Managing Ethnicity and Constructing the 'Bangsa Malaysia' (A United Malaysian Nation)* - Core
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Malaysian Management Journal 6 (1 &2) 99-1 15 (2002)
Managing Ethnicity and Constructing the ‘Bangsa Malaysia’
(A United Malaysian Nation)*
MOHAMED MUSTAFA ISHAK
Student Affairs Department
Universiti Utara Malaysia
ABSTRACT
The question of nation-building has always been a central issue in Malaysian politics. Whilst the coun-
t y has been able to sustain stable politics since the 1969 racial tragedy, spawning two decades rapid
socio-economic development until the 1997 Asian economic crisis, the project of nation-building re-
mained a basic national agenda yet to be fully resolved. This short paper investigates the delicate
process of nation-building in Malaysia in the post 1970s, especially in the context of the vision of
constructing the Bangsa Malaysia or united Malaysian nation enshrined in Mahathir ’s Vision 2020
project which was introduced in 1991.
The aim of the paper isfirstly, to highlight the underlying socio-political parameters that shaped and
influenced the politics of nation-building in the country, and secondly, to explore the viability of the
project of Bangsa Malaysia in the context of the daunting challenges involved in the process of nation-
building. The paper contends that, based on the Malaysian experience, the potent interplay between the
forces of ethnicity and nationalism constitute the crux of the problem in the politics of nation-building
in Malaysia. This dialectic it is argued, stemsfiom the prevalence of the varying ‘nationalisms’ within
and across ethnic groups. These phenomena have not only shaped the pattern of ethnic political mobi-
lization in the countv, but above all, laid the most complex set of obstacles in the path of the project of
nation-building.
The paper argues that the project of constructing the Bangsa Malaysia therefore, can be seen as sign$-
cant attempt by the state to reconcile the competing ‘nationalism ’. It can also be considered as an
attempt to consolidate Malay nationalism and cultural pluralism, thus promoting the development of
‘civic nationalism ’ orheation of ‘asupra-ethnic ’ national identiv. The ‘nation’, therefore, is depicted
as a ‘mosaic of cultures’, but with a strong fervour of MaIay nationalism. However, the viability of the
envisaged project is yet to be tested.
The concept itself is still vague to many people and the challenges ahead are enormous, involving
political, economic, socio-cultural and religious issues. Indeed the project risks becoming the ‘latest’in
the series of competing notions of ‘nation-of- intent’ circulating in Malaysia. The paper contends that
whilst, to some extent, the socio-political landscape of MaIaysian society has been rapidly changing,
especially in the past two decades of Mahathir ’s reign, ethnicity still pervades Malaysian political life.
The paper probably difers from many previous studies on nation-building in Malaysia, which have
’ I have completed a study on the politics of nation-building in Malaysia for my Doctoral Degree at the University
of Leeds, England in 1999. This paper is basically the gist of the thesis.
PERPUSThiO+AN SULTANAH WHMH
Universiti Utara Malavsir100
mainly focused on either the historical dimensions or those which have examined the impact of key
national policies. It is hoped that this briefpaper would be able to contribute towards broadening the
perspective in the analysis of ethnic relations and nation-building in Malaysia, thus, deepening the
understanding of Malaysia politics and society.
AJ3STRAK
Persoalan pembentukan negara sentiasa rnenjadi isu utama dalam politik Malaysia. Walaupun negara
ini telah memastikan kestabilan politik berterusan semenjak tragedi perkauman 1969, sepanjang
sepanjang dua dekadpembangunan sosio-ekonorni yangpesat hingga Krisis Ekonomi Asia I997, projek
pembentukan negara kekal menjadi agenda asas negara yang belum dapat disempurnakan sepenuhnya.
Artikel pendek ini menyelidik proses pembentuk negara yang rurnit ini di Malaysia pasca 1970an,
terutamanya dalam konteh wawasan untuk membentuk Bangsa Malaysia atau satu negara Malaysia
yang bersatu seperti yang tertera dalam projek Wawasan 2020 oleh Dr Mahathir yang diperkenalkan
pada tahun 1991.
Tujuanpertama artikel ini untuk menerangkan parameter sosio-ekonomi yang wujud dalam membentuk
dan mempengaruhi politik pernbentukan bangsa di negara ini, dan kedua, meninjau keupayaan dayamaju
projek Bangsa Malaysia dalam konteks cabaran berat yang dihadapi dalam proses pembentukan negara
ini. Artikel ini berpendapat, berdasar pengalaman Malaysia, hubungan timbal-balik utama di antara
pengaruh etnisiti dan nasionalisme merupakun teras masalah politik pembentukun negara di Malaysia.
Dailetik ini dikatakan lahir dari kewujudan kepelbagaian ‘nasionalisme ’ di dalam dan di antara
kumpulan etnik. Fenomena ini bukan sahaja membentuk pola pengembelingan politik etnik di dalam
negara ini, tetapi Iebih penting lagi, telah meletakkun satu set cabaran yang paling kompleks dalam
landasan projek pembentukan negara.
I Artikel ini berpendapat projek pembentukan Bangsa Malaysia patut dilihat sebagai satu percubaan
! penting oleh pemerintah untuk mengenemukan ‘nasionalisme’yang bersaing ini. lajuga boleh dianggap
: I
sebagai satu percubaan untuk mengukuh nasionalisme Melayu dan pluralisme budaya, hingga
iI
ii mempromosikan pembangunan ‘nasionalisrne sivil ’ atau pembentukan identiti nasional kupra-etnik ’.
!’ Justeru itu, ‘negara ’ dipamerkan sebagai satu ‘mosaikpelbagai budaya ’, tetapi dengan nasionalisme
Melayu yang kuat. Namun demikian, keupayaan dayamaju projek yang dibayangkan ini masih belum
‘diuji. ‘
Konsep inipun kasih lagi kabur dipandangan kebanyakan orang ramai dun cabaran mendatang adalah
besar yang melibatkan isu politik, ekonomi, sosio-budaya dan agama. Sememangnyaprojek ini berisiko
menjadi ‘ha1terbaru ’ dalam siri persaingan tanggapan tentang ‘negara idaman berlegar di Malaysia.
