IS IT SOMETIMES SAFER TO BE ALONE? - DIVA PORTAL
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Is it sometimes safer to be
alone?
A qualitative analysis of civilian agency and its
effects on rebel tactics
Hannah Ramel
Department of Peace and Conflict Research
Peace and Conflict studies C
Bachelor thesis, 15 credits
Fall 2020
Supervisor: Stefan Döring
Word count: 15808
Date: 11/01-2021Abstract
Despite an increasing interest in civil agency and its role in armed conflict, little is known
about the effect it might have on rebel groups' patterns of behaviour. In this study I explore
the theory of collective action capacity, which is the population's ability to cooperate and
forego short term incentives to preserve long term cooperation, and its effect on rebel groups'
method of generating compliance in new territory. My main claim is that non-secessionist
rebel groups won’t be able to persuade populations with high collective action capacity to
surrender to their control, and must therefore use coercive measures to generate compliance.
This claim is tested through a qualitative comparative case study, and finds that rebels might
always initially apply persuasive measures, and then if they realise that the society in
question have high levels of collective action capacity, and thus willingness and ability to
resist territorial occupation, fall back on coercive methods. The results provide support for
the theoretical framework and the hypothesis, but alternative explanations make the result
require further research to determine their significance.
1TABLE OF CONTENT
1. INTRODUCTION 4
2. THEORY 6
2.1 Conceptualisation of the independent and dependent variables 6
2.1.1 Independent variable: Collective action capacity 6
2.1.2 Dependent variable: Method of generating compliance 6
2.2 Previous research on civilian agency and rebel governance 7
2.3 Theoretical framework: CAC pushing rebels to use coercive measures 9
2.3.1 Hypothesis 10
2.3.2 Causal mechanism 11
2.3.3 Assumptions 11
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 11
3.1 Research method: Structured and focused comparison 12
3.2 Operationalisation of key variables 13
3.2.1 Independent variable: Collective action capacity 13
3.2.2 Dependent variable: Method of generating compliance 15
3.3 Data collection 16
3.4 Case selection: Mill’s method of difference 16
3.4.1 Background: CPP in Philippines 17
3.4.2 Background: CPI-Maoist in India 18
3.5 Control variables 18
3.5.1 Secessionism 18
3.5.2 Post-colonial state 20
3.5.3 Ideology 20
4. FINDINGS 21
4.1 Independent variable 21
24.1.1 Philippines in 1968 21
4.1.2 India in 2003 25
4.2 Dependent variable 28
4.2.1 CPP 28
4.2.2 CPI-Maoist 30
4.3 Analysis of findings 33
4.3.1 Alternative explanations 34
4.3.2 Contributions and Limitations 35
5. CONCLUSION 36
6. REFERENCES 37
7. APPENDIX 45
A: SFC- Questions for Independent variable 45
B: SFC- Questions for Dependent variable 45
C: SFC- Table for Control variable 45
31. Introduction
While one of the principles of decades of research on guerrilla warfare and insurgency have
been the centrality of civilian support for rebel survival and success, the bargaining power
that such a position proffers civilians has been widely ignored. The civilians’ role in conflict
dyads needs further enlightenment to enhance our understanding of the complexity of armed
conflicts. What determines the strength of their bargaining power have been theorised to be
features of the local communities presented as the communities collective action capacity
(CAC)(Arjona, 2017; Rubin, 2018). Research has also recently distinguished between
different patterns of behaviour of rebel groups. For instance, Stewart (2018) identified
differences of use of social provision between secessionist and non-secessionist rebels. Furlan
(2020) offered a list of characteristics of rebel groups during irregular civil war, for the
analysis of rebel group behaviour in different settings.
Continuing this line of research on civilian agency and bargaining power, I have decided to
apply the theory of collective action capacity to features of state institutions instead. CAC is
here used as the independent variable and is for the present analysis defined as a population's
ability to forego short term incentives to preserve long term cooperation across different
social groups. The dependent variable is one of the characteristics provided by Furlan; the
method of generating compliance, describing the means by which rebels acquire territorial
control from the population. The methods can vary between persuasive and coercive. The
main argument is that non-secessionist rebel groups won’t be able to persuade populations
with high collective action capacity to surrender to their control, and must therefore use
coercive measures to generate compliance. While societies with low levels of CAC will yield
to pervasive measures, making coercion unnecessary. The research question for this thesis
will be: How does the collective action capacity of the population effect rebels method of
generating compliance?
Findings on CACs' effect on rebels' use of violence in this manner will not only contribute to
the theoretical arguments of civil agency in civil war, but also further our understanding of
rebel-civil relations and rebel group behaviour (Arjona, 2017; Arjona, 2016a; Arjona, 2016b;
Justino, 2013).
4To answer the research question, I conduct a comparative study using Mill’s method of
difference, with two cases varying on the dependent variable. The independent variable;
CAC, will be measured on four aspects based on the definition of CAC presented by Ober
(2008) and Rubin (2018), the four being; civilian access to secure and effective justice; level
of democracy; political corruption; and the level to which laws are enforced transparently
and equally. The dependent variable; method of generating compliance, will be valued as
persuasive or coercive, and is measured based on the rebel groups; level of involvement in
local institutions; provision of sanction to the population; and their method of generating
taxes. These aspects are chosen based on Furlan's (2018) findings of these characteristics.
The unit of analysis is rebel groups as these are the units of dependence, but the environment
they are present in (the country) will be assessed in the findings of the independent variable.
The case of high CAC will be India with the rebel group CPI-Maoist (2000-present), and the
case of low CAC will be the Philippines with the rebel group CPP-NPA (1964-1991).
