LIVING ON WITH A COVID-19 HUM - ALLIANZ RESEARCH - Euler Hermes

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LIVING ON WITH A COVID-19 HUM - ALLIANZ RESEARCH - Euler Hermes
ALLIANZ RESEARCH

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LIVING ON WITH
A COVID-19 HUM
24 September 2020
04 A stop-and-go approach until the return to normal in 2022
06 An initial uneven or “dual” recovery for trade, consumers and investment
08 Capital markets: Not the time to take risks
11 Political risk could be back like a boomerang
14 Fiscal and monetary policy: The devil is in the details
17 Scarring effects? Covid-19 has changed the rules of the game for economic
   growth and capital markets
18 Regional outlooks
LIVING ON WITH A COVID-19 HUM - ALLIANZ RESEARCH - Euler Hermes
Allianz Research

                                                            Stop-and-go containment measures confirm a return to normal in 2022. After strong
                                                             post-lockdown catch-up effects, we expect the recovery to slow in Q4 2020 and Q1

EXECUTIVE
                                                             2021 as distancing measures tighten again and ongoing job shedding keeps spend-
                                                             ing and investment in check. Therefore we lower our GDP growth forecasts for 2021
                                                             to +4.6% (vs. +4.8% expected in June), following a contraction of -4.7% in 2020. Q2
                                                             data has already confirmed diverging recovery paths, with China and its Asian trade
SUMMARY                                                      partners, Germany and Brazil outpacing the rest of Western Europe and the U.S. The
                                                             sharpest trend reversals in activity should be visible starting in Q4 2020 in Europe
                                                             (mainly Spain, France and the UK), the U.S. and in Emerging Markets such as Brazil
                                                             and Mexico. In this context, the gradual phasing out of temporary policy measures
                                                             designed to support companies will lead to a major trend reversal in business insol-
                                                             vencies, with a +31% increase expected by the end of 2021.
 Ludovic Subran, Chief Economist                            A dual recovery for trade, consumers and investors. First, despite a stronger-than-
 +49 (0) 1 75 58 42 725                                      expected recovery in goods trade worldwide, the U.S. and Western Europe are trail-
 ludovic.subran@allianz.com
                                                             ing China, Emerging Asia and Eastern Europe’s export recovery. In 2020, we forecast
                                                             a fall in global trade in goods and services by -13% (vs.-11% in 2009) in volume
 Alexis Garatti, Head of Economic Research                   terms, leading to USD4tn of trade losses. In 2021, we forecast a +7% technical re-
 alexis.garatti@eulerhermes.com                              bound but expect a return to pre-crisis levels only in 2023 as services continue to
                                                             struggle and calls for de-globalization emerge. Meanwhile, a loss of purchasing
 Eric Barthalon, Head of Capital Markets Research            power for the most fragile households will be hard to recover. The asymmetric expo-
 eric.barthalon@allianz.com                                  sure to job losses meant young, less qualified and part-time workers were hit the
                                                             hardest, implying a K-shaped or “dual” recovery in consumer spending ahead.
 Ana Boata, Head of Macroeconomic Research
 ana.boata@eulerhermes.com                                  Political risk could be back like a boomerang. Odds for a no-deal Brexit have risen
                                                             to 45%, while the U.S. elections are paving the way for a new fiscal cliff and a judici-
 Maxime Lemerle, Head of Sector and Insolvency               ary dispute at the end of the year. In 2021, the tech war between the U.S. and China,
 Research                                                    tensions in the Mediterranean Sea and the U.S.-Russia dispute will remain top of
 maxime.lemerle@eulerhermes.com                              mind. The risk of policy mistakes for Emerging Markets that loosened their fiscal dis-
                                                             cipline to fight the crisis will rise in 2022: anticipations of higher U.S. rates should ma-
 Arne Holzhausen, Head of Insurance, Wealth and
 Trend Research
                                                             terialize then and debt sustainability worries could trigger pressures on EM curren-
 arne.holzhausen@allianz.com                                 cies.
                                                            Not the time to take risks. In the current market environment, it is important to con-
 Jordi Basco Carrera, Fixed Income Strategist
 jordi.basco@allianz.com
                                                             sider that there is greater economic uncertainty now than at the beginning of the
                                                             year, despite the current monetary and fiscal policy mix, as well as more geopolitical
 Georges Dib, Economist for Latin America, Spain and         risks and tighter valuations. In this context, equity markets show a persistent detach-
 Portugal                                                    ment from fundamental determinants, making the recent rally hardly justifiable.
 georges.dib@eulerhermes.com                                 Because of that we still expect the equity market to underperform in 2020 and to
                                                             start a muted rally in 2021. When it comes to corporate credit, both investment
 Françoise Huang, Senior Economist for APAC                  grade and high-yield corporate spreads look too tight. As in equities, corporate
 francoise.huang@eulerhermes.com                             credit markets remain detached from fundamentals on the back of the central
                                                             banks’ perpetual put option. Hence, we expect corporate spreads to converge to-
 Patrick Krizan, Senior Economist for Italy and Greece       wards higher values due to higher than expected market volatility and increasing
 patrick.krizan@allianz.com
                                                             default rates. Lastly, with the short-end of most developed countries’ sovereign yield
 Selin Ozyurt, Senior Economist for France and Africa        curves anchored by their respective central banks, we expect a timid curve steepen-
 selin.ozyurt@eulerhermes.com                                ing towards the end of 2020 and 2021. This gradual increase in term premium will
                                                             occur on the back of higher inflation expectations and a halt in the recent decline of
 Manfred Stamer, Senior Economist for Emerging               real yields. On the other hand, long-term Emerging Market sovereign spreads look
 Europe and the Middle East                                  overbought. The combination of this extreme bullish positioning and the current
 manfred.stamer@eulerhermes.com                              market fragility is a perfect combination for EM assets to become a victim of a sec-
                                                             ond “risk-off” rotation in the wake of a second risky-assets market correction.
 Katharina Utermöhl, Senior Economist for Europe
 katharina.utermoehl@allianz.com                            Fiscal and monetary policy: The devil is in the details. EU member states agreed on
                                                             issuing common debt to boost the recovery in a historical move. Yet the different
 Markus Zimmer, Senior Expert, ESG                           natures and spending calendars of fiscal policies will matter: countries focusing on
 markus.zimmer@allianz.com                                   (short-term) demand (Germany, U.S., China etc.) could see a faster recovery than
                                                             those betting on supply (France). Some countries still need to do more (Spain, Italy,
                                                             the UK). In the immediate crisis aftermath, inflation is likely to remain muted despite
                                                             these policy impulses; we see it moderately and temporarily overshooting in the US
                                                             starting in 2022. On the monetary policy side, we expect an acceleration of the U.S.
                                                             Fed’s securities purchases in H1 2021, with a tapering of its QE program to only start
                                                             from mid-2022 and a first rate hike in Q3 2023. The ECB should announce an addi-
                                                             tional EUR500bn in Quantitative Easing in December 2020.

 2
LIVING ON WITH A COVID-19 HUM - ALLIANZ RESEARCH - Euler Hermes
24 September 2020

   Scarring effects? Covid-19 has changed the rules of the game for economic growth
    and capital markets. First, the fight for regional primacy will lead to a regular
    “weaponization” of technology, trade, currencies and payment systems. Second, the
    balance between the state and markets will change, to the disadvantage of the
    latter. And as the state gets more and more entangled in the private sector, market
    dynamics for innovation will get weaker while the number of zombie companies
    rises. Private players in social security – such as life insurers – might be pushed
    against the wall. The growing role of the state also has ramifications for monetary
    policy. High (unsustainable) debt levels will force central banks to backstop sove-
    reign and corporate bond markets to ensure favorable refinancing conditions. In the
    end, these ultra-expansionary monetary policies may strip markets of their ability to
    price and allocate resources appropriately and encourage excessive risk-taking by
    both debtors and investors. However, every cloud has a silver lining: Covid-19 has
    showed how quickly change is possible; it is a welcome break-up of encrusted struc-
    tures and a boost to digitalization. The way we work has changed for good. Future
    work will see more remote working and flexible team structures but less business
    trips. Finally, it has also raised society’s risk awareness, including for low-probability,
    high impact tail risks. The upshot: More demand for and better pricing of risk cover.
    This should be a boon for insurers – if they are able to offer comprehensive and
    simple solutions.

