2018 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ESTONIA
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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AND ESTONIA
2018
CONTENTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The domestic political situation in Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Russian economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The effects of the sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The Russian military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Russian foreign policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Outlook for the Minsk Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Rosneft and Gazprom as the tools of Russian
foreign policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Relations between Belarus and Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Intelligence from the territory – threat to foreign nationals in Russia . 35
The FIFA World Cup in Russia – Putin’s PR project . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Influence operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Information warfare units targeting NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Kremlin’s use of misrepresentation of historical events
in influence operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Cyber threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Terrorism in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
North Korea’s weapons programme continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service’s mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2 INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
I
am pleased to present the Estonian
Foreign Intelligence Service’s third
public report, in which we describe
the world security environment surroun-
ding Estonia.
In 2017, Russian meddling abroad was
starkly exposed for a large share of the
public in the US and Europe. The topic
received an unprecedented and quite
deserved level of attention. Defining mo-
ments included the unanimous assess-
ment of US intelligence agencies regarding
Russia’s interference in the 2016 Ameri-
can election, French president Emmanuel
Macron’s denunciation of Russian media
channels as “agents of influence”, and Ger-
man chancellor Angela Merkel’s warning MIKK MARRAN
to Russian president Vladimir Putin not to Director General,
meddle in the German election. Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service
Estonian security institutions have been
talking for years about attempts on Rus-
sia’s part to splinter the unity and trust Russia’s fight against the West also
that exists between nations in the West. takes place on Russia’s own territory. The
The awareness of this fact is now spread- respective chapter of the report examines
ing more broadly in the US and in many the modus operandi used by Russian
places around Europe. Unfortunately, no special services to recruit or intimidate
changes can be seen in Russia’s behav- foreign nationals inside Russia (a practice
iour. In the years ahead, Russia seems known as gathering “intelligence from the
likely to continue its politics of division territory”). The purpose of the chapter is
and opposition to the system of Western not to dissuade people from visiting Rus-
values. In our report, we illustrate on just sia, but we do draw attention to the large
how broad a front Russia is waging this scale and aggressiveness of the activities
battle by listing the conflicts and regions pursued by Russia’s intelligence services,
where we see Russian interference as and describe the dangers that people
highly likely this year. could face who travel there.
INTRODUCTION 3
In early 2018, the big question pertaining Estonian security does not exist in a
to Russia is what will happen after its vacuum; our security and well-being
March presidential elections. The world is depend on that of our friends, and their
witnessing a carefully choreographed piece vulnerabilities are our vulnerabilities. That
of theatre that attempts to leave the im- is why our report also covers the issue of
pression of free elections. But behind the terrorism. Although the threat of terror-
scenes, a cynical plan is being executed to ism is low in Estonia, it is high in Europe
ensure Putin and his inner circle retain their as a whole, and poses a threat to Estonian
grip on power for yet another term. In the citizens travelling abroad.
report, we detail how complicated this task
An acute problem that emerged in 2017
is given Russia’s declining socioeconomic
was the threat from North Korea, which
indicators and gathering mood of protest.
could lead to noteworthy developments
Our aim is to cover the events in Russia this year. In spite of the fact that the
that tend all too often to reach the public in Korean peninsula is geographically far
distorted or incomplete fashion. The Putin from us, increased tensions in that region
regime is masterful at fostering a false also impact our security. We are therefore
image and creating deceptions. A vivid keeping a close eye on the situation there
example of the above is Zapad-2017, the and also in other distant conflict zones.
major military exercise held last autumn.
The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service
For the benefit of the entire internation-
recently marked its 25th anniversary. Our
al community and the Russian public, it
mission continues to be the same – to
was painted as a minor counterterrorism
protect the Estonian state from external
exercise held in Belarus, but actually this
security threats by providing trustworthy
was but a disguise for large-scale manoeu-
intelligence for decision-makers. Our task
vres that were a test run for all stages of a
is to ensure that when Estonian leaders
full-scale war on NATO. Although this was
gather to make key decisions from the
not the first time this scenario had been
standpoint of security, they know more
rehearsed, a greater level of concealment
about the topic than what is available over
could be detected on this occasion. Unfor-
public channels.
tunately, disinformation and half-truths
also showed up in Western coverage of the Just as important is the realization that
exercise. we – the government, society and the
citizens – create our own security space
Although Russia conducts large-scale every day. The well-known slogan to
military exercises, our report states clearly: “think globally, act locally” is also valid
the threat of a direct military attack on when it comes to understanding security
NATO member states in 2018 is low. We in the Baltic Sea region in 2018.
will discuss this matter in more detail in the
chapter on the Russian military. Bonne lecture!
4 T H E D O M E S T I C P O L I T I C A L S I T U AT I O N I N R U S S I A
THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL
In 2018, internal tensions will grow in Russia, the economy will
remain stagnant, and the regime will fail to convince the populace
that there is light at the end of the tunnel. In the coming years,
this may destabilize the foundations of the current political
system in Russia.
T
he main goal for Putin and though Russia’s current political leaders
the political ruling clique is have never shied away from using
to stay in power. In the short various administrative means for influ-
term, this means that the encing election results, such attempts
2018 presidential elections have to be will run significant risks on a backdrop
carried out smoothly. The unfavourable of general discontent. The ruling elite
domestic political situation will give the remember 2011, when State Duma
Kremlin less manoeuvring room. election fraud was the last straw that
led to resentment brimming over into
As regards the re-election of Putin, the protests among the middle class in the
domestic political realities in 2018 are largest cities. The elite want to avoid a
now less in his favour than ever before repeat of such a scenario at all costs.
– dissatisfaction with the actions of the But eliminating the root causes of the
political elite and the situation in the dissatisfaction – political and economic
country has grown significantly. Political stagnation – is impossible as long as
activism is simultaneously on the rise, the system continues to be tilted in the
especially among young people. Even ruling clique’s interests.
