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THE
PEACE &
SECURITY
MONITOR
Challenges in The Mediterranean region
Issue 5
peacehumanity.org
January 2022
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR All rights reserved © Platform for Peace and Humanity, 2022 Editors Ambre Karoutsos Filip Šandor Copy editors Kristian Weber Authors Ahmed Abdelaziem Fatima Umar Juan Carlos Benítez Kristian Weber Pamela Dávila Zofia Kostrzewa
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
Challenges in The Mediterranean region
Issue 5 January 2022
Table of contents
ANALYSIS
Israel & Palestine: The 2015 Gideon Plan and its Evolution to the 2019 Tnufa
Plan
Kristian Weber
Diversify or Perish: Turkey's 2022 Agenda in the Middle East
Pamela Dávila
Strategic Compass: Finding a Way Towards a More Effective MENA Policy
Zofia Kostrzewa
The Role of The Jewish Community in Moroccan Foreign Policy
Juan Carlos Benítez
Egyptian-Russian Relations and the Russian Influence on Contemporary
Middle Eastern Politics
Ahmed Abdelaziem
BRIEF SITUATION REPORT
Israel & Palestine - Palestine Postponed: The Lost Election
Kristian Weber
Turkey
Zofia Kostrzewa
Tunisia - Continuing Turmoil: A Tale Reoccurring Since Arab Spring Till
2022
Fatima Umar
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR Egypt - Security Stability and its Impact on the Emergency Law Ahmed Abdelaziem Maltese-Libyan Relations: Two Nations United by the Mediterranean Juan Carlos Benítez
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
Challenges in The Mediterranean region
Issue 5 January 2022
Foreword
The New Year came with the same rivalries in the Mediterranean region.
Therefore, Turkey is aiming to normalise relations with its Middle-eastern partners,
while the EU is discussing its Strategic Compass towards the MENA region and
elections were postponed in Palestine.
However, the North Africa is amidst changes: political turmoil in Tunisia and Libya,
as well as the abolition of the emergency law in Egypt are shaping the
Mediterreanean region of tomorrow. Furthermore, Russian involvement in Libya
and relations with Egypt are in contrast with Israel relations with Morrocco driven
by the Jewish community there. Historical alliances may hold, but they are to
evolve with current events.
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
Timeline
25/10/2021
Egyptian President Sisi terminated the
martial law October 25, 2021
30/11/2021
Turkey’s Central Bank sells foreign
07/12/2021 reserves to prop up the lira.
Turkey and Qatar sign 15 cooperation
agreements
18/12/2021
Third Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit
21/12/2021
Turkey and Qatar sign MoU to operate
Kabul Airport
31/12/2021
The lira becomes the worst performing
01/01/2022 currency in emerging markets in 2021,
Armenia lifted its embargo on Turkish shedding 44% of its value against the
products dollar.
02/01/2022
Erdogan announces visit to Saudi Arabia
in February
01/2022
Israel is leading the world in new daily
COVID-19 cases per capita as Omicron
outbreaks in the country 04/01/2022
The meeting that took place between
Turkish and Armenian special envoys in
which a roadmap for the normalization
14/01/2022 of bilateral ties was discussed
Important meeting regarding
normalization of relations with Armenia
28/01/2022
USA temporarily halts arms sales to UAE
and Saudi Arabia
PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
Israel & Palestine: The 2015 Gideon Plan and its Evolution to
the 2019 Tnufa Plan
Kristian Weber
Security is of the utmost importance for any but an offensive/deterrent posture towards the
country, but for Israel, it is arguably all the more non-state threats. This more active approach
so. In Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War”, fatal ground towards designated substate and terrorist
(sometimes translated as ‘desperate ground’) is organizations results in what is referred to by the
a terrain in which one finds themselves with their IDF as “Limited Campaigns” (Eizenkot 2015). As
back to the wall and escape impossible. It is here recently as mid 2021, Israel conducted such an
that a wise general, according to Sun Tzu, must operation in Gaza with the intention of drawing
fight with zealous ferocity. It could be argued that out and eliminating Hamas fighters and
Israel is a nation state founded upon fatal leadership as well as establishing deterrence.
ground and that its very existence is predicated These limited campaigns, sometimes referred to
on their military, scientific and economic as “mowing the grass” (Taylor 2021), may also
success. This article will focus on the evolution of serve a political purpose for leaders who may
Israeli defense strategy since 2015, its domestic want a boost in popularity for being seen as
context and the shifting alliances abroad. taking the Hamas/Hezbollah threats seriously.
As a country that sees itself as surrounded by The Gideon plan came amid an entrenched ISIS
enemies, both inside and outside its ill-defined and as the Syrian civil war was in full swing - the
borders (Melman 2015), Israel must take great unanticipated aftermath of the “Arab Spring”
care when considering its position in the region. which has shaped, and will continue to shape,
Iran is named as the distant threat and Lebanon the region going forward. Israel has reacted to
as the near threat in the 2015 Israel Defense this change by continuing to reduce the number
Forces (IDF) Strategy Document (Eizenkot 2015), of conventional, sometimes outdated,
henceforth to be referred to as the “Gideon Plan”. warfighting platforms like tanks (75% fewer than
It is here where the distinction is made between 1985) or war planes (50% fewer than 1985)
threats who are state actors, Iran and Lebanon, (Melman 2015), and vastly increasing its
and what the IDF designates “substate
organizations”, Hezbollah and Hamas, and a
further category of “Terrorist organizations
without links to a particular state or community”
(Eizenkot 2015).
