JAPAN'S NORM DEFIANCE: THE CASE OF WHALING IN 2007
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JAPAN’S NORM DEFIANCE: THE CASE OF WHALING IN 2007
GRO SLOTSVIK
Abstract
It is the argument of this paper that Japan’s defiance of international anti-whaling norms in
2007 can be explained by analysing the domestic and international factors shaping the state’s
foreign policy-making. A study of Japan’s refusal to end its scientific whaling programme
shows that this norm defiance was sustained by domestic factors. Simultaneously, the state’s
decision not to leave the restricting International Whaling Commission, despite threats to do
so, was based on international factors. The conflicting nature of the factors has left Japan in a
peculiar state of norm defiance, where the state will not end whaling, and yet chose to stay in
the IWC in 2007.
Introduction
In 2007, Japan declared its intention to start hunting the much-loved humpback whale,
triggering international protests (Independent 19.11.07a; Times 19.11.07). Although Japan’s
‘scientific whaling’ had already endured heavy criticism, the country had until then focused
on less well known and more abundant whales, such as the minke whale. The humpback
whale has been seen as a more sociable and intelligent than the other great whales since at
least the early 1900s (Risting 1922:34). 2007 thus formed yet another benchmark in Japan’s
history of defying international anti-whaling norms (Stockwin 2008:237).
The issue of whaling was first brought to my attention in 2007 through a project on
Norwegian and Japanese international relations, where whaling was one of the common
denominators. The case was interesting because Japan refused to end whaling in spite of
international criticism, and I was intrigued to investigate why. Despite accusations of
Japanese foreign policy simply being reactionary (Wolferen 1989; Schmiegelow and
Schmiegelow 1990:559), I believe that Japan's foreign policy-making, presumably like most
other states', consists of a mix of unit- and system-level factors. Few cases demonstrate this
better than the case of whaling. Generally, Japanese foreign policy appears to follow that of
international regimes. This makes it more difficult to distinguish between actual domestic
foreign policy-making and the influence that the international regimes themselves have on
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)foreign policy-making processes. In the case of whaling, however, strong domestic unit-level
factors battle with international system-level factors, leading to a situation in which Japan
will not stop limited whaling, but will also not leave the international regime that constrains
its whaling practice.
My hypopaper is that Japan's norm defiance in the case of whaling is an example of a foreign
policy-making process consisting of conflicting unit- and system-level factors. The questions
arising from this hypopaper are, fundamentally, what these unit- and system-level factors are
and how they interact to create Japan's whaling foreign policy. My assumption is that an
analysis of the unit- and system-level factors will explain why Japan acts as it does in the
case of whaling, i.e. why it continues limited whaling but does not leave the restricting
International Whaling Commission (IWC). I believe the unit-level factors in the case of
whaling correspond to domestic issues in Japanese foreign policy-making, and also to the
question of why Japan will not stop whaling. Similarly, system-level factors correspond to
the international aspect of Japan's foreign policy-making process, and also to the question of
why Japan did not leave the IWC in 2007. The dichotomy between domestic (unit-level) and
international (system-level) factors is not perfect, as the two levels clearly overlap and
interact. However, the strong distinction has proved useful for an analysis of conflicting
factors.
In order to explain the issue of whaling in 2007, I will first give a short background to the
whaling debate, before defining what the ‘norm defiance’ in this case constitutes. I will then
present the analytical framework, and then move on to the questions of why Japan will not
stop whaling and why Japan did not leave the IWC in 2007.
The methodology of my analysis is based on applying a combination of theories on
international regimes, domestic and foreign policy to my two research questions. The case of
whaling is an ongoing debate, and I have chosen to use newspaper articles as sources for
whaling debate events in 2007, and also for more recent developments. The first of the two
main issues is the question of why Japan continues to defy the anti-whaling norm. By
evaluating three different domestic explanations proposed on the subject, I will argue that all
three, to varying degrees, interact to create the unit-level factor of Japan's foreign policy. The
first explanation is that whaling acts as a ‘pressure vent’ for more important political matters;
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)whaling is seen as a way to assert Japan’s own politics, in a political climate where the state
is usually forced to follow the United States’ lead. The second explanation focuses on the
‘culture argument’, which is often mentioned as part of the whaling debate in both media and
scholarly debates. The argument focuses on the cultural importance of whaling –a view
which the Japanese government champions – and generally sees the anti-whaling bloc's
rhetoric and behaviour as a reason for why whaling has become such an important issue for
the Japanese. The third explanation is the ‘security argument’, which focuses on the Japanese
historical dependency on marine food resources, arguing that the whaling issue is perceived
to be a resource security issue, rather than a minor political or cultural matter, by the
Japanese.
I will then move on to the second part of my paper, which explains why Japan did not leave
the IWC in 2007, despite the fact that it appeared to be in the country’s interest to do so. I
will first evaluate the legitimacy of 'scientific whaling', arguing that Japan's whaling policy is
viewed as legitimate by the state itself due to the legality of research whaling. I will then
analyse Japan's role in the International Whaling Commission, emphasizing the importance
of the state's usual internationalist foreign policy approach in combination with regime
theory. My argument is that various factors relating to the international whaling regime and
Japan's international political approach interact to create the system-level factor of Japan's
foreign policy in the case of whaling.
Historical Background
Whaling has been a contentious political issue since Dutch and British whalers started the
commercial whale hunt in Europe in the 16th century, when whale stocks were still abundant
(Risting 1922:71-73). In Japan, commercial whaling did not start fully until a few centuries
later. By 1898, there were 11 whaling communities spread across Japan (Risting 1922:278).
With the development of modern whaling methods came extensive worldwide commercial
hunting; the larger whales could be hunted and processed at sea, with Great Britain and
Norway at the head of a large commercial fleet (Wong 2001:90).
