Latin America Between a Rock and a Hard Place: A Second Cold War and the Active Non-Alignment Option
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Global Policy, October 2020 Latin America Between a Rock and a Hard Place: A Second Cold War and the Active Non-Alignment Option Carlos Fortín, Jorge Heine and Carlos Ominami Emerging Global Governance The COVID-19 pandemic has brought to the Although it may last a couple of years, this fore the helplessness of a fragmented Latin pandemic will eventually pass. What will not America, unable to cope with global pass is the helplessness of a fragmented challenges. Although the virus took time to region that finds itself in its weakest position reach the region, once it arrived, it did so in many decades. Far from reducing with a vengeance. It triggered a chaotic international tensions, the pandemic has response, with each country haphazardly exacerbated geopolitical rivalry. It has also acting on its own. Borders were closed given a strong boost to a Second Cold War, overnight, tens of thousands of travelers this time between the United States and were left stranded, governments competed China. While US authorities talked about the for medical equipment, and almost no inter- "Chinese virus," and the "Wuhan virus," a governmental coordination took place on an Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson issue that, by definition, transcends national suggested that the virus might have been borders. In September of 2020, with 8 per generated by the United States. Washington cent of the world’s population, Latin America has expelled numerous Chinese journalists had 30 per cent of world’s fatalities from the from the United States, an action Beijing has pandemic. reciprocated. Several bills have been introduced in the United States Senate to That shouldn't have been the case. A decade restrict trade, investment and scientific ago, there were regional cooperation research and student flows with China. agreements on health under the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR) and the What will the impact of a Second Cold War Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR, which be on Latin America? could have helped alleviate the impact of this Will we see a repeat performance of what crisis, the largest that humanity has happened in the four decades of the first experienced since World War II, according to Cold War, in which the lack of regional unity United Nations Secretary-General Antonio and collective action left it at the mercy of Guterres. the two superpowers of the time, paying a 1
Global Policy, October 2020 very high price for it ? Or is it that, seventy Warren and Senate Minority Leader Chuck years later, these countries, now presumably Schumer, favor an even tougher policy more mature and developed, can manage toward China. Those who believe that the their own affairs without being manipulated election of a Democrat to the presidency in by others ? What should they do to achieve the November election would bring about a this goal? drastic change in US-Chinese relations are wrong. According to a Pew Research survey, The purpose of this essay is to answer that the perception of China in U.S. public opinion question, perhaps the most important has deteriorated in recent years. While in facing the region today. The first section 2017, 47 per cent had a unfavorable opinion below examines what is triggering the of China and 44 per cent an favourable one, Second Cold War; the second outlines why in 2020, these figures had changed to 73 per this puts Latin America at a crossroads; the cent and 22 percent respectively. Focus third proposes active non-alignment as the groups consulted by Democratic candidates sensible global policy option; and the fourth report anti-China positions are popular. A elaborates on what this would entail, in Harris poll in early April 2020 showed that 66 terms of policy recommendation, and per cent of Republicans and 38 per cent of provides some brief concluding thoughts. Democrats are in favor of Trump adopting an A movie we have already seen even tougher policy against China on trade. During a visit to the United Kingdom in On the other hand, the increased February of 2020, US Secretary of State Mike concentration of power held by President Xi Pompeo remarked that "the Chinese Jinping in China, the nationalist positions Communist Party is the central threat of our taken by China under his leadership, and time." The phrase, uttered only a few weeks China's more assertive foreign policy in after the United States signed an agreement recent years makes it difficult for the Chinese with China that seemed to signal a truce in government to accommodate Washington's the trade war they have waged since 2018, growing demands. The more personalized reflects the extent to which tensions leadership style of Xi Jinping (in contrast to between Washington and Beijing are no the collective leadership exercised by Jiang longer just about trade. They have moved Zemin (1992-2002) and Hu Jintao (2002- from trade to foreign investment, 2012), means he cannot ignore the very same technology, and cyber and espionage, as the nationalist embers he has stoked. United States ordered the closing of the We are at the dawn of a Second Cold War, Chinese consulate in Houston in July of 2020, this time not between the United States and which was reciprocated by China ordering the Soviet Union, but between the United the closure of the US consulate in Chengdu. States and the People's Republic of China. In This downhill course in US-China links is not this new version, the year 2020 is the just due to President Trump's idiosyncrasies equivalent of 1950. or personal preferences. If there is one That said, there are at least two differences aspect of US foreign policy that garners between the current situation and the one bipartisan support, it is China. Democratic seventy years ago. On the one hand, China's Party leaders, such as Senator Elizabeth 12
