Militarization Of Electoral Process In Nigeria: Changing The Increasingly Significant Quagmire - SEAHI ...
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International Journal of Innovative Legal & Political Studies 9(1):63-73, Jan.-Mar., 2021
© SEAHI PUBLICATIONS, 2021 www.seahipaj.org ISSN: 2467-8503
Militarization Of Electoral Process In Nigeria: Changing
The Increasingly Significant Quagmire
Samuel A. Akanibo* & Dr. Nuleera A. Duson**
ABSTRACT
It is an established truism that election remains a means of ensuring popular participation of the
citizenry in governance especially in the area of choosing political leaders at different levels of
governments. Unfortunately, this well known and age long practice of bringing on board the
managers of the political sector of Nigeria has continually experienced militarization by security
agents whose inability to offer election security in a competent, independent and professional manner,
has become a sustained cog in the wheels of electoral progress particularly in the light of the rights of
the electorates to freely exercise their franchise in choosing their political leaders. In the light of the
foregoing, this paper critically examined this significant distortion in our electoral process, the impact
of militarization of electoral process, justification for militarization of electoral process as it relates to
national elections and suggested that the status quo can be changed if the relevant legal frameworks
on electoral process especially the amended Electoral Act is signed into law by the current
administration before the 2023 general elections to provide the much needed guide and assurance in
Nigeria‟s quest for an electoral process devoid of militarization in the guise of providing security for
materials and officials.
Keywords: Militarization, Electoral Process, Nigeria, Significant Quagmire
INTRODUCTION
It is axiomatic that election process provides the mechanisms in which the right to participate in the
democratic process for the deepening of democratic governance is guaranteed and exercised by the
electorates through voting. As evinced in political conceptualizations, the legitimate power of a
government is sourced solely from the consent of the electorates. Consequently, an election process
by universal suffrage is seen as the major expression of democracy.1
Globally, elections remain not only the heart of representative democracy but a potent instrument
which constitutionally confers legitimacy on political leadership and a legitimizing mechanism for the
sustenance of democratic order.2 Despite different scenarios and circumstances, it is pertinent to
observe that at the very heart of the guaranteed participation in an election process is the important
question of credibility of the process. Several extant political literatures are unanimous regarding the
centrality of credibility to the conduct of election and administration.
There is no doubt that elections are indispensable and at the core of the democratic process. Therefore,
election process that is devoid of pressure, intimidation, influence and fear is sacrosanct to a credible
electoral process.
___________________
*LLB, LLM.BL, Part-time Lecturer, Institute of Legal and Global Studies, Captain Elechi Amadi Polytechnic, Rumuola,
Port Harcourt.
** Ph.D (Nigeria),BL, Lecturer, Institute of Legal and Global Studies, Captain Elechi Amadi Polytechnic, Rumuola, Port
Harcourt. Email-drnuleera@gmial.com;
1
Olajire O. Olutola, „Security Agents and Elections Security in the 2015 Nigeria‟s General Elections‟ (2019) 30(2)
JESBS46878accessed 4 April 2020.
2
S. Lindberg, The Democratic Qualities of Competitive Elections (Particigitin Africa: Commonwealth &
Comparative Politics 2003) 61-62.
63Akanibo & Duson.…. Int. J. Innovative Legal & Political Studies 9(1):63-73, 2021
According to Jose Ortegay Gesset; “The health of any democracy, no matter its or status, depends
on a small technical detail the conduct of elections. Everything else is secondary”.3
The ability to participate in a given election process is a cardinal expression of human rights. in
Nigeria, the management of Election process especially as it relates to the election of qualified
persons to the office of the president of the federal republic, vice president, governors of the states of
the federation, and members of the National Assembly alongside the states of the Assembly among
others is statutorily the responsibility of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).
However, the amendments of the Electoral Act 2010 on March 27, 2015, empowered INEC to deploy
security agencies during elections.
Specifically Section 29 (3) of the Electoral Act as amended provides that;
Prior to the amendments of the Electoral Act, the Nigerian courts have severally declared as illegal
and unconstitutional the deployment of the armed forces in the conduct of elections in Nigeria.4 These
judicial pronouncements are particularly of utmost importance in view of the impact such military
deployments have on the exercise of other human rights such as the right to movement, inhuman
treatment, freedom of expression among others by the electorates during the conduct and participation
in the electoral process.
Despite unanimity in the fact that election process is and should remain a civil approach managed by
the civilian population in choosing their political leaders, it is an incontrovertible actuality that the
massive deployments and involvement of the military in an electoral process such as ours is an
aberration. It is a recipe for slowing down our democratic progress, socio-political and cultural
integrity especially given Nigeria‟s leadership role in the continent of Africa.