T H E D O M E S T I C P O L I T I C A L S I T U AT I O N I N R U S S I A 5
SITUATION IN RUSSIA
THE DOMESTIC ruling elite. With the personal standard
POLITICAL REALITY of living declining, the lavish lifestyle
of senior officials and corruption cases
The domestic political situation in caused greater resentment. Moreover,
Russia in 2018 will also be character- as the recession dragged on, there was
ized by growing discontent among increasing lack of confidence in the
the population. The reasons for the capability of the central government,
broader dissatisfaction of its citizens all the more since top Russian leaders
come down to the political and eco- did not go beyond well-worn clichés in
nomic impasses, either separately or addressing solutions to the country’s
in combination. The first serious signs problems. As a result, many citizens
of growing discontent emerged in the have long since started to doubt
second half of 2015, when the number whether their leaders’ prescriptions are
of protests increased due to the coun- feasible. A certain segment of society
try’s economic difficulties. During that – above all, the younger generations
time, public accusations against the – are bothered by the political system
Kremlin and Putin were rare, and the itself; the stagnated, kleptocratic sys-
direct triggers for the protests and the tem is seen as the main obstacle to the
slogans were largely apolitical. But the country’s development, and is seen as
scope of political demonstrations had having a negative impact on their future
grown significantly by spring 2017. prospects.
Russia’s economic downturn
affected how society react-
ed to the actions of the
AS REGARDS THE RE-ELECTION OF PUTIN, THE
DOMESTIC POLITICAL REALITIES IN 2018 ARE NOW LESS
IN HIS FAVOUR THAN EVER BEFORE – DISSATISFACTION
WITH THE ACTIONS OF THE POLITICAL ELITE AND THE
SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY HAS GROWN SIGNIFICANTLY.
6 T H E D O M E S T I C P O L I T I C A L S I T U AT I O N I N R U S S I A
When comparing the current situation
to 2011, the main differences are the va-
riety of reasons for the discontent and
the spectrum of those dissatisfied. In
2011, the catalyst for the protests at the
start of the decade was dissatisfaction
among a fairly small part of society –
mainly the Moscow and St. Petersburg
middle class – with the current political
system. The overwhelming majority of
people in Russia did not support the
protests.
Putin’s public approval ratings are
still high, but it is questionable how
reliable or valid the figures are, given
the current atmosphere in Russia. First
of all, the ratings results cannot be fully
interpreted without knowing the exact
changes that have taken place in recent
years in the structure of the response
rate, especially among those who de-
clined to answer. Secondly, the accuracy
of the results is influenced by self-cen-
sorship as people may be reluctant to
criticize the regime.
A transformed media space and
new ways of exchanging information
play an important role in the broader
spread of criticism of the Russian
regime. While Kremlin-controlled
information channels are still domi-
T H E D O M E S T I C P O L I T I C A L S I T U AT I O N I N R U S S I A 7
nant in the sphere of traditional mass
media, especially television, their
impact on society has decreased as
new media become more extensively
consumed; this trend will continue.
The widespread use of social media
has brought Russia’s outlying regions
closer to the large cities than ever
before. That is probably one reason
why the protest demonstrations of
2017 spread so widely. New media
platforms also offers convenient ways
to organize demonstrations – ones
that can be hard for state security in-
stitutions to track. This forces Russia’s
elite to worry even more about how
they will conduct the 2018 presidential
elections.
In response to the broader protests,
Prime Minister
propaganda targeting the younger gen-
Dmitri
eration was increased with an attempt
Medvedev’s
to enforce even tighter control over
luxurious winter
exchanging information online. One
residence in
aspect that characterizes youth-ori-
Sochi
ented activities is their reliance on old
concepts – emphasis on World War II
themes and military-oriented patriotic
education – that are out of step with
SO URC E: the times.
HTTP://AVMALGIN.
LIVEJO U RN AL. While new media has been harnessed
CO M/4 271 637.H TML
to influence young Russians, so far it
8 T H E D O M E S T I C P O L I T I C A L S I T U AT I O N I N R U S S I A
has not achieved impressive results. down on internet freedoms. In July,
More often than not, the anti-oppo the State Duma adopted a decision
sition propaganda on new media has under which the Russian internet
left an awkward impression. Impor- supervision authority Roskomnadzor
tant steps were taken earlier, too, for will have the right to blacklist an-
improving the possibilities of con- onymizers and VPN services, which
trolling the internet and new media. are used for viewing websites blocked
In 2017, the Russian regime showed in Russia. The State Duma approved
more speed and muscle in clamping a proposal requiring all users of social
Direct conversations
with young Russians
where every detail is
stage-managed play
an important role in
propaganda youth
outreach, leaving younger
audiences in particular
with the impression of an
inert and old-fashioned
apparatus. Such inhibited
formats do not seem to
be an effective channel
for youth-oriented
propaganda. Pictured: one
such meeting at the Sirius
Centre in Sochi.
SO URCE: AP/SCANP I XT H E D O M E S T I C P O L I T I C A L S I T U AT I O N I N R U S S I A 9
TV CHANNEL VIEWERSHIP IN RUSSIA
BY AGE GROUP
100 %
80 %
60 %
40 %
20 %
0%
Almost 3-5 days 1-2 days Less than I do not I do not
every day a week a week once a week watch TV own a TV
Age 18-30 years 31-45 years 46-60 years Older than 60 years
SOURCE :
Ф О М Н И Б У С 2 0 17
media and instant messenger services In addition, tried and tested tactics
to identify themselves using a person- are used to apply pressure on more
al mobile phone number. This change, active critics of the government –
it is hoped, will foil the anonymity unfounded accusations and searches
of protest organizers. It is not likely of organizations’ offices and activists’
that the measures to curb Internet homes, organized hooliganism against
freedom will succeed in being fully persons and their property, and
implemented. pressuring people through employers
and education institutions. Russia10 T H E D O M E S T I C P O L I T I C A L S I T U AT I O N I N R U S S I A
Navalny supporters at a rally in
Novokuznetsk on 9 December 2017.
SOURCE : AP/SCAN PIX
continues to be a country where the
more active critics have a justified fear
for their own safety and that of their
loved ones. It is likely that the ruling
elite will try to further strengthen
their pressure methods against critics
of the regime and control of transmis-
sion of information.