Global Policy, October 2020 economy is much larger than the Soviet has relied too much on U.S. investment and economy ever was. In fact, China's economy technology. The Chinese leadership is putting is already larger than the US economy in more emphasis on developing China’s own terms of purchasing power parity. Projections scientific and technological capacities, as well indicate that it will be larger than the US as on indigenous innovation, and seeking to economy in nominal terms by about 2030. reduce reliance on the United States and On the other hand, in a globalized world, Western suppliers amid more “hostile both economies are much more imbricated external world conditions.” They are also than the American and Soviet economies calling for boosting growth based on ever were. In 2018, bilateral trade exceeded domestic consumption, more than on US$700 billion, and mutual investments in exports, long the engine of the Chinese both countries are also very significant, in the economy. hundreds of billions of dollars. Apple, the Latin America at a crossroads world's most valuable company, with a market capitalization of US$2 trillion, This is the international scenario that manufactures much of its flagship product, confronts Latin America at the start of this the iPhone, in China. new decade. From 2010-2019, the region's growth did not exceed an average of 1.9% In technology, China has made great strides. per annum, the worst of any region in the Although the United States holds the lead in world (Africa achieved 4.4 per cent growth many areas of high-tech, including the during the same period). This performance in production of chips, China is at the forefront Latin America was even lower than that of of telecommunications with 5G technology, the so-called "lost decade" of the 1980s. In leading Washington to an international 2019 it grew a mere 0.8. Given the impact of campaign to ban its deployment by Huawei, a the pandemic, projections for 2020 are of a Chinese company. In its approach to global negative growth of 9 per cent, the worst trade governance, the Trump administration performance of any developing region. has taken a protectionist and isolationist stance, hand in hand with the application of From a broader global perspective, the most unilateral trade sanctions and embargoes, to significant fact regarding the region´s the detriment of the liberal international international political economy in the new order it once championed. This has left China century, has been the increased presence of in the curious position of defender of global China. Today, China is South America's economic multilateralism and rules-based leading trading partner, having displaced the resolution of differences between nations. United States and the EU. Trade between China and Latin America grew rapidly, from One proposal on the table in the United $10 billion in 2000 to $310 billion in 2018. States has been the “decoupling” of the two Something similar can be said about Chinese economies. This means discouraging and investments in the region since 2010, and the reducing trade, investment and even the financial flows from Chinese banks, which in flows of people between the two countries some years have been higher than those of (which in January 2020 reached 10,000 the World Bank, IMF, the Inter-American people daily). But conditions have worsened Development Bank and the Corporation of as China’s leaders have concluded that China 13
Global Policy, October 2020 Andean Development (CAF) combined. For of “mask diplomacy” activities in the wake of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay, the COVID-19 pandemic. China is its number one trading partner, and This puts the region between a rock and a for most other South American countries, it is hard place. The relationship with the United number two. States, part of the Western Hemisphere and Since 2017, three Latin American countries the world's hegemon, is of long-standing and (Panama, Dominican Republic, and El reflected in close ties along many Salvador) have broken diplomatic ties with dimensions. If there is one thing these Taiwan and established diplomatic relations countries cannot do, it is to break up with with the People's Republic of China. Nineteen Washington. At the same time, relations with countries in the region have signed China, while much more recent, and focused Memoranda de Understanding on the Belt mainly on economics, have become crucial to and Road Initiative, China's flagship foreign the region’s foreign trade, its economies, its policy project under Xi Jinping. Eight South infrastructure and energy sector American countries have joined the Beijing- development. A quarter of the agricultural based Asian Investment and Infrastructure products that China imports come from four Bank (AIIB) -- although only Ecuador and Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay have fulfilled the requirements to Chile and Uruguay). China is the largest become full members. investor in the mining sector in Peru and the largest buyer of copper, iron, oil and But conditions have changed under the soybeans in South America. The region's Trump presidency. Although the Chinese boom between 2003-2013, during the presence in the region was tolerated by commodities super-cycle was largely due to Washington during President Obama's Chinese demand. Breaking up with Beijing is administration, this has changed under the also a no-no. Trump administration. Visits by the US Secretary of State and the Secretary of What is to be done? Defense to various countries in the region to Active Non-Alignment as the Option denounce the Chinese presence are now the rule. Washington's message is that the In the 1950s, at the beginning of the First traditional position of Latin American foreign Cold War, countries in Africa, Asia and Latin ministries, of wanting to have good relations America faced a similar dilemma. Stuck then both with the United States and China, is with a choice between Washington and unacceptable, and that the time has come to Moscow, some opted for a "third way." A choose between Washington and Beijing. For total of 29 heads of state from Asia and Washington, Latin America must align itself Africa met at the Bandung conference in with its positions, restrict trade with China, 1955, in Indonesia, under the leadership of and not accept any further Chinese President Sukarno of Indonesia, Jawaharlal investment. China, for its part, has increased Nehru of India, China’s Prime Minister Zhou its charm offensive in the region, with Enlai, and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. This initiatives such as the China-Community of meeting led to the founding of the Non- Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Aligned Movement (NAM), as formally Ministerial Forum, and an ambitious program announced at its First Summit in Belgrade. 14
