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Crisis States Research Centre Report
MEETING THE
CHALLENGES OF
CRISIS STATES
James Putzel and Jonathan Di John
www.crisisstates.com
First published 2012 by the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics and Political Science Houghton Street London WC2A 2AE csp@lse.ac.uk © James Putzel and Jonathan Di John, 2012 All parts of this report including all photographs and diagrams are subject to copyright. All rights are reserved. No part of this publication may be copied, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission in writing of the copyright holder, email address above. The authors have asserted their right to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. ISBN: 978-0-85328-477-2 A catalogue record for this report is available from the British Library. This document is an output from a project funded by UKaid from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) for the benefit of developing countries. The views expressed are not necessarily those of DFID.
Crisis States Research Centre Report MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CRISIS STATES James Putzel and Jonathan Di John* CONTENTS Page Introduction and executive summary ii Seeing the state as a political settlement: elite bargains and 1 1 social mobilisation 2 Distinguishing state fragility and resilience 5 3 Political organisations and trajectories of fragility and resilience 20 4 Politics of violent conflict: rebels, warlords and urban civic conflict 27 5 Military interventions, regional organisations and prospects for 33 peace making and peace building 6 Economic resource mobilisation: trajectories of accumulation 39 and links to fragility and resilience in states and cities 7 From fragility and resilience to development 47 8 References 55 * This paper is the product of a major collective research effort financed by the UK Department for International Development. Over five years the Crisis States Research Centre published over one-hundred Working Papers, Discussion Papers and Occasional Papers and produced eight key Policy Direction Papers and six integrated thematic papers. The research has already produced 86 refereed journal articles, 55 book chapters, 17 books and 63 policy papers and reports. We cannot do justice to such a rich body of work in a single paper. We would like to acknowledge the contribution of the entire CSRC team whose work we have used extensively and the continual support from Wendy Foulds, who served as centre administrator and Jonathan Curry-Machado, our copy-editor. Thanks go to Sean Fox, Antonio Giustozzi, Tom Goodfellow, Francisco Gutiérrez and Gabi Hesselbein for comments on the paper. The words of all the team appear in this text and particularly those of Jo Beall and Laurie Nathan, who led work on the Cities and Regional programmes. However, the authors take responsibility for all errors and omissions.
INTRODUCTION AND
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The research agenda or accelerated development. This was an
When our team began its research in the important conceptual innovation, which
year 2000, we decided to focus on what we allowed us to develop our political economy
called “crisis states” for two reasons. We approach and interact with evolving debates
wanted to investigate the processes that led in the policy community. The programme
states to collapse into violence and war or to was divided into three overlapping teams:
recover from episodes of extreme violence one undertaking comparative country-level
– that is, “states in crisis” – and we wanted research; another comparative research on
to examine how communities at the local cities; and a smaller third effort devoted to
and national level in poor countries coped looking at regional and global dimensions
with severe internal and external shocks – of conflict.
or “conditions of crisis” – and managed to The core case studies adopted at the
avoid violence. A “crisis”, we argued, is a national level (Afghanistan, Democratic
situation where the political, economic or Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Rwanda,
We have sought social system is confronted with challenges Colombia, the Philippines, Tanzania and
to understand the with which reigning institutions (or rule Zambia) were chosen partly with partners
conditions, actions systems) are potentially unable to cope. In in mind, but primarily to compare countries
and organisational other words, crisis is a condition of disruption with markedly different experiences of war,
processes that have severe enough to threaten the continued state collapse and state reconstruction – with
existence of established systems. In this paper, the inclusion of two control cases that despite
allowed conflict
we take up the findings of our second phase deeply rooted poverty had not experienced
to be managed of research from 2005 to 2010. war or state collapse. A secondary group
peacefully, and By the time we began the research of countries evolved with time, including
those that have led international attention was focused Mozambique, Tajikistan and Pakistan.
instead to violence. increasingly on what were becoming The fifteen city case studies (Ahmedabad,
known as “fragile states”, which were Arua, Bogota, Dar-es-Salaam, Goma, Gulu,
vaguely defined but generally understood Kabul, Kampala, Karachi, Kigali, Kinshasa,
to be poor developing countries, which Managua, Maputo, Medellin, Quetta) were
either had experienced violence and chosen in part on the basis of our choice of
warfare or were in danger of collapsing country cases and the partners involved, but
into violence (Di John 2008). We set out primarily to explore a range of cities based on
to answer two broad questions. First, why their scale, experience of conflict and degree
and how, under the conditions of late of geographical and economic integration
development, are some fragile states able with their central states. The smaller third
to respond effectively to contestation stream of research at the regional level
while others collapse and/or experience focused primarily on a comparative study
large-scale violence? Second, what are the of the role of twelve regional organisations
factors that contribute to and impede state in processes of peace making and security,
reconstruction in post-war periods? but additionally involved research on security-
We anchored the research programme sector reform and peace mediation.
in multidisciplinary development studies, In studying processes of violence and
strongly influenced by historical political war we do not subscribe to the view that
economy and were committed to bringing conflict or violence is “development in
together the insights that could be derived reverse”. We reject the use of the term “post-
from both qualitative comparative analysis conflict”, because conflict is ubiquitous
of a small number of cases and quantitative and a normal condition in human society,
cross-national research. We aimed to develop often driving development in progressive
a conceptual framework that could be applied directions. We have sought to understand
to any state and determine whether trends the conditions, actions and organisational
pointed toward what we then formulated as processes that have allowed conflict to be
state collapse or survival, but later understood managed peacefully, and those that have
as trends towards state fragility, state resilience led instead to violence. Neither do we
MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CRISIS STATES • iii
conclude that development will necessarily who have argued that for most of human
be a route out of violence, since the history states have presided over “limited
processes involved in development can access orders”, guaranteeing privileged access
be highly conflictual and at times violence to sources of income and political decision
can be constitutive of state formation and making to elites as a means for managing
development (Cramer 2006: 199-244). In violence (North et al. 2007, 2009).
