N. 19 BEYOND NETWORKS, MILITIAS AND TRIBES: RETHINKING EU COUNTER-SMUGGLING POLICY AND RESPONSE
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N. 19
Policy Study
BEYOND NETWORKS, MILITIAS
AND TRIBES: RETHINKING EU
COUNTER-SMUGGLING POLICY
AND RESPONSE
Gabriella Sanchez
Coordinator
Kheira Arrouche
Matteo Capasso
Angeliki Dimitriadi
Alia Fakhry
© Marta Sánchez Dionis 2020
N. 19
APRIL 2021
Policy Study
BEYOND NETWORKS,
MILITIAS AND TRIBES:
RETHINKING EU
COUNTER-SMUGGLING
POLICY AND RESPONSE
Gabriella Sanchez
Coordinator
Kheira Arrouche
Matteo Capasso
Angeliki Dimitriadi
Alia FakhryEuroMeSCo has become a benchmark for policy-oriented research on issues related to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, in particular economic development, security and migration. With 104 affiliated think tanks and institutions and about 500 experts from 29 different countries, the network has developed impactful tools for the benefit of its members and a larger community of stakeholders in the Euro- Mediterranean region. Through a wide range of publications, surveys, events, training activities, audio- visual materials and a strong footprint on social media, the network reaches thousands of experts, think tankers, researchers, policy-makers and civil society and business stakeholders every year. While doing so, EuroMeSCo is strongly engaged in streamlining genuine joint research involving both European and Southern Mediterranean experts, encouraging exchanges between them and ultimately promoting Euro-Mediterranean integration. All the activities share an overall commitment to fostering youth participation and ensuring gender equality in the Euro-Mediterranean experts’ community. EuroMesCo: Connecting the Dots is a project co-funded by the European Union (EU) and the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) that is implemented in the framework of the EuroMeSCo network. As part of this project, five Joint Study Groups are assembled each year to carry out evidence-based and policy-oriented research. The topics of the five study groups are defined through a thorough process of policy consultations designed to identify policy-relevant themes. Each Study Group involves a Coordinator and a team of authors who work towards the publication of a Policy Study which is printed, disseminated through different channels and events, and accompanied by audio-visual materials. POLICY STUDY Published by the European Institute of the Mediterranean Peer Review Academic Peer Reviewer: anonymous Policy Peer Reviewer: We are grateful to the Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Section of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for its substantive support to the development of this Policy Study, through the contribution of Ms. Morgane Nicot as a Policy Peer Reviewer. Editing Karina Melkonian Design layout Maurin.studio Proofreading Neil Charlton Layout Núria Esparza Print ISSN 2462-4500 Digital ISSN 2462-4519 April 2021 This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union or the European Institute of the Mediterranean.
The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), founded in 1989, is a think and do tank specialised in Euro-Mediterranean relations. It provides policy-oriented and evidence-based research underpinned by a genuine Euromed multidimensional and inclusive approach. The aim of the IEMed, in accordance with the principles of the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), is to stimulate reflection and action that contribute to mutual understanding, exchange and cooperation between the different Mediterranean countries, societies and cultures, and to promote the progressive construction of a space of peace and stability, shared prosperity and dialogue between cultures and civilisations in the Mediterranean. The IEMed is a consortium comprising the Catalan Government, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation, the European Union and Barcelona City Council. It also incorporates civil society through its Board of Trustees and its Advisory Council. The mission of the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) at the European University Institute (EUI) is to conduct advanced research on the transnational governance of international migration, asylum and mobility. It provides new ideas, rigorous evidence and critical thinking to inform major European and global policy. The MPC has three core aims: · Advancing Academic Research and Knowledge: It conducts theoretical and empirical research linking different types of migration, geographies, levels of policy-making and governance, and policy issues. · Policy Engagement and Dialogue: It proactively engages with users of migration research to foster dialogue in Europe and globally about migration policy and governance while building links with other key global challenges and changes. · Training: It provides advanced training for researchers, policy officials, civil society organisations and others dealing with migration issues in the form of executive training courses and its renown annual Migration Summer School.
