Overview Analysis of the activity of ISIS's branches in Congo
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Analysis of the activity of ISIS's branches in Congo
and Mozambique following the imposition of US
sanctions
March 25, 2021
Overview
Following the expansion of ISIS’s activity in the past year in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and in Mozambique, the US Department of State announced on March 10, 2021, the
imposition of economic sanctions on ISIS’s branch in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and its leader, Seka Musa Baluku, and ISIS’s branch in Mozambique and its leader, Abu Yasir
Hassan (website of the US Department of State, March 10, 2021)1.
Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are part of ISIS’s Central Africa
Province, whose establishment was announced by ISIS in April 2019. In practice, there are
two local organizations which pledged allegiance to ISIS: Ansar al-Sunna in Mozambique
and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which also calls itself Madinat al-Tawheed wal
Muwahideen, in Congo. These two organizations are apparently in contact with ISIS’s
leadership in Syria.
Right: ISIS operatives in Mozambique renewing their pledge of allegiance to ISIS’s leader. Left:
ISIS operatives in the Democratic Republic of the Congo renewing their pledge of allegiance to
ISIS’s leader (Telegram, July 24, 2019)
Both organizations have similar forms of action. ISIS’s main activity in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo is attacking military targets and local Christian residents. Its attacks
are focused on the region of the city of Beni, in northeastern Congo, about 50 km from the
border with Uganda, where most of the residents are Christian villagers.
1
For the US Department of State’s announcement, see:
https://www.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-isis-affiliates-and-leaders-in-the-
democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-mozambique/
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2
In Mozambique, ISIS attacks similar targets, but it also operates against Western targets
(such as gas reserves and tourist sites), especially Christian ones. It also demonstrates an
ability to rule over populated regions. The epicenter of the organization’s activity is the Cabo
Delgado Province in the northeast of the country, a region rich with natural gas, with tourist
sites and a seaport.
The US sanctions reflect the US administration’s concern about the expanding activity of
these organizations and the feeling, which is also supported by up-to-date research on the
part of the Pentagon, that the level of success of the US military aid, including in training
local armies, is low.
Characteristics of ISIS’s activity in Mozambique
ISIS in Mozambique – Ansar al-Sunna
The Ansar al-Sunna organization in Mozambique is referred to as “Al-Shabab” (i.e., the
youth) and sometimes as “Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’ah” or “Harakat al-Sunna wal-Jama’ah.” It
started in 2007 as a small group of Islamist youth who were active in the Cabo Delgado
Province, in northeastern Mozambique. In time, the group increased in number, reaching
about 1,000 jihadist insurgents whose background was mainly social and economic
frustration. The group’s activity began in October 2017. They pledged allegiance to ISIS in
early 2018. In the beginning, the group operatives, who apparently were reinforced by other
fighters from around East Africa, attacked remote rural areas. As years went by, their actions
became more and more complex.2 In 2020, the group carried out about 400 attacks, double
the number of attacks carried out a year before. Three years after the organization started its
attacks, more than 1,300 civilians were killed in Mozambique, hundreds of members of the
security forces were killed or wounded, and about 670,000 civilians were forced to leave
2
Emilia Columbo, The Secret to the Northern Mozambique Insurgency's Success. War on the Rocks.
Texas National Security Review, October 8, 2020:
https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/the-secret-to-the-northern-mozambique-insurgencys-success/
The author, Emilia Columbo, is a senior associate (non-resident) in the Africa Program of the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a research institute based in Washington D.C. Prior to
this position, she served as a senior analyst at the CIA, covering African and Latin American political-
security issues.
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3
their homes.3 In addition, the organization wreaked havoc on tourism and inflicted damage
on the gas reserves, where much foreign funds have been invested.
According to the US, the organization is headed by Abu Yasir Hassan. No further details
have been provided on him, apart from his name (or codename). The organization
operatives attract the locals by persuading them that the local authorities are impotent and
corrupt and by supplying them with food and funds. The group members are aware of the
limitations of the Mozambican security forces. Disgruntled soldiers who joined their ranks
added to the organization’s capabilities as they possess operational skill and also represent
sources of intelligence4.
