PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR - Challenges in The Mediterranean region T H E
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THE PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR Challenges in The Mediterranean region Issue 5 peacehumanity.org January 2022
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR All rights reserved © Platform for Peace and Humanity, 2022 Editors Ambre Karoutsos Filip Šandor Copy editors Kristian Weber Authors Ahmed Abdelaziem Fatima Umar Juan Carlos Benítez Kristian Weber Pamela Dávila Zofia Kostrzewa
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR Challenges in The Mediterranean region Issue 5 January 2022 Table of contents ANALYSIS Israel & Palestine: The 2015 Gideon Plan and its Evolution to the 2019 Tnufa Plan Kristian Weber Diversify or Perish: Turkey's 2022 Agenda in the Middle East Pamela Dávila Strategic Compass: Finding a Way Towards a More Effective MENA Policy Zofia Kostrzewa The Role of The Jewish Community in Moroccan Foreign Policy Juan Carlos Benítez Egyptian-Russian Relations and the Russian Influence on Contemporary Middle Eastern Politics Ahmed Abdelaziem BRIEF SITUATION REPORT Israel & Palestine - Palestine Postponed: The Lost Election Kristian Weber Turkey Zofia Kostrzewa Tunisia - Continuing Turmoil: A Tale Reoccurring Since Arab Spring Till 2022 Fatima Umar
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR Egypt - Security Stability and its Impact on the Emergency Law Ahmed Abdelaziem Maltese-Libyan Relations: Two Nations United by the Mediterranean Juan Carlos Benítez
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR Challenges in The Mediterranean region Issue 5 January 2022 Foreword The New Year came with the same rivalries in the Mediterranean region. Therefore, Turkey is aiming to normalise relations with its Middle-eastern partners, while the EU is discussing its Strategic Compass towards the MENA region and elections were postponed in Palestine. However, the North Africa is amidst changes: political turmoil in Tunisia and Libya, as well as the abolition of the emergency law in Egypt are shaping the Mediterreanean region of tomorrow. Furthermore, Russian involvement in Libya and relations with Egypt are in contrast with Israel relations with Morrocco driven by the Jewish community there. Historical alliances may hold, but they are to evolve with current events.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR Timeline 25/10/2021 Egyptian President Sisi terminated the martial law October 25, 2021 30/11/2021 Turkey’s Central Bank sells foreign 07/12/2021 reserves to prop up the lira. Turkey and Qatar sign 15 cooperation agreements 18/12/2021 Third Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit 21/12/2021 Turkey and Qatar sign MoU to operate Kabul Airport 31/12/2021 The lira becomes the worst performing 01/01/2022 currency in emerging markets in 2021, Armenia lifted its embargo on Turkish shedding 44% of its value against the products dollar. 02/01/2022 Erdogan announces visit to Saudi Arabia in February 01/2022 Israel is leading the world in new daily COVID-19 cases per capita as Omicron outbreaks in the country 04/01/2022 The meeting that took place between Turkish and Armenian special envoys in which a roadmap for the normalization 14/01/2022 of bilateral ties was discussed Important meeting regarding normalization of relations with Armenia 28/01/2022 USA temporarily halts arms sales to UAE and Saudi Arabia
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR Israel & Palestine: The 2015 Gideon Plan and its Evolution to the 2019 Tnufa Plan Kristian Weber Security is of the utmost importance for any but an offensive/deterrent posture towards the country, but for Israel, it is arguably all the more non-state threats. This more active approach so. In Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War”, fatal ground towards designated substate and terrorist (sometimes translated as ‘desperate ground’) is organizations results in what is referred to by the a terrain in which one finds themselves with their IDF as “Limited Campaigns” (Eizenkot 2015). As back to the wall and escape impossible. It is here recently as mid 2021, Israel conducted such an that a wise general, according to Sun Tzu, must operation in Gaza with the intention of drawing fight with zealous ferocity. It could be argued that out and eliminating Hamas fighters and Israel is a nation state founded upon fatal leadership as well as establishing deterrence. ground and that its very existence is predicated These limited campaigns, sometimes referred to on their military, scientific and economic as “mowing the grass” (Taylor 2021), may also success. This article will focus on the evolution of serve a political purpose for leaders who may Israeli defense strategy since 2015, its domestic want a boost in popularity for being seen as context and the shifting alliances abroad. taking the Hamas/Hezbollah threats seriously. As a country that sees itself as surrounded by The Gideon plan came amid an entrenched ISIS enemies, both inside and outside its ill-defined and as the Syrian civil war was in full swing - the borders (Melman 2015), Israel must take great unanticipated aftermath of the “Arab Spring” care when considering its position in the region. which has shaped, and will continue to shape, Iran is named as the distant threat and Lebanon the region going forward. Israel has reacted to as the near threat in the 2015 Israel Defense this change by continuing to reduce the number Forces (IDF) Strategy Document (Eizenkot 2015), of conventional, sometimes outdated, henceforth to be referred to as the “Gideon Plan”. warfighting platforms like tanks (75% fewer than It is here where the distinction is made between 1985) or war planes (50% fewer than 1985) threats who are state actors, Iran and Lebanon, (Melman 2015), and vastly increasing its and what the IDF designates “substate organizations”, Hezbollah and Hamas, and a further category of “Terrorist organizations without links to a particular state or community” (Eizenkot 2015). Although Israel possesses the single strongest military organization in the region, they must balance their organizational competencies between conventional warfare (i.e. tanks, missiles, planes and warships) as well as unconventional warfare (i.e. cyber, surveillance and missile defense systems) (Melman 2015). In the Gideon plan, the IDF states that it prefers to take a defensive posture, particularly towards its conventional military opponents, 5