In the run-up to the presidential
elections, there has been increased
emphasis on feigning political plu- well-known and of some interest to
ralism to increase the semblance of the public, while safe and not posing
legitimacy of the vote and as a sump a real threat of unseating the incum-
for opposition-minded sentiment. bent. In 2012, this role was played
As people in Russia have long found by Mikhail Prokhorov. In 2018, both
it hard to take seriously opposition Ksenia Sobchak and Pavel Grudinin
candidates who are officially sanc- appear to fit this role. Sobchak is
tioned by the regime, the Kremlin will well-known and merits attention, but
need at least one fresh new candidate most Russians view her as an un-
to play the role of “independent” suitable candidate for president or as
challenger. The person suitable for any kind of serious politician. For the
this would be an individual who is latter reason, Sobchak’s criticisms ofT H E D O M E S T I C P O L I T I C A L S I T U AT I O N I N R U S S I A 11
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN YEARS,
THERE IS REASON TO SPEAK OF
A CREDIBLE OPPOSITION FORCE
IN RUSSIA. ALEKSEI NAVALNY
GAINED NOTEWORTHY INFLUENCE
AMONG THE POPULATION AND
HAS BECOME A REAL THREAT
FOR THE KREMLIN.
influence among the population and
has become a real threat for the
Kremlin. Key reasons for his success
are his skilful use of social media to
get out his message, as well as the
fact that he speaks of problems that
matter to society. The main reason for
the government are entirely safe as his success, however, is the change in
far as the Kremlin is concerned and the social situation. General discon-
her political agenda is perfect material tent has grown, and this provides a
for the appearance of an open public grateful audience for an opposition
debate. leader who speaks openly about
problems and creates opportunities to
Despite the central government’s
protest against them.
actions against opposition and ma-
nipulation of popular sentiment, there
is, for the first time in years, reason to
speak of a credible opposition force.
Aleksei Navalny gained noteworthy12 T H E R U S S I A N E CO N O M Y
THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY
The growth and
decline of the Russian
economy reflect oil price
fluctuations, not structural
development of the
economy itself.
T
he current function-
ing of the Russian
economy can no longer
guarantee the well-being
of society. Fundamental reforms are
needed, but it is unlikely they will be un-
The primary condition for surviving and
dertaken, as this would be contrary to
being successful in Russia’s business
the interests of the ruling elite. To dis-
world is not having competitive goods
tract from the real economic problems
and services, but a patron who is as
and mislead the Russian public and the
high as possible in the power hierarchy.
West, the Kremlin is maintaining the
In more profitable sectors, enterprise
appearance of public debate on possible
is in the hands of the ruling elite or
reform and liberalization of the Russian
closely connected circles, and there is
economy.
no actual competition. Such a system
President Vladimir Putin and his inner is favoured by a biased judicial system
circle continue to use state power to that is controlled by the ruling elite, in
maximize their personal influence which no independent entrepreneur can
and to provide for their own financial expect the transparent administration
security. The silencing of critics and of justice. Providing closely connected
pressure on civil society also means the businesses with profitable govern-
creation of an environment extremely ment contracts has become so much
unfavourable to economic development. the norm that the Russian press usesT H E R U S S I A N E CO N O M Y 13
»» The state plays a dominant role in the
economy, and thus market-economy
processes have marginal influence, being
akin to imitations of a true market econo-
my. Initiative from private enterprise faces
too high a risk in such an environment.
»» The economic structure is tilted toward
large companies. Small enterprise is
hindered by bureaucracy and arbitrary
exercise of power and corruption among
lower officials. The low proportion of
small businesses leads to a lack of
competition, which in turn creates more
inefficiency.
»» The labour market is not flexible. Crises
rankings of income earned by perform-
are not used to spur reform of the labour
ing government contracts as a measure
market by retraining and developing
a companies’ influence.
small business. In a crisis, there is a
Falling energy prices and economic reluctance to lay off workers and a prefer-
sanctions experienced in recent years ence for riding out the crisis, with the
amplify the structural problems in the burden borne collectively.
economy and have highlighted the need
»» Citizens have low trust in those who are
for reforms. Compared to the low oil
beyond their immediate social circle and
price in 2016, the past year brought
this mistrust is amplified by recurrent
slight economic growth, which tends to
experiences of dysfunctional rule of law.
feed a misconception that the hardship
This in turn breeds apathy and a waiting
has been overcome and keeps reforms
attitude. Citizens do not view change
from being implemented.
positively, and as a result have low cour-
To summarize, the Russian economy age for action, yet these two things are
has a complex problem based on the indispensable for carrying out economic
following factors. reforms.14 T H E R U S S I A N E CO N O M Y
HOW MUCH RUSSIAN FAMILIES WITH TWO CHILDREN
HAVE LEFT TO SPEND AFTER ESSENTIALS
One indicator characterizing a country’s Only a very small share of these house-
social landscape is the compulsory holds earns the arithmetic mean in-
costs of a family with two children. come, and the absolute majority has to
This type of household accounts for subsist at very low income levels. Only a
the greatest share of the population small proportion of Russian inhabitants
and is a good basis for generalization. enjoy a standard of living equivalent to
Monetary value shows the amount that the average of Western countries.
should cover monthly expenses, such
The social stratification also has a
as clothing, footwear, transport, durable
regional dimension. A large part of
goods, and leisure activities.
the well-being for Russian citizens is
Looking back on Putin’s third term defined by where they live. It is often
in office, 2012–17, we see that this possible for Russian inhabitants to
indicator has dropped about 15 percent upgrade their standard of living just by
since 2011. Even more important than moving from rural areas to cities, and
the decrease is that social stratification from the cities to foreign countries. The
has increased. realization that part of their problem is
rooted in where they live makes Russian
citizens less enterprising and reduces
the regional tax base even further.