the countries we studied, developmental In this paper we present the main findings
processes were unleashed by violent of our research, which we believe make a
challenges to existing state authorities: for significant contribution to wider scholarship
instance in Uganda, when Museveni and on the role of the state and development, the
his National Resistance Movement fought study of violence and war, the study of urban
its way to power in 1986; and in Rwanda, change and the use of measurement tools to
where the Rwandan Patriotic Front waged understand social and political processes.
a war to bring an end to an exclusionary We believe the results of this research have
regime that had committed genocide in major implications for current policy debates,
its efforts to stay in power. design and implementation in the countries
However, “human development depends of the developing world in general and in
on investing in the future, whether it is in what we have defined as both “fragile” and
education, infrastructure or productive assets” “resilient” states. By way of introduction we
(Beall and Fox 2011) and where violence is summarise here the main findings and their
endemic it creates profound uncertainty and policy implications.
tends to inhibit investment and development
more generally (Bates 2001). Recent cross- 1 Seeing the state as a political
country quantitative research has identified
settlement: elite bargains and
that outbreaks of violence are heavily correlated
social mobilisation
with the incidence of poverty where political
regimes “are paralysed or undermined by The dominant position in the policy
elite divisions” (Goldstone et al. 2010). In our community when addressing the condition of
cross-country quantitative research we have a state, or public authority, in the developing
found that the poorest developing countries world is based on the proposition that “good
are sharply differentiated between those that governance”, defined as liberal democratic
have experienced violence and war and those and free market institutions, is the source
that have managed to avoid it (Gutiérrez et not only of a state’s ability to preside over
al. 2011). peace and stability, but also over growth and
We have argued that “fragile states” can development. These are generally assessed by
be best understood as countries particularly the formal rules adopted by a state and the
vulnerable to outbreaks of large-scale policies articulated and implemented. Our
violence, and we have sought to understand research suggests that a better understanding
what has allowed some states to avoid violence of the possibilities of progressive institutional
and achieve significant periods of “resilience” change and policy reform can be achieved
even in conditions of low growth and extreme by seeing the state as a political settlement
poverty. In our research we have identified embodying a set of power relations.
the central role played by elite bargains
embedded in wider political settlements Policy implications
in determining trajectories of violence and 1. The “design of institutions” (the
change in developing countries, a finding rules and norms that govern behaviour),
that is supported by recent econometric particularly formal state institutions, does
evidence that identifies regime type and not determine either political or economic
political institutions as central to patterns outcomes. Democratic institutions in one
of violence and political order (Goldstone state may be associated with violent conflict
et al. 2010). Our findings also sit well with and economic stagnation, while in another
those of Douglass North and his colleagues they may be related to peaceful social relations
iv • MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CRISIS STATES
and economic growth. It is the underlying 6. Incorporating an analysis of political
political settlement that determines political settlements can take the work done by
and developmental outcomes. DFID and others on understanding “the
drivers of change” in the developing
2. Understanding the state as a countries a step further. This lens allows
political settlement places the goal of an analysis of the contending interests that
democratisation in a new light. The insight exist within any state, which constrain and
that every state is based on a historically facilitate institutional and developmental
specific political settlement provides a route to change. It provides a framework to analyse
understanding why very similar sets of formal how the state is linked to society and what
institutions – like democratic rules, or rules lies behind the formal representation of
governing macroeconomic management or politics in a state.
trade liberalisation, or industrial policy – can
have extremely divergent outcomes. 7. To undertake development-assistance
programmes without understanding the
3. Focusing on the political settlement political settlement on which a state rests
directs attention to the crucial role of can lead to unintended consequences
elites in securing stability in a state, which of all sorts. Not only does the political
should lead international actors to be settlement set the constraints for what can
concerned about the incentives elites face and cannot be accomplished with foreign
to play by the rules of a state. A uniform assistance, but foreign assistance itself can
approach to opposing rent seeking may have an impact on the political settlement.
provoke instability and violence, and rent
allocation or special privileges allocated to
2 Distinguishing state fragility
elites may be central to the maintenance of
peace and state-building processes.
and resilience
There is a distinction among the poorest
4. Patterns of inclusion and exclusion are developing countries, between those that
central to the stability and resilience of experience a condition of fragility – or a real
political settlements, but important more danger of state breakdown and internecine
in terms of outcomes than the formal violence – and poor countries where the
institutional arrangements governing state has achieved considerable resilience,
access to state power. If democratic rules or peace, even when economic development
are likely to lead to significant exclusion has been elusive. Both fragile and resilient
of either powerful elites, or important states among the poorest countries are also
regional, ethnic, language or religious distinct from states presiding over accelerated
groups, then they may be inferior to forms development. Not understanding these
of power sharing. distinctions renders the idea of state fragility
meaningless and can lead to serious problems
5. Support for reforms that promote the in international interventions.
interest of non-elite social groups must It is impossible to understand patterns
be determined by the extent to which of state fragility and resilience by looking
such groups have developed their own only at the national state. In practice, the
organisations capable of articulating architecture of state authority in every
such reforms and engaging in the society is a complex network of public
political contests necessary to enact organisations and institutions. Within this
them. International actors need to be able network, towns and cities serve as critical
to identify organised social constituencies spaces of state formation, consolidation,
for major political reforms if external transformation and erosion. Cities are
support for such reforms is not only to be particularly significant sub-national units of
effective, but also avoid disrupting political analysis and intervention in “fragile” states.
