Knowledge and society facing the risk of bird flu in Turkey
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Knowledge and society facing the risk of bird flu
in Turkey
Berna Beyhan* and Huriye Aygoren**
*STPS, Middle East Technical University, Ankara Turkey
**STS, Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey
September, 2006
__________________________________________________________________
Abstract:
Turkey first faced bird flu in October 2005. After a 20 days quarantine period, the government
announced that “bird flu was completely exterminated in Turkey”. However, in January 2006
public anxiety had been alerted with the first human death and three more followed. This sad
experience has brought about questions regarding to (1) the construction and communication of
knowledge which is essential to the public perception of risk; (2) the perceived performance and
trustworthiness of institutions and agents in terms of responding to risk related issues.
In this research, our perspective is that these questions are essential to understand the
relationship between knowledge and society in terms of construction, perception and
communication of risk. Mainly, three institutions are analyzed in this research: government, the
representative body of medical scientists and mass media. This research is organized through two
phases. In the first phase, press releases, reports and programs published by these institutions are
analyzed. In the second phase we present the findings we deducted from face-to-face interviews
with lay people who live in two different cities, Istanbul and Van.
__________________________________________________________________
Introduction:
Turkey first faced bird flu in October 2005, however public anxiety had been alerted with the
first human death and three more followed in early January, 2006. This sad experience has
brought about questions regarding to, first, the construction and communication of knowledge
which is essential to the public perception of risk; and second the perceived performance and
trustworthiness of institutions and agents in terms of responding to risk related issues. Thisresearch is inspired by the desire to examine the construction, mediation and communication of
different knowledge claims based on the concept of risk in Turkish Society by tracing emergence
of bird flu within the society. Our study covers a period of one year i.e. from August 2005 to
date.
Risk scholars agree that, even if the concept of risk is taken as purely physical, ‘such
physical risks are always created and effected in social systems, for example by organizations
and institutions which are supposed to manage and control the risky activity’, in addition the
magnitude of the physical risks is therefore a direct function of the quality of social relations and
processes (Lash and Wynne, 1992, p:4). Therefore, it can be argued that explanation and
interpretation of risk attitudes mandates an examination of different knowledge claims while
considering particularly different interests of and complex interrelationships between involving
institutions in contemporary times.
While discussing the significance of knowledge raised in risk discourses in the late
modern era, Beck (1992), emphasizes the complex interrelationhips between these entities and
how knowledge, especially the scientific knowledge, gains an economic and political
significance which was a rarity before, modern and pre-modern times, in effect he argues ‘in
modern times being determined consciousness but in risk positions consciousness (knowledge)
determines being’ (p: 23). On the other hand, for Mary Douglas (1992), the concept of
knowledge in relation to risk possesses static significance since in risk situations knowledge is
always insufficient and ambiguities surrounding the area are always a part of risky-situations,
rather what is significant about knowledge is to what extent the knowledge represents the
political regime one supports (p:19). In other words, the cultural worldviews in essence are
responses to risk issues; moreover they are ‘complicit in the production of risks’ (Lupton, 1999,
p: 51), thus knowledge in risk discourses should be inquired within socio-cultural processes.
Informed by these accounts, we examine Turkish society’s responses towards the risk of
bird flu within the social and cultural frameworks. Moreover, as emphasized by Adam and van
Loon (2000, p:3), in our research, we aimed to challenge not only ‘to analyze people’s
perceptions, definitions and legitimations of risks’ but also to explore “the mutual constitution of
implicit assumptions’ and ‘mediation of otherwise inaccessible knowledge”. Thus the knowledge
claims raised by the social, political, scientific and economic actors and by the public in their
everyday lives have been scrutinized by considering the issue’s complexity and involving the
parties’ responses through their specific characteristics, interests and interdependencies.
We construct our research mainly in three distinct spheres. The first part, is a background
section, we examine mainly three different institutions: the government, national and local media
and Turkish Medical Association (NGO) through several media outcomes, news, TV programs,
press releases, secondary resorces and face-to-face interviews.
Briefly, the socio-cultural and economic conditions of people, who experienced poultry
and human deaths due to bird flu, were which the government concentrated on. In addition the
government relied on the the power of mass media to communicate this constructed knowledge
-2-to the public. Therefore, the construction of risk by mass media was mostly in line with the
government’s stance towards bird flu and limited its coverage with the concerns of the public
living in urbanized areas. On the other hand, in the local media, local concerns of lay people
were dominantly voiced.
Turkish Medical Association constructed risk knowledge both based on the universal
scientific information as well as putting into consideration the special conditions of the country.
The Association critically assessed the government’s way of managing the risk and their crical
opposition was, in fact, a response to non-autonomous characteristics of science and / or
scientists in Turkey
In the findings section, we examine lay people’s responses through face-to-face
interviews held in two different cities, Istanbul and Van. The findings reveal that the
interviewees construct and communicate risk knowledge based on a set of different factors which
are dynamicly prioritized relying upon weighted importance of these for the interviewees. Hence,
the public respond through perceived performance and trustworthiness of the involving
institutions, their sense of ability to access to eligible information, their personal experiences,
daily routines, economic and social factors, constructed social and cultural identities.
In our conclusion and further thoughts section, we compare and investigate our findings
in order to articulate the interrelationships and conflicts raised by different entities. This section
proposes deeper discussions on the way to explaining the risk issue in a broader context; ideally,
operationalizing risk disputes in a non-western society.