The results provide support for the theoretical framework and the hypothesis, but alternative
explanations make the result require further research to determine their significance. The
findings indicate that India in 2003 inhabited medium levels of CAC, based on their steady
democratic development, division of power, local independence from state powers and
efficient legislative system, but also their level of corruption and social gaps undermining the
systems. The Philippines in 1968 had low levels of CAC, in all regards assessed, society was
unequal, unjust and corrupt. CPI-M used coercive methods of generating compliance and
CPP used persuasive. CPI-M did however often attempt to appear persuasive in order to
manipulate the political environment into chaos, to then violently take over territorial control,
and punish anyone who opposed. The CPP constantly approached new territories much like a
secessionist group, arguably because their motivation for change was more genuinely for the
good of the people.
The paper is presented in four parts. It starts with a section introducing the conceptualisation
of the independent and dependent variables, the relevant previous research as well as a
presentation of the theoretical framework. The second section presents the research design,
the operationalizations, case selection and the control variables. The third section discloses
the findings, and the final concluding section discusses limitations and alternative
explanations, areas for further research, main contributions and a summary.
52. Theory
The theoretical framework builds on past research on civilian agency in civil war and
violence during rebel governance (Arjona et al., 2015; Arjona, 2017; Furlan, 2020; Rubin,
2018; Stewart, 2018). This section begins with a conceptualisation of the independent and
dependent variables, followed by an overview of past research on civil agency and rebel
governance.
2.1 Conceptualisation of the Independent and Dependent variable
2.1.1 Independent variable: Collective action capacity
CAC has been defined as communities’ ability to facilitate joint action in which “groups
composed of self-interested and interdependent individuals seek to develop and carry out
cooperative plans” (Ober, 2008), despite distributional conflict or other divisive pressures
(Rubin, 2019). I define CAC as the ability of individuals from different social groups to
cooperate and forego short term incentives to preserve long term cooperation. The variation
in CAC will not be clear cut high and low, but the two cases will differ to a sufficient degree
to be considered different. The aspects that will be evaluated to show the level of CAC is:
civilian access to secure and effective justice; level of democracy; political corruption; and
the level to which laws are enforced transparently and equally. I argue that civilians that
experience high levels of these aspects are likely to also inhibit the ability and willingness to
cooperate across lines of social groups for big, long term goals.
2.1.2 Dependent variable: Method of generating compliance
Several scholars have all researched different methods rebel groups use to take over territory
(e.g. Kylvas, 2006; Furlan, 2020). Generating compliance refers to the way in which a
non-state armed group that implements its rules in a certain territory. According to Furlan
(2020) rebels use coercion or persuasion in their quest to acquire compliance. Coercion is
here defined as ‘actions or practices of persuading someone to do something by using force
or threats’ (Terpstra et al., 2017). Rebel groups may use practices like mass kidnappings,
threatening individuals into compliance and killing whomever objects (Furlan, 2018).
Persuasive measures on the other hand are aimed to persuade civilians to comply, and entails
‘non-cursive actions or practises intended to get someone to do something’. This can include
6promotion of their ideology, emphasizing their own accomplishments, referring to a shared
identity, and presenting their actions as profertable to the locals. This only refers to rebels’
behaviour when they enter new territory and their initial interactions with the civilians. The
first aspect I will consider to determine the method most commonly used, is whether the
group expresses interest in being involved with the sub-national institutions. The second is
whether the rebel group provides some type of social provision, such as organizing systems
of order, building infrastructure or supporting businesses. The final aspect concerns taxation;
most rebel groups collect taxes from the population in some manner, the variation will be
whether the contributions are collected at force or provided by will (Kalyvas, 2006).
2.2 Previous research on civilian agency and rebel governance
Arjona, Kasfir & Mampilly (2015) define rebel governance as “the set of actions insurgents
engage in to regulate the social, political, and economic life of non-combatants during war”.
Since the XVI century have cases of governance by non-state armed actors emerged
worldwide, and rebel governance has occurred in 25% of all civil wars (Arjona, Kasfir &
Mampilly, 2015). ‘Governance without government’ have only recently been recognised by
political scientists as equivalent to ‘governance by government’ and the literature have since
grown immensely (Furlan, 2020). One major strand of research focuses on rebels’ incentives
for investing resources into governing. It is suggested that rebels govern because they
anticipate that it will boost civilian support (Humphreys et al., 2008) (Huang, 2016)
(Wickham-Crowley, 1987), ensure continued economic development (Lidow, 2016) ,
promote international support and legitimacy (Stewart, 2018, Jo, 2015) as well as enhance
territorial influence (Arjona, 2016) (Mampilly, 2011). These studies tend to ‘black-box’ the
character of rebel governance. Huang (2016) presented a dataset that controls for the presence
of rebel institutions but fails to capture differences in institutions’ responsiveness. Other
studies unpack variation in the characteristics of rebel governance, such as its effectiveness
(Mampilly, 2011), scope (Arjona, 2016) and inclusiveness (Stewart, 2018) (Humphreys et al.,
2008). Although these studies have contributed significantly to our understanding of the
different ways that insurgent groups govern civilians, the variation in the pre-existing
institutions that operate in war zones has been overlooked. Likewise, have different
institutions created by civilians to self-govern in absence of other systems of order been
completely neglected. Quality of local institutions, their origin and characteristics as well as
their effect on rebel behavior is a sub-field that requires much further scrutiny. Local
populations do –counter to earlier beliefs– have agency and influence and this needs to be
analysed and further understood.
7For a long time locals were seen as passive actors that could either support rebels or stand
back. Civilian agency must instead be seen as a spectrum of options rather than as a limited
framework where the population can either passively survive, flee, or perish (Dorff, 2019).