Policy Study
Content Executive Summary 8 Introduction 12 Gabriella Sanchez Revisiting the Counter-Smuggling Approach 14 Gabriella Sanchez Countering Smuggling of Migrants through Social Media Monitoring: Looking for a Needle in a Digital Haystack 34 Angeliki Dimitriadi Hiding in Plain Sight: Investigating the Blind Spots of Counter-Smuggling Efforts in Niger 52 Alia Fakhry Current Trends and Challenges on the Facilitation of Irregular Migration in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco 76 Gabriella Sanchez, Kheira Arrouche, Matteo Capasso List of acronyms and abbreviations 96
Executive Summary Countering migrant smuggling and its actors – described as the men behind the facilitation of migrants’ irregular journeys – are important elements of the European Union (EU)’s migration and border control policy. Under the new Pact on Migration and Asylum, the EU has proposed to promote tailor-made and mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries specifically to address migrant smuggling. EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson has also promised a predictable and reliable migration management system that includes “stepping up the fight against human traffickers and smugglers”. The EU has certainly taken important steps to counter irregular migration, including making considerable financial commitments to the fight against smugglers and their networks, to whom the journeys of irregular migrants into Europe are almost single-handedly attributed. Smugglers, characterised as inherently violent and exploitative, are also described as relying on a specific business model that generates incalculable earnings. Much has been written about how these profits, if unmonitored, can be funnelled by smugglers into other criminal enterprises like drug trafficking or weapons smuggling, but also into the more nefarious practices of sex trafficking or terrorism. Within this context, smugglers are also said to exploit an ever-growing number of naïve and desperate victims, primarily young men from sub-Saharan Africa who, driven solely by the power of social media and the iconography portraying European soil as a dreamed destination, do not think twice about embarking on dangerous journeys across vast deserts and seas. At high level policy events and academic exchanges, participants often cite examples of young men who, tricked by Facebook and Instagram posts, arrive in Europe after enduring harrowing experiences only to find themselves in even more desperate situations of homelessness and deprivation, having believed the lies and false promises of smugglers, friends and family members posted online. Migrant women, on the other hand, tend to be described as young sex slaves or prostitutes, victims of the depravity of sexually-predatory smugglers who do not hesitate to exploit them for profit in cities across North Africa and Europe. Migrants do face violence and intimidation at the hands of smugglers. These experiences have been documented at length in a vast number of reports targeting European audiences. Kidnapping, extortion, and physical and sexual assault are undeniable and troubling realities on the migration pathway, and migrants do experience them often at the hands of smugglers. Women, girls, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and questioning migrants are also more vulnerable to specific forms of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), which are often compounded by racism and other forms of discrimination – this does not preclude the fact that SGBV against migrant men is also common on the migrant trail. Policy Study n. 19
This policy study, developed by a team of migration scholars based in EU research institutions, argues that while these general notions have guided the mainstream, collective understanding of migrant smuggling, they do in fact pose several and serious limitations that, if not considered closely, can lead to faulty conclusions and inadequate policy responses. Echoing other studies, this report shows that irregular migration and counter-smuggling policy are often based on limited empirical data, drawn from similar if not identical stakeholders, and developed by a reduced and identifiable core of researchers (most of them, European and/or Europe-based). While this body of work has to a large extent expanded the understanding of smuggling, it has simultaneously privileged Euro-centric perspectives and law enforcement priorities at the expense of silencing the experiences (other than those involving victimisation and abuse) of the very people who rely on smugglers for their journeys. Chapter one examines how research has shown that while in most law enforcement, policy and academic circles the facilitation of irregular migration for profit is articulated as a crime, for most migrants the people behind their journeys merely facilitate a service of mobility, which may be in some instances illicit but not criminal, rooted in the lack of accessible, affordable, legal and safe paths for migration. These actors, commonly depicted in academic publications and research reports as heinously violent and predatory members of tribes or other ethnic and racialised groups, are quite often valued and well-respected people in communities across North Africa and the Sahel, trusted for the efficiency of their mobility, trade and transportation services. Known or depicted as smugglers in policy reports, these facilitators are quite often ordinary men and women, recognised for their contributions to the local economy, including the provision of mobility solutions for young and adult migrants unable to secure the protections afforded by passports or visas. The study also showcases how, contrary to smuggling’s depiction as a domain of adult men organised into criminal networks, the facilitation of irregular migration often takes place as a community-based enterprise, where local groups – often comprising extended families, women, children and elderly people – play critical roles in the facilitation of migrants’ journeys, sharing and reincorporating profits to the local economy. As shown throughout this study, the provision of smuggling services is an important source of income for women, who are often engaged in the provision of room and board, the care for injured or hurt migrants, running flats within ghettos, and in some instances transporting migrants across borders. The study shows that when seen from a local, micro-level perspective, the provision of smuggling services is perceived as a viable source of income, especially among marginalised groups – tribal communities in remote regions, women, migrants in transit and/or stranded, migrant children and youths travelling unaccompanied. Simultaneously, examples from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Niger included in this study highlight the impact of attempts to counter the activities of smugglers, not only on those who directly or indirectly benefit financially from migrants’ journeys, but on migrants themselves. Efforts to counter smuggling by both the EU and third countries – for example, the monitoring of social media pages by EU law enforcement bodies, the
10 Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response
introduction of a migrant smuggling statute in national criminal law as in the
case of Niger, or the designation of irregular departures in Tunisia, Algeria and
Morocco as criminal – often have either ineffective or counterproductive effects.
Chapter two showcases how social media data-mining efforts by EU law
enforcement appear to have scant impact on the operation of migrant
smuggling groups yet raise concerns over institutional transparency and
migrants’ right to privacy. In the case of Niger, chapter three shows how the
introduction of the counter-smuggling statute pushed the long-standing local
economy of mobility and trade underground, depriving of income sources not
only those directly involved in the facilitation of migrants’ journeys but those
who benefited from the presence of people in transit – particularly women,
children and youths who generated an income from the sale of food, equipment
or accommodation, and whose presence is often disregarded in smuggling
analyses and policy recommendations. Chapter four showcases how across
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, apprehension and conviction for irregular
departure – often punished through hefty fines – further compound the debt
and precarity of young men and their families, and reinforce the desire or need
to migrate, often with devastating consequences. Chapter four also provides
important evidence that, in these three countries, groups of friends and family
members – rather than smuggling groups – are behind the organisation of their
own irregular journeys, pulling together their own resources and knowledge.
Recommendations
The EU’s stated commitment to counter the negative impacts of migrant
smuggling activities constitutes an opportunity to rethink the traditional
approaches to smuggling, and to re-energise a body of research that has been
vastly dominated by Euro-centric perspectives and foci.
• Improved knowledge and understanding of smuggling can only come
from radical changes to the way research is created and data analysed.
This involves expanding the web of informants and stakeholders but also
diversifying the body of researchers and research entities traditionally
tasked with conducting smuggling research. Efforts to incorporate junior,
female, Global South researchers and consultants and to expand
perspectives through the recruitment of a wider net of informants through
alternative and innovative research methods are urgently needed.
• Most analyses on smuggling and counter-smuggling policy efforts are
devoid of references to the way race, class and gender shape the
experiences of both migrants and those who facilitate their journeys. To
this one must add the systematic racism and discrimination sub-Saharan
and other racialised migrants face and which shape their interactions with
migration authorities and their overall experiences of migration.