Artikel ini berpendapat, walaupun pada satu segi, landskap sosio-politik masyarakat Malaysia telah
mengalami perubahan yang cepat, terutama dua dekad pemerintahan Dr:Mahathir, etnisiti masih
mencorak kehidupan berpolitik rakyat Malaysia. Artikel ini mungkin berbeza dengan kajian yang lepas
tentang pembentukan negara di Malaysia, kerana mereka telah memberi penumpuan sarna ada pada
dimensi sejarah atau ke atas tinjauan kesan dasar utama negara yang tertentu. Diharapkan artikel
yang ringkas ini dapat menyumbang ke arah memperluaskan lagi perspektif analisis perhubungan
etnik dan pembentukan negara di Malaysia, sekaligus memperdalamkanlagi kefahaman Fnta tentang
politik dan masyarakat Malaysia.
The question of ethnicity and nationalism have drawn enormous interest from scholars of varied disciplines in the
social sciences since years that may not possible to be fully listed here. To name a few were Brown (1 999), Mcrone
(1 998), Nairn (1997), Hutchinson and A.D. Smith (1997) and so forth.
Malaysian Management Journal 6 (1&2) 99-1 15 (2002)101
INTRODUCTION system has been coping with it and to which di-
rection will the ideology of the Bangsa Malaysia
Studies on ethzlcity and nationalism have been introduced by Dr. Mahathir in 1991 seek to take
growing significantly in recent years despite the Malaysians into the new millennium? And of more
new interest in social sciences concerning ideas crucial is to what extent could this be a successful
of postmodemism, globalization, and market liber- endeavour?
alization, as well as regional political and eco- While the importance of historical factors
nomic cooperations.’ Ethnicity continues to be has to be acknowledged, thispaper embarked from
crucial, and to constitute one of the most promi- the premise that the dialectic between ethnicity
and nationaIism is crucial to apprehend the poli-
nent features of modem society. As Horowitz
tics of nation-building in Malaysia. Ethnicity
(1985:13) puts it:
characterisedthe very basis of Malaysian politics.
Tlus is reflected by the fact that political struggles
The increasingprom inence of ethnic are fought on ethnic basic, and tendency of every
loyalties is development for which political issue to be perceived in ethnic term (see:
neither statesmen nor social Zakaria Ahmad, 1989; Crouch, 1996). This is the
scientists were adequatelyprepared. prevailing phenomenon in Malaysian polity since
its independence in 1957. Armd its relative sta-
In many divided societies, managing eth- bility and rapid economic development, especially
nic conflict and promoting national integration over the past two decades, Malaysia’s nation-
continues to be at the centre of politics. This is building project has not been hlly accomplished,
bound to be true as far as Malaysia is concerned. thus, constantly dominating the political agenda.
As a plural society, nation-building has always Although there have been a proliferation
been the greatest challenge for Malaysia. Nation- in the study of ethnicity and nationalism in the
building basically refers to a process of construct- West in recent years, a 111-length study that spe-
ing national identity that could accommodate eth- cifically focus on the politics of nation-building
nic pluralism while simultaneouslyinculcating an in the post New Economic policy (NEP) 1970-
overarchng sense of nationhood. It is usually a 1990 on Malaysia is hardly There were
process associated with plural societies, Although several studies on a similar subject in the past such
since the 1969 racial riots Malaysian plural soci- as that Ratnam (1965); Ibrahim Saad (1976);
ety has been able to absorb various threats to its Ongkili (1982); Wan Hashim (1983); and
political stability, the ultimate aim to build a Abraham (1997). However, these studies were
‘united Malaysian nation’ is yet to be achieved. mainly restricted to events that took place in Ma-
The politics of nation-building in Malay- laysia over the first two and a half decades of in-
sia is’ basically the politics of mediating identi- dependence, or between 1957 and the early 1980s.
ties. Indeed, thls probably was the heart of the On the other hands, several contemporary writ-
issue for many countri3s struggling with problems ings on the questions of Bangsa Malaysia and
and challenges stemming from the politics of identity politics in Malaysia made by several lo-
ethnicity and nationalism. As Clive J. Christie cal observers such as Rustam A. Sani (1993);
(1998) asserts, ‘At the heart of any discussion of Shamsul A.B. (1993; 1996a) Ghazali Shafie
the nation and nationalism lies the issue of iden- (1995); and Abdul Rahman Embong (1997), ap-
tity’ (p. 3). For Shamsul A.B. (1993,1996a) the parently did not deeply discuss on aspect of the
politics of identity in Malaysia illustrates the pre- politics of nation-building. Therefore these obser-
vailing contradictions of various notions of nation- vations need to be further scrutinised and deserved
of-intent2 both inter and intra ethnic groups. The a more in-depth analysis as there have been tre-
central question to ask is how Malaysian political
~ -
* ‘Nation-of-intent’ was a concept first employed by Rothberg (1966) in his study of ‘African Nationalism’ and
applied to the Malaysian context by Rustam A. Sani (1 975) in his study of the ‘Malay Left”. The concept was
further expanded by Shamsul A.B. in debating about ‘identity in Malaysia.
Malaysian Management Journal 6 (1 &2) 99- 115 (2002)102
mendous socio-economic and political changes vision constructingthe Bangsa Malaysia or ‘united
affecting the country, particularly in the last de- Malaysian nation’ which was forrnally introduced
cades, of Mahath’s political reign. One observer in 1991. The key interest of the paper is to outline
perceived that Mahathir’s ‘,. .ideology, politics and the underlying socio-political parameters that
personalities have contributed to reshaping the shaped and influenced the politics of nation-build-
Malaysian polity.. . ’ (Khoo Boo Te& 1995:x).The ing in the country. It is also sought to trace the
question is, to what extend there exist a kind of extent to which shift was occurring from ethnicism
‘Mahathirism’ which has significantly affect the to a Malaysian nationalism facilitated by the no-
politics of nation-building in gestures, since he tion of Bangsa Malaysia. It is argued that the crux
came to power. Obviously, these new and impor- of the problem lies in the potent interplay of the
tant developments deserved fiesh investigations. forces of ethnicity and nationalism, which ulti-
A review of the literature suggests that the mately characterised Malaysian political life. This
NEP and socio engineering programmes have is the central argument of the paper.