While nonviolence might be viewed as more effective in the long term, Dorff (2019) points
out that local resources and opportunities could drive civilians toward violent resistance, and
likewise they might favor violence to challenge other actors and yet choose nonviolent
methods due to circumstance or community context. Civilians' ability to influence is based on
their ability to coordinate and establish a reliable threat, forcing rebels to be responsive
towards the needs and wants of the population (van Baalen, 2020).
Rubin (2019) named this ability CAC (collective action capability), and identified four
characteristics in the population that need to be present for high collective action capability,
that will be further discussed in a later section. Van Baalen (2020) argued that the strength of
local elites’ clientelist networks, conditional on ethnopolitical affiliation with the rebels,
shapes the responsiveness of rebel governance. These studies do not distinguish between
different types of rebel groups. Stewart (2018) however found that secessionist groups were
more likely to provide inclusive methods of social provisions, and non-secessionist groups
more exclusive. Weinstein similarly argues that civilian support is important to the outcome
of the conflict, because non-combatants are in a position of power, and thus able to shift their
support from one side to another. To provide or withhold resources and information necessary
for the groups’ operation, gives them substantial influence (Woolcock et al., 2000; Weinstein,
2007).
In addition, violence in relation to rebel governance has primarily been studied from two
angles; firstly as a method used by the rebels to gain compliance, power or influence; and
secondly civilian violent resistance towards rebellion occupation. Heger, Jung and Wong
(2017) argue that rebel groups that provide governance can produce unique forms of violence
and fear because they have in place clear lines of command, accountability mechanisms, a
structure that fosters specialization and territorial control.
Armed groups are said to target civilians as they organize their militaries, to build bases of
popular support, solicit resources to sustain the fighting and weaken the support networks of
8opposing groups (Humphreys et al., 2008). Rebels often offer security provision from
external threats, resolution of disputes, and even basic services such as medical care and
education (Mampilly 2011, 17). Alternatively, rebels may govern through dominance, relying
on coercion such as violence or threat of violence to impose social order (Rubin, 2019).
Some civil wars produce insurgents that seek to transform governance while others give rise
to predatory organizations that sow terror among local populations, this is dependent on the
variation in the characteristics of the rebel group, despite the presence of conditions that
facilitate armed opposition to the state. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) argue that variation
in the barriers that exist to the organization of insurgency, in particular whether insurgent
groups have access to economic resources, helps us to account for the different characteristics
of rebel groups. Rebel leaders that rely heavily on tax revenues that accompany consent,
tended to build states that protect the rights and the security of their constituents (Humphreys
et al. 2008).
2.3 Theoretical framework: CAC pushing rebels to use coercive measures
Studies have found that rebels benefit more from occupying an area with high levels of
collective action capability, since these villages and regions have systems the rebel group can
profit from, e.g., ; production of food, networks for information, and territorial security.
These areas however require a higher level of input by the rebels, to the institutions and
infrastructure, for the civilian to be satisfied and yield to the rebels attempting control
(Stewart, 2018; Arjona, 2016). The strength high levels of CAC provides, gives the civilians
power to demand provisions in exchange for surrendering territorial control. It could
therefore be argued that rebels will sooner establish rebelocracy in villages with high CAC,
and aliocracy in villages with low CAC (Arjona, 2016). Secessionist rebels require the
support and legitimization of the population to the degree that they will supply social
provisions and resources in areas that are able to demand it, as found in Arjonas (2016) study
of villages in Colombia.
I argue however that this might not be the case for non-secessionist rebel groups. I posit that
non-secessionist groups who encounter societies with high levels of collective action
capabilities, who are unwilling to yield to occupation and present a credible ability to resist,
will instead be taken over violently. Non-secessionist groups who encounter societies with
low level of CAC will be occupied without the use of coercive methods because the civilians
9do not possess an ability to resist. In cases like this, rebels imply persuasive methods of
generating compliance. CAC only provides the strength to resist occupation if the rebels are
concerned with the population's acceptance, and won't have any effect if the rebels decide to
not negotiate and kill howmever resists.
Before I present the hypothesis and specify the causal mechanism, the concepts secessionist
and non-secessionist require specification. Secessionist rebel groups cannot achieve victory
through military success alone, they strive to create an independent state and be recognised as
independent from the central government as well as international actors. Their main concern
to this end is legitimacy, and to gain legitimacy groups need to prove that they are able to
govern. To achieve this groups attempt to refrain from excessive violence and coercive
methods of generating compliance. It is in their interest to be accepted by the population, and
therefore is social provisions often a better strategy. Non-secessionist rebel groups on the
other hand strive to overtake existing institutions or simply remove the present actor from
power, and for these groups, a military victory alone is typically sufficient for success. To
mobilize a force needed to overthrow the government, non secessionist rebels main concern
is recruitment and territorial control. Strategies commonly used are exclusive services as a
recruitment tool, threats and kidnappings during forced recruitment, and territorial takeover
with disregard for the populations preferences (Stewart, 2018). These are the definitions that
will be applied to the two rebel group types in this paper. Specifying concepts is crucial in
order to strengthen the utility and coherence of the concept (Gerring, 1999).
2.3.1 Hypotheses
H1: Non-secessionist rebel groups who encounter populations with high levels of CAC will
use coercive methods to generate compliance.
H2: Non-secessionist rebel groups who encounter populations with low levels of CAC will
use coercive methods to generate compliance.
H0: The level of the CAC of the population does not affect the rebels choice of methods in
regard to the generation of compliance.