systems in unintended ways.MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CRISIS STATES • v
Policy implications competitive elections to carrying out
1. Policy practice directed towards “fragile programmes of decentralisation and
states” has been confounded by a failure devolution. Where the state’s own security
to make clear what distinguishes the forces are either incapable of defeating non-
particular problem of “fragility” from state armed challengers or where the state
general problems facing all developing cannot maintain power without unleashing
countries. Our definition of state fragility violence on its population, priority must be
directs attention to factors that are most given to the establishment of a unified chain
likely to provoke violence and lead towards of command, an end to all abusive practices
state collapse: the lack of a basic legitimate against citizens, and ensuring that officers
monopoly over the means of large-scale and enlisted personnel are paid and have a
violence, the absence of control over taxation, basic capacity to provide protection to elites
the failure of state organisations to operate and non-elites within the state’s territory.
in significant territories of the country and
5. Taxation is a key indicator for measuring A state’s taxation
the existence of rival rule systems that take
precedence over the state’s rules. state performance and assessing the extent capacity can
of fragility or resilience of a state. A state’s provide an objective
2. There is clearly a category of “resilient taxation capacity can provide an objective means to assess
states” among the least developed countries, means to assess the power, authority and the power, authority
which has not been given due recognition legitimacy the state possesses to mobilise
and legitimacy
in theory or policy practice. States that have resources and the degree to which it
monopolises tax collection. The level, the state possesses
achieved and maintained peace over time,
even when they have presided over economic diversity and manner of collection of taxes to mobilise
stagnation, have been able to consolidate all provide indications of a state’s position on resources and the
national identity, institutions of citizenship, the fragility to resilience spectrum. degree to which
and inter-community communication in it monopolises
6. Assessing the reach of a state’s
ways that can insulate them against both tax collection.
external crises and the disruptive and organisations into its significant territory
violence-provoking characteristics of future is a crucial indicator of a state’s resilience
economic development. or fragility. When a state’s authority
does not reach important sites of human
3. Analysis and policy discussion around settlement, economic resource mobilisation
fragile states has concentrated almost or areas bordering on neighbouring zones
entirely on the “central state”, failing of conflict, this can be considered a major
to see the particular place of cities in indication of state fragility. Programmes
state formation historically and the that aim to decentralise or devolve power in
contemporary importance of growing areas where the state is hardly present can
cities as key sites of state building and state aggravate fragility, while programmes that
erosion. The concentration of high-value promote economic and social integration
economic activity within the cities of fragile of the state’s territory, even if economically
states renders them central to state-building “inefficient”, may be important to establishing
processes. Elites capable of challenging the state resilience.
bargains on which political settlements rest
are often located in cities, and growing civic 7. The extent to which the state’s
conflict and violence threatens to undermine institutions, or rules, trump non-state
state consolidation. institutional systems, whether anchored
among regional, ethnic, traditional,
4. Consolidating basic security needs to religious or warlord actors in rural or urban
be seen as a precondition for not only areas, is a key indicator of state fragility
more elaborate programmes of security- or resilience. Where non-state institutions
sector reform, but also for a wide set of are not subsumed within the state’s own rule
governance reforms, from implementing system, they can act as important sourcesvi • MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CRISIS STATES
of legitimacy to those who mount violent wider political settlement. Political
challenges to the state. Programmes designed organisations determine whether the
to promote participation and tap the executive authority has the power to
resources of non-state organisations must be articulate and enforce both positive
cognisant of this dimension of state fragility or incentives for elites to play by state rules
they may potentially contribute to provoking and negative incentives that make it costly
or aggravating violent conflict. for elites to exit. Crucially, in establishing
executive power within the state, political
8. Dominant approaches to measuring organisations play the central role in
state performance, state fragility and state establishing checks against the abuse of
failure are poor guides to analysis and power by the executive. Efforts to influence
policy making. The advances made by the patterns of governance need to focus on
Crisis States Research Centre offer the basis how any reform or policy package may
for beginning to deal with the most important affect or be affected by the executive
Political organisations problems of ambiguity and aggregation, authority of the state.
determine whether and to present a more useful database of
the executive performance indicators and a more powerful 2. Understanding the particularities of
authority has the set of policy-relevant analytical tools. political organisation must be a prerequisite
power to articulate to efforts to promote governance reforms.
and enforce both 3 Political organisations The techniques political organisations use to
positive incentives for and trajectories of fragility win and maintain power and the patterns of
elites to play by state and resilience
collective action they promote are diverse
and often difficult for outsiders to see, but
rules and negative Political organisations shape the ways understanding these in any given country is
incentives that make it elites relate to each other. They shape the essential to understanding how politics works.
costly for elites to exit. relations between elites and their social
constituencies, and the fundamental 3. External actors should focus on areas of
characteristics of the political settlement good performance of a state and attempt
(the institutions and organisations of the to understand the interests that have led
state): most importantly, the powers and to state effectiveness, rather than attempt
the limitation of powers over executive to assess performance in the aggregate.