Although Israel possesses the single strongest
military organization in the region, they must
balance their organizational competencies
between conventional warfare (i.e. tanks,
missiles, planes and warships) as well as
unconventional warfare (i.e. cyber, surveillance
and missile defense systems) (Melman 2015). In
the Gideon plan, the IDF states that it prefers to
take a defensive posture, particularly towards its
conventional military opponents,
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cyber-capabilities and drone arsenal. Over the (Prime Minister) and Yair Lapid (Current Foreign
5-year course of the Gideon plan, the IDF budget Minister and next rotational Prime Minister).
has remained stable as a percentage of GDP Through skilled politicking, Lapid has managed to
(around 5.3%), but increased from $16.5b in 2015 coalesce disparate groups with competing
up to $20b in 2019 (Macrotrends 2019). agendas under his name, even giving away the
first two years of his potential Prime Minister term
Times have changed since 2015, however, and in order to seal the deal. The ideologies of the
under the direction of the 2019 “Tnufa plan”, Israel groups are not as important as the fact that their
appears to be shifting focus back to modernizing thin marginal victory would realistically prevent
its conventional fighting forces (particularly the them from tackling any controversy or grappling
ground forces) and integrating the latest with the most difficult problems the country
technologies into their respective service faces, like the Gaza Strip and the West Bank
branches (Al-Zanoun 2019). The stated goal of settlements for starters. Lapid (and Bennet)
the new multi-year plan is to increase “lethality, must spend his political capital wisely and on
quantity and precision” and to improve its missile more immediate concerns like the pandemic
defense systems to match both Hamas and situation. Should they falter, Netanyahu is waiting
Iran’s respective increases in missile attack in the wings with claims that this new coalition
capabilities (Barkat 2020). amounts to nothing less than a political coup
d’etat against him (Rabinovich 2021).
The end goal of the Tnufa plan related to ground
forces is to build up a multidimensional force
which relies on pressing the advantage provided
by air superiority and following up on
devastating missile strikes and/or cyber attacks.
Communications and information systems will
also be integrated across all forces so that
“every part of the IDF can communicate with
every other part” (Barkat 2020). The Tnufa plan
also seeks to reinforce the missile defense
system in three layers which hope to cover all
possible threats from Hamas and Iran. The
© tipinfo via Flickr
platforms from the outer layer to the inner layer
are as follows: Arrow 3 and 2 missiles to The pandemic situation in Israel is characterized
intercept long and medium range ballistic by a bright red hue on heat maps nowadays, as
missiles (Shaikh 2021), David’s Sling for a record number of cases were reported on
intermediate range (50-300km) ballistic and Wednesday, January 4th (The Associated Press
cruise missiles (Shaikh 2021) and the Iron Dome 2021). After opening its doors for tourism for the
for defense against rocket attacks often first time since the beginning of the pandemic,
employed by the designated substate/terrorist travel restrictions are again put in place, leaving
organizations (Missile Defense Project 2021). a whiplashed public to bear the brunt of the
omicron variant of Covid. Top Israeli health
The Domestic Context official Sharron Alroy-Preis best captured the
circumstances in one sentence live on Israeli TV:
On the domestic front, Israel also finds itself in a “There is no control of the omicron wave” (The
precarious position. After years of trials, scandals Associated Press 2021).
and political games, Netanyahu’s position as
prime minister has been overtaken by a slim, The new government now faces a difficult
fractious majority headed by Naftali Bennet choice: allow the omicron to spread while
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retaining some sense of normalcy and progress, the same with Bahrain (Rabinovich 2021).
potentially risking the more vulnerable members
of the population; or taking the plunge and The case of Bahrain is significant because it is
instituting another lockdown which would seen as the diplomatic proxy for Saudi Arabia
theoretically protect the more vulnerable citizens, testing the waters of normalization. Though they
but threatens their fragile coalition and margin in have worked together in the past, covertly on
parliament. In short, if the Bennet-Lapid matters of security due to a mutually
government is to survive its infancy, they have a antagonistic relationship with Iran (Rahman
politically hazardous uphill climb ahead of them. 2021), the Israel-Palestine conflict is a bridge too
far for normalizing ties just yet.
The Foreign Relations Context
Even this once removed half step on Saudi
The United States’ flip flop on the JCPOA Arabia’s part has infuriated Palestinians and
agreement has left the possibility of a nuclear could have added pressure to the bubbling
Iran on the table. And as the United States tensions which culminated in the May 21 violence
withdraws from the middle east in its “pivot in the Gaza strip. The outbreak of violence has
towards Asia”, Israel feels somewhat left alone to put a damper on the high of the accords, but it
deal with Iran, who they frequently target with should be noted that the Palestinian push-back
cyber attacks (Burgess 2021), as well as the odd did not result in any diplomatically tangible
alleged assassination in an effort to prevent results in relation to setting back the
them from building a nuclear weapon. There are normalization of relations between Israel and the
also small domestic concerns tied to the U.S- UAE or Bahrain.
Israeli relationship connected to Netanyahu’s
decision to work more closely with Trump than The State of the Israel-Palestine Issue
the traditional ‘both sides of the aisle’ approach.