102.3.2 Causal mechanism
The causal story is as follows; non-secessionist rebels, who enter villages inhabiting
populations with high CAC will not persuade them to comply, these villages have will and a
credible ability to resist, and because non-secessionist groups are not as willing (dependent
on legitimization) or capable to provide the cost of persuasion (providing social provisions
and investing in society), and will instead use coercive methods, forcing compliance by
violence. When non-secessionist rebel groups enter societies with low levels of CAC the
argument contests that persuasive methods will be sufficient to acquire territorial control, and
will therefore be used.
2.3.3 Assumptions
The argument builds on several assumptions. First, I assume that non-secessionist groups will
contend to occupy as much territory as they can with their given military strength. I also
assume that civilians will not independently from government forces or other NSAG attempt
to fierback with armed force in the case of a rebel-led territorial take over. Second, I assume
that a population experiencing the same level of access to sufficient and effective justice,
strength of democracy, political corruption; and the level to which laws are enforced
transparently and equally, inherit the came strength in CAC. I do realise that especially in
India there might be regional differences and will be vigilant during the analysis if such
differences are distinguishable. The third assumption is that rebel groups will apply the same
method of generation compliance in all areas of the same level of CAC. This assumption is
dependent on a relatively strong rebel group cohesion, which is present in both CPP and
CPI-M at the time of interest (UCDP, 2020a; UCDP, 2020b).
3. Research design and methods
This paper elaborates on the role of civil agency by assigning values to countries' collective
action capacity (CAC) and testing its effect on rebel group behaviour, specifically their
method of generating compliance in new territory. In this qualitative, structured and focused
comparative case study, the unit of analysis is rebel groups as this is the point of comparison
for the dependent variable. Below, I provide an overview of the operationalisation of the
independent and dependent variables, followed by descriptions of the data collection and case
selection criteria . Finally, I introduce briefly chosen cases, CPP in the Philippines (1968) and
CPI-Maoist in west India (2003).
113.1 Research method: Structured and focused comparison
Systematic comparison is used to achieve structure, and is accomplished by asking the same
question to both cases. This approach is used in order to find data that is completely
comparable. To achieve focus the approach only deals with relevant aspects of each case. It is
important to acknowledge that a “single study cannot address all the interesting aspects of an
historical event” (George et al., 2005: 70). To ensure that the significant and relevant
questions are being asked, one should make sure that they all are grounded and related to the
theoretical framework (George et al., 2005:70).
Qualitative comparative case studies are able to consider thick concepts as well as allow for
“the development of thick theory: richly specified, complex models that are sensitive to
variations by time and place” (Coppedge, 1999: 468). Considering that my focus is on
determining rebel behaviour based on a civil society, one could argue that there are benefits
from an in-depth approach, which is enabled through a qualitative study.
Important when operationalizing variables, is to consider the validity and the reliability of the
measurements. The reliability in qualitative comparative case studies are generally lower than
in other research designs, the questions that serve to direct the inquiry could be interpreted
differently and the sources I will use would not necessarily be the same if another researcher
would attempt the same framework (George et al., 2005:71). To achieve a higher degree of
reliability the questions posed for the operationalisation in this study intend to be broad
enough to enable triangulation of sources as well as focused enough to avoid margin of
individual interpretation (Coppedge, 1999).
Validity is achieved when the “scores meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the
corresponding concept" (Adcock et al., 2001: 530). There is a tension though, between
internal and external validity (Slater et al., 2013:1307). External validity concerns the
probability that our findings can be applied to the larger population beyond the cases
considered for the analysis. Internal validity concerns how the study “produces high levels of
confidence about whether the independent variables cause the dependent variable” (Kellstedt
et al., 2013: 89). High internal validity gives more details about the causal relationship
between the key variables (Slater et al., 2013; Gerring, 2007: 217). To achieve this we thus
need to work with multidimensional, thick concepts. This thesis has higher internal validity
as I work with detailed multidimensional concepts. However, with strong internal validity
comes often weaker external validity (Slater et al., 2013: 1307). Quantitative studies have
higher external validity, and lower internal validity, and thus more applicable beyond the
12cases in the analysis (Gerring, 2007: 43). The potential of generalization based upon the
findings in this analysis is limited, I therefore encourage more studies to be done on this
subject.
3.2 Operationalisation of key variables
The paper aims to assess values to countries' collective action capacity (CAC) and test its
effect on rebel groups’ method of generating compliance in new territory. In the following
section is the operationalisation of the independent and dependent variables presented. An
overview of the SFC-questions is located in Appendix A and B, section 7.
3.2.1 Independent variable: Collective action capacity
The independent variable is collective action capacity. This is a thick concept that can be
defined as the ability and willingness of a population to facilitate joint action in which groups
composed of self-interested and interdependent individuals seek to develop and carry out
cooperative plans. Operationalizing this concept is no easy feat, it concerns the feelings and
perceptions of a population in a certain area in a specific point in time. To maximise the
external validity the operationalisation has been made to consider the determinants that might
produce or counteract CAC within a population. I argue that access to these services/systems
creates an acceptance and reliance on the institutions in question, and makes the population
trust the establishment they all are a part of, which in turn creates the ability and willingness
of the population to facilitate joint action and carry out cooperative plans, at least in regard to
handling occupation of armed groups. The operationalisation was made this way, instead of
attempting to measure the populations actual ability and willingness to cooperate and stand
together, to increase the reliability and the external validity. A second reason for this method
is that data that could answer questions on population's perception in regard to extended
cooperation directly is unavailable to a sufficient degree at this time, and compiling
independent data is; within the time frame, with the global pandemic, language barriers and
lack of resources at this point, not an option. To justify the aspects chosen in the
operationalisation I will consider the aspects of CAC established in previous research. Rubin
(2019) argues that four categories are the main constituents of CAC, to find my aspects of
consideration I attempt to find services/systems that could lead to the increase or decrease of
CAC in the population based on those four categories. The analysis will be based on the
conditions of the time right before the rebel group were established, to insure covariation.
