ITALY AND THE SAHEL A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN - Camillo Casola, Edoardo Baldaro - ISPI
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ISPI POLICY BRIEF May 2021 ITALY AND THE SAHEL A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN Camillo Casola, Edoardo Baldaro
POLICY BRIEF
31 May 2021
ITALIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL STUDIES
This Report is realized with the support of the Policy Planning Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation pursuant to art. 23-bis of Presidential Decree 18/1967.
The opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and ISPI.
Camillo Casola is resident research fellow at ISPI Africa Programme and associate research fellow at the Center
for the Study of Contemporary Africa (CeSAC). He earned a PhD in International Studies at the Università degli
Studi di Napoli L’Orientale. His main research interests are related to politics, institutions, conflicts and security
in sub-Saharan Africa, with a focus on West Africa and the Sahel. Before joining ISPI he worked at the Directora-
te-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO).
Edoardo Baldaro is Gerda Henkel postdoctoral research fellow at the Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies -
Institute of Law, Politics and Development, and associate fellow at the REPI (Recherches et Études en Politique
Internationale) of the Université Libre de Bruxelles. His main areas of interest include critical security studies,
African security, EU foreign policy and international interventions. He published in various academic journals,
including, Security Dialogue, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Nationalities Papers and The International Spectator.*
Photo credits: Daniel Tiveau/CIFOR
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN 2
POLICY BRIEF
31 May 2021
ITALIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL STUDIES
The Sahel is the theatre for one of the most
significant new developments in Italian foreign 1. THE SAHEL CRISIS:
policy in the last decade. As a consequence of JIHADI INSURGENCIES,
the intersection of external shocks, domestic ILLICIT TRAFFICKING, MIGRATION
pressures, and internal reorganisations, Italy is 5
testing in the region new approaches, instruments
and strategies for pursuing its national interest, 2. THE SAHEL AND THE THREE AND
which is understood as much in terms of national
A HALF CIRCLES OF THE ITALIAN
FOREIGN POLICY
security as domestic stability and international
8
status.
3. FROM ‘GROWTH DIPLOMACY’
Contrasting and curbing irregular migration and TO MIGRATION AND SECURITY: 10
fighting against terrorist groups in the region YEARS OF STRATEGIC RE-ORIENTATION
are the two main concerns behind the Italian 11
strategic re-orientation towards the Sahel. In this
sense, the definition of national interests in the 4. BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND
area emerges from the entanglement of foreign COOPERATION: MULTIDIMENSIONAL
and domestic considerations. Italian initiatives in ENGAGEMENT
the area have also responded to the collateral 14
need to restructure Rome’s relationship with Paris
• The bilateral dimension of
and Berlin on specific foreign and security policy
political engagement in the Sahel
issues and interests. 14
• A multilateral response to the Sahel
crisis: the Coalition for the Sahel and
the Takuba task force
17
5. ENTANGLED INTERESTS:
WHY ITALY IS IN THE SAHEL TO STAY
20
6. ITALY IN THE SAHEL, A PATH FORWARD:
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
22
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN |3
POLICY BRIEF
31 May 2021
ITALIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL STUDIES
O
n 8 April 2021 the Italian Minister of
ITALY IN THE SAHEL Foreign Affairs, Luigi Di Maio, arrived in
Bamako for a two-day diplomatic mission.
A NEW NATIONAL On this occasion he met several members of
PROJECTION TOWARDS A Mali’s Government, including the Prime Minister,
Moctar Ouane, as well as the President of the
GREATER MEDITERRANEAN transition, Bah N’Daw. Significantly, the head
of Italy’s diplomacy took his first Africa trip in
the Sahel – a first in Mali for an Italian Foreign
Camillo Casola Minister since Paolo Gentiloni’s last visit in 2016.
ISPI
This was the latest signal of Italy’s growing
Edoardo Baldaro
Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies political and diplomatic attention to an ever
more strategic area in the continent, part of the
‘Enlarged Mediterranean’ region. Talking to the
press at the end of the mission, Di Maio stressed
that “Mali is a strategic partner for Italy in many
priority areas, such as Libya, the fight against
terrorism, the management of migration flows
and the stability of the Sahel”1 emphasising the
need to strengthen the partnership with Malian
authorities in security and human mobility. He
also anticipated that Mali and the Sahel will
have an important place in the discussions with
the international partners in the context of the
forthcoming ministerial meeting of the Global
Coalition against Daesh, to be held in Italy shortly.2
Previously, the Minister of Defence, Lorenzo
Guerini, clarified the general terms for growing
military involvement south of the Sahara. In an
interview given to the national newspaper la
Repubblica in March 2021 he pointed out that
“Italian military engagement in the Sahel fully
complements Italy’s commitment in Libya, the
Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. It is a single
|4
POLICY BRIEF
area of crisis, with a strong jihadi upsurge whose radars of Rome’s presence in the continent. Its
consequences reverberate in the Mediterranean stability is today ranked high among national
and Europe”.3 In April, talking to the Italian daily strategic interests and priorities6.
La Stampa, Guerini put the spotlight on Italy
The Italian Ggovernment’s political, diplomatic
and France’s common purpose to cooperate
and military activism in the Sahel shows how this
rather than compete in Libya and the Sahel,
region of sub-Saharan Africa has taken centre
also underlining the Italian strategic interest in
stage on Italy’s foreign policy agenda, despite
reinforcing a structural stabilising presence in
being historically kept off the radars of Rome’s
a triangular zone defined by the Horn of Africa
presence in the continent. Its stability is today
to the east, the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel
ranked high among national strategic interests
to the west, and the Mediterranean shore of
and priorities.
