INTERPRETING THE COMMISSION OPINIONS ON THE MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS OF UKRAINE, MOLDOVA AND GEORGIA, AND NEXT STEPS FOR THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ...

INTERPRETING THE COMMISSION OPINIONS ON
THE MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS OF UKRAINE,
MOLDOVA AND GEORGIA, AND NEXT STEPS FOR
THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

                             Michael Emerson
                             Steven Blockmans
                             Tinatin Akhvlediani

                             CEPS Policy Insight
                             No 2022-22 / June 2022

Interpreting the Commission Opinions on
             the membership applications of Ukraine,
               Moldova and Georgia, and next steps
                     for the European Council

          Michael Emerson, Steven Blockmans and Tinatin Akhvlediani

On 17 June the European Commission published its Opinions on the membership applications
of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia that had been triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, concluded the official
presentation of the Opinions with these fine words: ‘We all know that Ukrainians are ready to
die for the European perspective. We want them to live with us the European dream’. To her
great credit, she had already declared three days after Russia’s invasion: ‘Ukraine is one of us
and we want you in’. To which many cautious souls, who had remarked that she had
overstepped the mark, can now catch up.
The essential conclusions are that for Ukraine and Moldova it is recommended to the Council
that their ‘European perspective’ and immediate ‘candidate’ status be recognised,
accompanied by lists of conditions that each of them need to be address. For Georgia it is
recommended that their ‘European perspective’ be recognised, but that ‘candidate’ status is
deferred until a list of conditions is met.
The Commission’s recommendations are in line with the positions taken by the European
Parliament, to which we may add our own unofficial opinions on all three applications (see
Georgia 1, Moldova and Ukraine), published by CEPS, in April and May.

1
    Solely the opinion of Steven Blockmans and Michael Emerson.

         Michael Emerson is CEPS Associate Senior Research Fellow, Steven Blockmans is Director of Research at
         CEPS and Tinatin Akhvlediani is a Research Fellow in the CEPS Foreign Policy unit.
         CEPS Policy Insights offer analyses of a wide range of key policy questions facing Europe. As an institution,
         CEPS takes no position on questions of European policy. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed
         are attributable only to the authors in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which they are
         associated. Cover image credit: European Union.
                    Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu) © CEPS 2022
                    CEPS ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu

2 | EMERSON, BLOCKMANS & AKHVLEDIANI

Decoding the Commission’s recommendations
The content of the three Opinions is straight out of the regular EU enlargement book, with a
summary review of the progress made thus far regarding the many sector-specific chapters of
the process. This is not exciting reading, and the Opinion on Ukraine does not speculate on how
the war will end and it doesn’t discuss how the inevitable immediate priority of post-war
reconstruction will be planned and financed. On the other hand, this very conventional review
of the chapters has a positive aspect, implying that the three countries are now fully part of the
enlargement process, alongside the Western Balkans.
Recognising the ‘European perspective’, a term with no precise legal standing, is signalling that
all three countries would now enter the accession process following a simple political decision.
This would be only a first preliminary step without immediate operational consequences, but if
accepted by the European Council, it would mark a fundamental political move by the EU, and
one that distinguishes the ‘Trio’ more explicitly from the rest of the Eastern Partnership.
The three states have been requesting this ‘membership perspective’ for years with no success,
notably in negotiations over their association agreements and declarations made at the end of
important political meetings. The argument has been constantly made that it was implausible
to expect the associated states to be politically motivated to go the whole way in fulfilling the
onerous requirements in their association agreements to adopt EU law without the incentive
of membership. With such a political decision on Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia’s applications,
this argument would now be settled once and for all.
‘Candidate’ status carries the process one step further. This term also has no legal standing,
but again is important politically, and in this case also operationally, as it opens the door to the
accession process. Concretely it means that ‘intergovernmental conferences’ with the EU and
its Member States can be convened to ‘open’ the ‘clusters’ and ‘chapters’ of policy domains
that lay the groundwork for the eventual accession treaty.
Currently, of the Western Balkan applicants, only Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and North
Macedonia have candidate status, while Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo only have ‘potential
candidate’ status. The Commission’s recommendation that Ukraine and Moldova (but not
Georgia) should now become candidates also marks an important political differentiation (see
further below).

