Nuclear Disposal Part I: History, International Status & Disposal Conditions Dr. J. Shang
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Nuclear Disposal
Part I: History, International Status &
Disposal Conditions…
Seminar on regulations and technology of
waste management and disposal in Germany
March 28th, 2018 in Taipei
Dr. J. Shang
TÜV SÜD Slide 1
Contents 1 Introduction 2 Status of nuclear disposal 3 Safety requirements and long-term safety case 4 German „repository“ Asse, Morsleben, Konrad and Gorleben 5 Disposal conditions of the repository Konrad TÜV SÜD Slide 2
Contents 1 Introduction 2 Status of nuclear disposal 3 Safety requirements and long-term safety case 4 German „repository“ Asse, Morsleben, Konrad and Gorleben 5 Disposal conditions of the repository Konrad TÜV SÜD Slide 3
Options for possible repositories - suitability
Sea or ocean Arctic or Antarctic Space
• Water pollution • Instable system • Expensive
• London Dumping Convention • Climate change & ice melting • Risk of launch failure
1972 • Antarctic Treaty 1959 • Outer Space Treaty 1967
Source: www.clker.com
TÜV SÜD Slide 4
Options for possible repositories – suitability
Repository
At Surface
• Massive building with technical barriers
• Continous protection
• Long-term storage
Storage
• Interim or long-term storage
• LLW, MLW or HLW
Examples
• HABOG (The Netherlands)
• ATC (Spain)
Source: TÜV SÜD ET
TÜV SÜD Slide 5
Options for possible repositories – suitability
Characteristics
Deep geological depositories
• Safety through geological stable system
• Host rock and technical barriers
• Storage of LLW, ILW & HLW
Rock salt
• Very low permeability, high thermal conductivity
• E. g. Germany, USA, Russia
Claystone
• Low permeability, low dissolution behaviour
• E. g. Switzerland, France, GB
Crystalline rock/granite
• High strength, low dissolution behaviour
• E. g. Finland, China, Korea
Source: TÜV SÜD ET
TÜV SÜD Slide 6
Public opinion
• Provide information to public:
– Risks and suitability
– Security precautions
– Prospects like working places
• Importance of public support particularly of residents
TÜV SÜD Slide 7
Public opinion – case study
Positive reaction – Finland (Olkiluoto) Negative reaction – Germany (Gorleben)
Expectations: Expectations:
• Work places • Negative influence of radiation
• Higher wealth • Diseases
• Trust in politics • Distrust in politics
Acceptance: Acceptance:
• Local council: ~ 70 % • Protests since 1979
• Residents: ~ 60 % • Suitability not clear/accepted
repository in construction repository?
TÜV SÜD Slide 8
Contents 1 Introduction 2 Status of nuclear disposal 3 Safety requirments and long-term safety case 4 German „repository“ Asse, Morsleben, Konrad and Gorleben 5 Disposal conditions of the repository Konrad TÜV SÜD Slide 9
Repositories overview
Country LLW/ILW repositories HLW repositories
Belgium 1
Canada 1
Denmark 1
Germany 2 1
Finland 2
France 1 2 Planning
Great Britain 2
Under
Japan 1 construction
Republic of Korea 1
Spain 1 Operation
Sweden 1 Closed
Switzerland 1
USA 2 8
TÜV SÜD Slide 10Worldwide overview – international rules
• IAEA :
– Safety Standards: Particularly for radioactive waste & repository,
recommendations without legally binding
– “Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on
the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management“ (1997)
• ICRP :
– Recommendations about handling with repositories
• EU directive:
– “Management of spent fuel and radioactive waste” (2011)
TÜV SÜD Slide 11Finland - overview
Status quo ONKALO - Olkiluoto
• Nuclear energy since 1977 • Encapsulation plant and repository for HLW
• Nuclear reactors: • Isle before mainland
– 4 operational • Spent fuels stored in 400 – 450 m depth
– 1 under construction • Bedrock: migmatic gneiss
– 1 planned
• 2 repositories for LLW/ILW in Loviisa and
Olkiluto
• Waste management company: Posiva Oy
Source: POSIVA
TÜV SÜD Slide 12Finland - Olkiluoto
• Preparatory works since 1980s
– 1983 – 1985: screening studies over Finland
– 1985 – 1992: preliminary site investigations
– 1993 – 2000: detailed site investigations (for 4 sites)
all 4 were suitable
• 2000: Olkiluoto island is selected for repository because of highest
local consent
• 2015 : construction licence obtained
• 2020: submission of the operation
licence application
• 2023: scheduled start of the repository
