Issue 1348 11 January 2019 - Department of Defense
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Issue 1348 11 January 2019
// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1348 //
Feature Report
“Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States As Identified by Federal Agencies”.
Published by U.S. Government Accountability Office; Dec. 13, 2018
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-204SP
Threats to U.S. national security continue to evolve with technological, economic, and social
changes.
Federal agencies identified 26 long-term threats within 4 categories:
1) Adversaries' Political and Military Advancements—e.g., China's increasing ability to match the
U.S. military's strength.
2) Dual-Use Technologies—e.g., self-driving cars might be developed for private use, but militaries
can use them too.
3) Weapons—advances in weapons technology, e.g., cyberweapons.
4) Events and Demographic Changes—e.g., infectious disease outbreaks.
Issue No. 1320
22 June 2018
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Smith, Inhofe Clash on Nukes (Arms Control Today)
[Rep. Adam] Smith has indicated that he plans to oppose continued funding to develop and field the two
new, low-yield nuclear capabilities proposed by the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] report.
DOE Affirms Plans to Use SRS Plutonium for Pit Production in New Mexico (Aiken Standard)
In a document filed Jan. 4 in Nevada district court, the DOE explained 1 metric ton of plutonium — in pit
form at SRS — will eventually be sent to Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico where it will be
remanufactured into "new pits."
US COUNTER-WMD
Lockheed Upgrading Radar Systems for Hypersonic Threats (National Defense)
The U.S. military faces not only asymmetric threats — as characterized by warfare fought in Afghanistan
and Iraq — but those from near-peer competitors such as Russia and China, said Paul Lemmo, vice
president and general manager of Lockheed Martin’s integrated warfare systems and sensors division.
“Scavenger” Molecule Prevents Nerve Agent Poisoning in Animals (American Association for the
Advancement of Science)
For the first time, researchers have created a molecule that provides long-lasting preventative protection
against toxic nerve agents in rodents.
US ARMS CONTROL
Iran, Islamic State on Agenda as Pompeo Visits Middle East (VOA)
"We're actually going to set a policy that's actually going to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons,"
Pompeo told reporters traveling with him.
Stakes Grow for Possible Trump-Kim Summit (Arms Control Today)
North Korea reiterated that denuclearization of the Korean peninsula must include removal of U.S. nuclear
weapons in the region, a statement that underscores that diplomatic advances in 2019 will require
addressing simultaneously North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its security concerns.
COMMENTARY
North Korea May Be Willing to Begin Denuclearization, and Trump Should Make a Deal
(Brookings)
North Korea experts like Jonathan Pollack and Jung Pak have documented how unlikely Kim would be to
give up all his nuclear bombs (U.S. intelligence estimates he has as many as 60 by now).
New House, New Vision for America’s Nuclear Weapons? (The Hill)
… These developments point to a dangerous future, one where nuclear conflict is looking increasingly
likely.
The EU Should Tackle Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program (Atlantic Council)
The US contends that Iranian ballistic missile proliferation and testing has increased since the JCPOA.
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Arms Control Today (Washington, D.C.)
Smith, Inhofe Clash on Nukes
By Kingston Reif
Jan. 8, 2019
The incoming chairmen of the House and Senate armed services committees ended 2018 by trading
blows on nuclear weapons policy, presaging what is poised to be a contentious fight between
Democrats and Republicans on the issue during the 116th Congress.
Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.) has long maintained that the United States has more nuclear weapons
than it needs for its security and can reasonably afford. This has raised the ire of Sen. James Inhofe
(R-Okla.), who has expressed strong support for the Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) report and its emphasis on augmenting the role of nuclear weapons and developing
new nuclear capabilities. (See ACT, March 2018.)
At a November event in Washington hosted by Ploughshares Fund, Smith called for putting U.S.
nuclear policy on a different path by reducing the size and cost of the arsenal, renegotiating the
1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, extending the 2010 New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (New START), adopting a no-first-use policy, and forswearing new, low-yield
nuclear weapons.
President Donald Trump has declared his intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty in February if
Russia does not return to compliance with the agreement and has yet to decide whether to extend
New START by up to five years as allowed by the treaty.
In response to Smith’s comments, Inhofe told reporters that rebuilding the nuclear arsenal “is the
most important area of” upgrading the military.
“I don’t know why Smith or anyone else would single out nuclear modernization as an area to cut,”
Inhofe said. “That allows someone who’s not otherwise a formidable opponent to destroy the
United States of America.”
Smith quickly fired back, lamenting “that Senator Inhofe seems to want to…publicly question my
intelligence and publicly question my ability to adequately lead the committee.”
As a result of the midterm elections on Nov. 6, Democrats gained 40 seats and retook control of the
House of Representatives. As chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Smith will have a
platform to conduct aggressive oversight of the Trump administration’s nuclear policy and
spending proposals, especially through the annual national defense authorization process.
The annual bill, which has been passed and enacted each year for 58 years in a row, establishes
spending ceilings and legal guidelines for Defense Department programs and the activities
conducted by the Energy Department’s semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA).
Smith has indicated that he plans to oppose continued funding to develop and field the two new,
low-yield nuclear capabilities proposed by the NPR report. Those are a low-yield warhead option
for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a new sea-launched cruise missile.