However, since Nigeria is still evolving politically, the deployment of armed security forces during
election process may remain a feature of our election process for a while. Election violence which is
a reflection of our retarded political evolution will continue to attract a justification for the
deployment of armed security forces during election process. It remains to be seen how the military
style of intimidation, suppression and pressure can push Nigeria for a rapid political evolution that
will eventually discourage the deployment of the military in election process in Nigeria.
Conceptual Context
It is important to identify and understand in this section some key concepts that should give direction
to this discussion. First, there is need to understand the synergy between election and electoral
process. Election is the cardinal principle of democracy though not a sufficient determinant of
democracy, but remains the primary indicator for democratic governance. Election is about
competition on how leaders are selected by voting and/or by appointment or nomination howbeit,
consensually, to govern the society.5 Electoral process refers to the method by which a person is
elected to a public office.6 It is the totality of outlined steps and processes that governed a particular
election including the electorates and the contestants. Thus, voting, (open ballot, secret ballot, e-
voting, manual voting among others), counting of ballots, among others are essential components of
an electoral process. The aftermath of an electoral process devoid of manipulation by the umpire or
contestants will ensure an outcome less likely to be challenged.
Militarization is a term with many interpretations and definitions. From a more qualitative perspective,
militarization means to gear a state or a society toward the needs of a military environment or to subject a
community to military requirements.7 It is the act of assembling and putting into readiness for war or
_________________
3
S.E. Hendrix, The New Nicaragua: Lessons in Development, Democracy, and Nation-Building (ABC-CLIO 2009)
11.
4
All Progressives Congress (APC) v Peoples Democratic Party & Ors. CA/EK/EPT/GOV/1/2015 delivered on
Monday, 16 February, 2015, Saude V. Abdullahi (1989) 4 NWLR Pt 116 p. 387.
5
G. Yoroms, „Electoral Violence, Arms Proliferations and Electoral Security in Nigeria: Lessons from the twenty
fifteen Elections for Emerging Democracies‟ (2015) < https://www.inecnigena.org>accessed4April, 2020.
6
Per Ariwoola in N.D.P. v INEC (2013) 6 NWLR Pt 1350, at 412.
7
The Global Militarization Index (GMI) of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (Bicc),
http://warpp.infolen/m3/articles/militarization accessed 6 March 2020.
64Akanibo & Duson.…. Int. J. Innovative Legal & Political Studies 9(1):63-73, 2021
other emergency.8 Where an electoral process becomes dependent on or subordinate to the military, or
military in its attributes or practices, such electoral process is militarized.
Nigeria practices representative democracy and that presupposes certain inalienable minimum
attributes, chief of all being the credibility of the electoral process that determines the people‟s
representatives. All previous elections in Nigeria, including the acclaimed June 12, 1993 elections,
have to a large extent and by varying decrees, been tainted by the issue of legitimacy. 9 This has
proven a serious debilitating and limiting factors to the provenance and performance of those
supposedly elected thereby ensured impunity of office, the lack of probity and accountability and the
general insouciance to the welfare of the governed.10
The inability of Nigeria to extricate herself from the use of the military for the conduct of the
elections have become the significant quagmire with dire consequences to our quest for true
participatory democracy. The reform of the electoral process, therefore, become not only desirable
but inevitable. The reason for this is not for fetched. For many years, we have tinkered with the
desirability or otherwise of electronic voting and for unfathomable reasons have rejected its use as a
panacea to rigging and the manipulation of the electoral process.11 Yet, it is undeniable that
militarization of our electoral process which very often, negatively impact the voting process,
collation of results and the overall outcome of the election continues as a major dilemma to free and
fair electoral process.
Overview of Electoral Process in Nigeria (1999-2019)
The journey to the fourth republic and the desire to ensure a participatory democracy via a credible
electoral process started with the constitution of a new Electoral Commission known as the
Independent Electoral Commission of Nigeria (INEC) courtesy of the enabling law, Decree 1998.
Section 7 of the enabling law provided for the Commission to be corporate with perpetual succession
and may sue and be sued in its corporate name. It also provided for a chairman who is the Chief
National Electoral Commissioner and Chief Executive, and twelve (12) members to be known as
National Electoral Commissioners. Its function among others is organizing, conducting and
supervising all the elections and matters pertaining to all elections into all the elective offices
provided in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, as amended, or any other
enactment or law. Essentially, militarized elections in Nigeria have been limited to presidential and
governorship elections during the period of review.