Theoretical Framework
The relation between knowledge and risk has attracted the attention of sociologists and
anthropologists over the last two decades. In social scientific literature the phenomenon of risk
and its relationship with knowledge are addressed in different ways. One major approach to risk
is that of cognitive science, based in psychology. According to this perspective, risks are out
there in nature and they can be identified through scientific measurement and calculation and,
controlled using knowledge. This perspective is mainly interested in identifying the ways in
which people respond cognitively and behaviourally to risk (Lupton, 1999, p: 17-9). On the other
hand, socio-cultural perspective’s emphasis on the importance of social and cultural contexts in
which risk is understood and negotiated are also worth noting. In this paper our theoretical
framework will be limited within the different understandings of risk and risk knowledge in
socio-cultural perspectives.
One of the prominent figures in risk studies, Mary Douglas (1992) defines risk as a
socially constructed interpretation; and according to her, knowledge about risk is mediated
through socio-cultural processes (p: 39). In her view, risk does not depend on mere knowledge
but also on what kind of people we are; between science and subjective perception of risk,
therein lays culture which is an area of shared beliefs and values (Caplan, 2000, p:8). While her
-3-theoretical approach has been influential as a perspective which first emphasizes that risk
judgements are constructed through cultural frameworks, her approach is criticized as tending to
be static in some ways, especially in providing explanations for how things might change with
regards to risk and danger (Lupton, 1999, p:56)
On the other hand, Beck (1992) much more prioritizes knowledge, especially expert
knowledge systems. According to him (p: 23), risks “can be changed, magnified, dramatized and
minimized within knowledge”, and “in risk positions consciousness determines being”; so
“knowledge gains a new political significance”. Beck (p: 46) argues that the social and economic
importance of knowledge and therefore the power over the media to structure and disseminate it
grows simultaneously in risk society. However, throughout these arguments, Beck can be
criticized for giving credence to the role of experts to define and construct risks and perspectives
on risk provided by expert knowledge systems (Lupton, 1999, p:108). At this point it is
important to reveal the notions of risk society and reflexivity in Beck’s analysis.
According to Beck (1992), the concept of risk must be understood within the interests
and institutional designs of modernity. Along with the notions of modernity, Beck projects his
thesis based on three distinctive but not mutually exclusive phases. First phase is pre-modernity
(feudal era), the second is simple or first modernity and the last is reflexive modernity. In his
projection, the first modernity is mapped to the industrial society and the reflexive modernity to
the ‘risk society’ in which wealth distribution is replaced by risk distribution (p: 21). Beck (p:
22) defines risk “as a systemic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and
introduced by modernization itself”.
In Beck’s terms (1992, p: 72), “risk consciousness is neither a traditional nor a lay
person’s consciousness, but is essentially determined by and oriented to the science”, because
“everyday consciousness does not see, and can not perceive most of the risks such as
radioactivity, pollutants or threats in the future” (p:73). What that means is that public lose their
cognitive sovereignty; the harmful, threatening, inimical lies in wait everywhere, but whether it
is inimical or friendly is beyond one’s own power of judgment, and is reversed for the
assumptions, methods and controversies of external knowledge producers” (p: 53). But the issue
is that the shifted meaning and erosion of the position and role of science in the risk society
mostly results from “the science’s insistence on strict proof of causality” (p: 63), “intensive
forms of specialization” and “economic cyclopia of techno-scientific rationality” (p: 60). Hence
‘the history of the growing consciousness and social recognition of risks coincides with the
history of the demystification of the sciences (p:59). Therefore this failure of techno-scientific
rationality in the face of growing risks lies in the origin of the critique of science and technology
(p: 59). In this sense “the ‘risk society’ is also potentially a self-critical or self-reflexive society,
because anxieties about risks serve to pose questions about current practices” (Lupton and
Tulloch, 2002, p: 318). This situation brought about scepticisms on lay people’s side when
accepting the judgements and advice of experts on face value but actively seeking their trust in
them by assessing their worth and credibility (ibid.).
-4-Therefore we can argue that, according to Beck, people do not evaluate the risk definitions of
experts as taken for granted because people are aware of conflicts and disagreements among
various expert knowledge systems and therefore they try to attain as much information as
possible before assessing their worth and credibility. Information and knowledge are important
in risk society to define and avoid risks and so people are more dependent on knowledge and
information. To Beck (p: 46), risk society is “also science, media and information society”.
However, Beck is criticized for his notion of reflexivity since it presupposes a rational
calculating actor who chooses rationally between various perspectives on risk provided by expert
knowledge systems (Lupton, 1999, p: 108). Moreover Wynne (1996, p: 45) argues that what
Beck does is the uncritical reproduction of realists concept of scientific knowledge and therefore
overlooks the lay knowledge and misconceives its relationships with expert knowledge (p: 59).
According to Wynne (1992, p: 281-2) people’s experience of risks can never be a purely
intellectual process, about reception of knowledge rather they experience these in the form of
material social relations and they define and judge the risk, the risk information and the scientific
knowledge related to this risk as part and parcel of that social package. For Wynne (p: 283),
“understanding and knowledge is a function of social solidarity mediated by the relational
elements of trust, dependency and social identity”. Therefore Wynne (1993, p: 324) expands the
definition of the notion of reflexivity as “the process of identifying, and critically examining the
basic, pre-analytic assumptions that frame knowledge-commitments”. With this definition of
reflexivity, Wynne recognizes the ways in which lay people generate their own situated
knowledge in constructing risks and responding to experts’ interpretations and definitions on risk
(Lupton, 1999, p: 108).
Wynne (1996, p: 50) argues that public relationships with expertise and its institutions
has always been reflexive in a more hermeneutical sense than the rational – calculative model.