Source: POSIVA
TÜV SÜD Slide 13Finland - Olkiluoto
Multiple barrier concept:
Number Barrier Protection (before)
1
Final disposal canister (copper & cast iron) Mechanical stress (bedrock)
2 & 3 Jolts and slows down water
Betonite barrier & tunnel backfill
movement
4 Changes above & normal
Bedrock
living environment
3
2 4
1 Source: POSIVA
TÜV SÜD Slide 14The Netherlands - overview
Status quo HABOG
• Nuclear energy since 1968 • At surface
• Nuclear reactors: • Long-term interim storage
– 1 operational • For HLW
– 1 permanent shutdown
• Amount of waste:
– HLW 90 m3
– LILW 11.000 m3
• Waste management company: COVRA
Source: TÜV SÜD ET, COVRA
TÜV SÜD Slide 15The Netherlands - HABOG
• COVRA: need to collect enough waste & money
100 years storage in buildings, then deep diposal
• HABOG facility:
– Dry storage vault
– Wall 1.7 m reinforced concrete
– Passive cooling system
– Drums get into one of 120 concrete tubes filled with argon
Source: COVRA
TÜV SÜD Slide 16USA - overview
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Status quo Regional compacts
(WIPP)
• Nuclear energy since 1957 • 10 interstate disposal • Salt mine
• Nuclear reactors: compacts approved by • Storage since 1999
– 100 operational congress • For TRU
– 4 under construction • 8 operating licenses • Allowed Capacity:
– 33 permanent shutdown • 4 active regional compacts 180.000 m3
• Waste management agency: • For LLW
DOE
Source: NRC & DOE, TÜV SÜD ET
TÜV SÜD Slide 17USA - Yucca Mountain (YM)
• New strategy for Repository
– Foundation of the “Blue-Ribbon Commission on America’s
Nuclear Future”
– Development of a new legal framework with public participation
– 2012 Recommendation: start a new site election procedure
• Result: Yucca Mountain is still a potential repository for HLW
but there is local resistance
Source: NEI
TÜV SÜD Slide 18USA - Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)
Accidents Feburary 2014
• 5th February: a salt hauler truck cought fire
workers evacuated & WIPP shut down
• 14th February:
– A Continuous Air Monitor (CAM) alarmed at night shift
airborne radioacitivity
– Next day: Low levels of radioactive decontamination
were detected at surface
• DoE: established two Accident Investigations Boards
– to assess and to improve the safety systems
– Cause of radioactivity: exothermic reaction
in one drum
Source: DOE
TÜV SÜD Slide 19Republic of Korea - overview
Status quo Wolsong
• Nuclear energy since 1978 • Underground silos
• Nuclear reactors: • Construction began in 2006
– 24 operational • In operation since 2015
– 4 under construction • For LLW/MLW
• Waste management company: KORAD • Capacity: 800.000 drums
Source: KRMC, TÜV SÜD ET
TÜV SÜD Slide 20Republic of Korea - Wolsong
• Troubles with siting of repository (LILW) in the Republic of Korea
1986 – 2005: 9 attempts failed, because of strong protests
2004 – 2006: 10. attempt: Wolsong (Gyeongju-city)
in consent with residents (89.5 %)
• Wolsong: underground silo type (80 m -130 m below surface)
Source: KRMC
TÜV SÜD Slide 21France – Sites with radioactive waste
Project developer
Licensing authority
TÜV SÜD Slide 22France Disposal strategy
Disposal strategy
▪VLLW: Final storage on
the surface since 2003
▪LLW-long-lived: Final
storage in the flat
underground planned (15-
200 m)
▪LLW / ILW-short-lived:
Final storage on the
surface since 1992
▪ILW-long-lived / HLW:
Final storage in the deep
underground (500 m)
planned
Source: ANDRA, Project Owner File, 2013
TÜV SÜD Slide 23CIGEO-Repository for HLW & ILW-long-lived
• Depth ca. 500 m under surface, area ca. 15 km²
• Licensing application ca. 2018, granting of license ca. 2021
• Expected beginning of the industrial pilot phase ca. 2025
• Beginning of storage ca. 2030
• Reversibility of the decision during the whole process
• Gradual decisions for the extension of the repository
• Storage of the waste with the possibility of retrieval
• Planned operation time > 100 years
• Keep open before final closure of the repository
Source: ANDRA, OECD-RWMC-49, 2016
TÜV SÜD Slide 24Contents 1 Introduction 2 Status of nuclear disposal 3 Safety requirments and long-term safety case 4 German „repository“ Asse, Morsleben, Konrad and Gorleben 5 Disposal conditions of the repository Konrad TÜV SÜD Slide 25
Safety requirments and long-term safety case
Safety requirements on repository for HLW, BMUB on 30th Sept. 2010.