3.1.1 The 1999 Presidential Elections
The 1999 presidential election was conducted by the Independent National Electoral Commission
(INEC) on 27 February 1999. From the performance of the previous elections, People‟s Democratic
Party (PDP) had been in the lead. At the end of the Election, General Olusegun Obasanjo emerged
the winner with a total votes of 18, 738,154, representing 62.78 percent of the total votes cast. 12 In
accordance with INEC conditions and section 134(1) (a), (b) of the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria 1999, for a candidate to be declared a president, he had to win not less than one
quarter of votes cast in each of at least twenty four (24) states that is 2/3 of 36 states. But General
Obasanjo met the condition in 32 states and Abuja and was declared the winner while Chief Olu
Falae made it in 23 states and Abuja.
Chief Olu Falae, however did not agree with the results and claimed they were falsified. Similarly,
the Carter Centre International, a non-governmental organization which monitored the presidential
election also gave an account that there was wide disparity between the number of voters observed at
the polling
______________________________________
8
https://www.vocabulary.com accessed 6 April, 2020.
9
A. Charles Harry, That Tomorrow May Come, (Port Harcourt: Behaholiab 2010) 36.
10
Ibid
11
A. Charles Harry, That Tomorrow May come, (Port Harcourt: Bezahohab 2010) 37.
12
E. Otoghagua, Trends and Contemporary Issues on Regimes of Nigerian Heads of State (Benin: Research
Knowledge & Educational Services) 283.
65Akanibo & Duson.…. Int. J. Innovative Legal & Political Studies 9(1):63-73, 2021
station and the final results.13 The rejection of the election results by Chief Olu Falae and All Nigerian
Peoples‟ Party alongside the faulty of same by the Non-Governmental Organization monitoring
groups notwithstanding, General Olusegun Obasanjo of the Peoples‟ Democratic Party (PDP) was
issue with the certificate as the winner by the then INEC boss, Justice Ephraim Akpata.
3.1.2 The 2003 Presidential Election
The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), in order to enhance mass participation of
eligible adults in politics and to satisfy the yearning demand for more parties decided to register more
political parties. Prior to the registration exercise, three political parties were in existence namely;
People‟s Democratic Party (PDP), All Peoples‟ Party (APP) and Alliance for Democracy (AD).
The conduct of the election was not without challenges. There were cases of intimidation, thuggery,
electoral malpractice and free use of fire arms in most of the polling centres. Despite the challenges,
the presidential election took place on April 19, 2003 throughout all the states of the Federation.
Results released by the Independent National Electoral Commission showed the Peoples‟ Democratic
Party (PDP) won 28 states, ANPP won 7 states and AD won 1 state. However, the election was
generally declared to be fraudulent. Both local and International observers had the same report.14 The
Police Service Commission also indicted some policemen for colluding with politicians in polling
centres across the country to scare opponents from polling centres and with political agents and thugs
to stuff ballot boxes. Other notable anomalies observed were;
i. Voters Intimidated and turned away
Katsina, State was the epicenter of some of the very serious infractions that marred the electoral
process because it was the home state of both the PDP candidate and the then governor of the state,
Umaru Yar‟ Adua and his most prominent challenger, former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari.15
ii. Violent Clashes
In Daura, the home town of General Buhari his supporters rioted when it was discovered that
electoral officials had delivered only half of the ballot papers that should have arrived at local polling
stations. In the clashes that ensured, homes and business of prominent PDP members were torched,
two people got killed, and at least six people were wounded while one young teenager who had been
shot in the stomach allegedly by soldiers attempting to bring the rioting under control was taken to
Daura‟s general hospital.16 In the whole of Gombe State, voting did not begin until past 3p.m due to
the late arrival of presidential ballot papers by plane from Abuja. In Balanga and Yamaltu Deba
Local Governments, voters waited in vain for electoral materials and INEC staff to appear.
iii. Ballot Box Stuffing
At collation centres in Kamara Primary School, Jekada Fari and the Local Government INEC Office
in Gombe town, the stuffing of ballot boxes continued unabated by two young men who added ballot
papers to a ballot box whose results were in the process of being counted by electoral officials, the
filling in of result sheets by INEC officials together with PDP party agents, and the changing of
results from one form to another.17
Aside from the gross fraud perpetrated on polling day, party supporters and hired thugs were seen
freely targeting members of the opposition for arrest and intimidation. Nigeria‟s Security Services
played a controversial role in the polls. Police were seen ignoring to interfere in glaring
circumstances, violence
____________________________
13
E. Otoghagua, „Trends and Contemporary Issues on Regimes of Nigerian Heads of State‟ (Benin: Research
Knowledge & Educational Services) 283.
14
Among other observer organizations; Human Rights Watch, Transition Monitoring Group, US National
Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute reported that the election was far from being credible.
