Chechnya's Status within the Russian Federation
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SWP Research Paper
Uwe Halbach
Chechnya’s Status within the
Russian Federation
Ramzan Kadyrov’s Private State and Vladimir Putin’s
Federal “Power Vertical”
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
German Institute for
International and Security Affairs
SWP Research Paper 2
May 2018
In the run-up to the Russian presidential elections on 18 March 2018, the Kremlin further tightened the federal “vertical of power” that Vladimir Putin has developed since 2000. In the North Caucasus, this above all concerns the republic of Dagestan. Moscow intervened with a powerful purge, replacing the entire political leadership. The situation in Chechnya, which has been ruled by Ramzan Kadyrov since 2007, is conspicuously different. From the early 2000s onwards, President Putin conducted a policy of “Chechenisation” there, delegating the fight against the armed revolt to local security forces. Under Putin’s protection, the republic gained a leadership which is now publicly referred to by Russians as the “Chechen Khanate”, among other similar expressions. Kadyrov’s breadth of power encompasses an independ- ent foreign policy, which is primarily orientated towards the Middle East. Kadyrov emphatically professes that his republic is part of Russia and presents himself as “Putin’s foot soldier”. Yet he has also transformed the federal subject of Chechnya into a private state. The ambiguous relationship between this republic and the central power fundamentally rests on the loyalty pact between Putin and Kadyrov. However, criticism of this arrange- ment can now occasionally be heard even in the Russian president’s inner circles. With regard to Putin’s fourth term, the question arises just how long the pact will last. The price that Moscow was willing to accept for Chech- nya’s “pacification” by Kadyrov and his supporters include serious human- rights violations. Since 2017 these have increasingly moved back into the focus of international politics and reporting.
SWP Research Paper
Uwe Halbach
Chechnya’s Status within the
Russian Federation
Ramzan Kadyrov’s Private State and Vladimir Putin’s Federal “Power Vertical”
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
German Institute for
International and Security Affairs
SWP Research Paper 2
May 2018All rights reserved. © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2018 SWP Research Papers are peer reviewed by senior researchers and the execu- tive board of the Institute. They reflect the views of the author(s). SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-200 www.swp-berlin.org swp@swp-berlin.org ISSN 1863-1053 Translation by Tom Genrich (English version of SWP-Studie 1/2018)
Table of Contents
5 Issues and Conclusions
7 The Development of the “Vertical of Power”
13 “Pax Ramzana”: The “Pacification” of Chechnya in
Kadyrov’s Private State
16 Kadyrov’s Cultural Policy:
Back to Chechen Tradition?
19 Conflicts between Kadyrov and the
Russian Security Services
21 Human-Rights Violations
24 Reconstruction and Economic Boom,
or Façade of Stability?
26 Chechnya as a Cross-Border Actor
30 Prospects and Conclusion
32 AbbreviationsDr Uwe Halbach is a Senior Associate in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division
Issues and Conclusions
Chechnya’s Status within the
Russian Federation.
Ramzan Kadyrov’s Private State and
Vladimir Putin’s Federal “Power Vertical”
The current head of the Chechen republic, Ramzan
Kadyrov, has ruled for over a decade, during which
period Chechnya’s relationship with the Russian
Federation has become ambiguous. Kadyrov makes
strenuous efforts to proclaim that the republic is part
of Russia, to link Chechen nationalism with Russian
patriotism, to portray Russia’s president in the
Chechen capital Grozny as a state icon, and to present
himself as “Putin’s foot soldier”. Yet he has turned
the federal subject of Chechnya into a private state to
such an extent that the Russian President’s entourage
is asking itself to what degree the federal “vertical
of power” developed by Vladimir Putin extends to
Chechnya. Among Russians, expressions such as the
“Chechen Khanate” or “Kadyrov’s caliphate” have
gained currency. From a historical perspective, Chech-
nya’s position within the Russian Federation has been
compared to the Central-Asian Emirate of Bukhara,
which enjoyed a maximum of autonomy within the
power structure of the Tsarist Empire in the late 19th
and early 20th century.