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR cyber-capabilities and drone arsenal. Over the (Prime Minister) and Yair Lapid (Current Foreign 5-year course of the Gideon plan, the IDF budget Minister and next rotational Prime Minister). has remained stable as a percentage of GDP Through skilled politicking, Lapid has managed to (around 5.3%), but increased from $16.5b in 2015 coalesce disparate groups with competing up to $20b in 2019 (Macrotrends 2019). agendas under his name, even giving away the first two years of his potential Prime Minister term Times have changed since 2015, however, and in order to seal the deal. The ideologies of the under the direction of the 2019 “Tnufa plan”, Israel groups are not as important as the fact that their appears to be shifting focus back to modernizing thin marginal victory would realistically prevent its conventional fighting forces (particularly the them from tackling any controversy or grappling ground forces) and integrating the latest with the most difficult problems the country technologies into their respective service faces, like the Gaza Strip and the West Bank branches (Al-Zanoun 2019). The stated goal of settlements for starters. Lapid (and Bennet) the new multi-year plan is to increase “lethality, must spend his political capital wisely and on quantity and precision” and to improve its missile more immediate concerns like the pandemic defense systems to match both Hamas and situation. Should they falter, Netanyahu is waiting Iran’s respective increases in missile attack in the wings with claims that this new coalition capabilities (Barkat 2020). amounts to nothing less than a political coup d’etat against him (Rabinovich 2021). The end goal of the Tnufa plan related to ground forces is to build up a multidimensional force which relies on pressing the advantage provided by air superiority and following up on devastating missile strikes and/or cyber attacks. Communications and information systems will also be integrated across all forces so that “every part of the IDF can communicate with every other part” (Barkat 2020). The Tnufa plan also seeks to reinforce the missile defense system in three layers which hope to cover all possible threats from Hamas and Iran. The © tipinfo via Flickr platforms from the outer layer to the inner layer are as follows: Arrow 3 and 2 missiles to The pandemic situation in Israel is characterized intercept long and medium range ballistic by a bright red hue on heat maps nowadays, as missiles (Shaikh 2021), David’s Sling for a record number of cases were reported on intermediate range (50-300km) ballistic and Wednesday, January 4th (The Associated Press cruise missiles (Shaikh 2021) and the Iron Dome 2021). After opening its doors for tourism for the for defense against rocket attacks often first time since the beginning of the pandemic, employed by the designated substate/terrorist travel restrictions are again put in place, leaving organizations (Missile Defense Project 2021). a whiplashed public to bear the brunt of the omicron variant of Covid. Top Israeli health The Domestic Context official Sharron Alroy-Preis best captured the circumstances in one sentence live on Israeli TV: On the domestic front, Israel also finds itself in a “There is no control of the omicron wave” (The precarious position. After years of trials, scandals Associated Press 2021). and political games, Netanyahu’s position as prime minister has been overtaken by a slim, The new government now faces a difficult fractious majority headed by Naftali Bennet choice: allow the omicron to spread while 6
PEACE PEACE&&SECURITY SECURITYMONITOR MONITOR retaining some sense of normalcy and progress, the same with Bahrain (Rabinovich 2021). potentially risking the more vulnerable members of the population; or taking the plunge and The case of Bahrain is significant because it is instituting another lockdown which would seen as the diplomatic proxy for Saudi Arabia theoretically protect the more vulnerable citizens, testing the waters of normalization. Though they but threatens their fragile coalition and margin in have worked together in the past, covertly on parliament. In short, if the Bennet-Lapid matters of security due to a mutually government is to survive its infancy, they have a antagonistic relationship with Iran (Rahman politically hazardous uphill climb ahead of them. 2021), the Israel-Palestine conflict is a bridge too far for normalizing ties just yet. The Foreign Relations Context Even this once removed half step on Saudi The United States’ flip flop on the JCPOA Arabia’s part has infuriated Palestinians and agreement has left the possibility of a nuclear could have added pressure to the bubbling Iran on the table. And as the United States tensions which culminated in the May 21 violence withdraws from the middle east in its “pivot in the Gaza strip. The outbreak of violence has towards Asia”, Israel feels somewhat left alone to put a damper on the high of the accords, but it deal with Iran, who they frequently target with should be noted that the Palestinian push-back cyber attacks (Burgess 2021), as well as the odd did not result in any diplomatically tangible alleged assassination in an effort to prevent results in relation to setting back the them from building a nuclear weapon. There are normalization of relations between Israel and the also small domestic concerns tied to the U.S- UAE or Bahrain. Israeli relationship connected to Netanyahu’s decision to work more closely with Trump than The State of the Israel-Palestine Issue the traditional ‘both sides of the aisle’ approach. This momentum from the previous As part of the end result of the Six-Day War, administrations in both countries carried over to Israel is a country divided along stark ethnic and the new governments and has left a small religious lines. The only thing in Israel and political drama in its wake, of particular note the Palestine older than these Old Testament aftermath of the May 2021 Gaza situation spanning conflicts is the blood-soaked soil and (Rabinovich 2021). rocks over which they occur. West of the Jordan valley, there live an equal number of Arabs and This same trend of the United States choosing to Jews (Rabinovich 2021); and for either side, their lessen its influence in the middle east allows for very existence as a people is at stake. On the other opportunities to arise and strange Israeli side, a weak government lacks the political bedfellows to acquaint themselves. A long list of capital to make any lasting progress, while on Arab countries has long opposed the very the Palestinian side, a weak Palestinian Authority existence of Israel stretching all the way back to led by an aging Mahmoud Abbas faces an its founding, refusing to even diplomatically economic crisis and therefrom an emboldened acknowledge the state until the Palestinian issue Hamas. Significant progress on the major issues is resolved in a manner they deem satisfactory. seems unlikely given the untenable positions of The needle appears to be moving in a direction each government, making violence all the more the Israeli’s feel is positive and the Palestinians attractive to the more radical elements of both view as treacherous. The Abraham Accords, a sides (Rabinovich 2021). series of political agreements between Israel, the UAE, Morocco, Sudan and Bahrain, normalized The Israeli settlement of the West Bank will Israeli relations with the UAE and to a lesser continue, as was announced October 24th, 2021 extent promised to take steps to eventually do that 1355 homes are planned to be built to make 7