15
Human Rights Watch, Nigeria: Presidential Election Marred by Fraud, violence, www.hrw.org/news/nigeria-
Presidential election-marred by fraud-violence accessed 8 April 2020.
16
Human Rights Watch, Nigeria: Presidential Election Marred by Fraud, violence, www.hrw.org/news/nigeria-
Presidential election-marred by fraud-violence accessed 8 April 2020.
17
Ibid
66Akanibo & Duson.…. Int. J. Innovative Legal & Political Studies 9(1):63-73, 2021 and intimidation of voters by hired thugs. This clearly affected the integrity of the entire process. In Gombe Local government INEC Office, three police officers watched while one of the party‟s agents intimidated an INEC official into changing a result sheet. In many ways, the 2003 presidential election showcased the patterns of corruption and human rights abuse that characterized the daily reality for Nigerians. In the words of Takirambudde, the election and the entire process signaled regression rather than progress.‟ The 2007 Presidential Election The 2007 Presidential election was conducted simultaneously with the National Assembly elections on April 21, 2007. This was notwithstanding the general voter apathy by the electorates as a result of violence and obvious irregularities that marred the electoral process of governors/states assembly election held one week to the presidential election. In a statement allegedly attributed to the then president Olusegun Obasanjo prior to the 2007 general elections that the April 2007 presidential election will be a do-or-die affair, it therefore became easier to substantially attribute the unprecedented level of violence and irregularities that marred the 2007 presidential election to the alleged statement. Prior to the 2007 general elections, electoral violence had been recorded in several parts of the federation.18 In Lagos, Funsho Williams, a Peoples‟ Democratic Party governorship aspirant was brutally murdered in his home at Dolphin Estate. The election itself fell short of expectations as monumental violence was witnessed.19 Electoral observers, mostly the European Union Mission and the Transition Monitoring Group (which deployed 50,000 observers), were unanimous in underlining numerous irregularities in the voting process. Both stated that the elections were not credible and fell far short of basic international standards.20 The National Democratic Institute, one of the institutions that observed the elections, remarked that the 2007 election was full of irregularities including underage voting, ballots that did not include all the names of the candidates, errors in voter registration, lack of secrecy of voting, and inadequate polling stations), in addition to improper conduct such as stealing ballot boxes, intimidation and vote buying.21The lack of credibility of the 2007 elections was also recognized by the late Nigerian President Umaru Yar‟Adua, who soon after his inauguration in 2007 formed the Electoral Reform committee with the specific mandate of devising ways of making elections in Nigeria free and fair.22 The 2011 Presidential Election The 2011 Presidential election earlier scheduled to take place in January 2011 was postponed to April 2011. The postponement was requested by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to enable the release of the new electronic voter registration software. Series of pre-election violence also necessitated the postponement. In December 2010, bombs went off in Yenegoa, Bayelsa State during a gubernatorial campaign rally. Politicians and police attributed it to a deliberate attempt to disrupt the electoral process.23 There had been bombings and shootings in the north blamed on Boko Haram since 2009, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), a militant group, claimed ________________ 18 Editorial Commentary of PM News, www.pmnewssnigeria.com/2019/01/21/flashback-how-obasanjo-supervised- a-violent-rigged-2007-presidential-election. accessed 11 April 2020. 19 J.C. Inionagbe, D. Imhomopi and F.O Ahmadu, „A Conceptual Review of Mass Media and Political Violence in Nigeria between 1999 and 2013 (20) MMC www.pmnewsnigeria.comaccessed 12 April 2020. 20 Press Release, European Union Election Observation Mission,
Akanibo & Duson.…. Int. J. Innovative Legal & Political Studies 9(1):63-73, 2021
responsibility for dual car bombings during Nigeria‟s 50th Independence anniversary celebrations in
Abuja that and killed at least 12 persons.24
Although President Goodluck Jonathan emerged the winner of the 2011 presidential election, the
elections were seen widely as being well run. This was especially important given the universally
decried elections of 200725. A number of factors contributed to ensuring that the 2011 general
elections were successfully administered. They include the fact that the voters‟ register was the most
accurate, and there was also adequate training and fielding of election observers.26 Additionally,
ordinary citizens were encouraged to report, via calls or texts, any incidents of fraud or violence that
they witnessed or experienced. The chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission
(INEC), Attahiru Jega, was well regarded and judged independent from the government.27
However, despite a more transparent 2011 general elections, 800 people, mainly in Kaduna were
killed in three days and 65,000 people were displaced.28 Muslims burned churches and attacked
Christians and Southerners in their homes, businesses, schools, and on the streets, Christians soon
retaliated. Once violence erupted, only soldiers succeeded in stopping it. Indeed, many observers had
criticized the government‟s plan to rely heavily on the military to keep the peace.