                                                      -4.7%
                                                      Forecast for global
                                                 GDP contraction in 2020.

                                                                                                  3
LIVING ON WITH A COVID-19 HUM - ALLIANZ RESEARCH - Euler Hermes
Allianz Research

       A STOP-AND-GO APPROACH UNTIL
       THE RETURN TO NORMAL IN 2022

 Q2 data confirmed an unprecedented          evolution of the sanitary crisis. Back in    potential access to potential vaccines.
 contraction in global GDP (-6.1% q/q vs.    April we identified four different phases    Phase 3 will also see the implementa-
 -7.0% q/q expected by us) after the Co-     of the Covid-19 crisis. During phase 1,      tion of new fiscal stimulus packages but
 vid-19 shock, close to four times worse     characterized by the urgency of mo-          a slightly lower degree of central bank
 than the 2009 trough and double the         netary, fiscal and sanitary measures,        activity, keeping the global economy
 Q1 contraction. However, some coun-         real activity suffered heavily from the      below pre-crisis levels until end-2021.
 tries were hit much harder than others      lockdowns, as mirrored by the sharp
 due to differences in lockdown intensity    contraction of GDP across countries.         Still some way to go until we reach the
 and in the structure of their economies     Now, we are in phase 2, characterized        fourth and final phase of the Covid-19
 (share of services vs. manufacturing):      by more targeted and progressive sani-       crisis: What would it take for a full nor-
 France (81% of pre-crisis GDP level),       tary restrictions in response to rising      malization by 2022? We assume a fina-
 Italy (83%), the UK (78%) and Spain         infections, with persisting threats of a     lization of vaccination campaigns in
 (77%) were much more impacted than          lockdown in countries where the se-          mid-2022. From the beginning of 2022
 the U.S. (90%), Germany (88%) and the       cond wave materializes. Hence, the           onwards, vaccines should be available
 Netherlands (90%).                          recovery is expected to soften in Q4         at a large scale for the most advanced
 During the summer, de-confinement           and in some cases transform into a W-        countries in this race (Russia, China, UK
 strategies gained traction, allowing        shaped one. We expect the highest            and the U.S.) and be progressively dis-
 several positive surprises in the econo-    trend reversal activity in Q4 in Europe      tributed to the rest of the world. In line
 mic data, notably for order books, the      (France, Spain, UK) and in the U.S.          with the World Health Organization’s
 residential market and retail sales,                                                     (WHO) own assessment, the full distri-
 thanks to pent-up demand post-              Phase 3 of the Covid-19 crisis: Transitio-   bution of a vaccine at a global level
 lockdown. On the industrial side, global    ning towards normalization, with a stop      could be completed by the end of
 production stood at -8% y/y in June         -and-go approach until the end of            2022. In this context, stringency indices
 (after a trough at -16% y/y in April) and   2021. During phase 3 (from Q4 2020           should return to their minimum levels
 confidence in the manufacturing sector      until end-2021), we expect a succession      and 80% of global GDP will be back to
 reached pre-crisis levels. This confirmed   of tighter and targeted sanitary restric-    pre-crisis levels. However, we should
 our call of a faster return to pre-crisis   tions, followed by periods of easing.        not underestimate the risk of a possible
 levels for activity in the manufacturing    This stop-and-go trend in stringency will    temporary disruption in the transporta-
 sector (vs. services).                      continue until end 2021, assuming a          tion sector during the global vaccina-
 However, we think the recovery will lose    vaccine would be widely available from       tion campaign. In fact, vaccine delivery
 steam in Q4 on the back of tighter sani-    September 2021 and that at least 6           could mobilize half of the global trans-
 tary restrictions and the ongoing job       months would be needed for vaccina-          portation capacity for several months.
 shedding, which will keep spending          tion campaigns. While it will not freeze
 and investment plants in check.             the new investment cycle, it will hamper
                                             it, causing asymmetries across countries
 We remain in Phase 2 of the Covid-19        due to heterogeneous initial conditions,
 crisis, which means re-opening will re-     different sized stimuli, variable re-
 main divergent and dependent on the         confinement strategies and unequal

4
LIVING ON WITH A COVID-19 HUM - ALLIANZ RESEARCH - Euler Hermes
24 September 2020

                                              Figure 1: Real GDP forecasts, %
                                                                                    2017         2018           2019      2020      2021

                                             World GDP growth                         3.3        3.1            2.5       -4.7       4.6
                                             United States                            2.4        2.9            2.3       -5.3       3.7

                                             Latin America                            1.0        1.0            0.1       -7.9       3.3
                                             Brazil                                   1.3        1.3            1.1       -6.5       2.5
                                             United Kingdom                           1.8        1.3            1.5       -11.8      2.5
                                             Eurozone members                         2.7        1.9            1.3        -7.9      4.8
                                             Germany                                  2.8        1.5            0.6        -6.0      3.5
                                             France                                   2.4        1.8            1.5        -9.8      6.9
                                             Italy                                    1.7        0.7            0.3       -10.1      4.2
                                             Spain                                    2.9        2.4            2.0       -11.8      6.4

                                             Russia                                   1.8        2.5            1.3       -5.1       2.9
                                             Turkey                                   7.5        3.0            0.9       -4.7       4.0
                                             Asia-Pacific                             5.2        4.7            4.2       -1.5       6.2
                                             China                                    6.9        6.7            6.1       2.0        8.4
                                             Japan                                    2.2        0.3            0.7       -5.5       2.5
                                             India                                    7.0        6.1            4.2       -7.2       6.5
                                             Middle East                             1.4         0.9            0.3       -7.1       2.3
                                             Saudi Arabia                            -0.7        2.4            0.3       -5.1       2.0
                                             Africa                                   3.1        2.7            1.9       -4.3       3.4
                                             South Africa                             1.4        0.8            0.3       -8.2       2.7

                                             * Weights in glob al GDP at market price, 2019
                                              *Weights in global GDP at market price, 2019
                                             NB: fiscal year for India

                                              NB: fiscal year for India
                                              Sources: national sources, Allianz Research

Watch out for the massive trend rever-                   ures. Our EH Global Insolvency Index                                         to increase by +10% y/y in 2020 and by
sal in business insolvencies. Up to Sep-                 posted a -13% y/y decline in Q2 and -                                        +19% in 2021. We expect all regions to
tember 2020, the temporary adjust-                       7% y/y for H1. This decline continued in                                     post a double-digit increase in insolven-
ments made to insolvency frameworks                      most countries during the summer. Yet,                                       cies by 2021 but with an uneven tempo
across countries - designed to give time                 the overall outlook remains that of a                                        between 2020 and 2021, ranging from
and flexibility to companies before they                 sharp increase in insolvencies by 2021                                       +21% in Asia to +64% in North America.
resort to filing for bankruptcy – as well                (+31% by 2021 compared to 2019). This                                        In 2020, the larger increases are ex-
as the temporary business support                        trend reversal will begin in Q4 2020 in                                      pected in North America, Latin America
measures (such tax deferrals, social                     most countries and accelerate in H1                                          and Central Europe, while Western Eu-
security charges and loan repayments;                    2021 amid the gradual withdrawal of                                          rope and Asia will post larger annual
guaranteed loans, etc.) designed to                      various support measures and the zom-                                        increases in 2021.
prevent liquidity crisis, have resulted in               bification of many companies. This
significant decreases in business fail-                  would lead our Global Insolvency Index

