Jobbik: A Turanist Trojan Horse in Europe? - AUTHOR: Bulent Kenes - ECPS Party Profile Series #1 - populism
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ECPS Party Profile Series #1 August 2020
AUTHOR: Bulent Kenes
Jobbik: A Turanist Trojan
Horse in Europe?
www.populismstudies.org
Jobbik: A Turanist Trojan Horse in Europe? BY BULENT KENES ABSTR ACT Defined as Turanist, Eurasianist, pro-Russian, pro-Iranian, anti-immigrant but pro-Islam, racist, antisemitic, anti-Roma, Hungarist, and radically pop- ulist, Jobbik do not exist in a vacuum. The rise of Jobbik from deep nation- alist, antisemitic, and anti-Roma currents in Hungarian politics dates back to the late 1980s and early 1990s. Despite its extensive efforts at “image refurbishment” in recent years, Jobbik remains a populist, revisionist, racist, radical right-wing party that threatens to destabilize Hungary, the neigh- boring region, and the EU. BULENT KENES is an academic and a journalist who has over 25 years of professional experience. He has managed multiple publications, both in Turkish and English. ECPS Leader Profile Series offer analyses of political leaders and promi- nent public figures with populist tendencies. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed by the author are only attributable him and not to any institution with which they are associated. The profile available for free downloading from the ECPS website (www. populismstudies.org) ©ECPS 2021 ECPS | 155 Wetstraat, Rue de la loi, 1040 Brussels, Belgium | Tel: (+32) 246 583 18 | www.populismstudies.org
Table of contents 1. INTRODUCTION���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4 2. RACIST REINCARNATION IN A DIGITAL AGE ���������������������������������������������� 7 3. MORE THAN A POLITICAL PARTY�������������������������������������������������������������������� 8 4. JOBBIK VS. ROMA PEOPLE ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12 5. ANTISEMITISM AND HUNGARISM������������������������������������������������������������������� 17 6. UNIQUE AMONG EUROPEAN RACISTS: AN ISLAM-FRIENDLY JOBBIK ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������20 7. TRACING THE FOOTSTEPS OF IMAGINED ANCESTORS: TURANISM���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23 8. “EASTERN TURN” & TIES WITH RUSSIA, IRAN, AND TURKEY���������� 27 CONCLUSION����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������30 REFERENCES ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31
INTRODUCTION
The collapse of the communist regime and the transition to a liberal market
economy in the early 1990s precipitated major shifts in Hungarian society.
Almost one million people lost their jobs, while income inequality increased
markedly and wages and living standards shrank. Facing uncertain futures,
large sectors of society viewed themselves as the “losers” of this transition.
Extreme poverty reappeared amidst austerity measures initiated by the gov-
ernment. The rise in economic uncertainty and the hardships of transition
increased the popularity of political parties pushing for radical solutions (Pap
& Glied, 2018). As a consequence of this, since the end of communism there
has been widespread support for the political far right in Hungary.
During the past 30 years, the symbolic politics of “national revival” have
evolved into a daily politics characterized by anti-Semitism, anti-liberalism,
and anti-Roma expressions (Murer, 2015). Hungary, an erstwhile poster boy
of neoliberal transformation in the region, openly proclaimed itself as a pro-
totypical “illiberal regime.” This climate has also created a fertile ground for
more radical movements and populist parties. Thus, the far-right Jobbik,
which has affiliated paramilitary organizations, has become the second larg-
est party in the Hungarian parliament (Fabry & Sandbeck 2019). But what is
Jobbik? Who are the people who have been mobilized by the party which is
paradoxically defined as Turanist, Eurasianist, pro-Russian, pro-Iranian, an-
ti-immigrant but pro-Islam, racist, antisemitic, anti-Roma, Hungarist, and
radically populist?
The Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom)
(Jobbik.com) was established as a new generation radical right political par-
ty. It is commonly known by its abbreviated name “Jobbik,” which is in fact a
play on words. The word “jobb” in Hungarian has two meanings: an adjective,
meaning “better,” and adverb, meaning the direction “right.” The compara-
tive “Jobbik” therefore means both “the more preferable choice” and “more
to the right.” This is similar to the English phrase “right choice,” which could
mean both “a choice on the right side of the political spectrum” and “a cor-
rect choice” (Murer, 2015).
Actually, the current radical right and Jobbik do not exist in a vacuum. The
rise of Jobbik from deep nationalist, antisemetic, and anti-Roma currents in
Hungarian politics dates back to the late 1980s and early 1990s (Murer, 2015).
In the period since the political transition to democracy in post-Communist
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), nationalists and radical-right parties were
either newly formed or reemerged. In this transitional context, Hungary has
come to be seen as a stronghold of the radical right (Kim, 2016). However, of
all the radical-right Hungarian parties that existed in the 1990s, the only one
to have electoral success was the Hungarian Truth and Life Party (Magyar
Igazság és Élet Pártja – MIÉP) led by novelist István Csurka (Akçalı & Korkut
4
2012; Murer, 2015).
MIÉP was one of the most extreme far-right parties in Europe (Mudde,
2007). As the chief representative of the radical right in contemporary Hun-
gary, Jobbik is in many ways the successor of MIÉP, which seceded in 1993
from the then-governing party Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar
Demokrata Fórum – MDF). MIÉP’s ideology incorporated an anti-EU senti-
ment and nationalist and Christian values alongside anti-liberal, anti-dem-
ocratic, and anti-globalization elements. MIÉP focused its ire especially on
international financial groups, global capital, communists, Jews, and lib-
erals who, it claimed, controlled global trends and wished to “re-colonize”
Hungary by regaining their former power over post-communist Hungary. In
1998, the party gained seats in parliament but did not reach the necessary
five-percent threshold in 2002 and thus lost its seats (Pap & Glied, 2018; Kim,
2016). When Jobbik was established as a political movement in 1999 by uni-
versity students, they learned from MIÉP’s failure.
Preceding MIÉP by many decades, Hungary was briefly governed by the
fascist Arrow Cross party (Nyilaskeresztes Párt) following Nazi Germany’s in-
tervention in 1944. The Arrow Cross helped the Nazis to organize the exter-
mination of Hungarian Jews.