Furthermore, the experiences of women (both as migrants and as
facilitators of their journeys) continue to be underexplored. Policy
responses must take into consideration how migrants and those behind
their journeys experience enforcement and controls.
Policy Study n. 19Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response 11
• Efforts to access data revealed a deeply entrenched culture of secrecy in
EU enforcement bodies dedicated to counter-smuggling work. Interviews
were often denied, requests for access went unanswered despite multiple
official requests, and access to data was often limited. Mechanisms that
allow rapid and transparent access to data in a fashion that does not
compromise the nature of investigations are key to improving
smuggling and counter-smuggling analysis and policy development.
The creation of an open access database including information concerning
smuggling investigations and case law would be a welcome step towards
transparency.
• Along these lines, it is critical to ensure that any counter-smuggling effort
relying on social media data-mining is in line with European law and
that it protects the rule of law and human rights of migrants and asylum
seekers.
• If the EU is indeed committed to dismantling exploitative smuggling
operations and their actors, equal access to safe, legal and orderly paths
to migration in line with the Migration Compact must be implemented.
The demand for smuggling services does not emerge in a vacuum. Instead,
it is rooted in the lack of access to mechanisms allowing for safe transit.Introduction Gabriella Sanchez Research Fellow and Lead of Migrant Smuggling Research, Migration Policy Centre (MPC) at the European University Institute (EUI)
Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response 13
Amid the end of Operation Sophia, The policy study examines EU counter-
the announcement of a new migra- smuggling programmes and strate-
tion package together with a new Se- gies, documenting and improving the
curity Union Strategy, and the release understanding of their impacts not
of the Roadmap to the European only in North Africa and the Sahel, but
Union (EU) Action Plan against mi- in EU policy and law enforcement cir-
grant smuggling (2021-2025) – all in cles. Relying on field-based research
the context of the COVID-19 pande- and other empirical sources, it also
mic – there is momentum to reflect provides evidence-based understan-
critically on the actions and instru- dings of the dynamics present in the fa-
ments the EU has deployed to coun- cilitation of irregular migration
ter migrant smuggling in the (including those shaped or impacted
Mediterranean and beyond, and to by the COVID-19 emergency) and the
propose what should be done diffe- current challenges faced by migrants in
rently under the forthcoming term. transit and in need.
This is the goal of this policy study. It The study is divided into four chapters.
acknowledges that EU’s counter-smug- Chapter one identifies policy-makers’
gling strategy has been an essential understanding of migrant smuggling
component of EU migration manage- and its implications in light of the forth-
ment discourse, policy and response, coming EU migration package. Chap-
often being showcased as a sign of ter two examines the use of social
the strong collaborative ties between media by law enforcement in counter-
the EU and countries in North Africa smuggling operations and its ethical
and the Sahel. It also identifies a se- implications. Chapter three identifies
ries of challenges. The counter-smug- the impacts of counter-smuggling acti-
gling strategy’s strong focus on the vities in Niger, and the ways they have
Libyan case has left smuggling dyna- impacted the lives of migrant transpor-
mics in other regions virtually unexa- ters and other merchants – in particu-
mined. The lack of inputs from third lar, women – who benefited from the
countries; the criminalisation under presence of migrants. The fourth and
the migrant smuggling rubric of long- closing chapter examines how irregular
standing transportation and trade departures from Tunisia, Algeria and
practices – in the process disturbing Morocco have been organised over
local, tribal economies – the reliance the last year in spite of the pandemic,
on migrant returns, incarceration and and the implications of the facilitation
detention practices, combined with of irregular migration for migrants.
the high death rate in the Mediterra- Furthermore, the study provides a se-
nean, all have raised questions over ries of recommendations related to re-
the strategy’s effectiveness. Further- search development, the urgent need
more, the focus on dismantling smug- to diversify the makeup of migration
gling operations has also been researchers and their informants, the
criticised for the way it deflects atten- concerning veil of secrecy over counter-
tion from the reason at the core of the smuggling activities, and the demand
demand for smuggling services – the for responses that address the reason at
reduced availability of safe, orderly the core for the demand of smuggling
and regular paths for migration as services: the lack of equally accessible,
outlined in the Global Compact for Mi- safe, legal and orderly channels for mi-
gration. gration.
Policy Study n. 19Revisiting the Counter-Smuggling Approach Gabriella Sanchez Research Fellow and Lead of Migrant Smuggling Research, Migration Policy Centre (MPC) at the European University Institute (EUI)
Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response 15
Introduction into a country other than his or her own
without authorisation. In the context of
the so-called European refugee crisis of
This chapter examines how European 2015 and given the large number of arri-
Union (EU) policy-makers engage with vals to the EU of people seeking protec-
the concept of migrant smuggling and tion, migrant smuggling – a topic
how this in turn shapes policy conversa- extensively explored in the early 2000s
tions and decision-making. It identifies by criminology scholars, particularly in
four specific elements or notions which the case of irregular journeys bound for
are often mobilised to speak about and Italy – acquired renewed relevance, and
frame migrant smuggling in counter- policy-makers signalled their interest in
smuggling policy: the concept of net- understanding its actors and dynamics.
