Technology: The Great Liberator or the Insidious Oppressor?: Development and the Rise of the Mobile Phone

Technology: The Great Liberator or the Insidious
Oppressor?: Development and the

Rise of the Mobile Phone

Chloe Geoghegan

   Abstract:
   There is an implicit assumption at the heart of mainstream development thought, an
   assumption which bestows technology with the power, and the responsibility, to end
   poverty. Yet, neo-liberal discourses of technological determinism wilfully ignore the
   reality that technology has long been a cog in the historical machine of oppression. This
   dissertation challenges current tides in development theory and practice which
   presuppose the emancipatory qualities of technology, specifically
   discrediting the notion that the mobile phone will be the great equalising technology.
   Through discussing the contested nature of development, the centrality of innovation in
   the modern development paradigm, the rise of Information Communication
   Technologies (ICTs) and the impact of the mobile this dissertation concludes that
   technology can never be the answer for development because in being a product of
   structural oppression, technology is not only powerless to defeat oppression but
   actively perpetuates it.

Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge the guidance of Professor Ray Bush. His informed, insightful and
thought-provoking comments were of immeasurable value whilst writing this dissertation.

Introduction
Technology has been an implicit part of the historical machine of oppression; typically whoever has
had ownership of technology has used it to exploit those without. Yet, development discourses have
long heralded the ability of technology to redress inequality. Clearly, a paradox exists surrounding
the benefits of technology for development, which has been further complicated by the great leap
forward made in technological innovation over the past 40 years. This leap has led to increasing
numbers of people gaining access to technologies that have been labelled as emancipatory, most
important of which has been the monumental rise of the mobile phone. In light of these advances,
debate concerning the nature of technology need be re-examined to ascertain whether technology
has, in fact, become the champion of the global South. In order to explore the role of the mobile in
development, there will of course be a chapter on this topic. However, it will preceded by a
preamble which explores themes that will locate the mobile within larger patterns of raised hopes
and false promises in regards to technology and development. This dissertation will be moving from
the general to the particular with the first chapter tackling the contested nature of development, the
second debating the centrality of innovation and technology in the current development paradigm,
followed by a section exploring the impact of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) on
development discourses. These chapters will set the tone for the final section, which will assess the
virtues of the mobile phone for development.

This dissertation asserts that the mobile is not and cannot be the answer to development, as such
technocratic solutions only serve to depoliticise the structural root of poverty. It will maintain that
mobiles are no more than a product of the neo-liberal doctrine of development, which at its very
best is reductionist and at its very worst is an ideology propounded to ensure accumulation for the
elite through the dispossession of others. This is not to say that the mobile has not been
appropriated by the underserved as a weapon against the tyranny of inequality but, rather, that
weapons which are the product of a certain system can only be so effective in challenging that same
system. Moreover, as history is all too able to demonstrate, although from time to time a technology
emerges with equalising qualities soon enough new innovations are made which actively work to
redress this process. This dissertation will maintain that technological innovation is no more than a

cyclic pretence of progress, designed to keep the poor destitute by selling them the promise of
hope.

Literature Review
Over the past couple of years the rising references to the term “m-development” have been none
too conspicuous; it appears every non-governmental organisation (NGO) is clamouring to develop
their very own breed of m-health or m-learning programme. Yet, m-development is very much in its
infancy, meaning the emancipatory power of the mobile is still up for debate. The mobile
simultaneously seems able to afford people greater freedoms, whilst also being the tool through
which the ‘dynamics of uneven development’ are reinforced and inequality compounded (Carmody,
2012, p.1). Therefore, debate concerning the impact of the mobile on development is vital in order
to get to the crux of this paradox. This is especially important as resources are being funnelled into
implementing development agendas with the mobile at the heart of the solution.

Thousands of studies have been written concerning the outcomes of m-development projects.
However, literature has tended to be isolated to a certain field of development, for example
maternal health, or to a certain project – the impact of mobile ownership for a farming cooperative
in Lesotho (UN, 2014; Cull and Vincent, 2013). These evaluations generally offer only specific
strengths and weaknesses of their individual project. Very few commentaries have analysed a range
of projects and areas of focus, amalgamating their findings to tweeze common threads from their
outcomes. Thus, an overall evaluation on the mobile phone for development remains woefully
absent. Jenny Aker (2010), a Centre for Global Development (CGD) fellow working on the impact of
ICTs on development outcomes in Africa, has undertaken much research on m-development. She
offers the most considered conclusion: that in spite of the various ways in which it does further
development aims the mobile is unable to be the “silver bullet” for inequality. Yet, she fails to
question why this is so, why the mobile has been imagined as the saviour and why, in spite of this, it
cannot be.

There has been a large-scale bankruptcy of the m-development literature to adequately link the
limitations of the mobile with the greater deficiencies of the ICT for Development (ICT4D)
movement. In an attempt to contextualise the mobile’s shortcomings this dissertation will,
therefore, outline the assumptions of the ICT4D approach before tackling the issue of mobile
telephony. Daniel Bell asserted that the 1980s heralded the beginning of ‘The Third Technological
Revolution’. This revolution was transformative as it allowed all existing technologies to converge

and be presented through digits on a binary system (1999, pp.1-4). Since then there has been a
growing body of literature that assumes ICTs will be able to ameliorate the disordered effects of
capitalism. Manuel Castells (1996), the information society, communications and globalisation
researcher, has been the standout contributor to this topic, upholding the view that knowledge
diffusion is the means through which to achieve development. However, there has been a
widespread discrediting of the ICT4D approach resulting from the many failings of ICT policies and
also because of the gap in access between ICT-rich and ICT-poor regions; a gulf termed the digital
divide. Yet, as with the mobile, there has been a wholesale failure to contest the omnipresent belief
that ICTs are the tools of progress.