Both of these previous radical-right parties influenced Jobbik. The founders
of Jobbik claimed publicly to be inspired by MIÉP. Though the Arrow Cross
party is not officially cited as an influence, Jobbik’s use of its symbols, such
as the Árpád stripes, is a clear reminder of the Hungarian fascist era. This is
natural because the constant reference to the past is particularly crucial for
radical-right parties, since national history is usually a key element of their
ideology (Karl, 2017).
Jobbik, as a party even more radical nationalist than MIÉP, wields increasing
influence on the mainstream stage. Its success is a unique post-transition-
al political development that represents the central elements of Hungarian
nationalism. These include an underlying social prejudice against Jews and
Roma; anti-liberal capitalism; and an attraction to the historical narrative of
mythic Turanism in the debate over the origins of Hungarian national iden-
tity. Jobbik manipulates all of these national elements in shaping its iden-
tity (Kim, 2016). In many ways Jobbik is similar to other European far-right
groups, although it features several characteristics that make it unique.
5
Jobbik was officially founded as a po-
litical party in 2003, an outgrowth of
the student organization “Jobbolda-
li Ifjúsági Közösség – Jobbik” (Right-
Wing Youth Association) which was
established in 1999, and several other
organizations with links to the political
right. The young organizers led by Gá-
bor Vona and Dávid Kovács intended
to create a new, radical political force
that was capable of attracting the
masses. They were describing them-
selves as the answer to a left-wing and
right-wing political structure (Pap &
Glied, 2018). Vona, who became party
leader in 2006, took the party into an
electoral alliance with MIÉP for that
year’s parliamentary election cycle.
The MIÉP-Jobbik Third Way Alliance
only garnered 2 percent of the vote
and won no seats. As Csurka’s MIÉP
was dissolved, Vona became one of
the most prominent players on the far
right.
On September 17, 2006, when socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany’s
infamous speech – in which he lied about Hungary’s economic situation –
was leaked to the public, Fidesz, a center-right party, and Jobbik were pre-
sented with an opportunity to revive their fortunes. Throughout September
and October, a series of demonstrations organized by the members of these
two parties demanded the resignation of the PM. Gyurcsany refused to re-
sign and instead resorted to police force. The most violent confrontations
,,
between riot police and protesters took place at Freedom Square. Jobbik’s
vigorous resistance to the intervention made a deep impression on the pub-
lic. Jobbik, which came to be seen as a party that took the most determined
stance against the government, succeeded in shaping its image as an an-
ti-establishment party (Kim, 2016).
Due to the disillusioning of young people because of a lack
of future prospects, deteriorating living conditions, and a
frustrating level of state corruption, the popularity of Jobbik
skyrocketed among younger voters. Since 2014, Jobbik has
consciously tried to address young people that are disap-
pointed with the other parties in Hungary.
6
Racist Reincarnation
that Jobbik is the most active organiza-
tion amongst youth voters (Róna, 2020).
Nevertheless, Jobbik’s number of seats in
in a Digital Age parliament decreased to 23 because of a
reform which has decreased the number
In the next parliamentary election in of parliamentary seats from 386 to 199. So,
2010, Jobbik enjoyed great success, secur- while Jobbik’s seats were cut in half, its
ing 47 seats, finishing the race as the third overall percentage of the popular vote in-
largest party with nearly 17 percent of the creased to 20 percent. In April 2015, Jobbik
vote. Jobbik established itself as an essen- won its first single member constituency,
tial player in Hungarian politics. In analyz- in a by-election following the death of a
ing the electoral success of Jobbik, politi- Fidesz deputy. The seat was won by Lajos
cal scientist András Bíró-Nagy and others Rig, who had a reputation as being an
focused primarily on the radicalization of adamant anti-Semite and was rumored
the political process and identified three to sport an SS tattoo (Murer, 2015). In the
main components of Jobbik’s campaign: April 8, 2018 elections, Jobbik secured
hostility against minorities, a left-wing 19.06 percent of the vote and became
economic agenda, and cultural conserva- Hungary’s second largest party in parlia-
tism (Karl, 2017). Mihai Varga has argued ment.
that the reasons for Jobbik’s success,
especially in 2010, lie in its focus on the
economy (Varga, 2014). Meanwhile, Gerge-
ly Karácsony and Daniel Róna focused on
the Roma issue as a motivating factor for
Jobbik’s voters (Karácsony & Róna, 2011).
Due to the disillusioning of young peo-
ple because of a lack of future prospects,
deteriorating living conditions, and a
frustrating level of state corruption, the
popularity of Jobbik skyrocketed among
younger voters. Since 2014, Jobbik has According to Philipp Karl, Jobbik might
consciously tried to address young people
better be likened to the new social move-
that are disappointed with the other par-
ments of the digital age or to tech-savvy
ties. As a result of its youth policy, Jobbik’s
parties such as the German left-wing Pi-
popularity has continued to rise. Especially
ratenpartei than to the traditional radical
in the 2014 campaign, Jobbik performed
right. In this context, around 300 websites
very well among young people, thanks
were identified as parts of the Hungarian
both to the dedication of significant re-
radical online network. Researchers also
sources and energy by Jobbik as well as
extreme right-wing cultural organizations recognized four sub-networks: i) News,
that helped attract youth voters. Jobbik media, and history sites; ii) Music and
has organized a large number of concerts band sites; iii) Web shops; and iv) Political
(featuring national rock bands), festivals, parties and associations. Jobbik has been
get-togethers, camps, professional fo- particularly effective at mobilizing young
rums, and many other youth events (Salt- Hungarians by using online venues to
man, 2014). It has become a party which amplify its message, recruit new mem-
uses its platform and campaign messages bers, and organize. Jobbik shares some
to emphasize the problems facing the similarities to the new hybrid forms of
youth; its youth organization has more social movements that developed in the
Facebook-followers than all other compet- digital age. Manuel Castells emphasizes
itors combined (Gregor, 2014). three paramount conditions for those new
movements, all of which apply to Hunga-
According to an international survey, ry: an active group of jobless academics,
conducted in 2016, 53 percent of Hun- a highly developed culture of cyber activ-
garians aged between 18 and 35 years ism, and the rather widespread use of the
would vote for Jobbik (Almássy, 2016). A Internet. Jobbik’s success can be partly
university survey strengthens the claim explained by its grasp of the influence of
7
the Internet and social media on digital
natives (Karl, 2017).