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR way for Jewish residents in the area (Wires Sources 2021). These settlements and others like it claim Melman, Y. (2015, September 13). The gideon doctrine: The changing territory and push out/dispossess Palestinians in middle east and IDF strategy. The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com. their path, making for a swiss cheese-like Retrieved January 3, 2022, from https://www.jpost.com/jerusalem- report/the-gideon-doctrine-412594 territory of Jewish settlements and pockets of Palestinian communities, each made all the Eizenkot, G. (2015, August). Israel Defense Forces Strategy Document. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. more resentful of one another as a Retrieved January 3, 2022, from consequence. As more Palestinians are pushed https://www.belfercenter.org/israel-defense-forces-strategy- document#!chapter-i from their homes, more seek refuge in the radical elements of Palestinian politics, like Hamas, who Taylor, A. (2021, May 15). With strikes targeting rockets and tunnels, use violence as their strongest negotiating tool. the Israeli tactic of 'mowing the Grass' returns to Gaza. The Washington Post. Retrieved January 3, 2022, from In response to this ebb and flow of violence, the https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/05/14/israel-gaza- Israeli government continues to expand its history/ settlements and uses increases in Palestinian Macrotrends. (2019). Israel military spending/defense budget 1960- violence to justify their own violent campaigns 2022. MacroTrends. Retrieved January 4, 2022, from https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/ISR/israel/military- towards political/economic ends. spending-defense-budget The balancing force in these zealous claims of Al-Zanoun, S. (2019, August 27). Editor. rawabt center. Retrieved January 4, 2022, from https://rawabetcenter.com/en/?p=7409 religious and ancestral land has traditionally been the United States. During the Trump Barkat, A. (2020, February 13). Chief of staff launches plan for "more lethal" IDF. Globes. Retrieved January 4, 2022, from presidency, the Israeli side of the conflict was https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-chief-of-staff-launches-plan- given the green light to pursue more aggressive for-more-lethal-idf-1001318466 settlement and violence against the Palestinian Shaikh, S. (2021, July 23). Arrow 2 (Israel). Missile Threat. Retrieved communities (BBC 2020). But now, one year into January 7, 2022, from https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/arrow- 2/ the Biden Presidency, the new Bennett-Lapid government cannot afford to relax their tone for Shaikh, S. (2021, July 13). David's Sling (Israel). Missile Threat. fear of losing their majority because the more Retrieved January 7, 2022, from https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/davids-sling/ aggressive policy towards the Palestinians had suited many Israeli citizens (Politico 2021). This Missile Defense Project. (2021, July 13). Iron Dome (Israel). Missile Threat. Retrieved January 7, 2022, from makes the Biden team’s job an uphill battle to https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/iron-dome/ move the political needle even back to where it Rabinovich, I. (2021). Israel In The Fall Of 2021: Domestic And Foreign was in 2016, let alone towards any peaceful Policy Challenges. Hoover Institution. Retrieved 2021, from solution to the conflict. https://www.hoover.org/research/israel-fall-2021-domestic-and- foreign-policy-challenges Good governance and cool heads could keep The Associated Press. (2022, January 5). Israel sets covid-19 record the violence to a minimum, but sadly, good as rule changes create whiplash. NPR. Retrieved January 7, 2022, from https://www.npr.org/2022/01/05/1070478298/israel-sets- politics and hot heads sometimes demand it. A covid-19-record-as-rule-changes-create-whiplash? strong Israeli or Palestinian government could be t=1641557935147 in a position to make progress through Burgess, M. (2021, November 29). A hacking spree against Iran spills compromise, or a diplomatically prudent United out into the physical world. Wired. Retrieved January 7, 2022, from https://www.wired.com/story/hacking-iran-critical-infrastructure- States could keep the status quo bearable for israel/ the international community. But all signs point to yet no peaceful resolution on the horizon. Rahman, O. (2021). The emergence of GCC-Israel relations in a changing Middle East. Brookings. Retrieved 2021, from https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-emergence-of-gcc- israel-relations-in-a-changing-middle-east/ 8
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR Wires, N. (2021, October 24). Israel announces plans to build 1,300 new West Bank Settlement Homes. France 24. Retrieved January 10, 2022, from https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20211024- israel-announces-plans-to-build-1-300-new-west-bank- settlement-homes BBC. (2020, June 25). Explainer: Israel, annexation and the West Bank. BBC News. Retrieved January 10, 2022, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-52756427 Toosi, N. (2021, November 21). Biden's balancing act in the Middle East has a problem: Israel. POLITICO. Retrieved January 10, 2022, from https://www.politico.com/news/2021/11/19/biden-middle- east-israel-523053 9
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR Diversify or Perish: Turkey's 2022 Agenda in the Middle East Pamela Dávila From sanctions and feuds with NATO over the Saudi Arabia and Qatar. This segment will help to acquisition of Russian military technology, to understand current trends in economic and acute socio economic problems, 2021 has security terms, and how these partnerships could proven to be a challenging year for the Turkish bolster Turkey’s power beyond the government. Nevertheless, it is precisely in this Mediterranean. The final section will offer a few context that the idea of diversifying its considerations of the implications in terms of partnerships appears as a strategic move in security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East order to secure Turkey’s stance as a relevant should these new partnerships consolidate. actor in world politics. Considering the shifting geopolitical dynamics experienced in 2021, Turkey’s 2021 in a Nutshell Turkey has chosen to look beyond the Mediterranean and pivot towards regions like the NATO and the US Middle East, mainly towards the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Turkey’s 2021 started with a rise in tensions with the United States and other NATO member Despite their long-standing differences, Turkey states due to the purchase and reception of an managed to approach the United Arab Emirates initial batch of the Russian S-400 surface-to-air and Saudi Arabia during 2021 in order to missile system. This move was deemed not only normalize their ties and, alongside Qatar, move as controversial but also as a threat to NATO towards greater collaboration agreements in itself (1). While Turkey’s decision led to hard terms of commerce and security. These renewed sanctions established by the US, and its expulsion alliances, while not entirely solidified at the from the F-35 program, the general situation did moment, represent an interesting strategy from not escalate to levels that suggested major Ankara that will most likely influence dynamics in problems would ensue. the Mediterranean in the long term. In fact, presidents Biden and Erdogan had a brief This article will explore the implications of meeting in the context of the last G20 meeting in Turkey’s new partnerships in 2022. The first late October 2021, which showed that