In order to combat this, the notion of technological innovation as a central feature of development
will be interrogated in this dissertation previously to the discussion of the ICT revolution. There has
been an assumption, as Cherry notes that ‘All human beings are, and always have been,
technological creatures. Technology is essential to Man’s nature’ (1985, p.24). And as a result of this
association the concept of development has too been intertwined with innovation. The economist
Joseph Schumpeter was the first to articulate the role of technology in productivity, growth and
profit in the 1920s and since the 1950s his theory has become a part of economic doctrine (Niosi,
2008, p.613). Crucially, however, such thinking ignores the hypotheses of both Kondratiev and Perez
who decried traditional, linear capitalist economics, proposing instead a cyclical model of “progress”
which sees innovation as a catalyst for growth and eventual equality but only for limited periods
(Warner 2012, 2002, p.xxii). Much of the literature has assumed that development only ever builds
upon itself, instead of seeing development as a process where gains can only be made at the
expense of existing creations (Perez, 2002, p.606). Mainstream development discourses ignore the
inherent in-egalitarianism of innovation. By assuming that technology is beneficent, inclusive and
central to progress they fail to question why progress has been depicted as a world full of cities and
not a world of fields.

To rectify these deficiencies this dissertation will begin with a discussion of the contested nature of
development. Since the dawn of the doctrine of development – as Cowen and Shenton (1996) refer
to it – the notion of development has been shackled to the neo-liberal obsession with growth, to be
developed meant being economically advanced and industrialised. Amartya Sen (1999), the Noble
economist, powerfully argued against this vision stating that growth was not the central component
for development, rather freedom was. Critiques, such as these, have contributed towards the
human development approach, where capabilities and empowerment are privileged as the variables

of measurement instead of productivity and profit. Certainly, debates around the mobile phone
exhibit this binary between income-enhancing and freedom-enhancing programmes; a reflection of
the contested nature of development in microcosm. However, it is not just the means through which
to achieve development which has been disputed but also the whole notion of development itself.
With the emergence of the post-development school, development as an endeavour was
challenged. Arguably most profoundly by Edward Galeano, who labelled the development paradigm
as nothing more than smoke and mirrors deployed to stun the global poor into a paralysed hope for
better (1997, p.214). Yet, there has been scant reflection into whether the mobile is just one more
mirror in the arsenal of neo-liberal development. This dissertation seeks to fill this chasm in the
debate, tying together the assumptions that development is inherently good, that technology is
necessary to development, that ICTs are central to the development process with the belief that the
mobile can be the answer. In this sense, it not only offers an assessment of the relative strengths
and weaknesses of the mobile but, fundamentally, it demonstrates why the mobile has been
constructed as the saviour in spite of its impotence.

Chapter 1: The Contested Nature of Development
Introduction
In referring to development, one is not merely meaning the alleviation of poverty, which has been
an age-old concern. Rather development very specifically refers to the advance of a model of
poverty management that has arisen over the past 200 years, the genesis of which was cemented by
post-World War II economic and political policy (Thomas, 2000, p.3). Chari and Corbridge are correct
in noting that although development is conceived of as something that happens to - or more
accurately is done to - the global South, in fact, the economic, political, social and cultural
ramifications of development are happening all the time, everywhere, to everyone (2007, p.4).
Development is a normative concept meaning that it cannot be detached from the values,
assumptions and aspirations of each particular age. Development theory, therefore, is an attempt to
conceptualise neutral social change in a manner which appends meaning to the process and to
which agency can be affected (Hettne, 2009, p.8). Western development discourses encompass, in a
variety of formulas, three fundamental political values; freedom, order and justice, notions which
have historically held a pull over the human mind and can help account for the rise, and persistence
of development theory and practice (Hettne, 2009, p.14).Development has, thus, become to the
present moment what the civilising mission was to the nineteenth-century, the ‘central organising
concept of our time’ (Cowen and Shenton, 1995, p.27).

Development was once heralded as ‘the last bastion of modernism in the social sciences’; theorists
may have differed in their desired methods of achieving the goal of development but
mainstream thinking did not contest its desirability or effectiveness. However, post-development
theory surfaced during Communism’s denouement sparking a growing tirade of literature that
disputes development’s very purpose, condemning it as arbitrary; a meta-narrative used to
legitimise the continued self-interest of those who practice it (Rapley, 2002, pp.185-186).
Development whilst being one of the most omnipresent concepts of our time has also then become
one of the most contested (Chari and Corbridge, 2007, p.4).

Thomas proposes that development has been conceptualised in three ways; as a historical process
of social change; as a vision, ideology or discourse which encapsulate grand goals and, finally, as a
measure of the state of being of a society (2000, p.29). For the purposes of this chapter
development will be discussed using these three categories.

Development and the Idea of Progress
Progress as a human pursuit has existed at least since the times of Ancient Greece, yet it manifested
philosophically in its present form during the Enlightenment in eighteenth-century Europe. This
intellectual movement espoused the idea that technological and scientific advance would inevitably
perfect the human condition. It involved a linear perception of time where all societies were
inexorably ‘advancing naturally and consistently’ away from destitution, barbarism and tyranny
towards wealth, civilisation and democracy (Shanin, 1997, p.65). The power and resonance of the
Idea of Progress is evident in that it has survived for over two-centuries, remaining a founding
conviction through which modern Western society operates. There is belief that development is
seeking to bring about what Chambers has defined as ‘good change’, which aligns with the linear
upwards trajectory that progress supposedly follows (cited in Thomas, 2000, p.33). Thomas notes
this similarity, stating that development is not just a single event designed to improve a particular
aspect of society but, rather, is an all-encompassing process that builds on itself with the continuities
of change and improvement fundamental to the concept (2000, p.24). Therefore, development can
be said to have a modernising impetus, spreading the supposedly virtuous social, economic and
political systems and ideologies of the West for the “benefit” of those converted (Thomas, 2000,
p.1).