Despite adverse allegations, Jobbik has
long described itself as “a principled, con-
servative and radically patriotic Christian
,,
party,” whose “fundamental purpose” is The SD’s ambivalent rela-
the protection of “Hungarian values and tionship to neo-Nazis and
interests” (Reuters, 2017;politics.hu. 2009).
Although the party does not consider
other openly right-wing ex-
itself nationalist but “conservative,” this tremists has been a recur-
very moderate description is completely rent problem for the party.
different from the way Jobbik is present- During the first half of the
ed in the international media. The party is
usually described as “neo-nazi” (Rev, 2015), 1990s, the boundaries be-
“far-right,” “populist” (Aisch, Pearce, Rous- tween these groups and the
seau, 2016), “neo-fascist” (Chomsky, 2011) SD were blurred. Around
and so on. However, in 2014, the Supreme
Court of Hungary ruled that Jobbik can-
the mid-1990s, the new par-
not be deemed “far-right.” The party also ty leadership banned polit-
rejects such labels (Zalan, 2014). What is ical uniforms at SD demon-
more, during the Party’s 2016 congress, strations.
Vona declared that they want to be a “na-
tional people’s party” (Kowalczyk, 2017).
oric should be replaced by a more moder-
This political trend, the so-called nép- ate, yet uncompromising radical political
pártosodás (transition to a people’s party),
communication with similar objectives – a
first emerged before the 2014 parliamen-
prerequisite for transforming Jobbik into
tary elections. The party adopted a new
a popular party. This calculated change
style of communication while reversing
many radical elements of its earlier pro- earned further support for Jobbik (Pap &
gram (Csaky, 2016). Jobbik declared that Glied, 2018).
it has turned from a radical right-wing
party into a moderate-conservative peo-
ple’s party. Vona, in an interview, prom-
ised to “cut the wildlings,” the one-time
More Than A Political
radicals (Jobbik.com, 2015) According to
Vona, after 2014 the party has grown out
Party t
of its “adolescence” and reached its adult- Nevertheless, even in its reformed state,
hood. Since then Jobbik has significantly
Jobbik has always been more than a po-
changed its views on the EU; internally,
litical party: through their direct actions,
the party has started to emphasize open-
such as acts of intimidation and violence,
ing towards different groups of Hungarian
its members engage in physical politics
society (Szigeti, 2017). At the same time,
beyond the ballot box. With its stance
Vona distanced the party from “wrong
statements” that it had made in the past opposing liberalism, Jobbik has been
(Budapost, 2017). seen as the new face of illiberal politics in
Europe seeking to dismantle the Euopean
Jobbik had been gaining steam ahead Union (EU) project (Murer, 2015). The party
of the 2014 elections, so much so that the has also been described as an “antisemit-
ruling party, Fidesz, was forced to raise ic organization” by The Independentand
and discuss elements of Jobbik’s agenda. a “neo-Nazi party” by the president of
Due to its radical rhetoric, Jobbik attract- the European Jewish Congress (Pater-
ed 20.69 percent of all votes in the 2014 son, 2014). However, as Jobbik seeks to
parliamentary elections and won 23 seats increase its electoral support, it looks to
in the National Assembly (Róna, 2016). convince people that it is capable of gov-
From the results, the party leadership con- erning and to moderate its positions, or at
cluded that its racist and antisemitic rhet- least make them appear more palatable.
8One way of doing this has been the sep- Is that really so?
aration of the party’s political functions,
communications, and allied group activi- Jobbik did not give up its expansionist
ties through the creation of direct-action interests. According to Jobbik’s official
organs. The symbols, language, rhetoric, manifesto, the party’s political horizons
and even sartorial choices set Jobbik are not defined by the current borders of
,,
apart from the direct-action groups. For Hungary but by the borders of the Hun-
instance, the party chairman wears a suit; garian nation. These latter borders do not
the direct-action network members often coincide with the geographical boundar-
do not (Murer, 2015). ies of the Hungarian Republic, given that
the Hungarian nation had its contiguity
dismembered by “the imposition of the
Trianon peace diktat.” The manifesto says:
“Our fundamental principles are: thinking
in terms of a nation of 15 million, estab-
lishing ‘protective power’ status for the
motherland vis-à-vis Hungarian commu-
nities beyond the border, the cultural and
Jobbik did not give up its
economic reunification of the Hungarian
expansionist interests. Ac- nation, the granting of Hungarian citizen-
cording to Jobbik’s offi- ry to every Hungarian, the establishment
cial manifesto, the party’s of a Ministry of National Affairs, the pro-
motion of efforts for self-determination,
political horizons are not the reincorporation of beyond-the-border
defined by the current bor- communities and émigrés into active
ders of Hungary but by the Hungarian life, the promotion and devel-
opment of border-transcending regional
borders of the Hungarian
cooperation; and the coordinated devel-
nation. These latter borders opment of domestic relationships be-
do not coincide with the tween disparate nationalities… We will also
geographical boundaries develop a legal defense network, which
will extend assistance to Hungarians
of the Hungarian Republic. living in cleaved territories, should their
Therefore, Jobbik has been individual or collective rights be abused…”
frequently accused of being (Guide, 2010).
Because of this stance, Jobbik has been
revisionist and of agitating
frequently accused of being revisionist
for a return to pre-Treaty-of- and of agitating for a return to pre-Trea-
Trianon borders. ty-of-Trianon borders (Zimberg, 2013).
However, Jobbik has never suggested
changing borders by force and believes
that the ultimate solution is territori-
Eventually, the party started to re-de- al and cultural autonomy within an EU
fine itself as a conservative people’s party. framework of minority rights (Daily News
According to the party’s manifesto on the Hungary, 2017). It is a fact that one-fourth
guidelines of a future government, Jobbik of ethnic Hungarians live outside the
represents all Hungarian citizens and peo- country (Inder Singh, 2000). Many suffer
ple and aims to build a modern national discrimination because of their ethnicity,
identity, while rejecting the chauvinism of causing frequent diplomatic disputes be-
the 20th century (jobbik.com). Analyzing tween Hungary and its neighbors. Jobbik
an opinion poll conducted for Euronews in dedicates itself to supporting the cause of
Feb. 2020, leading political scientist Balázs Hungarian minorities in adjoining coun-
Böcskei commented that Jobbik has com- tries (Molnar, 2001 & Frucht, 2005). On
pleted its transformation into a centrist the other hand, Jobbik considers its most
people’s party and its voting base has important task to be the reunification of
been changed; now, it is a predominantly a Hungarian nation unjustly torn apart
moderate pro-EU constituency. during the course of the 20th century: “It
is our most fundamental moral duty to
9and promised to restore the death penalty
if they came to power (BBC News, 2015 &
Daily News Hungary, 2015).