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)The history of modern whale management started with the creation of the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling in 1946, and the establishment of the International
Whaling Commission in 1948. By then, the world market's demand for whale products,
particularly whale oil, had resulted in the serious depletion of whale stocks worldwide. The
International Whaling Commission was created in order to “provide for the proper
conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling
industry” (www.iwcoffice.org), and as such was only intended to protect whales in order to
enable continued whaling. However, by the 1960s, emerging environmental organisations
began to see whales as particularly intelligent, sociable animals, which should not be killed
under any circumstances (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982:129; Nadelmann 1990:517; Catalinac
and Chan 2005:137). The US government in particular was then lobbied to end domestic
whaling, which resulted in the proposal to end whaling at the 1972 UN Conference on the
Human Environment in Stockholm (Nadelmann 1990:518). Although the groundwork was
laid for a moratorium on the killing of whales, the International Whaling Commission’s
Scientific Committee disagreed with the proposal, stating that a ban on all, including
apparently abundant, whale stocks could be not justified on scientific grounds (Heazle
2006:9; Catalinac and Chan 2005:138; Wong 2001:97). Through extensive international
lobbying by environmental groups and the United States (Oterhals 2005:12; Andresen
1989:109), the anti-whaling bloc eventually managed to secure the necessary three-fourths
majority in 1982, thereby introducing what was meant to be a temporary blanket ban on the
hunting of whales from 1986 (Stockwin 2008:237). According to the IWC charter, a member
state may file a formal objection to proposals such as the moratorium, thus exempting itself
from that particular proposal. Japan and Norway, amongst others, submitted their objections,
but Japan later withdrew its objection. According to IWC regulations, Norway is therefore
able to pursue commercial hunting legally, whereas Japan can only hunt whales legally as
part of 'scientific whaling' (Gulland 1988; Catalinac and Chan 2005:142).
When the Scientific Committee adopted a conservative new whale management scheme in
1992 (Kalland 2002:19), which would have allowed for sustainable commercial whaling of
selected stocks, the anti-whaling bloc still refused to lift the moratorium (Catalinac and Chan
2005:141).
In 2007, Japan was not the only country that conducted whaling in spite of Western
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)sentiments. Norway hunted whales for commercial purposes and Iceland engaged in both
scientific and commercial whaling. Japan's whaling, however, differed from that of Iceland or
Norway in that this norm defiance ran contrary to Japan's overall foreign policy approach.
The moratorium was in 2007 still upheld by the countries with the toughest stances on the
whaling issue, i.e. the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand and Australia, as well as the
rest of the anti-whaling bloc. The Western states' reasons for protesting against whaling have
grounds in domestic opinion. Although there are other threats to whales than whaling, such as
destruction of habitat and noise pollution (Jenssen 1985:37), the history of whaling as a cause
of near-extinction makes saving whales a convenient ‘moral’ cause for non-whaling nations.
Arguing for a complete ban on whaling as the main part of the 'save the whale' campaign
enables non-whaling policy-makers to attribute responsibility for certain whale stocks’
endangeredness elsewhere (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982:8; Heazle 2006:33). Particularly
old whaling nations, such as the US and Great Britain, appeared to favour an aggressive stand
on whaling (Wong 2001:91). Greenpeace International and the Sea Shepherd Conservation
Society in particular stood out as the most confrontational anti-whaling NGOs in 2007. The
anti-whaling bloc's motives are varied. Whereas the more extreme Sea Shepherd is an
organisation devoted to "end (...) slaughter of wildlife in the world's oceans"
(www.seashepherd.org/who-we-are), Greenpeace International works to conserve the
environment generally (www.greenpeace.org/international/about). For the latter, whales
appear to provide a useful symbol to rally behind, despite the fact that the whale stocks
mainly targeted by the Japanese, the minke whale stocks, were not endangered even before
the hunting ban was initiated (Danaher 2002:105). Although less aggressive than Sea
Shepherd, Greenpeace activists have made it difficult for anyone without recommendations
from approved institutions to be allowed into the Institute for Cetacean Research (Personal
Communication 8 January 2009). The former appear to champion what Johansen (2005)
terms the “Moby Dick syndrome”, in which the whale symbolises uncorrupted and innocent
nature, in contrast to morally depraved and greedy mankind. The huge Japanese whaling
factory ships have therefore provided a good target for environmental activists (Caron
1995:174).
Norm Defiance
The fact that Japan’s whaling is technically legal does not mean that it is not a norm defiance.
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)Using Dyer’s definition (1997:14), “norms are, ordinarily speaking, standards or measures
(from the latin norma, a carpenter’s square or rule). More generally, a norm is a ‘standard or
pattern or type considered representative of a group’ (Oxford English Dictionary). In the
social or political context norms are (descriptively) standards of behaviour – of social and
political action – and (prescriptively) reasons which dictate such action”. It is often difficult
to determine whether those conforming to a norm do so because they believe in the norm,
because norm adherence aligns with their own interests, or because they fear the
consequences defying the norm would have (Nadelmann 1990:480). A ‘norm defiance'
implies that one actor's beliefs or behaviour are deemed unacceptable according to another,
authoritative actor's norms, but these norms are not necessarily official or written. In order to
affect a norm defiance, the actors would have to exist within the same system and interact in
some way. For whaling, the system in which the norm defiance takes place can either be seen
as the International Whaling Commission, ‘international society’ or ‘world opinion’.
Although some do not separate the three (Kingston 2004:214), the International Whaling
Commission has 84 member states (www.iwcoffice.org), which still lacks a majority of the
world's countries. Furthermore, it is difficult to argue that there exists a pro- or anti-whaling
'norm' within the Commission, as the moratorium is upheld, but the Scientific Committee
never agreed with its implementation (Catalinac and Chan 2005) and Japan's whaling is legal
according to IWC regulations (Gulland 1988; Catalinac and Chan 2005:142).