Perhaps, owing to the loss of lives after the 2011 general elections, the Nigerian government resulted
to heavy deployment of security forces during elections as witnessed in Edo, Ondo, Anambra, Ekiti
and Osun States.29 However, of all the mentioned elections, those of the last two (2007 and 2011)
were the highest where over a hundred thousand security forces, comprising the police, army, secret
agent, civil defence corps and other paramilitary forces, were deployed.
The 2015 Presidential Election
The use of the military in relation to the 2015 presidential election was anticipated by most observers
and analysts of the Nigerian political terrain. As the day of the rescheduled elections approached,
tension continued to pervade the polity, vitriol poured into the air from partisan political actors and
everyday even greater quantities of propaganda were released ranging from death threats on a
presidential candidate to rumours that members of the opposition party will be implicated if the Boko
Haram Kingpin, Abubaker Shekau was arrested.30 These further heightened the already excercebated
sense of insecurity prior to the elections.
Many Nigerians became apprehensive and upset that the elections were rescheduled at the behest of
the military. The high level of militarization witnessed during the Ekiti and Osun by-elections and
how the newly controversial released audio Ekitigate of how the military was sued to the advantage of
the ruling party put the supposed impartiality of the security forces in doubt.31 Consequently, the new
and increased role by the military in elections helped foster abuse by the military, particularly in the
light of outright
____________________
24
Ibid
25
Elections were held on April 9 (National Assembly elections); April 16 (Presidential elections); May 6
(Gubernatorial and State Assembly elections). European Union Election Observation Mission in Nigeria, “Final
Report: General Elections, April 2011,” p.3.
26
D. Bekoe; „Nigeria‟s 2011 Elections: Best run, but most violent;‟ (2011) USIPAkanibo & Duson.…. Int. J. Innovative Legal & Political Studies 9(1):63-73, 2021
partisanship displayed by some of their members in previous elections. The judiciary lent its voice
when the court of appeal per honourable Justice Umar Abdullahi (JCA) clearly stated on the legality
of the deployment of the military in Election as follows; Inspite of non-tolerant nature of our
political class in this country, we should by all means try to keep armed personnel of whatever
status or nature from being part and parcel of the election process. The civilian authorities
should be left to conduct and carryout fully the electoral processes at all levels. 32
Also, the Court of Appeal per honourable Justice Ayo Salami (JCA) stated that,
“It is up to the police to protect our nascent democracy and not the military, otherwise the
democracy might be wittingly or unwittingly militarized”.33
Notwithstanding the vehement opposition to the deployment of the military during the 2015 elections,
the president continued to maintain his stance that he will continue to deploy heavy military personnel
during elections, and in the process, turn elections into something of warfare. Therefore the Nigerian
electorates and other critical stakeholders could only watched with disillusion the platoons of the
military deployed before, during and immediately after the 2015 general elections.
The 2019 Presidential Election
If there was anything that could have prepared the minds of Nigerians towards the role of the military
in the 2019 national elections, it was the ambiguous shoot-on-sight presidential directives that was
given against ballot box snatchers and other categories of electoral offenders. President Buhari in a
build up to the 2019 general elections stated that; “….anybody who decides to snatch ballot boxes
or lead thugs to disturb it (elections) may be that would be the last unlawful action he would
take. I have directed the police and the military to be ruthless….”34
This statement characterized the securitization of the election process in Nigeria, as it particularly
concerns the military.35 Therefore, the militarization of the electoral process during the 2019 general
elections held on 9th March and 23rd April 2019 further added another dangerous dimension to
electoral violence which has characterized most general elections in Nigeria since independence. This
voidable situation has continued to constitute a major hindrance to active participation of the citizenry
in the electoral process.
Although election security constitutes a major component of the electoral process, however in respect
of emerging democracies like ours it has been hampered by series of factors, which include; faulty
legal framework, poor technical management of elections, poor management of competition and
opposition, poor management of electoral disputes, and past roles of security forces. 36 This scenario,
which to a considerable extent is attributable to the greed and desperation for power by the political
actors occasioned the massive deployments of the military outside of their constitutional duties for
election purposes in the 2019 general elections. Even the nation‟s electoral umpire, the Independent
National Electoral Commission (INEC) admitted that soldiers and armed gangs were used to
intimidate and unlawfully arrest its staff during the March 9th 2019 governorship election in Rivers
State.37 The Commission also expressed its displeasure with the role played by soldiers and armed
gangs in Rivers State through its National Commissioner and Chairman of its Information and Voter
Education Committee, Festus Okoye who remarked that; “Collation centres were invaded by some
soldiers and armed gangs resulting in the intimidation and unlawful arrest of election officials,
thereby
____________________________
32
I. Hassan, „ Election Consumed by Propaganda and doubt,‟ accessed 11 April 2020.
33
Buhari v Obsanjo (2005), 18 NWLR pt 956 p.96.
