressing and multifaceted 2021, there is an opportunity to realign all
considerations the Biden administration six GCC states around a common approach
should address in developing a strategy for to critical regional defense and security
the Middle East. It provides analysis and issues. There is also a mood of greater
policy recommendations relating to ongoing realism and restraint among leaders in
A robust and cohesive
developments between the Gulf Cooperation GCC capitals and a sense of the limitations
Council (GCC) states, U.S.-Iran relations, of the unilateral projection of power that GCC can support and
Islamist groups, and refugees and migration. characterized Gulf politics in the decade amplify the reassertion
Further CME publications will address other from the Arab Spring through to 2019. of U.S. diplomatic efforts
crucial issues, such as the prospects for The Biden administration should in the region, especially
Israeli-Palestinian peace and the ongoing identify measures that lock the GCC into
crisis in Lebanon. regional diplomacy and give U.S. partners
in re-engaging with Iran
a constructive stake in relevant policy and ending the war
processes and outcomes. Examples of in Yemen.
ARAB GULF STATES — actionable early measures include the
KRISTIAN COATES ULRICHSEN following:
• Reactivate and strengthen the U.S.-GCC
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a
working groups set up after the Camp
crucial element in the political and security
David summit with Gulf leaders in 2015
architecture of the Persian Gulf. A robust
and focus initially on addressing issues
and cohesive GCC can support and amplify
RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // POLICY BRIEF
of common concern, such as pandemic Sullivan, Deputy Secretary of State Wendy
and post-pandemic responses. Sherman, CIA Director William Burns, and
• Coordinate with GCC officials on Iran envoy Rob Malley—negotiated the
monitoring and oversight measures to JCPOA with Iran under President Barack
guarantee commitments made by all Obama. Nevertheless, they have come
parties to the Gulf rift to ensure that the under enormous pressure domestically and
2021 agreement between Saudi Arabia, from Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to
Qatar, and other states does not break not return to the deal and instead leverage
down in rancor as the 2014 Riyadh Trump’s unprecedented financial and
Agreement did. energy sanctions on Iran. Moreover, the
• Extend the offer of inclusion in previous administration linked many of the
“JCPOA+” negotiations to the GCC rather nuclear-related sanctions to terrorism and
than to individual states to reinforce the human rights, making their removal more
multilateral focus of regional dialogue complicated in the future. Meanwhile, Iran
and allay potential concerns that likely has demanded a verification process for
would arise if some states are given a U.S. compliance, should Washington return
to the JCPOA. Additionally, some Iranian
First and foremost, seat at the table but not others.
officials have even warned for the first time
President Biden should that if cornered by international pressure,
try to disentangle BIDEN’S IRAN POLICY STARTS AT HOME they may even weaponize their nuclear
his Iran policy from — MOHAMMAD AYATOLLAHI TABAAR program.1 To avoid a looming conflict, some
experts have suggested a “clean” return
domestic politics. He As the Biden administration takes office, to the JCPOA or an interim agreement to
should quietly reach out Washington is once again confronted with prevent Iran from making more nuclear
to the more moderate a challenge that has haunted the United progress. Others have recommended
and established States for decades: how to handle Iran's patience until Iran’s next presidential
nuclear, military, and regional ambitions, election in June or exerting even more
figures on the center-
which seem to be on the rise despite nearly pressure to force Tehran to surrender.
right to form a viable four years of crippling sanctions under The tense debates in Washington over a
bipartisan consensus former President Donald Trump. wide range of policy options reveal the ever-
that represents not a Iran has expanded its nuclear program increasing gap on the Iran question. Perhaps
in response to the Trump administration’s the best advice for President Biden is that
particular administration
“maximum pressure” policy and before making any move on Iran, he needs to
or party, but the withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive first deal with U.S. domestic politics. After all,
United States. Plan of Action (JCPOA). It has reduced some the JCPOA failed precisely because of a lack
of its commitments under the agreement, of internal consensus during the Obama-era
including the resumption of 20% uranium negotiations with Iran.
enrichment as well as the production of As long as Iran is a subject of partisan
uranium metal. Tehran has vowed to take politics, Washington’s policy—whether
even more drastic measures if the United in the form of a nuclear agreement or
States does not honor the JCPOA. all-out maximum pressure—will fail.