Analysing the list of conditions
The lists of conditions required by the Commission for each of the three cases to proceed, as
summarised in the table below, should be compared in more detail.
All three cases are notable for what does not appear, namely the economic chapters. The likely
explanation is that all three countries have been making progress across the board in
implementing their Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) with the EU, which

INTERPRETING THE COMMISSION OPINIONS ON THE MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS OF UKRAINE, MOLDOVA AND GEORGIA | 3

cover virtually all the economic chapters of the accession process. The extent of this progress
is often incomplete but can be reasonably expected to reach a satisfactory conclusion in the
course of the pre-accession process. There is an impressive sprinkling of ‘good’ assessments
made on many chapters in all three cases – Georgia actually scores best out of the three.

Table 1. Critical issues cited in the Commission’s Opinions as requiring action
             Georgia                             Moldova                                Ukraine
 Counter political polarisation, in
 the spirit of 19 April Agreement
 Improve democratic oversight

 Improve electoral framework

 Appointment of Ombudsman             Public administration reform

 Judicial reform                      Judicial reform                      Judicial reform

 Strengthen anti-corruption           Fight corruption at all levels       Fight against corruption
 agency
 De-oligarchisation                   De-oligarchisation                   De-oligarchisation

 Fight against organised crime        Fight against organised crime

                                      Asset recovery, money                Anti-money laundering
                                      laundering                           legislation
                                      Improve public procurement

 Media freedoms                                                            Media vested interests

 Human rights of vulnerable           Strengthen human rights              National minorities
 groups
 Gender equality

                                      Enhance civil society role

Only Georgia, however, is criticised over the functioning of democratic institutions, whilst
democratic electoral processes in Ukraine and Moldova have markedly improved in recent
years.
All three countries have varying problems with the judiciary, the rule of law and ‘de-
oligarchisation’. For example in Moldova, the long-ruling oligarch fled the country in 2019,
while in Ukraine the notorious role of several oligarchs has diminished due to the war, whilst in
Georgia the currently ruling oligarch exhibits increasingly autocratic tendencies.
Corruption is cited in all three cases. Georgia has had an outstandingly positive record, but high-
level corruption is now perceived to be a growing problem.

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The Georgian problem
It is of course necessary that fair and even-handed assessments be made. The Georgian
government responded very critically to our own assessment, and there will also presumably
be complaints that the Commission has not been fair in its own assessment. Additionally,
Georgian civil society has been vociferous in claiming that their country should be granted
candidate status given Georgia’s vulnerability to Russian invasion and the strong public support
for Georgia’s European future.
The rationale for postponing candidate status for Georgia is based first of all on poor
performance on political scores, which for the EU is a matter of fundamental – even existential
– importance. The EU has seen how some formerly communist countries have not sustained
sound democratic performance, even after their accession to the EU. This represents a serious
danger to the functioning of the EU, as seen for example in the abusive use of veto powers by
Hungary and Bulgaria in the Council.
With this mind, all three applicants have to understand that the EU will want not want to take
any chances over any amplification of this kind of problem. Georgia currently lacks credibility
on this front. The government appears to take the EU for granted by submitting a membership
application while at the same undertaking actions that are inconsistent with the EU’s
democratic values.
Fortunately, it should not be that difficult to correct the problems. If the Georgian leadership is
really committed to its EU application, it already has a good basis to progress along the
accession path on economic accounts. The sooner Georgia shows its commitment to the
needed reforms, the sooner it can request the EU to reconsider its decision. As foreseen by the
Opinion, the Commission will monitor and report on Georgia’s progress by the end of 2022,
and it will surely be closely monitoring the 2024 elections to ensure that they are conducted
impeccably in a spirit of fair competition rather than polarisation.
The EU needs to have its message understood now, at the beginning of the process. The EU
does not want to punish Georgia, but merely to encourage it to make a certain course
correction.