The matter is not much less complicated with regards to the 'world opinion' (Mandel
1980:114); Whales are a common resource (Kalland 1994) and thus belongs to 'everyone', but
as Catalinac and Chan (2005) point out, the concept of a world opinion on this topic is a
difficult one. Although international organisations certainly have an impact on people's
opinions about whaling across national borders, their impact is difficult to assess. Therefore, I
have chosen to focus on the ‘international society’ of states, paying particular attention to the
US, Great Britain, New Zealand and Australia. Whenever I refer to 'Western' ideas or beliefs,
the ‘West’ refers to these four. All of these generally share Japan's political ideals, and are
seen as important to Japan's overall foreign policy aims. The countries have been identified as
most anti-whaling because they openly object to whaling for ethical reasons, meaning that
they object to the resumption of commercial and scientific whaling regardless of the
abundance of whale stocks. The norm that Japan defies is the killing of whales in itself, rather
than the potential use scientific whaling as a ‘guise’ (Kingston 2004:214) or irresponsible
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)management of whale stocks.
Moreover, Japan's whaling foreign policy also defies the country's own foreign policy norms,
which are deeply rooted in Japanese modern history. Ever since its defeat in the Second
World War, Japan has undertaken a range of foreign policies designed to avoid provoking
international society. Under Prime Minister Yoshida, the main policies of the state centred
around not engaging in international affairs and instead focusing on developing Japan
economically (Hook et al 2000:68). Due to the economic boom in the 1980s, Japan suddenly
became an economic giant and was viewed as a potential threat to the other Western nations
(Stockwin 2003:347; Midford 2003:334). Coupled with a lack of decisive reaction during the
1991 Gulf Crisis, this may explain the extent of criticism Japan received for its ‘chequebook
diplomacy’, where the country was not seen to be pulling its weight internationally (Hughes
2004; Stockwin 2003:347). The embarrassment Japanese foreign policy-makers felt led to a
change in the country's foreign policy, in which the state sought to engage more in
international security matters, dispatching personnel for United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations and focusing on the United Nations generally as a source of legitimacy in
international society (Hook et al 2000:67). Japan remains uneasy about appearing aggressive,
thereby trying to avoid stirring memories of the country's wartime behaviour. To this day the
constitution only allows for 'Self-Defence Forces' rather than an 'army'. The United States has
been Japan's main ally since the American post-war occupation of Japan, and still has
military bases stationed on Japanese territory. Since the attacks on the World Trade Centre on
September 11th 2001, Japan has been eager to show the US that it is worthy of its status as a
'special ally' (Hook et al 2000:36), but nevertheless refused to participate in the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq without a UN resolution (Hughes 2004). Japan's past as an aggressor
has lead to a foreign policy focus on being seen as a responsible member of international
society, relying on 'soft power' - defined here as "the ability to get what you want through
attraction rather than coercion or payments" (Nye 2004:3) - in order to promote its policies.
Soft power policies include supporting the UN, providing overseas development aid and
promoting the Japanese 'peace constitution', which renounces the use of military force.
According to Nye, a country's soft power is enhanced through the attractiveness of its culture,
political ideals and policies that are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others), a country’s soft
power is enhanced (Nye 2004:3). It is baffling, therefore, how much Japan's norm defiance in
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)the case of whaling differs from the state's usual foreign policy approach: it makes Japan
appear aggressive towards an animal seen as particularly intelligent and sociable (Klinowska
1988), the image of whales as endangered makes Japan seem irresponsible, hunting whales
runs contrary to 'world opinion' (Kingston 2004) and it openly defies US pressure to end
whaling.
Analytical Framework
History and culture play a significant part in Japan's foreign policy-making, and I agree with
Stockwin's (2008) argument that Japan's politics cannot be explained purely in realist or
liberalist terms. Rather, the case of whaling demonstrates how factors both at the unit- and
system-level interact to create a foreign policy that appears to contradict Japan's usual foreign
policy approach (although not the usual foreign policy process). The analytical framework
used for my research consists of a fairly wide variety of political theories. I see all the
theories described as valid in general, and useful for this particular case study, but also too
limited to explain the case of whaling on their own. My assumption is that the case of Japan's
whaling foreign policy consists of both domestic and international factors, and that the
whaling debate is essentially a state against state argument taking place within an
international regime. This means that different theories will have to cover different areas of
the whaling issue. I realise that the wide choice of theories necessarily hinders a deeper
analysis of particular aspects of Japan's whaling foreign policy, e.g. bureaucratic politics,
domestic and international factor interactions or regime patterns. I believe, however, that for
a project of this length, which deals with an issue not yet widely discussed academically, a
more holistic approach is better suited. Additionally, the theories used here focus on the state
as the main actor in the international system. I disagree with Strange's argument that the state
is no longer in ultimate political control over society and economy (1996:220). The state of
Japan is clearly both the link between the whaling regime and domestic units (Smith 2005:32-
33), as well as the institution advocating Japanese society's and economy's interests.
However, I do recognise that there will always be a range of actors in a debate such as this,
many of which are international or non-governmental organizations (OECD 2003:47). One of
the weaknesses of my analysis comes from the fact that, in order to focus on Japan's role in
the whaling issue, I have chosen to exclude factors that are not essential to the Japanese
foreign policy-making aspect of the debate. Therefore, the role of NGOs and international
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)organizations apart from IWC, e.g. NAMMCO or CITES, in the general whaling
management debate is largely ignored.