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In addition, Smith appears likely to question the rationale for developing new fleets of nuclear-
armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles and expanding
the NNSA’s capability to develop new nuclear warheads.
Such actions by Smith would set up a clash with the Republican-controlled Senate Armed Services
Committee, which will strongly support the Trump plans under Inhofe.
Although Smith and Inhofe will have considerable say over the direction of U.S. nuclear policy,
congressional appropriators wield the most power over funding decisions.
During the first two years of the Trump administration, not only has the Republican-controlled
Congress backed the administration’s hefty budget requests for nuclear modernization, but in some
cases it has increased funding above the requested levels. (See ACT, November 2018.)
Congress largely supported the Obama administration’s spending plans as well, but not without
controversy. For example, the Democratic-controlled Senate Appropriations Committee sought to
scale back NNSA plans for the B61 mod 12 life extension program (LEP) in 2013 and block funding
for the W80-4 ALCM warhead LEP in 2014. Both efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. (See ACT,
January/February 2015.)
While Smith and Inhofe were drawing their own personal battle lines, other lawmakers closed out
2018 by issuing additional partisan salvos in response to the Trump administration’s NPR and
intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty.
In a Nov. 29 letter led by Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), 25 Republican senators urged Trump to think twice
before supporting an extension of New START due to Russia’s violation of several international
agreements, the imbalance posed by Russia’s development and modernization of nuclear
capabilities unlimited by arms control agreements, and the growth of China’s nuclear arsenal. The
letter added “that continued funding of the U.S. strategic modernization program, including for low-
yield warhead options, as proposed in your [NPR], is critical in the face of dangerous international
security developments since the New START was ratified.”
Two weeks later, on Dec. 13, 26 Democratic senators called on the president to address Russia’s
violations of the INF Treaty instead of unilaterally withdrawing from the agreement and for him to
extend New START.
“A collapse of the INF Treaty and failure to renew New START would lead to the absence of
verifiable limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces for the first time since the early 1970,” the letter
said.
The Democratic senators added that the administration’s “proposed new types of nuclear weapons
threaten the bipartisan consensus that investments in the U.S. nuclear weapons deterrent and
supporting infrastructure must be accompanied by pursuit of continued arms control measures.”
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-01/news/smith-inhofe-clash-nukes
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Aiken Standard (Aiken, S.C.)
DOE Affirms Plans to Use SRS Plutonium for Pit Production in New Mexico
By Colin Demarest
Jan. 7, 2019
The U.S. Department of Energy has again confirmed its plans to use plutonium currently stored at
the Savannah River Site for nuclear weapons purposes.
In a document filed Jan. 4 in Nevada district court, the DOE explained 1 metric ton of plutonium —
in pit form at SRS — will eventually be sent to Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico
where it will be remanufactured into "new pits."
Doing so will further the National Nuclear Security Administration's longterm stockpile work,
according to the same court document.
Plutonium pits are nuclear weapon cores, often referred to as triggers.
NNSA Chief of Staff William "Ike" White in a Nov. 20 letter, which was made public via other court
filings, described the weapons-grade plutonium stored at SRS as "mission-essential" and integral to
nation's defense enterprise.
"This material will ultimately be used for vital national security missions and is not waste," White
wrote, later adding: "We will keep you updated on our progress as the pit production mission
moves forward."
His skepticism, he explained, stems from the NNSA's "inconsistent track record with major
projects."
White's letter was sent to Nevada government officials. Before the plutonium is relocated to Los
Alamos, the nation's plutonium science and production center of excellence, it will be staged at
either the Nevada National Security Site or the Pantex Plant in Texas, according to the NNSA.
The shipments between Nevada and New Mexico would take place over "a period of years,"
according to the Jan. 4 filing.
The DOE is removing 1 metric ton of weapons-grade plutonium from SRS — South Carolina, more
broadly — to comply with a Dec. 20, 2017, court order. The plutonium must be out of the state no
later than 2020, according to the order, which was issued by U.S. District Court Judge J. Michelle
Childs.
The prospective weapons use of the SRS plutonium was first fully documented in an NNSA
environmental assessment issued last year.
https://www.aikenstandard.com/news/doe-reaffirms-plans-to-use-srs-plutonium-for-pit-
production/article_59e7b02a-1291-11e9-bd1e-936df797de19.html
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US COUNTER-WMD
National Defense (Arlington, Va.)
Lockheed Upgrading Radar Systems for Hypersonic Threats
By Yasmin Tadjdeh
Jan. 3, 2019
MOORESTOWN, N.J. — Lockheed Martin is working to upgrade its radar systems to detect emerging
threats such as hypersonic weapons and swarms of unmanned aerial vehicles, executives recently
said.
The U.S. military faces not only asymmetric threats — as characterized by warfare fought in
Afghanistan and Iraq — but those from near-peer competitors such as Russia and China, said Paul
Lemmo, vice president and general manager of Lockheed Martin’s integrated warfare systems and
sensors division.
“We’re really working throughout our portfolio to help our customers deal with all of those,” he
said during a media briefing at Lockheed’s Moorestown, New Jersey, facility.