The group’s epicenter is the Cabo Delgado Province, especially the region of Mocímboa da
Praia. The Cabo Delgado Province is one of the poorest regions in the country, despite the
potential of wealth inherent in the reserves of natural resources. Although most of the
Mozambicans are Christians, Cabo Delgado has a Muslim majority (about 54%), a
considerable part of which feels neglected and underprivileged. Therefore, they represent a
potential pool for collaborators and recruits to the organization. The largest ethnic group in
the region is the Makonde tribe, whose people live along the border between Mozambique
and Tanzania and in Kenya (Wikipedia).
According to researcher Eleanor Beevor, the residents of the province were assimilated
into criminal networks engaged in marine smuggling operations and were fertile ground for
a wave of Islamist preachers who arrived in the region mainly from Tanzania, in 2014–2015,
and found a sympathetic ear among local youth. These preachers not only inculcated their
teenagers with radical Islamic ideology but also promised them loans to establish small
businesses in return for loyalty to the group. The recruitment of the youth was even
accelerated due to repressive measures against them by the army.5
3
Sam Peters, Islamic State Africa – an Inevitability?, The Organization for World Peace, 2 May 2020:
https://theowp.org/islamic-state-africa-an-inevitability/
The Organization for World Peace (OWP) works to resolve violent conflicts by peaceful means, mainly
by providing aid to the displaced persons. It publishes daily and monthly reports, as well as breaking
news.
https://www.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-isis-affiliates-and-leaders-in-the-
democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-mozambique/
4
Emilia Columbo, Ibid.
5
Eleanor Beevor, Who are Mozambique’s Jihadists? IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies,
London, UK), 25 March 2020:
https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/03/csdp-mozambique-jihadists
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4
According to researcher Emilia Columbo, Ansar al-Sunna has economic capability based
on drug smuggling and trading in illegal timber, ivory, and rubies. According to
Columbo, this may adversely affect the support of the organization leaders, who do not
approve of this illegal activity, however lucrative it is. She believes that as this activity
continues, it may create a rift in the ranks of the organization.6
Mozambique (www.worldometers.info)
Links with ISIS leadership in Syria and Iraq
Except for the fact that the group members pledged allegiance to ISIS, the relationship
between the organizations and the extent of control by ISIS in Syria and Iraq over their
activity are unclear. On November 12, 2020, the Mozambican attorney general said that the
law enforcement authorities had arrested 12 Iraqi citizens suspected of supporting the
rebels in the Cabo Delgado region (allafrica.com, November 12, 2020; Wall Street Journal,
November 15, 2020). It can be estimated that these were ISIS operatives who arrived from
Iraq to establish ISIS’s presence in the region.
6
Emilia Columbo, Ibid.
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5
Links with ISIS operatives in African countries
The Democratic Republic of the Congo: According to Eleanor Beevor, limited
coordination is maintained between ISIS’s operatives in Mozambique and the operatives in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ADF). She notes that Islamic operatives from Congo
were arrested in Mozambique, which can indicate the presence of operatives from Congo in
Mozambique and maybe also operatives from Mozambique operating in Congo.7 On August
12, 2018, Mozambican chief of police Bernardino Rafael noted that one of the leaders of
terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado is Abdel Rahman Faisal, who has direct links to ADF and Ahl
al-Sunna wal-Jama’ah. In addition, ADF recently released a propaganda video in which it
expresses solidarity with Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'ah.8
Somalia: Tore Hamming noted in his recent article that ISIS’s Central Africa Province is
administratively subordinate to Maktab al-Qarar (literally, “the Office of Decision”), which is
based in Somalia and is responsible for ISIS’s branches outside Syria and Iraq. This may
indicate that relations are maintained between ISIS operatives in Mozambique (as well as
Congo) and ISIS operatives in Somalia.9
Control (at least partial) over territory
ISIS operatives in Mozambique control several regions in the country, including (since
August 12, 2020) the port city of Mocímboa da Praia, from which they apparently launch
some of their attacks against the province of Cabo Delgado. This indicates ISIS’s capabilities
and may subsequently result in the takeover of further territory and maybe even an attempt
to establish an alternative caliphate to that which existed in Syria and Iraq.
Last year, ISIS also controlled, for a short period of time, the Muidumbe District, a rural
region in the Cabo Delgado Province. On April 7, 2020, ISIS operatives took over four villages
in the region but had to withdraw after several days. They regained control on October 31,
2020, and were repelled once again by the Mozambican army on November 16, 2020. A UN
report on the situation in Cabo Delgado (March 11, 2021) revealed that half of the district’s
7
Ibid.