Yet, this morally benevolent depiction of development is not without its critics. Kitching has
conceded that ‘development is an awful process’, its purpose ‘ameliorating the disordered faults of

progress’ (cited in Thomas, 2000, pp.528-530). This unmistakably points to a desire to control and
manipulate the way progress occurs. Development demands the generation of behaviours which are
categorised as good, and supposedly prove conducive to socio-economic improvement, to replace
practices which are viewed as transgressive. Corea pertinently refers to this as a mass form of
cultural conditioning, as Western values and practices become associated with better living
standards (2007, p. 49). In requiring all societies to fit a predetermined model that embodies
“goodness”, Escobar claims that development is simply a continuation of the Enlightenment’s
‘dream of reason’, a dream which dismantles the rich, diverging and numerous cultures of the global
South, remodelling them in the image of Western civilisation (1997, pp.91-92). When
comprehending the impacts of the advent of globalisation and the near universal commodification
of Western culture it has brought, Escobar’s point does not seem hyperbolic.

The barbaric versus the civilised dichotomy present in the Idea of Progress has been repackaged in
the development discourses in the form of the undeveloped versus the developed (Escobar, 1997,
pp.91-92). This distinction privileges those belonging to the “developed world”, a term which literally
depicts the global South as so different as to be on a different planet to the global North. This has,
undoubtedly, helped legitimise the imperial undertones of development practice, where institutions
and values have been imposed on areas deemed ripe for development (Hettne, 2009, p.2). Certainly,
this self-righteous paternalism is evident in the severe limitations placed on the economic and
political autonomy of the global South. The structural adjustment programmes of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the 1980s a case in point. Malthus predicted that in the
pursuit of constant progress population surplus would become a problem owing to a shortage of
resources, an issue referred to by Arendt as the ‘human deficit’. Harvey in his concept of
‘accumulation by dispossession’ suggests that capitalism requires this deficit, that it ‘must
perpetually have something “outside of itself” in order to stabilise itself’ (cited in Duffield, 2007,
pp.7-10). This can also be applied to development. For development to endure there must always be
that which needs development, developed countries can only accumulate prestige and virtue
through the dispossession of their underdeveloped counterparts. Thus, it appears impossible to
achieve the ‘good change’ that Chamber’s proposes, without first destroying what it seeks to
replace; values, rituals and beliefs held sacred (Thomas, 2000, p.24). Therefore, critics of
development attack the mainstream adherence to this Idea of Progress as it actually serves to
create, label and marginalise the underdeveloped that it is, supposedly, attempting to save.

Development as a vision, ideology or doctrine

Conceptualising development as interchangeable with progress is a practice which Cowen and
Shenton dispute. They argue that it is a related yet separate condition, stating that it was not until
the arrival of industrial capitalism did the casualties of progress experience such widespread
degradation that they actually became a threat to the very movement of progress itself. They
suggest that this juncture between progress and chaos necessitated ‘intentional and constructive
activity’ to mitigate the destructive by-products of progress, for which development is another
name. It was at this point, they contend, that the ‘modern doctrine of development’ was forged
(cited in Thomas, 2000, p.25). This act of intent, the idea that it is possible to act in a means that will
beget development, is what created the juncture between progress and development (Cowen and
Shenton, 1996, p.iii).

Esteva marks the birth of this intent to develop on 20 January 1949 with the U.S. President,
Truman’s, pronouncement of ‘a bold new programme for making the benefits of our scientific
advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped
areas’ (cited in Thomas, 2000, p.4). This moment instituted a break with past discourses, with the
mere utterance of the term “underdeveloped” new visions of the self, and of the other were
created, ultimately condemning over 2 billion people not only to the ‘undignified condition of
underdevelopment’ but as part of an indistinct and homogenous whole (Sachs, 1992, p.2). Thus, the
boundaries of development were defined and fixed in relation to what development was not, what it
was escaping. It is hardly surprising that development has garnered such heavily criticism of late as
its institution served to ‘divide humankind against itself’ (Duffield, 2007, p.ix). Although the notion of
underdevelopment was formed at this moment it was a year before, during the Bretton Woods
Conference, where the enduring vision of how to achieve development was instituted. During the
conference the near-omnipotent institutions that today govern development, the World Bank and
IMF, were created. Controls were also implemented over the global financial system, embedding
liberalism into the world economy. International trade and open markets were presented as
‘engine*s+ of growth’ that improved living standards directly, through increased per capita income,
and indirectly, through state-sponsored welfare (Gilipin, 2003. p.13; UNDP, 2001, p.1). Since Bretton
Woods, theorists from Kitching to Hirchcman have agreed that economic development, and thus the
eradication of poverty, is impossible without industrialisation (Allen and Chataway, 2000, pp.509-
511). In the 1980s, the Washington Consensus was almost unilaterally adopted by countries in the
business of promoting development; ensuring neo-liberalism became not only the dogma of global
economics but of development thinking also (Gore, 2003, p.318).

The way that development functions as a discourse of neo-liberalism created a space, Escobar
contends, where only certain ideas could be proposed or even imagined (1997, p.85). Yet, for many
this pursuit of profit has not delivered the benefits it promised it would. Chang, a leading figure in
heterodox development economics, has argued persuasively that in prescribing a set of ‘good
policies’ for developing countries to follow the West is actively setting an agenda for development
which contrasts its own historical experience. He maintains that this policy of hypocrisy, which
requires developing countries to reject the protectionist methods once adopted by the West,
amounts to no more than the West ‘kicking away the ladder’ (2002, pp-1-7). Chang is fiercely critical
of neo-liberal development practice because conforming to such policies has not brought about the
prosperity they guaranteed (2002, p.140). Cammack argues that neo-liberal institutions have
succeeded in forging an ideology which conceals the pernicious elements of capitalist development,
presenting it ‘as a remedy for the very human ills it generates’ (2002, p.160).