both section will briefly summarize Turkey’s stance in countries recognize their need to preserve this 2021 in the international arena; this will include its relation with Greece, the United States, NATO, and security alliance. On the one hand, the latest Russia, in order to understand the reasons developments in the conflict between Russia and behind Turkey’s desire to diversify its partners. Ukraine reinforced Turkey’s role as a key NATO ally given its vital position in the Mediterranean This section will also focus on some of Turkey’s and the Black Sea. On the other hand, Turkey most pressing domestic challenges that have recognizes that a rupture with NATO would mean contributed to its consideration of new alliances. risking its access to Western technology and, The second section will analyze Turkey’s moves in (1) See Issue 2 of the Peace and Security Monitor: Challenges in the last few months with the aim of closing ties The Mediterranean region for a thorough explanation of the S-400 with new partners, specifically three GCC missile system dispute between Turkey and NATO: countries: The United Arab Emirates, https://peacehumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/peace- security-monitor_issue-1.pdf 10
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR therefore, putting its own security at stake While Turkey has declared they can no longer (Bechev, 2021) (2). keep receiving refugees, Greece has proceeded to strengthen its surveillance systems, installing a Greece 40km long fence along its border with Turkey, and building new facilities for refugees in the Furthermore, Turkey’s 2021 was characterized by islands of Samos and Lesbos, which are close to a continuous state of tension with its neighbor, its neighbor (Taylor, 2021). This could raise even Greece. Both countries have historical more geopolitical constraints, considering that, in differences that have not yet been solved, and the past, many refugees in Turkey attempted to which have appeared in diplomatic feuds for cross into Greece as a means to enter the decades. Following the 2020 Mediterranean crisis European Union. The increase in Greece’s when these states came close to an armed migratory controls could push more Afghani conflict, in early 2021 the Turkish and Greece refugees to choose Turkey as their main foreign ministers reunited in a summit in Ankara destination, putting a bigger strain on Turkish to address two of the nations’ main security society and economy. issues: Territorial waters disputes and migratory Additionally, in 2021 Greece signed a $1.68 billion flows in the region. defense procurement deal with Israel, oriented towards upgrading Greece’s Air Force. While The first concern is related to a 2020 Turkish Israel had remained close to Turkey since the expedition to search for natural gas and oil in 1990s, after a few disputes arose they decided contested territorial waters. During said their alliance was no longer strategic and sought exploration, two Greek and Turkish naval vessels to close ties with Greece in 2010 (Blavoukos, collided, an event considered to be a direct 2021). This partnership agreement translates into attack by Erdogan’s government (Kucukgocmen further diplomatic and military isolation for & Georgiopoulos, 2021). Considering Turkey’s Turkey in the Mediterranean, which could, in part, heavy dependence on energy imports and the explain strategies like the acquisition of the fact that it has been left out of two major energy Russian S-400 system, and its stance towards projects in the Mediterranean (Mercan, 2020), it other NATO member states. comes as no surprise that Ankara chose to continue its explorations for resources in 2021, a Russia move that has prompted stronger disputes with Greece. An additional point that cannot be overlooked when discussing Turkey’s 2021 is its relation with The second concern, related to migration flows in Russia. Last September, presidents Erdogan and the region, has also increased tensions between Putin met in Sochi for talks that intended to both nations, who have accused each other of reinforce their bilateral ties, despite previous pushing migrants to their neighbors’ coasts for political issues like their opposing stances in the decades. The influx of refugees in the region, Syrian Civil War and the situation in Ukraine. which has decreased in the past couple of years, While these talks were considered ‘productive’ by could take a new surge due to the latest events both sides, it is worth noting that due to the in Afghanistan, a situation that brings concern to fluctuating nature of their alliance these Turkey, who already hosts around 3.6 million countries have eventually become utilitarian refugees inside its territory (Armstrong, 2020). partners rather than actual allies (Litvinova & Fraser, 2021). (2) For example, the ongoing civil war in Syria has been one of Turkey’s main security concerns in the past decade. Border defense requires continuous reinforcement of their military resources, which are provided in large part by NATO. 11
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR A recent event that highlights this type of relation Erdogan’s acceptance rates (Koc, 2022). Both is the S-400 missile system purchase. While the issues could translate in the international arena deal was not born out of a desire for cooperation by making Turkey a less attractive economic and in defense matters, but rather from fear of political partner for other countries, which could Russian economic sanctions after a major rise in in turn affect its political role in the region. tensions in 2015, Turkey managed to send a message to NATO in regards its ability to To summarize, Turkey’s 2021 has been a year of diversify its partnerships in order to obtain constant tensions, both international and military technology. At the same time, Russia domestic. Erdogan’s government will most likely managed to convey a clear message to the face some key important challenges related to West: That they can exert influence over its its closest allies in 2022. In the first place, the partners and compete with the West’s strife with the US and NATO in regard to the technology. This specific alliance, therefore, did acquisition of Russian military technology has not answer to a genuine desire to cooperate in not yet been resolved, which could raise further terms of security, but rather to ulterior motives on tensions between both parties. Considering the both sides. ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Turkey could prove to be a key ally for securing stability in the Moreover, it is worth noting that Russia and Mediterranean and the Black Sea, one reason Turkey still share significant economic ties. why they might need to make a crucial decision Considering that Turkey imports over 90% of their in regards to its ties with the West. energy sources, Russia remains one of its key natural gas suppliers, which has given Moscow Turkey also faces an important challenge in the ability to influence Ankara’s economy should terms of energy resources, which relates, in part, they choose to (Furuncu, 2020). However, Russia to its relation with Greece. Turkey’s difficulty to cannot deny the fact that Turkey represents a secure energy sources within its own territory has strategic transit country for its natural gas not only made it dependent on other major exports, meaning they need to maintain their powers like Russia, but has also prevented it from bilateral ties as stable as possible for each exerting a more powerful stance to secure other’s benefit (Wilks, 2021). alliances like Greece has done with other key actors in the region. Domestic concerns Finally, it is vital to mention Turkey’s 2021 domestic context, where central government decisions have put a heavy strain on the country’s socioeconomic situation. Besides its tense relation with the European Union states due to the ongoing accession process, and the human rights concerns that arose from Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, the country’s economic problems have been a major point of inflexion for Erdogan’s government. Finally, Turkey’s domestic context —which could Turkey has two main domestic concerns to worsen with the migratory situation in the address in 2022: On the one hand, the Mediterranean — might contribute to further performance of the Turkish lira — which fell 44% isolation, as Turkey fails to present itself as a against the US dollar in 2021 —, and the country’s strong ally to other potential partners. In this 36% inflation rate, which have negatively affected context, Erdogan’s 2022 agenda appears to be 12
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR directed towards a diversification in multilateral stalemate for several years. The power vacuum relations that could enhance its current position created by the fall of traditional Arab leaders vis-à-vis other countries in the region, especially allowed for countries like the UAE and Saudi considering the upcoming presidential elections Arabia to take a more determinant role in the in 2023. Arab world; however, it also opened a door for Turkey’s involvement in Middle East politics. This Turkey and the GCC: A Love-Hate Relationship became a main area of concern for GCC countries since the Arab Spring uprisings After establishing some of Turkey’s key threatened the Gulf monarchies’ legitimacy; and challenges in the last year, it comes as no since Turkey supported revolutionary forces in surprise that Erdogan’s government has chosen several countries, its involvement in the Middle to look for close ties with partners outside the East was seen as a threat to stability in the Gulf region. In an unexpected move, Turkey has (Kardas, 2021). chosen to normalize ties with the GCC states, and has secured key compromises that might During this period, Turkey proved to be a strong improve their current situation. ally to Qatar, a GCC country that experienced considerable political and economic challenges Turkeys’ relations with the Gulf Countries – in the region. Qatar’s support for the Muslim especially with GCC states, which include Brotherhood resulted in a series of warnings from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, should they the UAE – have experienced historical continue backing a ‘terrorist organization’ fluctuations. While the 2010’s were characterized (Reuters, 2019). by a defined rift between both sides, certain events in 2021 show that the existing gap The demands escalated to an economic between Turkey and the GCC might start to blockade that negatively affected Qatar’s disappear. economy; in this context, Turkey remained one of Qatar’s main supporters. Both countries became Turkey began its approach to the Gulf Countries strategic economic and security partners, with after the First Gulf War, especially because of Turkey establishing a military base in Qatari economic interests. After the war, Turkey became territory, and Qatar investing heavily in FDI an emerging economy in search of new markets projects while also becoming one of Turkey’s for their foreign trade plans, as well as strategic main liquefied natural gas suppliers (Calik, partnerships for foreign direct investment (FDI); 2020). at the same time, the Gulf Countries, with considerable resources, showed an increasing Additionally, Turkey’s relations with Saudi Arabia interest in investment projects with new allies. and the UAE have been rather tense in the past Moreover, both sides had similar interests in few years. Despite its regional and domestic pressing issues in the Middle East, like the struggles, the aforementioned countries do ongoing concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear recognize Turkey’s assertiveness and influence in program and the support for the Palestinian the Muslim world, which, therefore, could threaten cause, among others. In this sense, cooperation their own leadership in the region. between Turkey and the GCC states was considered not only profitable in economic In the last decade, both sides have made terms, but also in geopolitical ones. decisions that reinforce their power struggles in the region. For example, Turkey angered the GCC However, the Arab Spring proved to be a major countries when it took a more utilitarian point of divergence that would keep relations approach towards Iran’s nuclear program between Turkey and the GCC countries in a (instead of siding with them against Iran). 13
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR nstead of siding with them against Iran). At the allies that will offer either economic or political same time, GCC states decided not only to profits (TRT World, 2021). In this sense, Turkey normalize ties with Israel (4) via the US-brokered could potentially provide the Gulf Countries with Abraham Accords, but also to sign security and both. energy cooperation agreements with Greece and Cyprus, a measure that was not taken well Besides its key location, skilled labor and by Erdogan’s government. competitive exchange rate (despite its latest currency issues), Turkey is finalizing the creation Nevertheless, 2021 showed a slight tendency of the Istanbul Finance Center, a project set to towards conciliation between Turkey and the open in the first half of 2022 that aims to GCC countries, which might push Turkey to “become a major (Islamic) financial hub serving choose a strategic approach towards the Middle many banks, public institutions and multinational East, and move its alliances away from the West. companies” (Daily Sabah, 2021). Additionally, the As for the UAE, in November 2021, Crown Prince UAE does consider Turkey as a country with Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan visited Ankara to considerable leadership power in the region; sign a financial cooperation deal of $10 billion in therefore, these initial economic ties could serve the health and energy fields, as well as bigger geopolitical interests in the long term. transportation, technology, environment, money laundering, among others. Additionally, there are As for Saudi Arabia, relations with Turkey took a expectations for both countries’ central banks to positive turn in 2021. After almost three years of engage in a swap agreement, which would tensions between both nations (5), the Turkish improve the Turkish lira’s current situation (Al Foreign Minister visited Riyadh last May to discuss Jazeera, 2021). bilateral relations, a meeting that took place after an alleged purchase of Turkish drones by The dynamics between these countries seem to Saudi Arabia in March 2021 (Al-Monitor, 