Wynne also criticizes the notion of trust in experts and their institutions; according to him the
trust of public to experts and their institutions is not a positive trust but a ‘virtual’ or ‘as-if’ trust;
this means that “even when people do… believe and trust in them, this trust is much more
conditional and indeed more fragile than the notion of simple modernity reflects”. Thus lay
relationships with expertise are routinely more skeptical, more ambivalent and more alienated
from expert institutions (p: 52). Lash and Wynne (1992; p:7) highlight that lay people’s
response to risk is not a response to expert knowledge systems as Beck underlines but it is multi-
layered as a form of private reflexivity (Lupton, 1999, p: 109). This kind of reflexivity blurs the
boundaries between the ‘private’ and the ‘public’; therefore risks may be debated at the level of
expertise and public accountability, and are dealt with by individuals at the level of the local, the
private, the everyday and the intimate (Lupton and Tulloch, 2001, p:14).
-5-Research design and methodology
This study covers two phases of research. In the first phase, our research is based on secondary
resources, especially on media coverage, both national and local, press releases of the
government and experts, in particular, Turkish Medical Association. Second phase of the
research is constructed on the base of face to face in-depth interviews to understand how lay
people had constructed the knowledge of bird flu risk.
In this second phase, qualitative research methods were used, to be more specific, in-
depth interviews. A range of lay people living in Istanbul and Van were interviewed. These two
cities were chosen due to disparities exemplified below. Istanbul was chosen, first of all, because
it is the biggest city in Turkey. Its population is ten times more than Van’s. Second, it is
economically a well developed city, with its 22,1% share in total GDP. Third, the share of
university and high school graduates are 7% and 14.7% respectively in Istanbul. On the other
hand, the share of Van in total GDP is just 0.5 %; and education level decreases to 2.75% and
9.3% respectively1
Apart from these demographic figures; Istanbul is geographically far away – nearly 1700
kilometers - from the region where human death cases of bird flu had been occurred. However,
people living in Van experienced, if not the human death cases, but the human infections.
Moreover, many infected patients were treated at the university hospital in Van.
Above all, previous studies carried out by Caplan’s (2000) study of British people’s
responses to the BSE (or mad cow disease) and Lupton and Tulloch’s (2002) study on risk as a
part of life were the guides for our decision to choose two different locations. As expressed by
Lupton and Tulloch (2003, p:10) the geographical and social context in which people made their
decisions is very vital for people to construct the knowledge regarding to risk and their risk
perceptions.
Our overall sampling strategy was purposeful; it was focused on purposefully selected
cases. As emphasized by Patton (1990, p:169) the logic and power of this kind of sampling lie in
selecting information-rich cases for study in depth. There are several different strategies for
purposefully selecting information-rich cases. The logic of each strategy serves a particular
evaluation purpose. Moreover there is no one and the most appropriate strategy. What strategy
you choose depends on what you want to get at the end.
While doing our research in these two cities, our sampling strategy was maximum
variation (Patton, 1990, 172). With this strategy, we aimed to capture and describe the central
themes. However, while using this strategy, our aim was not to generalize findings of this
research to all people or all groups but we looked for information that elucidates variations and
significant common patterns within that variation.
1
These statistical data were taken from the Turkish Statistical Institute [www.tuik.gov.tr]
-6-Participants were interviewed by us; however they were reached by gatekeepers who were local
residents of cities with established local social-networks. We used these gatekeepers’ pre-
existing social networks and snowball-sampling for recruiting participants. In Istanbul we
contacted to three gatekeepers, one is the local resident of a small providence where middle and
lower middle class families are located, the second one is the owner of a textile company who
provided us an access to qualified and unqualified employees; the third one is the local resident
of a providence where, in general, upper middle class families prefer to live. Our aim to choose
these gatekeepers was not to reemphasize the importance of social class and occupation as the
primary determinant of socio cultural identity but rather to explore Beck’s (1992) notion of
industrial modernity and risk modernity in an intensively urbanized metropolis like Istanbul
including both high tech industries and traditional sectors. In Van, we contacted to two
gatekeepers both were the local residents of the city.
We interviewed 26 people in Istanbul and 14 in Van, individually. Their ages differ
between 18 and 65. All these participants were interviewed in their houses or offices. These
interviews, except 5 in Istanbul and 4 in Van, were recorded, however since these nine
individuals do not want us to record, we just took notes.
The interviews we used in this research were semi-structured and directed at investigating
participants’ experiences and knowledge of bird flu as a risk threatening their lives in the context
of their everyday lives. Although our interview schedule covers certain topics and themes, we
were not strict on the structure and time while doing these interviews. We covered all topics in
our interviews but also there was a scope for flexibility and we let our interviewees to explain
their concerns and anxieties about the topic. We believe that, semi-structured interviews allowed
for a much freer exchange between us and our interviewees.
As aware of that analysis in qualitative researches depends on clarity of purpose (Patton,
1990, p:374) and there are no absolute rules to fairly represent the data, and communicate what
the data reveal given the purpose of the study (p: 372), we tried to follow the ways of analysis
made previous studies on risk and risk knowledge. In this study, the data were analyzed for the
ways in which the interviewees understand the risk, construct the knowledge regarding to the
risk in their everyday lives and percept the risk. Our focus is to identify dominant discourses,
shared values, ways and experiences and also explore the differences among perceptions and
discourses of people who live in different locations and socio cultural geographies.
As a conclusion, we need to emphasize that despite maximum variation sampling strategy, we
cannot claim that our findings can be generalized to all Turkish population or even all population
in these two cities. What we claim is limited with our argument that the in-depth data collected in
this research is valuable to understand how our interviewees understand risk, expert knowledge,
and how they construct and communicate the knowledge regarding to the risk of bird flu in their
everyday lives in the light of their previous experiences, daily routines and cultures.