made a significant unpact socio-economically,on
the landscape of Malaysia. To what extent this is
affecting the short and long-term political param- THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SETTING
eters of ethnicity and nationalism would certamly
constitute an interesting matter to look into. In the As far as demographic composition is corcerned,
early 1990’s Malaysia was experiencing tremen- Malaysian society is very diversified. The Malays
dous economic growth. However, together with and other indigenous communities who consti-
its other Southeast Asian neighbours, they were tuted about 60 percent of the population are clas-
shaken by Asian economic crisis in 1997, which sified as Bumiputera (1it.sons of the soil, and en-
severely affected the region. The economic crisis joy certain privileges as stipulated under the Ma-
of 1997 has then turned into a political turmoil in laysian con~titution).~ On the other hand, ethnic
1998 in several countries, and Malaysia is no ex- Chinese who made up about 37 percent and In-
ception. The sacking of Anwar Ibrahim- the popu- dian communities who contributed the remaining
lar Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia and, po- 11 percent. These two groups were classified as
litical crisis that erupted following his shocking non-Bumiputera. None of these groups are ho-
removal from office was the case in point. This mogenous, being made up of peoples with vary-
occurred at the time Malaysia was steadily mov- ing languages and religions. Whilst the Malays
ing towards promoting its Vision 2020 agenda, are all Muslims and speak Malay language, other
which embodied the idea of constructing the Bumiputera communities especially in the two
Bangsa Malaysia. Although aspects of the twin Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak practise dif-
* crises do not constitute the core focus of the pa- fering religions and have their respective ethnic
per, it is hoped that it would provide insights and languages, On the other hand, the Indians are
new perspectives in assessing the effect and di- mainly Hindus and speak Tamil, whlst the reli-
mensions of the crises on problems of nation for- gious and language backgrounds of the Chinese
mation as well as prospects for future trend in are much more complicated. The religion and lan-
Malaysian politics. guage divisions inMalaysia, therefore, OCCUT both
The main objective of this paper is to ex- within and across ethnic groups. In spite of the
arnine the delicate process of nation-building in general increase in population, from about 10
the post 1970’s especially in the context of the million in 1970 to approximately 22 million in
‘The terms Malay and Bumiputera, which are used in Malaysia often in the context of affirmativeaction programmes
may at times cause confusion.Legally speaking, the term Bumiputera is referred to the indigeneous communities
in Sabah and Sarawak, majority of which are non-Muslim. The term Malay used refers to ethnic Malay in the
Peninsular who are Muslims. The small minority of the indigenous communities in the Peninsular is classified as
the Orang Asli. However, during the NEP period ( I 971- 1990), the term Bumiputera has been widely used by the
government in policy documents as well as in idiom of everyday interaction to connote all the indigenous communities
in Malaysia including the Malays.
Malaysian Management Journal 6 (1 &2) 99-1 15 (2002)103
2000 as indicated in the censuses of 1970, 1980, whch politics is e h c i s e d , in whch political com-
1990, ethnic composition in Malaysia has not petition is overtly drawn along ethnic lines.
changed significantly. As far as nation-building is Whereas sustainable economic development and
concerned, it is the Bumiputera and non- democracy may to some extent d i f i s e the politi-
Burniputera e b c dlvide that is perceived as most cal salience of ethnicity, it is wrong to suggest they
important by many Malaysians as it illustrates the will lead to the elimination of ethnicity. Eriksen,
delicate demographic balance between the two 1993:15 8) argued that ethnic revitalization has
categories, each constituting about half of the been an inherent feature of modernity, thus ‘the
population (Shamsul A.B., 1996a;323). And eventual disappearance of ethnicity is no less cer-
withn this division, it is the Sino-Malay relations
tain than its appearance’ (Eriksen, 1993:160). To
that is perceived as most crucial as reflected in
him, ‘ethnicity does not necessarily arise from
the socio-political development and tend to domi-
modernity, and it is not necessarily an end-prod-
nate the politics of nation-building in Malaysia.
uct’ (p. 158). Therefore, although people tend to
For Malaysia, nation-building has been the
single most crucial national agenda since its in- share many modern and cosmopolitan cultural
ception as a sovereign state in 1957. Almost all values as a result of modernization, industrializa-
key national policies devised since then have a tion, and democratization, they simultaneously
direct bearing on the questions of nation-build- become socially more diversified. Ethnicity, with-
ing. Nevertheless in as much as these policies were out doubt, is one prevalent expressions of that di-
hoped to redress the related problems of national versification. Clearly, as Geller put it, modern so-
integration, new challenges cropped up and even ciety is both more homogeneous and more diver-
more problematic. In 1991 Prime Minister, Dr. sified.. .’ (Gellner, 1978:141)
Mahathir Mohamad unveiled the so-called Vision What make ethnicity and nationalism po-
2020, which simply means that in the year 2020 litically salient as far as nation-building in divided
the government wants Malaysia to be an societies is concerned? The significance of
industrialised country in its own mould (Mahathir ethnicity lies in its salience for group conscious-
Mohamad, 1991). Of great interests in the project ness and collective political actions. People are
Vision 2020 is the list of nine challenges and ob- willing to die for their collective ‘nation’, simply
stacles that Malaysia has to overcome to translate because of the powerful appeal and persistence
it into reality. On top of the list is the creation of of ethnic identity and sentiment (Anderson,
so-called Bangsa Malaysia, or ‘united Malaysian 1996a). Ethnic identity provides a tangible set of
nation’. Apparently h s was the first time the gov- common identifications-language, food, music,
ernment oflicially put forward a clear vision for names-when other social collectivities become
constructing ‘a nation’ or Bangsa Malaysia. With more abstract and impersonal (Bell, 1975). There-
that, it clearly d e r s previous attempt over the past fore, psychologically, it has one advantage over
forty years of con.tructing national integration
the other modes of personal identity and social
lacks a coherent focus and thus has not been fully
linkages, through its capacity to arouse and to en-
achieved.
gage the most intense, deep and private emotional
sentiments of the people (see: Fortz, 1974:105).
In t h ~ regards,
s the moment ethnic identity is per-
ETHNICITY NATIONALISM AND ceived as being driven into a situation of threat, it
NATION-BUILDING: explains why there is strong tendency for ethnic
TKE THEORETICAL LINKAGES revitalization movements to emerge.