                       Figure 2: Insolvency figures and forecasts (selected countries)
                                                                     2020                                                         Forecasts
                                           Last point               3m y/y             Ytd y/y           2020          2021        2020 y/y   2021 y/y   2021/2019
                       U.S.                  June                    -11%                -3%            31500          37500          39%       19%         65%
                       Canada                 July                   -26%               -30%             2850          3450            4%       21%         26%
                       Brazil                June                    -26%               -16%             3450          3800           20%       10%         32%
                       Germany               June                     -9%                -6%            19350          20850           3%       8%          11%
                       France               August                   -37%               -36%            46800          62000          -9%       32%         21%
                       United Kingdom        June                    -31%               -20%            22929          30072           4%       31%         36%
                       Italy                                                                            11660          14039           6%       20%         28%
                       Spain                 August                  13%                  -1%            4600          5600           11%       22%         35%
                       The Netherlands       August                  -23%                 -7%            4000          5000            5%       25%         32%
                       Russia                 June                   -25%                 -4%           13800          14500          18%       5%          23%
                       Turkey                  July                   8%                   4%           17200          18400          22%       7%          31%
                       Poland                  July                  32%                   3%            1100          1210           13%       10%         24%
                       South Africa            July                   -7%                -20%            2280          2450           12%       7%          20%
                       Morocco                June                   -87%                -38%            8861          10456           5%       18%         24%
                       China                 August                   1%                   7%           13500          14700          14%       9%          24%
                       Japan                 August                   1%                   0%            8600          9400            3%       9%          12%
                       India                  June                   -75%                -25%            750           2100          -60%      180%         11%
                       Australia               July                  -51%                -34%            6150          7150           -4%       16%         12%
                       South Korea           August                  -34%                -41%            400            470           -3%       18%         14%
                            GLOBAL INDEX                                                                                              10%       19%         31%

                       Sources: national sources, Allianz Research

                                                                                                                                                                                     5
Allianz Research

       AN INITIAL UNEVEN OR “DUAL” RECOVERY
       FOR TRADE, CONSUMERS AND INVESTMENT

 Recovery for trade in goods, but                                  result of the faster recovery of mer-                                                      The loss of purchasing power for most
 remember it’s a services crisis                                   chandise trade, we revise upwards our                                                      fragile households will be hard to reco-
                                                                   forecast of a yearly contraction of                                                        ver
 Global merchandise trade suffered a                               trade in goods and services from -15%
 historic blow in Q2 2020 compared to                              to -13% (compared to -11% in 2009) in                                                      After a historical wave of layoffs, which
 Q2 2019, contracting by close to -15%                             volume terms. The recent depreciation                                                      brought the U.S. unemployment rate to
 in volume terms y/y and -21% in value                             of the USD should alleviate the nega-                                                      14.7% in April 2020, job market condi-
 (USD) terms. Overall, in H1 2020, mer-                            tive price effect of the oil and commo-                                                    tions improved alongside the reope-
 chandise trade was -9% lower than in                              dity price shock in H1, bringing the                                                       ning of the economy. However, U.S.
 H1 2019 in volume and -13% in value                               trade contraction in USD value terms to                                                    initial claims recently rose to close to
 terms. Yet June figures and the latest                            -16% this year (vs. -20% in our previous                                                   one million, confirming the fact that the
 real-time maritime data show that in                              forecast). This is equivalent to USD4tn                                                    recovery is running out of steam. The
 August, maritime trade (80% of total                              of trade losses.                                                                           policy cliff effect is visible via the addi-
 trade) was back at only -3% below the                             In 2021, global trade in volume terms                                                      tional payment on U.S. unemployment
 levels of a year earlier. The recovery in                         should grow +7%, and in value terms it                                                     benefits, which has been reduced from
 merchandise trade was thus faster than                            could grow by +13%, finally recovering                                                     USD600 per week to USD400 per week
 we previously expected, outpacing the                             all its losses by early 2023. The recovery                                                 from August until 06 December amid
 2009 recovery. However, the U.S. and                              in global demand will drive trade vo-                                                      large uncertainties over the voting of a
 Western Europe are trailing China,                                lumes, while values will be helped by a                                                    new stimulus package by the U.S. Con-
 emerging Asia, and Eastern Europe’s                               lower USD (EUR1=USD1.15 in 2020 and                                                        gress.
 export recovery. On the services side,                            1.22 in 2021 vs. 1.12 in 2019) and mo-
 we estimate the collapse in the value of                          derately higher commodity prices
 trade was even stronger in Q1 (-18.5%)                            (Brent oil at USD44 in 2020, USD51 in
 and could be much worse in Q2. As a                               2021).

                   Figure 3: Global trade growth, in volume terms and value (%, y/y)
                       15%
                                                          Volume                           Price                          Value
                                                                                                                                                               13.0%
                                                                                                   10.2%
                       10%                                                                                         9.7%

                              3.3%          4.0%                                                                                                                                            6.0%
                        5%                                    3.0%                                                                                                            5.0%
                                                                            2.5%                                                                             7.0%
                                     2.8%                                                     5.5%                            1.3%
                                                   1.9%                                                    4.3%                                                        3.5%          3.2%
                        0%
                                                                                   -2.0%
                                                                                                           -1.6%
                        -5%

                                                                                                                                                    -13.0%

                       -10%
                                                                   -10.8%

                       -15%

                                                                                                                                     -16.0%
                       -20%

                       -25%
                               13           14               15             16               17             18              19e               20f        21f           22f           23f

                    Sources: national sources, Allianz Research

6
24 September 2020

In Europe, the adjustment of the job            Workers under the age of 25 repre-      lockdown and whose employment has
market is less visible because of the            sent close to 26% of people             not been impacted by its fallout.
priority given to job protection with par-       working in sectors highly exposed
tial unemployment mechanisms (vs.                to Covid-19, against 10% for those      But we doubt that this boom is sustain-
enhanced unemployment benefits in                sectors that are less exposed.          able. After all, in many development
the U.S.). In the five largest European         Part-time workers make up 32.3%         economies, housing markets are cur-
countries, we estimate that 9 million            of labor in highly exposed sectors      rently still shielded from the economic
workers or 20% of those currently enrol-         versus 18.5% in other sectors           implications of the pandemic, thanks to
led in short-work schemes face an ele-          Workers with a lower educational        government support measures includ-
vated risk of becoming unemployed in             attainment have a much higher           ing mortgage payment holidays, stamp
2021 because of the muted recovery in            weight in highly exposed sectors        duty cuts as well as short-work
late bloomer sectors and the “policy            The median hourly wage of full-         schemes. As these are phased out and
cliff” effect i.e. the end of emergency          time highly exposed workers is at       the consequences are felt more –
public support measures. The Eurozone            USD17 versus USD 23 for the non-        above all in the form of rising unem-
unemployment rate increased from                 highly exposed ones                     ployment and tighter mortgage condi-
7.2% in March 2020 to 7.6% in June and          The lowest quintiles in family in-      tions – the pandemic could yet bite
should end 2021 at 9.4%                          come are over-represented in            housing markets as many households
This asymmetric exposure to job losses           highly exposed sectors.                 will be priced out of the market. This is
implies a K-shaped or “dual” recovery in                                                 already visible in the U.S. where the
consumer spending. The social charac-        A K-shaped recovery is also visible in      most fragile households face difficulties
teristics of those most exposed to job       the housing market. In sharp contrast to    as evidenced by the significant increase
losses can explain interesting patterns      the 2008 crisis in the U.S. and the Euro-   of the default rate.
in terms of consumer spending. Spen-         zone debt crisis, the Covid-19 crisis has   The recovery of residential investment
ding on durable goods has out-               not seen a collapse of housing markets      and the stock market rally hide the Co-
performed as car sales experienced a         but has rather proven to be a source of     vid-19 profitability shock. This should
strong rebound (due to the preference        stability, with property prices up across   weigh on corporate investment inten-
for avoiding public transportation),         major developed economies. One fac-         tions, notably as a majority of state sup-
while spending in equipment for hou-         tor driving this trend is central banks’    port schemes arrive at maturity by the
sing followed the strong rebound in          ultra-expansive policy response, which      end of 2020. Cash-hoarding in the pri-
housing activity. However, Eurozone          has sent mortgage rates to record lows.     vate sector shows a lack of confidence
and UK household saving intentions           Beyond low rates and demand pent up         and suggests a difficult start for a new
stood at a record high in July, reflecting   during the pandemic, sales have been        investment cycle. On the financial mar-
consumer cautiousness as their expec-        driven by households looking for more       kets side, dual strategies between short
tations of rising unemployment in the        space for remote working and/or learn-      -term and long-term investors, between
next 12 months has hit to its highest        ing, as well as well as larger houses       retail and institutional investors, as well
level since 2009. We expect the saving       with gardens in suburban and rural          as the strong influence of administrated
rate in the U.S. and in Europe to remain     areas as commuting times now matter         aspects, point toward higher volatility
significantly above pre-crisis levels for    less. Moreover, constrained supply with     to come. At the same time, while the
the rest of 2020 and until the end of        the shutdown weighing on construction       wave of liquidity sparked by central
2021. But behind these macro-trends          activity has also pushed up prices. But     banks preserved the financial market
hides a more detailed picture of the         the stellar headline figures – with for     from stress, it is also further inflating
unequally distributed hit from Covid-19      instance property prices in the UK rising   imbalances and underlying risks.
and divergent recovery thereafter.           to an all-time high in August – conceal
A look at U.S. statistics helps compre-      a very polarized market: This is not a
hend the magnitude of K-shaped               boom for everyone; rather, housing
trends that can be seen in many deve-        markets are currently propped up by
loped economies:                             buyers that were not affected during
                                                                                                Photo on Unsplash