Charting the way forward
First, the European Council will meet on 23-24 June to decide its formal position on the
Commission’s recommendations. The idea of immediate candidate status for the new
applicants has been controversial. However the leaders of France, Germany, Italy and Romania
have announced their favourable position on candidacy for Ukraine and Moldova during their
joint mission to Kyiv on 16 June. Since then, the Netherlands and Denmark have indicated that
they would no longer object.

INTERPRETING THE COMMISSION OPINIONS ON THE MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS OF UKRAINE, MOLDOVA AND GEORGIA | 5

Consensus on 23-24 June in support of the Commission now seems highly likely, even if Viktor
Orban’s Hungary might attempt to throw another spanner in the works to extract more
concessions on the protection of minority rights in Ukraine.
Second, part of the 23-24 June meeting will be devoted to a special session on the Western
Balkans. Part of this agenda should focus on ideas for revamping the enlargement procedures,
for which President Charles Michel has already advanced his ideas during a speech on 18 May.
In particular, he proposes that there should be ‘progressive and gradual integration already in
the accession process’, including participation in the institutions and EU financial instruments,
conditional on progress in relation to ‘reference criteria’, and subject to ‘reversibility’ in the
case of regress.
These ideas are consistent with more detailed proposals that with partners in Belgrade we have
set out in our paper ‘A Template for Staged Accession to the EU’. Support for such an idea is
emerging among Western Balkan states.
A key idea (in our proposals) for a penultimate stage of integration is for the new Member
States to participate fully in the EU with only three exceptions (no veto powers in the Council,
no member of the Commission and no judge at the European Court of Justice).
Already the political argument is taking shape among Western Balkan states that they could
take a leading proactive role in this process, by unilaterally declaring their readiness to
temporarily do without veto power and thus promote desirable EU systemic reforms. This
would serve to sooth the concerns of existing Member States over accepting increasing
numbers of new but still fragile democracies, while favourably reshaping the political
reputation of these states. The European Council on 23-24 June could launch the process for
opening up a debate around these ideas, and invite the Commission to make proposals.
Third, the European Council will no doubt debate President Macron’s ideas for a European
Political Community, with a paper going into further details following his 9 May speech on the
proposal (see Annex below). This goes alongside President Michel’s ideas for a slightly
differently named initiative for a European Geopolitical Community.
The membership of both of these potential new communities seems to be potentially
addressed to the whole of Europe, excluding Russia and Belarus. Their functions would not be
to serve as an alternative to enlargement, but would engage on matters of foreign and security
policy, climate change, energy supplies and other raw materials, food security, infrastructures
and their connectivity, migration, the fight against organised crime, and relations with other
geo-political actors (Macron’s list, but Michel’s is similar).
The European Political Community would have a light structure, and meet several times a year
at summit and ministerial level. The European Council on 23-24 June should provide the first
indications on how much support it may win from Member States, as well as a possible
procedure for carrying the matter further, including consulting non-EU Member States on their
interest in the idea.

6 | EMERSON, BLOCKMANS & AKHVLEDIANI

Conclusions
The Commission’s three Opinions, if endorsed by the European Council as seems likely on 23-
24 June, will mark a geopolitical turning point for Europe, bringing the three eastern European
states into the EU’s enlargement process, albeit with a less advanced formulation for the time
being for Georgia than for Ukraine and Moldova. A broad geopolitical advance is favourably
viewed by a majority of EU citizens and its main international partners. It is an open rejection
of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy.
The European Council’s agenda is of even wider importance, with discussions also called for on
both possible reform of the existing enlargement process and the ideas advanced by Presidents
Macron and Michel for a new community embracing the whole of Europe (except for Russia
and Belarus). Membership applications raise existential questions not just about the borders of
the Union and relations with neighbouring countries, but also about the future shape of the EU
and how power and money will be distributed internally.
And of course, as with previous decisions on EU enlargement, an endorsement of the
Commission’s Opinions will inevitably lead, sooner rather than later, to a profound discussion
about EU Treaty reform.