8
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/The%20Islamic%20State%20in%20Congo%20
English.pdf
9
Tore Refslund Hamming, The Islamic State in Mozambique, WAWFARE, 24 January 2021:
https://www.lawfareblog.com/islamic-state-mozambique
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6
territory is inaccessible to UN activity due to the extensive presence of terrorist operatives
and military operations in the area.10
In March 2020, local sources reported that ISIS’s operatives had taken over the Quissanga
region, about 120 km south of Mocímboa da Praia, in the Cabo Delgado Province. A photo
was disseminated on social media showing armed ISIS operatives outside the local authority
building (Telegram, March 24, 2020). According to the aforementioned UN report, the
operatives are still in control of the area, which is rich in natural gas.
Armed ISIS operatives outside the local authority building of the Quissanga region
(Telegram, March 24, 2020)
Characteristics of ISIS’s terror activity in Mozambique
The following are several incidents characterizing ISIS’s activity (according to ISIS’s
announcements posted on Telegram):
Activity against the security forces
On November 10, 2019, the organization’s operatives ambushed Mozambican
soldiers in the Macomia region, in the eastern part of the Cabo Delgado Province. Eight
soldiers were killed and four others were wounded in the exchange of fire.
On December 6, 2019, a Mozambican army camp in the village of Malali, near
Mocímboa da Praia, was attacked. A total of 16 soldiers were killed in the exchange of
fire, one soldier was taken prisoner, and weapons and ammunition were seized. The
attackers set fire to the camp and to several houses of supporters of the Mozambican
army.
10
The inaccessible regions mentioned in the report are the districts of Quissanga, Macomia, Meluco,
Mocímboa da Praia, Muidumbe and Nangade. For the full report, see:
https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-update-cabo-delgado-situation-16-february-
3-march-2021
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7
Right: ISIS operatives who took part in the attack against the Mozambican army in the village of
Malali. Left: One of the ISIS operatives who took part in the attack standing on an ATV of the
Mozambican security forces (Telegram, December 8, 2019)
On March 23, 2020, five army and police posts in Mocímboa da Praia were attacked.
Dozens of soldiers and policemen were killed or wounded in the exchange of fire.
Weapons and ammunition, as well as a number of vehicles, were seized. According to
the BBC, “Islamist militants” took over Mocímboa da Praia and a military camp and
raised a jihadist flag. The Mozambican army and police mounted a counterattack. It
was noted that the city is situated near an area of a $60 billion natural gas project, with
foreign companies investing in the site (BBC, March 23, 2021).
Mocímboa da Praia, Mozambique (Google Maps)
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8
Right: Rifles seized by ISIS in an attack in Cabo Delgado. Left: Mozambican police vehicle hit by
bullets (Telegram, March 24, 2020)
On May 11, 2020, two soldiers were killed and others were wounded in an exchange
of fire with the Mozambican army in one of the villages in the Cabo Delgado Province.
In addition, a vehicle was seized.
Mozambican army vehicle seized by operatives of ISIS’s Central Africa Province in Cabo Delgado
(Telegram, May 13, 2020)
On August 6, 2020, two Mozambican army compounds near Mocímboa da Praia
were attacked. About 50 soldiers were killed or wounded in exchanges of fire that
lasted for several hours. In addition, weapons and ammunition were seized.
Right: Equipment of Mozambican soldiers seized by ISIS’s operatives. Left: Rifles seized by the
operatives (Telegram, August 11, 2020)
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9
Attacks against local residents, mainly Christian
On November 11, 2019, homes of Christian residents were set on fire in one of the
villages in the Cabo Delgado Province. There were exchanges of fire between ISIS and
the Mozambican army. The soldiers withdrew and the operatives took over the village
and set the houses on fire.
On May 11, 2020, two Mozambican army compounds and several houses of
Christian residents were set on fire in Miengueleue, about 20 km east of Muidumbe. No
casualties were reported. The compounds and the houses sustained damage.
On April 7-8, 2020, a total of 52 young men were slaughtered, some of them by
beheading, in Xitaxi, in the Muidumbe region, after refusing to join the organization
(BBC, April 22, 2020).
On November 7-9, 2020, Christian villagers were murdered in several villages in
Muidumbe and Macomia, about 50 km from Muidumbe, in the Cabo Delgado Province.
