ISSUE BRIEF COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: Lessons Learned for Tackling Far-Right Terrorism
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ISSUE BRIEF COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: Lessons Learned for Tackling Far-Right Terrorism JUNE 2021 thesoufancenter.org KEY FINDINGS • A l - Q a e d a a n d I S I S l eve ra ge d n ew • Successful counter-narra ve ini a ves and communications technologies and invested those u lizing strategic communica ons more resources in media capabilities to tools to challenge violent extremism and recruit, finance, and sow psychological fear terrorism have relied on a contextualized on an unprecedented level, recognizing the understanding of the target audience, and importance of strategic communications in on ensuring credible and resonant tandem with kinetic efforts. Far-right interlocutors that o er interven ons terrorists are now doing the same. tailored to speci c groups and places. • While Sala -jihadist groups and violent far- • While interna onal ini a ves to counter right extremist groups certainly di er in terrorist narra ves have largely targeted ideology and organiza on, important those of al-Qaeda, ISIS, and their a liates, similari es remain in their narra ves. Both they o er some important lessons learned premise their e orts on a quest for a for interna onal ac on to counter far-right racially or religiously pure community; use terrorist narra ves. of violence to achieve end goals; an - government sen ment; and espousal of • Recommenda ons include: adapt and intolerant and misogynis c narra ves. expand relevant UN ac vi es and measures to integrate responses to violent • Tradi onal stereotypes about men’s and far-right groups; ensure mul -stakeholder women’s roles shape the outreach of both responses that integrate gendered Sala st-jihadist and violent far-right groups dimensions; focus on proac ve posi ve to men and women; the same narra ves messaging; address some factors crea ng used to incen vize their support are also an enabling environment; respond early to o en ones that closely circumscribe their acts of violence; and strengthen public- roles in the organiza ons. private partnerships. 1 ft fi ti ff ti ti fi ti ti ti ti ti ti fi ff ti ti ti ff ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ffi ff ti ti ti ti ti ti
COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM INTRODUCTION In the two decades following the terrorist nancial resources into media capabili es to attacks of September 11, 2001, the international recruit, nance, and terrorize on an community has largely focused on countering unprecedented level,5 recognizing their the terrorist threat posed by groups like al- importance alongside ba le eld opera ons. Qaeda and later, the so-called Islamic State In April 2016, the o cial ISIS propaganda (ISIS), and their respec ve a liates around channel on the social media pla orm, the world.1 In addi on to e orts to degrade Telegram, shared a document called, "Media the groups and deny them control over Opera ve, You are a Mujahid, Too.” In it, territory and resources, policymakers and followers were instructed that pushing prac oners also turned to understanding propaganda is the same as gh ng and that the strategic communica ons of such groups media opera ons can be “more potent than and the narra ves they used to successfully atomic bombs.”6 The document lays out the radicalize and mobilize supporters.2 three elements of ISIS’s strategic narra ve: a posi ve narra ve on the group’s successes,7 The phenomenon itself is not new. Margaret counter-speech against cri cs and enemies, Thatcher famously spoke of terrorists’ need and weaponizing propaganda. for the “oxygen of publicity.”3 But al-Qaeda4 and ISIS leveraged new communica ons However, in recent years, there has also been technologies and invested human and increasing concern in many states about the 1This Issue Brief is part of a project examining the lessons learned from UN and interna onal counterterrorism e orts over the past two decades and their implica ons for interna onal e orts to address violent far right extremism and terrorism, with a par cular focus on strategic communica ons and narra ves, and terrorism nancing. The Soufan Center is grateful to the German Mission to the United Na ons for suppor ng this project. 2 “Countering Terrorist Narra ves,” European Parliament’s Policy Department for Ci zens’ Rights and Cons tu onal A airs, November 2017. h ps://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596829/ IPOL_STU(2017)596829_EN.pdf. 3Thatcher, Margaret. “Speech to the American Bar Associa on,” Margaret Thatcher Founda on, July 15, 1985. h ps://www.margare hatcher.org/document/106096. 4Burke, Jason. “How the changing media is changing terrorism.” The Guardian, February 25, 2016. h ps:// www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/25/how-changing-media-changing-terrorism. 