This momentum from the previous As part of the end result of the Six-Day War,
administrations in both countries carried over to Israel is a country divided along stark ethnic and
the new governments and has left a small religious lines. The only thing in Israel and
political drama in its wake, of particular note the Palestine older than these Old Testament
aftermath of the May 2021 Gaza situation spanning conflicts is the blood-soaked soil and
(Rabinovich 2021). rocks over which they occur. West of the Jordan
valley, there live an equal number of Arabs and
This same trend of the United States choosing to Jews (Rabinovich 2021); and for either side, their
lessen its influence in the middle east allows for very existence as a people is at stake. On the
other opportunities to arise and strange Israeli side, a weak government lacks the political
bedfellows to acquaint themselves. A long list of capital to make any lasting progress, while on
Arab countries has long opposed the very the Palestinian side, a weak Palestinian Authority
existence of Israel stretching all the way back to led by an aging Mahmoud Abbas faces an
its founding, refusing to even diplomatically economic crisis and therefrom an emboldened
acknowledge the state until the Palestinian issue Hamas. Significant progress on the major issues
is resolved in a manner they deem satisfactory. seems unlikely given the untenable positions of
The needle appears to be moving in a direction each government, making violence all the more
the Israeli’s feel is positive and the Palestinians attractive to the more radical elements of both
view as treacherous. The Abraham Accords, a sides (Rabinovich 2021).
series of political agreements between Israel, the
UAE, Morocco, Sudan and Bahrain, normalized The Israeli settlement of the West Bank will
Israeli relations with the UAE and to a lesser continue, as was announced October 24th, 2021
extent promised to take steps to eventually do that 1355 homes are planned to be built to make
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way for Jewish residents in the area (Wires Sources
2021). These settlements and others like it claim
Melman, Y. (2015, September 13). The gideon doctrine: The changing
territory and push out/dispossess Palestinians in middle east and IDF strategy. The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com.
their path, making for a swiss cheese-like Retrieved January 3, 2022, from https://www.jpost.com/jerusalem-
report/the-gideon-doctrine-412594
territory of Jewish settlements and pockets of
Palestinian communities, each made all the Eizenkot, G. (2015, August). Israel Defense Forces Strategy
Document. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
more resentful of one another as a Retrieved January 3, 2022, from
consequence. As more Palestinians are pushed https://www.belfercenter.org/israel-defense-forces-strategy-
document#!chapter-i
from their homes, more seek refuge in the radical
elements of Palestinian politics, like Hamas, who Taylor, A. (2021, May 15). With strikes targeting rockets and tunnels,
use violence as their strongest negotiating tool. the Israeli tactic of 'mowing the Grass' returns to Gaza. The
Washington Post. Retrieved January 3, 2022, from
In response to this ebb and flow of violence, the https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/05/14/israel-gaza-
Israeli government continues to expand its history/
settlements and uses increases in Palestinian Macrotrends. (2019). Israel military spending/defense budget 1960-
violence to justify their own violent campaigns 2022. MacroTrends. Retrieved January 4, 2022, from
https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/ISR/israel/military-
towards political/economic ends.
spending-defense-budget
The balancing force in these zealous claims of Al-Zanoun, S. (2019, August 27). Editor. rawabt center. Retrieved
January 4, 2022, from https://rawabetcenter.com/en/?p=7409
religious and ancestral land has traditionally
been the United States. During the Trump Barkat, A. (2020, February 13). Chief of staff launches plan for "more
lethal" IDF. Globes. Retrieved January 4, 2022, from
presidency, the Israeli side of the conflict was https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-chief-of-staff-launches-plan-
given the green light to pursue more aggressive for-more-lethal-idf-1001318466
settlement and violence against the Palestinian Shaikh, S. (2021, July 23). Arrow 2 (Israel). Missile Threat. Retrieved
communities (BBC 2020). But now, one year into January 7, 2022, from https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/arrow-
2/
the Biden Presidency, the new Bennett-Lapid
government cannot afford to relax their tone for Shaikh, S. (2021, July 13). David's Sling (Israel). Missile Threat.
fear of losing their majority because the more Retrieved January 7, 2022, from
https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/davids-sling/
aggressive policy towards the Palestinians had
suited many Israeli citizens (Politico 2021). This Missile Defense Project. (2021, July 13). Iron Dome (Israel). Missile
Threat. Retrieved January 7, 2022, from
makes the Biden team’s job an uphill battle to https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/iron-dome/
move the political needle even back to where it
Rabinovich, I. (2021). Israel In The Fall Of 2021: Domestic And Foreign
was in 2016, let alone towards any peaceful
Policy Challenges. Hoover Institution. Retrieved 2021, from
solution to the conflict. https://www.hoover.org/research/israel-fall-2021-domestic-and-
foreign-policy-challenges
Good governance and cool heads could keep The Associated Press. (2022, January 5). Israel sets covid-19 record
the violence to a minimum, but sadly, good as rule changes create whiplash. NPR. Retrieved January 7, 2022,
from https://www.npr.org/2022/01/05/1070478298/israel-sets-
politics and hot heads sometimes demand it. A covid-19-record-as-rule-changes-create-whiplash?