In addition, women were abducted, and houses were set on fire (BBC, November 9,
2020; GardaWorld, November 9, 2020).
Right: Muidumbe, northeastern Mozambique. Left: Muidumbe and Macomia, northeastern
Mozambique (Google Maps), Mocímboa da Praia, northeastern Mozambique, near the border
between Mozambique and Tanzania (Google Maps)
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10
Right: Article in ISIS’s Al-Naba' weekly, documenting ISIS’s operatives inside the port of
Mocímboa da Praia after taking over the port (Al-Naba', Telegram, August 27, 2020)
According to Hisham al-Najjar, an Egyptian researcher specializing in terrorist groups, the
attack on Mocímboa da Praia and the takeover of the nearby port indicate a change in the
organization’s modus operandi. According to Al-Najjar, until the takeover of the port, the
organization’s activity mainly consisted of attacking government institutions, destroying
army camps and taking control of weapons and ammunition. The attack on the port testifies
to the ability to carry out a more complex operation, targeting the country's strategic assets.
In his assessment, the change stems from the adoption of a new strategy, aiming to take
advantage of the world preoccupation with COVID-19 instead of fighting terrorism, while
striving to create sympathy among the local residents by catering to their needs in food and
weapons (Al-Arab, a pan-Arab newspaper published from London, April 14, 2020).
On September 15, 2020, operatives affiliated with ISIS took over two islands in the Indian
Ocean close to Mocímboa da Praia, where luxurious holiday resorts are located. The
operatives destroyed the hotels, drove away the residents, and imposed sharia law on the
islands. On September 20, 2020, it was reported that the operatives set fire to a hotel in the
Sita region, which is considered an especially luxurious hotel site, causing widespread
destruction (AFP, September 15, 2020; The Daily Telegraph, September 20, 2020; The Sun,
September 17, 2020; www.jihadwatch.org, September 20, 2020).
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One of the holiday resorts destroyed by ISIS (Al-Ayn, September 18, 2020)
Right: The island of Vamizi in northeastern Mozambique. Left: Location of the islands in
northeastern Mozambique (Google Maps)
On April 8 or 10, 2020, a Gazelle helicopter crashed in one of the islands west of the city of
Pemba, in the Cabo Delgado Province. It belonged to private contractors from South Africa
operating in Mozambique as part of the fight against terrorism. The helicopter apparently
crashed as a result of light weapon fire hitting its gearbox while it was attacking Islamic
militants (Defence Web, news portal on security issues in Africa, operating from South Africa,
April 15, 22, 2020). ISIS’s Amaq News Agency released a video allegedly photographed on
April 8, 2020, showing operatives of ISIS’s Central Africa Province who shot down the
helicopter, exchanging fire with the Mozambican army (Telegram, April 20, 2020).
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Right: Operatives of ISIS’s Central Africa Province near the wreckage of the helicopter. Left:
Operative of ISIS’s Central Africa Province near the tail of a helicopter (Telegram, April 20, 2020)
Expanding activity to other countries
Terrorism spilling over from Cabo Delgado to Tanzania
On October 14, 2020, it was found that the organization’s activity had expanded to
Tanzanian territory: ISIS operatives attacked a Tanzanian army compound in Kitaya, merely
some 700 meters northwest of the border between Tanzania and Mozambique. Several
soldiers were killed or wounded. Weapons and ammunition were seized, and one tank was
set on fire. As far as is known, this was the first attack carried out by ISIS on Tanzanian
territory. It can be estimated that those who carried out the attack were ISIS operatives
from the Cabo Delgado Province who crossed the border (a distance of less than one
kilometer) and apparently returned to Mozambique after the attack.
Kitaya, Tanzania (Google Maps)
On October 29, 2020, ISIS operatives set fire to three Christian villages in the Mtwara
region, in southeastern Tanzania, near the border with Mozambique. The villages sustained
damage.
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Threats against South Africa
In the main article of ISIS’s weekly Al-Naba' published on July 2, 2020, ISIS warned South
Africa not to send forces to neighboring Mozambique, threatening that South Africa will also
become an ISIS target. The threat was made following news on world media, according to
which the United States and European countries work to have South African forces join the
fighting against ISIS in Mozambique (Al-Naba', Telegram, July 2, 2020).