The falling standard of living in regions
makes it more costly and complicated
for the Kremlin to ensure the county’s
integrity and the current economic
mechanisms are incapable of solving
this problem. At the same time it is
clear that fundamental changes for
improving the business environmentT H E R U S S I A N E CO N O M Y 15 and restructuring the economy would collapse. Whether that indeed happens weaken the positions of the elite and depends more on the Kremlin’s ability the economic circles associated with to divert the attention of the masses them. Continuing on the same eco- than on economic measures. nomic policy course could end in social
16 T H E R U S S I A N E CO N O M Y
THE EFFECTS OF THE SANCTIONS
The consistent implementation of Although Russia would not gladly admit
sanctions has come as a surprise for it, the sanctions have had a compre-
the Kremlin. In hoping that the West’s hensive and long-term effect on the
unity in establishing and maintaining the Russian economy. The sanctions will
sanctions would be short-lived, Russia shave at least one percentage point off
made a miscalculation. The error is due of Russia’s economic growth in 2018.
to the inability to see Western policy Along with structural problems and
as values-based. Perhaps the Kremlin low oil prices, Russia’s economy will be
hoped that pragmatic and economic stuck in low gear. The longer sanctions
considerations would win the day and a last, the more ingrained the tendency
return to mutually beneficial deals would for investors and companies to forgo
be imminent, as the Russian market any transaction that may have a Russia
and opportunities in Russia are indeed connection.
important for the West. But it failed to
Domestic Russian propaganda is fairly
recognize how thoroughly Russia’s ac-
adept at creating a myth of how the
tions went against Western values and
“unjust” Western sanctions are an
how this has destroyed trust in Russia.
attack by an external enemy that is
The West’s sanctions imposed on causing economic hardship for ordinary
Russia have had economic and political Russians. This narrative shields Rus-
impact. The solidarity between Europe sia’s leaders from criticism for a failed
and the US has been substantial, to the economic policy, and helps to some
Kremlin’s surprise. Politically, Russia is degree to paper over the fundamental
displeased at finding itself in isolation weaknesses in the economy.
at a time that it seeks a role as a global
Even now, import substitution policy
player. Potential new American sanc-
and counter-sanctions breed a patriotic
tions cause anxiety among Russia’s
spirit in Russia, but this is no substitute
elite and would strengthen the effect
for a new economic environment and
further.
THE SANCTIONS WILL SHAVE AT LEAST ONE PERCENTAGE
POINT OFF OF RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 2018.T H E R U S S I A N E CO N O M Y 17
Contraband cheese seized on the
Russian-Finnish border in August
2017.
SO URCE: HT T P : //S Z T U.CUSTO M S. RU
foot, causing disgruntlement among
the population by destroying smuggled
food. Russian people, however, are keen
to acquire contraband products. Certain
Western foodstuffs have a firm local
following (even everyday perishable
does not lead to a rise in well-being. So
staples such as cheese) and are of a
far, the import substitution programme
quality Russian goods cannot compete
has only been partly fulfilled. There are
with, and thus they are actively smug-
clear problems with availability of high-
gled in.
tech parts in the energy sector and the
military industry is also experiencing a It is currently premature to predict
drought when it comes to components whether sanctions will lead to compre-
sourced from the West. Injections of hensive changes in Russian policy or
capital into Russian companies have deter planners of future Russian foreign
nearly dried up. Russia’s other partners policy adventures. Until the presidential
do not appear to be interested in filling elections, President Putin will not be
the vacuum. High interest rates and able to make sudden moves that are
Russian banks’ difficulties in raising comparable to losing face. Even during
capital have a stranglehold on small- to a new term for Putin, Russian society
medium-sized enterprises and their cannot for long delude itself by blaming
borrowing needs. Russia’s own coun- the West for its problems or think that
ter-sanctions have not been effective the country’s basic economic problems
in the area of import substitution and were caused by sanctions. Russia is not
have not managed to drive a wedge be- devoid of economic and political knowl-
tween EU member states. In their zeal edge, and a consistent sanctions policy
to impose countersanctions, Russian will help these ideas gain better traction
authorities have shot themselves in the in Russia.18 T H E R U S S I A N M I L I TA RY
THE RUSSIAN
MILITARY
The only existential threat to the sovereignty
of Estonia and other Baltic Sea states emanates
from Russia. However, the threat of a direct Russian
military attack on NATO member states in 2018 is low.
A
s long as Russia is ruled against Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and
by an authoritarian regime Poland. In the course of the exercise,
whose top priority is to Russian armed forces underwent all
exercise political dominance phases of an all-out war: Russia’s
over its neighbours, Russia will continue military intervention in response to a
using military pressure against Esto- “colour revolution” in Belarus, escala-
nia, Latvia and Lithuania. Considering tion into a conventional war with NATO,
that authoritarian regimes tend to see and finally, to nuclear war.
threats where none exist, it is not com-
Russia’s general behaviour in relation to
pletely beyond the realm of possibility
military exercises shows that the coun-
that the Russian leadership will make
try’s leadership does not care about
a strategic miscalculation, believing
the fundamental values of international
that NATO’s collective defence is not
treaties, including the principles of
effective.
building transparency and trust. What
Russian military planners do not view was, according to the official notice,
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania separate- a six-day exercise actually lasted six
ly; they approach Europe and NATO as weeks. Russia’s official media coverage
a whole. In Russia’s latest major military significantly distorted the size of the
exercise Zapad-2017, Russian armed exercise as well: publicly, the exercise
forces practiced a full-scale war with area was declared as Belarus and Ka-
NATO in Europe. According to the sce- liningrad, but actually the exercise was
nario, the conflict started in Belarus. As held all over western Russia, from the
usual, one of the main elements of the Barents Sea to the border of Ukraine.
military exercise simulated an offensive Furthermore, officially it was declaredT H E R U S S I A N M I L I TA RY 19
that 12,700 troops took part but actual- systems as well as the establishment
ly there were more than 100,000. of new units and commands. The same
trend continued in 2017. The first group
The nature of the exercise was nothing
of new Su-30SM fighters was de-
new: anti-NATO scenarios have been
ployed in the Kaliningrad Oblast. In the
used in most Russian armed forces
Western Military District, new divisions
exercises, including all of the previous
are formed and infrastructure is built.