strong Israeli or Palestinian government could be t=1641557935147
in a position to make progress through Burgess, M. (2021, November 29). A hacking spree against Iran spills
compromise, or a diplomatically prudent United out into the physical world. Wired. Retrieved January 7, 2022, from
https://www.wired.com/story/hacking-iran-critical-infrastructure-
States could keep the status quo bearable for
israel/
the international community. But all signs point to
yet no peaceful resolution on the horizon. Rahman, O. (2021). The emergence of GCC-Israel relations in a
changing Middle East. Brookings. Retrieved 2021, from
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-emergence-of-gcc-
israel-relations-in-a-changing-middle-east/
8PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
Wires, N. (2021, October 24). Israel announces plans to build 1,300
new West Bank Settlement Homes. France 24. Retrieved January 10,
2022, from https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20211024-
israel-announces-plans-to-build-1-300-new-west-bank-
settlement-homes
BBC. (2020, June 25). Explainer: Israel, annexation and the West
Bank. BBC News. Retrieved January 10, 2022, from
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-52756427
Toosi, N. (2021, November 21). Biden's balancing act in the Middle
East has a problem: Israel. POLITICO. Retrieved January 10, 2022,
from https://www.politico.com/news/2021/11/19/biden-middle-
east-israel-523053
9PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
Diversify or Perish: Turkey's 2022 Agenda in the Middle East
Pamela Dávila
From sanctions and feuds with NATO over the Saudi Arabia and Qatar. This segment will help to
acquisition of Russian military technology, to understand current trends in economic and
acute socio economic problems, 2021 has security terms, and how these partnerships could
proven to be a challenging year for the Turkish bolster Turkey’s power beyond the
government. Nevertheless, it is precisely in this Mediterranean. The final section will offer a few
context that the idea of diversifying its considerations of the implications in terms of
partnerships appears as a strategic move in security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East
order to secure Turkey’s stance as a relevant should these new partnerships consolidate.
actor in world politics. Considering the shifting
geopolitical dynamics experienced in 2021, Turkey’s 2021 in a Nutshell
Turkey has chosen to look beyond the
Mediterranean and pivot towards regions like the NATO and the US
Middle East, mainly towards the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries. Turkey’s 2021 started with a rise in tensions with
the United States and other NATO member
Despite their long-standing differences, Turkey states due to the purchase and reception of an
managed to approach the United Arab Emirates
initial batch of the Russian S-400 surface-to-air
and Saudi Arabia during 2021 in order to
missile system. This move was deemed not only
normalize their ties and, alongside Qatar, move
as controversial but also as a threat to NATO
towards greater collaboration agreements in
itself (1). While Turkey’s decision led to hard
terms of commerce and security. These renewed
sanctions established by the US, and its expulsion
alliances, while not entirely solidified at the
from the F-35 program, the general situation did
moment, represent an interesting strategy from
not escalate to levels that suggested major
Ankara that will most likely influence dynamics in
problems would ensue.
the Mediterranean in the long term.
In fact, presidents Biden and Erdogan had a brief
This article will explore the implications of
meeting in the context of the last G20 meeting in
Turkey’s new partnerships in 2022. The first
late October 2021, which showed that both
section will briefly summarize Turkey’s stance in
countries recognize their need to preserve this
2021 in the international arena; this will include its
relation with Greece, the United States, NATO, and security alliance. On the one hand, the latest
Russia, in order to understand the reasons developments in the conflict between Russia and
behind Turkey’s desire to diversify its partners. Ukraine reinforced Turkey’s role as a key NATO
ally given its vital position in the Mediterranean
This section will also focus on some of Turkey’s and the Black Sea. On the other hand, Turkey
most pressing domestic challenges that have recognizes that a rupture with NATO would mean
contributed to its consideration of new alliances. risking its access to Western technology and,
The second section will analyze Turkey’s moves in
(1) See Issue 2 of the Peace and Security Monitor: Challenges in
the last few months with the aim of closing ties The Mediterranean region for a thorough explanation of the S-400
with new partners, specifically three GCC missile system dispute between Turkey and NATO:
countries: The United Arab Emirates, https://peacehumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/peace-
security-monitor_issue-1.pdf
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therefore, putting its own security at stake While Turkey has declared they can no longer
(Bechev, 2021) (2). keep receiving refugees, Greece has proceeded
to strengthen its surveillance systems, installing a
Greece 40km long fence along its border with Turkey,
and building new facilities for refugees in the
Furthermore, Turkey’s 2021 was characterized by islands of Samos and Lesbos, which are close to
a continuous state of tension with its neighbor, its neighbor (Taylor, 2021). This could raise even
Greece. Both countries have historical more geopolitical constraints, considering that, in
differences that have not yet been solved, and the past, many refugees in Turkey attempted to
which have appeared in diplomatic feuds for cross into Greece as a means to enter the
decades. Following the 2020 Mediterranean crisis European Union. The increase in Greece’s
when these states came close to an armed migratory controls could push more Afghani
conflict, in early 2021 the Turkish and Greece refugees to choose Turkey as their main
foreign ministers reunited in a summit in Ankara destination, putting a bigger strain on Turkish
to address two of the nations’ main security society and economy.
issues: Territorial waters disputes and migratory
Additionally, in 2021 Greece signed a $1.68 billion
flows in the region.
defense procurement deal with Israel, oriented
towards upgrading Greece’s Air Force. While
The first concern is related to a 2020 Turkish
Israel had remained close to Turkey since the
expedition to search for natural gas and oil in
1990s, after a few disputes arose they decided
contested territorial waters. During said
their alliance was no longer strategic and sought
exploration, two Greek and Turkish naval vessels
to close ties with Greece in 2010 (Blavoukos,
collided, an event considered to be a direct
2021). This partnership agreement translates into
attack by Erdogan’s government (Kucukgocmen
further diplomatic and military isolation for
& Georgiopoulos, 2021). Considering Turkey’s
Turkey in the Mediterranean, which could, in part,
heavy dependence on energy imports and the
explain strategies like the acquisition of the
fact that it has been left out of two major energy
Russian S-400 system, and its stance towards
projects in the Mediterranean (Mercan, 2020), it
other NATO member states.