For Birch and Mykhenko, the inability of neo-liberalism to increase wealth through market efficiency
– its raison d’être, has exposed ‘the conceit at the heart’ of the project (2010, pp.1-2). Yet, to solely
focus on the neo-liberal economic development would be to buy into the doctrine the Bretton
Woods organisations have preached, to ignore the markedly different forms of practice that are
emerging. The Human Development Report maintains that ‘people are the real wealth of nations’,
that development is about more than the material affluence that Adam Smith foretold, rather it
requires the expansion of people’s choices in the pursuit of lives that they value (cited in McCloskey,
2003, p.4). This vision of development has been greatly enhanced by the works of the Nobel
economist, Amartya Sen, who encapsulated his idea of development as one of ‘freedom’; freedom
being a ‘primary end’ but, vitally, also the ‘principle means’ through which development is achieved
(1999, p.3). Sen maintains that condition of poverty is not solely determined through low income
levels but through the deprivation of the fundamental human capabilities necessary to flourish
(1999, pp.14-20). In broadening the way in which prosperity might be categorised Sen acknowledges
the severe limitations of neo-liberal canon which simplistically equates growth to well-being.

Development as an empirical measure
In order for the dichotomy between developed and undeveloped to operate, certain parameters
need exist which locate a region within the binary. This had lead to the practice of countries being
labelled as more or less developed through tables which rank them according to their performance
on key criteria, the most notable of which is poverty – universally categorised as living on less than
$2 a day (Thomas, 2000, p.30). Owing to this, measures of development have become inextricably

tangled with definitions of development, as measuring development presupposes the ability to
define what development entails (Storey, 2009, pp.22-23). This has led to the measure of the state
of being of any given society becoming one of the ways development is conceived of. In this sense,
Esteva has criticised the concept of development for being incapable of providing substantive,
meaningful theory or practice because of the arbitrary assumptions made concerning what
development truly entails (1992, p.3). That poverty has become a synonym for undeveloped speaks
to the power of these measurements in defining development. Interestingly however, Thomas
maintains that it is not only possible for development to transpire without alleviating poverty but, in
fact, evelopment inherently entails the aggravation of poverty (2000, p.3). Thomas points to the
increasing disparity of wealth in the world, a disparity long branded as an issue of poverty instead of
being spoken in terms of inequality. The sympathetic overtones of the word poverty lend themselves
to the notion that destitution is somehow a natural, albeit regrettable, state, whilst inequality points
to the role of power relations and the existence of agency in the perpetuation of widespread
deprivation. What the term poverty fails to capture, but what inequality unmistakably does, is that
in development there are winners as well as losers (2000, p.24). Poverty obscures the explicitly
racialised component of deprivation, that, for the most part, the “developing world” is the coloured
world, whereas inequality demands dissection of the institutional racialised practice that has
marginalised people based on the shade of their skin (Jones, 2008, p.907). Therefore, development
has been described by Alveres as a process of ‘active triage’ where those who profit do so at the
direct expense of others (cited in Thomas, 2000, p.20). The impulse to develop has consequently
been deplored as a specific form of social engineering, designed to profit powerful interest groups
(Harrison, 2010, p.60). Defining development through the measure of certain criterion is problematic
in many respects but none more pivotal than the way these measurements have been used to
obscure the reality of deprivation through the labelling of underdevelopment as an issue of poverty
instead of inequality.

Conclusion
Conjuring the ‘illusion of the outcast’ through the notion of development, for Galeano, legitimised
the interventions of states and technocrats into the “Third World”, it manipulated dispossession into
a promise to the global poor: that ‘WE CAN BE LIKE THEM’ (1997, p.214). But the promise of
development is one that is yet to be delivered. And arguably it cannot be delivered without pushing
the limits of the world’s natural resources to breaking point. Comprehending this gap between what
has been promised and what is possible has led post-development theorists to proffer the hoax
theory which stipulates that development was never intended to actually ameliorate humanitarian

crisis, rather it was implemented to facilitate the industrial North’s global dominance (Thomas, 2000,
p.19; Rapely, 2002, p.188). A binary, therefore, exists at the heart of development between harm
and help, sincerity and deceit. Clearly pernicious undercurrents of neo-imperialism pervade the
concept but this does not alter the reality that international development has assisted in halving the
proportion of people living in abject poverty worldwide, given 2 billion more people access to safe
drinking water, and decreased infant mortality by 41% (UN, 2013, p.4). These figures, and countless
more, show the very real and significant impact development does have on the lives of those in
need. However, questions persist concerning whether these improvements are the intended
purpose of intervention of just a by-product of a desire to control. One thing remains clear
development, as a concept, can no longer be viewed as something automatically beneficent and
emancipatory owing to the insidious oppressive undertones that permeate its existence.

Chapter 2: Innovation, Technology and Development
Introduction
Technological advancement - a concept almost inseparably linked to innovation – is a fundamental
component in the societal transformations inherent in the Idea of Progress. Technological
innovation, of the modern variety, has its roots in the Industrial Revolution in Britain which occurred
from around 1760-1840. For Hobsbawn, this was the moment where developed countries became
measured through their industrial economies (1975, p.43). Innovation enabled the production of
goods on a mass scale for export all over the world. Kitching mused that ‘for the first time’ the world
believed that there was a ‘real possibility of ending material want and suffering’ (cited in Hewitt,
Johnson and Wield, 1992, p.1). The innovations of the Industrial Revolution brought about the ‘great
leap forward’ of the capitalist world economy, which Hobsbawm blames for disrupting ‘the concept
of a Third World” and consciously forcing humanity into the modern era (1995, p.364). The World
Bank describes innovation as ‘the cornerstone of sustained economic growth and prosperity’ (2009,
p.3). And the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) acknowledged that
innovation was a major driver of development aims (OECD, 2007). Yet, innovation and technology do
not automatically improve living standards for everyone, everywhere. Bichler et al. crucially notes
that with technological innovation comes pollution, health risks and numerous unforeseen and
destructive outcomes which question the sustainability of innovation-based development (2010,
p.1). This thinking parallels that of Nietzsche who characterised the role of innovation in “progress”
as a form of ‘creative destruction’; loss being just as crucial to the process as gain (cited in Perez,
2002, p.22). Though often viewed in a deterministic framework of being the path to good change,
the benevolence of technological innovation is far from an inevitable reality (Dicken, 2007, p.76).