Global Policy, October 2020 The NAM led to subsequent related entities, the North or the advanced Western nations, such as the Group of 77 in the United the diplomacy of the cahier des doleances Nations, which is still active today, albeit with practiced by the NAM and related entities, a lower profile. An English sociologist, Peter with proposals such as the New International Worsley, taking a page from the role played Economic Order (NOEI) in the 1970s, by the so-called Third Estate in the French demanding massive transfers of resources Revolution, would later baptize these from North to South, were futile exercises countries as the “Third World”, with the First that showed little understanding of how the being that of developed countries, and the world economy works. Second that of the socialist camp. Yet, there is little doubt that for more than NAM did not have the same regional-wide three decades, the non-aligned movement buy-in in Latin America as it did in Africa and was seen by its proponents as an alternative Asia, though there were exceptions. Cuba to automatic subordination, whether to was the one country in the region present at Washington or Moscow, and provided a the Belgrade Summit. It also hosted the 1979 valuable platform for developing countries to and 2006 summits. Chile joined in 1971, but represent their own interests. It played a key was suspended after the coup d'etat in 1973, role in pressing for the decolonization agenda and it resumed its membership in 1991. In in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. It allowed Argentina, which joined in 1973, Juan for the creation of differing international Domingo Perón saw it as providing a coalitions of various kinds, as well as for a benchmark for Argentine foreign policy, rationale for meeting for countries on three alluding to the traditional Peronist "third very different continents. Its basic principles, position". However, in 1991, during the the “ten principles of Bandung”, including government of Juan Carlos Menem, support for the independence and autonomy Argentina withdrew from the Movement. of developing countries, the United Nations, Colombia, in turn, chaired it from 1995-1998. defending the principle of non-intervention Venezuela hosted the NAM summit in 2012. and the peaceful resolution of disputes, Brazil and Mexico have had an ambivalent remain current, even if their economic attitude toward NAM, and participated as demands no longer do. observers, but never joined as full members. At a time when a new Cold War is beginning, As of 2020, 14 Latin American and 13 when Latin American regionalism is going Caribbean countries are members of NAM, through a deep crisis, and when the region’s which now has 117 member countries. ministries of foreign affairs have no answers However, the three largest countries in the on how to deal with this geopolitical region, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, are not dilemma, a policy of active non-alignment members of NAM. should be considered. The NAM has received its fair share of Do not get us wrong. This is not a question of criticism. According to the skeptics, non- resurrecting anachronistic foreign policy alignment was merely a thinly veiled disguise approaches. On the contrary, we are for countries like Nehru’s India and Castro’s proposing an up-to-date alternative, attuned Cuba, that were allegedly nothing but Soviet to the imperatives of the new century. The fellow travelers. For other critics, often from 15
Global Policy, October 2020 key notion is to maximize the benefits for the disintegration and a concomitant reduction region’s integration into international trade, in the ability to influence global affairs. investment and financing flows, but also to preserve policy space and policy instruments CELAC, whose pro tempore presidency has that allow the countries of the region to been taken over by Mexico, in a define and implement their own national commendable effort to rescue it from development models. In turn, such an oblivion, is the most inclusive of these approach should also help to build a entities. In January 2020, Mexico presented democratic and inclusive international an ambitious work plan for the year at a governance arrangements that combine meeting attended by 29 countries. It includes global interdependence and national and 14 projects, including aerospace and regional autonomy. aeronautical cooperation, natural resource risk management, sustainable ocean An agenda for active non-alignment management, and an anti-corruption In these terms, rather than trying to simply program. Mexico also called for the “make do” with existing international resumption of joint initiatives in international arrangements, Latin American countries organizations, as well as to strengthen should realize the depth of the current crisis, contacts with extra-regional partners, such as the degree to which the region risks being the European Union, China, India, Russia, marginalized, and embrace a new approach Turkey and South Korea. to their international relations. This should include the following: However, CELAC's balance sheet over its first decade is modest, and any effort in this 1) Strengthening regionalism. Right now, direction must include all fronts, including Latin America could hardly be more Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, and a fragmented. Unasur has ceased to exist. possible convergence between the two. Mercosur is at its weakest moment in many years. The newly created Prosur is little more The de minimis approach to regional entities, than a WhatsApp group. In times of major with no budget and no permanent change in the international order, this is a secretariat, has been a failure, and should be problem. To paraphrase Henry Kissinger, "If I reconsidered. The notion, already part of want to talk to Latin America, what number conventional wisdom, that 33 countries, with should I dial? ", does not have an obvious a total population of 650 million people, are answer. The great danger is that individual unable to pay for any sort of regional body is Latin American countries may seek ways, on no longer credible. their own, to deepen their integration with the main centers of the world economy. The 2) Reorienting foreign policies: Despite result may well be a subordinate integration considerable changes in the global economy, of some countries to the main world centers, and the fact that South-South trade and and permanently reproduce ad aeternum the investment flows now make up about half of current primary-export model. This would go such global flows, Latin American foreign hand in hand with deepening regional ministries still seem trapped in a time warp. The bulk of its budgetary, human and 16