Stating that the image of the political
profession has been almost irreparably
damaged, Jobbik’s party manifesto also
underlined that, “In Hungary the word
‘politician’ is now synonymous with the
word ‘scoundrel.’ A fish rots from the head
down; which is why circumstances of de-
cency must first be produced in the coun-
try’s leadership… Our goal is not merely
represent the interests and defend the the abolition of corruption, it is rather the
rights of Hungarian communities. We will cessation of the existence of politicians –
strive, perpetually, for the collective rights as lawmakers – as being above the law…
of the Hungarians of the Carpathian basin, Jobbik wants the holding to account of
and for the realization of their territorial, politicians to be all-encompassing… It
economic and cultural self-determination” is high time that political crimes finally
(Guide, 2010). become classified under the Hungarian
penal code!” (Guide, 2010).
Jobbik was among the founding mem-
bers of the Alliance of European National In 2016, the party pursued its strategy of
Movements (AENM), alongside the French refurbishment by abandoning parts of its
National Front, the Ukrainian Svoboda, original ideological corpus and excluding
Italy’s Tricolour Flame, the British National certain extremist elements, in order to
Party, the Swedish Democrats, the Finn- make its image more respectable and to
ish Blue and White Front, the Portuguese craft a credible opposition to the govern-
National Renovator Party, and the Spanish ment of Orbán (Thorpe, 2016). In summer
Republican Social Movement. AENM was of 2016, Vona declared a new style of pol-
formed in Budapest on October 24, 2009. itics, called “modern conservatism” with
Jobbik’s membership ended in February the aim to exceed the pointless debates
2016, when the party cut its affiliation between the right- and the left-wing and
with AENM. However, Jobbik currently to induce cooperation among Hungari-
has ties to the Conservative People’s Party ans with different political backgrounds.
of Estonia, the Bulgarian United Patriots, According to Vona, the goal of “modern
the Latvian National Alliance, the Polish conservatism” is, beyond politics, to build
National Movement, the Indian Bharati- a society that can, by its proactivity, be
ya Janata Party, the Russian Rodina, and a basis for a more democratic political
the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party. functioning. As a historical precedent, he
Jobbik proposed joining the European referred to the ideals of István Széchenyi,
People’s Party, but was rejected in August who is considered as one of the greatest
2018 (Murer, 2015). statesmen of Hungarian history (Dunai,
2017). Despite Jobbik’s pledges, particular-
When the popularity of the ruling par- ly to the Jewish community in Hungary,
ty declined dramatically due to major many left-wing intellectuals and political
corruption scandals involving the gov- figures say they want to keep their dis-
ernment and Orban’s family in early 2015, tance from an organization often deemed
voters started shifting toward Jobbik, undemocratic. Thanks to these changes,
which is the only serious opposition to some media now debate whether Jobbik
Orban’s government and has been mor- should be classified as “far right” (Mc-
alizing about anticorruption policies and Laughlin, 2017).
defending the rights and interests of what
they call true-born Hungarians (Rev, 2015). Following the 2018 parliamentary elec-
To capitalize on the opportunity, Jobbik tion, Gábor Vona resigned due to his
adopted a policy of penal populism and earlier promises that he would resign if he
promised to bring political crime to an could not lead the party to victory. Despite
end. The party argued that the national rumors that Jobbik would change its poli-
police should be greatly strengthened cies, the National Board of the party unan-
10imously decided in favor of the moderate
right-wing conservative platform. On May
12, 2018, the party elected Tamás Sneider
as the president and Márton Gyöngyösi as
the executive vice president of the party.
The Hungarian press evaluated the new
presidency as a victory of the moderate
politicians. Sneider told he wanted to
build a socially conscious party based on
the teachings of Christianity
11Woman and her son in a Roma settlement in Hungary. 40 kms from Budapest there’s a really poor gipsy settle-
ment called Bag.
Jobbik vs. Roma
liszka (Politics, 2009). When a Tiszavasvari
teacher, Lajos Szögi, drove through Olasz-
liszka, an accident occurred in which Szö-
People gi knocked down a Romani girl. Szögi got
out of his vehicle to check whether or not
Tension between the Roma and the the girl was seriously injured. Although
non-Roma population is a longstanding the girl was not harmed, the onlookers
and pervasive issue in Hungary (Halasz, misinterpreted the scene and a group of
2009). There is a high level of social prej- angry Roma villagers beat Szögi to death,
udice against the Roma community as while his own children, who had been
reported by Amnesty International (AI, travelling with him, looked on from the
2014), and Jobbik has capitalized on this car. This grim news spread quickly across
particular issue for its own political ends. the country, and those who interpreted
Along with antisemitism, xenophobia, and the incident as a serious threat to their
racism, anti-Roma sentiments presaged own security asked for protection from
the rise of the far right in Hungary. Put- the authorities. Investigation into the case
ting aside political correctness and airing required time; however, Jobbik thought
anti-Roma views rapidly increased Job- that the authorities were too slow to react
bik’s popularity, especially in the eastern to the potential threats from the Roma
regions of Hungary, where – apart from community (Kim, 2016). The case turned
the big cities – the majority of the Roma public attention to the failure of Roma in-
population lives (Pap & Glied, 2018). When tegration and the inability of the Hungari-
Jobbik took up the case of a murder com- an police to maintain law and order in the
mitted by members of the Roma com- Hungarian countryside (Murer, 2015).
munity, Roma crime and penal populism
advanced to the political forefront (Kim, Jobbik’s leaders and members did not
2016). hesitate to exploit the incident and were
intent upon addressing “Roma crime” in
On October 15, 2006, a group of Roma their own way. Jobbik formulated its first
people lynched a Hungarian teacher in response: “The Movement for a Better
the Eastern Hungarian village of Olasz- Hungary took charge as the only party to
12,, Jobbik claimed that the aim is to as-
sist in “maintaining public order” and
“self-help in case of natural disasters, and
humanitarian interventions” (Varga, 2014).