• Safety level of repositroy for heat-generating radioactive waste in deep geological formations,
to fulfill the requirements of the atomic act
• License procedure for the (selected) site
• Safety objectives
• Safety principles
• Stepwise approach and optimization
• Protection against damage from ionizing radiation
• Safety analyses for operation and long-term safety case
• Safety concept for operation phase and after-closure phase
• Safety management for construction and operation of the repository
• Documentation
TÜV SÜD Slide 26General safety objectives & safety principles General safety objectives 1. Protection of human and environment against ionizing radiation and other harmful effects of these waste 2. Avoidance of unreasonable burden and commitments for future generations 2. Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and of Radioactive Waste Management 1997 Safety principles • Radioactive and other harmful substances have to be concentrated and enclosed in the effective containment zone • Only slight increase of the natural radiation exposure on the long term • No danger for the diversity of species • No resource competition • No higher pollution abroad permitted than in Germany • No interventions or maintenance after closure • Fast construction of the repository • Secured and timely financing for construction and operation incl. decommissioning of the repository TÜV SÜD Slide 27
Approach/optimization & protection against damage from ionizing radiation Stepwise approach and optimization Before essential decisions for the further approach are made, a optimization on the basis of safety analyses and safety evaluations with an examination of possible alternatives have to be done • Optimization of the repository concept and design due to the long construction and operation phases • Regular security check during operation phase (every 10 years) Protection against damage from ionizing radiation in the after-closure phase • Guarantee of integrity of the effective containment zone in the after-closure phase • Additional radiation exposure shall only appear in a limited area, so that as little persons of a generation as possible may be concerned • It has to be proved, that for probable developments through release of radionuclides, for individual persons of the population only a additional effective dose in the area of 10 microsievert per year could appear • For less probable developments in the after-closure phase a additional effective dose for humans not exceed 0,1 millisievert per year TÜV SÜD Slide 28
Protection against damage from ionizing radiation & Long-term safety case Protection against damage from ionizing radiation in the after-closure phase • For improbable developments no rate is determined for reasonable risks or reasonable radiation exposure. There, possibilities for optimization with acceptable efforts have to be proved. • For developments due to unintentional intrusion, no rate is determined for reasonable risks or reasonable radiation exposure. Long-term safety case • Safety analysis for all operating conditions of the repository • Site-specific long-term safety certification for 1 m years • Integrity of effective containment zone • The in each case underlying repository design • The quality assured collection of data and information from site exploration, research and development • The comprehensive identification and analysis of safety relevant scenarios and its classification in the probability classes • The identification, characterization and modeling of safety relevant processes • The representation and implementation of a systematic strategy for identification, evaluation and handling of uncertainties TÜV SÜD Slide 29
Safety concept for operation phase and after-closure phase
Long-term statement to the integrity of the effective containment zone:
• The integrity of the effective containment zone have to be ensured over a detection period of 1
million years
• Therefore the applicant have to show that:
• the formation of such secondary water paths within the effective containment zone, which
can lead to the penetration or leakage of possibly polluted aqueous solutions, is excluded
• present pore water does not participate at the hydrogeological cycle outside the effective
containment zone in the sense of the water rights
• For salt and clay rocks following criteria have to be proved additionally:
• the expected straining may not exceed the dilatancy stability of the effective containment
zone outside the bulking zone
• the expected fluid pressures may not exceed the fluid pressure straining of the effective
containment zone in a way that leads to a raised access of groundwater into the effective
containment zone
• the barrier effectiveness of the effective containment zone may not be impermissible
influenced through the temperature progression of the waste
TÜV SÜD Slide 30Safety concept for operation phase and after-closure phase Long-term statement to the integrity of the effective containment zone: Proof of robustness of the technical components of the repository system: The long-term robustness have to be predicted and presented on the basis of theoretical thoughts. The creation, construction and function of technical barriers have to be tested, if they take over significant safety functions and if they underlie special requirements and there are no recognized engineering rules. Exclusion of criticality: It is to show, that self-sustaining chain reactions at probable as well as at less probable developments are excluded Requirements on the safety concept • Minimization of the perforation of the effective containment zone • Consideration of geological attenuation zone at determination for effective containment zone • Separation of storage- and drivage areas • Minimization of open storage areas • Decommissioning concept have to exist at initial operation • Multiple barrier system TÜV SÜD Slide 31