5 Clarke, Colin and Charlie Winter. “The Islamic State May Be Failing, But Its Strategic Communica ons Legacy Is Here To Stay.” War on the Rocks, August 17, 2017. h ps://warontherocks.com/2017/08/the-islamic-state-may-be- failing-but-its-strategic-communica ons-legacy-is-here-to-stay/. 6Winter, Charlie. “What I Learned from Reading the Islamic State’s Propaganda Instruc on Manual.” Lawfare, April 2, 2017. h ps://www.lawfareblog.com/what-i-learned-reading-islamic-states-propaganda-instruc on-manual. 7Koerner, Brendan. “Why ISIS is Winning the Social Media War.” Wired, April 2016. h ps://www.wired.com/ 2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/. 2 fi fi ff tt ff ti ti ti ti tt fi ti ti ti tt ti tt ffi ti ti ti tt ti ff fi fi ti ffi ti ti ti tf ti ti ti ti tt ti ti ti ff ti ti tt ti ti ti ti ti ti ti tt ti ti
COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM rise of violent far-right extremist groups, For many states and international organizations many of which have similarly espoused the grappling with the complex challenges of use of terrorist tac cs. While a number of countering terrorist narra ves, both online groups have been recognized as domes c and o ine, an important objec ve has been threats, some are also forging transna onal to ensure that measures taken to counter linkages with likeminded groups and terrorist narra ves and prevent incitement individuals.8 As a result, a more internationalized do not themselves violate human rights violent far-right milieu is emerging, with obligations and curtail freedom of expression. individuals traveling to collaborate and train A common denominator in mobilizing together, including an ou low of ghters individuals to support terrorist groups has traveling to con ict zones like eastern been the experience, or percep on, of Ukraine to gain valuable combat experience.9 human rights viola ons at the hands of the state.11 Moreover, responses that constrain While these Sala -jihadist and violent far- freedom of expression can be seen as right extremist groups certainly di er in the furthering the very same goals that many specifics of their ideologies and organizational terrorist groups pursue, as well as reinforcing structures, signi cant similari es remain. their recruitment narra ves. Both premise their e orts on a quest for a racially or religiously pure community; a In his recent report on the implementa on of focus on the use of violence to achieve that the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, end goal; an -government sen ment; and Secretary-General Antonio Guterres reminded the espousal of misogynist, intolerant us that Member States have pledged to narra ves that deny individuals’ human counter “terrorism in all its forms and rights.10 For some within these groups, the manifesta ons.” He highlighted that “in the use of violence is not just a means to an end, face of a growing threat from racially, but an end in itself, ushering in widespread ethnically and ideologically mo vated right- con ict that will destroy progressive, wing and white supremacist groups that mul cultural socie es and lead to more resort to terrorist tac cs, it is cri cal that racially or religiously segregated ethno- Member States continue to strongly condemn states. acts of terrorism targe ng individuals on the basis of or in the name of race, ethnicity, religion or belief.”12 While the UN Global 8 “White Supremacy Extremism: The Transna onal Rise of the Violent White Supremacist Movement.” The Soufan Center, September 2019. h ps://thesoufancenter.org/research/white-supremacy-extremism-the-transna onal- rise-of-the-violent-white-supremacist-movement/. 9 Ibid. 10See for example: Miller-Idriss, Cynthia. Hate in the Homeland: The New Global Far Right. 2020; “White Supremacy Extremism: The Transna onal Rise of the Violent White Supremacist Movement.” The Soufan Center. 11“Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incen ves and the Tipping Point for Recruitment.” United Na ons Development Programme (UNDP), 2017. h ps://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/en. 12“Ac vi es of the United Na ons system in implemen ng the United Na ons Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Report of the Secretary-General.” United Na ons: O ce of the Secretary-General, January 29, 2021. h ps:// digitallibrary.un.org/record/3902203?ln=en. 3 ti fl ti ti ffl ti ti ti ti fi fi fl ti ti ti ff tt ti ti ti ti ti tf ti ti ti ti ff tt ti ti ti ti ti fi ti ti ti ffi ti ti ti tt ti ti
COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM Counter-Terrorism Strategy is notable for being a consensus document re ec ng a AL-QAEDA collec ve view of all states as represented in the United Na ons – an unusually unifying document that serves an important role in Al-Qaeda’s media produc on was ini ally se ng out the norma ve direc on for many considered sophis cated, both aesthe cally UN en es and states – the UN can and and historically. Several leaders have set the should do more. tone for this priori za on of strategic communica ons. Osama bin Laden was Beyond condemna on, the UN also has the considered by many as far more inspira onal, poten al to inform the legal and policy consistent in the themes he sought to responses of states on issues like preven ng convey, and overall more “on-message” than terrorist nancing, developing the legal and al-Qaeda’s current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, criminal jus ce framework necessary to who is frequently characterized as long- address terrorism, and sharing lessons winded and pedan c. In his book, The learned and providing capacity-building Management of Savagery, al-Qaeda strategist assistance, all of which can be cri cal in and ideologue Abu Bakr Naji stressed the ensuring a role for the UN in addressing importance of the media in destroying the evolving terrorist threats.13 Moreover, a United States’ image while also building the mul -pronged e ort can have cascading self-con dence of Muslims worldwide.14 e ects that a enuate terrorist groups and However, over me its messages have been accordingly, dilute the power of terrorist seen as increasingly wide-ranging and narra ves. unfocused. This Issue Brief will examine the strategic Al-Qaeda’s narra ves addressed myriad communica ons of terrorist and violent issues that many in the Arab and Muslim extremist groups, looking at some of the worlds were passionate about, including the speci c developments regarding al-Qaeda libera on of Pales ne, the U.S. occupa on of and ISIS and the evolving narra ves and Iraq, and the corrup on of governments and communica ons tac cs of far-right terrorists. regimes throughout the Middle East and The brief will conclude by offering some South Asia that al-Qaeda labeled as lessons learned and experiences from both apostates. This also included violence state and UN responses. perpetrated on the ummah, or community of Muslims, including against women and girls in con ict zones. In many ways, al-Qaeda’s ideology re ects its self-percep on as a defender and vanguard of the global ummah. 13See for example the work of UN Counter-Terrorism Commi ee Execu ve Directorate (CTED) and UN O ce of Counter-Terrorism (OCT). 14 Naji, Abu Bakr. “The Management of Savagery.” Transla on accessed via John M. Olin Ins tute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. h ps://www.narra vespace.net/uploads/1/1/7/9/117904861/ management_of_savagery.pdf 4 ff tti ti fi ti ti ti ti fl ti fi ti fi ti ti ti fl ti tt ti ti ff ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti tt ti ti ti ti fl ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti tt ti ti ffi
COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM In declaring jihad, bin Laden argued that the West – and par cularly the United States – ISLAMIC STATE was hos le to Islam and that the only way to respond to this aggression was with force or violence. In essence, the core of al-Qaeda’s Islamic State, or ISIS,16 took advantage of narra ve is individual jihad fused with social media to disseminate its narra ves and collec ve revenge.15 messaging far beyond what al-Qaeda was ever able to achieve. Despite the a en on Al-Qaeda has always maintained an a orded to its execu on videos, ISIS actually impressive awareness of the targets and produced much more material, and on a audiences it seeks to in uence with its broader range of topics, than what is covered messaging. Understanding that terrorism is in the mainstream media. ISIS propaganda is poli cally and/or ideologically mo vated centered on three major themes: violence, the raison d’etre of al-Qaeda’s violence is not, as some have suggested, • ISIS restored the caliphate, which makes simply hatred for American values and the it the only authen c Islamic state in the American way of life – although, to be sure, world and thus worthy of poli cal Western values are certainly inimical to the legi macy. Sala -jihadist pla orm. Rather, al-Qaeda • Any exis ng Islamic en ty (state or a acks the West to change policies and set in nonstate) that does not recognize the mo on social and poli cal responses that group’s authority quali es as an apostate advance their strategic objec ves. As such, and must be vanquished. al-Qaeda consistently sought to warn, • ISIS is more capable than al-Qaeda ever in midate, and cajole Western publics, was and con nues to grow as an viewed by al-Qaeda as “neutrals,” that the organiza on and an ideology. ac ons of their governments were the reason they were being targeted. ISIS revolu onized terrorists’ use of social media for a variety of purposes – such as solici ng nancing, recrui ng ghters, establishing the poli cal legi macy of its proto-state, and ins lling fear in its adversaries.17 The group also used social media to amplify the impact of and fear 15Bin Laden, Osama. ”Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” World Islamic Front Statement, February 23, 1998. h ps://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm. 16There is wide varia on in how states and interna onal actors reference this group, including ISIS, ISIL, Da’esh, and IS; the formal UN designa on is ISIL/Da’esh. 17Clarke, Colin and Charlie Winter. “The Islamic State May Be Failing, But Its Strategic Communica ons Legacy Is Here To Stay.” War on the Rocks. 5 tt tt ff ti ti ti ti ti fi ti ti ti ti ti ti ti fi ti ti ti ti tf ti ti fi ti ti ti ti fl ti ti ti ti fi ti tt ti ti ti ti
COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM from its acts of violence – such as through apostate regimes in the Middle East or distribu on of propaganda images of morally bankrupt socie es in Western destruction of a temple in Palmyra18 and a 22- na ons, Muslims who join ISIS are told that minute video of a Jordanian pilot burning they can enjoy an ideal Islamic community, alive in a cage.19 and those who resist this call will be eliminated. This vision is furthered by videos Of all the narra ves propagated by ISIS, the that focus on the caliphate as a benevolent establishment and implementa on of the state commi ed to public works and Islamic caliphate was a unique selling point, as it welfare, which extends a lifeline to retains historical and religious resonance for vulnerable individuals who feel marginalized the broader Muslim ummah and harkens or under-resourced by their governing back to Islam’s Golden Age. Where al- authori es. Qaeda’s narra ve focused on individual jihad, global policy changes, and the crea on of a The image of the Islamic State as a specialized “Delta Force” of terrorist ghters, benevolent and inclusive society was boosted ISIS narra ves focused on its state-building by the presence of women who traveled to project. ISIS therefore adopted a broader and the con ict zones in the Levant and more inclusive approach, deliberately encouraged others to, as well. In successive targe ng women, youth, and individuals who waves of foreign terrorist ghters (FTFs) could contribute to this new endeavor in traveling to support ISIS, unprecedented in its myriad ways, besides gh ng. 20 ISIS scale and scope, nearly 20% of those who a empted to communicate to all its poten al traveled were women – some going recruits the core narra ve that its caliphate is voluntarily, others under duress, and some a triumphant, model society. for a complex mix of reasons. Unlike al- Qaeda, ISIS recognized the importance of In addi on to the extraordinary achievement including women in its state-building of ISIS in establishing territorial control on an enterprise and created an invi ng narra ve unprecedented scale, the group was also for a wide range of people to contribute to notable for mobilizing a historic ou low of this endeavor. The presence of gures, like a individuals and even families – approximately Bri sh woman who traveled to Syria and 40,000 people from more than 110 countries went by the name Umm Layth (mother of – to join the group.21 The group’s slogan is lions), was associated with persuading and Baqiya wa Tatamaddad (Remaining and mobilizing young women to leave the West Expanding). Rather than living under 18 Curry, Andrew. “Here Are the Ancient Sites ISIS Has Damaged and Destroyed.” Na onal Geographic, September 1, 2015. h ps://www.na onalgeographic.com/history/ar cle/150901-isis-destruc on-loo ng-ancient-sites-iraq- syria-archaeology. “Jordan pilot hostage Moaz al-Kasasbeh 'burned alive'” BBC, February 3, 2015. h ps://www.bbc.com/news/ 19 world-middle-east-31121160. 20Fink, Naureen Chowdhury and Benjamin Sugg. “A Tale of Two Jihads: Comparing the al-Qaeda and ISIS Narra ves.” Interna onal Peace Ins tute: The Global Observatory, February 9, 2015. h ps:// theglobalobservatory.org/2015/02/jihad-al-qaeda-isis-counternarra ve/. 21“Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees.” The Soufan Center, October 2017. h ps:// thesoufancenter.org/research/beyond-caliphate/. 6 tt ti ti ti ti ti ti tt ti fl ti tt ti ti ti ti ti ti fi ti fi ti fi ti ti ti tf fi ti ti ti ti ti tt ti tt ti tt
COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM and join ISIS.22 This messaging was cri cal to compete with the informa on widely VIOLENT FAR-RIGHT available about ISIS’s treatment of women and girls, par cularly those belonging to the EXTREMIST GROUPS Yazidi community, and their horri c prac ces of sexual slavery and brutal gender-based Violent far-right extremist groups, and violence.23 par cularly white supremacy extremists, espouse narra ves similar in many ways to Although ISIS sought to appeal to women, those propagated by al-Qaeda and ISIS. Both the appeal was centered fundamentally on sets of groups advocate the use of extreme gendered stereotypes. Women were violence and create a worldview of “them” encouraged to assume roles centered on versus “us” to jus fy it. While ISIS ghts for a family or acceptable