                                                                                                                                        7
Allianz Research

       CAPITAL MARKETS:
       NOT THE TIME TO TAKE RISKS

 In the current market environment, it is            comes to corporate credit, both in-                   2020 and 2021. This gradual increase
 important to consider that there is                 vestment grade and high-yield corpo-                  in term premium will occur on the back
 greater economic uncertainty than at                rate spreads look too tight. As in equi-              of higher inflation expectations and a
 the beginning of the year despite the               ties, corporate credit markets remain                 halt in the recent decline of real yields.
 current monetary and fiscal policy mix;             detached from fundamentals on the                     On the other hand, long-term Emerging
 there are more geopolitical risks than              back of the central banks’ perpetual                  Market sovereign spreads look over-
 at the beginning of the year and valua-             put option. Due to that, we expect cor-               bought. The combination of this ex-
 tions are tighter. In this context, equity          porate spreads to converge towards                    treme bullish positioning and the cur-
 markets have been showing a persis-                 higher values due to higher than ex-                  rent market fragility is a perfect combi-
 tent detachment from fundamental                    pected market volatility and increasing               nation for EM assets to become a vic-
 determinants, making the recent global              default rates. Lastly, with the short-end             tim of a second “risk-off” rotation in the
 equity market rally hardly justifiable.             of most developed countries’ sovereign                wake of a second risky-assets market
 Because of that, we still expect the EQ             yield curves anchored by their respec-                correction.
 market to underperform in 2020 and to               tive central banks, we expect a timid
 start a muted rally in 2021. When it                curve steepening towards the end of

                           Figure 4: Capital markets forecasts 2020-2021
                           year-end figures                             Latest Value          Unit            2020             2021
                           Eurozone
                           Sovereign Rates
                           year-end figures                             Latest Value          Unit            2020             2021
                           Eurozone
                           Sovereign Rates
                           10y yield “risk-free” sovereign (Bunds)           -0,5              %               -0.5            -0.3
                           10y Swap Rate                                     -0,2              %                0.0             0.3
                           Italy - Germany spread (10y)                      148              bps           175 (220)        160 (170)
                           France - Germany spread (10y)                      27              bps             40 (90)         30 (40)
                           Spain - Germany spread (10y)                       75              bps            90 (110)         80 (70)
                           Corporate Credit Spreads
                           Investment grade credit spreads                   113              bps              180              150
                           High yield credit spreads                         438              bps              750              600
                           Equities
                           MSCI EMU: total return p.a                         -9               %               -22               10
                           United States
                           Sovereign Rates
                           10y yield “risk-free” sovereign
                                                                             0,7               %                1               1.4
                           (Treasuries)
                           Corporate Credit Spreads
                           Investment grade credit spreads                   136              bps              230              180
                           High yield credit spreads                         514              bps              800              650
                           Equities
                           MSCI USA: total return p.a. in USD                 3                %               -20              15
                           Emerging Markets
                           Sovereign Rates
                           Hard Currency Spread (USD)                        341              bps              450              370
                           Equities
                           MSCI EM: total return p.a. in USD                  -4               %               -24               20
                           * Old forecasts in parenthesis
                           ** We have reviewed our EUR spreads down as the ECB impact on peripheral spreads was larger than anticipated.
                           Sources: Allianz Research, Refinitiv
8
24 September 2020

 Global bond markets: pricing stagfla-                                   been rising while real yields remain at                    inflation rate of 2%, (i.e. allowing some
 tion. Despite the recent repricing of                                   historical lows. Overall, U.S. and EUR                     overshooting above 2%). According to
 long-term inflation expectations, nomi-                                 government bond markets are unwil-                         our “fair value” estimation, inflation
 nal yields have barely budged, thanks                                   ling to believe in a rapid economic re-                    expectations are unlikely to substantial-
 to a fall in real yields. To put current                                covery scenario and are positioned for                     ly overshoot the 2% upper limit. In con-
 levels into perspective, at -1.1% real                                  a stagflation one.                                         trast, EUR long-term inflation expecta-
 yields are now at the lowest point in                                   U.S. inflation expectations: back to                       tions are nowhere near their “fair va-
 recorded history. The current bearish                                   square one. The recent increase in oil                     lue”, as monetary stimulus has not yet
 growth positioning within the U.S. go-                                  prices and employment has led U.S.                         convinced market participants. Accor-
 vernment bond market contrasts with                                     long-term inflation expectations to fol-                   ding to our model, EUR inflation expec-
 the latest equity market exuberance,                                    low a V-shaped trajectory around their                     tations could still move closer to 1.5% in
 although partially corrected, fueling                                   March low. Since the trough, inflation                     the near future, but any overshoot
 doubts about the mid-term equity rally                                  expectations have been on an upward                        beyond that level would not be sustai-
 sustainability. As in the U.S., long-term                               trajectory, exacerbated by the Fed’s                       nable.
 inflation expectations in the EMU have                                  recent decision to target an average

 Figure 5a: U.S. market-based inflation expectations model                                    Figure 5b: EMU market-based inflation expectations model
%                                                                                              %
3,0                                                                                            3,0

2,5                                                                                            2,5

2,0                                                                                            2,0

1,5                                                                                            1,5

                                                                                                           10-Year EUR breakeven inflation rate
1,0                                      10-Year US TIPS breakeven inflation rate
                                                                                               1,0
                                                                                                           In sample estimation
                                         In sample estimation                                              Out-of-sample forecast
                                         Out-of-sample forecast
                                                                                                           +/- 1 std-deviation
0,5                                      +/- 1 std-deviation                                   0,5

0,0                                                                                            0,0
      04    06        08       10         12          14          16          18    20               08          10                12             14   16           18          20

  Sources: Allianz Research, Refinitiv                                                        Sources: Allianz Research, Refinitiv