The four are: Generalized trust which reflects the expectation that others will comply with
norms governing social interactions and forego short term incentives to preserve long term
13cooperation. Other-regarding preferences refer to individuals’ willingness to forego
self-interest to promote community welfare. The inclusiveness of local institutions
contributes to a community’s experience with consensus-building processes for generating
compromise solutions to distributional conflict. And lastly the density of interactions across
social group divides, or cross-cutting cleavages, promotes communication across group
boundaries and facilitates detection and sanctioning of noncooperative behavior.
3.2.1.1 The level to which laws are enforced transparently and equally
To determine the generalized trust, as well as interactions that promote communication and
facilitates detection and sanctioning of noncooperative behavior, I will consider the quality of
the justice systems. A justice system that is transparent, fair and accountable, that provides
for a structured discussion of norms and rules in society, that provides accountability both to
the common population but also to the political leaders, is argued to increase the level of trust
individuals feels that others will comply with the rules and norms of society, and increases
level of communication across social groups to detect and sanction noncooperative behaviour.
Specifically to which extent laws are transparent and equally enforced, and to what extent the
actions of officials comply with the law.
3.2.1.2 Democracy; and Political Corruption
To determine individuals’ willingness to forego self-interest to promote community welfare I
have chosen to measure values of democracy and levels of political corruption. This is
grounded in the argument that democracy creates a culture of understanding and acceptance
that all individuals' opinions matter equally and that the will of the majority should guide the
political decisions of the country. Analysing corruption compliments the aspect of democracy
in understanding individuals’ willingness to forgo self-interest to promote community
welfare, by analysing the individuals who have bigger influence on politics than the
commonon population separately. If corruption in a country is high then this indicates that the
rulers are not willing to forgo self-interest to promote community welfare which would likely
translate to the public and affect their behaviour in their community as well. Corruption is for
this purpose defined as ‘exchanging goods or services for political advantages’, and
democracy will be analysed according to Dahl's definition of polyarchy from 1994, composed
of seven aspects; elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, right to run for
office, freedom of expression, alternative information and associational freedom (Bailey et
al., 2003).
143.2.1.3 Local institutions
The final aspect of CAC concerns the inclusiveness of local institutions, Rubin (2019) finds
that inclusive institutions contribute to a community’s experience with consensus-building
processes for generating compromise solutions to distributional conflict. I will in regard to
this analyse local institutions and structures in the chosen cases and consider their;
independence from state, fairness in regard to different social groups as well as the quality of
outcomes of the activities being conducted. The vital role that local governance plays in
nation-building is well-established (Herrera et al., 2016). According to the International
Guidelines on Decentralisation and Strengthening of Local Authorities, issued by
UN-Habitat, ‘political decentralization to the local level is an essential component of
democratization, good governance and citizen engagement’ (Tibaijuka, 2009).
3.1.2 Dependent Variable: Method of generating compliance
The dependent variable is the rebels method of generating compliance, which refers to the
way in which a NSAG that implements its rules in a certain territory, seeks to create a
situation where the population complies with those rules. Furlan (2020) has introduced this
characteristic of rebels and she argues that this aspect varies in two ways, compliance by
persuasion or coercion, essentially rebel group either persuade the population or force them to
comply. I will determine the method used by considering three aspects; rebel group
involvement in institutions; rebel provided sanctions; and the method of generating taxes.
These aspects capture territorial occupation where the rebel group can interact in different
manners towards the civilians.
3.1.2.1 Rebel group involvement in institutions
The first aspect I will consider to determine the method most applied, is whether the group
expresses interest in being involved with the sub-national institutions. This will be apparent if
the group expresses interest in local institutions, joins counsels and inflicts their policies and
preferences in those institutions. Inserting themselves in institutions will create opportunities
for the rebels to persuade the population that complying to their rule is in the populations
interest.
3.1.2.2 Rebel provided sanctions
The second aspect is whether the rebel group provides some type of social provisions, this
can include activities such as organizing systems of order, building infrastructure or
15supporting existing systems with resources. High levels of rebel provided sanctions will
indicate that rebels are attempting persuasive measures to achieve compliance.
3.1.2.3 Method of generating taxes
The final aspect will concern taxation, most rebel groups do collect taxes from the population
in some manner, the variation will be whether the contributions are collected at force or by
request. Forceful taxation will in this study include radis and plundering, and taxation will be
deemed ‘requested’ if civilians have donated without being threatened or coerced.
3.3 Data collection
The data used for this thesis are primarily based on secondary sources, primarily national and
reports from governments, international organisations, news sources, journal articles, and
acclaimed databases such as V-Dem. Generally, information from conflict-ridden areas is
difficult to obtain, as information may often be compromised by bias or propaganda,
therefore it is important to be aware of and acknowledge this throughout the data collection
process (Höglund et al., 2011: 185, 198). Data collection on civilian targeting of violence
from primary sources is especially problematic due to ethical reasons; individuals responding
to interviews, portraying violent actors in a displeasing light may risk being punished
(Campbell, 2018). To further increase the reliability I relied on triangulation to gather
information, to find and compare multiple sources in order “to improve construct validity
and to detect bias” (Höglund et al., 2011:191). I deployed source criticism to assess the
reliability, by assessing the identity, dependence, bias and proximity of each source as well as
use a variation of sources for different purposes and to enhance the nuances of the
information (Höglund et all., 2011:187-190).