The company is currently working on upgrades to its Aegis advanced combat system, which is used
extensively by the U.S. Navy as well as international partners. They include a powerful radar system
to track and counter hypersonic missiles, he noted.
Jim Sheridan, Lockheed’s director of Aegis U.S. Navy programs, said the company recently
conducted an experiment focusing on hypersonics. “The results were very promising,” he said,
while keeping specific details close to the vest. The company focused on defensive capabilities,
Sheridan added.
Tony DeSimone, chief engineer at Lockheed’s integrated warfare systems and sensors division, said
the company writ large is making big investments in hypersonics technology.
“We’re looking at multiple opportunities from both the defensive posture and then … the offensive
posture,” he said.
Lockheed is also exploring ways to better detect swarms of unmanned aerial systems, said Tish
Rourke, who works with the company’s radar systems business development division.
The AN/TPQ-53 radar system — which is currently used by the Army — can detect rockets,
artillery and mortars. The company has so far delivered 100 systems to the service in addition to its
international customers, she noted.
“The architecture of that radar was designed such that we could …. [integrate] additional capability
to the radar through software upgrades,” she said.
Lockheed is under contract with the Army under a joint urgent operational need to incorporate that
capability, she noted. It is currently working alongside the service to test and validate that, Rourke
added.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/1/3/lockheed-upgrading-radar-systems-
for-hypersonic-threats
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American Association for the Advancement of Science (Washington, D.C.)
“Scavenger” Molecule Prevents Nerve Agent Poisoning in Animals
By Joseph Cariz
Jan. 2, 2019
For the first time, researchers have created a molecule that provides long-lasting preventative
protection against toxic nerve agents in rodents. Their new study describing the molecule's
potential was published in the January 2 issue of Science Translational Medicine.
Their treatment strategy represents a breakthrough in the field of nerve agent poisoning, as
researchers have unsuccessfully spent 60 years in search of similar approaches. Although more
testing is necessary before human trials can be conducted, the therapy could one day help shield at-
risk individuals from nerve agents, many of which are used in chemical warfare and as pesticides.
The scientists imagine a scenario where a refined version of their compound could be administered
to soldiers or civilians before they encounter situations where chemical weapons like sarin are
likely to be deployed.
Organophosphates are a family of chemicals that block the communication between nerves and
organs, causing muscle paralysis and death within minutes due to impaired breathing. Their high
toxicity makes them very useful as pesticides. However, pesticides containing organophosphates
are still toxic to humans — one study estimated they cause 200,000 poisoning deaths a year in
developing countries.
Furthermore, organophosphates have been repurposed into extremely toxic nerve agents such as
sarin and VX. These lethal poisons have been used in terrorist attacks such as the Tokyo subway
attack in 1996 and in conflicts such as the ongoing Syrian Civil War .
Sarin and other nerve agents can cause death within minutes when inhaled or exposed to human
skin, making it difficult to successfully treat affected patients. Existing therapies must be
administered within hours or minutes to be effective, and they do not protect patients from severe
side effects such as convulsions and permanent brain damage, according to the Science authors.
"Nerve agents threaten both soldiers and civilians in war zones while organophosphate poisoning
remains a major medical issue for public health," said Shaoyi Jiang, professor of chemical
engineering at the University of Washington in Seattle, Washington and senior author of the new
study. "The acute nature of the poisoning demands effective therapeutic and [preventative]
interventions."
For decades, researchers have sought to create a preventative treatment based on a "bioscavenger"
— a compound that breaks down organophosphates in the bloodstream before they reach the
nervous system. Administering such a treatment before nerve agent exposure could avoid
permanent damage and bypass the need for fast-acting post-exposure antidotes, said Jiang.
Despite their potential, existing bioscavenger candidates in development have only provided
protection for a few hours in animal models. Furthermore, some of the most promising
formulations provoke undesirable responses from the immune system, according to Jiang.
To overcome these obstacles, Peng Zhang and colleagues developed a bioscavenger based on an
enzyme named OPH, which can decompose nerve agents into biologically harmless molecules.
Critically, the researchers encased the enzyme in a tiny capsule made of polymers that prevents it
from being recognized by the immune system.
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As a result, the capsule "dramatically" prolongs the time that the bioscavenger remains in the blood
and makes long-term preventative protection feasible, according to Jiang.
The scientists conducted several experiments to determine how well their compound worked in
rodents. A single intravenous treatment protected rats against a lethal injection of the
organophosphate paraoxon — an ingredient of the insecticide parathion — for seven days. The
compound also prevented poisoning in rats that had received a paraoxon injection immediately
before treatment.
To mirror what individuals might encounter in a conflict zone or other military setting, the group
also investigated whether their treatment could protect animals against multiple exposures to
nerve agents. They intravenously administered the bioscavenger to guinea pigs, waited 20 minutes,
and injected the animals with a lethal dose of sarin. The animals then received an additional sarin
injection every 24 hours.
The bioscavenger provided safe and near-total protection against the sarin injections. All the guinea
pigs that received the treatment showed no signs of poisoning after eight days of daily injections
(the equivalent of weeks to a month in humans). By contrast, guinea pigs in the control group that
received OPH without the protective capsule did not survive after the third day.
"As a breakthrough, a one-week preventative protection time window was achieved against sarin,
while previous bioscavengers mostly protect victims within hours post administration," Jiang said.