Kadyrov’s self-arrogated powers also encompass
a foreign policy that is primarily orientated towards
the Middle East and the Islamic world as a whole. No
other regional leader has claimed a comparable role
for himself, extending beyond his own administrative
area and beyond Russia’s borders. Here too the above-
mentioned ambiguity is in evidence. On the one
hand, the Kremlin welcomes the division of diplo-
matic labour vis-à-vis the Islamic world between Mos-
cow and Grozny. On the other hand, this situation
creates contradictions, as was shown for instance
in Moscow’s and Grozny’s divergent statements
regarding the persecution of the Rohingya ethnic
group in Myanmar.
In the 1990s, Chechnya became the epitome of
separatism in post-Soviet Russia. Within the renegade
republic, a national movement invoked a historical
continuity of anti-colonial resistance to Russian do-
minion. In 1991 Dzhokhar Dudayev, the then-leader
of the Chechen secessionist movement, demanded
a peace treaty to put an end to “the 300-year war
SWP Berlin
Chechnya’s Status within the Russian Federation
May 2018
5Issues and Conclusions
between the Russian Empire and the Chechen people”. mately more successful fight against the armed under-
Moscow’s response to these efforts consisted of ground by local security forces. For them, this tran-
massive military operations. According to the official sition succeeded in removing Chechnya from the
interpretation, in the first war (1994–1996) Russian top position in the North-Caucasus violence statistics.
forces in Chechnya combated ethno-territorial sepa- Others consider that the local political price of this
ratism; in the second war, which began in 1999 and security-policy victory was too high. The “stabilisation
officially ended in 2009, they fought international costs” that President Putin was willing to accept in
Islamist terrorism. The two wars are the most violent this context include widespread human-rights viola-
events in the post-Soviet space. In terms of casualties tions in the Kadyrov republic, which Russian author-
and the extent of town and settlement destruction, ities have done nothing to check. The persecution
their consequences easily eclipse the secession wars and murder of homosexuals in Chechnya in 2017
in the Southern Caucasus (1991–1994), the civil and the arrest of the national representative of the
war in Central-Asian Tajikistan (1992–1997) and human-rights organisation Memorial in early 2018
the battles in East Ukraine from 2014 onwards. Nowa- have brought these violations to the forefront of
days, the Kadyrov republic portrays itself as an ad- international politics and reporting as rarely before.
vocate for Russian multiethnic unity, but in fact it The loyalty relationship between Kadyrov and his
has long been Russia’s “internal abroad”. The clearest “feudal lord” Putin plays a decisive role in Chechnya’s
expression of this development is its particular legal position within the Russian Federation vis-à-vis the
situation, which combines Islamic and traditional central-government level, which has been strengthened
common-law rules with the whims of the head of the since the early 2000s. With regard to Putin’s fourth
republic, and contradicts Russian legislation. term in office, the question arises whether the Putin-
By delegating the fight against the insurrection to Kadyrov pact will continue to hold.
Chechen security forces as of 2002, President Putin
attempted to end the period of large-scale acts of war
in the Caucasian republic. Critics of this “Chechenisa-
tion” claim that Akhmat Kadyrov and his son Ramzan
were using it to bring about de facto secession, all
the while proclaiming untiringly that Chechnya was
a constituent of the Russian Federation. In so doing,
critics say, the Kadyrovs were more successful than
the armed separatist resistance to which they had
both previously belonged. The Chechnya policy
during Putin’s first term in office is the more remark-
able because it was contemporaneous with his devel-
opment of the so-called federal power vertical: events
in and around Chechnya caused the Kremlin to re-
centralise political structures within the Russian
Federation. Even some Russian experts now critically
refer to this as “hyper-centralisation”. President Putin
derived legitimacy for the recentralisation from the
conflict with the Caucasian republic of Chechnya.
A major step in this direction was the (temporary)
abolition of regional gubernatorial elections follow-
ing the hostage crisis in the North-Caucasian town
of Beslan in September 2004. More than 300 people
were killed when Russian security forces stormed a
school occupied by terrorists.