2021). pivot towards cooperation based on economic interests, similar to what happened after the First This transaction and the fact that Saudi Arabia is Gulf War. On the one hand, Turkey is in great currently co-producing Turkish-made drones, is need for FDI projects and currency stabilization; not a coincidence: This GCC state has looked for on the other hand, despite the COVID-19 a new partnership with Turkey, given that the US pandemic having slowed down foreign trade, the has held off arms sales to Saudi Arabia (6) (DW, UAE is constantly looking for opportunities to 2021). Moreover, Turkey has vested interests in diversify its investments and alliances. closing ties with this Gulf country, considering that it has collaborated with Greece in joint The recent normalization of relations with Turkey military exercises and energy projects in the is due to shifting political dynamics in the region, Mediterranean. Mending relations with Saudi mainly due to events like the removal of US Arabia (and with the UAE) could give Turkey an troops from Afghanistan, the possible retake of opening for being considered in high-level talks with Iran and the end of Qatar’s economic Mediterranean forums that could offer new blockade, among others. If the UAE is expecting opportunities for their energy sourcing concerns. to exert more power and take leadership of the region, they need to move towards a security- (5) Tensions between Turkey and Saudi Arabia reached a peak in 2018 after the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul. oriented strategy and surround themselves with Saudi Arabia has also accused Turkey of supporting terrorist groups, like Hezbollah in Lebanon. (6) The US halted arms sales to both the UAE and Saudi Arabia in January 2021. In November 2021 the Biden administration decided (4) Turkey has historically supported Palestine in its territorial to resume the arms sale to Saudi Arabia. dispute with Israel. 14
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR Finally, relations with Qatar have remained solid, considering that Western traditional allies have especially due to Turkey's support during the failed to fill these needs. Nevertheless, Turkey’s GCC’s economic blockade. In December 2021, agenda with the GCC states goes beyond president Erdogan visited Doha to sign over 10 stabilizing its economy and, likewise for the Gulf cooperation agreements in different areas that countries, their approach to Turkey serves a benefit both countries. There were also talks for bigger purpose beyond FDI. convincing Qatar to extend the existing currency swap agreement with Turkey – that reached $15 Dynamics in the Middle East suffered billion in 2020 – a strategy that has greatly considerable changes in 2021, and most states helped Turkey’s economy (Kucukgocmen & will try to exert as much influence as they can Coskun, 2020). vis-à-vis their neighbors by using either soft or hard power. In the context of the removal of US Moreover, as it was previously mentioned, both troops from Afghanistan, some Arab countries – states have maintained a consistent military like the UAE and Bahrain – have chosen a more cooperation for several years, and during 2021, conciliatory approach towards Israel, for they entered negotiations with the Taliban-led example, even after decades of tensions due to government to work in ensuring Kabul’s airport the ongoing conflict with Palestine. This security and continue offering humanitarian normalization of relations answers to an assistance to people in Afghanistan. This increased instability in the Middle East, represents a key area of geopolitical influence characterized mainly by the new Taliban-led that might influence other GCC countries to government in Afghanistan, Iran’s ongoing consider an alliance with Turkey. After the United nuclear program, the Syrian Civil War and the States Forces left Afghanistan and the Taliban constant terrorist threat in the region. While these took control of the country, a power vacuum that do not represent new challenges, most countries threatened collective instability appeared in the have come to understand that political stability region. Taking into account that countries like the in a region as diverse as the Middle East requires UAE and Saudi Arabia might want to consolidate not only strong leadership, but also commitment their leadership in the Middle East, resuming and cooperation, even if it means working with amicable relations with two of the countries that unlikely partners. have come closer to security talks with the Taliban might prove beneficial in the long term. This is also part of the rationale behind Turkey’s 2022 agenda in the Middle East: Due to its Looking Ahead strategic position, instability in that region translates into instability for Ankara, a situation As it has been possible to observe, Turkey’s shift that Erdogan’s government will not tolerate. In towards the Gulf countries answers several of its order to avoid this, Turkey needs to reinforce main concerns. Economics and resources appear to be the main driver in their reproach to countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia; however, these represent but a small area of why relations between Ankara and the GCC have thawed in the past few months. Considering Turkey’s current challenges regarding the lira’s currency rate and the country’s heavy reliance on energy imports, an approach to wealthy, resource rich countries might seem like a natural move – especially 15
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR itself in relation to its main areas of concern, so Sources that they obtain not only a stronger position in Al Jazeera. (2021). Turkey, UAE sign financial cooperation deals as the Mediterranean, but also so that it manages ties warm. [online] Available at: to become a more relevant actor in the Middle https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/11/24/turkey-uae- sign-financial-cooperation-deals-as-ties-warm [Accessed East. January 8, 2022] The recent approaches to the GCC countries – in Al-Monitor. (2021). Intel: Saudi Arabia seeks Turkey’s drones, Erdogan says. [online] Available at: https://www.al- addition to talks with Egypt – in 2021 offers new monitor.com/originals/2021/03/turkey-saudi-drones- opportunities for collaboration with non- erdogan.html [Accessed January 8, 2022] traditional partners and opens a chance for Armstrong, M. (2021). These countries host the most refugees. Turkey to be included in high level forums for [online] Available at: energy cooperation agreements in the https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/12/countries-refugees- asylum-pandemic-covid [Accessed January 7, 2022] Mediterranean, which could be a first step into solving their issues with Greece. Moreover, Bechev, D. (2021). US and Turkey: It is not over yet. [online] Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/11/13/us- Turkey’s alliance with Qatar in managing Kabul and-turkey-it-is-not-over-yet [Accessed January 6, 2022] airport could prove to be a key bargaining chip to deepen its relations with other Middle East Blavoukos, S. (2021). The Greek-Israeli Relationship: Joining Forces to Tackle Turkey. [online] Available at: countries, hence strengthening its position as an