One limitation of the study is that the scavenger was only active against G-type agents, a category of
nerve agents that includes sarin. The researchers plan to conduct further studies to develop
enzymes that can counteract the effects of other types of nerve agents such as the V-type category,
which includes VX.
Further research is also necessary to determine the compound's long-term efficacy and safety in a
large animal model such as monkeys. However, Jiang's team believes that the long-lasting nature of
their treatment in rodents signifies it could help fulfill unmet needs in both medical and military
applications.
"Since the vascular [or in blood vessels] residence time of modified proteins in humans can be
several-fold longer than in rodents, it is hoped that the protection time window will prove to be
several weeks to a month in human prophylactic applications to fulfill the mission of
bioscavengers," he said.
https://www.aaas.org/news/scavenger-molecule-prevents-nerve-agent-poisoning-animals
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US ARMS CONTROL
VOA (Washington, D.C.)
Iran, Islamic State on Agenda as Pompeo Visits Middle East
By VOA News
Jan. 8, 2019
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is focusing on Iran and Islamic State as he makes a week-long
visit to the Middle East.
Pompeo said ahead of his first stop Tuesday in Jordan that he wants to "send a clear message" that
the United States is committed to the region, defeating Islamic State and countering what he called
"Iran's destabilizing activities."
In his talks with Jordanian leaders, Pompeo was expected to discuss the situation in Syria, where
the Trump administration is planning to withdraw 2,000 U.S. forces, as well as Jordan's economic
links with neighboring Iraq.
Other stops on the top U.S. diplomat's trip include Egypt, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait.
Pompeo is due to give a speech in Cairo that the State Department says will focus on "U.S.
commitment to peace, prosperity, stability and security in the Middle East."
Ten years ago, it was President Barack Obama making a major address in Cairo, where he sought "a
new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world."
Since taking office at the end of Obama's term, President Donald Trump has taken different foreign
policy paths than those of his predecessor, including abandoning the nuclear agreement the United
States and five other nations struck with Iran to limit the Iranian nuclear program.
The other parties of the agreement say it is the best way to make sure Iran cannot develop nuclear
weapons, something Iran has said it was not trying to do. The United Nation's nuclear watchdog has
certified in multiple reports that Iran is living up to its part of the deal.
Trump criticized the deal as giving Iran too much while demanding too little and says it leaves Iran
with a path to nuclear weapons.
"We're actually going to set a policy that's actually going to stop Iran from getting nuclear
weapons," Pompeo told reporters traveling with him. "That's probably the most important thing
that we're expecting to achieve."
Pompeo said he will be discussing with leaders at his various stops the ways in which the
governments can "apply pressure" to get Iran to change its behavior.
His stops in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia will also include a focus on the war in
Yemen, where Saudi and UAE forces are helping Yemen's government fight Houthi rebels.
The United States has provided support to the Saudi-led coalition, including refueling for warplanes
conducting airstrikes.
Last month, the U.S. Senate sent a strong signal of displeasure with Saudi Arabia by passing
resolutions calling for an end to U.S. support for the Saudi military campaign and blaming Saudi
Arabia for the death of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
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Khashoggi was killed when he visited the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey in October. Initially
Saudi Arabia said he safely left the site on his own, but later admitted he was killed there in what
Saudi officials called a rogue operation.
Saudi Arabia has charged 11 people in connection with the killing.
The State Department said Pompeo would be seeking an update on the status of the Saudi
investigation.
https://www.voanews.com/a/mike-pompeo-travels-to-middle-east/4733347.html
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Arms Control Today (Washington, D.C.)
Stakes Grow for Possible Trump-Kim Summit
By Kelsey Davenport
Jan. 8, 2019
North Korea reiterated that denuclearization of the Korean peninsula must include removal of U.S.
nuclear weapons in the region, a statement that underscores that diplomatic advances in 2019 will
require addressing simultaneously North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its security
concerns.
The state-run Korean Central News Agency said on Dec. 20 that denuclearization means “removing
all elements of nuclear threats from the areas of both the north and the south of Korea and also
from surrounding areas from where the Korean peninsula is targeted.” The United States has
focused on a deal in which North Korea gives up its nuclear weapons and related facilities in return
for a lifting of U.S. and UN sanctions and possibly ending the Korean War.
The United States removed its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991, but the country
remains under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea and Japan.
U.S. President Donald Trump announced in June that certain joint military exercises between the
United States and South Korea would be suspended, and subsequent exercises were modified, but
North Korea is still looking for the United States to take additional steps to address its security
concerns.
With little negotiating progress evident in late 2018, Trump said he is in no rush for an agreement
with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, even though he had sharply criticized President Barack
Obama’s policy of “strategic patience” as Pyongyang increased its nuclear and missile capabilities.
The apparent impasse increases the stakes heading to a second Trump-Kim summit, which U.S.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said during a Dec. 20 radio interview is expected “not too long after
the first of the year.”
Kim, in his annual New Year’s address Jan. 1, said that he is “ready to meet the U.S. president again
anytime” but that it is up to the United States to take the next steps. If the United States “responds
to our proactive, prior efforts with trustworthy measures and corresponding practical actions,
bilateral relations will develop wonderfully at a fast pace through the taking of more definite and
epochal measures,” he said.