Zapad exercises. Although the plans
In 2018, the Baltic Fleet will get its first
and scenarios have remained the same,
two Karakurt-class missile corvettes.
the Russian armed forces are able
The importance of these ships lies
to practice the military operations in
above all in their weapons systems. The
greater detail with each exercise cycle
new Kalibr cruise missiles, which can
– a number of the elements previously
attack land targets within 2500 km, will
simulated on a map are now played out
be part of the ships’ arsenal. In 2018,
in the field.
the Russian armed forces will complete
In 2018, the Russian armed forces’ an- the rearmament of the Kaliningrad mis-
nual exercise will be held in the Far East, sile brigade with the Iskander missile
under the name of Vostok-2018. The
scenario will involve a regional conflict
in the Pacific Ocean region. We know
from previous years that somewhat
paradoxically, the Vostok exercises are
also targeted mainly against a perceived
threat from the United States.
The largest land border between Russia
and NATO increases the military impor-
tance of the Baltic Sea region for Rus-
sia. Besides regular military exercises,
the Russian armed forces have consist-
ently strengthened their presence in the
region with the most modern weapon20 T H E R U S S I A N M I L I TA RY
Russian President Vladimir Putin,
Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu (on
the left) and Chief of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces Valeri
Gerasimov (on the right) observing
the Zapad exercise in the Luzhsky
district in the Leningrad Oblast.
SO URCE: AP/SCANP I X
The shooting of Iskander-K missile
during the Zapad-2017 exercise in
Luzhsky district which is roughly 100
kilometres from the Estonian border.
SO URCE: AP/SCANP I X
system. This system can be used to The weaknesses of the Russian armed
attack strategic targets within a radius forces must also be taken into account
of 500 km. when assessing Russia’s military
capability. Neglect, corruption and theft
In 2018, the formation of a National
are still prevalent in the Russian armed
Guard based on internal forces and
forces. Although the number of con-
Ministry of the Interior institutions and
tracted military servicemen is growing
units – a process started in 2016 – will
due to economic difficulties, the num-
be completed. In the final phase of the
ber of disciplinary violations has also
reform, the OMON and SOBR special
increased in the past year, suggesting
police units will be integrated complete-
low morale among the newly enlisted.
ly into the National Guard’s paramilitary
With economic problems deepening
structure, and the National Guard will
and the cuts and inflation spreading
thereafter be prepared to fulfil all of its
into the armed forces budget, discipli-
domestic security and national defence
nary problems and tensions are likely to
functions. In connection with this year’s
rise in the future as well. Staff turnover
presidential elections and the football
is still high among younger officers.
championship in Russia, the National
For young officers, the Russian armed
Guard will be put to the test, as the
forces provide limited decision-making
post-reform security services must en-
freedom, discourage their initiative,
sure that the elections proceed without
and assign menial service duties – all
major protests and unrest.T H E R U S S I A N M I L I TA RY 21
of which lower morale. Also, the lack 2017 that Russia had won the Syrian
of qualified junior specialists remains a war and was withdrawing its troops.
problem. These shortcomings will affect At the same time, in 2018 Russia is
the military readiness of all combat likely looking for ways to get involved in
units. other conflict areas in the Middle East
and Africa. The main purpose of such
The Russian military operation in Syria
activity is to irritate the West, and not
has essentially exhausted itself after
necessarily contribute to the resolution
achieving its three primary goals. In
of these conflicts.
terms of publicity, Russia has managed
to abundantly but not convincingly Russia’s war against Ukraine will con-
promote itself as a participant in solv- tinue in 2018. Russia’s goal is to main-
ing the world’s problems and a force tain a constant level of military activity
against terrorism. Russia has been able in eastern Ukraine and, through that,
to secure the right to use the port of keep the internal situation in Ukraine
Tartus, and has in essence used Syria as unstable.
a testing range for its weapon systems.
The likelihood of Russia’s covert or
Further involvement in the conflict
overt military intervention in countries
would expose inherent weaknesses
where it claims to have privileged inter-
in Russia’s military and diplomatic
ests, such as Belarus, Moldova or Ka-
capabilities. These factors influenced
zakhstan, is medium. Previous military
Russia’s announcement in December22 T H E R U S S I A N M I L I TA RY
The Russian nuclear submarine Dmitry Donskoy cruising by
SO URCE:
R EUT ERS/SCANP I X
Denmark’s Great Belt Fixed Link crossing.
interventions in Georgia (2008), posing a threat to the survival of the
Ukraine (2014) and Syria (2015) show Kremlin-obedient regime. It should be
that the Russian leadership has the will noted that the term “colour revolution”
and the readiness to intervene mili- can be used by the Russian leader-
tarily outside its borders. The “colour ship in the public narrative to describe
revolution” element at Zapad-2017 almost any situation. It can also be used
also shows that Russia wants to be to describe both actual and hypothetical
prepared if necessary for a rapid military future events, thus helping to justify
intervention in Belarus, if the Belaru- pre-emptive operations.
sian people’s bid for democracy starts
IN 2018 RUSSIA IS LIKELY LOOKING FOR WAYS TO GET
INVOLVED IN OTHER CONFLICT AREAS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND AFRICA. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF SUCH ACTIVITY
IS TO IRRITATE THE WEST, AND NOT NECESSARILY
CONTRIBUTE TO THE RESOLUTION OF THESE CONFLICTS.T H E R U S S I A N M I L I TA RY 23
HOW RUSSIA IGNORED
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
A good example of Russia’s lack of transparency is its attitude toward international
agreements related to regional security. One such is the Vienna Document on
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures from 2011, which the OSCE countries
including Russia have signed.
WITH THE ZAPAD EXERCISE, RUSSIA IGNORED THE LETTER AND SPIRIT
OF THE VIENNA DOCUMENT AGREEMENT.
Russia did not notify Zapad- Russia did not invite A couple of weeks before
2017 to other states party to observers from other OSCE Zapad-2017’s official phase, the
the Vienna Document, even countries to Zapad-2017, Russian armed forces organised a
though the number of military although it should have covert large-scale snap exercise, in-
personnel (over 20,000 land done so. It invited only the volving more than 100,000 military
and airborne forces) exceeded defence attaches residing personnel. Paragraphs 41 and 41.1
the notification threshold. in Russia as “guests” on of the Vienna Document oblige to
Paragraphs 38 and 40.1.1 of visiting day. Paragraph 47.4 notify other countries of the start
the Vienna Document oblige of the Vienna Document of a snap exercise. Such extensive
a country to provide 42 days obliges a country to invite snap exercises are held an average
advance notice of an exercise observers to exercises of five times per year by the Russian
involving at least 9,000 mili- involving at least 13,000 armed forces. In paragraph 67.1 of
tary personnel. military personnel. the Vienna Document OSCE coun-
tries pledged to hold a maximum
of one exercise involving at least
40,000 personnel every three years.