comes as no surprise that Ankara chose to
continue its explorations for resources in 2021, a Russia
move that has prompted stronger disputes with
Greece. An additional point that cannot be overlooked
when discussing Turkey’s 2021 is its relation with
The second concern, related to migration flows in Russia. Last September, presidents Erdogan and
the region, has also increased tensions between Putin met in Sochi for talks that intended to
both nations, who have accused each other of reinforce their bilateral ties, despite previous
pushing migrants to their neighbors’ coasts for political issues like their opposing stances in the
decades. The influx of refugees in the region, Syrian Civil War and the situation in Ukraine.
which has decreased in the past couple of years, While these talks were considered ‘productive’ by
could take a new surge due to the latest events both sides, it is worth noting that due to the
in Afghanistan, a situation that brings concern to fluctuating nature of their alliance these
Turkey, who already hosts around 3.6 million countries have eventually become utilitarian
refugees inside its territory (Armstrong, 2020). partners rather than actual allies (Litvinova &
Fraser, 2021).
(2) For example, the ongoing civil war in Syria has been one of
Turkey’s main security concerns in the past decade. Border defense
requires continuous reinforcement of their military resources, which
are provided in large part by NATO.
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A recent event that highlights this type of relation Erdogan’s acceptance rates (Koc, 2022). Both
is the S-400 missile system purchase. While the issues could translate in the international arena
deal was not born out of a desire for cooperation by making Turkey a less attractive economic and
in defense matters, but rather from fear of political partner for other countries, which could
Russian economic sanctions after a major rise in in turn affect its political role in the region.
tensions in 2015, Turkey managed to send a
message to NATO in regards its ability to To summarize, Turkey’s 2021 has been a year of
diversify its partnerships in order to obtain constant tensions, both international and
military technology. At the same time, Russia domestic. Erdogan’s government will most likely
managed to convey a clear message to the face some key important challenges related to
West: That they can exert influence over its its closest allies in 2022. In the first place, the
partners and compete with the West’s strife with the US and NATO in regard to the
technology. This specific alliance, therefore, did acquisition of Russian military technology has
not answer to a genuine desire to cooperate in not yet been resolved, which could raise further
terms of security, but rather to ulterior motives on tensions between both parties. Considering the
both sides. ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Turkey could prove to
be a key ally for securing stability in the
Moreover, it is worth noting that Russia and Mediterranean and the Black Sea, one reason
Turkey still share significant economic ties. why they might need to make a crucial decision
Considering that Turkey imports over 90% of their in regards to its ties with the West.
energy sources, Russia remains one of its key
natural gas suppliers, which has given Moscow Turkey also faces an important challenge in
the ability to influence Ankara’s economy should terms of energy resources, which relates, in part,
they choose to (Furuncu, 2020). However, Russia to its relation with Greece. Turkey’s difficulty to
cannot deny the fact that Turkey represents a secure energy sources within its own territory has
strategic transit country for its natural gas not only made it dependent on other major
exports, meaning they need to maintain their powers like Russia, but has also prevented it from
bilateral ties as stable as possible for each exerting a more powerful stance to secure
other’s benefit (Wilks, 2021). alliances like Greece has done with other key
actors in the region.
Domestic concerns
Finally, it is vital to mention Turkey’s 2021
domestic context, where central government
decisions have put a heavy strain on the
country’s socioeconomic situation. Besides its
tense relation with the European Union states
due to the ongoing accession process, and the
human rights concerns that arose from Turkey’s
withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, the
country’s economic problems have been a major
point of inflexion for Erdogan’s government.
Finally, Turkey’s domestic context —which could
Turkey has two main domestic concerns to worsen with the migratory situation in the
address in 2022: On the one hand, the Mediterranean — might contribute to further
performance of the Turkish lira — which fell 44% isolation, as Turkey fails to present itself as a
against the US dollar in 2021 —, and the country’s strong ally to other potential partners. In this
36% inflation rate, which have negatively affected context, Erdogan’s 2022 agenda appears to be
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directed towards a diversification in multilateral stalemate for several years. The power vacuum
relations that could enhance its current position created by the fall of traditional Arab leaders
vis-à-vis other countries in the region, especially allowed for countries like the UAE and Saudi
considering the upcoming presidential elections Arabia to take a more determinant role in the
in 2023. Arab world; however, it also opened a door for
Turkey’s involvement in Middle East politics. This
Turkey and the GCC: A Love-Hate Relationship became a main area of concern for GCC
countries since the Arab Spring uprisings
After establishing some of Turkey’s key threatened the Gulf monarchies’ legitimacy; and
challenges in the last year, it comes as no since Turkey supported revolutionary forces in
surprise that Erdogan’s government has chosen several countries, its involvement in the Middle
to look for close ties with partners outside the East was seen as a threat to stability in the Gulf
region. In an unexpected move, Turkey has (Kardas, 2021).
chosen to normalize ties with the GCC states,
and has secured key compromises that might During this period, Turkey proved to be a strong
improve their current situation. ally to Qatar, a GCC country that experienced
considerable political and economic challenges
Turkeys’ relations with the Gulf Countries – in the region. Qatar’s support for the Muslim
especially with GCC states, which include Brotherhood resulted in a series of warnings from
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, should they
the UAE – have experienced historical continue backing a ‘terrorist organization’
fluctuations. While the 2010’s were characterized (Reuters, 2019).