work, the gendering of the smuggler as This translated into the production of a
male, the smuggling business model large body of publications concerning
and the privileging of law enforcement migrant smuggling, not to mention into
perspectives. These elements, despite funding by the EU of a vast number of
being cited constantly, have scant evi- initiatives in third countries to counter
dence supporting them. Their use in the irregular migration by tackling smug-
security and migration discourse reflects gling. Third countries themselves, in an
significant inconsistencies in knowledge attempt to be perceived as supportive
and data, and serious cognitive biases. EU partners, but also to advance their
Policy – often trying to reconcile EU own migration and border enforcement
perspectives with “national level” prio- policy (see Sanchez et al., this report),
rities and their specific contexts – is the- have also become heavily engaged in
refore likely to articulate or propose activities that aim to dismantle the so-
responses to counter migrant smuggling called “business model” of migrant
that are not in line with the conditions smuggling. This has typically involved
on the ground, further muddling an al- adopting border and immigration con-
ready complex conceptual and policy trol initiatives to counter the operations
field. The chapter ends with a series of of smugglers through the containment
recommendations on how to address of irregular migration, most notably
these gaps and to strengthen the crea- across North Africa and the Sahel.
tion of evidence-based knowledge and
policy concerning migrant smuggling. While references to migrant smuggling
are commonplace in EU migration-rela-
What do we talk about ted policy initiatives and communica-
tions (Fakhry, this report), there is still a
when we talk about quite limited understanding of what the
migrant smuggling? practice actually entails. Policy-makers
across EU entities still struggle with its
Migrant smuggling involves the facilita- basic definition and often conflate it with
tion for profit of the entry of a person human trafficking.1 Along these lines,
1
Human trafficking is an act involving the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of
persons through the threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or
vulnerability, or giving payments or benefits to a person in control of a victim. It is carried out for the
purpose of exploitation, which includes sexual exploitation, forced labour, slavery or similar practices
and the removal of organs. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/
protocoltraffickinginpersons.aspx
Policy Study n. 1916 Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response
it is not unusual to find communications basis of quite specific contexts or
that refer to smugglers as traffickers and dynamics – a specificity often driven
vice-versa, adding to the conceptual by geopolitical priorities. In other
clutter.2 It is also common to come words, despite often recognising the
across references to cases in which need for contextual analysis and tai-
search and rescue efforts carried out lored recommendations that unearth
by civil society and individuals have or identify unique circumstances, po-
been designated as smuggling in licy-makers simultaneously call for
courts of law, in a fashion that contra- country-wide approaches to smug-
dicts the spirit of the United Nations gling that can be implemented or
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) even replicated across countries
Protocol against the Smuggling of Mi- (Fakhry, this report). This results in
grants, which calls for the non-crimi- specific contexts or experiences being
nalisation of humanitarian assistance used to explain or address others, des-
(UNODC, 2000; Carrera et al., 2018). pite their potential for detrimental,
damaging effects.
It is true that in practice the difference
between migrant smuggling and human This form of engaging with smuggling The difference
trafficking is hard to draw (GAATW, dynamics is perhaps best exemplified between
2011; Aziz et al., 2015). Many migrants in the case of Libya. Following the migrant
who consensually enter into a migrant spike in EU arrivals of 2015, Libya be- smuggling and
smuggling agreement may suddenly came the paradigmatic case of smug- human
find themselves under coercion, facing gling in the Mediterranean, its long trafficking is
conditions of forced manual or even se- history as a migrant smuggling hub hard to draw
xual labour, or other forms of abuse. (see Pastore et al., 2006; Hamood,
Many trafficking victims may also be 2006) often dismissed. The demand
able to negotiate arrangements with for research products to understand
smugglers for the purpose of advancing the arrival and departure of migrants
their journeys (Kook, 2018). However, re- to and from Libya and the rush to sa-
ferences to smuggling and trafficking, tisfy it left virtually all other smuggling
rather than showcasing these nuances, contexts in the Mediterranean under
often suggest an absence of conceptual or unexamined. It is true that the
and empirical clarity. The challenge the- focus on Libya was the result of its role
refore becomes one of deciding how to as the main point of departure for EU
prevent these limitations from conti- irregular arrivals. But recent develop-
nuing to trickle down into policy deve- ments in migration dynamics in Tuni-
lopment, leading to the articulation or sia, Algeria and Morocco to the EU
implementation of solutions that do not (especially in the context of the pan-
match the phenomenon or the dynamics demic) have begun to show the impli-
on the ground. cations of the hyper-focus on Libya, as
knowledge on smuggling and its
There is also a tendency to understand dynamics in these three countries is
or frame migrant smuggling on the scant at best (see Sanchez et al., this
2
See, for example, UN Security Council 2019: Letter Dated 6 August 2019 from the panel of experts
established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali addressed to the president of the Security
Council, where the panel of experts reads: “Human traffickers [is] a term covering both trafficking in
persons and the smuggling of migrants” (p. 33).
Policy Study n. 19Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response 17
report), and the generalisations that analysis carried out primarily in the
can be derived from the Libyan case context of the so-called refugee crisis
are limited. Even in the case of Libya it- and its aftermath. Just as an example,
self, the focus on mapping country- a recent International Organization for
wide smuggling dynamics, rather than Migration (IOM) report mapping mixed
local specificities, has generated sim- migration research and collaborative
plistic knowledge and short-lived solu- initiatives in North and West Africa bet-
tions (Al-Arabi, 2018). In short, the ween 2015 and 2019 identified a total
narrow focus on Libya resulted in a sig- of 191 reports and articles (2020). Writ-
nificant data and analysis gap concer- ten by organisations ranging from
ning other corridors of critical think tanks to international non-go-
importance to the EU’s migrant smug- vernmental organizations to intergo-
gling response, to the point that re- vernmental entities like UNODC and
searchers and analysts are struggling IOM and EU bodies, 34 of the reports
to identify and document current de- specifically focused on the topic of
velopments in a manner that leads to smuggling and trafficking; over 90
solid and effective analysis and policy- delved into the dynamics in Libya
making. and/or the Sahel. Another 40 exami-
ned violence and abuse related to
In sum, while ever-present in the EU’s smuggling, while an additional 41
discourse and policy, the notion of examined trends and routes – inclu-
smuggling is often misunderstood and ding those involving irregular travel
misapplied. When deployed, it focuses and/or with the support of smugglers.