Belarus, a participant of Za-
pad-2017, was not in violation
of the provisions of the Vienna
Document and was open to
neighbouring countries and the
international community.24 R U S S I A N FO R E I G N P O L I C Y
RUSSIAN
FOREIGN POLICY
Russian foreign policy and security
policy is based on an adversarial
stance toward the United States and
the West in general. The main goal of
the Putin regime is to end its political
isolation and to restore its position
on the world arena.
R
ussian foreign policy be- sphere of influence in its neighbour-
haviour is opportunistic. To hood, where its aim is to slow down the
achieve its goals, Russia pace of democratization and any sort
combines political, diplo- of Western integration. Russia does not
matic, economic and military means in draw the line there, and also meddles
various global or regional conflicts. In in politics in more distant countries. Its
this manner, the regime tries to leave an so-called fight against terrorism is one
impression that it plays an important of the most transparent foreign policy
role in international politics and that pretexts used in recent years to satisfy
without President Vladimir Putin it is its ambition of being a superpower in
not possible to resolve global problems. more distant regions. Russia uses the
The Kremlin exploits and, if necessary, counterterrorism narrative to strength-
leverages conflicts around the world to en its foreign policy position and to
increase its influence in various regions establish relations on a political and
and undermine international processes security institutional level. While Russia
and formats involving the West. seeks to show its readiness for inter-
national cooperation by invoking the
A central role in Russia’s superpower
fight against terrorism, this is a front
ambitions is played by maintaining its
for acting contrarily to the West, oftenRU SS I AN FOR E I G N POL I CY 25
President al-Assad and President
Putin in the Hmeimim Air Base
in Syria on 11 December 2017 where
Putin announced that Russia’s
mission in Syria is accomplished.
SO URCE: X I NHUA/ S I PA USA/SCANP I X
Russia’s role in Syria is currently signif-
icant. Using this position, Russia will
continue to stake out a more favourable
position in international talks in several
other conflicts, including on Ukraine
flouting international conventions and
issues. We can expect that “cooperation
agreements.
offers” concerning Libya and Syria will
In 2018, Russia will continue its oppor- be extended to Europe. In the Persian
tunistic foreign policy. It will persist in Gulf, Russia will try to strike a balance
its broader opposition to the West and between intensifying cooperation (in-
actively oppose NATO enlargement and cluding military) with Qatar and Saudi
sow division in the EU. As to countries Arabia’s regional demands.
in the region, the Kremlin will continue
In Afghanistan, the Kremlin will contin-
to oppose NATO enlargement to Fin-
ue meddling on the pretext of fighting
land and Sweden and also maintain its
terrorism. The same counterterrorism
efforts against potential enlargement
pretext will also continue to be used
in the Balkans. In the Western Balkans,
in various Central Asian countries, to
the Kremlin can be expected to seek
preserve or strengthen its role as a
closer relations with Republika Srpska
guarantor of security and to intervene in
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and continue
their local politics.
influence operations and intervention in
internal Montenegrin politics in the run-
up to the presidential elections.26 R U S S I A N FO R E I G N P O L I C Y
EXAMPLES OF RUSSIAN MEDDLING
In the Western Balkans, Russia is actively trying to hinder
NATO enlargement. Although Montenegro’s accession could not be
prevented, Russia is attempting to portray the actions of the EU and
the US as a failed project and maintain a global superpower image
through its historical ties in the region.
In Libya, Moscow’s broader goal is to obtain a new ally on NATO’s
southern border, whose influence could be used against European
countries. Russia has actively supported the Libyan National Army led
by Gen. Khalifa Haftar, a force opposing the UN-supported Libyan unity
government. Alongside political legitimacy, Russia supports Haftar also in
other ways. For example, Russia has repeatedly taken on the printing of
Libyan dinars, which are delivered to the cash-poor territories controlled by
Haftar. Russia is also maintaining ties with the Libyan unity government,
which understands that Russia is equally capable of escalating the conflict as
it is of defusing it.
In the Persian Gulf region, Russia is trying to undermine the
US-led regional security architecture. To do so, Russia is trying to
benefit from the frictions between the US and its Arab allies concerning,
above all, Iran’s role in the region. Russia has courted the monarchies
around the Gulf both economically and politically. It is also preparing
arms sale transactions with both Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In the same
way, Russia has also repeatedly passed itself off as a so-called neutral
peace broker in the Yemen civil war. With these steps, Russia tries to
undermine the US’s regional role and simultaneously transform itself
into an indispensable negotiation partner in the Middle East.RU SS I AN FOR E I G N POL I CY 27
In the case of Syria, the Russian narrative trumpets an ongoing fight
against terrorism, but the reality is that Russia is there in order to
halt a string of defeats for the Bashar al-Assad regime while trying
to increase its presence and possibilities to influence developments in
the region. In this sense, Russia’s intervention in Syria since 2015 has been
successful. Although Iran’s influence in Syria has grown significantly as a
result of the conflict, Moscow has managed to reinforce its military presence
in Syria. In addition, Russia has succeeded in breaking out of the diplomatic
isolation imposed on it due to the Ukraine conflict, achieving a situation
where at least in the Syrian issue, Russia can act as an equal counterpart
alongside the leading countries and regional forces.
Regarding intervention in the North Korea crisis, Russia’s ambition
is clear: to become an internationally recognized global actor, and to
undermine the role of the US at the same time. Russia is exploiting the
conflict to spread a narrative that the US is principally to blame in the North
Korea question. Russia volunteers itself as a “peace dove” which prefers
diplomatic channels and could possibly broker talks.
