Leah Dillard IAFS 4500-002
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Leah Dillard
IAFS 4500-002
Tues, Feb 8 2022
Herman Kahn (1984), “Thinking about the unthinkable” Part One
The Twelve Nonissues (commonly held assertions that are irrelevant and impractical):
1. Halt nuclear arms race to achieve the redemption of mankind
o Kahn argues this is a nonissue of least relevance to government policy on nuclear
war, because this idea is not applicable for a government (but is concern for a
church)
2. Control of nuclear weapons should be pursued through the creation of an effective world
parliamentary government and/or total worldwide disarmament
o Kahn states that world government already exists: UN Security Council, but
history has proven its ineffectiveness.
§ trying to establish a different form of world government would be
problematic
§ it is unrealistic to expect a major UN resolution on nuclear weapons in
terms of real-world significance
§ in terms of disarmament, if all were banned, amongst the 50,000 that exist,
surely not all of them world be destroyed.
3. Even if it cannot be total, the goal should be disarmament rather than arms control
o Kahn argues that objective of nuclear policy should not be to decrease number of
weapons, but to make the world safer- and these are not the same thing.
§ appropriate arms control could increase trend toward decreased
stockpiling but going about disarmament the wrong way could set it back.
4. There should be a total nuclear freeze
o Kahn states that total nuclear freeze is counterproductive because technology is
rapidly evolving. He clarifies that, a freeze would prevent an agreement on more
sufficient arms-control measures by halting incentive for helpful negotiations and
development of further technologies.
5. Deterrence must be made 100 percent reliable
o Khan states that this is a nonissue because a human system can never be 100 percent
effective.
6. Deterrence must fail eventually, and probably will fail totally
o Khan surmises that nuclear weapons will be used at some point in the future, but they
will be used on a small and limited scale. At this point, deterrence will have failed but
not totally.
7. Useful “damage limitation” in a nuclear war is infeasible; or 8. One can achieve totally
reliable damage limitation.
o Khan argues there is no such thing as total reliability, and that there are damage-
limitation programs that might be effective. Furthermore, it is immoral for a nation to
not attempt to achieve an improved war outcome in the event of failed deterrence.
9. Nuclear war can be reliably limited; or 10. There is no possibility of a limited war
o Kahn states that these options cannot be guaranteed and continues to say that very
clear firebreaks between nuclear and conventional war cannot be guaranteed even if
observed.11. There can be no victory in nuclear war; or 12. Either the US or Soviet Union could rely
on victory.
o Kahn argues tit will be incorrect for victory in nuclear war to be impossible, because
it is definitely possible if either side have low levels of nuclear forces that are
particularly vulnerable.
Twelve Almost Nonissues (widely held beliefs that may be credible)
1. Nuclear war would result in destruction of created order and/or 2. Nuclear war would
result in destruction of all human life
o Kahn insinuates that these concerns do not offer useful policy guidelines.
2. Threat of Nuclear War means “everybody Red, dead, or neutral”
o Kahn believes “everybody Red, dead, neutral or NATO” is more reasonable and
attractive due to the Atlantic Alliance.
4. Nuclear weapons are intrinsically immoral
o Seen as the common enemy as humanity, Kahn judges them as moral when used
to balance and deter while being immoral when used against civilians for
monetary and military alternatives.
5. Expenditures for strategic nuclear forces are bankrupting the US and Soviet Union
o Kahn does not see reducing cost of arms as a priority to bring turnaround in US
fiscal debt.
6. Defense expenditures should be reallocated to the poor
o Since defense expenditures are reallocated depending on interests, this would be
considered a recognition that national security programs have fundamental claims
on the nation’s resources. Kahn argues only those ideologically opposed to
military programs think the defense budget is a good place to acquire social
welfare needs.
7. War-fighting measures are ineffective and effective; and 8. Deterrence only is the least
undesirable policy
o Kahn insinuates war fighting does not mean one wants to fight in a war, but only
that deterrence can fail, stating that reinforced deterrence programs help alleviate
failure.