On the campaign trail, then-candidate Iranian leaders are now well aware that
Joe Biden pledged the United States any agreement that President Biden
would return to the JCPOA if Iran agreed approves can be canceled in four years, or
to fully comply with the deal. Similarly, even in two years after the next midterm
Iranian leaders have promised that if the congressional elections.
United States first removes the Trump-era Iran is presenting the United States a
sanctions, they would reverse their recent clear choice: either implement the JCPOA
steps. However, the U.S. return to the fully or Iran may make the political decision
JCPOA has proved to be a more arduous to push its nuclear program forward.
process than many had anticipated. The To address this challenge, President
Biden administration’s senior officials— Biden needs first and foremost to try to
including National Security Advisor Jake disentangle his Iran policy from domestic
2KEY MIDDLE EAST POLICY ISSUES FOR THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION
politics. Instead of launching a noisy movement. This policy should build on
media campaign2 to sell the Iran deal as the existing division between the political
the Obama administration did, President and religious factions. Islamist movements
Biden should quietly reach out to the more can be incentivized by conditioning their
moderate and established figures on the political participation on formalizing the
center-right to form a viable bipartisan divide between their political and non-
consensus that will represent not a political activism. This separation should
particular administration or party, but the encompass the finances and personnel of
United States. the movement and the party. The policy
can also facilitate the conditions for fair
political competition between Islamist and
ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AND PARTIES — non-Islamist parties. Islamists command
A.KADIR YILDIRIM an inherent advantage over non-Islamist
parties with their hybrid organizational
Islamist movements and parties have
structures. Many non-Islamist parties lack
been a permanent presence in the Middle
the resources and grassroots mobilization
Eastern political landscape since the
that offer a chance at competing with It is no coincidence that
1970s. Oftentimes, the ideologies of these organizational separation
Islamist parties. In this regard, a policy
movements face intense internal scrutiny:
do they respect democratic governance and
of organizational separation in Islamist in Islamist movements
movements can level the playing field such as Morocco’s
pluralism, or do they condone extremism
for other political parties in the system.
and violence? As members of many Islamist
Ultimately, the objective is to give
Party for Justice and
movements win elections and become Development, Tunisia’s
governments the ability to hold Islamist
a part of government, these questions
parties accountable and establish a Ennahdha, and Turkey’s
become more critical, and rightly so. The
mechanism to check on party compliance. Justice and Development
concern with possible Islamist governments
In cases where the party fails to uphold
has resulted in policies aimed to compel Party in recent years has
the formal separation between the party
Islamist movements to change, or moderate,
and the movement, the political party may been accompanied by
their ideological orientations. This singular
face sanctions that would temporarily ideological moderation.
focus on ideology has led policymakers to
constrain the party’s ability to participate
periodically sanction Islamist movements
in the formal political arena. This policy can
for ideologies thought to lean toward The Biden administration
facilitate ideological moderation and anchor
extremist and anti-democratic agendas.
broader democratization processes in the should pursue a policy
Yet such direct attacks on Islamist ideology approach that prioritizes
region’s countries.
have rarely produced the desired effect
of ideological moderation. It is the hybrid
organizational change in
organizational structure of Islamists that Islamist movements in
REFUGEES AND MIGRATION —
allows these movements to function as mass
KELSEY NORMAN the Middle East.
organizations that operate in the political,
social, and religious arenas, thereby shaping The Syrian displacement crisis remains the
their political discourse and ideology. It is no largest in the world, and resettling Syrian
coincidence that organizational separation refugees who meet eligibility criteria should
in Islamist movements such as Morocco’s be a cornerstone of President Biden’s
Party for Justice and Development, Tunisia’s revamped resettlement policy. Yet even
Ennahdha, and Turkey’s Justice and under the administration of Barack Obama,
Development Party in recent years has been Syrians were disproportionately excluded
accompanied by ideological moderation. from resettlement eligibility on “security”
The Biden administration should grounds, often for innocuous associations
pursue a policy approach that prioritizes with opposition groups in Syria.3 The reality
organizational change in Islamist of the Syrian conflict is that nearly every
movements in the Middle East, in particular civilian has been touched by the war in
a formal separation between an Islamist some way, and simply having a family
political party and its affiliated religious member who fought in an opposition group
3RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // POLICY BRIEF
or sold a sandwich to an opposition fighter processed fairly and efficiently and that
should not be grounds for inadmissibility.4 asylum seekers are allowed to remain inside
But in his executive order, Biden attempted the U.S. but outside of private detention
to walk a fine line between appeasing facilities while awaiting their hearings.