  Where are the institutional bulls? The                                  nies usually clustered around one in-                      Corporate credit: hard to keep a pro-
  recent U.S. equity market frothiness is                                 dustry group / economic sector. These                      mise. Since April, the Fed has bought up
  relatively hard to explain as both mu-                                  days, the technology sector accounts                       to ~45bn worth of corporate credit.
  tual fund and ETF flows show persistent                                 for more than 25% of the U.S. EQ mar-                      However, since the beginning of July, it
  transfers from equity funds towards                                     ket capitalization. Additionally, the con-                 has significantly reduced its weekly pur-
  fixed income and money market funds.                                    centration risk is higher since the sector                 chases as credit markets are once
  This is a symptom of the actual market                                  not only accounts for more than one                        again extremely tight. Yet, credit mar-
  fragility as structural long-term inves-                                fourth of the index, but the number of                     ket spreads have not reversed back to
  tors seem unwilling to participate in the                               companies within the sector itself has                     pre-Covid-19 levels and remain 10-20%
  market, thus leaving the floor to stock                                 been reduced by 20-40% since the dot-                      above pre-pandemic levels. In contrast,
  pickers and option traders (e.g. Soft-                                  com bubble. In the case of the Euro-                       the USD1.919trn U.S. corporate credit
  bank). However, the Eurozone equity                                     zone, the equity market has been per-                      issuance in the first nine months of 2020
  market does not show any signs of                                       manently dominated, in terms of                            has already surpassed the historical
  exuberance (yet) as most EUR equity                                     weight, by the financial sector. Ne-                       record of USD1.916trn set during the 12
  indices have settled around -10%ytd.                                    vertheless, this dominance is starting to                  months of 2017. Interestingly, most of
  Nevertheless, looking at fund flow data,                                be challenged by the technology and                        that fresh money will most likely not be
  one can see a small acceleration in the                                 healthcare sectors, as their respective                    invested into the issuing companies as
  inflows into EUR EQ funds, with Germa-                                  weights within the market have increa-                     42% of all new issuances are expected
  ny and France leading the pack.                                         sed since the 2008 crisis. This over-                      to be dedicated to debt refinancing
  Technology, the outstanding student.                                    concentration in tech-related risk has                     purposes.
  Historically, each financial cycle has                                  led major indices to underperform du-
  been led by a limited group of compa-                                   ring the latest market correction.

                                                                                                                                                                                 9
Allianz Research

                                       Figure 6: U.S. Federal Reserve Corporate Purchases (USDbn) vs spreads (bp)
                                        50        Commercial Paper                                                                      1200
                                                  Corporate Credit
                                        45        Investment Grade Spread (RHS)
                                                  High Yield Spread (RHS)
                                                                                                                                        1000
                                        40

                                        35
                                                                                                                                        800
                                        30

                                        25                                                                                              600

                                        20
                                                                                                                                        400
                                        15

                                        10
                                                                                                                                        200
                                         5

                                         0                                                                                              0
                                         Dec-19   Jan-20    Feb-20      Mar-20     Apr-20   May-20    Jun-20   Jul-20     Aug-20   Sep-20

                                         Sources: Allianz Research , Refinitiv

Equity exuberance: high expectations!                02 September). In the past, this per-                                   appreciation is to be expected from
The equity market is falling prey to a               ceived return has been higher in only                                   further PE expansion; EPS growth will
positive feedback loop whereby rising                1.2% of observations (i.e. six days out of                              be the main driver of its future return,
prices increase the demand for equities,             500). As this expectation disproportion-                                but 50%+ earnings growth looks ambi-
which in turn fosters a further rise in              ately depends on recent price move-                                     tious and unsustainable. Consequently,
prices. We estimate, for example, that               ments (the ones observed during only                                    equity markets may keep hissing in the
the recent performance of Apple leads                the last 1.6 years), it is inherently unsta-                            near future.
market participants to expect a 56.7%                ble. Furthermore, as the Apple stock is
annual return from the company (as of                already trading at a multiple of 40, little

                   Figure 7: U.S. tech sector – expected return

                                                                                                     Expected annual rate of return           Relevant past data for current
                             02/09/2020                                    Price
                                                                                                                 (%)                          return determination (in years)

                   Alphabet-Google                                     1,717.39                                   21.5                                    3.62
                   Amazon                                              3,531.45                                     56                                    1.66
                   Apple                                                  131.4                                   56.7                                    1.58
                   Bitcoin                                             11,398.44                                  46.1                                    1.79
                   Oil Brent                                             44.51                                     -0.8                                   24.21
                   Facebook                                              302.50                                   20.9                                    3.64
                   Gold                                                 1 940.23                                   7.6                                    7.27
                   Microsoft                                             231.65                                   33.3                                     2.5
                   Netflix                                               552.84                                   46.7                                    1.86
                   Tesla                                                 447.37                                   228.2                                    0.6
                   TRY to 1 USD                                           7.38                                    18.4                                    3.92
                   Zoom Video Comm.                                      423.56                                   38.7                                    1.97
                   Sources: Allianz Research , Refinitiv

10
10
24 September 2020

        POLITICAL RISK COULD BE BACK
        LIKE A BOOMERANG

Markets look complacent but are not                                         EU has threatened sanctions, the likeli-                             think the worst-case scenario can still
blind to the return of short-term politi-                                   hood of a Hard Brexit at year-end has                                be avoided.
cal risk: (i) Brexit, (ii) U.S. elections; (iii)                            considerably increased (from 20% to                                  Back in 2019, Boris Johnson tried a simi-
tensions in the Mediterranean Sea; (iv)                                     45%); the deadline for an agreement at                               lar strategy of harsh threats before
continued protectionism / a new “tech”                                      the European Council on 15-16 Octo-                                  agreeing to the Withdrawal Agreement
war; (v) U.S.-Russia tensions.                                              ber seems difficult to meet. While the                               10 days later. However, should a Hard
                                                                            economic environment is not conduc-                                  Brexit materialize by the UK not asking
Odds for a no-deal Brexit at year-end                                       tive for a Hard Brexit, as the UK was hit                            for an extension of the transition peri-
have considerably increased (45%), but                                      particularly hard by the Covid-19 crisis,                            od, we think that it will return to the
we expect a last-minute compromise,                                         but also given extremely low interest                                negotiating table in 2021. A Hard Brexit
with a FTA implementation by end-                                           rates and market complacency with                                    is likely to be very costly politically for
2021. UK PM Boris Johnson unexpect-                                         regard to public debt levels, the UK                                 the Conservative Party as it will not only
edly decided to make a last-minute                                          government might deem it “feasible” as                               cause serious economic disruption
change in the Withdrawal Agreement                                          it would count on increased fiscal and                               (close to -5% contraction in GDP, drop
that was ratified by both the UK and                                        monetary support to help UK compa-                                   of -15% of exports and above 4% infla-
the EU in January 2020. There are two                                       nies withstand the shock (including sub-                             tion) but it also risks compromising the
main points on which the UK seeks                                           sidies and a moratorium against com-                                 finalization of around 20 international
greater flexibility, notably in the context                                 pany defaults). However, given the high                              FTAs that are currently under negotia-
of a no-deal by year-end: (i) state aid                                     risk of social tensions on the island of                             tion (incl. the one with the U.S., notably
for Northern Ireland, which is deemed                                       Ireland (against the 1998 Belfast                                    in the context of a potential Joe Biden
to be subject to EU regulations; (ii) the                                   Agreement), the loss of popularity for                               Presidency). Hence, we think early elec-
border in the Irish sea and the dual cus-                                   Boris Johnson in favor of the Scottish                               tions are likely in this scenario, which
tom checks post exit from the Custom                                        National Party and Labor Party, as well                              could lead to a minority government
Union. As this last-minute turnaround                                       as the highly probable blocking of a                                 and make the final FTA take longer.
goes against international law and the                                      Hard Brexit by the House of Lords, we