Yet the appearance of the Guard, whose
members were uniformed in black with
Jobbik argues that Roma the red-and-white Arpad Stripe emblem
people are genetically pre- on the front, was reminiscent of the
pro-Nazi Hungarian Arrow Cross party
disposed to criminal activi- (Jordan, 2010). Inspired by the Guard, oth-
ty. With this in mind, Jobbik er similar quasi-paramilitary organizations
took a concrete course of were also formed, and the Hungarian
action to tackle the alleged Guard Movement became increasingly
popular and visible across the country
“Roma crime”. The idea (Kim, 2016). According to many academ-
of setting up a “national ics, it is the Guard that made a significant
guard” became widespread contribution to Jobbik’s success. (Karac-
sony and Rona, 2010).However, the Met-
among Hungary’s radi- ropolitan Court of Budapest disbanded
cal-right political parties. Magyar Gárda in 2009. Later, the Hungar-
On August 25, 2007, Jobbik ian Supreme Court approved the court
founded the Hungarian decision, and, in an appeal trial, the ECtHR
adjudicated on the case in July 2013 and
Guard (Magyar Garda) as a upheld the ruling of the Hungarian Su-
direct-action organization preme Court. (Ivanis et al., 2014).
to fulfill the role of policing
It did not take much time for the group
the Roma. to reorganize under at least three ban-
ners, as the Új Magyar Gárda (New Hun-
garian Guard), the Magyar Nemzeti Gárda
face one of the underlying problems in (Hungarian National Guard), and the
Hungarian society, the unresolved situ- Szebb Jövoért Polgáror Egyesület (Civil
ation of the ever-growing gypsy popula- Guard Association for a Better Hungarian
tion. The Movement spoke up about, what Future). Szebb Jövoért is the most active
everyone knows but others do not say of the three and has its roots in paramili-
due to political correctness, the phenom- tary organizations from the inter-war peri-
enon of ‘gypsy crime’ is real. It is a unique od and WWII. These groups work together
form of delinquency, different from the and with Jobbik (Murer, 2015). In 2019,
crimes of the majority in nature and force” László Toroczkai, the president of the Our
(Halasz, 2009). Homeland Movement, who was expelled
from Jobbik, reorganized the Magyar Gár-
The implication was obvious. Jobbik da. Nowadays, Magyar Gárda belongs to
argued that Roma people were genetical- this movement.
ly predisposed to criminal activity. With
this in mind, Jobbik prepared a concrete In August 2012, members of The New
course of action to tackle the alleged Hungarian Guard, Magyar Nemzeti Gár-
“Roma crime” (Kim, 2016). The idea of set- da, Szebb Jövoért Polgáror Egyesület,
ting up a “national guard” became wide- Betyársereg (the Outlaws’ Army), Mag-
spread among Hungary’s radical-right yar Nemzeti Arcvonal (the Hungarian
political parties. On August 25, 2007, with National Front), and Védero (Defence)
the blessing of his party, Vona founded gathered at the small village of Devecs-
the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Garda) with er to demonstrate against “gypsy crime
a mass loyalty oath ceremony at Saint (cigánybunozés).” The demonstration
Gyorgy Square (Pal, 2007; Murer, 2015 & began with a welcome from the Jobbik
Jordan, 2010)) as a direct-action organiza- affiliated Veszprém county chairman,
tion to fulfill the role of policing the Roma Gábor Ferenczi, who told the crowd that
with the alleged intent to “strengthen “self-defense is a fundamental right.” The
national self-defense.” “self-defense” was for ethnic Hungarians
13and so-called Hungarian “values” only, garians, a shared fantasy of small-scale
which by definition the Roma residents of crimes by Roma is allied with conspiracy
Devecser do not hold (Murer, 2015). Zsolt theories concerning large-scale financial
Tyirityán, the leader of the Betyársereg, crimes perpetrated by bankers and the
stated that “I will use any means neces- EU. In this paranoid fantasy, both must be
sary to protect our race. I am a racist and I violently opposed. Moreover, just as Roma
am proud of it, because I love my race and are habitually associated with the com-
I’m going to defend it.” The demonstrators mission of petty crime, larger financial
then began throwing bottles and rocks at degradations associated with globaliza-
homes they believed to belong to Roma tion and capitalism are often attributed to
and shouting, “You are going to die here” Jews. This combination could be seen in
(Hungarian Spectrum, 2013). This was a December 2012 propaganda campaign
no idle threat, as the events in Devecser from the MNA, which claimed “…a virtual
resembled those the year before in the bulldozer is destroying our country. The
small village of Gyöngyöspata, in Hunga- blade of the bulldozer is made up of gypsy
ry’s northeast corner (Murer, 2015). criminals and its driver, who is directing
the whole process, is the Zionist Jewry”
In March-April 2011, elements of these (Murer, 2015).
far-right direct-action groups descended
upon Gyöngyöspata and decided that The connection between Vona/Jobbik
they would run “military exercises” and and Zsolt Tyirityán and his Betyársereg
walk “security patrols” to defend the res- was exposed during a campaign rally in
idents against crime. Védero announced February 2014, held by Jobbik in a former
that it was going to establish a paramili- synagogue that became Esztergom’s
tary training center in the Roma section civic hall during the communist peri-
of town (BBC News, 2011). As the police od. Vona and Jobbik wanted to hold the
had done nothing to stop the incursions event there to demonstrate that that
by the paramilitary groups, an Ameri- “true Hungarians” could go anywhere
can businessman, with assistance from and say anything, including discussing
the Hungarian Red Cross, organized the the “evils of capitalism” in a former syn-
evacuation of around 270 Roma wom- agogue. While Vona addressed the 200
en and children from the beleaguered or so Jobbik supporters inside, Tyirityán’s
village (Der Spiegel, 2011). The village Betyársereg provided “security” to defend
became such a focal point for tensions the Jobbik speakers against the nearly
between far-right militants and the Roma 100 demonstrators who protested outside,
community that the Hungarian National some with yellow Stars of David pinned to
Front (MNA) published on their web page their chests (Aljazeera, 2014 & Murer, 2015).
that they believe the confrontations in Similarly, Tyirityán declared at a Novem-
Gyöngyöspata were the “outbreak of a ber 2013 anti-Roma demonstration in Vác,
cleansing civil war.” Since then, the MNA that people “should stop being the prey
has held monthly paramilitary exercises and start being the predators” vis-à-vis
either at their headquarters on a former Roma (Murer, 2015).