on specific contexts, often too nar- At first sight, the numbers could sug-
rowly. While Libya is indeed a critical gest that there is significant data on
element of the EU’s war against smug- migrant smuggling generated in
gling, it is far from the only case. The these last five years through the work
employment and focus on its dynamics of international bodies and consul-
alone has led to smuggling dynamics tants, assembled into vast databases
identified and policy responses – often documenting displacement and mo-
based on limited evidence – to guide bility. However, a closer look at the
what is a rather partial conversation on studies, their sources and content re-
smuggling in the Mediterranean. veals important trends. Most reports
on smuggling are authored by similar
How do we “know” if not identical bodies, relying on a
consistent group of authors (most of
smuggling? them European). Reports also tend to
cite each other and reflect an overre-
Along with the definitional challenges liance on the same informants and
and the almost single-handed focus on sources. Most reports tend to recycle
the Libya case, the issue of data is or reproduce already available data
another important challenge in unders- that reveals a clear Eurocentric focus,
tanding smuggling dynamics and the reflective of the concerns and inte-
development of counter-smuggling rests of the researchers’ target au-
policy. There are indeed many publica- dience – European policy-makers
tions on migrant smuggling in the lar- (Triandafyllidou & Ricard Guay, 2019).
ger context of the EU-Africa In short, the data contains almost
relationship, derived from research and identical perspectives and/or expe-18 Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response
riences, in part because it has systema- sumed to be men, tend to be descri-
tically relied on the same stakeholders bed as inherently violent, as showing a
who have simultaneously based their preternatural inclination to engage in
analyses on similar sources and docu- sexual violence, and as financially rapa-
ments.3 cious (Sanchez, 2018). The emphasis
on their ethnic identities further sets
The absence of the perspectives of them apart from European lifestyles or
third country actors outside of those modes of governance, affirming them
assigned to government agencies or as different, even primitive or back-
bodies in line with EU perspectives is ward (Bland, 2020; Sharma, 2020). This
also quite notorious. With counted ex- is quite visible in the case of Libya,
ceptions, there is a clear preference to where there has been a tendency to
identify and describe smuggling along describe violent smuggling acts in as-
the lines of EU Law Enforcement Agen- sociation with references to the smug-
cies (LEAs), or to favour/privilege EU glers’ tribal affiliations. This does not
rather than third country understan- mean to suggest that smugglers do
dings and approaches to smuggling not pertain to specific groups or tribes
and its control (Baird & van Liempt, but rather that smuggling-related vio-
2016). A clear example of this gap in- lence is often depicted as inherent or
cludes the lack of data from the facili- natural to their nature as such.
tators of migrants’ journeys
themselves, which figure prominently Despite the limited amount of know-
in the conversations of third country ledge and data on smuggling, acade-
actors, which recognise smugglers as mics and policy-makers have noticed
important facilitators of mobility in hesitation on the part of EU officials to
their communities, rather than as crimi- rely on, further build or expand the evi-
nals (Achilli, 2018; Ayalew, 2018; Bra- dence base on smuggling (Perkowski &
chet, 2018). With the exception of the Squire, 2019; Alagna 2020). As Dimi-
work of the Mixed Migration Centre – triadi's chapter in this study shows,
which has been surveying smuggling agencies are reluctant to share infor-
and migration facilitators along migra- mation or to communicate data out-
tion corridors in Africa – and a planned side of official channels or
joint study by UNODC, the United Na- authorised/vetted stakeholders. Obtai-
tions Entity for Gender Equality and ning interviews with law enforcement of-
the Empowerment of Women, the Uni- ficials involved in counter-smuggling
ted Nations Children’s Fund, and IOM initiatives for this project proved difficult
on gender and smuggling in Libya, that in some cases and impossible in others.
seeks to collect data on local smug- Researchers were asked to follow speci-
gling dynamics, the perspectives of fic guidelines, yet their fulfilment did not
those behind migrants’ journeys are necessarily lead to either interviews or
virtually absent (Baird & van Liempt, data (at the time this report goes into
2016; Zhang et al., 2018). Instead, print, our researchers are still waiting
smugglers are often depicted in rather for replies to requests filed in the sum-
gendered, racialised ways. They are as- mer of 2020). Claiming this reluctance
3
The Research and Evidence Facility for the Sahel and Chad of the EU Emergency Trust for Africa,
for example, has relied on the same four research entities for the development of the nine research
reports listed on their webpage. See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/research-
facility-sahel-and-lake-chad_en
Policy Study n. 19Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response 19
is related to concerns related to secu- work of Salt and Stain on characteri-
rity and confidentiality or to the politi- sing the facilitation of irregular migra-
cised nature of the topic is also tion as a business (1997), Koser’s
problematic, as the researchers were analysis on the smuggling business
not seeking secret or sensitive data but model (2011), and the more recent cri-
rather to gain an improved understan- tique by Baird and van Liempt concer-
ding of data collection and analyses ning the production of knowledge in
processes (in this case, the role of so- migrant smuggling (2016) come to
cial media in counter-smuggling activi- mind. Here they are brought together
ties). The reluctance of some bodies to to show the way in which they are em-
engage with researchers suggests the ployed/mobilised in the smuggling and
existence of not only a culture of se- counter-smuggling discourse, and how
crecy (see Dimitriadi, this report) but they are insufficient at explaining the
the tendency of some EU bodies to extent to which smuggling operates.
control the access to information and
its dissemination (Lixi, 2019; Hartwig, The concept of network
2020).