34
Yusuf v. Obasanjo (2005) 18 NWLR pt. 956 p.96.
35
F. Ajala, „Trapped in a Militarized Democracy‟ (2019 (3), (2) https://www.republic.com.ng>accessed 21 April
2020.
36
O. Igbuzor, „Electoral Violence in Nigeria‟ (2010) Cscanada (10) (3) www.csanda.net/index.php/csc/article/
viewaccessed 14 April 2020.
37
Ibid
69Akanibo & Duson.…. Int. J. Innovative Legal & Political Studies 9(1):63-73, 2021
disrupting the collation process. The commission therefore condemned the role played by some
soldiers and armed gangs in Rivers State who disrupted the collation process and attempting to
subvert the will of the people.”38
However, the Chief of Army staff, Lieutenant Gen. Turkur Buratai in reaction to the allegations
stated that the military kept to their promise of ensuring that her men were above board during the
election. He further added that even though the election of 23rd February 2019 cannot entirely be
exonerated from rigging, but such did not come from the angle of the military. Furthermore, there
were substantial interference by men in Army and other security uniforms in elections in Imo, Rivers,
Zamfara, Kaduna, Akwa Ibom, Edo, Kogi, Lagos, Ogun and Kano States were some politicians
deployed their personal security attached to disrupt elections on various fronts. 39It is however
pertinent to note that as a result of the several cases filed by the chieftains of the former ACN and
CPC as well as APC against deployment of the military in Election from 2003 to 2015, incidentally
they have continually resorted to heavy deployment of the military against the backdrop of their
ascendancy to power as the ruling political party at the federal level and who in the immediate past
have championed the cause against the deployment of the military during elections.
The Justification for Militarization of Electoral Process in Nigeria
Notwithstanding the wide spread condemnation of the militarization of elections in Nigeria especially
in the 2019 general elections, there are some schools of thought whose position clearly support the
deployment of the military in election. One of such proponents is the International Society for Civil
Liberties and the Rule of Law (ISCLRL)40 whose report affirmed that having perused and ransacked
the 320 sections of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended they could
not come across in the same constitution where a section frowns at the involvement of the military in
elections in Nigeria whether staggered elections, run off or general elections. The Armed Forces
according to them were constitutionally empowered with the following duties;
Defending Nigeria from external aggression41
Maintaining Nigeria‟s territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, air
or sea,42
Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called
upon to do so by the president, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of
the National Assembly43
Section 218 of the same constitution clearly provides; “The powers of the president as the
commander –in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation shall include powers to
determine the operational use of the armed forces of the federation.
Supplementary section 26, under part 1 of the third schedule to the constitution provides that
“the National Security Council (which includes the chief of Defense staff as the head of the
armed Forces and the National Security Adviser) shall have powers to advise the president on
matters relating to public security including matters relating to any organization or agency
established by law for ensuring the security of the Federation;
In supplementary section 17 of Part 1 of the third schedule, the constitution provides that the
National Defence Council shall have power to advise the president on matters relating to the
defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria.
___________________
38
A. T Okechwuku and Others, „ Militarization, Electoral violence and 2019 Election in Nigeria (2019) (9) (10)
1JSRPhttp://dx.doi.org/1029322/IJSRP accessed 14 April 2020.
39
Ibid
40
S. Oyeyipo and E. Oluku, „Nigeria: House to Investigate Military Involvement in Election; (2019) This Day
Newspapers (Lagos) https://allafrica.com/storeis /20193200063> accessed 15 April 2020.
41
One of the Civil Liberties Organizations approved for the 2019 general election monitoring.
42
CFRN S. 217 (2) 1999 as amended
43
CFRN S. 217 (2) (b)
70Akanibo & Duson.…. Int. J. Innovative Legal & Political Studies 9(1):63-73, 2021
In section 8(3) of the Armed Forces Act of the Federation under its part, the operational use of
the armed forces by the president is defined to include the use of the armed forces in Nigeria
for the purpose of maintaining and securing public safety and public order.