The article threatening that South Africa will become an ISIS target if it sends forces to fight ISIS
in Mozambique (Al-Naba', Telegram, July 2, 2020)
Cautious optimism
Recently, security officials in Mozambique expressed optimism in view of a decrease in
terrorism in Mozambique over the recent weeks. The decrease is apparently due to special
activity by the Mozambican security forces. Owing to this activity, “only” 10 attacks were
carried out in January 2021, compared to 30 in December 2020. In addition, recently, the US
sent Special Forces to train Mozambican army special units in fighting against terrorism (The
New York Times, March 17, 2021; AFP, February 9, 2021).11 In spite of the optimism, the data
should be examined over time.
In this context, it should be noted that according to a document which was leaked to the
media, which was written by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a research institute that
belongs to the US Department of Defense, the US army commando units sent to fight against
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210209-mozambique-sees-militia-violence-dwindle-as-
11
military-gains-steam
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radical terrorist groups in Africa over the past two years to reduce violence in the region
have failed in their mission, and violence only escalated. The document describes a
worrisome situation in the Sahel, in the region of Lake Chad and Somalia, noting a 43%
increase in Islamist militant activity and violence in 2020, compared to the previous year
(VICE World News, March 18, 2021). With that in mind, it will be difficult to assess the impact
of US support on the security situation in the Cabo Delgado Province. It should be noted that
the situation in the region is complicated in terms of ideology, politics, economy, and
society; a military solution will probably not suffice to provide an answer to the intrinsic
problems of the region, which are fertile ground for the development of violence.
Characteristics of ISIS’s activity in Congo
The organization of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which is also called Madinat al-
Tawheed wal Muwahideen, i.e., City of Monotheism and Monotheists12, was established by a
group of Islamist rebels originating in Uganda, which has been operating in Congo since
1995. The organization is responsible for carrying out many attacks against civilians and
members of the security forces, mainly along the border between Congo and Uganda.
According to a UN report, the organization is responsible for the death of at least 849
civilians in 2020 alone. In 2014, the US Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on it,
but back then, apparently there was no connection between the organization and ISIS, or at
least no such connection was identified. The connection between ADF and ISIS apparently
started in 2015. During the last two years, ISIS has been claiming official responsibility only
for some of the attacks carried by ADF in Congo, which raises questions as to the nature of
the relations between the two organizations.13 The current announcement of the US
12
The use of the word “city” probably stems from the fact that the organization operatives tried to
establish a separate area in Uganda where sharia is implemented according to their ideology. This
corresponds with the beginning of Islam, when the Prophet Muhammad left the city of Mecca and
established the base of his forces in the city of Medina, disseminating Islam from there to the entire
Arabian Peninsula.
13
Daniel Fahey and Judith Verweijen, A Closer look at Congo's Islamist rebels: Claims about links to
the Islamic State may hamper civilian protection. The Washington Post, September 30, 2020:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/30/closer-look-congos-islamic-rebels/
Dr. Daniel Fahey is an independent consultant on natural resources and armed conflicts, former
financial expert and coordinator of the United Nations Group of Experts on DRC. Dr. Judith Verweijen
is a lecturer on international relations in the University of Sheffield. Her research examines the micro-
dynamics of militarization, including of conflicts around natural resources. See the wording of the UN
Department of State: https://www.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-isis-
affiliates-and-leaders-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-mozambique/
049-2115
Department of State may possibly hint that the US has information confirming actual links
between the Allied Democratic Forces and ISIS.
Over the last year, there was a prevailing assessment among researchers that ADF is
related to ISIS or is part of it, but it is unclear to what extent.14 A report of the UN Security
Council’s Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC, from June 2020,
has not traced evidence indicating a direct link between the two organizations, apart from
claiming responsibility for attacks and the pledge of allegiance.15 According to the report, the
claims of responsibility issued by ISIS have not necessarily been in line with actual facts on
the ground. In addition, it was found that the improvised explosive devices used by ADF
were different from the sophisticated explosive charges used by ISIS. Apart from that, no
documentation, evidence, or any items were found to establish the existence of an
organizational link between ADF and ISIS.16
The clause in the UN report published on June 2, 2020, stating that “The Group did not find any
direct links between Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and ADF.17
An article published recently points out links between ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and ADF.