-7-Institutional response towards the risk of bird flu
First Wave: No human death case
Long before it was perceived as a risk to society, bird flu news were broadcasted on Turkish TV
screens and newspapers mostly as a disease that affected Far East Asia; more like a reality of
people living far away. The national contact or news about bird flu disease first appeared in mass
media in August 2005 to inform the society about the bird flu practice and an urgent plan as a
bureaucratic event recommended by European Union yet there was no real threat. 2
On the 7th of October 2005, the Turkish society was greeted with the news of the death
of two thousand turkeys’ at one of the farms in Manyas, a small town in the western Anatolia.
The declaration of the ministry of agriculture briefly stated that the virus caused poultry deaths
was not the same virus which had brought human death cases in Asia and thus there was no
threat to humans. However, the government took preventive actions such as announcing a start of
the quarantine period in this particular region and culling poultries fed in farms but not in
industrial poultry farms, dogs and cats on streets in order to prevent the spread of the disease to
further areas.3 In the days that followed, representatives of the government, including, the Prime
Minister and Minister of Agriculture blamed media channels for creating “information
pollution”, thus, exaggerating the issue.4
A few days later, European Union Commission declared that, the virus caused poultry
deaths was the same virus which could bring human deaths.5 This information was echoed both
in the internal market, which slowed down sales of poultry meat, eggs and egg-based products,
and abroad there was a ban on importing poultry from Turkey. The government however kept its
stance towards moderating the anxiety smoothly by inculcating the danger as if the ‘disease was
certainly limited within a particular area’ which was completely under control.6
However, on the 16th of October, CNN Turk TV announced that 6500 Chickens had died
in Ağrı, a city in the eastern Anatolia7. It was reported that these chickens had been purchased
from Bursa/Inegol, a town in the western Anatolia, in order to be sold in this region.
Nevertheless, government representatives never made a declaration regarding to this case in
particular. Later in January, The Prime Minister’s speech brought some suspicions and queries
2
CNNTurk. 2005, August, 28.
Online:http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=121144
3
Milliyet. 2005, October, 09. Online: http://www.milliyet.com/2005/10/09/yasam/ayas.html
4
CNNTurk. 2005, October, 10.
Online: http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=131373
5
European Commission Press Releases: Avian Flu in Turkey. 2005, October, 11.Reference: IP/05/1244. Online:
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1244&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui
Language=en
6
CNNTurk. 2005, October, 15. Online:
http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=132715
7
CNNTurk. 2005, October, 16. Online:
http://www.cnnturk.com/TURKIYE/haber_detay.asp?PID=318&HID=2&haberID=132808
-8-regarding the circulation of economically absolute poultry all over Turkey by some firms. He
said in his speech on national TV: “The migrating birds are not the only reason for the bird flu”.8
Such news were circulated, reported and speculated upon by a few media channels discussing the
speed with which the bird flu disease had been spread all over.
From October to late December, the prevalent concern about the bird flu mostly had been
reflected in the frame of the poultry industry’s reduced internal sales and exporting opportunities.
Fortunately, after the end of a 21 day quarantine period, on the 9th of December the Minister of
Agriculture announced that “The bird flu had been completely exterminated in Turkey”9 as a
consequence of the effective operations of the ministry in the region. After this explanation,
Turkey as a country sighed with deep relief until the 27th of December when there seemed to be
a resurrection of the bird flu in Aralik/AGDIR, a border town in the Eastern Anatolia as was
reported.10 The explanation of the ministry came just after: Since there was no industrial poultry
in this region, no need to worry about this case in terms of poultry industry and ‘the society’.11
Second Wave: Four children died
A new year opened up with an unpleasant and foggy atmosphere in Turkey under the shadow of
human death cases of bird flu. Four children of the same family were examined under the
suspicion that they might have been infected by the virus in Van. The sample tissues were sent to
the expert laboratory in Ankara (Capital city) to be examined12; however, a day later, the eldest
child died. Laboratory examination did not indicate the existence of the virus in the samples, and
the reason of the death was announced as pneumonia. 13. However, the doctors treating the
patients in the university hospital in Van insisted upon further examination.14 Government
Spokeperson, Cemil Çiçek, accused them of obtrusiveness.15 Two days later, it was correctly
reported that the real reason for the human death was the bird flu virus.16 In the days that
followed, two children from the same family also died due to this virus.17 There deaths served as
8
TGRT Haber. 2006, January, 28. Online: http://www.tgrthaber.com.tr/news_view.aspx?guid=bf9c1d7e-e18a-4c59-
a1f4-e89907741232
9
Milliyet. 2005, December, 10. Online: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2005/12/10/yasam/axyas02.html , CNNTurk.
2005, December, 09. Online: http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=144951
10
The governorship of Igdir. Online Web Release on Bird Flu. Online: http://www.igdir.gov.tr/KUSGRIBI.DOC
11
CNNTurk. 2005, December, 27. Online:
http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=148815
12
CNNTurk. 2005, December,31. Online:
http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=149549
13
CNNTurk. 2006, January ,02. Online:
http://www.cnnturk.com/TURKIYE/haber_detay.asp?PID=318&HID=1&haberID=8189
14
Devletim. 2006, January, 05. Online: http://www.devletim.com/gundem.asp?konu=28
15
NTV-MSNBC. 2006, January, 07. Online: http://www.ntv.com.tr/news/356716.asp
16
CNNTurk. 2006, January, 04. Online:
http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=150460
17
Hurriyet. 2006, January, 05. Online: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/3742738.asp?gid=0 ,
-9-a mode of disserminating information about the disease around the country while also elevating
human fear and suspicions. In this period, the news of infected poultry were reported from other
regions but the reported cases of human infection were limited with in the eastern part of
Anatolia. Information released, on the 9th of the January revealed that the disease was on a fast
steady increase it was reported that the pandemic was now in 17 cities; and on the 12th of January
it spread out over 25 cities. 18
An impending religious holiday that involves a ritual of sacrificing cattle and sheep
raised the anxiety level for the public especially after people had died. Turkish Medical
Association persistently warned the government to take precautions about the risky situation
since the sacrificed animals would be transferred from the eastern cities to the other regions.