Overall, my analytical framework for studying the domestic policy-making process is very
much based on Putnam’s two-level game theory (1988) and Wendt's theories on macro- and
micro-structures (1999). Wendt’s theories will also be applied, along with Haas’ (1993) and
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger’s regime theories, to the analysis of international factors
shaping Japan’s foreign policy-making process. Micro-structures, according to Wendt, deal
with unit- and interaction-level theories, and explain foreign policy, whereas macro-structures
explain international politics. In the case of whaling, micro-structures concerns states’ beliefs
about other states’ rationality, strategies and beliefs, none of which, according to Wendt
(1999:159), actually need to be true. As long as states believe that others believe in the same
institutions, conventions, norms and rules, their interaction will reinforce those beliefs
(Wendt 1999:160). In the case of whaling, both pro- and anti-whaling nations adhere to the
International Whaling Commission, although, as I will be arguing later, neither necessarily
agrees with the regime's norms and rules. Putnam (1988) also argues for the importance of
integration between domestic and international politics in foreign policy-making. The two-
level game theory presupposes that domestic groups pressure the government into pursuing
their particular interests, while the government (or particular parts of government) also
mitigates for international pressure that may have adverse effects on domestic affairs (Putnam
1988:434). Putnam’s theory allows for the existence of a state against state debate, while not
presupposing that states are necessarily unitary, rational actors. The whaling debate is a clear
case of this; non-governmental organisations have a large say in foreign policy-making,
emotions run high during and between IWC meetings, and whaling and non-whaling states
alike choose to stay in an organisation that quite often runs contrary to their own interests.
Using Haas’ and Hasenclever et al's theories on international regimes, it is obvious that
"power-based" or realist theories of regimes (Hasenclever et al 2002:3) fail to explain Japan's
whaling foreign policy, mainly because Japan remains in an organisation that conflicts with
its own interests and defies the most powerful states within that organisation (Stockwin
2008:237; Hook et al 2000:38). Neoliberal or "interest-based" theories of regimes
(Hasenclever et al 2002:4) do not really fit the case of whaling either, as actors do not appear
to be rational or unaffected by the IWC's practices and norms. The cognitivist or "knowledge-
based" theories of regimes (Haas 1993:170; Hasenclever et al 2002:5), however, seem to fit
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)the whaling debate fairly well, as it combines elements of traditional power theories and
newer ideas about the importance of social norms. According to Hook et al (2000),
constructivism emphasizes that no ‘one’ rationality exists among units within a regime.
Mutual interaction between policy-making agents and political actors is argued to create
patterns of behaviour, shaping expectations, norms and identities (Hook et al 2000:38). The
emphasis on "role-playing" (Hasenclever et al 2002:5) echoes Wendt’s theories on micro-
structures and the reinforcement of beliefs (1999:160), as well as complementing Krasner's
theory about the organisation assuming a 'life of its own' (1983:357). The regime is then
viewed as reciprocally affecting the states, creating a system where states are not in complete,
'rational' control of their own beliefs or behaviour (Krasner 1983:357). Thus, when an anti-
whaling state accuses Japan of breaching whaling regulations, or Japan justifies scientific
whaling according to IWC regulations, both play their roles according to a regime neither
fully agrees with. The regime is nevertheless "affirmed" by the states' actions and then
reaffirms their roles as part of the regime (Hasenclever et al 2002:20).
Why will Japan not stop Whaling?
Much of the literature on Japan's scientific whaling has, just like the research question for this
section, been focused on why Japan will not give up whaling despite international criticism
(Blok 2008; Danaher 2002; Catalinac and Chan 2005). Generally, explanations focus on
whaling as a 'pressure vent', on cultural reasons or resource security issues. Despite a
contradictory, apparently popular belief within the anti-whaling bloc, there is little evidence
to point towards any significant economic gain from Japan’s scientific whaling or even their
resumed commercial whaling (Catalinac and Chan 2005:144; Blok 2008:51; Times 10.05.07;
21.12.07). It may appear puzzling, then, that Japan should choose to pursue a foreign policy
that causes international tension, with no real economic gain to compensate for this (Blok
2008:45).
In order to explain the domestic part of Japan’s whaling foreign policy approach, I will
therefore focus on the three theories of why Japan continues whaling. The underlying theme
for all of these theories is that the whaling issue is no longer primarily about whales, but
rather reflects larger issues within Japanese domestic and foreign policies (Blok 2008:48).
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)It is frequently argued that the Japanese domestic political game can be difficult to fully
decipher (Wolferen 1989:5). Bureaucratic politics, factions and business play an important,
yet often elusive, part in foreign policy making (Hook et al 2000:72; Wolferen 1989:5).
Although a full analysis of the decision-making processes, domestic groups and bureaucratic
wrangling that form part of the current whaling foreign policy is beyond the scope of my
research, some insight into the background of Japan’s foreign policy-making is important.
According to Putnam's two-level games theory (1988:434), the domestic coalitions that form
in response to certain issues may, depending on their levels of influence in national and
international politics, have significant implications for policy making. I assume that for the
state, internal actors and external pressures shape both foreign policy and ideas of national
interest (Hook et al 2000:38). In the case of whaling, the Fisheries Agency (FA), part of the
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, holds much of the power with regards to
government policy-making and responses (Catalinac and Chan 2005:146; Danaher
2002:109). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), meanwhile, tends to be left to defend
these policies on the international scene (BBC News online 22.01.08; Blok 2008:45). The
Fisheries Agency is also in charge of domestic pro-whaling events and has close ties to the
Institute of Cetacean Research (ICR), which is responsible for scientific whaling, and pro-
whaling organisations (Blok 2008:46; Danaher 2002:109). These in turn have strong links to
groups within the Japanese Diet and the leading domestic parties, including the currently
ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) (Danaher
2002:109; Blok 2008:46). Finally, the fact that the whaling industry is considered part of the
traditionally powerful fishing industry leads to an even stronger position for pro-whaling
business within the government (Catalinac and Chan 2005:146; Danaher 2002:109). At the
same time, the Japanese generally do not view whaling as an environmental issue, and few
Japanese environmental NGOs campaign to end whaling (Danaher 2002:111). This should
make it all the more difficult for the government to cater for international pressure, as there is
little corresponding domestic interest in following international society’s lead (Putnam
1988:428; Miyaoka 1998:168; Danaher 2002:115). The theory certainly appears to be
appropriate in the case of whaling, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can do little to
counteract domestic pro-whaling forces.