Soviet military base outside of Bony or in
other cities all around the country. These In 2009, Betyársereg and Jobbik signed
groups coordinate with one another and a cooperation agreement, saying that “we
organize training exercises not only for support each other and take part in each
other Hungarian groups, but for groups other’s events.” While Betyársereg does
across the region. The MNA does this not receive funds directly from Jobbik, it
because, according to their propaganda did have access to more than 40 million
materials, they believe that civil war is im- forint (approximately Euro 130,000) pro-
minent (Murer 2015). vided by the Jobbik Party Foundation to
the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement.
In the logic of the Jobbik-affiliated, di- Tamás Sneider, then vice president of
rect-action groups, and within the rhetoric Jobbik, stated that the relationship be-
of Jobbik itself, Jews and Roma become tween Betyársereg and Jobbik “must be
two sides of the same threatening coin. acknowledged to be a division of labor. It’s
For the extreme right, and increasingly good to have an Outlaw’s Army; it’s nice
for more politically mainstream Hun- to have the Sixty-Four Counties because
14,,
they are able to do what I cannot from was the cause of perceived “Roma crimi-
inside parliament” (Murer, 2015). nality.”
The relationship between Jobbik and
the radical nationalist Betyársereg has
caused much controversy. Betyársereg
openly asserts that elements of guerrilla
warfare, such as preparing explosives and
training for acts of terrorism, can be learnt
Anti-Roma sentiments,
from the propaganda videos of Al-Qaeda
and ISIS. With varying degrees of suc- even violence, character-
cess, Jobbik has tried to demonstrate its ize the political climate in
distance from radical organizations since Hungary. The Roma popu-
2015 (Pap & Glied, 2018). The separation
between Jobbik and the direct-action lation is blamed for not only
groups allows the party itself to suggest committing crimes, but also
that it is more moderate, without ac- draining national wealth by
tually alienating the participants in the
direct-action groups. The separation also
relying on social benefits.
allows Jobbik to claim that it does not Jobbik’s successful manip-
endorse violence in any way. Jobbik told ulation of anti-Roma senti-
Reuters through a communiqué that ment resulted in increased
“Jobbik condemns violence, and its mem-
bers cannot be linked to such acts either” electoral support.
(Goettig & Lowe, 2014).
Jobbik’s anti-Roma character does not The significance of this socio-cultural
consist solely of direct-action groups. In phenomenon for shaping the party iden-
2015, deputy leader Előd Novák posted tity is well observed by political analyst
on Facebook a picture of himself and his Andras Bíro-Nagy, who notes that: “An-
family next to a separate image of the first ti-Roma sentiment is very strong in Hun-
newborn in Hungary of the year, who was garian society. It is Jobbik that made the
born to a Romani family. In a comment most use of this social attitude for its own
on the pictures, he stated that the pop- benefit, and was indeed successful… For
ulation of Hungarians would become a that process, I stress the role of the Hun-
minority and suggested that the Romani garian Guard. The Guard was the paramil-
population is the biggest problem fac- itary arm of Jobbik and it was very import-
ing Hungary. Novák’s remarks were both ant for the party to reach many people
condemned and supported. Novák would via media. With the Guard, Jobbik could
later respond to the issue by refusing to appear in every corner of the country,
apologize and suggested that the family precisely in the ‘crisis area’ of Northeast
should apologize to him (Thorpe, 2015). Hungary. This is the poorest region of the
Novák was forced by the party’s parlia- country, in which ethnic conflicts are re-
mentary group to resign from his position current and Jobbik, along with the Guard,
as an MP in 2016 (Székely, 2016). marched there on a regular basis. When
people saw it, they said, ‘finally there is
Prior to Jobbik’s entry onto Hungary’s someone who creates order and keeps
political stage, parties had not dealt open- [people] safe from potential threats in
ly with the Roma issue and instead treat- this abandoned under-served rural area.’
ed it as a part of wider social problems In this way, Jobbik could garner support”
arising from underlying social circum- (Kim, 2016).
stances such as the prevalence of extreme
poverty and illiteracy. In contrast, Jobbik Jobbik’s successful manipulation of an-
approached the issue by taking an exclu- ti-Roma sentiment resulted in increased
sively “ethno-perspective,” promulgating electoral support. Jobbik distinguished
the view that “most of gypsy society lives itself from other political groups by find-
outside the law and outside work and ing its own practical solution. Accord-
education” (Bíro-Nagy et al., 2012), and this ing to Laszlo Lengyel, a leading political
15commentator at the Financial Research never once seen their parents in work.
Institute, this differentiated approach of The continuation of the Gypsy people’s
Jobbik is well observed at the small town circumstances along their current course
of Pecs. This is where a boy was raped is nothing short of a potential time-bomb,
and murdered on a roadside leading to a and if it is not subject to concerted inter-
predominantly Roma area. According to vention, our mutual home could sink into
Lengyel, immediately after the incident, a state of virtual civil war. At the present
Vona, went to the crime scene and spoke time a segment of the Gypsy community
in front of several hundred people. He strives for neither integration, nor em-
encouraged people to treat the Roma in a ployment, nor education; and wish only
certain way. He said that “there are people that society maintain them through the
around here who might kill our wives, our unconditional provision of state benefits”
children, and our mothers.” Following this (Guide, 2010).
incident, the people in Pecs felt the need
to place the Roma community under The manifesto continued: “The most
police surveillance and to prevent them pressing of these issues is undeniably
from leaving the Roma area of town (Kim, the halting of gypsy crime, for which the
2016). By basing their campaign on the strengthening of the established po-
Roma crime issue, Jobbik made electoral lice, and the foundation of a dedicated
gains, and its use of anti-Roma political rural police service, or Gendarmerie, is
rhetoric was instrumental in shaping par- required… certain specific criminologi-
ty identity. cal phenomena are predominantly and
overwhelmingly associated with this
Likewise, anti-Roma sentiments, even minority, and that as a result such phe-
violence, also characterize the current nomena require the application of fitting
political climate. These expressions of and appropriate remedies. Law enforce-
antagonistic politics are tied to the widely ment initiatives therefore must go hand
held political belief among the political in hand with the reform of social, educa-
right that Hungary is under assault from tional and employment policy, given that
outside forces, whether expressed as in- Gypsy integration means assimilation
ternational global capitalism, dominated into society-at-large, and that this process
by Jews, or trans-local, “rootless” Roma must commence at school, even in nurs-
painted as the perpetrators of “gypsy ery school…” (Guide, 2010).