Libya to the north.4 Only a few days before,
during a summit held in Paris, Guerini and the
THE SAHEL CRISIS: JIHADI INSURGENCIES,
French Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence
ILLICIT TRAFFICKING, MIGRATION
Parly, had discussions on security in the Sahel
and the Italian participation in the French-led The strengthening of Italy’s diplomatic and
Takuba task force, giving evidence of a renewed military presence in the Sahel has occurred
synergy between Paris and Rome after the in a context of increasing instability. 2020 has
unprecedented diplomatic crisis in 2019.5 been the deadliest year in the region since the
crisis broke out in Mali in 2012. In the previous
On the 19 and 20 May 2021, Minister Guerini
years, the trend of violent attacks by Salafi-
was in Mali and Niger to discuss Italy’s military
jihadi insurgents, ethnic-based militias and state
cooperation in the region. He had institutional
security forces in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso
meetings in Bamako with the Vice President,
increased exponentially.
Colonel Assimi Goïta, just a couple of days before
the new military takeover which ultimately led to After the launch of the French regional
him assuming the presidency. He then travelled counterterrorism Opération Barkhane in
to Gao to meet with General Philippe Landicheff, 2014, the epicentre of Sahelian insecurity has
Head of the Takuba task force, and discuss the gradually moved from North Mali towards the
Italian contingent's forthcoming full operational Liptako-Gourma or the “three borders” area
capability. The Italian government’s political, between Central Mali, South-western Niger and
diplomatic and military activism in the Sahel Burkina Faso. Two jihadi networks are mainly
shows how this region of sub-Saharan Africa active in the region: Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam
has taken centre stage on Italy’s foreign policy wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM or the Support Group
agenda, despite being historically kept off the for Islam and Muslims), a coalition of Katibas
linked to al-Qa’ida – Ansar al-Din, al-Murabitun,
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN |5POLICY BRIEF
the Katiba Macina and the Katiba al-Furqan armies, alongside widespread corruption, a lack
of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) of accountability and general impunity lead
– headed by Iyad ag Ghali, a former Tuareg Sahelian youths to join jihadi armed insurgencies.
nationalist rebel; the Islamic State in the Greater
The Sahel region is furthermore marked by the
Sahara (ISGS), an al-Qa’ida splinter group led by
presence of transnational organised networks
Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, a former MOJWA
devoted to criminal activities, such as protection
(Movement for the Oneness and the Jihad in
rackets and systematic extorsions, and is crossed
West Africa) spokesperson and al-Murabitun’s
by illicit trafficking of subsidised goods, cigarettes,
military commander, who pledged allegiance to
drugs, gold, natural resources, weapons, and
the Caliph of the Islamic State in 2015.6
human beings, with the active complicity of
Salafi-jihadi armed groups entrenched their compromised state and local authorities.8
presence in rural areas of the Central Sahel,
The fault lines of the security crisis in the Sahel and
exploiting state governance failures. In a context
a possible direct impact on the Mediterranean
of widespread marginalisation of mostly Fulani
have pushed the Italian Government to increase
semi-nomadic pastoral groups,7 jihadi insurgents
a policy focus on the stability of the “Southern
have advocated their cause and obtained
European border”. This has mostly been done by
some sort of social legitimacy, offering them
strengthening the Sahelian regimes’ capacity to
protection, delivering social services, ensuring
fight against local insurgencies, control borders
justice and equal access to land in occupied
and limit human mobility, in order to curb illicit
areas. In a sense, violent extremism intersects
trafficking and human smuggling networks.
community-based conflicts and inter-ethnic
Furthermore, development cooperation
tensions: ethnic-based and self-defence militias
initiatives have aimed at addressing the root
have regularly attacked Fulani villages, with
causes of migration in the area, coherently
civilian communities accused of supporting
with the European “comprehensive approach”
extremists, while jihadi groups retaliate against
underlying the EU Emergency Trust Fund for
Dogon or Bambara villagers. Beside this, the
Africa launched at the Valletta Summit on
main targets of violent activities from jihadi non-
Migration in November 2015.
state actors remain French forces, international
peacekeepers, national armies and civilians The need to “protect security and national
suspected of supporting security forces. interests”9 from the potential spill-over of
terrorism, the proliferation of illicit trafficking
Abuses by state and national security forces’
activities and the development of irregular
contribute further to a deterioration in the security
migration flows set out the guidelines of Italy’s
of local communities: targeted violence, extra-
“look south policy”, pushing for a more proactive
judicial killings, human rights violations by regular
political and diplomatic presence in the Sahel
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN |6POLICY BRIEF as well as the deployment of a growing number 2013 – and rebuild the alliance with France, while of armed forces employed both for capacity- gaining a central role within the framework of the building and counterterrorism. In addition, European Union’s foreign policy towards sub- the Italian Governments’ trans-Mediterranean Saharan Africa. In this respect, the decision to activism indicates the desire to affirm a new answer the French call for a greater involvement assertiveness in Europe. The involvement in of European partners could have been met in the Sahel provides Italy with an opportunity to order to obtain, from France the willingness to reinforce a convergence with Germany – whose accommodate Italy’s strategic priorities in other presence in the Sahel has been growing since theatres. ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN |7
POLICY BRIEF
THE SAHEL AND THE THREE AND A HALF unstable political equilibria.11 In this sense, even
CIRCLES OF THE ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY if the end of the Cold War implied the need to
recalibrate some strategic assumptions, the role
Italy’s growing presence in the Sahel is a major
Italy built for itself within the liberal Western
strategic re-orientation for Italian foreign policy,
order is still the defining feature of the country in
which is now deploying multidimensional action
the international system. 12
in an area where the country has historically
been absent or poorly committed at best. In The image most commonly evoked for analysing
order to understand how Italian engagement and disentangling Italian foreign policy is the one
in this African region should be interpreted, of the “three circles”.13 According to this analytical
it is necessary to define how this shift can be lens, Italian foreign policy can be seen as based
inserted within the wider policy paradigms that on three main pillars and vectors for power
have informed Italian foreign action since World projection: Atlanticism, Europeanism, and the
War II. Mediterranean. The three circles encapsulate
Italian national interest in the international system,