authority at central and sub-national levels In this way they can determine whether
of the state. State resilience is most likely such performance can be duplicated
achieved when the political organisation(s) elsewhere or why it may not be, and ensure
that control the state: (1) mobilise their that interventions designed to address
social base in ways that accommodate the one domain of activity do not undermine
demands of a sustainable elite coalition another central activity of the state – most
notably conflict management. Differential
without pursuing violent repression
performance of a state is deeply related to
of non-elites; (2) establish executive
the way political organisations deal with the
authority within the state with the power
interests of elites and their social constituents.
and resources to discipline defectors
The creation of state capacities is deeply
and reward those who play by state rules; influenced by political decisions and is never
and (3) establish the executive authority simply the result of having the technical
independent of the particular individual(s) expertise necessary for a particular activity.
who occupy high office and subject it to
checks against the abuse of its power. 4. Political possibilities, and therefore
governance reforms, are decisively
Policy implications linked to reigning elite interests at a
1. Executive authority within the state is given moment in time. The ways politics
crucial to determining the inclusiveness are organised are intimately linked to the
and stability of elite bargains and the interests of elites and their constituentsMEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CRISIS STATES • vii
at given moments in history. Strategies 4 Politics of violent conflict:
for political or economic reforms that are rebels, warlords and urban
radically at odds with interests embodied civic conflict
in a political settlement will either fail or
Our research on states and cities challenges
are likely to provoke conflict.
crude economic determinist theories
that seek to explain violence as driven
5. The promotion of democracy in a
by individual utility maximisation, or the
country needs to focus on establishing
economic returns combatants can expect
mechanisms for checks and balances on
from engaging in violence. It also rejects
executive authority rather than the form
the idea that differences between armed
of political party competition. In almost
organisations are primarily due to differential
all cases of state resilience in poor countries
access to economic resources. All non-state
forms of centralised patronage have been armed organisations are not the same, but
organised in national political parties, rather they differ not only in terms of their
though not all states with national political motivations and objectives but also crucially
parties have achieved state resilience. in the organisational mechanisms they deploy
Where the basic parameters of the state – as they attempt to survive and grow over time.
like who is a citizen and who is not, or the These are essential to understand, if non-state
basic authority to allocate property rights armed groups are to be defeated or brought
– remain contested, the establishment of into peace negotiations.
multiple political parties may allow rival Our research has also found that cities
elites and their social constituents to are increasingly fraught by civic conflict
challenge the existence of the state itself, and violence that does not necessarily
thus leading to exacerbated conflict. appear to be explicitly political in nature. It
suggests that violent civic conflicts (as well
6. Political organisations tend to imitate as assaults and homicides) have a political
those who succeed in gaining and keeping dimension that is often overlooked. In a
power regardless of what advice they may quantitative study we found that cross-country
receive from at home or abroad. Once this variation in homicide rates (a rough proxy
is understood, it is possible to understand for “social” violence) is explained by a
why particular techniques and patterns of combination of traditional socioeconomic
collective action are adopted by political factors and variations in political institutional
actors, even when in doing so they may arrangements. City-level qualitative research
challenge long established elite bargains also points to the significance of political
and political settlements, or reproduce the factors in spurring violent civic conflict.
same despite having long fought for change.
Policy implications
7. Possibilities exist for transformative 1. Understanding the particular organi-
political coalitions to emerge committed sational mechanisms and incentive struc-
to establishing security, particularly in tures within non-state armed actors is
urban environments where a diversity of essential to understanding what sustains
relatively well organised interest groups them, how durable they may be and on
can challenge reigning political practices. what grounds they might be defeated or
Reformist politics are most likely to emerge brought into peace processes. While these
when it is in the collective interests of newly organisations are all likely to be deeply
emergent elites who do not have the means involved in illegal activities to fund their
enjoyed by traditional elites to finance their operations, likely to attract young under-
security privately. employed men as fighters and may behave
brutally towards civilians, there are pro-
found differences between them based
on who they recruit, how they operate,viii • MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CRISIS STATES
and why combatants join and remain in 4. Quantitative large-N cross-national
the organisations. studies of episodes of violent conflict can
identify important associations between
2. Organisational incentives are a far the multitude of variables related to
better analytical indication of the nature complex processes of violence, but on their
of non-state armed movements than own cannot explain causal or dynamic
particular patterns of access to natural processes. Large-N research needs to be
or illegal resources. In Colombia, the backed up by small-N comparative studies
paramilitaries and the FARC guerrillas that can shed light on the organisational
have both been deeply involved in narco- dynamics that determine the sustainability of
trafficking, while in Afghanistan warlords armed challenges to the state. Comparative
working with or against the state and the analysis of the organisational dynamics
Taliban have all been involved in the of FARC in Colombia and the Taliban in
production and trade of opium poppies. Afghanistan allowed us to formulate a model
What differentiates these organisations in to understand their differential behaviour
terms of their durability and strength are along a spectrum separating army-like and
the structure of incentives faced by their network-like non-state armed groups. In this
leaders and members. way we showed that differences between
them in terms of their relations with civilian
3. Only an analysis of the organisational populations were not determined by their
dynamics and sources of power and resource base, but rather by the imperatives
legitimacy that underpin warlord dictated by their organisational dynamics.
power can predict their potential role
in processes of state consolidation and 5. Cities are often havens of relative security
state destabilisation. The extent to which in civil war, but it would be a mistake to
powerful non-state armed actors like take urban security for granted when war
warlords or clan bosses can be won over has ended. Major population movements
to state-building processes depends on the and socio-economic ruptures often lead to
trade-offs they face between imperatives of widespread conflict in cities after civil war.
bureaucratisation involved in state-building Often municipal state capacities are eroded
projects and preserving the relations of with long-term implications for development.
patronage on which their power depends. People will come into cities during and in the
wake of war, whatever happens, and unless
issues such as urban employment, housing
© Tom Goodfellow, Kigali building where 10 Belgian soldiers serving in the UN Assistance and basic services are addressed, civic conflict
Mission for Rwanda were shot by government soldiers during the genocide of 1994. is likely.