A quick examination of any EU docu-
What do policy-makers ment on smuggling reveals the wide-
spread use of the term network to
mean when talking about convey a sense of smuggling presenting
migrant smuggling? a complex and well-defined structure –
or as set up in a “vibrant and organised”
Policy-makers’ views of migration fashion (REF, 2020, p. 17). The EU Action
dynamics (including migrant smug- Plan against Smuggling for example, re-
gling) shape the possibilities and limi- fers to smuggling as set up in the form
tations of migration regulations and of “ruthless criminal networks […] that
policy (Lixi, 2019). Simultaneously, go- make substantial gains while putting mi-
vernance systems play a definite role in grants’ lives at risk” (EC, 2015). Lan-
the way policy-makers see and tackle guage from the EU Emergency Trust
While migration challenges (Geddes & Lixi, 2018). Fund for Africa (EUTF) also argues that
policy-makers While migration policy-makers and mi- smuggling is constituted into transnatio-
and migration gration analysts describe smuggling as nally-operating entities that the EU, the
analysts posing significant challenges to migra- African Union, international organisa-
describe tion governance systems and to EU se- tions, member states and third countries
smuggling as
curity, there is limited insight into how must fight collectively (2020). Publica-
posing
they understand smuggling. This sec- tions from the International Criminal Po-
significant
challenges to tion identifies a set of four lice Organization (INTERPOL), the
migration concepts/paradigms common to the European Border and Coast Guard
governance way smuggling and counter-smuggling Agency (Frontex) and the European
systems and to are spoken about in policy circles: the Union Agency for Law Enforcement
EU security, concept of network; the (gendered) Cooperation (Europol) cited here have
there is limited persona of the smuggler; the smug- almost invariably claimed smuggling is
insight into how gling business model; and the privile- organised into vast networks of trans-
they understand ging of law enforcement perspectives. national influence and reach.
smuggling Some elements of this analysis have
been discussed or identified previously There are several implications with the
by other researchers – the important use of the term network, the first one20 Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response
tied to the way it is defined and used. enemy to fight. By extension, this faci-
As Campana shows (2016), while there litates the introduction of other con-
has been a tendency to speak about cepts that go in line with this network
smuggling as a network, the concept narrative, like the kind related to pro-
“is very limiting and often hard to re- fits. Seen solely as networks, it is easier
concile with real-world manifestations to communicate the notion that mi-
of criminal endeavours” (Campana, grant smuggling groups together ge-
2016, p. 3). There is in fact vast evi- nerate massive financial returns. A
dence that the facilitation of irregular 2019 infographic from Europol claims
migration involves multiple actors and smugglers generated 190 million
configurations – from hierarchically-or- euros, although it does not indicate
ganised groups to migrants and asylum over what term (Europol, 2019);
seekers operating independently on UNODC’s 2018 smuggling report cal-
behalf of other migrants to migrants culates that the estimated value of the
guiding/organising their own journeys smuggling enterprise along the three
(Achilli, 2018; Maher, 2018; Richter, main Mediterranean routes into Eu-
2019; Sanchez et al., this report). Cam- rope annually generate between 320
pana (2016) has also shown through and 550 million dollars (UNODC, 2018,
analyses on smuggling that networks p. 20). Bundled together, numbers can
as depicted in law enforcement com- effectively “convey an aura of objective
munications (structured, hierarchical, truth and scientific authority despite
centralised transnational groups) are the extensive interpretive work that
not the ideal mechanism for smuggling goes into their construction” (Merry,
operations of the kind present in the 2016, p. 1).
Mediterranean to succeed.
Furthermore, speaking about smug-
Here it is not suggested that policy- gling as networks also makes it easier
makers or law enforcement officials are to allege interactions occur between
unaware of the existence of other or- them and other criminal actors of con-
ganisational structures or arrange- cern to the EU. The alleged smuggling-
ments in the facilitation of migrant terrorism connection figures The overreliance
on the term
smuggling. Europol’s February 2016 prominently among the concerns of re-
network –
report on smuggling makes reference searchers and policy analysts, who fre-
despite the
to “freelancers” working in smuggling, quently claim terrorist organisations multiplicity of
and the 2018 UNODC Global Report may be generating funds through their actors and
on Migrant Smuggling also acknowled- engagement in migrant smuggling structures
ges the diversity of organisational stra- and/or that terrorists may be using mi- present in
tegies in the facilitation of irregular grant smuggling organisations to travel smuggling –
migration, dividing them into hierarchi- into the EU to carry out their aspira- oversimplifies
cal, network-like, mixed groups, and in- tions (Dokos, 2019; Aerens, 2016; GIT- smuggling’s
dividuals (UNODC, 2018, p. 8). What NOC, 2015). The Europol-INTERPOL dynamics, and
this chapter suggests is that the ove- 2016 Report on Migrant Smuggling creates the
illusion that
rreliance on the term network – des- Networks, for example, while admit-
there is a
pite the multiplicity of actors and ting that a systematic link between ter-
specific,
structures present in smuggling – over- rorism and migrant smuggling has not tangible,
simplifies smuggling’s dynamics, and been proven, claims that “foreign ter- organised target
creates the illusion that there is a spe- rorist fighters may use migratory flows or enemy to
cific, tangible, organised target or to (re)enter the EU” (2016, p. 4). fight
Policy Study n. 19Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response 21
While examples of criminal conver- to carry out a terrorist activity would
gence (that is, the coming together of opt to travel through mechanisms that
different criminal markets) are quite are not exactly characterised as reliable
frequent in the conversations of policy- or expedited forms to reach a destina-
makers and often cited as a growing tion. The October 2020 case of a Tuni-
global security concern, they are not sian migrant who attacked and killed
supported by the empirical literature three people inside a church, while ini-
(Andreas, 2021; Achilli & Tinti, 2019). tially raising concerns about its poten-
In the specific case of smuggling, there tial terrorist ties, has not yielded
is in fact no evidence pointing to terro- information suggesting the perpetra-
rist organisations seeking to engage in tor entered Europe for the sole pur-
the transportation of migrants when pose of engaging in what was
their goals, ideological in nature, rely on ultimately designated by the French
their ability to enlist followers (Achilli & government a terrorist act.