Identity as crucial mark of distinctiveness
The rhetoric of nation-building has emerged as is the force behind ethnic consciousness and, in
an essential agenda in most plural societies as the many cases ethmc groups enter into politics pur-
state sought to neutralise competing e h c ide- portedly to protect themselves fiom or rather to
ologies of nationhood. A plural society is one in resist the perceived threat of domination from
Malaysian Management Journal 6 (1 &2) 99- 1 15 (2002)104
other ethnic groups, which might result in the di- cordance with changes in social and political en-
lution of their e t h c identity (the very mark of vironments. Identity is fluid and situational. The
distinctiveness).As ethnic groups transform them- problem that prevails in many divided societies is
selves into political conflict groups for the pur- that, while e h u c identitiesmay constantly change,
pose of articulating its interest, the emotional in- the people are still strongly attached to their col-
tensity of their internal ethnic cohesion arises and lective ethnic identities, in contrast to national
e t h c solidarity and consciousness will be en- identity, which has yet to be developed.
hanced. From t h ~ premise,
s it appears that e h c i t y The crucial linkages between e t h c i t y and
does not exist in isolation but rather is a conse- nationalism lie in the state. That is, nationalism
quences of contact and conflict. According to ‘the emerges when there is an . . . institutionalization
ethicist paradigm’ (Smith, 1996) e t h c i t y is some- of one particular ethnic identity attaching it to the
thing ‘mythic’ and ‘symbolic’ in character and state (Worsely, 1984:247). Whereas a state in con-
derived its powerfbl appeal fiom aspect of a ‘com- temporary politics is defined as having (1) a geo-
mon past’. However, the relevant aspect of ‘com- graphical area endowed with political sovereignty,
mon past’ here refers to ‘order collective ties’ (2) a monopoly on the use of force; and (3) con-
(Smith, 1986) and not necessary or exclusively to sisting of citizens with terminal loyalties
a product of hstory (Nash, 1989: Shamsul A.B., (Oommen, 1994:26), a nation derives fiom the
1996a) or modernization and industrialization people’s relationship to and identification with the
(Gellner, 1983). It is argued that, whereas ethnic state. Where there exists a relatively strong, co-
groups are characterized by a multiplicity of at- hesive and common identification between the
tributes, namely common descent, shared history, people and the state, then a nation-state is argu-
language, religion, race, colour culture, sect, caste able created. In this regard, national identity or
and so on, ethnicity is basically an aspect of so- collective culture llnks together the people and
l, cial relationships between one or more ethnic the state to create a nation-state. The most com-
groups in a given socio-political setting. mon feature of a modern nation state can be in
By the same token, cultural peculiarities seen Europe, where a nation (a cultural entity) co-
I may have a h e c t bearing on the emergence of exists with the state (a political entity) thus creat-
I ethmc consciousness, but it is only when cultural ing many distinctive Europe nation-states
I differences make a social difference do they lead (Oommen, 1994). These states are basically a
I to the creation of ethnicity. The question of pro- composition of both cultural and political nations,
tecting one’s cultural traits may not arise unless which emerges through a long process of the
there exist elements of cultural domination and ethnogenesis of the nation.
* threat from another culture. Nevertheless, living However, many developing countries have
with dual or multiple identities does not always been formed as a consequence of decolonisation.
constitute a problem. It does create some dificul- They are largely independent states created out
ties when one is expected to have a clearly delin- of the territories, which were under European co-
eated identity. This is part of the problem that pre- lonial administration. Their boundaries were
vails in plural societies, which consequently drawn, as Hobsbawm (1990: 171) explains, with-
makes the project of nation-formation a difficult out any reference to, and sometimes without the
task. The problem lies in the conflict between pro- knowledge of their peoples, except perhaps for
tecting ethnic distinctiveness or identity vis-a-vis some Westernized aristocrats. For Malaysia, its
subscribing to national identity. Ethnic identities, geographical boundaries were delineated by com-
and the belief in shared cultures and history, how- mon consent through a process negotiation. In the
ever are not perpetual. Instead, they are creations, Peninsula, the common factor is provided by rec-
which may result fiom specific historical circum- ognition of the federation of Malay states as the
stances, strategic actors or as unintended conse- basic for the ‘new state’. After departure of the
quences of political projects (Eriksen, 1993:92). colonial masters, the ruling elites inherited the
Identity, in this regard is not static but rather is state, but without having ‘a united union’. Instead,
dynamic, and is prone to constant change in ac- they had to grapple with the problems of govern-
Malaysia Management Journal 6 (1 &2) 99-1 15 (2002)105
ing a state in which the society was multi-ethnic state thus sometimes reflect the struggle of vari-
and multi-cultural. ous social groupings ‘against’the state, which was
By the time of independence, the Malay perceived as attempting to hinder their legitimate
states had already been changed through linkages interests, a persistent phenomenon llkened to the
instituted by the British. Above all, the composi- ‘Hobbesianstate’. With such a backdrop, the state-
tion of the population had also changed, so that nations itself tends to be a very fiagile institution.
common descent could not be the basis of national Although political violence or anarchy m y not
identity and unity. The presence of citizens of dif- necessarily be a persistent phenomenon, these
fering ethnic m,d cultural origins requires the for- societies probably can be best described as ‘states
mulation of a new basis for the national identity. in stable tension’ (Shamsul A.B., 1996a). Hence,
The basic problem with which Malaysia (and in a conscious attempt to preserve the sovereignty
many other states with similar characteristics) and the integrity of the state, political regimes in
have to cope has been the prevalence of strong divided societies tend to succumb into political
and conspicuous identification of its people with authoritarianism or make use of ‘quasi-demo-
other social collectivities (especially ethnic and cratic’ systems as an alternative to western style
tribal groups) in contrast to common identifica- liberal democracy (see: Crouch, 1996; Zakaria
tion with the state. In other words, their national Ahmad, 1989).
identity is still weak in comparison to their ethnic Starting with an authoritariansystem, those
identities. This also implies that whereas the citi- who control or dominate the state tend to manipu-
zens can identify with the state politically because late its apparatus to propagate nation-building as
of their citizenshp status, they may not identify an e t h c project or present the nation-state in eth-
strongly with it culturally. This is a crucial prob- nic terms. In other words, the country’s nation
lem in the development of national culture and formation is to be based on a particular ethnic iden-
identity in Malaysia. tity. Which consequently implies that other eth-
Hence, if Malaysians envisage the ‘nation’, nic communities will inevitably have to accept a
it will tend to be a political nation rather than a predetermined national identity at the expense of
‘cultural nation’. This is a possible alternative to their own ethnic identities. This type of nation
avoid the controversy of being an ethnic nation, formation encourages ethnic and cultural revital-
while awaiting the long process of ethnogenesis ization on the part of the affected groups to resist
of the nation to bring about the creation of the the cultural and political hegemony of the domi-
‘ethno-culturalnation’. This is the significant con- nant ethnic group. For some other states whose
trast between these ‘nations’ and other nation- internal political structures have been established
states such as those of many European nation- on the framework of consociational democracy,
states. Therefore, countries such as Malaysia can the persistent dilemma has been to maintain plu-
be regarded as states with ‘several nations’ ralism while simultaneously moving towards the
(Sh&ul A.B., 1992) or ‘plural society nations’ construction of national identity, and hence na-
because of their mulFationa1 or multi-etbmc com- tion formation. Malaysia has been facing most of
position. Thus, there was a suggestion that these these problems since its inception as a modern
states be called ‘state-nations’ rather than nation- independent state in 1957.