The 'Pressure Vent' Theory
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)The first theory, which argues that whaling is essentially a nationalist issue, presupposes that
Japan’s pro-whaling foreign policy approach is a purposefully created approach; whaling is
seen to act as a vent for international pressure and hurt national pride (Blok 2008:47-49;
Times 10.05.07). The term nationalist used here refers to a point of view in which Japan is
pitched against an (often unreasonable) outside world; whaling then becomes both a source of
national pride (something that distinguishes us from them) and a 'pressure vent' for foreign
demands (placed on us by them) (Shimazu 2006:184).
Blok (2008:61) emphasizes the importance of the international ‘outsiders’ to maintain this
mindset and shape domestic political responses. The “moral universe” (Danaher 2002:115)
created becomes as uncompromising as that of the more extreme environmental NGOs. The
unfairness of the anti-whalers with regards to scientific rationality, culture and national
sovereignty only serves to strengthen the perceived moral capital of the pro-whalers (Danaher
2002:115; Blok 2008:41). The portrayal of whalers as almost savage, blood-thirsty or
uncultured (Independent 19.09.07; Guardian 15.09.08) unifies the Japanese pro-whaling
community. Without highly critical outsiders, this community might otherwise question the
approach Japan has taken to this particular foreign policy (Blok 2008:47). Due to the
saturation of Japanese society with newspapers and TV stations, the mass media has
enormous potential in shaping Japan's policies (Hook et al 2000:61). As was the case in
Norway in the 1980s (Claudi 1988:126), anti-whaling groups are portrayed as ‘eco-terrorists’
by the Japanese media (Guardian 28.02.07; BBC News online 22.01.08; Blok 2008:55). The
‘goodies and baddies’ picture this paints does little to ease negotiation processes and efforts
to compromise on the whaling issue.
Historically, Japan's foreign policy has tended to gravitate towards "the major power of the
day" (Hook et al 2000:36), with the US being Japan's main ally since the end of the Second
World War (Stockwin 2008:249). Coupled with this is Japan's internationalist foreign policy,
in which the country seeks to be seen as a responsible member of the international
community (Hook et al 2000:66). The bilateral relationship with the US in particular has put
pressure on Japanese foreign policy-makers, as Japan relies heavily on the US for national
security (Hook et al 2000:40). With regards to whaling, pressure from the US to retract
Japan's objection to the moratorium played a significant role in ending Japanese commercial
whaling (Wong 2001:110). The introduction of the 1973 Pelly Amendment and 1979
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)Packwood-Magnuson Amendment allowed the US to pressurise nations not complying with
the ban on commercial whaling, threatening Japan with a withdrawal of fishing rights in US
waters. With the economically important fishing rights at stake, Japan withdrew its objection
to the moratorium, but the US nevertheless banned Japanese fishing within the American
economic zone a few years later (Wong 2001:111; BBC News online 16.05.07).
The Cultural Theory
The second theory, that whaling reflects a broader cultural issue, assumes that the pro-
whaling bloc is actually driven by sincere convictions about Western ‘cultural imperialism’
and the need to counteract it (Blok 2008:44).
Minke whale stocks are currently estimated to about 900,000 worldwide (Danaher 2002:118),
so they are not in danger of extinction. Anti-whaling nations and groups have therefore
generally turned to ethical, rather than scientific, reasons for why whales should not be
hunted (Mirsky 2008; Kalland 1993). The Japanese decision in 2007 to hunt humpback
whales was described as "terrible" (Times 27.12.07) and "simply a gratuitous extension of the
wish to kill, like a fox in a henhouse killing everything in sight" (Independent 19.11.07).
International reactions that are obviously based on Western cultural perceptions of whales
and whaling appear to only make Japan more determined to continue its policy on whaling.
The humpback hunt was abandoned, but Japan has continued campaigns to promote the
cultural aspect of Japanese whaling. These address both the issue of coastal whaling for
communities with long whaling traditions, and what is perceived to be Western eco-
imperialism and hypocrisy (Kalland 2002:28; Ben-Ami 1997:15).
Firstly, certain nations, including the US, argue for indigenous whaling at home, while
simultaneously arguing against coastal whaling in Japan (Mandel 1980:109). The difference
between 'aboriginal subsistence' whaling, which is allowed under IWC rules, and small-scale
coastal whaling, which is not allowed for any country that has not filed an objection to the
moratorium, is contentious (Blok 2008:54; Catalinac and Chan 2005:155). Japan has a very
long history of whaling, and a tradition of fully utilising caught whales. By the beginning of
the 19th century, it is estimated that there were around 30 whaling communities across Japan.
The European history of whaling, meanwhile, is very much linked to acquiring whale oil and
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)bones (Epstein 2004:318). In 1908, the Japanese Whaling Association was set up for the
purpose of developing whaling and protecting whale stocks, creating one of the world's first
concession arrangements in 1909 in order to control and limit whaling (Tønnessen 1969:174-
214). This controlled, small-scale form of whaling, termed coastal whaling, has little in
common with the notorious commercial whaling of the first half of the 20th century. Hunting
generally takes place within entire communities, often fishing villages, with long traditions of
sustainable resource management (Jonsgård 1992:26; Epstein 2004:318; Danaher 2002:113).
The rather dismal history of commercial whaling in general, however, may explain why the
term sets off alarm bells for some, who fear that allowing Japan to resume coastal whaling
will once again lead down the path to depletion (www.greenpeace.org; Independent
19.11.07). However, the defence for a continued ban on whaling on the basis of a Japanese
lack of cultural traditions for whaling, does not sit well with the Japanese government.