6. Forms of civic violence are ubiquitous
in the cities of the developing world and
they are deeply political in character.
Gang warfare, crime, terrorism, religious
and sectarian riots, and spontaneous riots
or violent protest are increasing throughout
the developing world. While these conflicts
are rarely fought as direct challenges to
state power, they are nevertheless usually
expressions of deep grievances towards
the state or politically and economically
powerful urban elites. Treating them as
criminal activities, or simply repressing
them, may achieve some peace and orderMEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CRISIS STATES • ix
in the short-term, but this can also lead to of World War II, we found that large-scale
deferred and even more explosive violent military interventions have had a decisively
conflict in the future. negative impact on subsequent patterns of
democratic consolidation.
5 Military interventions,
regional organisations and 2. Military interventions have tended
prospects for peace making to destroy a state’s conflict-resolution
and peace building mechanisms, often unleashed forms of
politics incompatible with democracy,
Since the end of the Cold War the rules
upset political settlements and critically
governing international relations have
weakened state systems in general. Many
changed. Where long-established principles
interventions have provoked long periods
of sovereignty appeared to trump concerns
of armed conflict in invaded countries.
for the protection of human rights or
They have often given rise to polarised
conversely the pursuit of national security
nationalist and identity-driven politics.
Invaders have often
through pre-emptive action, new doctrines combined motives of
have emerged advocating the judicial use Invaders have often combined motives
of international military intervention in of democracy promotion with measures democracy promotion
pursuit of these goals. A rigorous large-N that have redrawn elite bargains and with measures that
study of the long-term impact of military political settlements in ways that have made have redrawn elite
interventions in the developing world democratisation more difficult. bargains and political
revealed that there is a large and negative settlements in ways
association with the consolidation of 3. Despite the optimism among international
actors that regional organisations can play that have made
democracy after interventions.
With the disappearance of the bi-polar a major role in achieving regional security democratisation
world there appeared to be new room for and make a positive contribution to peace more difficult.
regional organisations to become involved in building, their effectiveness is constrained
maintaining security and peace-making and by a lack of common values among their
peace-building efforts within the regions of member states. The mandate, norms,
the developing world. However, there is little decision-making modalities, goals, strategies,
evidence that the confidence international programmes, structure, capacity and culture
actors have in these organisations is warranted. of regional organisations derive from their
International efforts have been developed member states. Among the cases studied the
to promote peace-making and peace- effectiveness of peacemaking was limited
building operations and to attempt to bring by the absence of normative congruence
conflicts internal to states to a conclusion among member states in Central Asia, South
through international mediation. There is Asia, Southeast Asia and the various regional
an urgent need to professionalise approaches organisations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Only
to mediation and to ensure they are well the European Union achieved the degree
resourced and given time to operate effectively. of normative congruence necessary to forge
a security community.
Policy implications
1. There is a strong, negative and 4. Opportunities for positive engagement
significant association between military in mediation to bring about an end
interventions and democracy. A majority to conflict arise when the interests
of cross-country comparative analyses of the of belligerents align to make peace a
impact of military interventions over time more attractive option than continued
on patterns of democracy and development warfare. The dynamics of war and peace
found their effect to be either positive or can be understood as cyclical, but also
neutral, but these have suffered from serious efforts to understand them through an
methodological problems. By applying a analysis of the causes for the outbreak of
rigorous definition of military intervention war are often thwarted by the fact that the
and reconsidering all episodes since the end motivations for participation in violencex • MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CRISIS STATES
change over time. Opportunities for related to elite bargains and patterns of
peace often emerge when processes of state fragility and resilience. In analysing
accumulation of financial, ideological or the results we distinguish between formal
political capital change the economic and and informal capital-accumulation
political landscape and a range of actors processes that predominate in different
share an interest in securing what they have settings. Our findings challenge some
accumulated. Understanding the cycle of conventional wisdom in development
war and peace can help to identify the theory and practice. First, resilient states
most propitious moment for intervention with predictable formal rules of the game
through mediation. do not necessarily generate dynamic
economic development outcomes. Second,
5. There is an immediate need for our research at both the country and city
international actors to professionalise their levels suggests that processes of capital
approach to mediation. Four measures are accumulation in the informal sector are
Centralised patronage required to bolster international mediation underpinned by fragile, competing and/
underpinned by an capacity: (1) the implementation of a or exclusionary elite bargains typical of
inclusive elite bargain rigorous system for appointing and evaluating fragile states. Third, external intervention
and external conditions impose constraints
and state control perspective mediators; (2) mediators need
and incentives that have a profound impact
over resources can adequate support in the field to allow them
on the choices open to actors in fragile and
play an important to deal with the complexity of conflicts;
resilient states.