On the whole, since the transition from the Fascist
and for most of the history of the Italian Republic
regime to the Republic, the Italian presence
they have been developed in a complementary
and action in the international arena have been
way.14 With few, yet important exceptions – such
characterised by substantial continuity, anchored
as the Iraqi crisis in 2003, or most recently the
in a redefinition of national identity, which framed
concerns caused by the Trump Administration’s
the country as a middle power fully integrated
limited support for multilateralism – the Atlantic
into the multilateral system built by its Western
and the European circles have advanced
allies. Italy’s commitment to the West’s economic,
hand in hand without major tensions: Italy has
political, and security arrangements became the
historically played a major role in the process
Pole star guiding Italian foreign policy for two
of European integration, and it has showed a
main reasons. On the one hand, the quest for
staunch commitment towards NATO and more
status and recognition: as a former revisionist
generally America. Within this framework, the
state whose pursuit of power and autonomy
Mediterranean area, seen as Italy’s geographic
had been abruptly stopped by the defeat during
backyard, has epitomised from time to time
the War, Italy needed to reconstruct its role in
a space where the country could develop a
the international community as a trustworthy
more autonomous action.15 If Atlanticism and
partner fully engaged in the new international
Europeanism have reflected the quests for status
architecture created after 1945.10 On the other
through interdependence (within the North
hand, within a Cold War international setting,
Atlantic sphere) and integration (within the EU),
foreign policy also had a domestic application,
as well as the promise for security and economic
being instrumentally used as a tool for maintaining
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN |8POLICY BRIEF
development, the Mediterranean was thought Italian foreign policy, which finally gave Africa,
to offer Italy a space to obtain international and more specifically to its internal “frontier”,18
recognition through autonomy.16 This has been a new centrality for Italy, which eventually
mirrored by the relationship built with the Arab came to see the continent as an “inevitable
countries during the first decades of the Cold partner” for the future.19 The first event was the
War, or again by the political initiatives towards 2008-09 global financial crisis, which forced
the Balkans in the 1990s and the early 2000s. the Italian Government to develop a new form
of economic diplomacy towards emerging
With the partial exception of North Africa, the
markets, in order to open new venues and
African continent has historically occupied
opportunities for Italian industry. The real turning
a marginal place in this quite fixed structure
point explaining Italy's current diplomatic,
shaping Italian foreign policy. Even in the Horn of
military and political engagement in the Sahel
Africa, where the country was a former colonial
emerged in the aftermath of the Arab Spring,
power in Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Italy did
following the destabilisation of large parts of
not develop strong and durable partnerships.
North Africa and the Middle East. Starting from
Italy’s presence in Sub-Saharan Africa has been
this moment, through the newly introduced
de facto delegated to a network of non-state
concept of “Enlarged Mediterranean” – namely a
actors, mainly NGOs and missionaries. The
geopolitical space ranging from the Great Middle
revamping of the development aid allocated to
East to the Sahel, passing through the Horn of
the continent during the 1980s – including the
Africa – a “third circle and a half”20 has replaced
Sahel, hit by a dire drought and a famine crisis –
the Mediterranean one within the traditional
was followed soon by a sharp persistent cut. In
structure of Italian foreign policy.
a similar way, between 1985 and 2014, no Italian
Prime Minister officially visited Sub-Saharan In 2015, Italy’s Ministry of Defence, under then
Africa.17 In accordance with the logic of the Minister Roberta Pinotti, published the “White
three circles, Italy accepted and implemented Paper for International Security and Defence”.
a division of labour with its allies, according to The Sahel was viewed as an area with crisis
which the continent would remain under the dynamics that were directly influencing equilibria
“responsibility” of other European partners in the “Euro-Mediterranean” region, emphasising
while Italy channelled its (limited) efforts and the need to understand the root causes of this
development aid through the EU and other instability and to engage in initiatives aimed at
multilateral initiatives. their resolution to secure national interests.
According to the White Paper, indeed, the
This state of affairs has changed starting from
Sahelian states’ “limited economic development,
the beginning of the 2010s. Two main external
extreme poverty, religious and tribal conflicts
shocks boosted a strategic re-orientation of
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN |9POLICY BRIEF
and lack of state structures able to guarantee and counterterrorism initiatives had to be
internal security”21 triggered instability in the mainly delegated to US-European partners.24
Mediterranean. What contributed the most to US security and counterterrorism engagement
this strategic re-orientation were the migration remained limited, opting to provide political,
crisis – a peak of over 1 million migrants arriving logistical and financial support to the traditional
in Europe was recorded in 2015 – and the wave security providers in the area, France in particular.
of terrorist attacks hitting Europe since 2014. In this sense, the French and EU policies mostly
In this view, the growing insecurity in north- complement NATO's limited involvement in the
western Africa and the Sahel fed mass migration region, indirectly favouring the deployment of
to Europe – with irregular migrants increasingly transatlantic capacity in other geopolitical areas.
transiting from Niger, which stands at the core of On the other hand, Italy’s engagement in the
all European securitisation strategies in Africa22 Sahel is thought to produce a double effect vis-à-
–, illegal trafficking of drugs and human beings, vis the European circle. Since the approval of the
and international terrorism. European strategy for the Sahel in 2011, the G5
Sahel area – comprising Mauritania, Mali, Niger,
The focus of Italian foreign and security policy
Burkina Faso and Chad – has represented one of
on the Sahel has grown consistently ever since.23
the most important theatres where the European
Under the governments led by Paolo Gentiloni
Union is defining and testing its capacities as an
and Giuseppe Conte a further step forward was
international security, development, and stability
made in the process of integrating this geopolitical
player.25 Given the importance the Sahel has
region into a system of direct strategic interests
obtained among decision-makers in Brussels,
and foreign policy priorities for Italy, encouraging
in a post-Brexit European setting the Italian
the opening of new embassies, the conclusion
presence in the area is reinforcing the role of
of bilateral political and military agreements with
Italy as a potential third pillar of the EU’s external
Sahelian state actors and active participation
action, within and beyond the Franco-German
within the framework of multilateral initiatives,
engine.