Scholarly literature is divided on the merits of
the “Chechenisation” policy. Some observers point
to the transition from the period of large-scale armed
violence to a more selective, more targeted and ulti-
SWP Berlin
Chechnya’s Status within the Russian Federation
May 2018
6The Development of the “Vertical of Power”
The Development of the
“Vertical of Power”
On 31 March 1992, after the dissolution of the Soviet of regions is currently reliant on annual financial
Union, a federation treaty set out the division of power support. Only 14 regions count as net contributors.
in post-Soviet Russia between the centre and the re- Among the net beneficiary regions (dotacionnye
gions or federal subjects. During his visit to the Tatar regiony), the largest autonomous republic in the North
capital Kazan in the summer of 1990, Boris Yeltsin, Caucasus, Dagestan, is first and Chechnya fifth. 3
the president of the then-Soviet Russian Federation Among the federal subjects, 22 republics have
(Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, RSFSR), non-Russian titular nationalities. In some cases, these
had proclaimed: “Take as much sovereignty as you populations are smaller in number than the ethnic-
can digest.” In the period that followed, republics Russian populations. However, hardly any Russians
that had been Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics still live in Chechnya or Dagestan. The areas of the
(ASSR) declared themselves sovereign political enti- Russian Federation that have attracted the attention
ties. They demanded autonomy and resolute feder- of Russia specialists in the West are the North Cauca-
alisation. The 1992 federation treaty sealed this sus with its seven autonomous republics, from Ady-
process. A year later, Russia’s post-Soviet constitution gea near the Black Sea to Dagestan on the Caspian
was adopted; even then, it contained no explicit Sea; the Volga region including the autonomous
mention of the treaty. Moreover, two autonomous republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan; and the
republics, Chechnya and Tatarstan, had not signed Far East.
the treaty. Hardly anyone in Russia remembers that President Vladimir Putin has initiated a process
document today. 1 of recentralisation and expanded a “power vertical”
At the dawn of the post-Soviet era, the Russian limiting the federal subjects’ leeway for independent
Federation consisted of 89 regional entities. In the policy-making. An example of this interlocking with
years that followed, mergers of several regions the central government is the dominant position of
reduced that number to 83. Today, the multinational the governing party United Russia (Yedinaya Rossiya)
federal state consists of 85 federal subjects (including in the regional parliaments. Putin’s power vertical
the Crimea, annexed in 2014 in violation of inter- contrasts with his predecessor’s time in office. The
national law, and the city of Sevastopol). They are early Yeltsin years in particular were characterised by
represented at the central government level by del- a sometimes chaotic process of decentralisation and a
egates on the federal council. The regions, including “sovereignty parade” of autonomous republics and
the autonomous republics, differ widely in socio- autonomous regional entities.
economic development, size of economy and popu- Recentralisation began in 2000, when the govern-
lation, ethnic composition, financial dependence on ment created seven federal districts, which were
the federal budget, and other criteria. 2 The majority
land: Politisch verursacht (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische
1 Vadim Shtepa, The Devolution of Russian Federalism Bildung, 14 April 2014), http://www.bpb.de/internationales/
(Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 4 April 2017), europa/russland/182692/analyse-regionale-diskrepanzen-in-
https://jamestown.org/devolution-russian-federalism/. russland-politisch-verursacht.
2 Alexander Libman, Russische Regionen. Sichere Basis oder 3 “Dagestan i Chechnja popali v pjaterku vysokodotacion-
Quelle der Instabilität für den Kreml?, SWP-Studie 19/2016 nych regionov” [Dagestan and Chechnya came in the top five
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2016); of the highly subsidised regions], Kavkazkii Uzel, 12 October
Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, Regionale Diskrepanzen in Russ- 2017, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/310951.