However, this article does not specify the nature of the links either, since, according to the
article, it is an organization which maintains a great degree of secrecy. The article does
reveal that there exists communication between ISIS’s local leadership and its central
leadership in Syria and Iraq, and also financial ties of sorts.18
14
Ibid.
15
The report was submitted to the President of the UN Security Council on June 2, 2020. It includes
528 pages. As stated on p. 10, the Group did not find any direct links between Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL) and ADF. See https://www.undocs.org/S/2020/482.
16
Daniel Fahey and Judith Verweijen, ibid.
17
https://www.undocs.org/S/2020/482
18
Tara Candland, Adam Finck, Haroro J. Ingram, Laren Poole, Lorenzo Vidino, Caleb Weiss, The
Islamic State in Congo, Program on Extremism, The George Washington University, March 2021:
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/The%20Islamic%20State%20in%20Congo%20
English.pdf
049-2116
The relation between ADF and ISIS started in 2015, after ADF leader Jamil Mukulu was
arrested and Musa Baluku, who is considered more radical, took his place. It was Baluku
who made the first contact with ISIS and nurtured it. Unlike his predecessor, Baluku
intended, back in 2015, to turn ADF into a global organization, and therefore a relationship
with ISIS was in line with his policy. The first connection with him was possibly made
through social media, which Baluku started using, mainly for propaganda needs. In 2018, the
contact between Baluku and ISIS’s central leadership became stronger, and in an audiotape
released by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in August 2018, the latter mentioned the
existence of ISIS’s Central Africa Province. On April 18, 2019, the Central Africa Province
issued its first claim of responsibility. The claim was for an attack carried out by its
operatives in Congo. Since then, it has claimed responsibility for dozens of operations. In
July 2019, Baluku renewed his pledge of allegiance to ISIS’s leader.
Baluku preaches to his men, ADF operatives, during Eid al-Adha (Telegram, July 31, 2021)
According to the aforementioned article, in 2001-2010, ADF operatives kept a low profile
and were assimilated into the local population, including by marriage. With time, ADF
became a separatist and radical Salafi-jihadist organization. Although it began carrying out
attacks in Congo only in 2003 (until then it carried out attacks only in Ugandan territory), it
took advantage of the forest area in the Beni region to organize its forces even before that.
Starting in 2014, following a military campaign against its operatives, ADF became more
aggressive and cruel, not hesitating to kill civilians, including children and old people. Since
2015, after ADF joined forces with ISIS, the global Islamic ideology and brutality constitute a
joint basis for the two organizations, along with ISIS’s aspiration to expand globally.
049-2117
The leader
Seka Musa Baluku, also referred to as Musa Baluku and Musa Seka Baluku, was apparently
born in 1977 in southwestern Uganda. He became Salafi-jihadist at a younger age and served
as an imam in a mosque in Kampala. He is considered to be one of the first to join ADF, and
was closely associated with the organization’s previous leader, Mukulu, who appointed him
to a number of posts, including the senior legal authority and the official in charge of
shaping the ideology. After Mukulu was arrested, Baluku took his place as commander of the
ADF and appointed himself “Sheikh.”19
ADF’s ties outside of Congo
The ADF’s ties outside of Congo and Uganda are based on ties identified in the past which
may still exist today, including immigrants from Uganda who live in London. In addition,
there are ties in Kenya, described as the organization’s “financial outpost”, in Tanzania and
in South Africa, where ties exist mainly with ISIS’s operatives in Mozambique.
Characteristics of ISIS’s terror in Congo (based on claims of
responsibility of the Central Africa Province)
In Congo, ISIS mainly operates against security personnel and Christian residents. The
operatives also carried out an attack to liberate prisoners, apparently following a call by
ISIS’s central leadership which in the past two years has reiterated the importance of
liberating prisoners by force.
ISIS’s operatives in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Telegram, July 24, May 30, 2019)
The epicenter of ISIS’s activity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the region of
Beni, in the northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, near the border with Uganda.
This region, which is inhabited by poor Christian villagers, is rich in various minerals,
especially gold.
19
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Musa_Baluku.
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The Beni region, in the northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and near the border with
Uganda (Google Maps)
Examples of recent outstanding attacks against the Congolese army (according to
ISIS’s claims of responsibility posted on Telegram):
On August 4, 2020, ISIS ambushed and exchanged fire with the Congolese army
near one of the villages in northeastern Congo. One soldier was killed. Weapons and
ammunition were seized.