by a defined rift between both sides, certain
events in 2021 show that the existing gap The demands escalated to an economic
between Turkey and the GCC might start to blockade that negatively affected Qatar’s
disappear. economy; in this context, Turkey remained one of
Qatar’s main supporters. Both countries became
Turkey began its approach to the Gulf Countries strategic economic and security partners, with
after the First Gulf War, especially because of Turkey establishing a military base in Qatari
economic interests. After the war, Turkey became territory, and Qatar investing heavily in FDI
an emerging economy in search of new markets projects while also becoming one of Turkey’s
for their foreign trade plans, as well as strategic main liquefied natural gas suppliers (Calik,
partnerships for foreign direct investment (FDI); 2020).
at the same time, the Gulf Countries, with
considerable resources, showed an increasing Additionally, Turkey’s relations with Saudi Arabia
interest in investment projects with new allies. and the UAE have been rather tense in the past
Moreover, both sides had similar interests in few years. Despite its regional and domestic
pressing issues in the Middle East, like the struggles, the aforementioned countries do
ongoing concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear recognize Turkey’s assertiveness and influence in
program and the support for the Palestinian the Muslim world, which, therefore, could threaten
cause, among others. In this sense, cooperation their own leadership in the region.
between Turkey and the GCC states was
considered not only profitable in economic In the last decade, both sides have made
terms, but also in geopolitical ones. decisions that reinforce their power struggles in
the region. For example, Turkey angered the GCC
However, the Arab Spring proved to be a major countries when it took a more utilitarian
point of divergence that would keep relations approach towards Iran’s nuclear program
between Turkey and the GCC countries in a (instead of siding with them against Iran).
13PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
nstead of siding with them against Iran). At the allies that will offer either economic or political
same time, GCC states decided not only to profits (TRT World, 2021). In this sense, Turkey
normalize ties with Israel (4) via the US-brokered could potentially provide the Gulf Countries with
Abraham Accords, but also to sign security and both.
energy cooperation agreements with Greece
and Cyprus, a measure that was not taken well Besides its key location, skilled labor and
by Erdogan’s government. competitive exchange rate (despite its latest
currency issues), Turkey is finalizing the creation
Nevertheless, 2021 showed a slight tendency of the Istanbul Finance Center, a project set to
towards conciliation between Turkey and the open in the first half of 2022 that aims to
GCC countries, which might push Turkey to “become a major (Islamic) financial hub serving
choose a strategic approach towards the Middle many banks, public institutions and multinational
East, and move its alliances away from the West. companies” (Daily Sabah, 2021). Additionally, the
As for the UAE, in November 2021, Crown Prince UAE does consider Turkey as a country with
Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan visited Ankara to considerable leadership power in the region;
sign a financial cooperation deal of $10 billion in therefore, these initial economic ties could serve
the health and energy fields, as well as bigger geopolitical interests in the long term.
transportation, technology, environment, money
laundering, among others. Additionally, there are As for Saudi Arabia, relations with Turkey took a
expectations for both countries’ central banks to positive turn in 2021. After almost three years of
engage in a swap agreement, which would tensions between both nations (5), the Turkish
improve the Turkish lira’s current situation (Al Foreign Minister visited Riyadh last May to discuss
Jazeera, 2021). bilateral relations, a meeting that took place
after an alleged purchase of Turkish drones by
The dynamics between these countries seem to Saudi Arabia in March 2021 (Al-Monitor, 2021).
pivot towards cooperation based on economic
interests, similar to what happened after the First This transaction and the fact that Saudi Arabia is
Gulf War. On the one hand, Turkey is in great currently co-producing Turkish-made drones, is
need for FDI projects and currency stabilization; not a coincidence: This GCC state has looked for
on the other hand, despite the COVID-19 a new partnership with Turkey, given that the US
pandemic having slowed down foreign trade, the has held off arms sales to Saudi Arabia (6) (DW,
UAE is constantly looking for opportunities to 2021). Moreover, Turkey has vested interests in
diversify its investments and alliances. closing ties with this Gulf country, considering
that it has collaborated with Greece in joint
The recent normalization of relations with Turkey military exercises and energy projects in the
is due to shifting political dynamics in the region, Mediterranean. Mending relations with Saudi
mainly due to events like the removal of US Arabia (and with the UAE) could give Turkey an
troops from Afghanistan, the possible retake of opening for being considered in high-level
talks with Iran and the end of Qatar’s economic Mediterranean forums that could offer new
blockade, among others. If the UAE is expecting opportunities for their energy sourcing concerns.
to exert more power and take leadership of the
region, they need to move towards a security- (5) Tensions between Turkey and Saudi Arabia reached a peak in
2018 after the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul.
oriented strategy and surround themselves with Saudi Arabia has also accused Turkey of supporting terrorist
groups, like Hezbollah in Lebanon.
(6) The US halted arms sales to both the UAE and Saudi Arabia in
January 2021. In November 2021 the Biden administration decided
(4) Turkey has historically supported Palestine in its territorial to resume the arms sale to Saudi Arabia.
dispute with Israel.
14PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
Finally, relations with Qatar have remained solid, considering that Western traditional allies have
especially due to Turkey's support during the failed to fill these needs. Nevertheless, Turkey’s
GCC’s economic blockade. In December 2021, agenda with the GCC states goes beyond
president Erdogan visited Doha to sign over 10 stabilizing its economy and, likewise for the Gulf
cooperation agreements in different areas that countries, their approach to Turkey serves a
benefit both countries. There were also talks for bigger purpose beyond FDI.
convincing Qatar to extend the existing currency
swap agreement with Turkey – that reached $15 Dynamics in the Middle East suffered
billion in 2020 – a strategy that has greatly considerable changes in 2021, and most states
helped Turkey’s economy (Kucukgocmen & will try to exert as much influence as they can
Coskun, 2020). vis-à-vis their neighbors by using either soft or
hard power. In the context of the removal of US
Moreover, as it was previously mentioned, both troops from Afghanistan, some Arab countries –
states have maintained a consistent military like the UAE and Bahrain – have chosen a more
cooperation for several years, and during 2021, conciliatory approach towards Israel, for
they entered negotiations with the Taliban-led example, even after decades of tensions due to
government to work in ensuring Kabul’s airport the ongoing conflict with Palestine. This
security and continue offering humanitarian normalization of relations answers to an
assistance to people in Afghanistan. This increased instability in the Middle East,
represents a key area of geopolitical influence characterized mainly by the new Taliban-led
that might influence other GCC countries to government in Afghanistan, Iran’s ongoing
consider an alliance with Turkey. After the United nuclear program, the Syrian Civil War and the
States Forces left Afghanistan and the Taliban constant terrorist threat in the region. While these
took control of the country, a power vacuum that do not represent new challenges, most countries
threatened collective instability appeared in the have come to understand that political stability
region. Taking into account that countries like the in a region as diverse as the Middle East requires
UAE and Saudi Arabia might want to consolidate not only strong leadership, but also commitment
their leadership in the Middle East, resuming and cooperation, even if it means working with
amicable relations with two of the countries that unlikely partners.
have come closer to security talks with the
Taliban might prove beneficial in the long term. This is also part of the rationale behind Turkey’s
2022 agenda in the Middle East: Due to its
Looking Ahead strategic position, instability in that region
translates into instability for Ankara, a situation
As it has been possible to observe, Turkey’s shift that Erdogan’s government will not tolerate. In
towards the Gulf countries answers several of its order to avoid this, Turkey needs to reinforce
main concerns. Economics and resources
appear to be the main driver in their reproach to
countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia; however,
these represent but a small area of why relations
between Ankara and the GCC have thawed in
the past few months.
Considering Turkey’s current challenges
regarding the lira’s currency rate and the
country’s heavy reliance on energy imports, an
approach to wealthy, resource rich countries
might seem like a natural move – especially
15PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
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16PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
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17PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
Strategic Compass: Finding a Way Towards a More
Effective MENA Policy
Zofia Kostrzewa
Introduction this article aims to infer whether the EU is likely to
remain a worm in the Middle East, as it had in
Following the failure of the European Union (EU) 1991, or if it can finally shed this label.
to appropriately respond to the Gulf Crisis in 1991,
Mark Eyskens, the Foreign Minister of Belgium said How Things Were Going South: EU in the Middle
that ‘Europe is an economic giant, a political East
dwarf, and a military worm.’ (Whitney, 1991).
Since then, Europe has undergone many The MENA region presents an array of security
changes that challenged this statement through threats to Europe, ranging from terrorism and
a gradual development of its political and migration to maritime security and Iran’s nuclear
military capacities (Zandee, Stoetman and Deen, programme. In recent years, increasing conflicts
2021). However, the Strategic Compass set to be in MENA and a general lack of economic
voted on in March 2022 represents perhaps the opportunities have made terrorism and irregular
most important recent development in this migration to the EU particularly salient threats,
sphere. The Strategic Compass is a political with discussions on these topics generating
proposal that will “set out a common strategic cracks in the internal stability of the Union
vision for EU security and defence for the next 5- (Zarhloule, 2019; Dempsey, 2015).
10 years” (European External Action Service
(EEAS), 2021, p. 4), and has been described as However, despite the negative spillover effects of
“the closest thing the EU could have to a military MENA conflicts on European security, it is notable
doctrine” (Emmott, 2020). that the EU has “not been a major player in
recent conflicts” (Anderson, 2021). In fact, The
This doctrine and strategy come at a particular EU’s engagement in MENA has also been
critical juncture in EU, and Middle East and North characterized by having a ‘short-term’ and
Africa (MENA) relations. Growing instability in the ‘transactional’ character, designed to primarily
MENA region and the decreasing involvement of focus on migration, and not the underlying
the United States (US) has opened the space for drivers of instability (Zarhloule, 2019). This can be
other actors and consequent shifts in power seen from the EU’s Agreements with Turkey and
balances that can threaten not only EU interests Libya on border control and refugees (Thevenin,
but also overall European security (Genugten, 2020). Similarly, where the EU has tried to
2021). Keeping this in mind, this article will explore engage in diplomacy or conflict resolution, it has
what the Strategic Compass can and should been described as ‘weak, ‘irrelevant’ and a
mean for the EU’s security policy in the MENA ‘bystander’ (Anderson, 2021; Weimers, 2020;
region. The article will begin with an analysis of Çetin, 2016). This was seen not only in the fall-out
the EU’s policy towards MENA to date. It will then of the Iran nuclear deal, where the EU was shown
proceed to examine whether the components of to have a “ limited ability to chart a truly
the Compass can help European policy become independent foreign policy” (Grammer and
more effective in the region. In this discussion, Johnson, 2020), but also in two recent major
the EU- NATO relationship will also be conflicts in the region: Syria and Libya.