states (Leo Suryadinata, 1997). What tends to Moving to the question of nationalism, it
constitute a persistent problem in these states has is argued that nationalism emerges as a form of
been the assertion of ethnic identities in national ethnicity or rather as Smith (1986) perceives,
terms, thus signifying a ‘danger’ to the state and ‘ethnicityis a precursor of nationalism’.Although
often ‘perceived’ as posing a similar threat to other Smith ( 1983) argues that nationalism may emerge
e t h c communities. with or without a nation, Gellner (1983) believes
Quite often, the state itself is not a neutral that nationalism ‘invents nations where they do
entity, as it may have been ’seized’ to serve the not exist.’ This score implies that without nation-
specific motives and agendas of a particular po- alism, the nation is perhaps much more difficult
litical elite or e b c group. Political life in the to conceive. Therefore, in the context of countries
Malaysian Management Journal 6 (1 &2) 99-1 15 (2002)106
in which their ‘nations’ are in-the-making, it is political accommodation or compromise (2) the
crucial that nationalism is constantly developed failure of ethnic elite at the national level to gain
to promote a sense of nationhood amongst its citi- adequate or continuoussupport fiom ethnic groups
zens. But since nationalism is deeply embedded that they represent; and (3) the threat of moderate
in ethno-symbolic base, the question is whch eth- national ethnic elite being severely challenged by
nic identity should constitute the basis for nation- the extremist and radical forces within and out-
alism in divided societies? side their own ethnic groups (see Lijphart, 1977;
In Malaysia, the Malays felt that Malay Horowitz, 1985). These challenges have posed
nationalism that matured in 1957 should be the serious threats to Malaysian consociationalism,
basis for the country’s nationalism, as other na- which brought the system to near collapse in the
tionalism were externally oriented (pre-indepen- 1969racial riots. However, the systemwas revived
dence Chinese and Indian nationalism in Malaya). in 1974 with the establishment of the Barisan
However, the non-Malays were sceptical about Nasional grand coalition which is a bigger, more
h s view, as they saw that accepting Malay na- representative and thus a more stable consocia-
tionalism and its hegemonic tendencies might re- tional structure. Nevertheless, to provide a more
sult in the encapsulation of other ethnic commu- lasting stability, the country still needs to find a
nities into Malay society. This is something that
permanent solution through the nation-building
would ultimately undermine the culturally plural-
agenda. The biggest challenge is to formulate the
ist basis ofthe polity that was established in 1957.
most acceptable framework for mediating identi-
For the Malays, their intention to subordinate other
ethnic communities into the framework of ‘Malay ties, so that it can accommodate all the essential
nation-state’ was obstructed by the consociational interests of major ethnic groups in the society.
frameworkthat anchored the political system. This In short, there is no simple solution to alle-
system is based on power sharing mechanism in viate the effect of ethmc, religious or linguistic
whch every ethmc groups attempt to seek maxi- cleavages in plural societies. Without consensus,
mum power to protect their interest and influence a radical and coercive approach in nation-build-
national policies. Therefore, ethnic struggle in t h s ing often may result in a setback. Neither ethnic
connection may not be so much about political cleavages nor ethnic nationalism can be easily
independence, but rather about getting some lim- managed single handedly. State intervention may
ited objectives pertaining to economics, cultural, only resolve part of the problem. But over inter-
religious, linguistics, and so on within the fiame- vention by the state in the nation-building project
work of the existing state. These illustrate the may result in the state being regarded as a tool to
notions of efhnrc ideology of nationhood held by advance the interests of a particular ethnic group.
each individual ethnic group. Perhaps, this might However, it is much more reasonable for the gov-
be the same,factor that ‘saved’ Malaysia from ernment to embark upon programme towards
plummeting into endless ethnic confrontations, as minimising ethnic grievances in politics and socio-
the system provides adequate space for conflict economics spheres, while simultaneously promot-
regulation, despite being severely challenged in ing ‘state nationalism’ or ‘civic nati~nalism’~ ,a
the 1969 racial riots. vision of common destiny, and universal cultural
While consociational democracy may pro- values among all the ethnic groups. The most
vide certain tangible mechanisms for conflict important is to pursue the project of nation for-
management, it has, however, certain outstand- mation on the basis of national consensus but the
ing flaws. The dangers for this system may lie in big question is how could these be attained with-
(1) the failure ofmulti-ethzllc national elite to reach out prejudice or implying that nation-building
The distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism tend to be a problematic one in the sense that one cannot
simply equate civic nationalism as good and all ethnic nationalisms as bad. David Brown (1 999) argued that civic
nationalism might also develop in either liberal or illiberal directions depending upon how effectively its visions of
civic community are employed by the mobilizing elites to resolve societal aspirations or fears.
Malaysian Management Journal 6 (1 &2) 99- 1 15 (2002)107
agenda is not heading towards an ethnic project? as a system of ‘hegemonic consociationalism’
Obviously the debates so far indicate that nation (Milne and Mauzy, 1999:18). Whilst the Malays
building as argued by Atal(l98 1:23) is are politically dominant, the non-Malays, espe-
cially the Chinese are economically superior. This
a complex phenomenon, simplistic delicate balance or perhaps an outstandingdiscrep-
answers do not explain its intricate ancy has further complicated the project of nation
patterns, nor can one trust the formation in the country.