Japan’s whaling foreign policy is very much linked to eventually opening up for small-scale
coastal whaling for four communities with long whaling traditions: Taiji, Abashiri, Ayukawa
and Wada (ICR 2008b:11-14; Guardian 24.06.01; Catalinac and Chan 2005:142;155; Blok
2008:54). The apparent hypocrisy of allowing one culture to whale, whilst deeming another
unfit to do so, accounts for part of the Japanese unwillingness to follow its usual foreign
policy norms of international compliance (BBC News online 06.02.09; Johansen 2005).
The second reason why Japan reacts badly to what is perceived to be a new form of Western
imperialism, is the different perception of whales (Blok 2008:48; Catalinac and Chan
2005:148). The Western notion of whales as sacrosanct animals clashes with Japanese ideas
about whales being an animal like any other. According to Danaher (2002:10), the 'apparent
paradoxes' deriving from the co-existence of a whale-watching industry and whale-hunting
industry are possibly due to the traditional Japanese Buddhist notions of respect for nature.
Johansen (2005), meanwhile, argues that sustainable management of nature's resources in
Norway is built on both Christian and humanistic sets of values. Epstein, on the other hand,
argues that this notion of animals may stem from these particular types of small coastal
societies, as whaling cultures share similar ethnographic profiles. This lifestyle is contrasted
with the essentially urban dwellers of the anti-whaling movement, who generally have little
contact with animals (Epstein 2004:318). According to Kalland, Western ideas about whales
have gradually mutated into a "super whale", which combines the most striking qualities of
various types of whales into a single sacrosanct creature (Kalland 2002; 1993; Kalland and
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)Moeran 1992). The notions of the "super whale" originally stem from articles purporting the
supreme intelligence and social skills of the whale (D'Amato and Chopra 1991). As a result,
assumptions about whales in general, such as the idea that whales are the marine equivalent
of man (Day 2006:7; Wong 2001:91) - “at least as sociable as elephants and probably a lot
smarter” (Mirsky 2008:39) - makes Japan’s foreign policy appear "uncivilized" (Catalinac
and Chan 2005:133) and “barbaric in the extreme” (Independent 19.11.07). Japan, however,
does not share the notion that whales have special rights (Catalinac and Chan 2005:146), and
the pressure from foreign NGOs to give up what has formed part of Japanese culture for
centuries, without any scientific grounds for doing so, is perceived as Western cultural
imperialism (Catalinac and Chan 2005:148). Whaling then forms part of a foreign policy
seeking to challenge the status of the anti-whaling norm as universal, where continuing to eat
whale meat becomes a matter of fundamental human and sovereign rights (Blok 2008:48;
Danaher 2002:118; Johansen 2005).
The Resource Security Theory
Although, as previously stated, there is little to gain economically from hunting whales (Blok
2008:45), whaling is nevertheless a Japanese resource security issue. Whaling has been seen
as belonging to fishing rather than land hunting for decades (Tønnessen 1969:95), and is still
dealt with as a marine resource under the Fisheries Agency (Danaher 2002:107; Blok
2008:58). Part of the reason why Japan will not stop whaling lies in the uncertainty about
what, and how much, whales actually eat; whereas some view the notion of minke whales
eating large quantities of economically important fish as contentious (Huseby 2005:9;
Guardian 19.06.06; Times 10.05.07), current Japanese and Norwegian reports of whales'
stomach content, as well as reports dating back to the 1800s, disagree (Jonsgård 1992: 23-24;
71; Danaher 2002:112; ICR 2008a; 2008b). According to the Institute of Cetacean, “the
whaling issue is a problem over food between man and whales” (ICR 2008a:11). For
Japanese foreign policy-makers, what is true in this case matters less, perhaps, than that the
ICR's beliefs may be true. Japan is fiercely protective of its marine resources (Danaher
2002:106), and the whaling issue tends to be placed into the wider context of resource
security in general (Blok 2008:58; Danaher 2002:107). As an island nation with few natural
resources, securing both food and other resources has been high on the state agenda for
decades (Stockwin 2008: 264; Wong 2002: 112; Catalinac and Chan 2005:145; Danaher
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)2002:107). Quoting a pro-whaling advocate cited in Blok (2008:58), whaling "is a tip of a
very huge iceberg" consisting of fisheries and other natural resources. According to Article
117 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, whales are considered
exploitable resources which may be used in a sustainable manner, either in countries'
exclusive economic zones or on the high seas. What appears to worry Japanese policy-makers
is the impact that a never-ending moratorium on the apparently sustainable hunting of whales
might have on other resources, resource regimes and the principle of sustainable management
of resources (Danaher 2002: 107; Catalinac and Chan 2005:145; Times 21.12.07). Japan's
fisheries in particular are seen as threatened by the changing ethical norms towards marine
resource management. Two percent of the world's population are Japanese, but the country
accounts for eight percent of global fisheries resource consumption (Catalinac and Chan
2005:145). Any threat to the continued use of marine resources is therefore a very serious
one, which the Fisheries Agency is keen to counteract through Japan's foreign policy.
Why Japan Will Not Stop Whaling
The research question relating to the unit-level factors of Japan's foreign policy concerns why
Japan will not stop whaling. I believe that when combined, the three domestic factors
described above answer this question. The 'pressure vent' theory appears to be most favoured
by the British media; it pictures Japan and the Japanese as unreasonable and intolerant, and as
such makes most sense to the anti-whaling bloc. It also, ironically, resembles the Japanese
view of anti-whalers according to the same theory. This theory is certainly most useful for
states wishing to depict Japan as an environmental laggard in a political game where the cost-
free action of 'saving the whale' scores green points at home (Kalland 2002:21-31; Wong
2001:91; Guardian 29.11.07). The whaling issue is, however, not cost-free for the Japanese,
and the weakness of the theory lies in the fact that it is seen as an innocent pressure-vent for
more important issues. I believe Japan's whaling foreign policy generates far too much
international criticism to simply be a form of political retaliation (Danaher 2002:110). There
does, admittedly, appear to be an almost nationalist element to Japan's whaling policy, but
this is perhaps not surprising considering the harsh, sometimes borderline racist, anti-whaling
attacks on Japan (Johansen 2005; Guardian 29.11.07; Hammond 1997:xviii). Certainly,
personal opinions offered by officials at the Institute of Marine Research in Bergen and the
Fisheries Agency in Tokyo indicated that the anti-whaling criticism was partially racially
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)motivated (Personal communication 19 August 2008; 7 January 2009). If criticism of Japan's
foreign policy appeared more rational, i.e. written in less anthropomorphic or inflammatory
terms (Johansen 2005), the nationalist element might very well disappear.