From the military circle, the then chief of Defence Staff, General Abayomi Gabriel Olonisakan
justified the deployment of officers and soldiers for the conduct of 2019 elections as a legitimate duty
necessitated by the prevailing situation in the county.44 According to the former CDS, “if military
personnel were not deployed for the elections, the security of the country would have been
jeopardized.”45
Similarly, the then Acting Director of Defence Intelligence, Colonel Onyema Nwachukwu stated that
the military especially the Nigerian Army performed creditably during the elections in line with the
rules of engagement which defined their conduct and that the Army‟s role is contained in section 271
of the 1999 constitution as amended.46
The former Publicity Secretary of the Peoples‟ Democratic Party, Olisa Metuh affirmed the
justification of the deployment of the military during elections when he remarked; “………the
president had by the action, proven that the deployment of soldiers to states for election was not
new since Edo, Ondo and Anambra where governorship elections had been hold earlier…….47
Lending credence to Metuh‟s position, the Transition Monitory Group (TMG), a civil society group
which regularly monitors the conduct of elections in Nigeria also justified the deployment of soldiers
for elections in the country citing past experiences where politicians take elections as an act of war. 48
From the perspective of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the then chairman,
Attahiru Jega noted that:
“The Military performs what we describe as peripheral outer cordon. It is the mobile police
that handle internal movement in terms of movements in the towns but away from polling
unit…….”49
Whereas, the security of the electoral process is paramount and therefore should not be left unattended
to, especially in Nigeria where often times, the regular police force are overwhelmed by the enormity
of the security challenges posed by the conduct of elections, it is imperative to deploy the military
forces to ensure additional safety assurance during the conduct of election. However such
deployments are very often abused by the politicians to perpetrate election malfeasance through
intimidation and outright denial opportunity to vote which ultimately negates the transparency and
fairness required during the process.
Judicial pronouncement concerning militarization of elections in Nigeria shows that the courts have in
several judgments frowned at the involvement of the military in elections.50 One of such judgments is
a Federal High Court Sokoto division judgment where Justice Aikawa among others; restrained the
President and Commander in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and INEC
from engaging the service of the Nigerian armed forces in the security supervision of elections in any
manner whatsoever in any part of Nigeria, without the Act of the National Assembly.51
The Court of Appeal in Yusuf v Obasanjo ruled that; it is up to the police to protect our nascent democracy,
and not the military, otherwise the democracy might be wittingly or unwittingly militarized.52 In another
ruling, the same Court of Appeal in Buhari v Obsanjo held that; „Inspite of the non-tolerant nature and
behaviour of our political class in this country, we should by all means try to keep armed personnel
of whatever status or nature from being part and parcel of our election process.
_______________________
44
CFRN 1999 S. 217 (2) (C)
45
CFRN 1999 S. 217 (2) (d)
46
(n38)
47
(n38)
48
M. Ebonugwo and C. Kumolu, „Militarization of 2019 Elections‟ (2019)
www.vangaurdngr.com/2019/03/militarisation-of-2019-electionsaccessed 15 April 2020.
49
(n30)
50
(n30)
51
Suit No FHC/S/CS/29/2014
52
(2005) 18 NWLR pt. 956 at 96
71Akanibo & Duson.…. Int. J. Innovative Legal & Political Studies 9(1):63-73, 2021
The civilian authorities should be left to conduct and carryout fully the electoral processes at all
levels.”53 To corroborate the authority of the subsisting Appeal Court judgment barring the military in
elections as part of the law of the land, the Supreme Court in Buhari v Obasanjo held that, “ the state
is obligated to ensure citizens who are sovereign can exercise their franchise freely, unmolested
and undisturbed.”54
Impact of militarization of Electoral Process in Nigeria
The impact of militarization of process in Nigeria is multi-dimensional. One of such impact is voters‟
apathy. There was a wide spread apathy by the Nigerian electorates during the 2019 general elections.
Also, the run up to the governorship election in Ekiti State, the siege by the military on Ekiti was so
severe that moving from a minute walking distance to the other was virtually impossible due to the
heavy security lock down in the state on the day of the election.55 This unfortunate situation in the
guise of providing security, turned Ekiti State into a war-like zone. This ultimately led to a feeling of
intimidation and fear on the part of the electorates including members of the opposition and therefore,
withdrawal from participating in the electoral process became the only option. The electoral laws are
clear that every polling unit should have one unarmed policeman and the military should have no role
on the election.56
Similarly during the August 9th, 2014 Governorship Election in Osun State, the scenario was not
particularly different, except that the number of troops deployed to provide security in the elections
doubled the 36,000 strong security personnel deployed for the elections.57 A total number of 73,000
men comprising of the army, police and Civil defence operatives were deployed for the election in the
State.58 A general low voter turnout largely because of the atmosphere of deliberate tyranny and fear
caused by the excessive militarization of the state ensured.
In a fragile democracy as witnessed in Nigeria, the militarization of the electoral process by the
government in power is borne out of a misunderstanding of what an opposition party represents in a
democracy. It follows that “no government can be secured without any formidable opposition. 59
This is because it is a function of the opposition to criticize the government and proffer a constructive
alternative. An opposition party ensures that an elected government is more responsive to the needs
of its people and it is within this context that they must be understood.60 The militarization of electoral
process is therefore a potential recipe for over heating the already fragile polity such as Nigeria‟s
thereby portend dire consequences for her teething democracy.