Their claim was that the virus might be carried during the transportation of these animals.19 The
Prime Minister assessed this argument as inappropriate, and his response was sharp: “The ones
who are supposed to talk should talk”. In turn, the Association replied that they believed that, as
a scientific institution, they had the right and expertise to talk about the issues concerning the
public health and added that they were targeted as hostiles to Islam, thus they declared that the
association did not appreciate those who responded to their warning with religious sensitivities.20
On the government side, even though, the ministry of agriculture had an urgent action
plan to combat the bird flu disease, it was seen that the plan itself should have been revised
considering the country’s specific conditions such as wide-spread back-yard poultry and internal
trade in open markets, especially in the areas populated by people having very-low-income and
being undereducated. Therefore, the responsible government bodies led by the Prime Minister
announced that they would inform; moreover educate, the society by using all possible
communicative bodies and vehicles such as imams on Friday sermons, teachers at schools and
broadcast briefs from the municipality loudspeakers and the mobilization of all possible mass
media channels.21 Prime minister especially asked for the media support 22and the media did so.
CNNTurk. 2006, January, 05. Online:
http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=150472
18
CNNTurk. 2006, January, 12. Online:
http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=151368;
CNNTurk. 2006, January, 09. Online:
http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=151079
19
Hurriyet. 2006, January, 07. Online: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/3754623.asp , Milliyet. 2006, January,
08. Online: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/01/08/guncel/gun12.html
20
Turkish Medical Association. 2006, January, 20. Online: http://www.ttb.org.tr/data/kisa_haber/ocak06/gazete.php;
Milliyet. 2006, January, 11. Online: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/01/11/guncel/axgun02.html ; Hurriyet. 2006,
January, 20. Online: http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=3815583&p=2
21
Radikal. 2006, January, 07. Online: http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=175143
22
Sabah. 2006, January, 06. Online: http://www.sabah.com.tr/2006/01/06/gnd84.html
- 10 -On the 15th of January, the death of one more child infected by the virus was reported. This case
was given minute by minute updates on TV screens and in the newspapers.23 What dramatic for
audiences was the father’s refusal to send his children to the hospital; since he did not have any
health insurance and was not capable of paying the cost for treatment. The result was an outpour
of sympathy from all corners of the society, there was also questioning on the developmental
objectives of the country, and questions such as could we be a member of the EU under these
circumstance arose.24 Bird flu in an unprecedented way provided a political arena to discuss
issues affecting the Turkish society. 25
For the ordinary Turkish watching the whole system of culling poultry in the farming
regions on television created a sense of the unreal. The destruction team wore protective gear
similar to that worn by astronauts. The contrast between these individuals and the farmers was a
significant one. The farmers and even the children turning over the birds for culling, were in
ordinary dress with no protection, while the official being handed the supposed infected bird,
was covered from head to toe to avoid, possible infection. 26
But returning to the ongoing furore between the national media, government and
industrial poultry producers, government prepared a plan in order to compensate the poultry
sector.27 In one of the national newspaper, it was argued that a social explosion would take place
if government did not handle the poultry farming industrial in a satisfying manner.28 The
industrial poultry producers on the other hand introduced some high-tech mediated applications
for instance each chicken was given an identity card, this way, a consumer was able to monitor
the information on a particular chicken over the internet.29 None of these however, be helped
alleviate the fear harbored by the consumers who continued to reject poultry products.
In this second wave the risk of bird flu was said to be under control within the particular
region in the eastern Anatolia, even though the virus continued to spread among other poultry
across the country from west to east. The reason of human deaths cases in this region was not
only associated with the virus itself but included poverty, illiteracy, and ignorance on issues
concerning health risks and hygiene. What the minister of agriculture commented on the deaths
23
CNNTurk. 2006, January, 15. Online:
http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=151671
24
Milliyet. 2006, January, 20. Online: http://www.milliyet.com/2006/01/20/yazar/zbirand.html
25
Directorate General of Press and Informationj. 2006.Jan.20. Online:
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/anadoluyahaberler-yeni/2006/ocak/ah_20_01-06.htm ; The Grand
National assembly of Turkey. 2006. February. 01. Online:
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/gelenkagit/d022/yil04gk/gk.75.htm
26
http://www.aksam.com.tr/yazar.asp?a=9194,10,9
27
Council of Ministers Cabinet. Letters of administration. 2006.January.30,No.2006/9994. Online:
http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Eskiler/2006/02/20060216-3.htm
28
Referans Gazetesi. 2006, January, 19. Online:
http://www.referansgazetesi.com/haber.aspx?HBR_KOD=33637&ForArsiv=1
29 TGRT Haber. 2006, January, 21. Online: http://www.tgrthaber.com.tr/news_view.aspx?guid=6ab5eb23- 78d1-
4684-95e0-e5c10fa2c20d
- 11 -was worth noting; he claimed that “deaths were caused by socioeconomic and socio-cultural
reasons”.30
In the press releases of the Turkish Medical Association, the government was blamed of
the spreading out the risk so rapidly. According to the association, the government was late in
taking precautions, and severely attenuated the perception of risk by the mass public especially
with their speeches and actions. Moreover a coordination center including experts appointed by
the government was presented as the responsible body to deal with the present crisis; however
expertise of Turkish Medical Association as an NGO were excluded in this process. Therefore, it
is argued that the government failed to mobilize and delegate efficient human resources.31
Most of the mass media channels agreed that the deaths were due to ignorance and
poverty. However, when we reviewed the local media where the disease had been experienced,
we noticed different concerns in terms of perceiving and assessing the risk of bird flu. When the
bird flu was first seen in Igdir before spreading out to neighboring regions, the head governor of
the city claimed that the sick poultry had been transferred from the western part of Turkey
(Balikesir). Along with the governor’s claim, the public was insisting that their poultry was not
sick at all; what they claimed further was that it was cheaper poultry moved from the western
cities that infected their produce. 32Their concern was different from that of those living in urban
cities. The bird flu in with reference to urban areas could only affect the daily dietaries of
individuals. On the other hand for local poultry farmers subsistent poultry farming was their
families’ main source of income and the only way they could feed their children. 33 What is
perhaps important to note is that poultry was also an intimate figure in their everyday lives for
instance; even each chicken had a given name in the family.