professional roles which religiously pure caliphate, several white might be required to provide educa onal or supremacy extremist and neo-Nazi groups medical services in the so-called caliphate. espouse the idea of a separate ethno-state Beyond the roles of women in the domes c for whites, a “utopian” community based on sphere, the gendered narra ves adopted by racial and ethnic purity and adapta ons of ISIS included an appeal to young men based Nordic or Northern European myths, folklore, on no ons of masculinity associated with and histories.25 tradi onal roles as ghters, patriarchs, and poli cal and public leaders. Incen vizing There is also a common element of violence foreign ghters with the appeal of sex slaves driven by misogyny and intolerance, together – many minors and children – further with a concep on of gendered roles along reinforced toxic no ons of masculinity within the lines of tradi onal stereotypes, with ISIS outreach.24 women’s ideal roles portrayed as being within the domes c sphere.26 Just as groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda see gender equality as represen ng the oppression of women, far- right terrorists view themselves as vic ms of organized state feminism. A acks on women and girls perceived as members of the pure “in-group” have also been important stories 22Hoyle, Carolyn, Alexandra Bradford, and Ross Frene . “Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS.” Ins tute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015. h ps://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ ISDJ2969_Becoming_Mulan_01.15_WEB.pdf. Callimachi, Rukmini. “ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape.” New York Times, August 13, 2015. h ps:// 23 www.ny mes.com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theology-of-rape.html. 24 Taylor, Lin. “From Boko Haram to Islamic State, sex slavery and tra cking fund extremism: report.” Reuters, October 9, 2017. h ps://www.reuters.com/ar cle/us-global-slavery-extremists/from-boko-haram-to-islamic-state- sex-slavery-and-tra cking-fund-extremism-report-idUSKBN1CE1I3. 25“White Na onalist.” Southern Poverty Law Center. h ps://www.splcenter.org/ gh ng-hate/extremist- les/ ideology/white-na onalist. 26Darby, Seyward. “The Rise of the Valkyries.” Harper’s Magazine, September 2017. h ps://harpers.org/archive/ 2017/09/the-rise-of-the-valkyries/. 7 ti ti ti ti ti ti fi ti ti ti ti ti ti tt ffi ti ti ti ti fi tt ti ti tt fi fi ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti tt tt ffi fi ti tt tt fi
COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM for the narra ves of violent extremist groups; For violent far-right groups, the use of in the a ermath of the January 6 insurrec on violence is o en portrayed as a means to an at the U.S. Capitol, for example, the death of end, namely accelera ng an apocalyp c Ashli Babbi was used by white supremacy societal breakdown and allowing for a more extremists as a rallying cry to others.27 racially and ethnically pure society to emerge from its ashes. It is, however, some mes also An element common to the communica ons the end in itself: a violent society that can of both kinds of groups is “propaganda of the impose segrega on and protect a pure elite deed,” with the message conveyed by ac ons group. Just as ISIS and al-Qaeda drew on the making up an important component of Management of Savagery and used violence strategic communica ons. For al-Qaeda, this to communicate, terrorize, and create a state was the a acks of September 11, 2001, of constant insecurity that they could exploit, whereas for ISIS it was the claim to revive the so too have many violent right-wing groups caliphate. Both groups exploited the glori ed violence. communica ve power of destruc on, whether it was the imagery of the burning World Trade Center or the destruc on of cultural heritage sites like Palmyra. POLICY RESPONSES Meanwhile, far-right terrorists within the United States and in other countries pointed to the storming of the Capitol as an Governments and interna onal organiza ons achievement that could be later replicated. In have mounted an extensive e ort to counter Germany, for example, in late August 2020, terrorist narratives, including the development hundreds of far-right ac vists in Berlin of counter-narra ve libraries,29 regional a empted, but failed, to overrun police and hubs,30 and dedicated ini a ves via the storm the Reichstag (German parliament). United Na ons, the Global Counter-Terrorism While that a empt in Germany was a failure, Forum, and the Global Coali on Against the successful storming of the Capitol in the Daesh. However, the e ec veness of such United States appears to have provided a ini a ves has been di cult to measure boost and inspira on to a range of far-right empirically, and long-term success remains groups in Europe.28 elusive. While these have been largely targeted at the narra ves of al-Qaeda, ISIS, and their a liates, they o er some 27 Bergengruen, Vera. “'Our First Martyr.' How Ashli Babbi Is Being Turned Into a Far-Right Recrui ng Tool.” TIME, January 10, 2021. h ps:// me.com/5928249/ashli-babbi -capitol-extremism/. 