9. No significant weakening of deterrence is acceptable
o Kahn believes small destabilizing or weakening is not so likely to be significant,
because intentional weakening can be a tradeoff for different gains.
10. If retention of nuclear weapons is unavoidable, then “simplistic stability” is preferable
to “multistability”
o Kahn defines simplistic stability as stability only against a first strike, and
multistability as deterring serious provocations against the US and allies in
addition to preventing a real first strike. He argues that multistable deterrence
poses more necessary requirements than simple deterrence.
11. Nuclear war would be fought mainly to achieve positive gains.
o Kahn argues that since states achieve affluence power, etc. through mor economic
means than territorial or political gains, physical war between two major powers
may still prove important to a cause and resorting to nuclear war may remain
basic to adequate defense.
12. Normally, there is an automatic and increasingly dangerous “arms race”o Kahn states the world became less dangerous (in the 1960s) due to improvements
in equipment and thinking. He continues to state that there was no race, but
instead an “arms competition” on the Soviet side in order to catch up and surpass
the US, in which the US barely competed.
How is Nuclear War Different?
o The biggest difference between nuclear era and previous millennia is threat of total
annihilation of countries, not of mankind as a whole.
o Fear of accidental war caused by mechanical/human error, and in prenuclear era this was
not a possibility.
o Possible unchecked spread of nuclear weapons is less terrifying due to proliferation
moved much slower than expected years ago.
o A nations defense lies in the credibility of the nation’s threat to use nuclear force as a last
resort, which means it must rely on other policies before the use of nuclear weapons.
How is Nuclear War the Same?
o War can be fought and survived rather than a total end to human history
o Like conventional wars, nuclear wars are dependent on how they are fought. Similar to
past wars, they vary in size and defense and produce different outcomes
o Nuclear war may begin with old fashioned declaration of war
o Mobilization (gearing up the economy and society in order to defend) has implications in
nuclear war, and this idea precedes the nuclear era.
So What?
This should be studied when studying war and peace, because Kahn states that there exist many
flawed arguments (all of the above 24). He thinks that a compelling reason for public acceptance
of these is a lack of alternative concepts put forth by government. He believes that it is important
for the government and defense experts to explain a different approach to controlling nuclear
weapons (outlined below).
- Governments should:
o produce a long-term perspective,
o political and moral imperatives,
o optimistic political and military visions of the future
o the promise of future technological advances.
- Common moral obligations of a state are to:
o preserve nuclear deterrence consistent with security interests
o improve world safety (when faced with nuclear weapons)
o alleviate consequences of nuclear war through prevention
Henry Kissinger (1957) “The Fires of Prometheus”
The Legend of Prometheus and Implications
- Prometheus wanted to steal fire from the Gods and was chained to a rock for the rest of
his life as a punishment.
- The inflicted punishment was an act of compassion, because it would have been much
more hazardous had Prometheus stolen the fire (with the permission of the gods).
Nuclear Attacks on Cities
- An attack on a major city, in any capacity, has the potential to be crippling to the
economic system.- currently, thermonuclear weapons have no upper limit, so the USSR would be able to
attack a target with a weapon that would be suitable for total destruction
- Fun fact: a successful soviet attack on the 50 most important urban centers in the US
would produce 15-20 million dead with 20-25 million injured.
- Thermonuclear attacks on city centers differ greatly from bombings in WWII, because
one 10 megaton weapon is equivalent to five times the explosive power of all bombs
dropped on Germany during all four years of war.
- Material and psychological impacts will be compounded by radiation effects, thus
thermonuclear attacks can become the symbol of vanity of human strivings
Nuclear Effects on Outskirts
- If a city is subject to blast, the surrounding areas will have collateral radioactive fallout
o comprised of fission (force liberated by break-up of atoms) and fusion (process of
combining atoms)
o most of the fallout is caused by what is produced from fission
o Hydrogen bombs have little to no radioactivity
o Thermonuclear devices operate in three stages: fission-> fusion -> more powerful
fission reaction
So What?