many proffered panaceas for Politically, Chan and Ever (1973:303-4)
instant nation-building. It is a argued that in many Southeast Asian countries
journey towards the desirable but there were two alternatives adopted in d e a h g with
the unknown, with several built-in the problems of nation-building. One was to re-
handicaps all along the road. sort to the ‘regressive’ identity by reviving a long
and proud cultural tradition through an appeal to
the ‘golden past’. The other was a ‘progressive’
THE POLITICS OF identity, culminating an ameliorative programme
NATION-BUILDING IN MALAYSIA: of building a society by dxcarding its feudal or
MANAGING ETHNICITY AND colonial shackles in which one such option lay in
CONSOLIDATING NATIONALISM establishing a socialist state. For Malaysia both
approaches were attempted, yet neither were suc-
History has shown that Malaysia is never short of cessfully materialized. Attempt by the communist
nationalist ideals to form the basis of a nation. (the MCP) to create a ‘progressive’ identity
Indeed, the country’s independence was largely through the realisation of a socialist state in Ma-
attributed to the struggle of Malay nationalism. laysia was rejected by the Malays, as its struggle
However, w i h Malay nationalist movements of was incompatiblewith their hstorical, cultural and
the pre-independence era there were clear ideo- religious identities. Discarding feudal and colo-
logical divisions between the radical and conser- nial bondages that have been strongly embedded
vative groups (W.R. Roff, 1994; Ariffn Omar, in the system in order to allow the establishment
1993;Ikmal Said, 1992; Firdaus Abdullah, 1985). of a socialist or a communist state would result in
Even after the conservative-nationalistgroup rep- the elimination of Malay e t h c identifiers namely
resented by UMNO managed to dominate the post the bahasa, agama and the raja. Moreover, the
independence Malaysian politics, the aspiration MCP was an organisation dominated by the Chi-
of creating a Malay nation-state has not been ma- nese. Therefore, the communists agenda was seen
terialized. Instead, the nationalists had to compro- by the Malays as Chinese struggle which was per-
mise to the creation of ‘a plural society nation’ ceived as incompatible with their cultural identi-
when independence was granted in 1957 and ties and political interests, On the other hand, at-
shared power with,the non-Malays, who were tempts by Malay nationalists to revive a long and
mainly immigrant communities then had settled proud Malay cultural traditions culminated in the
in the colonial Malaya in the 19” century. Never- creation of a Malay nation-state was denied by
theless, despite the creation of a power sharing the British as it was opposed by the non-Malays
mechanism at the Federal level which illustrates especially the economically superior ethnic Chi-
the formation of Malaysia’s model of consocia- nese. W h l e Malay historical and political su-
tional democracy, Malay political supremacy was premacy was recognized, a new independent state
reconstituted, enshrined in UMNO as the back- of 1957 was based on the principle of multi-eth-
bone of the Alliance ( 1957-1974) and later the BN nic society that would allow the diverse ethnic
coalition government. Malay centric or rather and cultural elements to co-exist along each other.
UMNO centric government has been the hallmark The post-independence era, saw that
of Malaysian politics. Thus, in contrast to the Malay hegemony has been fiercely challenged by
‘ideal consociationalism’ arrangement (Lipjhart, the non-Malays. They felt that Malay dominant
1977), the system in Malaysia can be considered thesis was an ideology that served to dominate
Maiaysian Management Journal 6 ( 1&2) 99- 115 (2002)108
them, hence perceived that there were conscious threat to the system continued stability, and gov-
attempts by the nationalists to turn nation-build- ernment leaders have constantly reiterated that
ing as an ethnic project which will ultimately managing ethnic conflicts and moving towards
threaten their ethnic identities and the basis of the national integration always constitute a primary
‘plural society nation’. This partly explained the national agenda.
reasons behmd the non-Malays opposition to the That was a backdrop against which the
national language and education policy in the notion of Bangsa Malaysia was introduced in
1950’s-1960’s, and the national cultural policy that 1991. Whereas the objective of the project may
was introduced in 1971. Apart fiom that, the post- well be easily understood, Bangsa Malaysia, how-
independence Malay nationalism has also to cope ever, is a problematic concept. On one hand, its
with challenges fiom other factions withn Malay operational definition is still vague to many Ma-
and Bumiputera communities who espoused the laysians, while on the other, its viability as a for-
notion of an Islamic state; and notions of mula to resolve the national predicament in
Kadazanism and Dayakism as the definitive iden- Malaysia’s plural society may arouse as much
tities in the two Borneo states of Sabah and ambiguity as its’meaning. While the country was
Sarawak respectively. Nation-building in Malay- enjoying constant economic growth since the late
sia thus could be seen as a struggle of every eth- 1980’s, in July 1997 what was later known an
nic groups against the state (read a Malay centric Asian economic meltdown, has severely disrupted
state) on one hand, and on the other, against each Malaysia’s relative stability and thus eclipsed its
others to materialise their respective versions of a economic success story. Malaysia has not only had
’nation’. But the most obvious contestation was to grapple with the economic downturn, but worst
between Malay vis-a-vis the non-Malay groups still, a year later the country was plunged into a
anchored by the Chinese. This is the most salient political crisis following the abrupt dismissal of
struggle which had left several damaging politi- Anwar Ibrahim, then the country’spopular Deputy
cal scars to Malaysian society, the worst culmi- Prime Minister, who was widely seen as
nated in the 1969 racial riots. This is also a Mahathir ’s heir-apparent.
struggle, whch formed the basic characteristic of The twin crises have left damaging politi-
Malaysian politics. cal consequences not only for Mahathir’s leader-
Since the 1969 tragedy, Malaysian politi- ship, but beyond that the ruling party or rather
cal system however has been able to absorb vari- more specificallyW O , suffered serious politi-
ous threats to its stability. To some extent, this cal setback as depicted in the November 1999 gen-
indicates that the once perceived very fragile sys- eral election. Although the BN retained its two
tem of Malaysia’s consociational democracy has third majority at the Federal Parliament, UMNO
been gaining momentum since the formation of power-base has been seriously eroded by the Op-
the BN coalition government in 1974. Apart fiom position Front, the Barisan Alternatif led by PAS.
that, the state generated ‘stability’ can also be at- Indeed, PAS was the greatest beneficiary of the
1997-98economic and political crises. Apart fiom
tributed to various strategies of depoliticisation
retaining Kelantan, Pas was able to capture
that marked the growing political authoritarianism
Terengganu and also made significantin-road into
in Malaysia (see Crouch, 1996; Khoo Boo Teik,
several other states such as Kedah, Pahang,
1997). Despite the various criticism to its demo- Selangor and Perak. The 1999 the general elec-
cratic practices, the government since the imple- tion clearly indicated that UMNO was largely re-
mentation of the NEP in 1970 has been able to jected by the Malays; its traditional power-base,
embark upon affirmative action programmes to and now had to count on the non-Malays in order
tackle the problems of ethnic imbalances in the to remain in power. To what extent UMNO could
soci&economicfields, especially in rectifying the regain its influence among the Malays, especially
Bumiputeras’ economic backwardness. While the younger generations and the middle class, be-
these measures have made some positive results, fore the next general election remain to been seen.