Kim warned, however, that if the United States fails to follow through, persists in imposing
sanctions, and attempts to “unilaterally enforce something,” North Korea “may be compelled to find
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a new way for defending the sovereignty of the country and supreme interests of the state and for
achieving peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.”
Kim referenced North Korea’s decision to suspend its nuclear warhead and missile tests in 2018,
which Trump frequently cites, as evidence of its commitment to denuclearization, but North Korea
is thought to be increasing its stockpile of nuclear materials for warheads. As a result, time works in
Pyongyang’s favor and may make a diplomatic solution more difficult.
Further, the protest resignation of U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, a strong advocate of the U.S.-
South Korean military alliance, may raise anxieties in Seoul even as President Moon Jae-in has
worked to ease tensions with Pyongyang.
That is because the Trump administration is pressing Seoul to bear more of the burden for keeping
28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea, leading to speculation that Trump might be willing to pull out
some U.S. forces in a concession to Kim. The U.S. troops help with South Korea’s defense
preparations and act as a trip wire to reassure South Koreans that the United States would engage if
the North attacks.
North Korea’s Institute for American Studies at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated in a Dec.
17 commentary that North Korea is waiting for the United States to take action to move the process
forward, arguing that Pyongyang has taken “proactive denuclearization steps” and Washington
must respond in a corresponding manner.
North Korea’s expansive definition of denuclearization is not new. Pyongyang made a similar
statement in July 2016 emphasizing that U.S. nuclear weapons in the region must be part of the
diplomatic process.
The July 2016 statement said that “the denuclearization being called for by [North Korea] is the
denuclearization of the whole Korean peninsula and this includes the dismantlement of nukes in
South Korea and its vicinity.”
North Korea cited five specific demands in July 2016 to remove the U.S. nuclear threat: public
disclosure of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea, removal and verification that such weapons are
not present on U.S. bases in South Korea, U.S. guarantees that it will not redeploy nuclear weapons
in South Korea, U.S. assurances that it will not threaten or conduct a nuclear strike on North Korea,
and withdrawal from South Korea of U.S. troops authorized to use nuclear weapons.
This list might provide insight as to what Pyongyang will be wanting from Washington if talks
progress.
It was also clear after Trump and Kim met in Singapore in June that Washington and Pyongyang do
not share the same definition of denuclearization, which many experts predicted could complicate
negotiations.
At a July hearing held by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Pompeo was pressed on
whether the two countries agree on what constitutes the Singapore summit’s commitment to
pursue denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
Pompeo said that the United States shared its definition with Pyongyang and that North Korea
“understands” U.S. expectations for what that process will accomplish, but he would not confirm
that North Korea agreed with the U.S. terms.
North Korea may be emphasizing its definition of denuclearization to influence the diplomatic
process going forward.
Since the June summit in Singapore, negotiations between the United States and North Korea have
failed to gain traction. Initially, the U.S. insistence that Pyongyang complete denuclearization before
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any U.S. concessions on sanctions or an end of the Korean War appeared to stymie progress, as
North Korea insisted on a step-by-step approach with each side taking reciprocal actions.
North Korea’s Dec. 20 commentary may be intended as a reminder that Pyongyang expects the
United States to take steps that address Pyongyang’s security concerns as the country rolls back its
nuclear weapons program.
The Dec. 17 commentary made a similar point, stating that the United States must realize “before it
is too late” that maximum pressure will not work and Washington should take a “sincere approach
to implementing” the Singapore statement.
Pompeo’s visit to Pyongyang in November initially appeared to reinvigorate the process when the
two sides agreed to more regular contacts and the establishment of working groups, but there has
been little evidence that these developments are being realized. Still, Pompeo described the
negotiations thus far as a “great process” in a Dec. 21 interview with NPR.
Although the announcement of working groups meeting regularly would be a step forward in
establishing a process for negotiations to proceed, commentary from North Korea suggests that
Pyongyang may prefer to deal directly with Trump.
The Dec. 17 statement said that Trump “avails himself of every possible occasion to state his
willingness to improve [North Korean-U.S.] relations” and targeted the U.S. State Department as
“bent on bringing” the relationship between the United States and North Korea “back to the status
of last year which was marked by exchanges of fire.”
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-01/news/stakes-grow-possible-trump-kim-summit
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COMMENTARY
Brookings (Washington, D.C.)
North Korea May Be Willing to Begin Denuclearization, and Trump Should Make a Deal
By Michael E. O’Hanlon
Jan. 7, 2019
Editor's Note: We should immediately engage in serious talks to see just how serious Kim Jong-un
really is about the intriguing and promising offer he made in his recent speech, contends Michael
O'Hanlon. This piece originally appeared in USA Today.
In his traditional New Year’s Day speech earlier this week, North Korean strongman leader Kim
Jong-un has just made an offer that, if serious, could present an opportunity for President Donald
Trump to reach a historic breakthrough in the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula and record his
greatest foreign-policy accomplishment as president.