https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/greek-israeli- important actor in security matters beyond the relationship-joining-forces-tackle-turkey [Accessed January 7, 2022] Mediterranean. Calik, E. (2020). Qatar's gas investment in Turkey and the Saudi blockade. [online] Available at: Turkey’s approach to the GCC countries does not https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200101-qatars-gas- necessarily entail a complete disengagement investment-in-turkey-and-the-saudi-blockade/ [Accessed with traditional Western partners, especially with January 7, 2022] NATO member states. It is possible that Turkey’s Daily Sabah. (2021). Gulf states’ appetite grows for investments in strategy towards the Middle East could be seen Turkey. [online] Available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/gulf-states- by the US as a more favorable move than siding appetite-grows-for-investments-in-turkey [Accessed January 8, with Russia, considering the current situation in 2022] Ukraine, where Turkey will definitely play a vital Deutsche Welle. (2021). Biden administration halts arms sales to role. At the same time, this initial approach does UAE and Saudi Arabia. [online] Available at: not guarantee a solid partnership between https://www.dw.com/en/biden-administration-halts-arms-sales- to-uae-and-saudi-arabia/a-56365478 [Accessed January 12, Turkey and the GCC states in the upcoming 2022] months, especially with countries like Saudi Arabia. As geopolitical dynamics evolve in the Furuncu, Y. (2020). Analysis: COVID-19’s blow to energy markets. [online] Available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis- Mediterranean and the Middle East, both sides covid-19s-blow-to-energy-markets/1817106 [Accessed January 7, will look for opportunities to capitalize on this new 2022] ‘friendly’ environment as long as their main Kardas, S. (2021). Turkey’s Relations with the Gulf Countries: Trends interests are not threatened. The normalization of and Drivers. [online] Available at: ties between Turkey and the GCC countries will https://ovipot.hypotheses.org/15724 [Accessed January 7, 2022] remain a key point of interest worth monitoring Koc, C. (2022). Mystery surrounds end-of-year windfall for Turkey’s during 2022. central bank. [online] Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/1/4/mystery- surrounds-end-of-year-windfall-for-turkeys-central-bank [Accessed January 7, 2022] Kucukgocmen, A. & Coskun, O. (2020). Qatar offers Turkey relief by tripling FC swap line to $15 billion. [online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-qatar-swap- idUSKBN22W147 [Accessed January 8, 2022] 16
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR Kucukgocmen, A & Georgiopoulos, G. (2021). Turkish, Greek foreign ministers trade accusations at news conference. [online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-says-all- issues-with-greece-be-discussed-meeting-thursday-2021-04-15/ [Accessed January 7, 2022] Litvinova, D. & Fraser, S. (2021). Putin, Erdogan sit down for talks on war-torn Syria. [online] Available at: https://apnews.com/article/europe-middle-east-russia-syria- migration-627a1060e880704ea51c1745298842a2 [Accessed January 7, 2022] Mercan, M. (2020). Turkey’s gas discovery could reduce energy dependency. [Online]. Available at: https://think.ing.com/articles/black-sea-energy-more-to-prove [Accessed January 7, 2022) Reuters. (2019). Explainer: Who is targeting the Muslim Brotherhood?. [online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump- muslimbrotherhood-explainer-idUSKCN1S90YX [Accessed January 7, 2022] Taylor, H.(2021). Greece extends border wall to deter Afghans trying to reach Europe. [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/21/greece- extends-border-wall-deter-afghans-trying-reach-europe [Accessed January 7, 2022] TRT World. (2021). A new dawn: Turkey and the Arab world choose cooperation over conflict. [online] Available at: https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/a-new-dawn-turkey-and- the-arab-world-choose-cooperation-over-conflict-52409 [Accessed January 8, 2022] Wilks, A. (2021). Ukraine tensions test Erdogan and Putin’s complex relationship. [online] Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/20/ukraine-tensions- test-erdogan-and-putins-complex-relationship [Accessed January 7, 2022] 17
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR Strategic Compass: Finding a Way Towards a More Effective MENA Policy Zofia Kostrzewa Introduction this article aims to infer whether the EU is likely to remain a worm in the Middle East, as it had in Following the failure of the European Union (EU) 1991, or if it can finally shed this label. to appropriately respond to the Gulf Crisis in 1991, Mark Eyskens, the Foreign Minister of Belgium said How Things Were Going South: EU in the Middle that ‘Europe is an economic giant, a political East dwarf, and a military worm.’ (Whitney, 1991). Since then, Europe has undergone many The MENA region presents an array of security changes that challenged this statement through threats to Europe, ranging from terrorism and a gradual development of its political and migration to maritime security and Iran’s nuclear military capacities (Zandee, Stoetman and Deen, programme. In recent years, increasing conflicts 2021). However, the Strategic Compass set to be in MENA and a general lack of economic voted on in March 2022 represents perhaps the opportunities have made terrorism and irregular most important recent development in this migration to the EU particularly salient threats, sphere. The Strategic Compass is a political with discussions on these topics generating proposal that will “set out a common strategic cracks in the internal stability of the Union vision for EU security and defence for the next 5- (Zarhloule, 2019; Dempsey, 2015). 10 years” (European External Action Service (EEAS), 2021, p. 4), and has been described as However, despite the negative spillover effects of “the closest thing the EU could have to a military MENA conflicts on European security, it is notable doctrine” (Emmott, 2020). that the EU has “not been a major player in recent conflicts” (Anderson, 2021). In fact, The This doctrine and strategy come at a particular EU’s engagement in MENA has also been critical juncture in EU, and Middle East and North characterized by having a ‘short-term’ and Africa (MENA) relations. Growing instability in the ‘transactional’ character, designed to primarily MENA region and the decreasing involvement of focus on migration, and not the underlying the United States (US) has opened the space for drivers of instability (Zarhloule, 2019). This can be other actors and consequent shifts in power seen from the EU’s Agreements with Turkey and balances that can threaten not only EU interests Libya on border control and refugees (Thevenin, but also overall European security (Genugten, 2020). Similarly, where the EU has tried to 2021). Keeping this in mind, this article will explore engage in diplomacy or conflict resolution, it has what the Strategic Compass can and should been described as ‘weak, ‘irrelevant’ and a mean for the EU’s security policy in the MENA ‘bystander’ (Anderson, 2021; Weimers, 2020; region. The article will begin with an analysis of Çetin, 2016). This was seen not only in the fall-out the EU’s policy towards MENA to date. It will then of the Iran nuclear deal, where the EU was shown proceed to examine whether the components of to have a “ limited ability to chart a truly the Compass can help European policy become independent foreign policy” (Grammer and more effective in the region. In this discussion, Johnson, 2020), but also in two recent major the EU- NATO relationship will also be conflicts in the region: Syria and Libya. considered. Altogether, through this exploration, 18