   Figure 8: Brexit scenarios and economic impact
             Soft Br exit with ver y-last m inu te c om pr om ise and F TA im plem entation                Har d Br exit on Jan 1st, 2021 with likely c om ebac k into negotiations du r ing 2021 after
                                           by m id-2021 (55%)​                                                                               ear ly elec tions (45%) ​
                               2020​                                                     2021​                                 2020​                                               2021​
                              -11.8​                                                     + 2.5​                               -10.9​                                               -4.8​
                               -13.3​                                                     5.9​                                 -12.0​                                               0.7​
                               -26.8​                                                    -15.1​                                -26.8​                                              -25.8​
                               -13.7​                                                     1.8​                                 -13.7​                                              -13.0​
                                0.7​                                                      1.5​                                   0.7​                                               4.5​
                                7.0​                                                      8.5​                                   7.0​                                               10.0​
                                -2.0​                                                     -3.0​                                 -2.0​                                              -10.0​
                                4.0​                                                      31.0​                                  4.0​                                               53.0​

    QE increased by 5% of GDP (around GBP100bn) and implemented until mid-2021, rates unchanged at 0.1%​    Rates cut into negative territory and QE increased by GBP250-300bn, similar to the Covid-19 package​

                                                                                                             4% of GDP in 2021 mainly focused on infrastructure spending and measures to protect consumers
                                   2% of GDP in 2021 (after only 1.5% in 2020)​
                                                                                                                           purchasing power. State guaranteed loans prolonged until end-2021.​

                            mainly focused on infrastructure spending and tax cuts​                                                                          ​
                      10y GILT at 0.4%(eoy)​                                     10y GILT at 0.6%(eoy)​              10y GILT at -0.2%(eoy)​                               10y GILT at 0.1%(eoy)​
                    FTSE 100 at -22%yoy (eoy)​                                 FTSE 100 at +10%yoy(eoy)​           FTSE 100 at -50%yoy (eoy)​                            FTSE 100 at -10%yoy(eoy)​

   Source: Allianz Research

                                                                                                                                                                                                                   11
Allianz Research

 U.S. elections have the potential to         remote voting. There is therefore a high      China’s leading chipmaking compa-
 create a judiciary battle with a climate     probability just after the end of elec-       nies, saw its shares tumble after the U.S.
 of extremely high uncertainty. We            tions that Republicans could be in a          took steps to blacklist it. Moreover, (i)
 maintain our 2018-2019 call of a pos-        lead position for the time needed to          U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
 sible victory of Biden in the approa-        access and collect all ballots. Then it       has threatened a broad crackdown on
 ching U.S. elections. Initially this was     could take a month to eventually con-         Chinese tech companies with access to
 based on traditionally pro-Republican        firm a Democrat win. President Trump          American data, including barring an
 voters, i.e. farmers and inhabitants of      has already announced that he could           unspecified number of the country’s
 the rust belt, being the victims of the      reject the result of an election organi-      apps and limiting its cloud computing
 current U.S. President’s protectionist       zed with mass mail-voting. A risk scena-      groups that operate on American soil;
 policy. The Covid-19 crisis has led to an    rio could therefore bring us to the Su-       (ii) the White House’s fiscal year 2021
 accentuation of the Democrat lead as         preme Court for one or two months of          budget proposal includes USD1.5bn for
 Joe Biden now benefits from 50.7% of         extremely high uncertainty.                   artificial intelligence (+USD0.38bn com-
 vote intentions, while President Trump                                                     pared to 2020), and USD699mn for
 currently stands at 42.6%. Paradoxical-      Tensions in the Mediterranean Sea are         quantum            information    science
 ly, the outcome of the election could        likely to create more noise than facts.       (+USD120mn); (iii) members of Con-
 not be as clear-cut as suggested by          We think that the situation will remain       gress have introduced bills aiming at
 public opinion polls. Indeed, bet polls      under control as Turkey is more likely to     (a) boosting domestic semiconductor
 suggest that the race could be much          seek a (financial) compromise rather          manufacturing – remaking the Natio-
 tighter as the approaching debates           than a military escalation while the EU       nal Science Foundation, and creating a
 between Biden and President Trump            will not agree on a unified military in-      national research cloud, (b) making
 could represent a risk for the Democrat      tervention. Nevertheless, an “accident”       immigrant visas more easily attainable
 leader, who will be challenged by the        cannot be ruled out entirely. In the          for AI-specialized profiles and people
 intensity of the debate.                     short run, this should keep uncertainty       with knowledge of other valuable tech-
 The end of 2020 will see an extremely        at high levels amid the already fragile       nologies for national security. On the
 high level of uncertainty in the U.S. be-    diplomatic relationship between Turkey        Chinese side, policy moves include: (i)
 cause of these elections. Tangible si-       and the EU. Any economic impact will          the National People’s Congress’ five-
 gnals of this nervousness are already        mainly be felt by Turkey, which is alrea-     year USD1.4trn plan allowing munici-
 visible in the option market, which mir-     dy in dire straits. The country is on the     palities, provinces and companies to
 rors a significant increase of the risk      brink of another severe currency crisis,      invest in building new infrastructure on
 premium during this election period.         owing to its questionable policy res-         AI, data centers, 5G, the Industrial Inter-
 U.S. banks are also rushing to issue         ponse to the Covid-19 crisis, as well as      net and other new technologies; (ii)
 debt in advance as they bet on much          other critical political involvements out-    other policies to support the chip indus-
 higher volatility and tighter credit con-    side its borders (Syria, Libya). The latest   tries: tax benefits, R&D support, incen-
 ditions at the end of the year.              event could be the tipping point for          tives for international semiconductor
 Moreover, only 25% of Democrat voters        Turkey to slide into a full-blown finan-      companies to relocate to China; (iii) as
 traditionally opt for the direct vote, the   cial crisis, and that could also prevent      many as 3,000 chip engineers, inclu-
 rest preferring to use mail votes, whe-      the situation from escalating too much.       ding top-level talent from Taiwan’s
 reas two thirds of Republican voters                                                       world-leading companies, having been
 use to opt for direct vote. The context of   2021 will see an intensification of the       attracted to mainland competitors; (iv)
 Covid-19 has incited states to send a        new cold “technology” war. After a suc-       Beijing establishing a USD29bn semi-
 record high level of ballots to allow        cessful listing in mid-July, SMIC, one of     conductor fund.
                                                                                                 Photo on Unsplash

12
24 September 2020

Figure 9: U.S. election scenarios
   Scenario            Biden large victory                      Biden short/contested victory                      Trump short/contested victory                                Trump large victory
  Probability                      30%                                            40%                                                    20%                                               10%
                  •   Trump cannot claim there was          •    Trump victory claim before full counting of  •   Biden refuses verdict – argues for Russia            •        Biden cannot advocate for
                      fraud.                                     ballots                                          interferences, potential voting fraud, institutional          fraud.
                  •   Democrat majority in congress.        •    Fraud claim after Biden’s victory official       pressures, voter suppression                         •        Whole congress turns
   Scenario       •   Rapid voting of a USD 3.7 trillion    •    Possible validation from the supreme court 1 •   No clear majority in the Congress. Democrat house,            Republican.
  description         package over next 10yr                     to 2 months after election                       Republican Senate
                                                            •    Negotiation blockade on budget in the        •   Validation from the supreme court 1 to 2 months
                                                                 Congress maintains a possibility of              after the election possible.
                                                                 shutdown until Q2 2021.