the project of nation formation is still far from Obviously, all these new developments would
being resolved. Ethnic politics is still a major have significant effects on the project of nation-
Malaysian Management Journal 6 ( 1&2) 99- 1 15 (2002)1 UY
building in Malaysia, thus constituting a new di- parities between the Bumiputera and non-
mension to look into as far as the politics of Bumiputera communities, the framework of na-
e h c i t y and nationalism in Malaysia is concerned. tion formation embodied in the policy did not tran-
Despite some tensions between the federal scend the premise of conflict management and
government and several state governments, eth- racial hannony. On the contrary, the Bumiputera-
nic struggle in Malaysia has largely taken place non-Bumiputera dichotomy that was created dur-
w i h n existing political boundaries, whereby each ing the NEP period has further deepened ethnic
ethnic group trying to seek maximum power to differentiationin the society. For non-Bumiputera,
protect their interests. PAS, which ruled the state the question was why the new Malaysian genera-
of Kelantan from 1959-1978, and fiom 1990 to tion who were supposed to have equal citizenship
the present, has confined itself to attempting to rights and status had to carry the burden of the
portray the Islamic ‘holier than thou’ approach in hstorical baggage of previous generations that
governing the state vis-a-vis the perceived UMNO clearly affected their current position. In turn,the
‘secular-nationalistideology’. Although PAS has Malays argued that, the compromy was based on
been propagating the notion of ‘Islamic-nation- a ‘sacred social contract’ between the founding
state’, it has not been able to achieve its goal, due fathers of the country in 1957 which had set the
to constitutional limitation. PAS needs to amend basis of every citizen’s constitutional rights. Ob-
the Federal Constitutionin order to allow Kelantan viously the institutionalization of ethnicity seems
and Terengganu to become ‘model’ of Islamic to be the core factor in such a debate, and will
states, a legislative battle which it has been un- inevitably continue to be so, as long as the debate
able to win given the BN domination of the Fed- on national identity and nation formation is not
eral Parliament. Moreover, the non-Muslim com- resolved.
munities who constituted around 40 percent of the Whereas the Malays were concerned about
population are yet to be convinced by PAS con- sustaining Malayness and strengthening Malay-
cept of universal justice through the establishment Islamic hegemony as well as improving their eco-
of an Islamic state. In Sabah the PBS regime from nomic gains, the Chinese fear was the perceived
1985-1991 only attempted to reconstruct the no- threat to Clunese culture and Chmese language,
tion of Malay-based Bumiputeraism into the defining features of Chineseness, from the
Kadazan-based Bumiputeraism in that particular exertion of the Malay or Islamic dominant ide-
state. Kadazan nationalism is more of a political ologies. Although Wang Gung Wu (1988:4) as-
expression of socio-economic and cultural depri- serts that, ‘the Chinese have never had a concept
vation of the Kadazan communities than a politi- of identity, only a concept of Chineseness’, the
cal nationalism per se. Likewise, Ibanism or perceived threats to aspects of their ‘Chineseness’
Dayakism in Sarawak have a similar characteris- such as Chinese language and culture, be it real
tics. The success of the BN to topple the PBS-led or imaginary, that came from Malay nationalism
government in 19& after several of the former and Islamism had resulted in the revitalization of
state representatives hopped into the BN and re- Chnese cultural movements to project Chnese
gained its power in the 1999 Sabah election ap- identity. For ethnic Chinese, the symbols of their
parently ‘halted’ the wave of Kadazan national- identity lie in Chmese schools, the Chinese mass
ism for the time being. In Sarawak, however, the media (especially the press), and Chinese asso-
strong BN leadership of Tan Sri Taib Mahmud ciations (see: Leo Suryadinata, 1997). The main
has been able to curb Dayalusm from gaining its functions of all these institutions are to promote
strength similar to that of Kadazanism.6 Chinese language and culture, thus sustaining
While the New Economic Policy (NEP Chineseness. Therefore, as long as the basis of
1970-1990) has made a number of significant cultural pluralism is maintained in Malaysia, the
impacts in terms of rectifying socio-economicdis- Chinese and the other non-Malays’ aspirations to
In contrast to the Kadazans, the Day& communities are disunited and their resources limited. Therefore, Dayakism
as political movement has not been successfullymobilised (See: Jayum, 1994;and Mohamed Mustafa Ishak, 1999)
Malaysian Management Journal 6 (1 &2) 99-1 15 (2002)110
sustain their distinctive ethnic identities will be rather than similarities.The notion of Bangsa Ma-
guaranteed. laysia has brought with it several fundamental
In the wider context, Vision 2020 the ulti- questions yet to be addressed. The first and fore-
mate goal of which was to create ‘a united and an most is, to what extent the philosophy of ‘unity in
industrialized Malaysian nation in its own mould’, diversity’ brought by the notion of Bangsa Ma-
can be seen as an attempt to reconstruct Malay- laysia is going to be viable basis for creating a
sian nationalism on the basis of ‘secular-materi- ‘united Malaysian nation’? The second is, before
alist’ components. However, the notion of Bangsa this venture can be endorsed, Malaysians may
Malaysia embodied in the project has yet to be need to know what criteria are to be used to bal-
clearly spelled out. The definition of the concept ance Malay nationalism with the notion of cul-
is still open to various interpretation, and there- tural pluralism in the formation of the character-
fore could mean different things to different istics of the Bangsa Malaysia? Answering these
people. This clearly reflects the conflicting per- questions may trigger another cultural-political
ception of what ‘Malaysian nation’ should repre- ‘battle’ between the major ethnic groups. The
sent. For the large majority of Malaysians, the battle is likely to be a multi-dimensional one, that
concept is still vague and perhaps an ambiguous is a struggle between Malay nationalism, Islam,
notion. Every ethnic cornunity hoped that their Bumiputeraism (Kadazanism and Dayakism), and
social, cultural and political aspirations would be cultural pluralism.