hard-line immigration critics advocating Contrary to unfounded claims that asylum
for stricter screenings of refugees on the seekers fail to appear for their hearings unless
one hand, and refugee and humanitarian placed in private detention, a recent study
workers calling for a more humane and from the American Immigration Council
accommodating process on the other. If found that 83% of all non-detained asylum
Biden is serious about raising the number seekers attend all their court hearings, and
of resettled refugees to 125,000 next this number is even higher (96%) for those
year—and about resettling Syrians more who have a lawyer.6 This policy is critical for
specifically—he should err on the side of ending the use of private detention facilities
more transparent and accommodating, within the U.S. asylum system, though
though still efficient and effective, the administration will have to sufficiently
screening policies. support the nonprofit organizations assisting
Refugee resettlement was once an issue asylum seekers while they await trial in order
with broad bipartisan support in the United for it to work.
States. It was only after the Paris attacks of Second, the Biden administration must
2015—following which news reports falsely assess its Central American strategy. The
The Syrian displacement accused Syrian refugees of responsibility— administration already took steps to end
crisis remains the and the candidacy and presidency of Donald the highly questionable safe third country
largest in the world, Trump that calls were made for the further agreements that the Trump administration
and resettling Syrian security screening of resettled refugees, enacted with Central American countries.7
who already undergo the most stringent Under a safe third country agreement,
refugees who meet vetting of any immigration category to the asylum seekers arriving in the U.S. can
eligibility criteria should U.S. It is incumbent upon President Biden to be sent back to a country they passed
be a cornerstone of return us to an era of depoliticized refugee through such as Guatemala or Honduras.
President Biden’s resettlement, and he can do so by increasing The agreements were rightly cancelled since
the transparency, accountability, and these countries lack well-functioning asylum
revamped resettlement
effectiveness of the process. systems and individuals returned to these
policy. Beyond disregarding the plight of Syrian countries may be subject to generalized
refugees, the Trump also administration took violence. Yet the Biden administration has
unprecedented actions to limit the number stated that it instead prefers a migration-
of resettled refugees, asylum seekers as well for-development approach that promises $4
as regular and irregular migrants allowed billion in aid over four years to address the
to come to or remain in the United States. “root causes” of migration—including gang
President Joe Biden has already taken steps and gender-based violence and corruption.
to reverse these measures and pave a It is not clear that migration-development
progressive pathway forward on the topic of schemes actually decrease migration in
asylum and refugees, but some issues require the short term,8 and my research from the
further action. Mediterranean context shows that such aid
First, the Biden administration must can create perverse incentives that are not
restore the credibility of the U.S. asylum in the interest of refugees and migrants.9
system. On February 19, 2021, Biden began As such, aid distributed to Central American
the critical process of officially ending the countries should not be contingent upon
Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), which preventing onward migration to the U.S.
required asylum seekers to remain in Mexico Nonetheless, ending Trump’s safe third
rather than allowing them to lodge asylum country agreements is an important step
claims in the U.S.5 To build on this measure, toward reaffirming the right to seek asylum
the administration must direct the necessary in this country.
resources—financial and personnel—to Finally, the administration should take
ensure that asylum applications are
4KEY MIDDLE EAST POLICY ISSUES FOR THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION
steps to increase the effectiveness and 5. Nicole Narea,“Biden is allowing
transparency of the refugee resettlement asylum seekers caught by Trump’s
system, in addition to implementing its ‘Remain in Mexico’ program to cross
promised 125,000 ceiling for FY 2022. Biden the border,” Vox, February 22, 2021,
issued an executive order on February https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
4, 2021, that lays out the steps by which politics/2021/2/22/22295451/mpp-remain-
his administration can reverse the Trump in-mexico-asylum-biden; Nick Miroff, et
administration’s funding cuts to the U.S. al., “Biden Issues New Immigration Orders,
government agencies and affiliates that While Signaling Cautious Approach,”
vet and process refugees abroad and the Washington Post, February 2, 2021,
organizations that assist refugees once they https://www.washingtonpost.com/
arrive in the U.S, in addition to providing national/biden-immigration-executive-
refugees with a more straightforward and order/2021/02/02/8c7510a8-64f3-11eb-
accountable process.10 Following through on bf81-c618c88ed605_story.html.
this strategy immediately, ahead of the start 6. Ingrid Eagly and Steven Shafer,
of FY 2022, is critical for restoring America’s “Measuring In Absentia Removal in
stature in the world as a leader on refugees Immigration Court,” The American
and ensures that other countries believe we Immigration Council, 2021, https://
are doing our fair share, encouraging them www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/
to also follow through on refugee-hosting research/measuring-absentia-removal-
commitments. immigration-court.