SWP Berlin
Chechnya’s Status within the Russian Federation
May 2018
7The Development of the “Vertical of Power”
Map: Northern Caucasus
SWP Berlin
Chechnya’s Status within the Russian Federation
May 2018
8The Development of the “Vertical of Power”
compared to the General Governorates of the Tsarist Within several months to go before the presiden-
Empire. Two others have now joined: in January 2010 tial elections in March 2018, Moscow further tightened
the Northern Caucasus, which previously belonged to its grip on governors and regional finances as part
the larger Southern Federal District, was promoted to of a staff policy focusing on a generational change
its own federal district; in 2014 annexed Crimea was among the regional elites by replacing older “terri-
also added to this category. The federal districts are torial princes” with younger, easier-to-control tech-
run by special representatives of the Russian presi- nocrats from central institutions. Moscow has also
dent. Their main tasks include ensuring the concord- tied the loans that it grants to the many indebted
ance of federal and regional legislation and control- regions to conditions that restrict the latter’s leeway
ling the federal authorities that are active regionally, to decide their own financial policy. 6 Nineteen gov-
such as tax authorities, the police or the domestic ernors were forced to resign in 2017, in the largest
secret service, the FSB. 4 The fact that Chechnya largely wave of dismissals of the past five years. 7 Simulta-
eludes such control makes it a true exception. neously, Moscow has increasingly recruited non-local
cadres to lead regions and republics. A striking
Nineteen governors were forced to example was in Chechnya’s neighbouring republic
resign in 2017, in the largest wave of Dagestan. In October 2017, Ramazan Abdulatipov,
dismissals of the past five years. the 71-year-old head of the republic, who had been in
office since 2013, was replaced by Vladimir Vasilyev,
After the Beslan hostage crisis of 2004, direct a former high-ranking police officer from Moscow
elections of governors and heads of republic were and deputy speaker in the Duma. For the first time
abolished. Since then, they have been appointed by since 1948, this placed a non-native at the helm of the
the Russian president. After mass protests against largest republic in the North Caucasus. 8 This move was
alleged fraud during the December 2011 elections to rationalised not least by arguing that the new head
the Duma, the principle of direct regional elections of republic had no obligations to any one ethnic
was reintroduced, albeit with serious restrictions. group or clan in Dagestan and would therefore be
Becoming a candidate for gubernatorial elections is better able to lead the fight against corruption and
now complicated by a “municipal filter”: prospective clanish nepotism, which are particularly present
candidates first have to submit a set number of there. However, some commentators see in this cadre
signatures of delegates from local and district coun- policy the idea favoured by Russia’s patriotic circles
cils and mayors in their favour. Moreover, the elected of returning to the Tsarist practice of appointing gov-
governor or head of republic can still be deposed by ernors. 9
the Kremlin. Before regional elections in 2017, there
were demands that the municipal filter – which had
ensured the dominance of the governing party at the
regional level – be made more democratic. Neverthe- Golos%20Reports/Report_Russian_Election_Municipal_
less, in September 2017 the filter once again served as Final.pdf.
6 Fabian Burkhardt and Janis Kluge, Dress Rehearsal for
an administrative tool to prevent independents from
Russia’s Presidential Election. Mosow Tightens Grip on Regional
registering as candidates for gubernatorial elections
Governors and Budgets, SWP Comment 37/2017, (Berlin:
in 16 regions. 5
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2017), https://
www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/dress-rehearsal-for-
4 Martin Russell, Russia’s Constitutional Structure. Federal in russias-presidential-election/
Form, Unitary in Function, (Strasbourg and Brussels: European 7 Maria Domańska, The Kremlin’s Regional Policy – a Year
Parliamentary Research Service [EPRS], Members’ Service of Dismissing Governors, OSW Warsaw Commentary no. 257
Research, October 2015), 4. (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies [Ośrodek Studiów
5 “In 8 out of 16 regions, non-systemic candidates failed Wschodnich, OSW], 15 December 2017).
to overcome the ‘municipal filter’ because of obstruction by 8 Denis Sokolov, “Pervyj prokurator Dagestana” [Dagestan’s
local and regional authorities.” European Platform for Demo- first procurator], Vedomosti, 4 October 2017, http://www.
cratic Elections (EPDE), Analytical Report on the Administrative vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2017/10/04/736464-prokurator-
Control over the Procedure of Collecting Signatures of Deputies and dagestana.
Heads of Municipal Entities in Support of Candidates (“Municipal 9 “Russian Pundit Puts New Dagestan Appointment in Con-
Filter”), Newsletter (Berlin, 10 August 2017), 1, http:// text”, BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union Politi-
newsletter.epde.org/tl_files/EPDE/RESSOURCES/2017%20 cal File, 11 October 2017.