crime” (Murer, 2015). The Roma population
is blamed for not only committing crimes,
but also draining national wealth by rely-
ing on social benefits. This anti-Roma at-
titude was well demonstrated by a social
survey conducted by social researchers at
the Tarki institute. They found that more
than two-fifth of respondents (40 percent)
were in favor of taking discriminatory
measures against the Roma community
(Bernath, Juhász, Krekó & Molnár, 2013).
Jobbik’s 2010 electoral manifesto explic-
itly stated that the coexistence and cohe-
sion of Magyar and Roma is one of the se-
verest problems facing Hungarian society.
“On the occasion of 1989’s regime change,
great swathes of the Gypsy people lost
their jobs; who subsequently found them-
selves unable, and in many cases unfor-
tunately unwilling, to adapt to the new
realities… In certain parts of the country
over the last decades the situation has
deteriorated to truly deplorable levels.
Generations have now grown up, having
16The memorial wall with the names of the members of the Hungarian Jewish community perished in the Holo-
caust, inside the famous Dohány Street Synagogue.
Antisemitism and
of their own creation: the value of Hun-
garianness (Kim, 2016). Hungarianness,
or Hungarism, is also a powerful Jobbik
Hungarism phenomena. Established in the 1930s,
Hungarism is one of the ideologies of the
Another element that has contributed to traditional Hungarian far right. Its ideas
Jobbik’s rise is that of Hungary’s specific were sustained by émigré groups after
history of antisemitism and its embedded 1945, and it returned to Hungary after the
socio-cultural prejudice towards Jews. transition to democracy. Two small groups
Unfortunately, in contemporary Hungary, operate independently from each other:
antisemitism remains a very public part the Hungarian National Front (Magyar
of the political landscape (Murer, 2015). In Nemzeti Arcvonal) and the Pax-Hungarica
the context of post-1989 political devel- Movement (Pax Hungarica Mozgalom).
opments, antisemitism – like anti-Roma Neither has become a significant political
sentiment – is essentially linked to the far actor, but their members and supporters
right. Being anti-Roma was the main plat- generally vote for right-wing parties. Their
form of MIÉP, whereas antisemitism is the messages are anti-Western, antisemitic,
central tenet of Jobbik’s political rhetoric. anti-capitalist, and anti-democratic, with
A poll on antisemitism, conducted by the an added emphasis on maintaining mili-
Anti-Defamation League (ADL), suggested tary capabilities (Pap & Glied, 2018).
that a large segment of the Hungarian
population thought that Jews wielded Although the term “Hungarism” was
too much influence in global financial coined by the Catholic bishop Ottokár
markets (63 percent), and that they were Prohászka to describe an ideology rapidly
utilizing this influence to serve their own spreading before World War II, the Hun-
interests (57 percent) (Kim, 2016). garist ideology has no strong Christian
influence. During the last two decades,
Despite this subtle difference, both the foreign policy stance by these two
MIÉP and Jobbik have represented an organizations has taken on a significant
extreme ethno-nationalism, the essence pro-Russia orientation, which aims to
of which was expressed through a notion build economic and cultural relation-
17ships with Russia. Although Jobbik is not ers have suggested registration of
an outgrowth of traditional Hungarism, the Jews in Hungary (Stephens,
both movements share some ideological
elements (antisemitism and a Russian ori- 2017), the party has strenuously
entation), and both also typically use the denied allegations of antisemitism
so-called Árpád striped flag (Pap & Glied, (LeBor, 2009) or racism, claiming
2018). According to Jobbik, Hungarianness such allegations are either polit-
ought to be safeguarded from perceived
ically motivated (Moore, 2008) or
,,
“foreign” influences. With this in mind, any
supranational bodies, international orga- simply false. It has also dismissed
nizations, or multi-national companies the criticism of perceived antisem-
were seen as alien to the national interest itism, racism, and homophobia as
(Kim, 2016). the “favorite topics” of its political
opponents. Even so, the move-
ment has been accused of playing
on those fears (Freeman, 2009). For
instance, in a newsletter published
by a group calling itself “The trade
Hungarianness, or Hun- union of Hungarian police officers
garism, is a powerful Jobbik prepared for action,” the following
phenomena. Established in was printed: “Given our current
the 1930s, Hungarism is one situation, antisemitism is not just
of the ideologies of the tra- our right, but it is the duty of every
ditional Hungarian far right. Hungarian homeland lover, and
Its ideas were sustained by we must prepare for armed battle
against the Jews.” The editor of the
émigré groups after 1945,
union, Judit Szima, was a Jobbik
and it returned to Hungary
candidate in the upcoming elec-
after the transition to de- tion for the EU Parliament. Haaretz
mocracy. alleged Szima “didn’t see anything
wrong with the content of the arti-
Jobbik’s transformation since cle” (Lahav, 2009).