Schematic presentation of the effect duration of different barriers
(Example repository system in salt / clay rock )
Geological barrier
Shaft- and route sealing
Compacted route stowing
Fuel element cask
Waste matrix
Time / Years
TÜV SÜD Slide 32Safety management for construction and operation of the repository
Repository design:
For the safety of the repository during the operation phase and including the decommissioning, the
reliability and robustness of the safety functions have to be proved. Following four safety levels have
to be considered:
• Normal operation – measures avoid the appearance of operation disturbance
• Abnormal operation – measures avoid the appearance of design basis incidents
• Design basis incidents – measures control design basis incidents
• Events beyond the design basis – measures reduce the entrance probability or the environment
impacts
• The piercing of the effective containment zone with shafts, drivages or bore holes have to be
minimized
• For the determination of the borders of the effective containment zone, a adequate depth position
as well as a adequate distance to geological disturbances have to be met
• The handling of waste packages have to be separated from the mining work
• The amount of open storage areas should be kept low. These are to be loaded quickly, then
backfilled and sealed securely against the mine.
TÜV SÜD Slide 33Safety management for construction and operation of the repository
Repository design:
1. Retrievability and recoverability:
• During operation phase until the closure of the shafts or ramps the retrieval of the waste casks
have to be possible.
• The manageability of the waste casks at a eventual recoverability from the decommissened and
closed repository have to be possible for a time period of 500 years.
• Measures, that are taken to ensure the possibilities for the retrieval or salvage, may not influence
the passive safety barriers and therewith the long-term safety.
2. Multi-barrier system:
The containment capacity of the repository have to be based on different barriers with diverse safety
functions. Relating the reliability of the inclusion, the interaction of these barriers in their redundancy
and diversity have to optimated.
TÜV SÜD Slide 34Safety management for construction and operation of the repository
Repository design:
3. Decommissioning concept
Before the initial operation of the repository, a realizable and checked decommissioning concept have
to exist. It has to be ensured that the personnel, financial and technical conditions allow a eventual
necessary short-term implementation of the decommissioning concept.
In line with the every ten years performed safety check, the decommissioning concept has to be
checked after the state of science and technology and further developed if necessary.
4. Safety management:
• The applicant/operator has to establish a safety management, which is maintained during all
phases of the repository project until the closing of the decommissioning. It gives the verification
and continuous improvement of the safety the highest priority.
• For the realisation of the safety management, a safety management system has to be arranged. It
has to contain all determinations, regulations and organisational tools for the execution of safety
relevant operations and processes.
• The safety management system is an integral part of the whole management system.
• Safety management have to be constructed as a learning system.
•
TÜV SÜD Slide 35Safety management for construction and operation of the repository
4. Safety management:
• Establishment of safety management system
• For all project phases
• Responsibility at operator organisation
• Clear organisational structure
• Suitable employee selection (knowledge, reliability…)
• Validity for all parties, also for external organisations which act as external company, deliverer or
contractor for the applicant/operator
• The organisational structure of the applicant / operator has to be aligned on the safety targets:
• Determination of clear responsibilities for contents and processes
• Promote the stepwise optimization of the project in consideration of the continuous gaining of
information and findings
• Support of the internal and external, disciplinary and interdisciplinary exchange
• Pursue a transparent approach for the extraction, processing and documentation of data and
results
• Promote self-critical behavior and a critical questioning attitude of all employees as well as a
trusting handling in all areas within the organization
TÜV SÜD Slide 36Documentation
• All data and documents relevant for the safety statement have to be documented until the
decommissioning is finalized. This includes:
• the mine surveying data of the repository, including their historical development
• all relevant information about the stored waste, including their safety technical significant
properties
• the planned and taken technical measures at construction, storage operation and
decommissioning of the repository
• the results of all measuring programs
• all made forecasts for developments in the repository mine and its surrounding area
• all made proofs for operational safety and long-term safety.