In untangling the relationship between technology and development this chapter will first discuss
the role of technology in growth, followed by a debate regarding the globalisation of technology. It
will then consider the role of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) before examining the failures of
technology to deliver on its promise of development. The chapter will conclude by arguing that the
modern development paradigm is a façade, proffering an alternative vision for the relationship
between technology, growth and inequality.

Technology and growth
When speaking of technology John McDermott espoused: ‘no other single subject is so universally
invested with high hopes for the improvement of mankind’ (cited in Wilson, 2004, p.21). This
optimism can largely be attributed to the ubiquitous popularity of growth theory. It was Joseph
Schumpeter, the Austrian economist, who first detailed the relationship between profit and
innovation in the 1920s. Schumpeterian theory treats technological progress as an economic
phenomenon whose main driving force is innovation. In 1956, Robert Solow revived the endogenity
of technology in the Solow-Swan neo-classical model of economic growth. This was the moment
when the relationship between technology and growth was embraced as economic doctrine. Since
this time technology has been viewed as the primary means through which to increase living
standards (Niosi, 2008, p.613). This consensus has led institutions such as the World Bank to
promote policies of a global ‘openness’ in regards to innovation (cited in World Bank, 2009, pp.12-
16). Coe and Helpmen believe that this is because open policies allow the positive impacts of
innovation breakthroughs to spill over into growing economies in the global South (cited in Niosi,
2008, p.614).

Certainly the success of the Newly Industrialised Countries, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Singapore and more recently Mexico, China, Brazil and India, are evidence that innovation can have
a positive impact on growth and development. These countries have moved from marginal
positionality in the global economy in the 1950s to become members of ever increasing importance
(Sheppard, 2009, p.424). As a result of its innovation-based economic strategy from 2006-2013
China’s Gross National Income (GNI) per capita almost doubled, from $5,720 to $11,850 with annual
growth in this period as high as 13% (World Bank, 2014a).
Taking these figures at face value suggests that innovation has a dramatic impact on the purchasing
power of those in developing countries. However, GNI per capita, unlike the GINI co-efficient, is
unable to express whether benefits are spread equally amongst the population. The World Bank’s

(2014b) latest ranking of China using the GINI index placed the country at 42.1 on a scale of 1-100,
with high numbers indicating greater inequality, demonstrating that great economic inequities
persist. Yet, the fact remains China has succeeded in pulling over one billion people out of extreme
poverty since 1990 and this has certainly been propelled by its increasing involvement in the
technology market (Economist, 2013).

One of the main flaws in the notion of innovation-based development is the failure of technology to
be packaged into a universal model for growth. Though being a staunch advocate of generalising
growth, even the World Bank notes that economic policy needs to be appropriate and, therefore,
context-dependant; success in one country does not automatically translate into success in another,
especially when factors such as environment, infrastructure and distance to the innovation frontier
are markedly different between regions (2009, p.21). Innovation-based growth has yet to fully
deliver on its promise of development. In fact, it has served to heighten the maldistribution of global
wealth (Sheppard, 2009, pp.418-419). However, the OECD believe that the meteoric rise made by
some developing countries, able to grab hold of the coattails of innovation, will afford these
countries power to vertically fragment their value chains and divide labour so as to incorporate less
developed countries into the lower value activities of the industrial process. This socalled ‘flying
geese model’ does appears to be occurring with the inclusion of Cambodia, the Philippines and
Vietnam by China (2010, p.7). These South-South relationships may help include countries that have
been left behind. Yet, the very obvious power imbalance in such collaborations must be recognised.
Historically, unequal power relations have served to keep those subjugated in chains. Though it is
possible that global South-South partnerships will have a positive impact on development it is also
very possible that they will act to preserve the status quo; though still thought of as “Southern”
those that have successfully modernised are arguably “Southern” in namely only.

Technology and globalisation
Globalisation, a term which articulates the ‘smooth and universal inclusion of countries into a core
economic system’ based on industrialisation, is a driver of innovation and has been a catalyst in the
diffusion of technology across the globe (Thomas, 2000, p.527; Cantwell, 1999, p.225). The World
Bank, a staunch advocate of market openness, claims that globalisation is responsible for increasing
the exposure of developing countries to foreign technologies. It proposes that the import of
products related to systems of innovation represent between 6-14% of developing countries’ GDP, a
ratio increase of over 80% since 1994 (2009, p.174). This diffusion of technological knowledge across
borders help account for the positive growth experiences of countries that have little to no direct

involvement in indigenous innovation processes, though knowledge is not produced it is
accumulated (Connelly, 2009, p.492). Archibuigi et al. believe this is because ‘the transmission of
knowledge has never respected state borders’ (1999, p.10). Yet, this assumption, that knowledge
flows freely in all directions, is dangerous because it obscures the reality that diffusion resembles
less that of osmosis – movement of matter for equalising purposes – than it does an overflowing
river which spills its superfluous contents into the bank for reasons of pure self-interest. Jenkins
correctly identifies the problem with the innovation paradigm when he notes that the technological
lead that industrialised countries have on those seeking to develop is enormous, making it near
impossible for new entrants to compete (1992, p.19). The issue with catch-up theory is that the
frontiers of technological innovation are constantly moving, meaning that unless an astonishing leap
forward is made developing countries will continue to scramble for the scraps of technology cast
away from countries sitting at the developed table. Moreover, firms and regions have an interest in
preserving their technological advantage and so stifle their competition. Because by preventing
imitation those with the power are able to entrench their position and harvest economies of scale,
meaning that often only old technologies are diffused across the industrial divide (Kenwood and
Lougheed, 1999, p.3). Thus, technological innovation can be perceived as not only failing to deliver
development but, rather, as a means through which unequal power relations and
underdevelopment are compounded.