to promote development, improve governance,
curb migration and counter violent extremism. At the same time, Italian deployment in the
area can be seen as a ‘middle way’ between
At the same time, the opening of the new
the approaches pursued by the two European
“southern front” for Italian external engagement
Member States that are the most engaged in
should not be interpreted in opposition, but
the region, namely France and Germany. While
rather as fully integrated with the two other
France is pursuing a strategy mainly based on a
foreign policy circles. On the one hand, under the
counterterrorism and security-focused approach
Obama administration the Sahel already started
to the stabilisation of the area, Germany is
to be considered as a region where stabilisation
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN | 10POLICY BRIEF
favouring the multilateral deployment of its 2014, paved the way for the re-direction of Italy’s
security and development capacity, mostly foreign policy towards the African continent.26
framed within current EU and UN missions In accordance with economic rationale, little
in the Sahel. Mixing military effort based on attention was paid to the Sahel: the Farnesina’s
bilateral agreements with the Sahelian states “growth diplomacy”27 mainly addressed other
with the multilateral, cooperative approach African regions, such as Southern Africa, the
that characterises the country's diplomatic Greater Horn and the Gulf of Guinea, home to
and development policies, the Italian strategy some of the most promising and rapidly-growing
promises to integrate and reinforce broader economies in the world. Significantly enough,
European action in the Sahel, guaranteeing a Italy’s then Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, in office
new status for Rome. since February 2014, visited the Republic of
Congo, Angola and Mozambique in July 2014,
The strategic redeployment of Italian foreign
followed by Kenya and Ethiopia in 2015.
policy, and the opening of a third circle and a
half with the Sahel as its focal point, address In fact, the new attention for Africa was primarily
two main strategic needs. First, in the Sahel driven by domestic considerations, since Italy
Rome is revamping an ancient tradition, which was looking for new market opportunities to
sees the foreign policy of the country as a tool mitigate the impact of the 2008-09 financial
for managing domestic balances. In this sense, crisis. In a similar way, the centrality acquired by
the focus on counterterrorism and migration- the Sahel in the following years must be seen first
management clearly responds to the new and foremost as the result of a reinterpretation
priorities identified by Italian policy-makers since of Italian political priorities and interests,
the 2014-15. Secondly, acting in the Sahel shows deeply affected by the events of 2014-16. The
Italy's main European partners its renewed destabilising effects of the Central Mediterranean
ambitions both within the European architecture migration crisis and the ever-greater importance
and vis-à-vis other interconnected strategic given to migration issues in the Government’s
theatres – such as Libya – where the country is political agenda pushed the Italian authorities,
seeking to play a leading role. in parallel with European institutions, to place
greater emphasis on the Sahel area. The Euro-
FROM “GROWTH DIPLOMACY” African summit in Valletta in November 2015 met
TO MIGRATION AND SECURITY: the need to curb illegal migrations, stop human
10 YEARS OF STRATEGIC RE-ORIENTATION trafficking and ease repatriation processes
through the enhancement of political cooperation
The Italy-Africa Initiative launched in 2013 by
with African partners – for both countries of
then Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Emma Bonino,
origin and countries of transit –, strengthening
and the subsequent Italy-Africa Conference in
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN | 11POLICY BRIEF
their capacity to control borders and mobility.28 – were highly prioritised and obtained the largest
The ‘European Union Emergency Trust Fund for share of funding.29
stability and addressing root causes of irregular
In line with the changed European approach
migration and displaced persons in Africa’ (EUTF
towards Africa, the Valletta summit also marked
for Africa) was created to provide African partners
a symbolic starting point for Italy’s strategic
with financial instruments and resources – €1.8
re-orientation towards the Sahel. Since 2016,
billion – to invest in job creation, socioeconomic
Rome’s Africa policy has increasingly focused
programmes, food security, the resilience of local
on migration issues and the stabilisation of
communities, conflict prevention and migration
the Sahel belt. In May 2016 the second Italy-
management. In this framework of intervention,
Africa conference reflected the Government’s
the Sahel states – and particularly Niger and Mali
new priorities on migration and security along
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN | 12POLICY BRIEF
Europe’s “external frontier”. During the ministerial Government – the first led by the Prime Minister
summit in the presence of 52 African delegations, Giuseppe Conte – was based on three thematic
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paolo Gentiloni, pillars (peace and development; political stability
put forward Italy’s "Migration Compact" proposal. and security; human development), with a focus
The aim was to build a long-term partnership on the Sahel sub-region. A few months later, in
between Europe and Africa, based on the January 2019, Conte was received in Niamey and
financing of sustainable economic development N’Djamena, where high-level meetings between
in return for effective border control, cooperation the Italian Prime Minister and the Nigerien and
in managing irregular migration, repatriations Chadian national authorities respectively were
agreements and the fight against human dedicated to discussing migration and terrorism.32
trafficking.30 In October of that year, Gentiloni
Lastly, December 2020 saw the issuing of the
visited Senegal, Mali and Niger to follow up
“Partnership with Africa” document, promoted
discussions on the migration compact issue.