Kim’s speech was not all sweetness and light. He warned that his patience is not infinite, and that in
the absence of diplomatic progress, his country may resort to more confrontational tactics. Little
has happened since the famous Singapore summit back in June between Kim and Trump; we seem
no closer to a deal on North Korea’s threatening military capabilities now than we did six months
ago. Meanwhile, Kim clearly resents and suffers from the tough international sanctions that the
Trump administration has convinced the United Nations to impose these last two years, after North
Korea’s big missile and nuclear tests of 2017. The latest statistics show that, despite sanctions
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evasion in multiple quarters, North Korean trade was down as much as half in 2018 compared to
the year before.
But Kim held out an olive branch nonetheless. He seems to want a deal, and seems interested in
another summit. He was much more specific than ever before about what he might offer in the
course of such a tête-à-tête with Trump. So far, North Korea has only offered to place a moratorium
on future nuclear and long-range missile tests, which has been a welcome development, but has
only talked vaguely about “denuclearization” and has not stopped making more bombs. Now,
apparently, Kim would put nuclear production capability on the table as a bargaining chip.
North Korea experts like Jonathan Pollack and Jung Pak have documented how unlikely Kim would
be to give up all his nuclear bombs (U.S. intelligence estimates he has as many as 60 by now). They
represent the collective accomplishments of a program that Kim’s grandfather and father
prioritized when they led North Korea, so giving up all those bombs quickly would almost seem to
dishonor the memory and legacy of his forefathers. And perhaps even more importantly, Kim as
well as his generals remember the one cardinal mistake Saddam Hussein, Mohammar Quadhafi, and
the Taliban all committed—leaving themselves vulnerable in war against the United States because
of the lack of a nuclear deterrent. For Kim to give up the bomb, he would need a great deal of
confidence that relations will remain peaceful.
Yet there is still a big opportunity for compromise, if Kim is serious about ending production of
more bombs. North Korea could stop expanding its nuclear arsenal, and we could relax, then lift
some of the sanctions imposed on North Korea over the years, especially the U.N. sanctions that
have really cut into North Korean trade with China and South Korea in the last couple years. The
goal of complete denuclearization could await another day.
With this approach, the United States would keep enough sanctions in place to stay true to its
principle that North Korea cannot be accepted as a nuclear-weapons state; before being fully
welcomed into the community of nations, it will in fact have to honor its obligations under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and give up all its bombs. Yet as a practical matter, that second
stage of nuclear talks can wait for a number of months or years. That is ok. The world will be much
safer if North Korea stops enlarging and improving its nuclear and long-range missile arsenals that
could threaten not only South Korea and Japan (and the almost 300,000 Americans living in those
two countries combined), but also eventually North America.
The real challenge is likely to be verification. We know where some, but not all, of North Korea’s
nuclear infrastructure is located. As such, international inspectors would have to be allowed to
return not only to the Yongbyon location where they have been before, and where North Korea has
operated a nuclear reactor to make plutonium as well as centrifuges to enrich uranium. They would
also need some degree of free reign to explore other suspicious sites around the country. On the
one hand, this would not be an arrangement unique to North Korea; similar provisions are part of
the Iran nuclear deal, for example. On the other hand, North Korea has shown extreme nervousness
about such inspections in the past.
Another possible problem: John Bolton, Trump’s national security advisor, and Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo may consider a deal that only freezes, rather than eliminates, North Korea’s nuclear
arsenal inadequate for purposes of American and allied security. But they should reassess, or
Trump should overrule them.
This compromise deal would go further than the Iran deal, in fact, if North Korea were willing to see
its nuclear production facilities dismantled permanently. Yes, Kim would keep his nukes for a while.
But he would have powerful economic and military reasons to behave himself. In this case, taking
half a loaf is far more realistic than hoping for a complete denuclearization accord that just isn’t in
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the cards anytime soon. We should immediately engage in serious talks to see just how serious Kim
really is about this intriguing and promising offer.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/07/north-korea-may-be-willing-to-
begin-denuclearization-and-trump-should-make-a-deal/
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The Hill (Washington, D.C.)
New House, New Vision for America’s Nuclear Weapons?
By Kenneth Keulman
Jan. 7, 2019
A new House of Representatives has taken power. And with it comes much needed change to how
the U.S. approaches nuclear weapons. It’s about time.
Over the course of the last two years, the U.S. has been on a perilous path when it comes to nuclear
weapons policy. President Trump moved to pull out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty, a 1987 milestone agreement with the Soviet Union that prohibited a comprehensive
class of nuclear weapons and helped usher in the end of the Cold War. At the same time, a long-term
project of nuclear weapons modernization is under way, and likely to expand once the INF Treaty is
abandoned, during which nuclear forces will undergo “upgrading.”
Together, these developments point to a dangerous future, one where nuclear conflict is looking
increasingly likely.
Yes, the INF treaty is not perfect. But it banned the Soviet Union and the U.S. from retaining, testing
and deploying ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 300 and 3,400
miles. Since the Obama administration, Washington has censured Moscow for violating the terms
because of its deployment of cruise missiles. Actually revoking the agreement though will ignite a
new era of nuclear proliferation by permitting the United States to acquire comparable missiles.
That opens the door to host of dangerous developments.