Intellectual property rights
There has been a long-standing assumption that the systems of protection known as Intellectual
Property Rights encourage innovation and, so, are drivers of development. The granting of patents,
part of the IPR process, supposedly incentivises innovators as they guarantee market
monopolisation in the short-term (Rutenberg, 2013). Tyfield suggests that the Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) implemented by the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
fundamentally restructured the global economy, compounding North-South power relations. TRIPS
established, for the first time, unilateral minimum standards for IPRs forcing many countries in the
global South to alter their laws (2010 pp.60-64). Whereas patent regulations had previously
conspired to afford the innovator only a temporary monopoly, TRIPS now protected discoveries for
twenty years (Bhattacharjea, 2004, p.21). The increased restrictions imposed by TRIPS also meant
that many products and processes that had once been exempt from protection were now included
(O’Brien and Willliams, 2010, p.166). Chang and Grabel contend that TRIPS costs developing
countries enormous amounts of capital, namely in the form of royalty payments owed to
industrialised countries for the use of patented technology. They also state that TRIPS stunt the

incremental innovative processes associated with developing countries, as they make it difficult to
adapt or imitate patented technologies through the process of reverse engineering. Informal
channels of technology diffusion, such as this, have historically been the primary basis of technology
adoption throughout the world (2004, p. 91). IPRs conspire to stifle indigenous innovation because
developing countries lack the capital to innovate for themselves and, more insidiously, they also lack
to the financial power to fight their unequal position at the negotiation table.

Technological failure
Technological determinism propounds the notion that societies have no choice but to submit to the
dictates of technology. Though many hopes have been placed on the ability of technology to deliver
development Huesemann warns against such blinkered thinking as, for him, ‘technology by itself
can’t save us’, in fact, not only is it ‘not a panacea’ but ‘maybe a poison pill’ (2011, p.xvii). Alongside
the emergence of the doctrine of development economists expected that per capita income levels
across the globe would converge. Yet, statistic after statistic has proved definitively that
industrialisation has not resulted in greater income equality, in fact, global as well as regional
inequality levels have increased (Evenson, 2002, p.61; Chang and Grebel, 2004, p.20). The Genuine
Progress Indicator endeavours to calculate the “true” progress of a country through a variety of
variables instead of an index based solely on GDP. Until the mid-1970s the GPI increased almost in
tandem with GDP, as modernisation theory predicted. However, crucially, since this time global GPI
measurements have proceeded to plateau or even decline regardless of increased GDP reporting.

This is compelling evidence that although technological innovation can positively impact growth, it
has failed for almost half a century now to enhance well-being (Huesemann, 2011, p.204). Change
and Grabel insist, however, that technological innovation could act as a vehicle for a broad range of
variables that constitute development such as education, health and empowerment (2004, p.1).
Paunov emphasises that for this to occur products must be adjusted for context reflecting the needs,
conditions and capabilities of each community (2013, p.7). Because what use is a computer in a
village which lacks of electricity? She also proposes that frugal innovation, using simplified versions
of current products in the way adjusted versions of mobile phones have been embraced throughout
Africa, is another way which technology can serve development aims by providing basic needs and
services (Paunov, 2013, p.11). It seems that for technology to have a positive impact on inequality, it
can no longer been seen as the answer but rather as the vehicle through which a broad and rich
variety of development goals can be effected.

Contesting the modernisation paradigm
Though this dissertation has discussed innovation in terms of the traditional notion of a linear and
continuous process it actually adheres to a very different theory. This theory is based upon
Kondratiev waves (K-waves), named after the Russian economist who first proposed the model.
Kwaves are a type of long-wave business cycle associated with Western capitalist economies. In
particular, with the cycle of boom and bust every fifty-sixty years, of which there have been five
since the Industrial Revolution. These cycles have roughly correspond to the ‘great transformations’
of the modern era: the railway; electricity; the automobile; electronics and the advent of mass
communications (Warner, 2012). Theory concerning these supercycles remains outside of
mainstream economic dogma, yet K-waves appear incredibly apt at accounting for the dichotomy of
hope and failure that pervades technology driven development. Kondratiev noted that during the
recession of the supercycles a number of important innovations in production and communications
transpire that cause the following upswing (Warner, 2012). Research published by the University of
California demonstrates a correlation between K-wave cycles and GDP; the 2008 global economic
crisis further underscores K-wave logic (Warner, 2012). Carlota Perez, an expert on technology and
socio-economic development, extended Kondratiev’s model through her theory of great surges. She
too argues that innovations engender an explosion in productivity ultimately leading to collapse. The
“Golden Age”, which Perez believes follows collapse, is characterised, crucially, as a period where
the benefits of innovation are generalised leading to an ‘era of “good feeling”’ (2002, p.5). These are
the moments where equality is at its greatest and the hope of technological progress appears
realised, where development and justice is equated with consumption and growth. This dissertation
maintains that society is currently in one of these “Golden Ages” with mobiles being the symbol of
progress. Yet, Perez maintains that the failure of technology to deliver development ultimately
results in dashed expectations and political unrest. Interestingly, she terms this last period as the
maturity phase, which implies belief that technology can deliver development is naïve (2002, p.47).
The realisation that most new products and processes inherently possess a limited lifespan is crucial
if the technology paradigm is to be re-imagined.