2014 is a unique post-transition-
al political development that is In spring 2012, a Jobbik deputy
rooted in elements of Hungarian in Hungarian parliament, Zsolt
nationalism. These national ele- Baráth, caused outrage by com-
ments included underlying social memorating the 1882 blood libel
prejudice against Roma and Jews, against Jews in Parliament. The
a preference for paternalistic eco- Tiszaeszlár blood libel, found lat-
nomic systems, and a re-introduc- er to be unrelated to Jews, was
tion of a historical narrative based known as the first major anti-Jew-
in mythic Turanism. Jobbik has ish event in modern Hungary, pre-
capitalized on these elements in dating the Holocaust (Free Hunga-
order to shape party identity, and ry, 2012). After the incident, Baráth
their political maneuvering has was not re-elected and is no longer
proved effective, recognizably in- an MP. In November 2012, while
fluencing both politics and society evaluating the latest news on the
as a whole (Kim, 2016). controversial Israeli military action
in the Gaza strip, Jobbik’s depu-
Despite the fact that Jobbik lead- ty parliamentary leader, Márton
18Gyöngyösi, stated in his speech at In 2014, Tibor Ágoston, the depu-
Parliament, “I think such a conflict ty chairman of Jobbik’s Debrecen
makes it timely to tally up people and Hajdú-Bihar County organiza-
of Jewish ancestry who live here, tion, referred to the Holocaust as
especially in the Hungarian Parlia- the “holoscam” (politics.hu, 2014).
ment and the Hungarian govern- Then-Jobbik leader Vona later stat-
ment, who, indeed, pose a national ed that he had criticized Zionism
security risk to Hungary” (Ynet- as a political idea and pointed out
news.com, 2012). Around 10,000 that he understood the Hungarian
Hungarians (Than, 2012) in Buda- Jewish community had to survive
pest protested against Gyöngyösi’s traumas during the 20th century
antisemitic remarks. All major Hun- that make dialogue very hard. At
garian political parties took part in the same time, he emphasized
the protest. Jewish organizations that he wanted to have harmonic
responded to Gyöngyösi’s speech relations with the Hungarian Jew-
by describing it as a reintroduction ish community (Bayer, 2017).
of Nazism in the Hungarian Parlia-
ment and by describing Jobbik as According to a survey on an-
a Nazi party. Gyöngyösi admitted tisemitic prejudices, antisemitic
immediately after his speech that political discourses, and political
he had composed his sentence antisemitism in Hungary, 10-15 per-
wrongly and offered an apology (Al cent of the Hungarian adult pop-
Jazeera, 2012). ulation held a strong antisemitic
prejudice. Surveys conducted after
On May 4, 2013, Jobbik members 2006 show not only an increase in
protested against the World Jew- the absolute percentage of an-
ish Congress in Budapest, claiming tisemites, but also an increase in
the protest was against “a Jew- the proportion of antisemites who
ish attempt to buy up Hungary” embed their antisemitism in a po-
(BBC News, 2013). Jobbik MP Enikő litical context. This phenomenon is
Hegedűs vociferously condemned directly linked with the appearance
both Israel and Jews at the rally on the political scene of Jobbik as
as her husband, Lóránt Hegedűs an antisemitic party. When exam-
Jr., stood nearby (Heneghan, 2013). ining the causes of antisemitism,
An ordained minister in the Re- the most interesting finding was
formed Church in Hungary, Lóránt that the strength of antisemitic
Hegedűs himself had served in feelings is regionally different and
the National Assembly as an MP of that these differences correlate
the far-right nationalist Hungarian with the strength of Jobbik’s sup-
Justice and Life Party from 1998 port across various regions. Accord-
to 2002. He invited Holocaust de- ingly, the support for a far-right
nier David Irving to his Budapest party is not a consequence of an-
church in 2007 as a “special guest” tisemitism, but conversely the par-
(Odehnal, 2011) and has also been ty should be regarded as a factor
accused of antisemitism on several that mobilizes attitudes leading to
occasions for statements he has antisemitism. Thus, antisemitism is
made about Jews at Jobbik events. a consequence of an attraction to
the far-right rather than an expla-
19nation for it (Kovacs, 2012). Later Perhaps, the main reason for this is
surveys have also showed that the fact that in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope (CEE), immigration has not caused
anti-Jewish sentiment is reactive to problems that affect people’s daily lives.
political campaigns: antisemitism There are no major immigrant groups;
increased in election years and religiously active citizens are typically
then fell back to its previous level. Christian, and cultural identity is based
on Judeo-Christian cultural traditions.
(Karacsony & Rona, 2010). This is exactly why the nationalistic radi-
cal rhetoric of Jobbik is outstanding and
controversial at the same time: its for-
mer leader, Gábor Vona, considers Islam
humanity’s last hope. Moreover, Muslim
migrants were not targeted in Hungary as
they have been in other parts of Europe,
where many far-right movements overtly
define Muslim immigrants as an existen-
tial threat. Since Hungary has no sizeable
Muslim community but a rapidly increas-
ing Roma population, the social and po-
litical issues typically linked to Muslims in
Aerial view from Tomb of Gul Baba, Turkish memorial Western Europe have been linked instead
monument in Budapest, Hungary. to the Roma (Pap & Glied, 2018).
The Hungarian tribes first came into
Unique Among Euro- contact with Islam during their migration
through the Eastern European Steppe, in-
pean Racists: An cluding passing through the Khazar Em-
pire, in the 8th century. When the tribes
Islam-friendly Jobbik settled in the Carpathian Basin at the
end of the 9th century, there were some
Muslims among them. In the Hungarian
Kingdom, ruled by the House of Árpád up
to the 14th century, Muslims held import-
Although they differ regarding the ant offices in the financial administration,
extent and form of action demanded, the the military, and the royal guard, and lived
agenda of each far-right party includes on royal estates. 500 years of peaceful co-
the fight against the spread of Islam in existence passed. At the end of the Árpád
Europe, primarily manifested by halting dynasty, Muslims disappeared from his-
the construction of mosques. Far-right torical records, and historians assume that
parties demand governments take radical they converted and assimilated into the
measures to force immigrants, predomi- Hungarian population by the 14th century
nantly from Muslim-majority countries, to (Pap & Glied, 2018).
accept
The present Hungarian Muslim commu-
European traditions, customs, and nity is young and concentrated in Buda-
legal order; as well as the forced learn- pest, with no apparent segregation within
ing of the language of the host country. the city. The number of Hungarian con-
In many ways Jobbik is similar to other verts is significant: estimated to be more
far-right groups in Europe; however, it is than 30,000, they make up 10 percent of
alone among radical parties in Europe in Hungary’s Muslim community, itself less
pursuing a Muslim-friendly policy (Pap & than 1 percent of the total population.
Glied, 2018). Jobbik’s views on Islam differ Established Hungarian Muslims typically
significantly from those of most parties in work in the retail and hospitality sector, as
Europe that are recognized as nationalist, architects and engineers, and in health-
which consider Muslim people as a seri- care. Their standard of living is not high,
ous threat to the safety and the identity of and there is a sense of marginalization. In
Europe (Kowalczyk, 2017). spring 2015, when the Fidesz government
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