• The set of documents has to be updated regularly. For the form and place of the storage it has to
be ensured that all sets of documents are accessible at every time and with currently available
technic without substantial effort. Complete sets of documents have to be stored at at least two
different suitable places. Documentation to be kept after the closure of the repository must
• contain all data and documents from the operation-documentation that may be relevant to the
information of future generations
• especially contain information, which area in the surrounding area of the repository mine have
to be protected against human interventions in the deep underground respectively which
interventions have to be provided with special conditions.
TÜV SÜD Slide 37Contents 1 Introduction 2 Status of nuclear disposal 3 Safety requirments and long-term safety case 4 German „repository“ Asse, Morsleben, Konrad and Gorleben 5 Disposal conditions of the repository Konrad TÜV SÜD Slide 38
Repositories for Nuclear Waste in Germany
Repositories for Nuclear Waste in Germany
Former exploration mine for nuclear waste GORLEBEN
Rock Salt
HAW
Repository for nuclear waste MORSLEBEN (Rock Salt)
Former repository for low and intermediate level
radioactive waste in GDR
Interstratifation complete
Status: Closedown
Repository for nuclear waste KONRAD (Iron Ore/Clay))
Repository for low and intermediate level radioactive
waste
Status: Construction; Commissioning: 2022
Former test repository for nuclear waste ASSE II (Rock Salt)
Former test repository for low and intermediate level
radioactive waste in Germany (1965-1978)
Source: VGB
Research activity (1979-1995)
Status: decommissioning and retrieval (ca. 200.000 m3)
TÜV SÜD Slide 39Germany - overview
ERAM (Morsleben) Asse II Konrad Gorleben
• Former potash & • Former potash & • Former iron ore • Salt dome
salt mine salt mine mine • Possible repository
• Storage: 1971-1991 • Storage: 1965-1978 • Planned for HLW
&1994-1998 • 47.000 m3 completion: 2027 • Protest of residents
• 37.000 m3 LLW/MLW • ~300.000 m3
LLW/MLW LLW/MLW
Source: Deutsches Atomforum e. V., GNS
TÜV SÜD Slide 40Germany - overview
Inventory KONRAD
Maximum storage 5*1018 Bq
Inventory 1 CASTOR
Maximum storage 1*1018 Bq (type V/19)
Inventory ASSE II
Storage 3*1015 Bq (01.01.2010)
Inventory MORSLEBEN
3*1014 Bq
Source: BfS
TÜV SÜD Slide 41Repositories for Nuclear Waste in Germany
Former Repository Morsleben for Radwaste with heat generation < 2 kW/m3
1970: Site selection GDR
Repository Morsleben
1986: Commissioning
1990: FRG
1998: Stop of the storage
2001: BfS decision: Decommissioning
2009: Plan-approval procedure
(13000 objections)
2013: ESK Safety review
Volume: 36.754 m3
Activity: β/γ: 9,6 x 1013 Bq / α:1,8 x 1014 Bq
TÜV SÜD Slide 42Repositoriy Morsleben TÜV SÜD Slide 43
Repositories for Nuclear Waste in Germany Former Repository ASSE II for Radwaste with heat generation < 2 kW/m3 1909 - 1964 : Rock salt mine Former Repository ASSE II 1965 - 1967: exploration for 1967 - 1978: operation 1995 – 2008: Closedown 2009: Stop operation 2010: decision for „retrieval“ 2013: act for acceleration of retrieval 2033: Begin of retrival TÜV SÜD Slide 44
Asse II
Source: GNS, BfS
TÜV SÜD Slide 45Repositories for Nuclear Waste in Germany
Repository Konrad for Radwaste with heat generation < 2 kW/m3
1965 - 1976 : Iron mine
Repository Konrad
1976 - 1982: exploration
1982 - 2002: Plan-approval procedure (20 a)
2007: Ende of the legal process for
objections
Status: Construction
2027: Commissioning
Volume: 303.000 m3
Activity: b/g: 2 x 1018 Bq; a: 1,5 x1017
Source: VGB
TÜV SÜD Slide 46Repository Konrad TÜV SÜD Slide 47
Repositories for Nuclear Waste in Germany
Possible repository Gorleben for Radwaste with heat generation > 2 kW/m3
Worldwide biggest examination program for repository
(HLW) „Repository“ Gorleben
Exploration underground (since 1986):