Conclusion
No single technology has yet succeeded in unilaterally improving living standards to deliver
development so it would be ridiculous to believe that one could in the future. As evidence
concerning K-waves highlights the equalising impact of technology only occurs after periods of
increasing inequality and is only sustained until new innovations re-tip the balance of power. In this
respect, not only is technology unable to deliver development but it becomes the very factor which

creates, expands and entrenches inequality in a cycle of repetition. Technology poses as the answer
when, in truthfully, it lies at the crux of the problem. The insidiousness of this being that technology
serves to give hope in a hopeless situation – hopeless, as long as technology is held up as the great
liberator.

Chapter 3: The ICT Revolution
Introduction
In 1996, Manuel Castells suggested that development is increasingly becoming associated with the
accumulation of knowledge and the fostering of high-tech service-based economies which he
labelled ‘knowledge economies’ (cited in Thomas, 2000, p.528). The World Bank has since stated
that nurturing knowledge economies is one of the most critical catalysts for future progress (2008,
p.53). Fundamental in facilitating the rise of these economies was the development of the
microchip, ‘the big bang of a new universe’, by the computing giant Intel in 1971 (Perez, 2002, p.3).

The potential of the computer chip lay in the way it shattered long standing barriers to convergence
in the technology industry. This discovery triggered the ‘Information Technology Revolution’, where
vast amounts of data can be collected, stored, processed and disseminated almost instantaneously
(Forester, 1985, p.xvii) Beniger has referred to this as an ‘eclipsive moment’, citing the ‘quantum
leap forward’ that it represented. He muses that social transformations are often so gradual as to be
all but imperceptible to those caught up in the process, yet these subtle evolutions have a great and
lasting impact on the fabric of society (1989, pp.2-3). The transformative nature of the ICT revolution
has disrupted the landscape of development by compelling developing countries to implement
projects of a digital nature, often regardless of the utility of such proposals (Fonesca, 2010, p.25).
ICTs are so prevalent in development discourses because they supposedly empower people,
communities and even countries to “leapfrog” the long process of digital adoption experienced by
OECD countries. Yet, ICT4D programmes are not without contestation, as Forester rightly noted,
they have the very real possibility of exacerbating and entrenching North-South inequalities,
rendering the industries and services of the global South obsolete (1985, p.xvii). In spite of such
doubts, the international development agenda is still upholding ICT4D as the “hammer” that can be
applied to all “nails”; the neo-classical rhetoric of which depicts technology as apolitical and
unilaterally efficiency enhancing, rather than a tool which is applied to achieve certain targeted and
biased outcomes (De’ and Ratan, 2009, p.260).

This chapter will first assess the centrality of information and communication to the current
development paradigm before discussing the prominence of ICT4D in the international arena. It will
then move on to the more pernicious impacts of ICTs by debating the so-called digital divide and the
ways ICTs can work against development goals, finishing with a thought regarding the hubris of the
ICT4D approach.

The age of information
For Lucas, the information revolution has been just as profound in transforming the fabric of the
world as its industrial predecessors (2008, p.14). Castells stipulates that the novelty of this new
economic era is not that knowledge is now being prized as a factor in production but, rather, with
the development of ICTs the creation and dissemination of knowledge has become all-but
unstoppable (1999, p.9). An absence of a knowledge economy is, therefore, steadily replacing that of
an industrial one as a significant marker through which underdevelopment is judged. This should
come as no surprise seeing as even in 1597 the philosopher Sir Francis Bacon - ruminating on the
impact of the printing press in Europe - understood that ‘knowledge is power’ (cited in McGuire,
2007, p.6). Whilst, the polymath, Ben Franklin, has been quoted as saying in 1749 ‘remember time is
money’ (cited in McGuire, 2007, p.13). These maxims help explain why ICTs have become such an
essential component to growth as they allow for the saving of time and the accumulation of
knowledge which, as Bacon and Franklin note, mean money and power. However, Freeman and
Louca raise a valid point when they question whether information overload could become a
debilitating factor for those utilising the age of information to better their quality of life. They quote
T. S. Eliot’s musings ‘Where is the knowledge we have lost in information? Where is the wisdom we
have lost in knowledge?’ to highlight their point (2002, p.328). Information is only useful if one can
extract meaning from it. The worry with ICTs is that with their ever increasing ability to amass and
store data the knowledge that is required to truly benefit the marginalised will be lost in an ocean of
irrelevance.

Connection
Nelson Mandela believed that it would be the capacity to communicate which would tear down the
barriers between information-rich and information-poor regions, eliminating the inequality of
experience between the global North and South (cited in Wilson, 2004, p.1). This belief is founded
upon the premise that the globalisation of communications technologies necessitates the delivery of
functional infrastructure into deprived regions; infrastructure being a widely recognised enabler of
sustainable development (Roztocki and Weistroffer, 2011, p.163). ICTs are making the world smaller

as they facilitate connection and the transmission of knowledge in ever faster, greater, cheaper and
more imaginative ways. Tarafdara maintains that ICTs can reach those most excluded by society,
specifically through their ability to overcome conditions that characterise bottom of the pyramid
(BOP) markets. Because ICTs are able to transcend time and space they are able to reach
communities in physically remote locations (2012, p.312). This is pivotal for those in the global South
as much valuable time is often spent, for example, by farmers travelling from rural villages to
markets in search of the best price for their grain. ICTs have the power to connect people to the
knowledge they need instantaneously preventing such wastage. Moreover, there is hope that ICTs
are facilitating a “digital democracy” by engaging the marginalised in an open and collaborative
virtual commons. The ‘inherent democratic capacities’ of this new generation of communications
technologies, social media in particular, equip users with agency. Individuals are able to reject
dominant discourses through the publication of their own opinions (Loader and Mercea, 2011,
pp.757-759). The power of people-centred ICTs is no better demonstrated than through the website
Wikileaks which has exposed countless inflammatory documents sent in by whistleblowers, allowing
individuals from around the world to critically engage with the exploits of their governments and
national and multi-national corporations. Sajda Qureshi,
the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Information Technology for Development, whilst conceding that
social media has been a catalyst in increasing empowerment, equality and justice does, however,
question whether these impacts have translated into a marked increase in income levels and
wellbeing for the marginalised (2014, p.4). However potentially beneficial ICTs can be for the global
South the reality remains that around two-thirds of the world are limited, if not excluded, from the
global information society due to absent infrastructure (Jorgensen, 2006, ix). For the power of
communication to really impact the lives of the vulnerable connectivity is key and connectivity is far
from universal.