SWP Berlin
Chechnya’s Status within the Russian Federation
May 2018
9The Development of the “Vertical of Power”
The Kremlin has declared the defence against sepa- Caucasus in August 2017. In this context, there has
ratism one of the greatest challenges for its national been some discussion over whether the National
security policy. It is risky in today’s Russia to advocate Guard with its posts in Chechnya limits the (conspic-
real federalism and the right to regional self-deter- uous) independence of the Chechen security bodies –
mination: the authorities could interpret it as an and if so, to what extent. 13 Some observers have inter-
appeal for separatism. In 2014 a law entered into force preted this measure as a move against Kadyrov’s in-
that encouraged this equation by prohibiting “calls clination to act on his own authority. Others see no
to harm the territorial integrity of the Russian Federa- limitations on his power since Chechen soldiers
tion. It has already led to criminal proceedings. 10 serving in the National Guard continue to be loyal
During the Second Chechen War, the fight against to their territorial sovereign and are not deployed
terrorism and Islamist extremism served to justify without his approval. They are led by Sharip Delim-
a renewed, large-scale military operation. At the khanov, a younger brother of Adam Delimkhanov,
regional level, the threat of ethno-nationalistic sepa- who is considered Kadyrov’s right-hand man in the
ratism had declined by then. Sibirian regionalism, federal Duma in Moscow. The Delimkhanovs are
Finno-Ugric national movements in Karelia, and de- Ramzan Kadyrov’s cousins.
mands for autonomy in Tatarstan never turned into
serious secession movements. The Russia expert In 2017 the question of whether fed-
Marlène Laruelle doubts that the nationalisms of non- eralism can develop in Russia, and to
Russian ethnic groups are still a “force for change” in what extent, gained in importance in
today’s Russia, for the following reasons: in the North domestic political discourse.
Caucasus, the region with the highest initial potential
for secession, ethno-territorial separatism was over- In 2017 the question of whether federalism can
taken by Islamist dynamics within the armed under- develop in Russia, and to what extent, once more
ground. In her assessment, the “sovereignty parade”, gained in importance in domestic political discourse.
which had emerged at the dawn of the post-Soviet era One trigger was the confrontation over extending the
through various national movements and popular accord that gave the autonomous republic of Tatar-
fronts, is now largely a part of Russia’s past; today’s stan a special relationship with the central govern-
regional faultlines tend to be characterised by socio- ment. In the early 1990s, the Russian leadership had
economic rather than ethnic differences. 11 been challenged not only by the Chechen independ-
At the military level, the National Guard (Ross- ence movement pushing for separation from Russia.
gvardiya) created by President Putin in 2016 is seen as Moscow was also confronted with emphatic demands
the most recent and striking institution of the power for autonomy from the Tatar nationalist movement
vertical. It reports directly to the president and groups in the Volga region. The Tatars are the largest non-
existing structures of the security agencies, including Russian ethnic group in the Russian Federation. Like
the troops of the interior ministry and special units Chechnya, Tatarstan had not signed the 1992 federa-
such as OMON and others. This kind of Pretorian tion treaty. However, unlike Chechnya, the autono-
guard had already been considered in the Yeltsin era, mous republic – located not on the periphery but
but was not established until recently. 12 It now has in the centre of Russia – focused on separate power-
a staff of about 400,000 men under the command of sharing negotiations with the central government,
Putin’s close confidante, Viktor Zolotov, who was also rather than on secession. In 1994 an accord was
appointed head of counterterrorism for the North signed to that end. It was extended for ten years in
2007 and expired in July 2017. This special accord
10 “Putin Signs a Law Criminalizing Calls to Separatism”, guaranteed Tatarstan a certain measure of political
The Moscow News, 30 December 2013. and economic autonomy, which has since been re-
11 Marlene Laruelle, “Is Nationalism a Force for Change stricted by Putin’s power vertical, but not eliminated
in Russia?”, Daedalus 146, no. 2 (2017): 89–100 (90).