Tinti, 2019; Achilli & Abu Samra, 2019;
Procter, 2021). Migrants in transit are The gendered persona of the
typically people who are seeking to smuggler
move and travel, and not join ideologi-
cal quests (Fan, 2007). The evidence The EU policy discourse has historically
available further indicates that people conceptualised smugglers as men. To a
engaged in terrorist activities are neither lesser but also important degree, these
forced nor must travel clandestinely, but men have also often been racialised as
by virtue of being citizens or permanent non-European, identified as organised
residents of countries within the EU, into ethnic networks. References to
have access to legal travel mechanisms smugglers presenting a specific tribal
(Fan, 2007; Saux, 2007). affiliation, ethnic background or natio-
nality or pertaining to a specific racial
Furthermore, the very nature of terro- group are common in law enforcement
rism requires, if not demands, that the accounts of smuggling activity (see, for
activities of their members remain as example, Europol & INTERPOL, 2016)
covert and unknown to outsiders as but also in policy circles. Said references
possible. The involvement of terrorist reaffirm smugglers as male and foreign,
groups, even if peripheral in migrant and their practices as falling outside of
smuggling, would divert significant what are considered European tradi-
time and energy from ideological cau- tions or culture – for example, through
ses into the logistical difficulties related statements that establish them as vio-
to transporting people whose very pre- lent on the basis of their origin (Bland,
sence could ultimately compromise a 2020). A report for the European Com-
potential operation, for their loyalty – mission’s Directorate-General for Migra-
or discretion – cannot be easily guaran- tion and Home Affairs quotes the
teed. Migrants maintain constant com- Maltese Security Service arguing that
munication with friends and family some migrant smuggling organisations
members to remain safe by reporting are more professionally organised than
their whereabouts but also to report others by virtue of “being foreigners”
the smuggler should any abuse arise (2015, p. 51).
(Achilli, 2018; Ayalew, 2018). Further-
more, it is hard to believe that a person Despite the androcentric characterisa-
with a clear, predetermined aspiration tion of smuggling, women have been22 Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response
active if not always visible participants women, children and the elderly, for
in the market. Their participation and the wellbeing and livelihood of their
roles are far from a recent or new de- extended households (see Niger-Tho-
velopment, and they should not be la- mas, 2001; Moussaoui, 2015; Sanchez,
belled as evidence of a female “take 2020). The framing of smuggling as
over” of the smuggling market. Re- male does not merely make the pre-
search by scholars like Moussaoui, sence of women, children or the el-
Souiah and Richter attest to the way in derly invisible but also obscures the
which, historically across North Africa, ways in which policy and practice im-
what eventually became known as pact their lives.
smuggling and contraband has relied
on tasks performed by both men and And yet, despite smuggling’s focus on
women, who perform them to earn a li- the persona of the male smuggler, it is
ving, supplement their income from surprising that EU-funded initiatives
other sources (licit or illicit), “playing on have often turned to women as part of
the increasingly strong demand […] for harm-reduction efforts implemented
[goods and services] that cannot be following the introduction of mecha-
found outside the informal circuits or nisms to disrupt the provision of activi-
at prices accessible to the majority of ties considered smuggling, as in the
the population” (Moussaoui, 2015, p. case of Niger. As Fakhry examines in
121). Women work administering flats her chapter of this study, EU-funded
across towns in Morocco and Algeria projects in the context of the EUTF like
for migrants in transit (Arrouche, forth- Plan d’Actions à Impact Economique
coming; Richter, 2019). Sporadic de- Rapide à Agadez (PAIERA) sought to
tentions of local women attempting to provide financial support for “people
cross migrants into Tunisia on the Libya who benefit directly and indirectly from
border have generated concern the economic benefits linked to the
among civil society of the involvement smuggling of migrants, especially
of women in more visible smuggling young people and women in the Aga-
roles (Sanchez, 2020). Zandonini (2019) dez region” (EUTF, 2017) that could
has also shown how the introduction of foster the creation of small businesses Across North
Africa and the
the counter-smuggling law in 2015 in in the aftermath of the introduction of
Sahel, activities
Niger had gendered implications, eli- counter-smuggling initiatives. According like the
minating jobs for men, but also for the to a journalistic investigation, two years facilitation of
women who worked in the vast market after PAIERA’s launch, only 371 of the migration tend
of services developed to support mi- 6,550 smuggling actors registered had to be collective
grants’ journeys. received funds (about 2,300 euros each) tasks, not
to start new activities (Zandonini, 2019). merely
While these examples show migrant It is not known how many of these be- restricted to
smuggling has to be further examined neficiaries were women. isolated actors
through the lens of gender, research or groups, but
has also documented the community- Initiatives of this kind often impose ad- performed by
men, women,
based nature of trans-border forms of ditional responsibilities upon women,
children and the
trade. Across North Africa and the who are expected to generate income elderly, for the
Sahel, activities like the facilitation of that substitutes that of men, introdu- wellbeing and
migration tend to be collective tasks, cing solutions without having a clear livelihood of
not merely restricted to isolated actors understanding of what women’s con- their extended
or groups, but performed by men, texts or needs are, or of the ways in households
Policy Study n. 19Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response 23
which expecting them to assume spe- (UNODC, 2018); to its reliance on the
cific financial responsibilities may fur- facilitation of document fraud and fi-
ther the gender-based inequalities nancial crime (EMSC, 2019), and even
they already face. The inclusion of ini- as in itself constituting a life-threate-
tiatives of this kind further – and rather ning criminal model (Europol, 2020).