7. The White House, “Suspending
and Terminating the Asylum Cooperative
ENDNOTES Agreements with the Governments El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras,” 2021,
1. Rick Gladstone, Farnaz Fassihi, and
https://www.state.gov/suspending-and-
Ronen Bergman, “Iran Suggests It May Seek
terminating-the-asylum-cooperative-
Nuclear Weapons, in New Escalation of
agreements-with-the-governments-el-
Threats,” New York Times, February 9, 2021,
salvador-guatemala-and-honduras/.
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/09/
8. Hein de Haas, “Migration and
world/middleeast/Iran-nuclear-threat.html.
Development: A Theoretical Perspective,”
2. David Samuels, “The Aspiring Novelist
International Migration Review 44,
Who Became Obama’s Foreign-Policy Guru,”
no.1 (2018).
New York Times, May 5, 2016, https://www.
9. Kelsey P. Norman, Reluctant
nytimes.com/2016/05/08/magazine/the-
Reception: Refugees, Migration and
aspiring-novelist-who-became-obamas-
Governance in the Middle East and North
foreign-policy-guru.html?_r=1.
Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2020).
3. Lama Mourad and Kelsey Norman,
10. The White House, “Executive Order
“Transforming Refugees into Migrants:
on Rebuilding and Enhancing Programs
Institutional Change and the Politics of
to Resettle Refugees and Planning for the
International Protection,” European Journal
Impact of Climate Change on Migration,”
of International Relations 26, no. 3 (2019):
2021, https://www.whitehouse.
687-713.
gov/briefing-room/presidential-
4. Human Rights First, “Addressing
actions/2021/02/04/executive-order-on-
Barriers to the Resettlement of Vulnerable
rebuilding-and-enhancing-programs-to-
Syrian and Other Refugees,” 2014, https://
resettle-refugees-and-planning-for-the-
www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/
impact-of-climate-change-on-migration/
addressing-barriers-resettlement-
vulnerable-syrian-and-other-refugees
5RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // POLICY BRIEF
AUTHORS
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Ph.D., is a Baker
Institute fellow for the Middle East. Working
across the disciplines of political science,
international relations and international
political economy, his research examines
the changing position of Persian Gulf states
in the global order, as well as the emergence
of longer-term, nonmilitary challenges to
regional security.
Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, Ph.D.,is
a fellow for the Middle East at the Baker
Institute and an associate professor at
Texas A&M University's Bush School of
Government and Public Policy. His research
focuses on U.S.-Iran relations and the
politics of religion.
A.Kadir Yildirim, Ph.D., is a fellow for the
Middle East at the Baker Institute. His main
research interests include politics and
See more policy briefs at:
www.bakerinstitute.org/policy-briefs religion, political Islam, the politics of the
Middle East and Turkish politics.
This publication was written by a
researcher (or researchers) who Kelsey Norman, Ph.D., is a fellow for the
participated in a Baker Institute project.
Middle East and director of the Women’s
Wherever feasible, this research is
reviewed by outside experts before it is
Rights, Human Rights and Refugees Program
released. However, the views expressed at the Baker Institute. Her research focuses
herein are those of the individual on women’s rights, human rights, and
author(s), and do not necessarily refugee and migration issues in the Middle
represent the views of Rice University’s East and North Africa.
Baker Institute for Public Policy.
© 2021 Rice University’s Baker Institute
for Public Policy
This material may be quoted or
reproduced without prior permission,
provided appropriate credit is given to
the author and Rice University’s Baker
Institute for Public Policy.
Cite as:
Coates Ulrichsen, Kristian, Mohammad
Ayatollahi Tabaar, A.Kadir Yildirim,
and Kelsey Norman. 2021. Key
Middle East Policy Issues. Policy
brief: Recommendations for the New
Administration. 03.17.21.
Rice University’s Baker Institute for
Public Policy, Houston, Texas.
https://doi.org/10.25613/J4BB-YE98
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