Global Policy, October 2020 administrative resources are allocated to its plan announced by President Trump in early traditional partners of yesteryear, i.e. North 2020, designed to support the re-election of America and Western Europe. Asia and Africa PM Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, was remain as an afterthought. A foreign policy profusely praised in statements from the that gives priority to current realities is long ministries of foreign affairs of both Brazil and overdue. Chile-- although the plan contradicts long- standing policies followed by both countries 3) Grasping that there are new towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The international financial institutions. Few things fact that both countries lay claim to better reflect the power of inertia and the traditions of independent and relatively capture of the region's ministries of finance consistent foreign policies, and that by by the World Bank and the IMF, than the fact undertaking such rash actions they merely that of eight prospective members from the diminished their own standing and credibility, region in the Asian Investment and only aggravates the problem. Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), five years after committing to join, only three have passed Something similar can be said in relation to the required national legislation, and only Chinese policy on foreign investment and two have paid their dues and are now full international cooperation issues. In members: Ecuador and Uruguay. The December 2017, at the WTO, in Geneva, amounts involved are nominal so it is not a China signed a Joint Ministerial Declaration matter of resources. Refusing to be part of calling for "initiating structured discussions to these new entities, despite the many develop a multilateral framework on opportunities they offer, reflects an investment facilitation". China thus anachronistic mindset, one fixed on the abandoned its traditional opposition to the world as it was in 1945, rather than in 2020. inclusion of investment among WTO Something similar could be said of the disciplines. The reality is that it is very capitulation of a majority of the countries of difficult to separate the issue of investment the region in the face of pressure from the facilitation from issues of investor access to United States, to elect, in September of 2020, the domestic market and investment for the first time since its inception in 1959 a protection. A possible facilitation agreement U.S. citizen to the presidency of the Inter- could impair the ability of host nation-states American Development Bank. This broke a to select foreign investors and investment long-standing, albeit unwritten, agreement and could open the door to indiscriminate that the head of the Bank would always be a liberalization of FDI flows and the Latin American. It is part of the current White penetration of foreign capital into developing House’s effort to exert full control over the economies. An active non-alignment Bank to better harness its resources to keep approach should reiterate the opposition to China and other extra-regional powers out of establishing international obligations that the Western Hemisphere. deprive nation-States of the ability to select and impose obligations on foreign investors. 4) Keeping an equal distance from both Superpowers in fueling geopolitical and In turn, China has also been reluctant to geoeconomic rivalry. The Middle East peace accept recipient requests to apply global aid 17
Global Policy, October 2020 effectiveness measures to China’s aid, different situation from that of the Soviet including agreeing to external third-party Union in its days. This is not a question of evaluation, in other words to make its aid ideology. Conservative governments have as subject to independent international review. much to lose as progressives or centrists. The An active non-alignment approach should challenge lies in how to convey this message underscore the importance of all aid-givers and how the region perceives the global abiding to a universal and transparent challenge it now faces. development cooperation mechanism, such as the United Nations Forum on Cooperation for Development, to assess the effects of international development cooperation. Carlos Fortín is an Emeritus Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University of Sussex. He is a former UNCTAD To conclude, the first Cold War had dire Assistant Secretary General, and a former consequences for Latin America, some of Director of Research at the South Commission which reverberate to this day. Guatemala in in Geneva. 1954, Dominican Republic in 1965, Chile in 1973, Granada in 1983 and Panama in 1989, Jorge Heine is a Research Professor at the are just some of the most visible examples. Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, Cuba continues to pay a high price. Boston University. He has served as Chile’s ambassador of Chile to China, to India and to There is no reason to think that the Second South Africa, and as a Cabinet minister. Cold War would not have similar consequences. The difference is that, this Carlos Ominami is Director of the Chile 21 time, the economic stakes are much higher, Foundation. He has served as Chile’s minister given the size of the Chinese economy and its of Economic Affairs, and as a Senator in the considerable presence in the region, a very Chilean Congress (1993-2009). 18
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