28Bennhold, Katrin and Michael Schwirtz. “Capitol Riot Puts Spotlight on ‘Apocalyp cally Minded’ Global Far Right.” New York Times, January 24, 2021. h ps://www.ny mes.com/2021/01/24/world/europe/capitol-far-right- global.html. 29 “Dounter Narra ve Library.” Hedayah. 30“UAE & US Launch Sawab Center – New Digital Communica ons Hub to Counter Extremist Propaganda.” United Arab Emirates and United States: Sawab Center. h ps://www.uae-embassy.org/news-media/uae-us-launch-sawab- center-%E2%80%93-new-digital-communica ons-hub-counter-extremist-propaganda. 8 tt ti fi ti ft ti tt tt tt ft ti ti ffi ti ti tt ti ti ti ti ti ti ff ffi ti ti ti ti ff tt ti ti ff ti ti ti ti ti ti ti tt ti ti ti tt tt ti ti ti
COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM important lessons learned for countering far- extremism in all its manifestations, with a right terrorist narra ves. focus on early prevention and cross-sectoral cooperation.33 For example, Norway's current Within the UN, Security Council Resolution action plan against radicalization involves nine 1624 (2005), co-penned by the United government industries and several civil society Kingdom and Russia,31 called on states to organizations. They have developed the same prohibit incitement to terrorism and the broad approach in their current effort to glorification of terrorist acts. This resolution is develop a national counterterrorism strategy. applicable to all types of extremism and not Although their policies are directed at all limited to al-Qaeda or ISIS, and as such, it forms of extremism, they continuously assess should be employed to combat far-right whether new measures are needed to address violence, as well. Furthermore, UN Security developing challenges, such as differences in Council Resolution 2354 (2017) emphasizes terrorist financing between far-right and the importance of credible interlocutors and a jihadist extremism. Norway has also grappled whole-of-society approach, while also with the challenge of balancing between highligh ng the right to freedom of expression illegal content online and freedom of speech; in Article 19 of the International Covenant on hate speech is prohibited and punishable by Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) adopted by law, but it continues to be a challenge to draw the General Assembly in 1966. It calls for any a line between illegal hate speech and restrictions on the freedom of expression to protected political speech. be those provided by law and necessary on the grounds set out in paragraph 3 of Article In Belgium, meanwhile, the Central Unit for 19 of the ICCPR. Moreover, the resolution Threat Analysis (CUTA) examines the influence highlights the UN Comprehensive Framework, of conspiracy theories on individuals or which compiles good practices and groups likely to commit extremist or terrorist recommendations for ensuring a multi- acts. In addi on to violent-far right and stakeholder response that is at once credible radical Islamic extremism, CUTA has followed and sustainable. 32 the emergence of more broadly an - government movements without a poli cal Several national governments have also or ideological a lia on, such as violent adopted domestic measures to counter protests against COVID-19 restric ons or terrorist narratives. Ten years after the far- threats against virologists. Belgium has also right terrorist attacks in Oslo and Utøya that focused on the role of conspiracy theories and killed seventy-seven people, mostly youth, misinformation, par cularly during mes of Norway has developed a whole-of-society crisis. The Belgian government has further approach to combat all forms of violent noted the importance of clear communica on 31“UN Security Council Resolu on 1624.” United Na ons Security Council, 2005. h ps://undocs.org/S/RES/ 1624(2005). 32“UN Security Council Resolu on 2354.” United Na ons Security Council, 2017. h ps://undocs.org/S/RES/ 2354(2017). 33“22 July Breivik Commission Report,” Norwegian Parliament, August 13, 2012. h ps://www.regjeringen.no/ contentassets/bb3dc76229c64735b4f6eb4dbfcdbfe8/en-gb/pdfs/nou2012_14_eng.pdf; Remarks by Kris n Hemmer Morkestol, Director of the Sec on for Na onal Security for the Norwegian Ministry of Jus ce, in The Soufan Center webinar, April 28, 2021. 9 ti ti ti ti ffi ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti tt tt tt
COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM from authori es, the removal of hate speech This range of approaches o ers a glimpse and extremist content online, and counter into the array of policy and programma c narratives that offer an alternative to extremist solu ons available to counter terrorist propaganda.34 narra ves in order to tackle a range of ideological threats. Nor is it only governments genera ng policy responses; public-private partnerships play an important role. Moonshot CVE – recently rebranded as Moonshot with an expanded RECOMMENDATIONS remit – is an organiza on based in London and Washington, D.C. that works with governments, tech companies, and the 1. Strengthen the evidence base: Within the interna onal community to respond to UN system, ensure that en es like the violent extremism and a range of other Counter-Terrorism Commi ee Execu ve online harms. Moonshot has experimented Directorate (CTED), O ce of Counter- with non-ideological interven ons and has Terrorism (UNOCT), and O ce on Drugs found that extremist audiences are more and Crime (UNODC) are taking into recep ve to these than explicit counter account the threats posed by all terrorist narra ves that a empt to undermine and violent extremist groups in terms of extremist ideologies. For instance, it found in their assessment and capacity-building two related tests that white supremacist and partnerships with states. Increase Islamist extremist audiences were 48% and a en on to the threats posed by far-right 47% more likely, respec vely, to engage with terrorists, including racially and ethnically self-help or mental health content compared mo vated violent extremists. to the general public.35 Their messaging centered around feelings of loneliness, A. UN en es should increase focus on thereby mimicking the tac cs of extremist supporting states to advance implementation groups that a empt to reach individuals who of resolu ons 1624 and 2354, including feel alienated from wider society and the Comprehensive Framework, and marginalized or discriminated against. encourage states to report on these Moonshot has pioneered various types of measures in their brie ngs to the non-ideological messaging, including de- Counter-Terrorism Commi ee following escala on and psychosocial messaging, such assessment visits. as the “redirect” method that diverts individuals searching for extremist content B. The UN O ce of Counter-Terrorism online. These have encountered early success (UNOCT) and the UN Counter-Terrorism and suggest new paths forward for Center (UNCCT) should expand the governmental and intergovernmental scope of programs rela ng to PVE and bodies.36 strategic communica ons to include violent far-right groups, and support 34Remarks by Karl Dhaene, Director Counterterrorism for the Ministry of Foreign A airs of Belgium, in The Soufan Center webinar, April 28, 2021. 35 Remarks by Vidhya Ramalingam, Founder of Moonshot CVE, in The Soufan Center webinar, April 28, 2021. 36 Moonshot. “The Redirect Method.” h ps://moonsho eam.com/redirect-method/. 10 tt ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ffi ti tt tt ti ti ti ti ffi tt fi tt ffi ti ti ff ti ti tt ti ti ti tt ff
COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM states in developing responses that credible messaging and reliable information. focus on mul ple forms of terrorism. Consider di eren al impacts and analyses and ensure inclusive policy development C. More resources should be allo ed to and implementa on, taking into account measurement, assessment, and evaluation, the o en under-addressed roles and needs so UN en es can have a be er of women and girls. Many civil society understanding of the impact of counter organiza ons oriented toward women and narra ves and whether they are youth may have less opportunity to inform achieving their intended objec ves. and engage in policy development and implementa on; proac ve outreach will 2. Deliver targeted responses: Projects be necessary, though not su cient, and focused on counterterrorism and countering must be considered in conjunc on with a violent extremism need to be tailored to comprehensive strategy. context and not broadly generalized. Moreover, they should focus on o ering 4. Pay attention to acts of violence and posi ve and alterna ve narratives statements of intent: Take early ac on to presented by credible interlocutors. Counter- note trends in inten ons of commi ng narra ves should stress posi ve aspects violence or a willingness to perpetrate acts and be centered on achievements, of violence or encourage others to do so. opportunities, and work, rather than Groups that have declared inten ons to adopting the traditional approach of merely commit violence, already commi ed questioning or challenging ISIS’s claims violence, or explicitly incited supporters to without providing an alterna ve. commit violence will need to be iden ed and addressed at early stages; countering A. Violent right-wing groups have u lized their narratives early on will be key. spor ng events, such as mixed mar al Governments and communi es should be arts (MMA) tournaments and concerts prepared to intervene proac vely to to reach out to supporters and new counter narra ves from extremist groups recruits; counter-narratives and prevention