by the Africa Direction of the Ministry of Foreign
The strategic weight of the Sahel countries in
Affairs and International Cooperation.33 The Sahel
the struggle against illegal migration, terrorism
is identified among the four priority areas of Italy’s
and illicit trafficking was reaffirmed. In February
Africa policy, alongside the Mediterranean area,
2017, the new Government led by Gentiloni
the Horn of Africa/Red Sea and Southern Africa,
announced a €200 million Fund for Africa to
underlying its strategic value “in terms of security,
help African partners – including Mali, Niger and
management of the migration phenomenon and
Chad – control their borders and stop departures
the fight against illegal trafficking of all kinds,
by promoting technical support, training, local
which have found fertile ground in the fragile
community development, information about the
social, economic, and institutional fabric of the
dangers of the migration journey, protection for
Sahelian belt”.34 Italy’s Africa strategy highlights
refugees and vulnerable migrants. Libya, Tunisia
the need to contribute to the stabilisation of
and Niger were considered “strategic partners”
the Sahel region through the enhancement of
for the fund.31
cooperation with the G5 Sahel and its Joint Force
In October 2018 a new Italy-Africa ministerial (FC-G5S), in order to support governments in
conference was launched on the initiative of strengthening their institutional and military
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Enzo Moavero capacity, improving border control activities
Milanesi, and Emanuela Del Re, Vice-Minister and fighting organised crime and terrorism.
with responsibility for international cooperation. For human mobility, it puts the spotlight on the
The summit, aiming to revive Italy-Africa relations need to act on the root causes of migration, help
after difficult diplomatic months following the migrants and refugees in transit countries, tackle
establishment of the new right-wing populist human trafficking and criminal networks, and
assist with voluntary repatriations.
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN | 13POLICY BRIEF
The unprecedented diplomatic activism of Rome in the field of migration and security, affirming
towards its Sahelian partners has been coupled Italy’s engagement to assist Malian authorities
with the deployment of multidimensional in managing irregular migration flows, fighting
and multisectoral action in the area. Surfing human trafficking networks, and implementing
between autonomy and cooperation, Italy development projects in the North.35 According
has implemented both bilateral initiatives and to leaks, the agreement allows Bamako to
multilateral actions in the Sahel, alternating accept the repatriation of Malian irregular
and integrating diplomatic, defence, and migrants in return for a €2.5 million in funding.36
development instruments. In the same occasion, the representatives of
the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad
BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND COOPERATION: (CMA) and the Platforme, the two coalitions
MULTIDIMENSIONAL ENGAGEMENT of former rebel actors and pro-Government
militias which are parties in the Algiers Process,
As remarked, the strategic re-orientation of
adopted the “Rome Declaration”, committing
Italy’s Africa policy towards the Sahel has been
themselves to fostering the implementation of
built upon bilateral initiatives and multilateral
the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in
engagement in the area. In continuity with the
Mali, ensuring social cohesion among Malian
traditional pillars of Italian foreign policy, at
communities and operationalising the joint
the frontiers of the "Enlarged Mediterranean"
mechanisms for combating insecurity by
region Rome is developing autonomous action
setting up a political coalition funder the Cadre
to reinforce its status as a pivotal partner in the
Stratégique Permanent (CSP).37 Facilitated by
multilateral security architecture currently active
the Rome-based NGO Ara Pacis Initiatives for
in the Sahel.
Peace, the declaration was hailed by Italy’s
The Bilateral Dimension of diplomacy as an important development for
Political Engagement in the Sahel the advancement of peace and security in Mali;
however, as confirmed by ministerial sources,
Between 2017 and 2019, three similar defence
the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not
cooperation agreements were reached between
involved nor aware of the initiative38 – which
Italy and Sahelian countries, namely Chad (26
begs the question about a possible role of other
July 2017), Niger (26 September 2017) and
state actors in the process.
Burkina Faso (1 July 2019). More recently, on 6
May 2021, Italy’s Minister Di Maio and Al Hamdou The salience of the bilateral cooperation
Ag Ilène, Bamako’s Minister of Malians Abroad agreements in the context of a gradual
and African Integration, signed a joint declaration strengthening of Italy’s political relations with
in Rome to strengthen bilateral cooperation Sahelian states is associated with a growing
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN | 14POLICY BRIEF
diplomatic presence on the ground. In February for Italy’s development and humanitarian
2017 Italy established a new embassy in Niger cooperation, due to the presence of countries of
(Niamey) – the first one in the Sahel. In the particular concern for human migration routes,
following years, two other diplomatic missions climate change, weak economic development
were inaugurated, in February 2018 in Burkina and food crises. Cooperation interventions
Faso (Ouagadougou) and in June 2018 in in the Sahel area – mostly Niger and Burkina
Guinea (Conakry) – in fact a re-opening (it was Faso – for the 2019-21 period have focused on
closed in 1998), in a country deemed strategic regenerating degraded soil, integrated agro-
for managing irregular migration flows. In pastoral land management and the commercial
October 2020 Vice-Minister Del Re announced improvement of agro-biodiversity, to deal with
the establishment of a new embassy in Mali malnutrition and food insecurity, and bolster the
(Bamako), with this opening currently in the local capacity to frame migration flows.41
pipeline, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Since 2018, the strategic weight of Niger in the
has confirmed that a new one will probably be
context of Italy’s Sahel policy has been reflected
established in Chad by the end of 2021.39 Under
by the launch of a bilateral military mission in the
this framework, just as significant has been the
country, MISIN (Missione Bilaterale di Supporto
appointment of former Vice-Minister of Foreign
alla Repubblica del Niger). It was negotiated by
Affairs Bruno Archi as a Special Envoy for the
Minister of Defence Pinotti with the Government
Sahel, whose mandate recently expired and will
in Niamey, based on the military cooperation
seemingly not be renewed because of Rome’s
agreement signed in September 2017 and a
attempt to get an Italian diplomat designated as
formal request made by the Nigerien authorities
the new EU Special Envoy for the Sahel.40
on 1 November 2017. 470 personnel units – an
The notable increase in Italy’s diplomatic average yearly presence of around 250 soldiers
presence in the Sahel has come together –, mostly light infantry troops responsible for
with greater attention on the enhancement of reconnaissance, control and command operation,
bilateral development cooperation plans, mostly training, health support, infrastructural work, force
thanks to the political initiative of Vice-Minister protection, intelligence and surveillance, alongside
Del Re, who travelled to Niger, Burkina Faso and 130 land vehicles and 2 aerial vehicles, were to
Mali on severaloccasions, heading business and be deployed between Niamey and Madama, not
NGOs delegations, and encouraging the direct far from the southern border of Libya. The main
involvement of representatives from Sahelian goal of the mission would have been to provide