(3) a learning culture needs to emerge
role in maintaining based on review, assessment, research and
political stability but Policy implications
adaptation; and (4) a confidence-building
may come at the model needs to be adopted to deal with 1. Centralised patronage underpinned
cost of economic national conflicts, breaking from power- by an inclusive elite bargain and state
control over resources can play an
development. based diplomacy.
important role in maintaining political
stability but may come at the cost of
6. Mediation requires time necessitating
economic development. Policy makers
a shift away from approaches that attempt
need to consider the extent to which
to find a “quick fix” in peace agreements.
deregulating an economy across the board
Mediation takes time to take account of
will be politically destabilising and actually
the complexity of conflict and the need
undermine economic reforms.
to overcome hatred and mistrust among
conflicting parties, who must be brought
2. State capacity varies substantially
to feel they own a peace settlement. across functions and sectors within
Mediation, pitched at the right moment polities – a central feature of fragile
in the cycle of war and peace, can have states not acknowledged in aggregate
an important impact, when those involved measures of governance – but this
have proper expertise and have mastered variation needs to be taken into account
the skills and techniques of mediation. in the design of economic reforms in
fragile states. Detailed historical analyses
6 Economic resource of the political coalitions and settlements
mobilisation: trajectories of underpinning specific state capacities are
accumulation and links to essential to increase understanding of
fragility and resilience in states variable state capacity within a polity. As
and cities such, investigating under which conditions
the achievement of state resilience hinders
Our research on economic resource
or facilitates economic development is an
mobilisation identified different dominant
important area of research.
trajectories of accumulation in the case-
study countries and cities, which areMEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CRISIS STATES • xi
3. The creation of organisations that can when these programmes were only partially
provide support for informal sector firms implemented, had a much more devastating
is central to improving production capacity impact where political settlements and elite
and thus sustainable employment creation. bargains were factionalised than where more
Tax collection and other government solid political organisations reigned.
strategies need to be linked to providing
incentives for informal firms to register as 7 From fragility and resilience
taxpayers. A promising approach to this to development
challenge could be to link the expansion Promoting development – or progress
of the tax base to the informal sector in towards accelerated growth and poverty
exchange for providing incentives for reduction – requires both transcendence
small and medium-sized firms to increase of basic fragility and the creation of further
productive capacity. state capacity to promote an intensification
of economic integration within a state’s
4. While sectors such as construction and territory and a step-change in productivity
the drugs trade provide livelihoods in the in agriculture, manufacturing, wider
informal sector for a substantial number of industry, trade and key service delivery.
people, they are unlikely to be sustainable The way “state fragility” is defined in the
in political economy terms. This is because policy community loses sight of the huge
these trajectories of accumulation take place distance that must be traversed from
in the context of fragile political settlements both conditions of fragility and stagnant
that undermine state building. Moreover, resilience to a situation where the state
the dynamism of the informal sector means is presiding over accelerated growth and
that capital accumulation proceeds without poverty reduction. A “developmental” or
increases in the formal tax base of the state. “transformational” state has to be able to
This further undermines the prospects of create incentives and conditions for the
state building. holders of wealth to invest in productivity-
raising economic ventures, and incentives
5. Governments need to effectively regulate and conditions for labouring people to
land and housing markets and deliver work for wages.
key public goods in an effort to formalise While our research was focused more
urban informal economies to avoid the on the distinction between fragile and
emergence of political and economic resilient states than on developmental
entrepreneurs with powerful incentives success stories, we were able to observe
to resist state consolidation. In urban several factors crucial to the transition from
settings, policies that contribute to state fragility and resilience to development.
withdrawal are often evaluated on grounds Many economically stagnant but resilient
of efficiency and equity, but almost never for states depend heavily on resource
their impact on the institutional resilience extraction and we found that the ability of
of the state. This is a major blind spot which the state to create a regulatory framework
has far-reaching consequences for the ability to govern the sector is related to the
of states to embark upon or return to a path political settlement in place when resource
of institutional consolidation. exploitation begins. We also found that the
promotion of developmental patterns of
6. Assessing the initial conditions of capital accumulation may only proceed
a polity and the parameters of the incrementally, sector by sector. Our
political settlement on which the state research on taxation suggests that it can
is based must be a prerequisite before be deployed to encourage transformation
prescriptions for far-reaching economic of production and to establish a terrain
reforms are adopted. Rapid economic favourable to the formation of political
liberalisation associated with structural coalitions with an interest in growth and
adjustment programmes in Africa, even development. The research has contributedxii • MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CRISIS STATES
to a growing body of work that illustrates challenge will remain to replicate advances
that the way aid is delivered in fragile and in single sectors to other sectors within
resilient states can have a profound impact agriculture and industry.
on its potential to contribute to sustained
development. Finally, we conclude with a 4. Taxation and tax reform can be
reflection on the types of coalitions that are deployed to promote investment in lines
most likely to provide the basis for positive of production with good potential for
developmental transitions. growth. Tax allows governments to secure the
revenues needed for social programmes and
Policy implications public investments. It can be organised both
1. Ensuring that resource-extractive as a means to increase public accountability
industries contribute to wider developmental and as a nexus for political organising in
patterns through revenues generated and society. Expanding the tax base geographically
processing operations established, requires and sectorally can help to embed the state
an activist state. A state needs capacity in society, and revenue expenditure by the
within its revenue and licensing agencies state is one of the principal means to meet
and in its law-making bodies, to design and societal demands.
implement sectoral development plans that
ensure the contribution of resource-extractive 5. Aid needs to be channelled through
industries to the creation of infrastructure, the agencies of the state and it should
the emergence of processing activities and give due priority to developing the core
the development of skills among workers. In capacities of the state to govern economic
the face of political arrangements that block development. Donors need to give due
the development of a resource sector, the consideration to mechanisms that increase
answer is seldom likely to be the wholesale the capacity of states to raise their own
withdrawal of the state from intervention finances. Aid channelled outside state
within the sector. systems or “off budget” can contribute to
the creation of a “dual public authority”
2. The successful management of thus weakening states as the centre for
resource-extractive industries is most decision making, in favour of potentially
likely to happen in states that consolidate rival networks of patronage.