3.4 Case selection: Mill's method of difference
This analysis will use Mill's method of difference, with the cases chosen on the independent
variable to ensure variation. George and Bennett (2004:30-32) presents that cases in this
method are chosen to be as similar as possible on all relevant variables, except on the
phenomenon of interest (George et al., 2004:30-32). The case selection process is
fundamental in qualitative studie to establish covariation and isolation. Covariation refers to
whether one variable covaries with another, and isolation is present when other confounding
variables do not affect the dependent variable (Kellstedt et al, 2013:54). To meet these
requirements I choose cases that vary on the independent variable and are held similar on the
16control variables. The control variables are used to ensure that the cases are similar enough to
ensure that the variation experienced on the dependent variable is probable to be due to the
variation on the dependent variable. However, George and Bennett (2005:30-32) reminds us
that in social studies we can never control for all possible alternative variables, and reality is
not as neat as one sometimes would like. Important is instead to control for the most obvious
variables, that could likely have an effect on both independent and dependent values. The last
two criterias for establishing causal relations are time order and causal mechanisms (Kellstedt
et al., 2013:55). Time order will be achieved by assessing the independent variable in the
year/years before the formation of the rebel group and analysing the dependent within the
given timeframe for each case, and the causal mechanism will be clearly identified.
The “universe of cases” or the population, are the group of cases in which yours belong. The
population of cases in this thesis is all countries with rebel groups attempting total or partial
occupation of territory and its population. The two choices were preliminary assessed using
V-Dem, Global standards and the Local knowledge database. From the population of cases
assessed I controlled for the control variables and from the cases remaining, I chose the two
cases that differentiated the most in the independent variable (CAC). The Philippines
(1964-1991), representing the case with low CAC, with the rebel gropp CPP; and India
(2000-present), representing the case with the high CAC with the rebel group CPI-Maoist,
became the final candidates and such the cases for this analysis. The timeframes start a few
years before the rebel groups were established, and the end of the timeframe is based in the
case of the Philippines on a deescalation in violence after 1991. In India the conflict is still
active motivating the “end of the timeframe” as present.
3.4.1 Background: CPP in Philippines
During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during the second world war, several
bands of anti-Japanese armed groups formed, one of these was the Hukbalahap, they
redistributed land that was abandoned during the war. When the Philippines became
independent in 1946, the new government tried to reinstate ownership of the territory held
pre-war, which led to the reactivation of the Huk organisation. The reactivation of the rebel
group made US involvement increase which was met by several protests in the early 1960s.
In response to this, one of the spearheads of the declining Huk organisation, Jose Maria Sison
established the new group CPP (Communist Party of the Philippines) (Stanford University;
2018). CPP provided the political and strategic leadership, but the organization also consists
of the armed wing; New People’s Army (NPA), established in 1969 and the National
17Democratic Front (NDF), set up in 1973, to align other various left-wing movements. When
NPA was established it consisted of just 60 men with 26 single-shot rifles and 9 automatic
rifles. In the following years, NPA expanded and in 1972 President Ferdinand Marcos
declared martial law to suppress the growing state of rebellion, as well as the increasing
communal conflicts in the southern region of Mindanao between Christians and Muslims.
CPP-NPA outlined their plans and motives for armed struggle in the 1968 ‘Program for a
People’s Democratic Revolution’. Here it was made clear that CPP perceived the Filipino
regime as well as “all the reactionary bourgeois classes supporting it” to be the enemy. By
1985 CPP were active in 80 percent of the country’s 73 provinces, and controlled more than
25 000 fighters (UCDP, 2020a). It was estimated that at least 50% of the population could be
mobilized for protest actions at CPP-NPAs request (CIA, 1985).
3.4.2 Background: CPI-Maoist in India
Since its independence in 1947, India has seen several episodes of violent conflict waged by
many different communist groups. The governmental power with the british influence has
been contested by the communist ideologies and through the 50s, 60s and 70s different
groups emerged, splintered and were contained by state forces. They all fought to either
overpower the government, or to change the directionality of the country, in one way or the
other. CPI-Maoist was formed in September 2004 when the then two largest communist
groups; People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) merged
(UCDP, 2020b). At this point in time the brutality and lethality of attacks by the group
increased dramatically (Ramana, 2006). The CPI-Maoist have been accused of killing and
torturing villagers after accusing them of being police informers, as well as using kidnappings
for ransom (Al Jazeera, 2017). The CPI-Maoist presence ranged from intense to negligible in
160 districts across 16 states in India (Ramana, 2006), and their estimated strength varied
from 6500 to 22 000 fighters (UCDP, 2019b).
3.5 Control variables
This paper aims to estimate the level of CAC in the two countries and test its causal effect on
the rebel groups method of generating compliance. In this section, I present the control
variables as well as the findings when controlling for them. The operationalisation is
illustrated in Appendix C, where I specify the questions posed to the material. The two
chosen cases –CPP and CPI-Maoist– are similar across all these variables, which contributes
to a higher level of isolation of confounding variables.
183.5.1 Secessionist goals
The rebel groups goal might be the most important variable to control for in this research
design. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, previous research has identified a casual
variation between the rebel groups goal and their level of civilian targeting, as well as
provision of social services and resources, which have some similarities to the dependent
variable in this analysis (Stewart, 2018; Fazal, 2018). It is argued in these studies that
secessionist groups, who aim to create an independent state in a certain territory, are more
dependent on the support from the civilian population, as they need to be legitimized by
multiple levels of actors to achieve their goal of independence. From this it is possible to
theorise that the rebel groups goals might also affect the method rebels use to gain
compliance from the population. As different methods might generate different levels of
support and legitimization. To control for this variation two rebel groups are chosen who
have non-secessionist goals, namly groups who aim to dismantle the present state
government.