embedded in the concept of Bangsa Malaysia. On Since the notion of Bangsa Malaysia re-
the other hand, several policy speeches made by mains rather vague to the people at large, and the
government leaders concerning Bangsa Malaysia debates over what should constitute the core char-
also had not been clearly elaborated the meaning acteristics of the envisaged ‘nation’ are still very
of the concept. A number of speeches made by much alive, the project remains both conceptu-
Dr. M a h a h since 1998 Concerning the meaning ally and practically problematic. Bangsa Malay-
of the concept of Bangsa Malaysia indicated that sia can therefore only be envisaged in political
he only insisted that Bangsa Malaysia as ‘the terms rather than cultural terms. Given the domi-
people who are able to identify themselves with nance of competing ethruc ideas of a nation within
the country, speak Bahasa Malaysia and accept Malaysia’s pluralistic socio-political settings, the
the Constitution,’ but will ‘remain as Chmese or notion of Bangsa Malaysia may simply prove the
Indians or Ibans or Kadazans or Muruts and so latest in a series of different nation-of-intent which
forth’. In short, Mahathir states that a Malaysian have been articulated in post-independence Ma-
will only be a ‘Bangsa Malaysia’ in the form ‘po- laysia. Looking from this perspective, it is argued
litical identity’ and therefore will not lose their that the forces of ethnicity and nationalism will
respective ethnic languages or cultures (see: remain crucial in shaping and influencing the
Mohamed Mustsa Ishak, 1999). mechanics and the dynamics of the politics of
With the introduction of the idea of Bangsa nation-building in Malaysia for many years to
Malaysia, the government can be seen as attempt- come.
ing to formulate a middle ground through the con- In one way or another, Bangsa Malaysia
solidation of Malay nationalism and cultural plu- is tied to UMNO ‘pragmatic-secularist politics’.
ralism, thus depicting the nation as ‘a mosaic of UMNO is fully aware that based on the non-Mus-
different cultures’ and creating a supra-ethc na- lims’ difficulties in adapting to Islam in compari-
tional identity. By so doing, it tacitly sought to son to their willingness to adapt to the Malay lan-
downplay the ‘ethno-cultural dialectic’ that guage, the Raja and some elements of Malay cul-
strongly prevails in Malaysian society. Neverthe- ture, Islam will always constitute a sensitive sub-
less, depicting the ‘nation’ as a ‘mosaic of cul- jectas far as the Malay vis-a-vis non-Malay rela-
tures’ is easier than living in such a mosaic. Cre- tionshp is concerned. Therefore, although UMNO
ating the united ‘nation’ out of distinct ethnic cul- has claimed that the party is committed to Islam,
tures is a difficult matter. The problem for this the party has never proposed transforming the
framework lies in its emphasis on differences Malaysian semi-secular polity into an Islamic
Malaysian Management Journal 6 (1852) 99-1 15 (2002)111
theocratic state. Ttus has been the crux of the con- generation) tended to see PAS as serious political
flict between UMNO and PAS which does envis- alternativeto UMNO. Indeed, support for PAS has
age an Islamic state. Bangsa Malaysia has been been growing significantly since Anwar’s dis-
part of Mahathir’s grand vision of what a semi- missal, especially in the Malay heartland state of
secular Malaysian state should be in the year 2020. Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, and Perlis as dem-
Until July 1997 the government, in par- onstrated in 1999 general election. In fact, the
ticular Mahathx’s leadership, seemed to enjoy a opposition parties seem to have been brought
strong popular mandate given the continued sta- much closer together by forming an electoral pact
bility and rapid economic development the coun- as depicted in the last election.
try has been experiencing. Every ethnic cornmu- Although the government has been able
nity generally felt that it had been getting its re- to turn around the 1997-1998 economic recession
spective portion of the country’s economic pros-
with some moderate growth recorded by mid- 1999
perity. The landslide electoral victory secured by
through several unorthodox approaches such as
the BN in the 1995 general election illustrated t h s
that of capital contTol and fixed exchange rate
widespread support backed by continuous eco-
nomic growth, political stability, and strong popu- policies, politically, the government, especially
lar support. Mahathir ’s leadership and his grandi- W O is still struggling in its attempt to win back
ose visions seemed unaffected despite various Malay voters who have supported PAS and its
criticisms leveled against his policies, and the opposition pact during the last election. Such sce-
government’s authoritarian tendencies. For more nario if continued, will not only affect UMNO’s
than a decade, Mahathir has been able to subdue position as the backbone of the government, but
his critics with Malaysia’s economic success, in- of more crucial is the position of Malaysian con-
ternal cohesion and h s high profile international sociational political arrangement, as moderate
reputation. Several attempts to challenge his national elite, namely UMNO, are faced with
power grip within UMNO itself ended in abject daunting task of regaining their influence. If
failure. UMNO is weakened, would there be another po-
However, when the country was severely litical party in the country capable of taking over-
hit by the 1997 economic crisis whch later turned all control to maintain racial harmony in the coun-
into a political one, things began to change. The try? To what extent the post Mahathir leadershp
most serious criticism of his economic policies in UMNO would be able to survive all these criti-
and grandiose projects were those of ‘crony capi- cal challenges has yet to be seen. The relevant
talism’ and the widespread of corruption in h s question to ask is: to what extent is the idea of
government. Even the new middle-class Malays Bangsa Malaysia going to survive beyond Dr.
who were basically the product of Mahathu’s eco- Mahathr’s political reign? In what manner Ma-
nomic policies begin to challengehis leadershp, laysian politics will evolve in the post Mahatlur
especially with regard to the shocking dismissal era is yet another crucial question which will have
of his popular deputy Anwar Ibrahim, and above a significantbearing on the project of nation-build-
all the ill-treatment that he received thereafter. ing in the country. What is perhaps more or less
Mahathx’s eighteen years grip on power has been certain is that e h c i t y and nationalism will still
seriously questioned.Mahathrr ’s leadership in the be socially and politically salient in shaping and
midst of the economic and political turmoil has influencing the politics of nation-building in Ma-
divided Malaysians along ethmc lines. While the laysia for rnany years to come.
non-Malays, particularly the Chinese) believed
that retaining M a h a h ’ s leadershp and UMNO
led government was crucial to prevent Malaysia CONCLUSION
from succumbing to a grim scenario similar to that
of the Indonesian crisis, many Malays (especially It is clear that as far as the project of nation-build-
fiom amongst the middle class and the younger ing in Malaysia is concerned, many of the shift
Malaysian Management Journal 6 ( 1 &2) 99- 1 15 (2002)You can also read