diasporas. In the last “Three-year Programming support to Niger’s efforts to control territories and
and Policy Planning Document”, the Sahel is frontiers, while ultimately contributing to develop
confirmed as one of the geographic priorities the capacities of the national security and to assist
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN | 15POLICY BRIEF
them in tackling illicit trafficking, human smuggling mutual trust and preserving balances with
and security threats.42 the local Government.45
With a €49.5 million budget for 2018, the mission Others pointed at a supposed reluctance by
should have started in January 2018. However, it French authorities to accept Italy’s new military
was stalled for most of the year due to the alleged role in the country, resulting in pressure on the
opposition of political actors in Niamey – as well Nigerian Government. If this assumption seemed
as of a large part of the local populations – to the at least difficult to reconcile with France’s need
strengthening of a new foreign military presence to obtain support from European partners for
in the country: its military commitment in the Sahel,46 what is
more likely is a partial lack of understanding
Niger was then going through a season of
protests and, as President Issoufou told and coordination between Italy and its European
us on many occasions, it found it difficult partners,47 as also assumed by the person we
to justify an increasing number of external spoke to.48 The first 40 Italian units arrived in
military interventions. And that’s also the Niger in January and were stuck inside the US
reason why Nigerian authorities refused at base at Niamey airport until September, when
the time to give us a military base: this led
the deadlock was brought to an end and other
the Italian contingent to be deployed on the
contingents finally joined the mission. In October
US and the French bases in the country.43
2018 the first training course was carried out.
Official Nigerian sources cited by Radio France In 2020 MISIN – whose mandate includes
International, instead, complained about the fact intelligence information gathering related to
that the Government had not been informed as to human trafficking and training of special forces
the beginning of the mission and did not need it, units in Agadez, Niger’s main migration hub until
having access to American training and coordination 2016 – was extended, with an average presence
with French forces on the ground.44 Particularly, the of 208 units and a maximum availability of 295
fiercest opposition to Italy’s deployment allegedly units, 160 land vehicles and 5 conventional and
came from then Minister of Interior and current remotely-piloted aircraft, for a total cost of €43.8
President, Mohamed Bazoum. This state of affairs is million.49 It had trained about 3,000 Nigerien
corroborated by the words of a former high-ranking soldiers by late 2020, mostly through delivering
official of the Italian Ministry of Defence: parachuting and anti-terrorism courses, while
The launch of the MISIN mission occurred in implementing civilian-military cooperation
a strange manner: nobody knew but us, and activities, mostly in the health sector.50 In addition,
my sense was that Niger didn’t really ask for Italy and Niger have recently concluded an
a deployment with those numbers. Niamey
exchange of notes with which the Government
perceived a lack of respect from Italian
authorities with regards to the deployment of Niamey has granted Italy land to build its own
of the bilateral mission. At some point, we military facility in the airport area.51
had to change our approach, rebuilding
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN | 16POLICY BRIEF
A Multilateral Response to the Sahel Crisis: every multilateral operation launched in the
The Coalition for the Sahel and Sahel. In most cases, however, it only offers a
the Takuba Task Force small contribution in personnel and funding. In
2020 it was a contributing member state of the
Along with the two Franco-German initiatives in
UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, MINUSMA
the region – the Sahel Alliance, bringing together
(United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
international donors to promote development
Stabilization Mission in Mali), with 7 staff units
projects, improve coordination on the ground
deployed in the Bamako headquarter; it provided
and increase funding for stabilisation,52 and
12 military units to EUTM Mali (EU Training
the Partnership for Security and Stability
mission in Mali), a European mission that trains
in the Sahel (P3S), which focuses more on
and advises Malian armed forces (FAMa) and
mobilising international support to address
the G5 Sahel Joint Force units; it also broadened
governance issues – Italy took part in nearly
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN | 17POLICY BRIEF
its contribution to the European Union Mission Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the
Capacity Building Mission in the Sahel, making United Kingdom – issued a joint communiqué
available 16 personnel units to EUCAP Sahel expressing political support for the creation
Mali and 14 units to EUCAP Sahel Niger, two of a task force mainly made up of European
civilian capacity-building missions intended to special force units and integrated into the joint
supportthe capacity of internal security forces’ Barkhane-G5 Sahel JF command, in order to
(police, gendarmery, national guard) to control enhance the counterterrorism response to
borders, curb illegal migration and contain violent extremist groups in the Liptako-Gourma
criminal activities.53 area.55 The plan was for initial operational
capability by the summer of 2020 and full
In January 2020, on the side-lines of the France-G5
operational capability by early 2021. Takuba – a
Sahel summit hosted by French President Macron
Tuareg word meaning “sabre” – will operate from
in Pau, with the participation of the Heads of State
Malian armed forces’ bases in Gao, Ansongo
of Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad,
and Ménaka, and relies on a 3A – assist, advise,
the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, as
accompany – rationale. Its mandate allows
well as the European Union’s and African Union’s
for advising, assisting, training and mentoring
high authorities, a new framework for political
regional armed forces and special forces, and
cooperation was announced. Proposed by the
strengthening local capacities to tackle terrorist
G5 Sahel and led by France, the “Coalition pour
and criminal activities. Some of the European
le Sahel” was based on four pillars – fight against
forces involved in the initiative, furthermore, will
terrorism; strengthening of national defence
be called to conduct direct counterterrorism
and security force capabilities; support for the
operations and reconnaissance missions under
redeployment of the state, the administrations
French leadership.56 However, the mechanisms
and basic services in the territory; development
of coordination with the other actors operating
actions – and promoted the adoption of an
in the area have not been defined yet, and the
integrated approach to address the multiple
details of how the command will be structured
dimensions of the Sahel crisis through political,
as well as the division of tasks within the force
social, development and military means,
are still under review. Belgium, Denmark,
coordinating and complementing the activities
Estonia, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden,
of the different actors on the ground.54
together with France, expressed the political will
The deployment of the Takuba task force falls to make military contributions to the force. The
within the first pillar of the Coalition for the Sahel. first European special operations forces to join
It was officially launched on 27 March, 2020: 11 France in Mali were Estonian units, followed by
European states – Belgium, Czech Republic, Czech and Swedish (150) ones, while Denmark
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the will keep its military commitment as of 2022.