In Afghanistan, Russia is using counterterrorism rhetoric to
justify its activities. Russia is increasing its troop presence under the
guise that the American-led coalition is failing in its fight against drug
trade and terrorism. Russia maintains contacts with the major parties to
the Afghanistan conflict in order to keep its options open for any future
scenario. Similarly to its actions in Syria, Russia has also tried to form
alternative coalitions and negotiating platforms that undermine the
formats established on the basis of international agreements.28 R U S S I A N FO R E I G N P O L I C Y
OUTLOOK FOR THE MINSK AGREEMENTS
Russia has only partially achieved its to a greater extent while Russia feigns
desired goals in its aggression against commitment to the Minsk accords and
Ukraine. Crimea is occupied, the war in diplomatic solutions. These mutually
eastern Ukraine continues to destabilize exclusive trends gained particular mo-
European security, and Ukrainian socie- mentum in 2017.
ty and economy are still vulnerable. But
In a situation where Russia’s opposition
Russia’s main goal – to draw Ukraine
to the West and the ever-deepening
into its sphere of influence – is slipping
isolation could become permanent,
away irreversibly. The Minsk Agree-
the Kremlin is attempting to save face.
ments, which brought the worst of the
The upcoming presidential elections in
fighting to a halt in eastern Ukraine,
Russia are also forcing Vladimir Putin
coupled with Ukrainian resistance and
to propose actions that have at least
the unanimous pressure from the West,
the semblance of being peace-oriented.
has kept the fighting to the level of
In September 2017, Russia’s president
local skirmishes, which no longer poses
made a proposal to the UN to send an
an existential threat to Ukraine. The
armed mission to eastern Ukraine to
fighting nevertheless has had a heavy
provide protection to the OSCE special
human toll. Russia seems unwilling to
observer mission operating there. This
break it off, but rather uses the violence
idea was meant to take the initiative
as an instrument to achieve the control
out of Ukraine’s hands, as the Ukrainian
of Kyiv it yearns for.
president had announced a plan prior
It has been more than three years since to the UN General Assembly meeting
the Minsk agreements were signed. to demand UN peacekeepers be sent to
Russia has had many opportunities to the area. Russia’s proposal was noth-
bring the conflict to a peaceful solution, ing but an attempt to defer a solution
if it wanted to. Instead of cutting off its to the conflict burdening Ukraine. At a
proxies in eastern Ukraine and no longer time when the international community
equipping and directing the militants, is waiting for true steps to be taken to
the Russian administration is playing a resolve the bloody conflict, Russia is only
two-faced game. The occupied eastern suggesting solutions that would only
Ukrainian areas are being integrated make the conflict more entrenched. Rus-
with the Russian economy and society sia apparently sees this as a sustainableRU SS I AN FOR E I G N POL I CY 29
prospect, as it believes that it can shift
the responsibility to various interna-
RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY tional organizations in a manner that
reduces Russia’s accountability while
INITIATIVES TO WATCH
increasing the status of the self-pro-
IN 2018: claimed formations – the Donetsk
and Luhansk people’s republics – that
»» International initiatives on Ukraine and in
undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
the Middle East
Russia’s calculations are predicated on
»» Pressure on Europe regarding Syria and the belief that multiple frozen conflicts
Libya on its borders are a manageable strat-
egy for the long term and that this will
»» Negotiations between warring factions in
yield direct political benefits for Russia,
Libya
giving it an instrument for keeping its
»» Activities in Afghanistan justified by the neighbourhood at heel.
fight against terrorism
However, Russia’s rationale for attack-
»» Influence activities in Montenegro and ing Ukraine is increasingly on unstable
Moldova before and during elections footing. At the Valdai Discussion Club
forum on 19 October 2017, President
»» Ever closer relations with Republika Srpska Putin floated a new pretext – the claim
in Bosnia and Herzegovina that it was trying to prevent a Srebreni-
ca-type tragedy in Donbas. By citing the
»» Consolidation of influence in Central Asia
goal of avoiding massacres in eastern
Ukraine as an excuse for maintaining
control of the Ukrainian border, Putin
AT A TIME WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
IS WAITING FOR TRUE STEPS TO RESOLVE THE BLOODY
CONFLICT, RUSSIA IS TABLING IDEAS THAT WOULD ONLY
MAKE THE CONFLICT MORE ENTRENCHED.30 R U S S I A N FO R E I G N P O L I C Y
The building where
the paramilitary
representation of
the Donetsk people’s
republic in Ostrava,
Czech Republic was
registered until April
2017.
SO URCE: G O O G LE M APS
once again confirmed what he him- resentation” in Italy was joined by centres
self, his diplomats and officials have in Greece and France. The latter one is
schizophrenically persisted in denying led by a failed and convicted municipal
for many years – Russia controls the politician. In April 2017, the paramilitary
occupied areas of eastern Ukraine representation of the Donetsk People’s
because it has a specific strategy for Republic in Ostrava, Czech Republic
doing so. Yet it is evident that Russia’s (pictured), was closed by court ruling and
assessment of the situation – which in December, Russian agent of influence
was the grounds for its aggression Johan Bäckman, who had previously
against Ukraine – was not even close to claimed to represent the Donbas in
reality. Considering Russia’s potential Finland, announced a new representation
from the standpoint of security, this had been opened in Helsinki. Such groups
conveys a negative message, at least in – although marginal – spread disinforma-
Russia’s neighbourhood. tion, originating from the Kremlin via the
“Donetsk foreign ministry”, aimed against
Examples of manipulations against the
Ukraine and the West. As the Donbas
West orchestrated by Russia can also
separatists’ attempts to imitate diploma-
be seen in the phantom representations
cy in the West have proved unrealistic,
of the eastern Ukrainian separatists – in
Russian agents attempt to register the
particular the Donetsk People’s Re-
representations or NGOs and associate
public – in Europe. In 2017, the “rep-
them with existing associations.RU SS I AN FOR E I G N POL I CY 31
ROSNEFT AND GAZPROM AS THE TOOLS
OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
General economic constraints will keep In Serbia, Gazprom uses the same
Russia’s foreign policy influence in influence means that it did in Ukraine:
check in 2018 as well. The Kremlin has a long-term supply contract has been
little money to support governments signed with a monopoly, Srbijagas. This
of Moscow’s liking and thus it will rely enterprise is characterized by corrupt
on the large state-owned corporations schemes, politicians’ participation in
Rosneft and Gazprom. company management and opaque
transactions. Through Gazprom, Russia
This is risky business – for instance,
establishes relationships that make CIS
Rosneft’s loans and agreements in
countries dependent on Russia. For ex-
Venezuela (totalling 6,7 billion EUR)
ample, the price of the natural gas sold
may end up making a loss if the Ven-
to Belarus and Kyrgyzstan is decided by
ezuelan government continues on the
the Kremlin, like investments into the
same economic policy course, which
gasification of Kyrgyzstan. The ex-
has made what was once the wealthiest
penses from this type of foreign policy
country in South America insolvent.
instrument are borne by Gazprom.