Russia’s expansion of its Novator 9M729 cruise missile program is already in a more mature state,
so it can be utilized broadly once the agreement is ended. Russia will also have autonomy to deploy
an intermediate range ballistic missile without restriction. The U.S. decision to withdraw from the
INF could even speed up the expansion of this capacity.
Moscow maintains that abandoning the pact might also restart the Cold War nuclear arms race.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated that Russia will react “in kind” if new American
missiles are positioned in Europe. And he warned that any European states accommodating these
weapons would be in danger of Russian attack. That could lead to serious international
confrontations, which will jeopardize future national security concerns and test the support of U.S.
allies in Europe at a time when support for Trump’s policies is already low on the continent.
Withdrawal from the agreement will probably also damage the 2010 START Treaty regulating
Russian and American long-range nuclear missiles. START will automatically terminate in 2021
unless Washington and Moscow decide to prolong it. Without the INF treaty in place, the chances of
it dissolving are increasing.
To go along with these concerning moves, the Trump administration has initiated an alarming new
program of nuclear weapons acceleration. Trump has supported his predecessor’s weapons
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modernization agenda. But he has also pledged to significantly enlarge current nuclear resources.
America is now engaging in the most excessive nuclear weapons expansion since the collapse of the
Soviet Union.
In abandoning another nuclear pact, the Trump administration is showing a lack of long-term
strategy. The INF Treaty, accompanied by the New START accord, holds at bay a renewed great
power nuclear arms competition. Since one of the objectives in withdrawing is to modernize U.S.
nuclear capabilities, this will only accelerate the expansion of a more hazardous world.
Nations possessing nuclear weapons are already modernizing their stockpiles all across the globe.
Russia, China, and America are embarking on vast modernization agendas that involve new
warheads and forms of delivery systems that are more destabilizing since they incentivize an
adversary to strike first to immobilize the foe at the beginning of warfare. Any additional fodder for
nuclear proliferation is likely to increase these efforts.
Thankfully, the new Congress has some ability to push back on this nuclear agenda. With Rep. Adam
Smith (D-Wash.) running the House Armed Services Committee there is a new voice in power
pushing for the downsizing of our country’s nuclear program.
One way to accomplish this would be to abolish the most hazardous element of the nuclear
weapons system—one leg of the nuclear triad—Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, or ICBMs. These
are susceptible to unintended nuclear conflict if they are released as a result of miscalculation by a
leader functioning under intense pressure to make a decision, or by accident.
While the House’s power is limited in making these types of changes, we can only hope that these
new, reasonable voices at the table will help steer our country away from a dangerous, and costly,
nuclear arms race.
Kenneth Keulman is Provost Distinguished Professor emeritus at Loyola University and a member
of the Scholars Strategy Network.
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/424219-new-house-new-vision-for-americas-
nuclear-weapons
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Atlantic Council (Washington, D.C.)
The EU Should Tackle Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program
By Emma Scott
Jan. 7, 2019
Between 2004 and 2015, the European Union (EU) coordinated a series of negotiations with Iran on
its nuclear program. In the early stages, the negotiations took place in the format of the EU and
E3—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. In 2006, the negotiating framework evolved to the
P5+1 format—the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. In 2015, an
agreement was finally reached, with the EU at the helm of the negotiations, in the form of a Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Yet distrust of Iran continued after the signing of the JCPOA. One of the strongest criticisms is that
by excluding curbs on Iran’s ballistic missile program, the JCPOA left Iran with one part of the
formula for a fully functioning nuclear weapon, namely the delivery vehicle.
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The renewed focus on Iran’s ballistic missile program reflects the more hardline views of the
Trump administration. Iran’s decision to continue missile testing after President Donald Trump
took office also drew renewed criticism by Western actors and was seen as provocative.
The US contends that Iranian ballistic missile proliferation and testing has increased since the
JCPOA. In this regard, the US has addressed the varying ranges and payloads of Iran’s missiles,
considering them nuclear capable systems. It has spoken out against Iran’s space launch vehicles
(SLVs) arguing that they use technology similar to that used in intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The US has described Iran’s missiles as a threat to European territory as well as to US partners in
the Middle East. It has further criticized Iran for spreading missile systems throughout the region,
notably to Shia militias in Iraq and to the Houthis in Yemen, who have fired such missiles at Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The EU has stated that it is leading a “dialogue” with Iran to address regional issues, as well as other
issues of concern including the ballistic missile program. The question is how the EU is framing the
negotiating agenda on Iran’s ballistic missile program. Is its position similar to the US position or
does it diverge?
The EU has maintained that it shares “most of the concerns expressed by the US regarding the
status of Iran’s nuclear program after 2025, ‘Iran’s ballistic missiles program’ and its destabilising
actions in the region.” However, it has failed to address or expand on these concerns. While the E3
has been willing to discuss missiles with the Trump administration—albeit in talks that ended
when the US quit the JCPOA in May 2018—the EU has only referred to Iran’s ballistic missile
program in public statements focused on preserving the JCPOA. It has yet to address the missile
program as a stand-alone issue with implications for European security, the Middle East and the
theme of proliferation more broadly.
The EU had hoped that successful implementation of the JCPOA would act as a confidence building
measure and lay the ground for negotiations on other issues. Two years into the Trump
administration, and eight months following US withdrawal from the JCPOA, that premise is
questionable. Tehran has said that it is not willing to negotiate additional issues in the absence of
the US from the JCPOA and in light of renewed economic sanctions.