Construction of Slot 1 & 2 and connection Bild: Fice / Wikipedia
2000: government decided moratorium for 10
years
because of doubts (after 5 years already
eliminated)
Since 2010 further examination, but complaints
in 2012
Exploration aboveground (1979 – 1983):
Recording of 477 km seismic profiles
322 vertical drillings (measurement of ground
water)
44 salt mirror cuts
4 deep boreholes
2 pilot shaft drilling
2013/2017 StandAG: keep mine open until further
exploration because of selection process Source: VGB
TÜV SÜD Slide 48Possible repository Gorleben TÜV SÜD Slide 49
Contents 1 Introduction 2 Status of nuclear disposal 3 Safety requirments and long-term safety case 4 German „repository“ Asse, Morsleben, Konrad and Gorleben 5 Disposal conditions of the repository Konrad TÜV SÜD Slide 50
Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
Cask/Container Length or Width Height Volume
Diameter
(mm) (mm) (mm) m3
Concrete packaging I 1060 - 13701 1,2
Concrete packaging II 1060 - 15102/3 1,3
cast-iron packaging I 900 - 1150 0,7
cast-iron packaging II 1060 - 15004 1,34
cast-iron packaging III 1000 - 1240 1,0
Container I 1600 1700 14505 3,95
Container II 1600 1700 1700 4,6
Container III 3000 1700 1700 8,7
Container IV 3000 1700 14506 7,47
Container V 3200 2000 1700
F1060 10,9
Container VI 1600 2000 1700 5,4
TÜV SÜD Slide 51Conditions for repository Konrad TÜV SÜD Slide 52
Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
Radioactive half-life of 44 radionuclides (Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
List II: Guaranteed values for
radionuclides and radionuclide
groups per waste container
(Bq/Container)
TÜV SÜD Slide 54Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
List 3: activity limiting values for
radionuclides and no specified
a, b or g emitter per waste
container (Bq/Container)
TÜV SÜD Slide 55Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
List 4: activity limiting values
for radionuclides per waste
container (Bq/Container)
TÜV SÜD Slide 56Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
List 4: activity limiting values
for radionuclides per waste
container (Bq/Container)
TÜV SÜD Slide 57Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
List 5: activity values for
radionuclides and no specified
a, b or g emitter per waste
container (Bq/Container)
TÜV SÜD Slide 58Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
List 5: activity values for
radionuclides and no specified
a, b or g emitter per waste
container (Bq/Container)
TÜV SÜD Slide 59Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
List 6: activity values for
radionuclides per waste
container (Bq/Container)
TÜV SÜD Slide 60Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
List 6: activity values for
radionuclides per waste
container (Bq/Container)
TÜV SÜD Slide 61Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
List 6: activity values for
radionuclides per waste
container (Bq/Container)
TÜV SÜD Slide 62Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
List 6: activity values for
radionuclides per waste
container (Bq/Container)
TÜV SÜD Slide 63Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
List 7a: activity values of fissile materials (no Uranium)
per waste container (Bq/Container)
TÜV SÜD Slide 64Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
List 7b: Mass of fissile materials (no Uranium)
per waste container (Bq/Container)
TÜV SÜD Slide 65Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
List 8: max. activity of radionuclides at the end of the
operating phase of Konrad repository
TÜV SÜD Slide 66Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
List 9: mean activity concentration of radionuclides (Bq/m3)
TÜV SÜD Slide 67Casks & Containers for reporsitory Konrad
List 10: Permissible
radionuclides for repository
Konrad
TÜV SÜD Slide 68Thank you for your attention TÜV SÜD Slide 69
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