UCDP (2020a) presents that the Communist Party of the Philippines aims to overthrow the
government through armed struggle and replace it with a communist regime. The center for
international security and cooperation concours, and states that CPP seeks to overthrow the
Philippine government and make way for a new state led by the working class and to expel
American influence from the Philippines (Stanford University, 2018). CPP has a website
where they post documents and statements about their organisation, and in a document named
CPP Constitution and Program, their goals are also outlined in their own words. To bring
about a people's revolution and enforce a communist ideology in the country as presented by
Mao Zedong (Central Committee, 2016).
The Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist) is according to UCDP (2020b) fighting
the “people’s war” with the goal of ousting the government and installing the “people’s
government” in its place. The CPI-Maoist completely rejects to partake in the parliamentary
processes, claiming that the institutions of the Indian government cannot be reformed but
must be destroyed to be able to truly represent the people’s interests (UCDP, 2020d). Banned
thought.net is a website where rebel groups statements and publications are made available to
the public as the indian government attempts to suppress these publications. A large number
of groups have documents published there. One of their founding documents from 2004 is
their part program, published by the central committee. This document also states that the
19movement's goal is to oust the present government and implement a new regime for the
peasants of the country (Central Committee, 2004).
3.5.2 Post-colonial state
The second control variable concerns the country's history as a colony. Research on countries
becoming independent after years of being colonised by foreign powers make up a significant
section of development studies and conflict research, and the types of conflicts that arise in
post-colonial settings often bear similarities in a couple of ways (Young, 2003:1-9; Loomba,
2015: 19-60). Post-colonial states have often a weak sense of identity, since cultural
development has been repressed by controlling actors, violence is more commonly a part of
everyday life and dissatisfaction with the leadership have led to rallies towards change and at
times independence is achieved by revolution from an organised population (Loomba,
2015:112-130). At other times colonial powers released control back to the population, often
with a hand picked government to serve as a transition into democracy and open elections
(Young, 2003:69-78). This is a vulnerable time in the transition, research shows that
transitioning states moving from dictatorship and colonialism into democracy experience a
surge of violence and conflict, as emotions run high and systems of expression are not
sufficiently established (Loomba, 2015:60-71). I chose to control for whether the cases
chosen were post-colonial countries because the presence of these factors would likely affect
the populations CAC as well as the rebel groups behaviour. Specific research on how
post-colonial characteristics might affect population CAC and rebel group behaviour have not
been identified, but one could theorize that post-colonial populations will be less unifyd in
their identity and have weaker CAC. The rebel groups might also be more prone to use
violence, as well as persuasive methods, as outsing forgine influence and a people's
revolution will be an accessible point of conviction for the rebels.
The Philippines have a long history of foreign occupation, after 400 years of colonialism, the
Philippines was granted independence by the USA on 4 July 1946, as part of the
decolonisation after the Second World War.
The Republic of India gained its independence after two centuries of colonialism in 1947,
after being under the control of the British Empire from approximately the mid-19th century
(UCDP, 2019d).
203.5.3 Ideology
The last control variable will examine the group's ideology. Different ideologies are used by
rebel groups all over the world to motivate a shift in power, and different ideologies use
different arguments to motivate the need for revolution to themselves and the civilian
population. Religious islamic rebellions with the intention to establish sharia laws in a
country might approach civilians differently than socialistic movements fighting for the rights
of the lower class for example. I believe this variation could affect the independent and
dependent variables of this study and have therefore chosen to control for the ideology
driving the movement to be similar enough to not independently affect the generation of
compliance and the CAC of the population.
The Communist Party of the Philippines, and the Communist Party of India–Maoist, are both
communist movements, who rose as anti-movements to the liberal, capitalist, colonial powers
that earlier suppressed them (UCDP, 2020a; UCDP, 2020b). The CPP expresses their
ideological framework to be based on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (Central committee,
2016). CPI-Maoist took inspiration from Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese communist Party,
and expressed their ideology and culture to be guided by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as well
(Central committee, 2004).
4. Findings
4.1 Independent variable: Collective action capacity
This thesis tests the causal relationship between the level of CAC to the method of generating
compliance chosen by the rebel group. As mentioned earlier, four aspects will be addressed:
The level to which laws are enforced transparently and equally; Democracy; Political
Corruption; and Local institutions presented. First for the case of the Philippines and then for
India, the data will be gathered from the year/years leading up to the formation of each rebel
group. To ensure that the observed values are representing the state of society at the time of
interest.
4.1.1.1 Philippines: The level to which laws are enforced transparently and equally
A study was made by professor Cornelius J. Peck at the University of Washington School of
Law, about the administrative law and the public law environment of the Philippines in 1965,
three years before the formation of the CPP. This study found inadequacy of the Philippino
government's ability to maintain a separation of powers, and regarding the proper role of the
courts in reviewing administrative action (Peck, 1965). A separation between the executive,
21legislative and judicial power is widely regarded to be important in a democratic system, to
prevent too much power being accumulated in one spot (Britannica, no date,a). An inability
to maintain this separation will likely lead to systems forming who benefit the people in
power more than the population, which leads to increased division in class and dissatisfaction
among the masses (Dubnick et al., 2011: 134-136). Courts inability in reviewing actions by
the administration lowers the level of accountability, which is essential to maintain
democratic establishments (Dubnick et al, 2011:129-136).
Another issue that was identified was the centralization of authority, and the multitude of
employees that needed to be involved at each stage of processing a matter (Peck, 1965).