                  •   New investment cycle with big         •    Less ambitious program. Consensus on         •   Supply-side policy, extended tax cuts for individuals, •      Tax cuts, new protectionist
                      infrastructure projects and                Infrastructure projects but lower re-            Smaller size Infrastructure project. Uncertainty on           measures, bipartisan adoption
                      redistributive policies.                   distribution in favor of households, not         external policy, perspective of harsher tone on               of infrastructure program, but
                  •   Decline of unemployment rate at            fulfilling half the promise of increasing        China and re-shoring weighs on the investment                 less extensive than Biden
   Economic
                      5.5% by the end of 2022 (8.4%              corporate tax rate from 21% to 28%               cycle despite tax cut announcements.                          because of less ambitious
    impact            today).                               •    US GDP growth comes at -5.3% in 2020;        •   Bold moves on the external side (tech cold war,               green plan.
                  •   US GDP growth at -5.3% in 2020,            +3.7% in 2021 and +2.5% in 2022                  tariffs, & sanctions on US companies located           •      US GDP growth comes at -
                      +4.2% in 2021 and +3.0% in 2022                                                             abroad) penalizes growth (-5.3% in 2020; +1.7% in             5.3% in 2020, 2.7% in 2021,
                                                                                                                  2021 and +1.2% in 2022)                                       1.8% in 2022

                  •   FED balance sheet levels off as       •    FED balance sheet increases until end-Q2     •   FED balance sheet increase until end Q3 2021,             •   FED balance sheet levels off in
                      early as Q1 2021 after a steady            2021 (to alleviate significant amount of         then levels off. Political uncertainty is as high as in       Q2 2021 after a steady increase
FED response          increase since Q4 2020.                    uncertainty) then levels off.                    the short Biden victory case.                                 since Q4 2020.
                  •   First rate hike as early as Q3 2022   •    First rate hike from Q3 2023 only.           •   First rate hike Q1 2024                                   •   First rate hike Q4 2023

                  •   The dollar is set to depreciate       •    The dollar is set to depreciate versus the   •   The dollar is set to depreciate versus the EUR by up •        The dollar is set to depreciate
                      versus the EUR by up to 2,5%               EUR by up to 5% (~1.25) within the next 12       to 7.5% within the next 12 months;                            versus the EUR by up to 10%
      USD             within the next 12 months;                 months;                                      •   Then re-appreciates by 2-3% one year later                    within the next 12 months;
                  •   Then re-appreciates by 4-6% one       •    Then re-appreciates by 2-3% one year later                                                            •        Then re-appreciates by 4-6%
                      year later                                                                                                                                                one year later

   10-year     •      1.25% at the end 2020; 1.8% at the •       1% at the end 2020; 1.4% at the end of       •   1% at the end 2020; 1.4% at the end of 2021               •   1.15% at the end 2020; 1.6% at
                      end of 2021                                2021                                                                                                           the end of 2021
Treasury yield

Source: Allianz Research

Recent official gatherings suggest that                             strong responses against other coun-                                     latory restrictions will continue to dam-
China’s        international       relations                        tries could be decided (especially when                                  age doing business in Russia in 2020–
(particularly those with the U.S. and                               sovereignty issues are at stake), but we                                 2021, with firms linked to the Kremlin
some of its allies) are likely to affect the                        think it unlikely that Chinese authorities                               being the most likely targets for poten-
country’s economic planning. Chinese                                would actively damage external rela-                                     tial new sanctions. The events in and
authorities are currently preparing the                             tions and risk economic links and access                                 related to Belarus resemble those that
14th five-year plan (2021-2025), which                              to foreign technology.                                                   occurred in 2013-2014 in Ukraine. Rus-
will be discussed and finalized in Octo-                                                                                                     sia will not accept a democratic and
ber 2020 and we expect goals such as                                Russia may experience intensified                                        potentially Western-friendly regime in
continuing the upgrade of China’s man-                              Western sanctions while trade will shift                                 its neighbor and will, if necessary, know
ufacturing base and rebalancing fur-                                to China. Two recent events have led to                                  how to prevent this.
ther towards domestic demand are still                              a further deterioration in Russia-                                       Russia will continue to pursue its politi-
likely to be included.. After the imple-                            Western relations: (i) Russia’s support                                  cal interests strongly, notwithstanding
mentation of the National Security Law                              for Belarusian President Lukashenko,                                     any (potential) adverse economic
in Hong Kong in July this year, there are                           whose disputed re-election in August                                     effects. We believe that it is even willing
concerns China could turn more ag-                                  2020 has caused ongoing social unrest                                    to risk a last-minute collapse of the
gressive in its (geo)political strategy.                            as well as Western condemnation; (ii)                                    Nord Stream 2 pipeline project with
This is not in our central scenario. While                          the apparent poisoning of Alexei Na-                                     Germany. Western FDI inflows to Russia
China aims to increase its global posi-                             valny, currently the most prominent                                      already dropped sharply in the wake of
tion in the long run, a complete reversal                           leader of Russia’s independent opposi-                                   the 2014 sanctions and have never re-
of current orders in coming years is un-                            tion. Existing Western sanctions – likely                                covered. Non-sanction-imposing coun-
likely. There seems to be a growing view                            to become more and more permanent                                        tries, notably China, compensated for
among Chinese officials that a prag-                                – combined with the threat of new re-                                    that, in part. We expect that this re-
matic long-term term approach needs                                 strictions, especially by the U.S., and                                  balancing of Western trade and invest-
to be adopted. That is not to say that                              retaliatory Russian sanctions and regu-                                  ment flows to China will continue.

                                                                                                                                                                                                             13
Allianz Research

       FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY:
       THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS

 Disinflation in the short-run, temporary     progressively fade as the global econo-          overshoot (to around above 2.3% - 2.5%
 overshoot in the medium-run                  my will gradually return to pre-crisis           y/y in the U.S.), but for a limited period
                                              levels in 2022-23 amid a synchronized            of time. Crucially, central banks’ tole-
 2020: The immediate crisis aftermath –       acceleration in global growth. Pent-up           rance will depend on the key driver
 messy, as both supply and demand             demand will emerge, supported by the             behind inflationary pressures.
 collapse. In the very short run, inflation   reduction in excess savings, while the
 is likely to remain muted as a result of     full transmission of fiscal stimulus pack-       A sustained shift to fiscal dominance is
 the sharp decline in economic activity,      ages will be visible. Consequently, oil          unlikely. Confidence in central banks
 lower oil prices and limited monetary        prices are likely to accelerate modera-          independence should thus remain in-
 policy pass-through on the back of high      tely. Rising unit labor costs will also be       tact. Massive crisis stimuli (monetary as
 uncertainty. Upside pressures on prices      driven by higher wages on the back of            well as fiscal) will be gradually drawn
 could come from income-support poli-         growing social discontent and higher             down, in line with the recovery. Several
 cies that prop up demand and pockets         state interventionism, coupled with pro-         long-term structural factors should also
 of cost-push inflation, from ongoing         ductivity losses post Covid-19. The              keep inflation at bay, e.g. aging and
 sanitary restrictions and reduced capa-      green transition and regulatory factors          digitalization (robotization, automa-
 city. Less favorable terms of trade and      could also be at play (carbon tax, digi-         tion).
 supply constraints could also support        tal tax, border adjustment tax) in aug-
 inflation. We expect these pressures to      menting energy costs.                            All in all, inflation expectations are li-
 be limited. Temporary factors will dis-                                                       kely to remain in check in the absence
 tort inflation figures (changed con-         Some momentum around reshoring                   of another supply shock and/or oil
 sumption patterns, disruption to price       and lingering protectionism could prop           price shock. We do not expect drastic
 collection, VAT reduction, delayed sum-      up inflation, but it is likely to remain in      paradigm changes regarding globali-
 mer sales etc.). All in all, in 2020, we     check, given the negative impact on              zation and the interaction between
 expect inflation to reach +0.3% and          economic growth. Against this, central           monetary and fiscal policy that could
 +1.1% in the Eurozone and the U.S., res-     banks’ switch to average inflation tar-          lead to large inflation pressures. Our
 pectively.                                   geting without the introduction of new           forecasts based on the output gap
                                              tools is unlikely to produce much higher         point to +1.2% in the Eurozone in 2022
 2021: Disinflationary recovery as supply     inflation rates. There could be some             and +2.1% in the U.S.
 recovers faster than demand. Lower
 income and elevated unemployment
 will continue weighing on inflation sta-         Figure 10: Inflation forecasts, %
 bilization as fiscal support schemes will
 only allow a progressive reduction in                                       2020​          2021​           2022​            2023​
 the enormous amount of slack created             Eurozone​
 in the job market. Disinflationary pres-         Central scenario​           0.3​           0.9​            1.2​             1.4​
 sures are likely to persist as the recove-
 ry of demand would lag behind that of            Protracted crisis​         -0.1​          -1.5​            -1.2​            -1.1​
 supply. In 2021, we expect inflation at          United States​
 +0.9% and +1.6% in the Eurozone and              Central scenario​           1.1​           1.6​            2.1​             2.7​
 the U.S., respectively.                          Protracted crisis​          0.5​          -0.4​            0/7​             0.7​