12 Margarete Klein, “Russlands neue Nationalgarde. Stär-
kung der Machtvertikale des Putin-Regimes”, Osteuropa 66, 13 Dmitry Shlapentokh, “The Kremlin’s Last Resort:
no. 5 (2016): 19–32; Pavel Luzin, “The Ominous Rise of Kadyrovtsi in Russia’s National Guard”, Central Asia-
Russian National Guard”, Intersection (Security), 21 July 2017, Caucasus Analyst, 3 March 2017, http://www.cacianalyst.org/
http://intersectionproject.eu/article/security/ominous-rise- publications/analytical-articles/item/13430-the-kremlin-last-
russian-national-guard. resort-kadyrovtsi-in-russias-national-guard.html.
SWP Berlin
Chechnya’s Status within the Russian Federation
May 2018
10The Development of the “Vertical of Power”
completely. Tatarstan has remained the only federal “the entire fate of Russia” and of Russian federalism.
subject to have a president; all other autonomous Its extension was a “historical necessity”; the parties
republics have had that title replaced by the desig- needed to sit at the negotiating table to resolve legal
nation “head of republic”. Ironically, it was the auto- issues and harmonise the regional and federal con-
cratic head of the Chechen republic, Kadyrov, who stitutions.
inspired this terminological change in 2010 by point- To date, the Kremlin has only granted one of these
ing out that there could only be one president in demands. It has allowed Rustam Minnikhanov, the
Russia, namely Vladimir Putin. 14 Like Chechnya (but head of the republic since 2010, to use the title of
unlike other regions), Tatarstan also demanded the President until 2020, but rejected any extension to
right to have its own foreign policy and foreign eco- the special agreement with Tatarstan. Even the
nomic relations. In the dispute between Russia and Tatar government only accepted some of the above-
Turkey (2015-16), it was thus able to take a stance mentioned concerns, and that cautiously. Russian
against the economic sanctions that Moscow had organisations in the autonomous republic, 40 percent
imposed on Ankara and insist on having its own of whose population of 3.8 million (according to the
relationship with Turkey. 2010 census) are ethnic Russians, indignantly rejected
Before the power-sharing agreement expired in the cultural and linguistic demands. 16 These demands
July 2017, demands were made for a renewed exten- certainly contradict the strengthening of the Russian
sion and a strengthening of federalism. There was language that President Putin has called for at all
talk of a new form of power-sharing and a “budgetary levels of the Federation. 17 In late November 2017,
federalism” that would allow Tatarstan, which is eco- Tatarstan ceded to Moscow’s pressure: being taught
nomically powerful compared to the North Caucasus, the Tatar language at school was not made compul-
to keep the majority of its revenues. Against this sory. 18
background, there were also calls for compulsory
teaching of the Tatar language at schools in Tatarstan The wave of resignations and new
and a Tatar-language TV channel to be broadcast appointments of governors moved
nationwide since many Tatars live in other parts of regional affairs into the spotlight.
Russia. These language-policy demands resonated to
some extent with non-Russian titular nationalities in There were also disturbances below the national-
other regions. 15 At the Tatar World Congress in early territorial level with its autonomous republics. The
August 2017, which was attended by a thousand del- wave of resignations and new appointments of gov-
egates from 40 countries, the first elected President ernors moved regional affairs into the spotlight. 19
of Tatarstan (1991–2010), Mintimer Shaimiev, gave
a speech. He reminded his audience of the power- 16 A Society for Russian Culture in Tatarstan complained
sharing agreement, which he believed influenced to the minister of education and science in Moscow about
the call for compulsory lessons in the Tatar language for
all of the republic’s inhabitants. At least 50 percent of the
14 “Chef ohne Präsidententitel: Kadyrov legt Treue- region’s children, it said, would have to suffer through a
bekenntnis zu Moskau ab – ‘Iswestija’”, Sputnik Deutschland, useless subject – the Tatar language – at the expense of
13 August 2010, https://de.sputniknews.com/politik/ the Russian language and culture. “Russia: Tatarstan Media
20100813257098749/. Highlights 28 August–3 September 2017”, BBC Monitoring
15 Paul Goble, “Tatarstan’s Pursuit of Power-Sharing Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union Political File, 10 September
Accord with Moscow Energizes National Movements across 2017.