In addition, unlike the national coverage which critically evaluating the inappropriate
methods of culling, the main concern on behalf of the culling in that region was that “Turkey was
loosing its special gene pool which was the essence of the adaptation of animals to this region’s
particular conditions in hundreds of years”.34 The news coverage also provided some deeper
insights about this region’s particular living conditions: “the wild and hunger wolves may
30 Milliyet. 2006, January, 07. Online: http://www.milliyet.com/2006/01/07/yazar/bila.html
31
The Association of Turkish Medical Scientists. Press Release on Avian Influenza. 2006, January, 18. Online:
http://www.ttb.org.tr/avian/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=49&Itemid=38
32
Yesil Igdir Gazetesi. 2005, December, 28. Online:
http://www.yesiligdir.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1480&mode=&order=0&thold=0
33
Yesil Igdir Gazetesi. 2006, January, 06. Online:
http://www.yesiligdir.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1506&mode=&order=0&thold=0
34
Yesil Igdir Gazetesi. 2006, January, 21. Online:
http://www.yesiligdir.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1582&mode=&order=0&thold=0
- 12 -potentially attack the villages under the hard conditions of the winter”35, “please be very cautious
towards smoke/gas poisoning from the stoves”36 or “do not eat snow”37.
As we have tried to illustrate, the construction of risk, risk knowledge and perception of
risk differed between national and local media. National media restricted the risk with the region
where human death cases had appeared, and the risk was addressed with victims and their living
and social conditions; the responsibility of being at risk was burdened by the victims themselves.
While the local media insisted on the value and importance of poultry, economically and
culturally, for individuals and its claim was based on the argument that the virus had spread out
in the region because of transferred poultry from the west to their region. In the local media case
the responsibility was not burdened on the shoulders of individuals living there but on
irresponsible industrial firms and their not being effectively controlled by responsible bodies.
What seemed as conceived of as responses to the risk of bird flu resonates with the claims
of Mary Douglas (1992) in terms of cultural traits of risk. She argues that “the response to a
major crisis digs more deeply the cleavages that have been there all the time” (p: 34) and could
be traced by following the blaming claims of the different parties. According to Douglas “In
individualist culture, the weak are going to carry the blame for what happens to them; in a
hierarchy, the deviants; in a sect, aliens and also faction leaders” (p:36) as it was reified in this
example.
The third Wave: It had eventually dropped out from the society’s agenda
The second wave concluded in the end of January with four human death cases, and visible and
invisible concerns and quests brought about the risk of bird flu to the society and its institutions.
The barbeque party held in the parliament building by the initiation of the prime-minister and
with the association of all the ministries was an ongoing effort of the government to encourage
the society to consume chicken, hence, at the same time to support the industrial poultry
producers.38 However, in the days following we did not recognize the effect of this overture from
the government towards the consumption behaviors of individuals. Hence, the uncertainty about
the risk clearly continue to prevail and the social agenda was still full of the bird flu concerns
until the country’s most celebrated anchorman, Ugur Dundar, appeared on all TV screens within
a short advertorial movie shot in the leading industrial poultry farms. He was inculcating that we
could consume poultry meat, eggs and egg-based products confidently if they were produced in
35
Yesil Igdir Gazetesi. 2006, February, 01. Online:
http://www.yesiligdir.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1643&mode=&order=0&thold=0
36
Yesil Igdir Gazetesi. 2005, December, 28. Online:
http://www.yesiligdir.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1475&mode=&order=0&thold=0
37
Yesil Igdir Gazetesi. 2006, February, 07. Online:
http://www.yesiligdir.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1670&mode=&order=0&thold=0
- 13 -industrial farms where hygiene conditions were strictly followed and packaged properly. 39After
those brief adverts, sales started to increase40. According to a research conducted by GFK
Turkey, 80 % of the participants respond that this advertorial strengthen their trust against
industrial poultry producers and 76 % of those particularly emphasized Ugur Dundar”s role as
the main factor41. This point of time can be addressed as the time when the closure on risk and
risk definition was constructed.
Ugur Dundar was the good choice to construct the trust of individuals to industrial
poultry because of his perceived identity by the society constructed along the years on television
screens. His reputation historically relies on prime-time occupying television programs in which
“clean society” messages are conveyed by his active involvement in the organized
sudden/unexpected visits to government offices, companies and etc. For instance, his hidden
camera-recordings displaying the public or government officers’ bribery instances moment by
moment or the firms’ food producing processes in non-hygienic conditions are very familiar
snapshots for most of the Turkish people. At the end of each program, after appreciating his
efforts in the name of us, the responsible are judged first by the society’s conscious and then
delivered to the hands of justice to take care the rest of bureaucratic processes.