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN | 18POLICY BRIEF Italy was not part of the political declaration, economic costs of Opération Barkhane.57 An but joined the task force later, answering the understanding between France and Italy was French call for European partners to share the probably reached in February, on the occasion burden of counterterrorism operations in the of an inter-governmental summit held in Naples, Sahel, in the face of the growing political and during which Italian Minister of Defence Guerini, ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN | 19
POLICY BRIEF
met his French counterpart, Florence Parly, status. As summarised by our respondents, the
probably discussing Italy's involvement in the list of priorities to be pursued in the area is clear
Takuba mission.58 and shared with our partners, and structures the
special framework in which Italy operates:
In June 2020, a Government decree authorising
international missions allowed Italian participation The need to guarantee security, the need
in the Takuba task force with 200 military units to control migrations, the need to protect
our Mediterranean border from terrorism
– reportedly from the 9th Parachute assault
and migrations, but also the necessity to
Regiment “Col Moschin”, the Navy's Operating re-orient our approach towards African
Group “Incursori” (GOI), the Special Intervention development ... have brought together
Group (GIS) of the Carabinieri, the Air Force's 17th the different countries [participating in the
Raiders Wing, and the 4th “Monte Cervino” Alpini multilateral initiatives in the Sahel] and
regiment59 – headquartered in Ansongo, 20 land persuaded us of the need to be there. We
are not the only ones, but we are those who
vehicles and 8 aircrafts – AW-129D Mangusta
have done the most.63
and UH-90 helicopters –, for a total cost of
€15.6 million. In particular, Italy’s contribution As suggested by the interviewees and reiterated
will consist of transport and medical evacuation in parliamentary debates and several official
helicopters, as well as training units in charge statements since 2016,64 contrasting and curbing
of accompany local forces, in coordination with irregular migration and fighting against terrorist
the other international partners operating in groups in the region are the two main concerns
the region.60 The first Italian units left for Mali behind the Italian strategic re-orientation
on 9 March 2021, as stated by Guerini,61 and full towards the Sahel. In this sense, the definition
operational capacity should be reached by the of national interests in the area emerges from
end of the year.62 the entanglement of foreign and domestic
considerations. The migration question has been
ENTANGLED INTERESTS: a dominant issue in the national political debate
WHY ITALY IS IN THE SAHEL TO STAY since 2015-16, and the urgency to manage
The Sahel has been the theatre for one of the most and reduce the flow of arrivals via the Central
significant new developments in Italian foreign Mediterranean Route has shaped the Italian
policy in the last decade. As a consequence of approach towards the Mediterranean, with Libya
the intersection of external shocks, domestic as the most evident case in point. At the same
pressures, and internal reorganisations, Italy is time, this domestic need has intercepted and
testing in the Sahel new approaches, instruments reinforced the recently developed move towards
and strategies for pursuing its national interest, Africa in Italian foreign and development policy
which is understood as much in terms of national circles, making the Sahel the perfect space for
security as domestic stability and international the merger of these two trajectories.