a national development coalition before
the exploitation of resources begins. This 6. Developmental coalitions may emerge
means that the first step in assistance to a in less than democratic ways, or only
country that is engaging with international within particular tiers or organisations
or domestic business to undertake of the state, but if they are inclusive
exploration for minerals, fossil fuels or and incorporate measures to check the
any other natural resource, should be the abuse of executive authority they deserve
creation of knowledge, skills and agencies the support of external actors. Political
within the state capable of both bargaining settlements and the elite bargains at their
with and regulating private investors. centre, which are capable of steering a
course through the conflictual processes
3. Sustainable employment creation and that may lift a government out of resilient
poverty reduction in rural areas requires stagnation, arise only rarely and are largely
the development of effective organisations a matter of internal politics. External actors
where the focus is on developing production need to be able to recognise and support
strategies. Pockets of growth can emerge them even when they are organised along
incrementally and these “islands of success” lines that fall short of the standards of
can form the basis of development projects. modern liberal democracies.
This approach is likely to yield greater success
than “big push” macroeconomic reforms
often advocated by international actors. TheSeeing the State as a Political Settlement:
Elite Bargains and Social Mobilisation
The dominant position in the policy community when addressing the
condition of a state, or public authority, in the developing world is
based on the proposition that “good governance” (defined as liberal
democratic and free market institutions) is the source not only of a
state’s ability to preside over peace and stability, but also over growth
and development. These are generally assessed by the formal rules
adopted by a state and the policies articulated and implemented. The
institutions or rules are seen primarily as incentive structures: get the
institutions right and actors will face incentives to behave in ways that
promote peace and development. This has led international actors
– for instance in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) after its
peace agreement – to focus on adopting a democratic constitution,
conducting elections and articulating policies to fight corruption, promote
transparency and reduce poverty. However, these institutional and
Formally designed
policy reforms have neither secured peace nor even the beginnings of institutions which
a development trajectory in the DRC. In Tanzania and Zambia, similar are out of step
reforms have been adopted peacefully but not led to growth, while in with the dominant
Rwanda institutional arrangements that limit democratic competition political settlement
have nevertheless allowed the establishment of peace within its territory in a polity, are at
and significant growth with modest poverty reduction. best likely to be
ineffective or at
Political settlements and bargaining between those who control worst to provoke
determine the impact of the state and the wider society. violent conflict.
institutional reforms Institutions are not just sets of
incentives that can be designed by those
A better understanding of the possibilities
who occupy political authority to achieve
of progressive institutional change and
peace-promoting and growth-promoting
policy reform can be achieved by seeing the
behaviour in society. Rather, they reflect
state as a political settlement embodying a
and embody power relationships and
set of power relations. Every state is based
distributional advantages. Property rights
on a political settlement that embodies the
and state regulations – key institutions
distribution of power between contending
defined within any state – create incentives
social groups and social classes (Khan
for behaviour, but also, by definition, specify
1995, 2000). Political settlements emerge
a historically specific distribution of control
from processes of conflict and bargaining
and authority over assets (Dahlman 1980:
(Di John and Putzel 2009). Looking at
213-214). Formally designed institutions
the political settlement focuses attention
– whether related to an effort to control
on: intra-elite contention and bargaining
rents, prevent corruption, or promote social
(political versus economic elites, landed
inclusion and democratic participation –
and non-landed elites, regional elites,
which are out of step with the dominant
rural and urban elites, religious and
political settlement in a polity, are at best
secular elites, etc); contention and
likely to be ineffective or at worst to provoke
bargaining between elites and non-elites
violent conflict. Historically in Rwanda,
(the rich and the poor, employers and
the threat presented by the introduction
employees, land-owners and tenants or
of democratic reforms in the early 1990s
farmworkers); inter-group contention and
likely contributed to the mobilisation by
bargaining (between genders, regional
Hutu extremists leading up to the genocide
groups, ethnic or linguistic communities,
in 1994 (Golooba-Mutebi 2008b) – an
or religious communities); and contention
extreme case where institutional reforms
pushed by the international community2 • MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CRISIS STATES
were entirely incongruent with the reigning In exchange for privileged access to valuable
political settlement. The endorsement of resources, income streams and activities,
decentralisation reforms in Afghanistan and elites agree not to fight one another, as they
Rwanda, with the objective of promoting come to perceive that the costs of exiting the
democratic accountability, were actually state or breaking from the political settlement
used to project central authority to distant – or in other words, the costs of not playing
regions (OECD 2010; Lister 2007), with by the rules of the state – exceed what they
arguably positive developmental effects in chance to win by pursuing their interests
Rwanda and negative ones in Afghanistan: through violence.
outcomes were determined by parameters For an elite bargain to hold, the state
of power in the political settlement. needs to be structured in such a way that those
who control it command coercive force that
Elite bargains, state-society is solid and legitimate enough that: (1) rents
relations and legitimacy allocated and property rights assigned can be
In much of the protected and enforced – a positive incentive
Given the widespread goal within the
developing world development-policy community to work attracting elites to stick within the political
the immediate to promote poverty reduction and social settlement; (2) those who defect or choose to
prospects for inclusion, it is particularly contentious to exit and challenge the state through violence
achieving or suggest that careful attention must be focused face a threat of punishment – a negative
incentive – that makes exit costly; and (3)
sustaining peace on the conflicts, entitlements and power
relations among elites. While the effective those who control the state do not need to
and promoting exercise its coercive force against citizens to
organisation of non-elites in a society can
development are decisively influence the action of elites and maintain power – there is a basic acceptance
contingent on the the shape of a political settlement, in much of their right to rule, or a basic legitimacy.