ICT4D
Bell postulates that in previous periods wealth had generally been accumulated through exploitation
but now, with the advent of new technologies, a peaceful means through which to generate and
disperse wealth has emerged (1988, p.2). ICT4D, the aim of which is to incorporate those countries
and regions currently lacking infrastructure into the digital revolution, follows from this thinking and
has become integral in development agenda. ICTs have certainly had a positive effect on the
productivity of businesses in the global South. Paunov notes that quantitative evidence has
highlighted the benefits for smaller businesses are massive, as adoption has allowed them to
compete alongside agglomerations. This is because ICTs operate to increase the speed of market

transitions and, thus, engender growth (2013, p.8). However, Byrne cites mounting scepticism
regarding whether scare resources should be funnelled into ICT4D programmes when previous
evidence has suggested that their application has often been substandard and failed to achieve
desired results (2011, p.1). Corea warns against adopting ICT-based policies for their own sake.

Instead he propounds a vision of ICT4D based on the nurture of ‘IT artfulness’ which he defines as
‘developing behaviours adapted to receive and exploit the transformative potential of such tools’.
Cultivating carefully planned programmes necessitates the consideration of the social factors at play,
crucially serving to counter the determinism that constructs ICTs as the solution instead of the tool
(2007, pp.63-64). The failure to perceive ICTs as merely tools has led to unsuitable ICT4D
programmes being implemented simply because of the buzz surrounding them, resulting in
wholesale failures to improve quality of life indicators for marginalised communities.

Digital divide
ICTs have very obviously helped certain countries such as India and China improve their record of
economic and social development. However, the trend is not solely positive. There is a growing
spatial chasm between those countries and regions that have benefited from ICT development and
those who have been left behind. This has resulted in greater inequality being reported both within
and between countries (Castells, 1999, p.8). This phenomenon of polarisation has been termed the
“digital divide”. The diverging levels of access are evident when one considers that in 1997 internet
penetration figures in North America were 267 times the rate Africa recorded, yet only three years
later this chasm had almost doubled to 540 times. The existence of a divide is extremely damaging to
developing countries as a lack of ICTs prevents communities from participating in knowledge
economies, meaning they are unable to tap into the benefits of the information revolution and its
global market worth of approximately US $800 billion (Qureshi, 2012, pp.277-278).

Pieterse states that the term digital divide, however, ‘is a deeply misleading discourse’ because the
divide, though presenting as differential access to ICTs, is actually rooted in socioeconomic
inequalities. He suggests the divide is purposefully represented in technical terms so as to logically
require technical interventions which obscure the role of inequality (2010, p.167). Thus, the
technology gap may better be represented as that of a ‘social divide’, as ability to engage with ICTs is
defined by educational levels, digital literacy, language, agency, income and so on (Qureshi, 2012,
p.278). Castells has gone one step further and actually used the phrase ‘technological apartheid’ to
characterise the differential experience of ICT access between the global North and South (1999,

p.4). In doing so, he politicises the phenomenon; deprivation depicted as the result of discriminatory
policies of segregation. The persistence of social divides in regard to ICT access starkly highlights the
dichotomous impact technology can have. Although imagined as a tool of emancipation ICTs can
actually exacerbate existing forms of discrimination if precautions are not taken to prevent
distribution copying patterns of inequality.

ICT against development
The ubiquitous optimism surrounding ICT4D has functioned to obscure the numbers of ways that
ICTs can actually hamper and even reverse development. Diamond notes that authoritarian states
are able to manipulate ICTs for repressive purposes. Countries such as China, Belarus and Iran have
already demonstrated this by defining the parameters of internet access to restrict autonomy,
prevent freedom of information and to identify dissenters (2010, p.70). This type of intrusive
surveillance, however, is not contained merely to so-called rogue states but is utilised by countries
that cite democracy as their founding principle. The impetus for such surveillance has grown
exponentially in the post-9/11 period, where the freedoms of association, assembly and expression
are increasingly being curtailed (Jorgensen, 2006, p.x) In 2013, Edward Snowden disclosed thousands
of classified documents to the Guardian obtained through his role at the United States’ National
Security Agency, which exposed the pervasive global surveillance programmes operated by the U.S.
(Guardian, 2014). This watershed leak brought to the forefront debates regarding international
human rights and privacy which had long been marginalised in the ICT discourses (Jorgensen, 2006,
p.3). ICTs are currently viewed as a means through which to further democracy by providing people
access to information that is exogenous to state-controlled media but they can just as easily be used
to install autocracy (Saleh, 2010, p.7). Asking whether ICTs are a tool for emancipation or repression
is, therefore, somewhat of a moot point, as ICTs are not inherently good or bad but are tool which
can be politicised. Consequently, ICTs can be as emancipatory as the human mind can imagine but,
frighteningly, this too means that they can be as enslaving as the mind can be also.

Conclusion
Diamond asserts that it is ‘tempting to think of’ ICT4D as ‘unprecedented in its potential for political
progress’. But history has warned against the hubris of thinking that technocratic interventions, no
matter how well intended, could ever substantiate the hope placed at their feet. One example being
the printing press, which revolutionised information networks in fifteenth-century Europe. In spite of
the greater freedoms it did afford, this innovation was the catalyst in the widespread
implementation of censorship policies in the period which sought to control information flows.