INTERPRETING THE COMMISSION OPINIONS ON THE MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS OF UKRAINE, MOLDOVA AND GEORGIA | 7

Annex. Communauté politique européenne2
L'agression russe contre l'Ukraine a renforcé les aspirations légitimes de l'Ukraine à rejoindre
l'Union européenne. Lors du sommet de Versailles, les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de
l'Union européenne se sont engagés à renforcer encore nos liens et à approfondir notre
partenariat pour aider l'Ukraine, qui fait partie de notre famille européenne, à progresser sur
sa trajectoire européenne.
Le Conseil européen des 23 et 24 juin sera invité à se prononcer sur la candidature de l'Ukraine,
ainsi que sur celles de la Moldavie et de la Géorgie, sur la base des avis de la Commission
européenne.
Quelle que soit l'étape franchie à l'occasion de ce Conseil européen, la politique
d'élargissement, par l'exigence des réformes nécessaires pour rejoindre l'Union européenne et
la durée qui en découle nécessairement, n'offre pas aujourd'hui le cadre politique nécessaire
pour répondre à l'urgence des nécessités historiques et géopolitiques nées de la guerre contre
l'Ukraine et développer la structuration politique de notre continent européen.
C'est pourquoi il est proposé de créer dès cette année une Communauté politique européenne
entre tous les Etats européens souhaitant ensemble contribuer à la sécurité, la stabilité et la
prospérité de notre continent. La Communauté politique européenne serait ouverte aux Etats
européens partageant un socle de valeurs démocratiques, qu'ils soient membres de l'Union ou
non et quelle que soit la nature de leur relation actuelle avec l'Union européenne : qu'ils
souhaitent la rejoindre, qu'ils l'aient quittée, qu'ils n'envisagent pas d'y adhérer et ne soient liés
à elle que par des accords économiques.
La Communauté ne remplacerait ni le Conseil de l'Europe, ni l'OSCE, ni la relation
transatlantique. Mais nous ne disposons aujourd'hui d'aucune enceinte européenne non
spécialisée permettant de rassembler tous les membres de la famille européenne, sur un pied
d'égalité et dans un esprit d'unité de notre continent. Au contraire, les relations entre les pays
de notre continent, qu'ils appartiennent ou non à l'Union européenne, qu'ils souhaitent la
rejoindre ou non, sont marquées par un écheveau complexe de cadres plurilatéraux ou
bilatéraux. Tous conserveront leur pertinence. Mais nous devons retrouver le sens de la
communauté.
La Communauté politique européenne renforcerait les liens politiques, économiques, culturels
et de sécurité entre ses membres. Elle constituerait une enceinte de coordination, de décision
et de projets de coopération afin de répondre de manière concrète aux défis auxquels sont
confrontés l'ensemble des pays du continent européen : les questions de politique étrangère
et de sécurité, le changement climatique et l'approvisionnement énergétique et en autres
matières premières, la sécurité alimentaire, le développement des infrastructures et leur

2
    Paper submitted by France for the European Council of 23-24 June

8 | EMERSON, BLOCKMANS & AKHVLEDIANI

interconnexion, la mobilité, les migrations, la lutte contre la criminalité organisée, les relations
avec les autres acteurs géopolitiques.
La Communauté politique européenne ne serait pas une alternative à l'adhésion à l'Union
européenne et ne substituerait pas au processus d'élargissement pour les Etats européens
souhaitant rejoindre l'Union européenne, elle permettrait au contraire de renforcer les liens
avec les Etats membres de l'Union avant l'adhésion, au niveau politique comme dans
l'accompagnement de la participation à certaines politiques de l'Union européenne, y compris,
le cas échéant, par une intégration progressive à son marché intérieur.
La Communauté politique européenne prendrait la forme d'une structure juridique légère,
dotée d'une capacité décisionnelle, tout en respectant l'autonomie de décision de l'Union
européenne et de chacun des Etats qui constituent cette communauté. Elle se réunirait
plusieurs fois par an au niveau des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement, ainsi qu'au niveau
ministériel.