Kissinger’s “The Fires of Prometheus” should be studied when considering war and peace,
because he clearly outlines the tragedies that will occur on a nationwide scale in terms of nuclear
fallout and power. He believes:
- A large city will not be able to rely on countryside for anything, because fallout will
contaminate all crops and water supply
- All-out war with modern weapons will have unprecedented consequences. Blast/heat
effects will halt modern urban life, while genetic effects could threaten the entire human
race.
- An important problem of strategy is the relationship between power and how to use it.
- Identification of deterrence with retaliatory power may provide a baseline for peace
Harvard Nuclear Study Group “How Might A Nuclear War Begin?”
Intro
- Nuclear war would begin similarly to past wars in thew ay that governments see a way
for easy political/military gains.
- Governments may see nuclear war as the lesser of two evils
- not all paths to nuclear war can be foreseen, and murphy’s law is applicable (if something
can go wrong, it will)
Scenarios
The Bolt from the Blue
Outlines a soviet reaction to an American buildup of military defenses. In order to react to this
threat, the Soviets have extreme confidence in their military strength and surmise that they can
end the “capitalist threat forever” by destroying it before it gains in strength and becomes even
more of a threat.
- The Harvard Nuclear Study Group (HNSG) argues that this is possible but definitely not
likely and is in fact one of the most unlikely scenarios for the start of nuclear war because
all American forces would have to be very vulnerable, Soviet ballistic missiles and airdefense would have to be very technologically advanced, and technical difficulty would
halt prospects of a surprise Soviet attack.
- This scenario would only be possible if relations were completely deteriorated, with
American defenses depleting while Soviet armament was built up significantly.
A Limited Attack on the Minuteman Missiles
This scenario outlines an attack by the USSR on Minuteman silos, in which they send a message
when the first warhead is launched stating that they will spare American cities if the US does not
retaliate, and the US gives in to Soviet demands in Europe. In response, Washington finds that
15 million Americans just died in the soviet attack and an American response will trigger Soviet
retaliation on population centers. The question is: should the president launch a retaliatory strike
or abide by Soviet demands?
- The HNSG argues that the Soviets would try to reduce American retaliation, and they
would not have much to gain by attacking US ICBMs alone.
- This scenario is not very likely, because if nuclear forces were to be used, they would be
used on a massive scale.
A Pre-Emptive War
This scenario explores what it would be like if the Soviets had warned the US that if NATO
deployed any missiles in Western Europe, they would take retaliatory steps. Ultimately, the
Soviets then set an attack on America, killing 35 million Americans.
- The HNSG states that a preemptive war scenario like this one would be a possibility in a
desperate situation.
- Conditions that might increase the likelihood of this are leaders believing there is an
intended strike, believing that the other side can carry out a disarming strike, and being
convinced that launching a preemptive attack would reduce casualties.
- This scenario is a reminder that security of both sides is dependent on who strikes first
Escalation: Conventional Steps to Nuclear War
This scenario outlines a credible attack during peacetime in which a Soviet or American leader
might launch a full nuclear attack. The question is, will the war escalate to full nuclear power or
a settlement?
- In a scenario like this one, a leader is more likely to authorize a small number of weapons
instead of a large number. But it could be possible that when conventional war begins,
escalation may lead to nuclear war.
- In this scenario, maintenance of firebreak is the goal to avoid all out nuclear war.
Tragic Accidents/ Regional Nuclear War/ Catalytic War
In a scenario where a nuclear war begins by accident, or between two armed countries, these
assumptions are incorrect because situations that may cause these conditions to arise might not
affect other nations.
So What?
This article by the HNSG is imperative to understanding war games and simulating an
environment where peace might not be an option. They surmise that:
- Decisions are not always deliberate- It is misleading to concentrate on number of nuclear weapons when looking at likelihood
of war
- It is incorrect to assume all out nuclear exchange is the only type of nuclear war possible
- Design of nuclear war must be considered
- Horrible nuclear futures are not inevitable, but they are possible
- There are infinite scenarios, and almost all can be counteredYou can also read