considered. Altogether, through this exploration,
18PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
In Syria, the EU’s non-military tools of intervention there is an opportunity for the EU to put such a
such as sanctions and diplomatic dialogues strategy in place, as the US is beginning to pivot
proved ineffective in the first stage of the conflict away from the MENA region towards Asia
resolution. At the time, the EU did not engage (Genugten, 2021).
militarily as it did not possess a mechanism
necessary for deploying coercive forces. Even if it Changing Direction
had, disagreements among Member States
came to the fore during this crisis, and many Given the developing changes, it is clear that the
solutions were not possible due to different views EU needs to alter its approach to the Middle East
on correct policy options and outcomes (for and North Africa. It is predicted that in the next 10
instance, some Member States thought a years, the MENA region will require the most
negotiated solution was feasible, while others attention from the EU in terms of civilian and
considered the fall of Assad as inevitable). In military crisis management deployments (Fiott
such an environment, the EU only adopted a and Lindstrom, 2021). In light of the current
strategy for conflicts in Syria, as well as Iraq and situation, the Strategic Compass has the
the fight against the Islamic State 4 years later potential to ensure a stronger, more effective
(van Veen, Di Pietrantonio Pellise, Ezzeddine, presence of the EU in the region. This next section
Napolitano, 2021). The issue of diverging policy will now explore to what extent the Compass
priorities was one of the key reasons for the EU’s addresses the issues identified above regarding
ineffectiveness as a player in the Libyan conflict European engagement in the MENA region.
and peace process, as Italy and France declared
themselves on opposite sides of the conflict. In First, when it comes to developing a long-term
such a scenario, even the Common Security and strategy, the Compass aims to bring together a
Defense Policy (CSDP) military and civilian vision for European security and defense for the
operations and the EU’s participation in next 5-10 years. In doing so, it has outlined four
diplomatic dialogues were unable to have great points of focus: crisis management (scenarios
influence. To add to this, Member States have for military civilian missions, geographical
been contradictory in their approach to priorities, institutional capacity), resilience
Operation Irini (designed to enforce arms (mutual assistance and solidarity, protecting
embargo), whereby some states continue to critical infrastructure, non-traditional threats),
export arms to other regional actors involved in capability development (technological
the conflict and thus undermine the EU’s general sovereignty, PESCO, European Defence Fund,
interest(s) (Crosson, 2020). space, cyber and maritime capabilities), and
partnerships (UN, NATO, US, Africa, Eastern
The actions of the EU in these two conflicts partnership, Indo-Pacific). Such an approach
illustrate why the EU has not been able to clearly envisions a long-term strategy that is
effectively engage in the MENA region: lack of multi-pronged and makes use of the EU’s
long-term strategy, a lack of the right tools, and already existing capabilities. However, how
disagreement among Member States. coherent the strategy will be, in accounting for
the various EU instruments already in existence
Moreover, an exacerbating factor to European as well as the tendency of Member States to
ineffectiveness was the substantial role that the engage in conflicts outside of the EU framework,
US played in the region. In the past, the EU had will only be visible during the implementation
continually relied on US leadership due to the stage.
country’s ability to engage militarily to a much
higher extent than the EU. However, this would Perhaps the most debated contribution of the
often come at the cost of developing a European Compass is the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity,
regional strategy (Zarhloule, 2019). Currently, which aims to have 5,000 troops, including land,
19PEACE & SECURITY MONITOR
air, and maritime components ready for for EU security and defence among European
deployment (EEAS 2021). Such a force could Union Member States threat analysis (EEAS, 2021;
prove instrumental to quick and decisive Amirfarhangi, 2021). This analysis was concluded
reactions at the beginning of conflicts, such as in in 2020, and aimed at establishing a common
Syria, but it seems to fall short of the idea of a vision for the increasingly complex threats facing
European Army (Nováky, 2021). However, the the EU in the future. Unlike the EU Global Strategy,
deployment of such troops would still require the creation of the threat assessment and the
consensus of the Member States (Emmott, 2021), Strategic Compass has been a Member State-
and it is important to note that the EU already led project. Given the commitment expressed by
has deployable troops, the so called EU Member States to this endeavor, there is hope
Battlegroups of 1,500 troops, but it has been that a unified vision can be achieved not only of
reluctant to use them, for example in Libya, due how threats themselves are understood, but also
to disagreements among its Member States their solutions (EUISS Foresight, 2021).
(Reykers, 2016). In fact, the Battlegroups have
never been deployed at all (van Veen, Di On these three main issues, the Compass has
Pietrantonio Pellise, Ezzeddine, Napolitano, 2021). certainly been an important start, but given the
As such, it is not entirely clear whether the rising importance of the MENA region to the EU,
addition of more troops will solve the problems in the final version of the Compass needs to take
diverging foreign policy views unless serious into account how exactly the EU aims to engage.
consideration is given to the voting procedure on Taking into account the EU’s past actions, the
their deployment (Perissich, 2021). Compass should provide a concrete explanation
as to why engagement in the MENA region is
It is on this front that the Compass can, and to a necessary, how crisis management tools should
certain extent has, made progress. Through a be employed, and how to make better use of
shared threat analysis “based on information non-coercive tools if military engagement is not
from the civilian and military intelligence services pursued (Fiott and Lindstrom, 2021). In addition,
of the 27 EU member states”, the Compass did further attention should be paid to how to
try to create the foundations for a shared vision counteract the strategic competition of other
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