The loss of confidence in the electoral process is another obvious effect of militarization of the
electoral process. It is a trite position in Nigeria that prior to every general elections, substantial
financial resources are expended in most cases, to train the electoral officials, field workers, provision
of logistics covering the movement of materials to polling booths among others, yet a deliberate
militarization of the entire process is capable of ensuring a complete counter productive of the process
where the armed security agents are encouraged to intimidate and harass the electorates, the
confidence level in the election umpires to superintend over a credible process becomes questionable
thereby erode the confidence reposed in the electoral body.
_______________
53
(2005) 1 WRN 1 at 200
54
(2005) 50 WRN 1 at 313
55
(2005) 50 WRN 1 at 313
56
O. Eme and others “Implications of Militarizing Elections in Nigeria. The Ekiti and Osun State” (2016) (001)
(0023) JSSGP
57
Ibid
58
Ibid
59
PM News of 11 August, 2014.
60
The War Against Opposition and Militarization of Nigeria‟s electoral Process, www.placing.org/legist/the war-20
April 2020.
72Akanibo & Duson.…. Int. J. Innovative Legal & Political Studies 9(1):63-73, 2021
Very often, the general apprehension generated over the deployment of security forces to the polling
stations arose from the background of the compromised nature of the security forces. This has been
witnessed in several instances were security agencies were caught supporting the ruling party during
elections. Adam Oshiomohole, formerly Edo State Governor was in a dilemma as to whether nor not to
accept the deployment of security agencies in the election which he was seeking a re-election to complete
his second tenure as the governor of Edo State. At the last minutes he gave into fate and in a broadcast to
the state said, I believe we need the army to compliment the efforts of the police----so don‟t allow any
body fool you that the army is going to harass you, or prevents you from voting. No! the army is
here to assist you that your vote will counts.61 Despite his approval for the militarization of the process,
the fear and anxiety driven by the previous scenarios, especially the 2003 and 2011 elections where
innocent lives, including members of the National Youth Corps were killed while participating as both
officials of INEC and voters during the elections, the memories of those avoidable fatalities remained fresh
in the consciousness of the electorates.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the conduct of an election in Nigeria can be herculean especially as it concerns
electoral security. The security of the entire electoral process including the electorates, the Independent
National Electoral Commission‟s adhoc staff and every other critical stakeholders is of utmost importance.
The deployment of the security forces remains the prerogative of the INEC in accordance with the
Electoral Act. Such deployments are meant to ensure and guarantee the security of the electoral process
and not for any unwarranted interference with the process by the armed security agencies.
However, the political gladiators have constantly resorted to the use of the military for their self centered
ambition during elections in Nigeria despite several judicial pronouncements frowning at such
deployments. Ultimately, the electorates, transparency of the electoral process and the ultimate objective
of bringing on board leaders with the requisite capacity for good governance in the overall interest of the
people have continued to remain a mirage.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. There is the need for a comprehensive legal frame work that prohibits the deployment of the military
during election in Nigeria.
2. The Electoral Management body should be headed by someone who is elected and not appointed by the
president so that he would pledged his allegiance to the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
and not the regime in power.
3. Code of conduct should be developed for all the key stakeholders involved in the conduct of elections
especially security agencies, the Media and NGOs.
4. Every electoral infraction should be investigated and culprits if found culpable should be prosecuted
and sanctioned so as to serve as a deterrent to others.
5. There is need for the judiciary to exhibit uncommon courage and resilient spirit when electoral cases
are before them for adjudications. This will help bolster the confidence as the last hope for all.
6. A training initiative should be entrenched which must involve the key stakeholders in the electoral
process such as the executive, legislative, judicial institutions including non institutional stakeholders
such as leaders of civil society organizations, political party supporters on the role expected of security
agencies.
7. Since Nigeria is still emerging from internal conflicts and political crisis, there is need to reform the
security sector before deploying them during elections so as to create a cordial civilian-military
relationship during elections.
8. There is need to ensure the neutrality and impartiality of traditional and religious leaders during
elections so as not to unduly influence the electorates and thereby encourage conflicts.
9. The welfare of members of the Armed Forces should prioritized to enable them focus on their core
professional mandate of protecting Nigeria against external aggression.
____________________________
61
G. . Yoroms, „Electoral Violence, Arms Proliferations and Electoral Security in Nigeria: Lessons from the
twenty-fifteen Elections for Emerging Democracies‟ (2015) ,You can also read