After February, the media focus on the bird flu risk disappeared on the national level and
the issue had dropped out from the society’s agenda.
Lay response towards the risk of bird flu
“I am afraid”
During the interviews more salient response with regards to the risk of bird flu is that people
stopped consuming poultry products. This result is also confirmed by a European Commission’s
research (2006, 17) on avian influenza. According to this research, unlike other European
countries, in Turkey, consumers decreased their consumption of poultry meat (58%) as well as
eggs and egg-based products (53%). This report suggests that reported cases of human deaths in
Turkey can probably explain this exception.
Our study supports this argument, since most interviewees mentioned that they ceased
consumption of poultry products after they had heard the cases of human deaths. A 29-year-old
38 TGRT Haber. 2006, January, 31. Online: http://www.tgrthaber.com.tr/news_view.aspx?guid=912f3eed-4730-
4d53-a046-8df918a25dd2
39
TGRT Haber. 2006, February, 07. Online: http://www.tgrthaber.com.tr/news_view.aspx?guid=7508859f-3ce6-
4345-acc2-2a8aa80c5067
40
CNNTurk. 2006, February, 10. Online:
http://www.cnnturk.com/EKONOMI/haber_detay.asp?PID=40&HID=1&haberID=157090 ;
Zaman Gazetesi. 2006, March, 26. Online: http://www.zaman.com.tr/?bl=yazarlar&trh=20060326&hn=262425 ;
TGRT Haber. 2006, February, 18. Online: http://www.tgrthaber.com.tr/news_view.aspx?guid=275bd185-b07e-
46b1-bdde-613ae149a91a
41
NTV-MSNBC. 2006, July, 03. Online: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/378677.asp
- 14 -woman house wife in Istanbul said that even she knew that people who died of bird flu infection
had direct contact with the infected chickens; she did not consume poultry meat and eggs as she
thought that this was the most appropriate precaution at the time.
As inferred from interviews, interviewees took immediate action and what they did is the
same, they firmly stopped consuming poultry. This situation resonates with the statement made
by Lash (2003, 51). He argues that the contemporary individual must choose fast, and must make
quick decisions, s/he does not have enough time or space to reflect but s/he must live in an
atmosphere of risk in which knowledge and life-changes are precarious that was exemplified
within the interviewees responses. However, what was missing in these lines of expressions is
their source of reasoning?
First we noticed that they all were aware of the scientific arguments and definitions made
by experts in relation to the disease for instance; they knew that poultry, even if infected, was
not a health risk if cooked at certain degree and the eggs must be washed effectively and cooked
very well, moreover interviewees in Istanbul acknowledged their belief that the reason for the
deaths in the eastern regions were their ways of treating poultry with close contact since they
almost live together with their poultries. However despite this awareness, they did not consume
poultry meat and/or eggs. Therefore we argue that most of interviewees did not reflect but rather
behaved in a very reflexive way; they took their own precautions which obviously were not
based on the expert recommendations since from the very beginning there was no information
banning people from consuming poultry products. What was interesting is that their primarily
response in terms of precautions was cutting off eating the poultry meat.
“We know but also we do not know”
The prominent of risk studies long recognized the uncertainty as an inherent element of modern
risks, since the perception of risks goes beyond everyday experiences, thus risk perception relies
on the scientific methodologies of expert systems. However, as argued by Beck (1992) the
failure of science to define risks and threats has the scientific institutions’ losing credibility, and
hence ignite uncertainty.
In our interviews, we discovered that uncertainty revealed from the interviewees was not
about the cogency or efficiency of the scientific knowledge provided; there seemed to be no
dispute on such sensitivity. What surprising was, people’s lack of interest with regards to the
information regarding bird flu. There was no sceptism on the recommended ways of precautions
whether these were clear or effective methods, curiosity did not extend to human-to human
infections either, something that science at that time was unable to guarantee against. What was
indicated instead from our interviewees was not so much the information but the source. Who
could they really trust as telling them the truth? Showing that it was not about scientific
credibility but involving more complex societal parameters.
- 15 -A 48-year-old woman in Istanbul (teacher) noted: “we do not know who to we trust. We think by
ourselves but it is not possible to solve this problem by ourselves. We know but at the same time
we do not know; therefore we just speculate on it”.
The problematic notion of trust has been expressed from most of our interviewees in
different ways. For instance, two of our interviewees, 32 and 45 year old working men noted
that, their having seen the prime minister on TV eating poultry meat did not change their opinion
since they thought that he was a privileged man but they were not, hence the chicken he ate was
most likely very special, thus carefully selected, tested, etc. But they were not powerful or
privileged enough like prime minister to have their poultry tested first before consuming it so
they had look out for themselves.
Before going further with examining the notions of trust and uncertainties revolving
around the government experts or the government, it is vital to briefly reflect in the ways
interviewees felt about information emanating from scientific experts, medical doctors. In this
part, we examine interviewees’ direct trust in doctors. Their answers were not incompatible with
their attitudes and their responses to risk; since in general they explained their trust in doctors.
However they mentioned that they did not see doctors on television. What they took as reference
information was given by government and governmental representatives, experts directly
associated with government.
At this point, our research has started to be more crystallized with the appearance of the
notions of perceived uncertainty and trust in our data. Our interviewees frequently mentioned
that there was something hidden in the case of bird flu. They thought that experts, as mentioned
above, the ministry of health, government and their representatives or experts working for the
government hid the real extent of the risk, its reasons and the other facts about the disease even
when they knew the facts. They perceived that they were at distance to the eligible information.