 2022 and beyond: Demand exceeds                  Source: Allianz Research
 supply, leading to temporary inflation
 overshoot. Disinflationary forces will

14
24 September 2020

Fiscal policy: the devil is in the details as        only, given the Fed’s policy shift to aver-                  strategy shift towards implicitly con-
disbursement of the stimulus 2.0 and                 age inflation targeting (AIT) that effec-                    cluded the ECB’s own strategy overhaul
political agendas will shape the recov-              tively focusses on pushing inflation up                      before it even kicked off – at least as far
ery in 2021-2022. Monetary policy will               to 2% for an extended period. However,                       as the inflation target is concerned. This
have no choice but to follow. In the U.S.,           the monetary policy won’t be powerful                        does not mean that the ECB will copy
high uncertainty will force the Fed to               enough to solve the K-shaped scenario                        the Fed’s precedent to a T. After all, it
alleviate market fears and avoid a wid-              currently visible in the labor, consumer                     does not feature a dual mandate and
ening of spreads by re-injecting signifi-            and housing markets. To tackle the sig-                      more importantly switching to a regime
cant amounts of liquidity, leading to an             nificant impoverishment of the most                          that requires making up for a below-
increase of its balance sheet from 33%               fragile fringe of the population, the Fed                    target inflation would not be very credi-
of GDP to 34.5% of GDP by mid-2021. It               has clearly called for further fiscal sup-                   ble, given the very subdued inflationary
should stabilize at this level as new im-            port.                                                        pressures in recent years. But we think
pulses coming from U.S. fiscal policy                In the Eurozone, the ratification of the                     that the ECB will probably signal its
should help reactivate a new invest-                 EUR750bn EU Recovery Fund is ongo-                           readiness to also tolerate a temporary
ment cycle from H2 2021. In our scenar-              ing as the European Parliament is de-                        inflation overshoot by making its 2%
io of Biden’s victory, the realization of a          bating its size. Despite this blocking, we                   price stability target symmetric. How to
more redistributive economic program                 expect it to be operational before June                      meet this slightly higher goalpost while
should support growth in 2021 by +1pp,               2021, boosting Southern and Eastern                          keeping financial stability risks at bay
albeit to a lower extent compared with               European countries’ nominal GDP by                           remains anyone’s guess. Going forward,
2020 (+1.7pp impact on growth of the                 more than +1.5% over two years. On                           the best proxy for ECB policy action
so-called USD2.2trn            CARES Act             average, the annual EU nominal GDP                           may be the state of the U.S. labor mar-
(Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic               will be boosted by +0.4%. The European                       ket. Due to this prevailing policy de-
Security Act)) as direct cash payments               political calendar (general elections in                     pendency, as the Fed is ready to stay
to households in particular had quicker              Germany and the Netherlands in 2021,                         lower-for-longer (we don’t expect a
and higher multiplier impacts. After the             local elections in the UK in 2021 and                        rate hike on either side of the Atlantic
elections, we estimate the size of the               French Presidential elections in 2022)                       before 2023) in an effort to support the
new stimulus at USD2.7trn over 10                    are likely to shape economic policies                        labor market, the ECB will have little
years, leading to an accumulation of                 and allow for more redistribution to-                        choice but to do the same. After all, the
deficits close to -16% in 2020, -10% in              wards middle-class households.                               ECB’s few attempts (remember 2008
2021 and –5% in 2022.                                We expect the ECB to act decisively by                       and 2011) to swim against the U.S. fi-
In this context, we expect a tapering of             year-end with a EUR500bn top-up to its                       nancial cycle failed miserably. With the
the Fed policy to only start from mid-               2021 QE. Even if PSPP comes with less                        ECB bound to wait for the Fed to make
2022 until mid-2023, a point from which              flexibility, we think it will be easier to                   the first move, we expect it to remain on
the Fed could consider re-initiating rate            rally support within the governing coun-                     hold until at least 2023.
hikes. In our view, a first interest rate            cil around a QE boost. Doves are in the
hike could take place from Q3 2023                   air – also in the medium-term: the Fed’s

Figure 11: Balance sheets, % of GDP                                                 Figure 12: Key interest rate forecasts, %
                                                                                    6
  70

  60                                                                                5

  50                                                                                4

  40
                                                                                    3
  30

                                                                                    2
  20

  10                                                                                1

  0
       05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21                           0
                                                                                         06   07   08   09   10     11   12     13   14   15   16   17    18      19   20    21   22    23   24
              ECB (lhs)    BoE (lhs)   PBoC (lhs)   FED (lhs)
                                                                                    -1                  10yr Bund             10yr UST         ECB deposit rate             Fed Funds

Source: Allianz Research                                                            Source: Allianz Research

                                                                                                                                                                                             15
Allianz Research

                                          Figure 13: Expected impact on GDP growth from fiscal stimulus
                                                    packages, pp

                                         4,5
                                         4,0
                                         3,5
                                         3,0
                                         2,5
                                         2,0
                                         1,5
                                         1,0
                                         0,5
                                         0,0
                                                China      US       Germany    UK    Italy   Spain   France
                                                                     2020     2021   2022

                                         Source: Allianz Research

 Emerging Markets (EMs) are likely to           all have negative real policy interest                 profile policy rate cuts, but liquidity in-
 benefit from higher risk appetite until        rates and thus may be forced to tighten                jections to ensure the smooth functio-
 2022, albeit unevenly. Negative real           monetary policy next year. We expect                   ning in the banking system are likely.
 interest rates in advanced economies           2022 to be a tricky year for EMs as ma-                On the fiscal side, support could decline
 should support risk appetite for EM            turing debt is peaking and investors                   from 7.1% of GDP in 2020 to c.5.5% in
 assets and, as long as the USD depre-          anticipate the start of the normaliza-                 2021, as the government bond is-
 ciates, positive net capital flows into        tion of the Fed’s monetary stimulus.                   suance quotas and tax and fee cuts are
 EMs should continue. However, inves-           Brazil, Thailand, India, Turkey and In-                likely to be smaller. That said, the fiscal
 tors will discriminate against markets         donesia currently have the highest                     stance we expect for 2021 is still large –
 that are subject to negative political         amounts of maturing debt by the end                    as a comparison, we estimate that the
 risk events (e.g. Hong Kong, Russia) or        of 2022.                                               support in 2018 and 2019 stood at 2.4%
 pursue unsustainable monetary policies                                                                and 3.3% respectively.
 (e.g. Turkey) or, more generally, have         In China, policy easing is likely to peak
 overall weak macroeconomic funda-              earlier than in other economies. This is
 mentals. The latter includes Argentina,        because the economic recovery is now
 Turkey, Brazil and South Africa, whose         well on track (although not broad-
 currencies have already depreciated            based yet), and policymakers could
 substantially in 2020 are expected to          gradually turn their focus to structural
 continue facing downward pressures,            concerns in 2021. Indeed, from c.260%
 with Turkey already at the brink of its        of GDP worth of total debt at the end
 next balance of payments crisis. We            of 2019, the ratio is likely to near 300%
 project a more visible rise in inflation in    by the end of this year. Based on past
 H2 2021, especially for economies with         credit cycles and policymakers’ recent
 weaker currencies and those that have          announcements, we expect our credit
 embarked on significant QE-like mo-            impulse index to peak in the coming
 netary stimulus in the wake of the Co-         months. It should then gradually de-
 vid-19 crisis. The latter include Turkey       cline, and turn negative in Q4 2021.
 and several Central European econo-            This means that in the coming year, the
 mies, as well as India and Chile, which        PBOC could refrain from further high-

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