Rosneft’s investments (totalling 1,2
The risks assumed by Rosneft and Gaz-
billion EUR) in Iraqi Kurdistan, the inde-
prom in the state’s foreign policy inter-
pendence referendum of which was not
ests are compensated by the risk-free
recognized by the Iraqi central govern-
redistribution of oil and gas exploration
ment, are also in doubt. Baghdad has
sites in Russia.
restored control over the oil fields and
has contested the Rosneft deal with the
Kurds.32 R E L AT I O N S B E T W E E N B E L A R U S A N D R U S S I A
RELATIONS
BETWEEN
BELARUS AND
RUSSIA
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s
autonomy is dwindling, and although
Belarus is stable on the surface,
uncertainty is growing in the country.
A
bove all, the country’s Russian control over Belarusian
uncertainty is based on its military capabilities is increasing; the
almost full dependence on legal framework is being supplement-
Russia. Most of the crude ed to bring the armed forces of both
oil imported from Russia is exported countries under a joint command in the
from Belarus as refined oil products. case of a threat, and there is deepen-
This accounts for almost a third of the ing harmonization of both countries’
budget revenue of Belarus. The 1,6 armed forces and training of units
billion EUR loan allocated by Russia at the tactical level, right up to the
in 2016–18 is essential for refinancing creation of mixed units. The Belarusian
past loans taken by Belarus. Belarus’s armed forces are also equipped with
economic dependence gives Russia Russian military equipment, making
leverage it can use if necessary to force Belarus technologically and financial-
Belarus to take decisions not benefit- ly dependent on Russia for decades
ting Minsk’s development. For example, to come. The leaders of Belarus are
if oil exports using Latvian and Lithu- interested in inexpensive solutions for
anian ports are re-routed to Russian maintaining their armed forces while
ports, Russia will assume direct control Russia’s goal in this cooperation is to
over Belarus’s petroleum exports. strip the Belarusian armed forces ofR E L AT I O N S B E T W E E N B E L A R U S A N D R U S S I A 33
Belarusian president Alyaksandr
Lukashenka and Russian president
Vladimir Putin.
SO URCE: AP/SCANP I X
declining, more and more Belarusians
are travelling abroad in search of work,
above all to Russia and Poland.
In terms of foreign policy, Belarus has
attempted to foster the image of a
guarantor of regional security, hosting
talks on the eastern Ukraine conflict
and promoting the Helsinki 2.0 initiative
aimed at getting China, Russia, the US
and EU leaders behind the negotiating
table, looking for new and constructive
solutions. Taking part in the Za-
their autonomy so that they would be pad-2017 exercise as an ally of Russia
crippled in case of a conflict. dealt a significant blow to this image.
Belarus’s initiative to invite foreign ob-
The protests of spring 2017 showed
servers to the exercises did not reduce
that if Russia decides to reduce
neighbouring countries’ fears related
economic support to Belarus – as it
to the exercises. The two countries’
temporarily did that year – this will have
presidents did not meet in the course of
a direct effect on the socioeconomic
the exercises, which shows that Russia
situation in Belarus. In this situation,
does not consider Belarus an equal
Belarusian officials were forced to
partner. In the run-up to Zapad-2017,
find other income sources to fund the
the FSB detained a Ukrainian citizen,
budget, such as the “social parasites
Pavel Grib, on Belarusian territory. This
tax” (imposed on people who have
demonstrated a direct subordination
worked less than six months per year),
to the Russian special services and
which brought thousands of people to
makes one doubt whether the Belaru-
the streets in Minsk and the regions. A
sian authorities are capable of keeping
steep rise in utilities expenses in 2018
developments under control in their
will directly hit the wallets of Belaru-
own country. In addition to Grib, the
sian people. With the standard of living
arrests of the Ukrainian journalist Pavel34 R E L AT I O N S B E T W E E N B E L A R U S A N D R U S S I A
Joint exercises are one measure by which Russia increases
SO URCE:
TASS/SCA NP I X
its control over Belarusian military capabilities.
Sharoiko and the businessman Alek- After the 2018 presidential election,
sandr Skriba are a sign of the country’s Russia will continue applying pressure
efforts to please Russia in sowing and increasing control over the Bela-
tensions in relations with Ukraine. rusian economy, politics, military and
social life, as the complicated situation
The common visa space agreement be-
in the Belarus economy will increase
tween Belarus and Russia means that
internal discontent and instability. Once
visa policy is essentially placed under
again, the sale of strategic Belarusian
Russian control. Belarus will essentially
companies to Russia and the establish-
lose its right to decide on who enters
ment of a Russian military base on Be-
the country – yet another step in the
larusian territory will be on the agenda.
erosion of sovereignty. Russia’s decision
Street protests would be sparked more
to set up temporary border checkpoints
by a worsening socioeconomic situation
on the Belarus-Russia border in spring
than calls from the fragmented oppo-
2018 and intensify checks on the roads
sition.
and railways should also be seen as
pressure on Belarus. Should the visa The demise of the sovereignty of
issue be resolved, some other topic Belarus would reinforce Russia’s sphere
would come up immediately, such as of influence in the proximity of Central
infiltration of terrorists from Belarus Europe.
to Russia or growing cross-border
smuggling, which would be prevented
by more effective border controls.You can also read