complex processes of the developing world the immediate That is, states need to demonstrate a “credible
of conflict prospects for achieving or sustaining peace commitment” to the defence of the terms
of the bargain and a “credible threat” to
and bargaining and promoting development are contingent
on the complex processes of conflict and defectors. As we will argue below, political
among elites. organisation is crucial to structuring the
bargaining among elites. We have defined
elites observable in the developing countries state in this way. When externally promoted
today as: a) those in possession of valued reforms threaten the power of the state
assets in agriculture, manufacturing, to allocate rents they may well unwittingly
services (main capitalists); b) those who contribute to breaking up an elite bargain
wield substantial power over the distribution and a reigning political settlement, leading
and allocation of property rights (traditional to violence and even warfare – as arguably
chiefs, landlords, regional political leaders, was the case during the decade of structural
warlords); c) those who possess authority to adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa during the
bargain on behalf of rural communities or 1980s (Putzel 2005).
organised religious communities (traditional However, when social movements
leaders, religious leaders); and d) those who emerge domestically with organisational
lead political organisations (Di John and coherence and discipline, they may force a
Putzel 2009: 15). change in rent allocation and the shape of
The “bargain” that emerges between the elite bargain, as happened in Zambia (Di
elites within a political settlement comes John 2010a). Recognising power equations of
about as a means to manage violence and elites does not negate the wider importance
achieve peace, as Douglass North and his of society for at least two reasons. First, elites
colleagues (2007, 2009) have so convincingly are part of society and exist only due to their
argued. In political economy terms, elites command of authority over non-elites – their
have privileged access to rents (Khan and constituents, followers or clients – and their
Jomo 2000), such as licenses to engage in actions need always to take into account
mining, establish telecoms networks, run the maintenance of their authority vis à
bus networks or trucking, or control land. vis their social base (this is valid, though inMEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CRISIS STATES • 3
different ways, whether we are considering John 2010a; Putzel and Lindemann 2011),
democratic or authoritarian regimes, or instead loosely knits together regionally
religious or tribal communities, warlords or or ethnically based elite bargains within a
regional strongmen). Second, non-elites not wider territory, as has always been the case
only can be decisive in sanctioning specific in the DRC and Afghanistan (Hesselbein
elites, or undermining them, but in doing 2007; Giustozzi 2008a). Cities sometimes
so new forms and sites of social mobilisation have been the locus of such local bargains,
can emerge, and have done so throughout as in Lumumbashi in the DRC (Hesselbein
history: “counter-elite movements” that and Garrett 2009), Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat
can overturn an elite bargain or even give for extensive periods of the Afghan conflict
rise to new elites altogether (Wood 2000); (Giustozzi 2009c) and Quetta on the border of
or the reconstitution of old elites in a new Afghanistan and Pakistan (Gazdar et al. 2010).
or re-invented elite bargain and political The third dimension of inclusiveness
settlement, as happened in Zambia (Di concerns the relation between elites and
John 2010a; Putzel and Gutiérrez 2011). the wider society. As we argued above, by
Our research in cities has documented definition elites require a social base and
the emergence of such “counter-elite how they mobilise that base – for instance
movements” (Gutiérrez et al. 2009). whether they resort to mobilisation on
the basis of ethnicity as in the DRC or a
Inclusive or exclusionary developmental programme as in Rwanda
elite bargains and – in large part determines the stability
political settlements and developmental quality of a political
In dominant thinking within the policy settlement (Hesselbein 2011). In Durban,
community, democratic institutions by promising a new era of peace so much
are advocated as a means to promote desired by ordinary people, political leaders
participation and social inclusion. While built an inclusive coalition at the city level
the degree of inclusiveness appears to be around developmental objectives (Beall
central to the stability of elite bargains and and Ngonyama 2009). In Ahmedabad,
wider political settlements, whether or not Chandhoke (2010) showed how a once
this can best be achieved with democratic stable and relatively inclusive political
or alternative institutional arrangements settlement could become exclusionary
is a socially and historically specific issue. through patterns of political mobilisation.
Inclusiveness is important to elite bargains in Determining how inclusive or
at least three ways. First is the extent to which exclusionary a political settlement is
a bargain is inclusive or exclusionary of rival can partly be understood by looking at
elites (and their constituents) – particularly the extent to which divergent elites and
those anchored in diverse territories, members of important social groups
religious, ethnic or language communities. participate in the bargaining process, or
This is what eluded state-building projects in gain appointments in the offices of the
Uganda before 1986, but then was achieved state (Lindemann 2010a, 2010 b). However,
during Museveni’s first two decades in power perhaps more fundamentally than actual
and what threatens the future of stability in participation of individuals within the
the country today (Golooba-Mutebi 2008a; agencies of the state, the inclusiveness
Putzel and Gutiérrez 2011); and what the or exclusionary character of a political
post-apartheid state in South Africa achieved settlement can be assessed through the
in cities like Durban (Beall 2005; Beall and distribution of rights and entitlements
Ngonyama 2009). across groups and classes in society on
Second, it is crucial whether or not a state which the settlement is based. It is possible
is formed of one overarching elite bargain, that an imposed political settlement can be
like that which was achieved and maintained more inclusive than one reached through
during at least the first thirty years after pluralist bargaining (as might be argued in
independence in Zambia and Tanzania (Di the case of Rwanda since 1994). As societyYou can also read