that glorify violence and incite terrorist e orts should increase focus on the use acts. of sport, arts, and culture37 to create more inclusive opportuni es to bring 5. Address crises and enabling environments: together communi es, especially youth, Successful strategic communica ons need to create posi ve alterna ves. to close the “say-do” gap; there needs to be visible and tangible e orts to match the 3. Ensure the par cipa on of relevant rhetoric with ac on. Governments and stakeholders: Local communi es, women, interna onal actors need to work to tackle youth, civil society organiza ons, local the enabling environment that contributes government, and the private sector should to and fosters extremism, including the all be involved in project development COVID-19 pandemic, related public health from the beginning stages to ensure measures, and shor alls in alloca ons of 37Fink, Naureen Chowdhury, Ra a Bhulai, Wedad Alhassen, and Sara Zeiger. “Thinking Outside the Box Exploring the Cri cal Roles of Sports, Arts, and Culture in Preven ng Violent Extremism.” Global Center on Coopera ve Security, February 2015. h ps://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2015/02/15Feb17_SAC_Brief_Hedayah_GlobalCenter.pdf 11 ff ti ti ft ti ti ti ti ti ff ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti tf tt ti ti ti ff ti ti fi ti ti ti ti ti ti ffi ti ti ti tt ti ti ti ti ti ff tt ti ti tti tt fi ti ti
COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM public services. In addi on, greater ins tu ons and payment pla orms, emphasis must be placed on resolving organizations like Moonshot, local businesses, con icts that both drive and provide and civil society organiza ons can all opportuni es for extremism, as well as on contribute to countering narra ves and addressing the threats of disinforma on ac ons from extremist groups; examples and conspiracy theories that create an include communi es u lizing the private enabling environment for and normalization sector to limit violent right-wing groups’ of extremist narratives. Proactive messaging access to venues, proper es, or services about the posi ve work being supported needed to promote their violent objectives. by states and others to address these It will be important to work with bodies issues, whether via the UN, development like the Global Internet Forum to Counter assistance, or diplomacy, should be Terrorism (GIFCT) and technology companies to increased.38 increase cooperation between the public and private sectors. Informal intergovernmental 6. Enhance public-private partnerships (PPPs): groups like the Christchurch Call also provide an This collabora on is key to connec ng important platform for collective international communi es, businesses, and local and action to research and engage on preventing na onal level governments in order to far-right terrorism. most e ciently align resources, exper se, and access toward shared objec ves. Social media and tech companies, nancial Related Event On April 28, 2021, The Soufan Center, in partnership with the Permanent Missions of Germany, Belgium, Norway, and Tunisia to the United Na ons, hosted a webinar en tled, “Countering Terrorist Narra ves & Strategic Communica ons: Comparing the Violent Far-Right with ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida.” The discussions therein directly informed the further research The Soufan Center thanks developed in this Issue Brief. the German Mission to the United Na ons for their support and partnership on this project. Watch the Event 38See for example: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury and Jack Barclay. “Mastering the Narra ve: Counterterrorism Strategic Communica on and the United Na ons.” Center on Global Counterterrorism Coopera on, 2013. h ps:// www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Feb2013_CT_StratComm.pdf. 12 ti ti ti ti fl ffi ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti fi tf ti ti ti ti ti ti ti tt
COUNTERING TERRORIST NARRATIVES & STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FOR TACKLING FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM ABOUT TSC: The Soufan Center (TSC) is an independent non-profit center offering research, analysis, and strategic dialogue on global security challenges and foreign policy issues, with a particular focus on counterterrorism, violent extremism, armed conflict, and the rule of law. Our work is underpinned by a recognition that human rights and human security perspectives are critical to developing credible, effective, and sustainable solutions. TSC fills a niche role by producing objective and innovative reports and analyses, and fostering dynamic dialogue and exchanges, to effectively equip governments, international organizations, the private sector, and civil society with key resources to inform policies and practice. www.thesoufancenter.org 13
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