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN | 20POLICY BRIEF
The preeminence of the security concerns same policy initiatives and “solutions” to the
about the Sahel helps to explain the central role crisis identified by its European and international
the Ministry of Defence has played in favouring partners. In terms of diagnosis, the crisis in the
and defining Italian redeployment in the area. Sahel is interpreted primarily as a consequence
As demonstrated by the 2015 White Paper, the of the presumed interconnections between
very definition of “Enlarged Mediterranean” terrorist insurgencies and transnational criminal
and the opening of the third-and-a-half circle activities, ranging from drug and arms trafficking
emerged first in the defence circles of Italian to illegal migration. Within this context, the
policy-making. This was not only due to the institutional and material fragility of local states,
identification of new security threats from the and the porous borders of the region, provide
other side of Mare Nostrum, but also linked to the perfect framework for these destabilising
the recent reorganisation Italian defence policy, actors to reinforce their presence and further
with regards to the international deployment their activities, finally becoming a direct threat
and distribution of Italian military missions.65 to Europe. So, most of the international initiatives
In this sense, missions such as MISIN, or Italian implemented to tackle the Sahelian crisis have
involvement in Takuba, fit perfectly with the new focused their action on reinforcing the security
strategic thinking of Italy’s Ministry of Defence, capacities of local states. Border control and
aiming at reducing the Italian military presence the need to guarantee the redeployment of
globally while increasing its efforts in those the local states in their peripheral territories has
theatres considered as key for the security of Italy been a particular area of importance, with the
and its main allies. So, while Italian involvement in priority being to strengthen local security forces
the Sahel is now multidimensional, characterised and make them more ‘efficient’. These strategic
by the simultaneous deployment of diplomatic, paradigms and priorities clearly emerge in the
military, and development instruments, European Regional Action Plan for the Sahel, the
theMinistry of Defence still plays a major role in document which has informed the EU approach
translating the Italian engagement in the area to the Sahel for 2015-20.67 Nonetheless, the
into action. worsening of the conflicts in the region, and
worrisome events such as the military coups
As remarked by a former high-ranking official
in Mali in August 2020 and May 2021, illustrate
of the Italian Ministry of Defence, “defence
the limits of an approach that does not take
commitment is not enough, we need more
the political dimension of the crises in the area
coordinated engagement at the level of states
sufficiently into account, nor the breakdown
and development initiatives ... implemented
of the social contract, which characterises the
around specific areas of strategic interest”.66
relationship between Sahelian states and large
This points to the fact Italy's action in the Sahel
parts of their citizens:
tends to be aligned with and reproduces the
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN | 21POLICY BRIEF
In this moment, the priority is to maintain and German multilateral engagement, Italy is now
security against terrorism, criminality, and reinforcing its status as a potential driving force
the irregular flows of human beings […]
of European external action towards its southern
Nevertheless, we are aware that too many
border. Through their cooperation in the Sahel,
elections that seem democratic in Africa
are not. There is clearly an issue around the Italy and France are building increased mutual
effective democratic nature of the regimes trust, paving the way to develop coordinated
that we sustain: either we start to question and integrated action in other strategic theatres
ourselves about this problem ... or we keep – such as Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean –
on doing business as usual. ... We are now where they have competed until recently. More
containing the damages [but we would
generally, the new relation between Rome and
need a] sursaut civile – as stated during the
N’Djamena summit – to reconquer territory, Paris in the Sahel captures a larger trend pointing
public services, justice, schools, in those to a stronger partnership between the two
lands where they have been absent.68 countries – which are expected to sign the new
‘Quirinale treaty’ this year – aiming at indirectly
The recently published “European Union
strengthening European cohesion and common
Integrated Strategy for the Sahel”,69 along with
action, in line with Berlin’s expectations.
the launching of the Coalition for the Sahel,
suggest the international community, and the On the whole, Italy is showing new and enduring
European Union more specifically, are now ambitions in the Sahel. Nonetheless, its action
trying to rethink their engagement in the area, is hampered by the same limits that have
in order to take into account the root political characterised European involvement in the area
and governance causes which are transforming so far. The real challenge for the country and its
the crisis in the Sahel into a never-ending and partners will be to translate the new consensus
expanding multidimensional conflict. Italy's around the effective causes of the crisis in the
contribution to the various initiatives designed to Sahel into a sound and effective strategy and
transform the European approach towards the course of action.
Sahel shows that Rome sees its engagement in
the area as a deep, long-term involvement. ITALY IN THE SAHEL, A PATH FORWARD: POLICY
Aside from the security and domestic RECOMMENDATIONS
considerations, the European level is an additional Promote a human security approach among
indicator that Italy is in the Sahel to stay. As noted international actors involved in the Sahel. The
above, Italian initiatives in the area have also number of attacks against civilian populations
responded to the collateral need to restructure in the region has peaked. Violent extremist
Rome’s relationship with Paris and Berlin on groups and jihadi insurgents are not the only
specific foreign and security policy issues and parties responsible for this: state-sponsored self-
interests. Beside France’s counterterrorism efforts defence militias and national security forces are
ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN | 22POLICY BRIEF also to blame. Moreover, increasingly resorting peace agreements and favouring trust-building to remote warfare techniques by counterterrorist processes among local populations, in order to forces also feeds the risk of an ever-higher settle community-based conflicts that are often number of civilian casualties. Foreign military at the roots of insecurity. The Italian state can interventions should first and foremost address play a crucial role in preventing and managing the security of Sahelian populations: Italy must local-based conflicts, by acting as mediators advocate for revising the security approach of through the involvement of state actors, NGOs international partners to prioritise the protection and community representatives. of local populations over counterterrorism. Problematise the support ensured to electoral Set up higher quality standards of assessment for autocracies. Economic funds and political capacity-building missions. Italy is an important actor support provided to Sahelian regimes by the for capacity-building activities in the Sahel. However, European Union have too often been translated the lack of professionalism of national armed forces into tools for strengthening the grip on power of still remains a crucial issue. Coordinating with EU and ruling élites and illiberal forms of governance, US partners, Italy should put human rights protection without concretely addressing governance at the core of military and police training processes issues or development. Italy should encourage as a way to enhance trust between security forces a more critical approach by European partners, and local communities. effectively urging transparency and fairness in the Move beyond considering migration only as a use of funds, as well as the enhancement of local national security issue. To address migration governance processes and the implementation phenomena Italy should adopt a comprehensive of democratic practices. Moreover, it should be stance, reinforcing legal pathways of entry for made clear that ‘good governance’ cannot just be economic migrants and humanitarian corridors a label, but must be accompanied by concrete for asylum seekers. It is also important to take actions both by donors, which must stop their into account the potential for instability that unconditional support to allied regimes and their comes with security measures enforcing strict uncritical acceptance of electoral processes and regulations against human smugglers and outcomes, and by Sahelian states, which must be smuggling activities in the Sahel. Migration called upon to adopt accountability mechanisms policies, as well as local development plans, and respect rule of law principles. must be discussed at grassroots levels, engaging Support the implementation of the new EU state and local actors, civil society organisations Strategy, with its focus on governance and political and traditional authorities. accountability of local states and security forces, Foster local peacebuilding. Italy’s diplomacy and reinforce coordination with other European should recognise the importance of brokering partners. ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN | 23
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