simplistically – assumes that the mere Much less is known about how the
introduction of financial solutions is like- model is to be tackled, other than fre-
ly to restore the disruption to long- quent references to the ways in which
standing forms of survival caused by law enforcement should “follow the
enforcement activities. money” – or as the European Commis-
sion has put it, pursuing “proactive fi-
The smuggling business model nancial investigations and effective
asset recovery operations” (2015).
Almost every single document concer-
ning EU migrant smuggling policy in- The broadness of what constitutes
cludes or makes reference to a the model is often counterproductive,
“smuggling business model”, which to the point that it prevents a defini-
needs to be dismantled to curtail the tion of what the model actually is or
ability of smuggling networks to facili- stands for (Brachet, 2018), other than
tate the journeys of migrants (EC, involving a demand-and-supply logic
2015, p. 7). The notion of the business fuelled by migrants’ desperation and
model is in part derived from the criti- smugglers’ greed – a logic in fact not
cal piece from Salt and Stein, who sug- restricted to smuggling.
gested that the migration business was
“a system of institutionalised networks What the notion of model often fails
with complex profit and loss accounts, to account for is the fact that a signi-
including a set of institutions, agents ficant proportion of irregular migra-
and individuals each of which stands to tion is self-facilitated, and cannot
make a commercial gain” (1997). The solely be traced to smugglers or their
business model notion has also been groups – recent research in Tunisia
used to describe smuggling as a and Algeria for example suggests
“transnational service industry” (Gam- that many families organise their own
meltoft-Hansen & Nyberg Sørensen, journeys independently, without the
2013) of vast profits. help of smugglers or any other kind
of facilitators (see Sanchez et al., this
There is no shortage of references to report). The focus on models further
the model’s characteristics. A 2017 obscures the fact that smuggling ac-
study prepared for the European Com- tivities are often community-based
mission’s Directorate-General for Mi- operations seeking to support the
gration and Home Affairs describes journeys of their members, rather
“the business model [as] network than profits. While smugglers who fa-
based, forming active hubs where the cilitate migrant journeys for a living
intensity of smuggling activities is grea- do seek to generate financial returns,
test” (2017, p. 6). Other documents these profits vary widely given the
make reference to the model’s profita- precarious conditions faced by many
bility (Collet, 2015); to the way smug- migrants, who in fact often enter into
glers build their business around the agreements with smugglers in order
needs arising from people’s aspirations to work off their fees – this is often the24 Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response
case of young people and children tra- makes it easier to communicate and jus-
velling unaccompanied (IOM, 2016), or tify the vast demand for resources to
of men and women who forge personal, contain a seemingly growing threat –
close and intimate relationships with the groups that facilitate the irregular
other people along the journey to im- entries of migrants who can pose untold
prove their conditions and at times their risks to the Union and its security.
ability to move further (Migrating out of
Poverty, 2019). Furthermore, even in the The criminological perspective is often
cases of for-profit smugglers, most of built alongside that of border enforce-
their returns are immediately recircula- ment and control, on the premise that
ted into their communities, often to the EU – and to a degree, the third
cover their own household’s basic needs countries it considers critical to its stra-
(Al-Arabi, 2018; Sanchez, 2020) rather tegy – has the right to protect and seal
than funding external interests or net- its borders and defend itself from any
works. If at all, the oft-cited business threats. The EU has signed a vast num-
model of smuggling rather constitutes ber of agreements with third countries
the mechanism developed by people in an attempt to control irregular migra-
who have been historically marginalised tion – agreements that alongside the
to support the facilitation of mobility provision of equipment and technology,
along corridors where this is limited or and the promotion of training and edu-
restricted, and who benefit financially cational programmes and initiatives,
and in kind from the provision of their allow them to deter or limit the migra-
services. The increasing criminalisation tion of nationals from other countries or
of their labour through the introduction even its own.
of legislation that designates it as smug-
gling has in turn reshaped understan- Perhaps the best example of the weight
ding of mobility, transportation and of the criminological approach to coun-
support, often leading to abusive and ter-smuggling lies in the implementation
violent exchanges. of the EUTF. EU’s trust funds, although
varying in scope, objectives, funding
The privileging of law and governance arrangements, were
enforcement and originally set up to address the root caus-
es of conflict and instability, and to assist
criminological approaches conflict-afflicted countries (Kangas &
Knoll, 2016). The EUTF, implemented at
While scholars and policy-makers can the Valetta Summit in 2015, expressed
tackle the facilitation of irregular migra- from the onset a clear goal to fund ef-
tion in multiple ways, the criminological, forts to fight irregular migration and
law enforcement approach has been the forced displacement by “stepping up
most dominant (Baird & van Liempt, the fight against smugglers and traffic-
2016; van Liempt & Sersli, 2013). This kers and increased cooperation with
has in turn and not unexpectedly led to Egypt, Tunis and Algeria – preventing
the development of policies and practi- irregular migration and the displace-
ces that support a law enforcement res- ment of routes” (EC, 2017).
ponse to what is depicted as the domain
of extended criminal networks and their While the trust funds can indeed fund
facilitators. The focus on networks as the migration management interventions,
only structures present in smuggling they were set up with the goal of fun-
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