Furthermore, it was clear that there was no administrative procedure act, to establish
principles of general applicability for creating laws and adjudicatory functions of
administrative agencies. Nor were regulations or administrative adjudications made available
to the population (Peck, 1965). Which also increases the possibility for legislators to affect
laws and agencies for their own benefit, as well as unables accountability due to a lack of
information (Judicial Department, 1987; Villanueva, 1978). This creates an environment where
politicians are able to formally or informally control most social and economic systems, and
individuals who become victims of organised crime rarely get vindication, as the political
elites are able to affect the courts to their advantage (Dubnick & et al., 2011:140-145; Peck,
1965). I have been unable to further determine the populations access to the laws and
regulations at the time, internett access was practically nonexistent. The state of the
legislative at the time however seemed to indicate that politicians probably chose not to make
public such information. These facts in conjunction makes it near impossible to hold specific
individuals accountable for unsatisfactory behaviour (Peck, 1965).
4.1.1.2 Philippines: Democracy, Political Corruption
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Philippines endured a combination of economic crisis
and mass protests, which built up political tension that fuelled the polarisation of classes and
a decline in the legitimacy of elite rule. The political arena was based on a two party system
where all significant influence over society was centralised to the political elite. The two
parties present during this period were indistinguishable in ideology, policy, elitist structures
and social make up. The two interchanged power over office almost every term, and
Tancangco, (1988) observed: “where the Nacionalista and Liberals alternated as the majority
party, the co-ordinating and carrying out of official policy became increasingly difficult when
the parties and their various factions in office used the so-called separation of powers
22between the presidency and congress inventively to strengthen their bargaining power against
each other.” The intensification of intra-factional competition had brought the country to a
political brink (Teehankee, 2002). In November 1965 (the last election before the formation
of CPP), Ferdinand E. Marcos was elected to the presidency. His administration faced grave
economic problems that were exacerbated by smuggling, corruption and tax evasion
(Britannica, no date,b). The right to vote was re-established in the 1940 bicameral legislature
which remained until 1972, granting the right to all Filipino residents who were: 21 years and
above; able to read and write Spanish or English; and residents of the Philippines for at least
one year and of the municipality in which they proposed to vote for at least six months prior
to the election. By 1939, all existing election laws were consolidated into an Election Code
(Commonwealth Act No. 357) that empowered the secretary of the interior to supervise all
types of election (Teehankee, 2002). But remaining is the fact that residents did not
practically have options in regard to policy. The fusion of wealth and power brought about by
political connections and patronage, undermined the state’s capacity to realize broad national
goals for economic and social development. Elections were more or less staged as schemes of
oligarchic interests manipulated and controlled the electoral outcomes, by controlling the
media, funding campaigning, and committing electoral fraud (Teehankee, 2002; Tancangco,
1988).
VDem code democracy to be absent in the Philippines from 1964-1986, here a regime is
considered a democracy; if multiple parties are allowed; if the executive and legislative
power is directly or indirectly elected by popular vote; if there are multiple parties within the
legislature; if there is de facto existence of multiple parties outside of regime front; and if
there has been no consolidation of incumbent advantage (V-Dem, 2019).
The citizens did enjoy the right to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative
information and associational freedom to a sufficient degree, but due to the previously
mentioned facts, can the level of democracy in the Philippines in 1967 not be considered
anything but low.
Whereas so-called ‘pork barrel’ had been used by previous presidents to influence individual
members of the Senate and House, Marco’s administration moved to circumvent
congressional representatives in a more systematic fashion. During his first term, Marcos ’
skilful manipulation of agencies like the Presidential Arm for Community Development and
use of the discretionary Barrio Funds allowed him to strengthen the executive branch visà
-vis the Philippine Congress. In addition to expanding government developmental initiatives
23– as exemplified by the 1966 Four-Year Economic Program and the 1967 Industrial
Investment Act – Marcos reintroduced monetary and fiscal controls in mid-1967. It
culminated in 1972 when Ferdinand Marcos declared Martial Law, and ushered in an
extended period of authoritarianism until he was ousted in 1986 (Teehankee, 2020).
Evidence of bribery and corruption of members of Congress and officials of the executive
branch has been found extensive, for example have charges of bribery been found to have
played a significant role in bringing about the adoption of the Retail Trade Nationalization, as
well as defeating efforts to repeal or amend it. Government employees did not receive pay
based on their responsibilities, or on a monthly basis, and the potential for corruption was
deemed so great that no one person was able to be held responsible for any matter of
importance (Peck, 1965). Corruption can be distinguished from inefficiency of the
administrative process, even though the inefficiency may lead to corruption by those who
desire more prompt action. A distinction may further be drawn between that type of
corruption that might be used for a more speedy disposition of a pending matter, and the kind
of corruption under which legal rights or other expectations are enjoyed through
compensation of those who exercise power of government. The administrative process in the
Philippines has, since its independence and the end of World War two, unfortunately seen
enough of both types (Peck, 1965).
4.1.1.3 Philippines in 1968: Local institutions
The 1960s had also witnessed continued economic differentiation and rapid urbanisation in
the Philippines, with the National Capital Region becoming the number one destination of
migration. This also led to a deficit in local leaders in rural areas (Hedman et al., 2001). The
country is divided into provinces, which in many ways act like municipalities, they are
corporate bodies who administer certain national laws within their boundaries, headed by a
provincial governor. Like municipalities, they have no constitutional powers over legislation,
and were granted very limited powers by the government. The Phillipine Constitution
provides that the President of the Republic may remove local officials from office where
authorized by statute, and shall "exercise general supervision over all local governments as
may be provided by law" (Macaspac, 2018). Local governments are kept generally weak in
finance and personnel by the government. Even the more prosperous cities and provinces are
not able or allowed to keep a substantial share of their revenues as the government likes to
maintain their dependence on state resources. The local government chief executives in these
provinces and cities are also not given authority to structure their offices independently to
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