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR In Syria, the EU’s non-military tools of intervention there is an opportunity for the EU to put such a such as sanctions and diplomatic dialogues strategy in place, as the US is beginning to pivot proved ineffective in the first stage of the conflict away from the MENA region towards Asia resolution. At the time, the EU did not engage (Genugten, 2021). militarily as it did not possess a mechanism necessary for deploying coercive forces. Even if it Changing Direction had, disagreements among Member States came to the fore during this crisis, and many Given the developing changes, it is clear that the solutions were not possible due to different views EU needs to alter its approach to the Middle East on correct policy options and outcomes (for and North Africa. It is predicted that in the next 10 instance, some Member States thought a years, the MENA region will require the most negotiated solution was feasible, while others attention from the EU in terms of civilian and considered the fall of Assad as inevitable). In military crisis management deployments (Fiott such an environment, the EU only adopted a and Lindstrom, 2021). In light of the current strategy for conflicts in Syria, as well as Iraq and situation, the Strategic Compass has the the fight against the Islamic State 4 years later potential to ensure a stronger, more effective (van Veen, Di Pietrantonio Pellise, Ezzeddine, presence of the EU in the region. This next section Napolitano, 2021). The issue of diverging policy will now explore to what extent the Compass priorities was one of the key reasons for the EU’s addresses the issues identified above regarding ineffectiveness as a player in the Libyan conflict European engagement in the MENA region. and peace process, as Italy and France declared themselves on opposite sides of the conflict. In First, when it comes to developing a long-term such a scenario, even the Common Security and strategy, the Compass aims to bring together a Defense Policy (CSDP) military and civilian vision for European security and defense for the operations and the EU’s participation in next 5-10 years. In doing so, it has outlined four diplomatic dialogues were unable to have great points of focus: crisis management (scenarios influence. To add to this, Member States have for military civilian missions, geographical been contradictory in their approach to priorities, institutional capacity), resilience Operation Irini (designed to enforce arms (mutual assistance and solidarity, protecting embargo), whereby some states continue to critical infrastructure, non-traditional threats), export arms to other regional actors involved in capability development (technological the conflict and thus undermine the EU’s general sovereignty, PESCO, European Defence Fund, interest(s) (Crosson, 2020). space, cyber and maritime capabilities), and partnerships (UN, NATO, US, Africa, Eastern The actions of the EU in these two conflicts partnership, Indo-Pacific). Such an approach illustrate why the EU has not been able to clearly envisions a long-term strategy that is effectively engage in the MENA region: lack of multi-pronged and makes use of the EU’s long-term strategy, a lack of the right tools, and already existing capabilities. However, how disagreement among Member States. coherent the strategy will be, in accounting for the various EU instruments already in existence Moreover, an exacerbating factor to European as well as the tendency of Member States to ineffectiveness was the substantial role that the engage in conflicts outside of the EU framework, US played in the region. In the past, the EU had will only be visible during the implementation continually relied on US leadership due to the stage. country’s ability to engage militarily to a much higher extent than the EU. However, this would Perhaps the most debated contribution of the often come at the cost of developing a European Compass is the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, regional strategy (Zarhloule, 2019). Currently, which aims to have 5,000 troops, including land, 19
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR air, and maritime components ready for for EU security and defence among European deployment (EEAS 2021). Such a force could Union Member States threat analysis (EEAS, 2021; prove instrumental to quick and decisive Amirfarhangi, 2021). This analysis was concluded reactions at the beginning of conflicts, such as in in 2020, and aimed at establishing a common Syria, but it seems to fall short of the idea of a vision for the increasingly complex threats facing European Army (Nováky, 2021). However, the the EU in the future. Unlike the EU Global Strategy, deployment of such troops would still require the creation of the threat assessment and the consensus of the Member States (Emmott, 2021), Strategic Compass has been a Member State- and it is important to note that the EU already led project. Given the commitment expressed by has deployable troops, the so called EU Member States to this endeavor, there is hope Battlegroups of 1,500 troops, but it has been that a unified vision can be achieved not only of reluctant to use them, for example in Libya, due how threats themselves are understood, but also to disagreements among its Member States their solutions (EUISS Foresight, 2021). (Reykers, 2016). In fact, the Battlegroups have never been deployed at all (van Veen, Di On these three main issues, the Compass has Pietrantonio Pellise, Ezzeddine, Napolitano, 2021). certainly been an important start, but given the As such, it is not entirely clear whether the rising importance of the MENA region to the EU, addition of more troops will solve the problems in the final version of the Compass needs to take diverging foreign policy views unless serious into account how exactly the EU aims to engage. consideration is given to the voting procedure on Taking into account the EU’s past actions, the their deployment (Perissich, 2021). Compass should provide a concrete explanation as to why engagement in the MENA region is It is on this front that the Compass can, and to a necessary, how crisis management tools should certain extent has, made progress. Through a be employed, and how to make better use of shared threat analysis “based on information non-coercive tools if military engagement is not from the civilian and military intelligence services pursued (Fiott and Lindstrom, 2021). In addition, of the 27 EU member states”, the Compass did further attention should be paid to how to try to create the foundations for a shared vision counteract the strategic competition of other © European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) via Flickr 20
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