On December 21, 2020, two security personnel were attacked and a Congolese
army compound in Beni was targeted by machine gun fire. Three soldiers were killed.
Weapons and ammunition were seized.
On December 29, 2020, ISIS operatives halted a Congolese army attempt to
advance towards the village of Lusilusi (in the Beni region), which was taken over by
ISIS operatives on December 28, 2020. The operatives fired at the retreating force. At
least 15 soldiers were killed and a few others were wounded. Weapons and
ammunition were seized.
ISIS operatives setting fire to a Congolese army camp near Lusilusi
(Telegram, December 28, 2020)
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On December 31, 2020, a Congolese army compound in the Beni region was
attacked, and the soldiers fled. The operatives set fire to the compound. One soldier
was taken prisoner.
On January 12, 2021, ISIS operatives attacked a Congolese army compound in
Lusilusi for several hours. An officer and 14 soldiers were killed. Weapons and
ammunition were seized.
On January 13, 2021, there was an exchange of fire with Congolese soldiers in the
Beni region. Several soldiers were killed or wounded. Weapons and ammunition were
seized.
On February 18, 2021, a Congolese army compound in the Beni region was
attacked. Several Congolese soldiers were killed or wounded in the exchange of fire.
The others fled. ISIS seized weapons and ammunition.
On March 2, 2021, machine guns were fired at a town in the Irumu region, in
northeastern Congo. At least seven soldiers and fighters of the Congolese army and
militias supporting it were killed in the exchange of fire. The rest fled.
Right: ISIS operatives in the attack. Left: Weapons and ammunition seized by ISIS operatives
(Telegram, March 6, 2021)
Attacks against Christian residents (according to ISIS’s claims of responsibility):
On May 12, 2020, a gathering of Christians in Iringiti, near Beni, was targeted by
machine gun fire. Ten Christians were killed (Telegram, May 13, 2020).
On October 28, 2020, the Christian village of Biti, in the Beni region, was attacked. A
total of 19 people were killed and others were wounded. In addition, 45 houses were
set on fire (Telegram, October 29, 2020).
On December 31, 2020, the Christian village of Tingwe, in the Beni region, was
attacked. At least 25 people were killed and others were wounded (AP, January 1,
2021).
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On February 16, 2021, a group of Christians was targeted by machine gun fire in the
Beni region. At least four Christians were killed (Telegram, February 17, 2021).
Attack against the international forces (according to ISIS’s claim of responsibility):
On June 22, 2020, soldiers of a UN force in the Beni region were targeted by
machine gun fire. Five soldiers were killed.
Operation to liberate prisoners:
On October 20, 2020, in the early morning hours, armed operatives broke into the
Kangbayi Central Prison in the Beni region. According to the town head, Modeste
Bakwanamaha, a large group of armed operatives broke into the prison with welding
equipment. At the end of the attack, only 110 out of the 1,456 inmates remained in the
prison (i.e., 1,346 escaped). A police official tweeted that two prisoners were shot dead
during the attack (DW, October 20, 2020). ISIS’s Amaq News Agency released a
statement according to which, on the morning of October 20, 2020, ISIS operatives
attacked a prison and a Congolese army base in the Beni region. No further details
were given.
Right: Beni region, in the northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the Kangbayi
Central Prison is located (Google Maps). Left: Kangbayi Central Prison
(John Kanyunyu@Kanyunyu Twitter account, which belongs to an independent journalist from
the city of Beni, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, October 20, 2020)
Are ISIS operatives in Congo (ADF) responsible for killing Italy's
ambassador to Congo?
On February 22, 2021, Italy's ambassador to the Democratic Republic of the Congo Luca
Attanasio was killed in an attack on a UN convoy near Goma, in eastern Congo, near the
border with Rwanda. The attack was probably carried out with the intention of abducting
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the ambassador. A security guard and an Italian policeman were killed along with the
ambassador. So far, no organization has claimed responsibility for the attack. The blame
was placed on the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, the militant organization
dominant in the region. However, the organization denied any connection to the incident.
Elements affiliated with ISIS expressed support for the killing on social media. Although the
incident occurred some 200 km south of Beni, ISIS’s epicenter of activity in Congo, it cannot
be ruled out that the organization behind the attack was ADF (MEMRI, February 22, 2021; The
New York Times, February 23, 2021).
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