The culture theory, meanwhile, appears more plausible. Although critics point to the limited
whaling and eating of whale meat in Japanese society today (Independent 19.11.07b), a
culture does not need to be national to be worthy of protection. Indeed, the opposite appears
to be the case for "aboriginal" or "subsistence" whaling communities, such as the Alaskan
Eskimo hunting of endangered bowhead whales (BBC News online 29.05.07). The fierceness
of the attack on Japan's whaling culture, which has historical roots nationwide, has made the
whaling issue one of culture and sovereignty, and the culture argument thus deeply influences
the Japanese whaling foreign policy. The idea that some communities are 'indigenous enough'
to continue whaling, whereas some should be 'modern' and refrain from whaling (Kalland
2002:28; Johansen 2005), makes little sense to the Japanese (Times 02.06.07). I believe this
domestic factor will continue to influence Japanese foreign policy for the foreseeable future,
unless the anti-whaling bloc in the IWC finally concedes and allows small-scale coastal
whaling for Japanese whalers. It may be useful, in this case, to think of whaling as an issue of
"societal security", a term borrowed from Buzan's (1991:19-20) five security agenda sectors:
military, economic, political, societal and ecological security. Societal security concerns a
state's identity and the “ability of a society to maintain its traditional patterns of language,
culture, religion, and national identity and customs” (Smith 2005:33-34). If anti-whaling
states were willing to consider the issue of whaling as more than a mere nationalist agenda
issue, the dialogue between the two blocs might become more fruitful.
As is the case for the other two domestic factors, the resource security argument argues that
whaling forms part of a much larger issue in Japanese domestic politics. The importance to
Japan of securing marine resources should not be underestimated. Although whaling may
appear to have little in common with fishing to an outsider, the value of something depends
principally on how the actor perceives it and the situation the actor is in (Baldwin 1997:19).
Interests are, as Katzenstein points out, defined by actors who respond to particular cultural
factors (Katzenstein 1996:17-32). Japan's geographical and historical position with regards to
resource security should therefore be taken into account by those who claim that whaling is
no longer needed. Being perceived as a resource security issue by the Japanese automatically
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)lends whaling importance, and there is little to indicate that it will be removed from that
agenda in the foreseeable future. Seeing the whaling issue as part of Japan's resource and
societal security agenda may enable the more compromise-orientated anti-whaling states to
realise why the country refuses to give up the hunt even in the face of international protest.
With less international pressure, there will be less to unify against and the Japanese may be
equally willing to compromise (Blok 2008:61; Danaher 2002:115).
Why did Japan not leave the IWC in 2007?
Having dealt with the unit-level or domestic part of Japan’s foreign policy making process, I
will now move on to explain the system-level or international part of the country's whaling
foreign policy. The research question for this section concerns why Japan did not simply
leave the IWC in 2007, end its scientific whaling programme and resume commercial
whaling: the latter does after all appear to be the ultimate goal of Japan's scientific whaling
(Blok 2008:51). Part of the criticism of the country's whaling policies focuses on scientific
whaling as a 'guise' (Mirsky 2008:40) or 'loophole' (Huseby 2005:59; BBC News online
06.02.09; Times 10.05.07; 21.12.07). Therefore, a resumption of commercial whaling would
possibly lead to the Japanese being seen as more honest about their reasons for whaling.
There are, however, two problems associated with a return to commercial whaling. Firstly,
there is issue of the legality of scientific whaling, and secondly, the problems associated with
leaving the International Whaling Commission.
Scientific Whaling
Firstly, scientific whaling is not illegal, and is therefore a legitimate policy from a Japanese
point of view. Under Article VIII, the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
(ICRW) allows member states to grant permits to conduct lethal scientific whaling, and the
IWC allows hunting of whales for scientific purposes in whale sanctuaries (Butterworth
1992:332; Danaher 2002:107). ICRW regulations also state that "any whales taken under
these special permits shall so far as practicable be processed and the proceeds be dealt with in
accordance with directions issued by the Governments" (iwcoffice.org). Japan's sale of whale
meat does not run contrary to whaling regulations, with government officials arguing that the
sale of whale meat partially funds the research programme (Huseby 2005:57; Catalinac and
Chan 2005:143; Danaher 2002:109). The research is openly conducted, the Fisheries Agency
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)appears eager to explain the methods, findings and rationale behind Japan's scientific research
and the materials from the research are published in both English and Japanese (ICR 2008a;
2008b). Legally speaking, then, scientific whaling is perfectly legitimate. That scientific
whaling is actually a guise for commercial whaling is more contentious; certainly, the aim of
scientific whaling is to show that a return to regulated commercial whaling is feasible
(Danaher 2002:105; Blok 2008:51). Norway conducted similar research on the north-eastern
Atlantic minke whale stock before resuming commercial whaling, in order to prove the
viability of sustainable resource management (Jonsgård 1992:17). As has already been stated,
however, Japan gains little economically from whaling, with evidence to suggest that
Japanese government subsidies of scientific research have consisted of approximately 900
million yen (5.7 million Euro) annually since 1987 (Blok 2008:51; Danaher 2002:109).