According to them their inability to reach legible information were mainly determined by their
social class and status in the society, thus they saw themselves as victims (a case of class) as
being at risk.
Literally, this sense of inability to be able to reach eligible information was first
constructed upon their past experiences which were not independent from their understandings of
dominant political culture and institutional framework in a broader sense. Particular reference
was the Chernobyl case, among many others, which, according to them, was a reflection on the
past and present governments’ (the state’s) stance towards public concerns.
Our interview data explored edified how much the Chernobyl case still lingers in the
public’s memory after 20 years. Many interviewees recalled the date’s minister of internal
affair’s TV speeches then, to the public in which he claimed that the explosion in Chernobyl
did/would not affect the tea crops in Northern Turkey. However interviewees argued that people
were affected from radiation because what they saw in their personal networks and heard from
their friends or relatives supported an apparent increase in cancer cases especially in regions
which were affected by radiation. Even though the ministry of health revealed in August 2006
- 16 -that after a-two-year research in the northern Turkey, they found no direct relationship between
the increase in cancer cases in this region and radiation; and that the main reasons of cancer were
smoking, alcohol drinks and foods contains high level of calories42. However, interviewees in
Istanbul, explained their belief on that the Chernobyl disaster and hence radiation and
government’s failure to deal with risk were the primary causes of cancer cases in this region.
Expert vs lay knowledge
This dispute between lay knowledge and expert knowledge, in this case the knowledge created
by the ministry of health, exemplifies anatomy of the dispute between lay and expert knowledge
in risk cases. Interviewees’ response to risk is not a response neither to expert knowledge and
their failure to define risks and the ways of avoiding risks nor conflicts among experts on risks
rather their response is to government’s attitudes in risk situations and their ways of dealing with
risks. According to interviewees, experts may define and assess the risk and their definition may
be true however the government and experts working in the field tend to hide the risk or at least
they do not share all information with the public. Therefore, we believe that they construct their
own risk knowledge in accordance with the information they gather in their personal networks or
what they experienced first hand which may or may not be directly related to the risk or risk
issues.
On the other hand, in Van, our interviewees criticized expert knowledge from a totally
different perspective, for instance they had never mentioned their concerns about Chernobyl case
or how experts or the government dealt with the risk in this case. However, what we saw was
that their lay knowledge with regards to the bird flu risk had been fundamentally encased in their
daily routines. First of all the interviewees have close contact with poultries at least have
relatives or neighbors fed these animals. What interviewees mentioned was that their chickens
were not ill but in anyway they were culled. Their argument was that if their animals were
infected they could recognize these infected animals and take the necessary precautions. A 65
year old woman (housewife) in Van noted: “My chickens were so beautiful and healthy. But my
neighbors called the officers to take them and cull. I am still sorry about them. Even I have a
neighbor, even today she cries when someone talks about chickens and their being culled”.
A 25-year-old woman (housework) criticized the expert knowledge which led to the
precaution of culling. She mentioned that even though the experts argued that the main reason of
bird flu cases in Turkey was migrated birds, they did not take precautions to prevent the
transmission of the virus from these birds to poultry but instead killed their chickens.. Since their
chickens were culled, she argued that their backyards now full of insects which had never been
seen before. According to them officers who tried to terminate bird flu disease in fact changed
the balance of nature and caused the emergence of other threats.
42
NTVMSNBC. 2006, August, 16. Online: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/382548.asp
- 17 -According to us this difference between lay knowledges in geographical context is a
consequence of whether collect information through direct personal experience on what is seen
as the risk issue or not. In other words, for interviewees in Van, poultry is part of their lives
hence they do not construct them as risky; their risk knowledge is a reflection of what they see
and experience in their daily life. On the other hand what interviewees’perception in Istanbul is a
reflection on how experts construct the knowledge and on subjective trustworthiness of experts.
Risk and everyday life
Most of the people, if not all, suddenly stopped the consumption of poultry meat however they
could not stop the consumption of eggs at all that is another interesting response in our findings.
Our interviewees explained their different attitudes in consuming eggs and meat comparatively
saying that eggs have an inevitable place in their daily diets. They argued that they could not stop
consumption of eggs, thus they chose to consume them in accordance with the advice provided
by experts.
During the interviews in Van we also realized that some cultural concerns embedded in
daily routines affected interviewees’ responses to risk. The first example was that a 60-year old
woman’s concern about their food culture. She mentioned that in this region, every year, women
prepare a special kind of pasta which is one of the main dishes in their long lived winters. By
preparing the pasta, they use village eggs, and because of bird flu, she could not find “village
eggs”, eggs taken from poultry who fed in the backyards and she had to use branded eggs of
industrial farms. According to her the color of the food is not good.
Another important issue in the extent of interviews made in Van was that their daily diet
was mainly based on meat and cereals because of long winters. The weight of vegetables and
fruits in their diet is not as high as it is in the other regions. Therefore meat, eggs and milk are
the basis of their diet. Thus, this kind of diet is not only a necessity but also a cultural
component.
“What chases us we in turn chase it”
Last but not least, we need to question the role of the media in this case. We traced that media
especially television was assessed as the source of reference information in risk perceptions. If
something is in the media, it is real, dangerous and risky however when it disappears it is thought
as terminated or ended. Interestingly, this attitude is the same both in Istanbul and Van. A 24-
year-old woman (worker) summarized this situation as follows: “what chases us we in turn chase
it”. However, what chases them is defined according to what they see in the media. Interviewees’
awareness of risk depends partly on media coverage. However, as inspired from this excerpt they
have a sense of powerless hence they just follow what is going on and they think they are not
capable to reflecting on it; what they can do is only to follow what is conveyed in the media until
the item disappears.
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