Iran’s ballistic missile program is indeed outside the scope of the JCPOA. The deal addresses issues
such as uranium enrichment, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, and the Arak Heavy Water
Reactor, nuclear procurement, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Missiles are mentioned in UN
Security Council Resolution 2231. It “calls upon” Iran “not to undertake any activity related to
ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using
such ballistic missile technology.” Iran contends that since it has promised not to build nuclear
weapons, its missiles cannot be viewed as “designed to” deliver them. However, the US and E3
dispute this position.
The EU, in public at least, has not begun to address the question of whether Iran’s missiles are
designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, nor whether the technology used in Iran’s
SLV launches is suitable for intercontinental ballistic missiles. Furthermore, issues such as range or
payload have yet to be accounted for. One EU official said, at least with the current nuclear
agreement, Tehran wouldn't have the warheads for those missiles. The EU’s point is not employed
to counter the need for an agreement on the ballistic missiles but to invoke a violation of the JCPOA.
The farthest the EU has been willing to go is to call ballistic missile launches “inconsistent” with
UNSC Resolution 2231. Although, the language has toughened from two years ago, when EU High
Representative Federica Mogherini said, “we do not see the missiles tests as a breach of the JCPOA,”
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there has been no specific address on the missile tests separate from speeches given in relation the
JCPOA.
The EU has called on Iran to join the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC), which is an arrangement
aimed at preventing the spread of ballistic missiles. Specifically, the HCoC asks member states to
voluntarily commit themselves politically to provide pre-launch notifications on ballistic missile
and SLV launches and test flights. Referring to Iran, the EU has said that “the subscription of all
States to the Hague Code of Conduct would build confidence, encourage restraint and create more
stability and security for all.” While this is a positive step, the EU could go further by addressing the
missile issue in its entirety separate from the JCPOA.
Any enquiry into Iran’s missiles should raise questions about the nature of the threat to European
territory. However, there has been a complete lack of statements from EU officials about Iran’s
missiles as a threat. The only official to speak out on the matter was Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister
Jean Asselborn, who strictly speaking is not an EU official. He said, “Mr. Trump should not destroy
the nuclear deal. After all, it is Europe that is within range of Iranian missiles.” Again, this statement
was provided within the context of Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA.
The EU has maintained that “the proliferation and testing of ballistic missiles especially those
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction is a destabilising factor in many regions,” and
subsequently expressed concern “about the pursuit of ballistic missiles by both the DPRK and Iran.”
The EU has also called “upon Iran to refrain from[…] ballistic missiles tests, which are[…]
destabilising for the region.” However, the EU did not comment on the fourteen launches of Iranian
manufactured missiles into Saudi Arabia’s territory by the Houthis in Yemen, which contrasts
starkly with the more outspoken positions of EU member states.
The overall position of the EU regarding the ballistic missile program is a non-position. It does not
address any of the broader parameters of Iran’s missile program nor paint the path forward. On the
whole, it appears that Brussels is not too concerned by, and is not framing a negotiating agenda on,
Iran’s ballistic missile program. Although it may be prudent to prioritise tackling Iran’s nuclear
program over the ballistic missile threat, the EU seems unwilling to push the ballistic missile issue
with Tehran for fear that Tehran will no longer accede to the nuclear-related provisions of the
JCPOA.
If the EU does not develop its thinking further and address the issue directly, it will not be in a good
position to lead relevant negotiations. It will once again stand in the shadow of Washington, which
has taken a different approach. Indeed, confronting the missile issue may be the best way of
convincing the US—if not Trump then his successor—to return to compliance with the JCPOA.
Emma Scott is a Research Assistant with Project Alpha in the War Studies Department of King’s
College London. She is also the Iran Assessor on Transparency International’s Government Defence
Anti-Corruption Index. Follow her on Twitter: @emmascott_es.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/the-eu-should-tackle-iran-s-ballistic-missile-
program
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ABOUT THE USAF CSDS
The USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of
Air University — while extending its reach far beyond — and influences a wide audience of leaders
and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff’s Director for Nuclear and
Counterproliferation (then AF/XON) and Air War College commandant established the initial
personnel and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation
awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an
information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues;
and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and
nonproliferation.
In 2008, the Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management recommended
"Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military
education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense."
This led to the addition of three teaching positions to the CPC in 2011 to enhance nuclear PME
efforts. At the same time, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10
and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide
professional continuing education (PCE) through the careers of those Air Force personnel working
in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the CPC in 2012,
broadening its mandate to providing education and research on not just countering WMD but also
nuclear operations issues. In April 2016, the nuclear PCE courses were transferred from the Air
War College to the U.S. Air Force Institute for Technology.
In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons
Studies (CUWS) to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and
defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security,
major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term
“unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also
includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. In May 2018, the
name changed again to the Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies (CSDS) in recognition of senior
Air Force interest in focusing on this vital national security topic.
The Center’s military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The
arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation — counterforce, active
defense, passive defense, and consequence management. The Latin inscription "Armis Bella Venenis
Geri" stands for "weapons of war involving poisons."
DISCLAIMER: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely
those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United
States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.
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