Furthermore, a scientific approach to the issue of whaling is viewed as legitimate foreign
policy by the Japanese due to the standing of science. Science in general is viewed as an
important factor in Japan, and a scientific approach appears to be the most reasonable way to
counteract claims that all whales are special and endangered animals in need of complete
protection (Wong 2001:112; Catalinac and Chan 2005:145; Danaher 2002:106). If Japanese
whaling policies can be proven to follow rational and reasonable, this contrasts favourably
with the 'emotional' approach taken by Western anti-whaling states and also renders useless
any arguments about the non-viability of well-managed whaling.
Leaving the International Whaling Commission
Secondly, a return to commercial whaling would be problematic due to IWC regulations.
Japan's scientific hunt is legal, but a resumption of commercial coastal whaling would be in
breach of international whaling regulations. The only viable option, then, would be for Japan
to leave the IWC, in which case any whaling would be conducted according to the country's
own guidelines. However, this would be a fairly radical turn for Japan’s foreign policy.
Japan's initial compliance with the moratorium was greatly influenced by US pressure.
Japan's continued compliance, however, must be viewed in the context of the effects that
adhering to regimes has on a state's foreign policy approach, in combination Japan's search
for international legitimacy and responsibility (Wong 2001:117-119; Catalinac and Chan
2005:135; Danaher 2002:116).
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)According to an official at the Fisheries Agency in Tokyo, the IWC is the 'proper' institution
for whaling related activities, and Japan would like to continue cooperation as far as possible
(Personal communication 8 January). This statement mirrors Japan's search for international
legitimacy and Krasner, Hasenclever et al and Haas' theories on the importance of regimes.
The international environment of the whaling regime has changed radically since Japan
joined the IWC, and Japan's decision to stay in the organisation may be explained partially as
'habit' (Krasner 1983:360). "Role-playing" in the IWC (Hasenclever et al 1997:5) may mean
that Japan is not in complete, 'rational' control of its own political behaviour. When Japan
justifies whaling according to IWC regulations, it plays its role within the regime and aligns
its foreign policy approach according to a regime the country no longer really agrees with.
The "role-playing" means that the regime is nevertheless "affirmed" by the state's actions and
then reaffirms its role as part of the IWC regime (Hasenclever et al 1997:20; Catalinac and
Chan 2005:150).
Wendt argues that macro-structures, in this case the whaling regime, are both acted upon and
acts upon states (Wendt 1999:155), in this case the state of Japan. The whaling regime should
then "generate macro-level patterns in individual behaviour" (Wendt 1999:161). Put simply,
this means keeping Japan within the ICW because 'that's the way it is'. The principles, norms,
rules and decision-making processes in the IWC appear to have led to at least some degree of
"regime autonomy" (Krasner 1983:359), although regime theory alone may not be adequate
to explain Japan's approach to the whaling regime. As mentioned in the analytical framework,
"power-based" or realist theories and "interest-based" or neoliberal theories of regimes
(Hasenclever et al 1997:3-4) are difficult to apply to the case of whaling in 2007.
"Interest-based" or neoliberal explanations of regimes -what Haas terms institutionalist or
"bargaining patterns" explanations (Haas 1993:83) - are difficult to apply to whaling because
interest-based theory assumes that actors are rational (Hasenclever et al 1997:4). Looking at
the whaling regime in 2007, this is clearly not the case, although the theory may be applicable
to the initial creation of the IWC. At the beginning of the modern whaling regime in the
1940s, the measures taken to curb whaling reflected the parties that were least enthusiastic
about cutting the whale quotas. Members were united by their common interests, but
unwilling to commit to drastic measures (Haas 1993:183; Catalinac and Chan 2005:134).
POLIS Student Journal Vol.1 (1)"Power-based" or realist explanations of regimes are difficult to apply to the whaling regime
because neglecting the influence of non-state actors, and similarly neglecting the potential for
international influence based on non-material forces (Haas 1993:169-170), would mean
ignoring important aspects of the whaling regime. Non-governmental environmental groups
such as Greenpeace, for instance, appear to influence international opinion greatly, even
though this particular study is too short to include the role of NGOs. In addition, the Japanese
reliance on soft power (Nye 2004:3) as a political tool means that there must at least be a
belief among Japanese foreign policy-makers that non-material forces are useful for gaining
international influence: this belief, in turn, influences policy-making. The realist approach,
which Haas refers to as the "Follow-the-Leader" theory, could be argued to be applicable to
the start of the moratorium, albeit if the role of non-state actors was still ignored to some
extent. "Follow-the-Leader" assumes that collective behaviour within the regime is shaped by
the strongest country, which then presses less powerful states to accommodate its own
preferences by forcing them to modify their policies (Haas 1993:181). The United States'
efforts to pressure Japan to withdraw its objection to the moratorium would be the obvious
case of this. Additionally, the role of non-state actors, such as anti-whaling environmental
organisations, was at this point more or less confined to lobbying through states, which would
support the theory's assumption that states are the main actors.
Although the "power-based" and "interest-based" approaches to regimes may be able to at
least partially explain why states would adhere to the international whaling regime in the past,
neither one can adequately explain why Japan chose to remain in the IWC in 2007. Iceland
was able to return to commercial whaling by leaving the whaling regime. In order to
understand why Japan, despite their wish to resume commercial whaling, nevertheless chose
to stay in the IWC, a theory that is more sensitive to historical context than the
abovementioned is required. Japan’s reliance on soft power (Nye 2004:3) as a means for
gaining international influence, and the country’s quest for recognition of its role in
international society makes it harder for Japan to leave an international organisation. This
alone would mean that both “power-based” and “interest-based” theories are difficult to apply
in order to understand Japan’s behaviour, because these do not, unlike cognitivist theory, treat
actors as “reflective organisms” (Haas 1993:170). The cognitivist idea that state’s interests
are often unclear and that the international system is more indeterminate than “power-based”
and “interest-based” theories assume, is particularly clear in the case of whaling in 2007.
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