Russia”, Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, 13 April 17 “He has encouraged both ethnic Russians and Russian-
2017; Ramazan Alpaut, “Stanet li tatarskij vtorym gosu- speaking members of other nations to come out in open oppo-
darstvennym jazykom Rossii?” [Will Tatar become Russia’s sition to non-Russian republican policies of language” Paul
second official language?], Kavkaz.Realii, 8 April 2017, Goble, “Language Fight in Tatarstan Set to Ignite Political Ex-
http://www.kavkazr.com/a/stanet-li-tatarskiy-vtorym- plosion Across Russia”, Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily
obshenatsionalnym/28416275.html?mc_cid=344420573e Monitor, 19 September 2017.
&mc_eid=9eaa49374d; Ruslan Gorevoj, “Iskushenie sepa- 18 “Squeeze on Tatarstan Underlines Putin’s Bid to Central-
ratizmom” [Temptation through separatism], Versiya, ise Control of Republics”, Financial Times, 26 January 2018.
12 February 2017, https://versia.ru/tatarstan-mozhet- 19 Andrey Pertsev, Russia’s New Old Wave of Technocratic
sprovocirovat-rossijskie-regiony-na-novyj-parad-suve- Governors (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 3 March 2017),
renitetov?mc_cid=344420573e&mc_eid=9eaa49374d. http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=68169.
SWP Berlin
Chechnya’s Status within the Russian Federation
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11The Development of the “Vertical of Power”
Regional elites, for example, complained about representation of history. In a return to the past, that
their loss of influence and decision-making powers. representation is increasingly steered by state author-
According to a study by the Centre for Applied Stra- ities, who are directing it towards a unitary narrative
tegic Research, whose director is the former Russian that exalts Russia as a great power. At a meeting in
finance minister Alexei Kudrin, these are exclusively March 2015 with regional North Caucasus politicians,
administrative elites behind the “political elites” able Moscow’s special envoy for the federal district accused
to influence political decisions and the “veto elites” local universities of falsifying history and questioned
able to correct such decisions. The importance of re- historical terms such as “anti-colonial resistance”. He
gional economic elites has also decreased. 20 Following also disapproved of exhibits in local museums dedi-
the latest regional and gubernatorial elections in cated to native life before the region became part of
autumn 2017, Russian historians, economists and Russia, supposedly glorifying that period. 23 In recent
political scientists warned against “hyper-centralisa- years, there have been “monument conflicts” between
tion”, a division of Russia into “Moscow and Not-Mos- the centre and periphery, in which ethnic Russians
cow” carried out in the name of safeguarding terri- pay homage to Tsarist generals such as Aleksey Yer-
torial integrity. 21 molov while North Caucasians commemorate their
There was resistance to the draft bill “On the resistance fighters, including Imam Shamil. 24 During
State’s National Policy”, initiated by President Putin Putin’s mandate, the policy on history has tended to
in 2016, and the binding definition of the “Russian challenge the notion of Russian colonialism, effec-
nation” (rossiyskaya naciya). A definition had been tively saying: We were never a colonial power like the
needed since the start of Russia’s post-Soviet history. Western powers, which attacked overseas territories
Policy had oscillated between three interpretations and exploited them. In Ocober 2016, Russia’s security
of national statehood: civic nationalism; ethno- council called for a Centre to be established to protect
nationalism (here referring to Russianness); and neo- against falsifications of Russian history, which it
imperialism. 22 While Moscow pays lip service to civic claimed were circulating in the West and former
nationalism, it has been more attached to the third Soviet republics, for example “speculations on the
variant during the Putin years. The definition was colonial issue”. 25
therefore supposed to be settled by legislation. De- Chechnya, which only two decades ago forged its
spite President Putin’s support and encouragement, place in the anti-colonial resistance to Russian domin-
however, the draft bill was shelved until further ion, now corroborates the historical narrative sup-
notice after five months of discussions. Its (provi- ported by the Kremlin. Since 2011, for example, the
sional) failure was due to the resistance of Russian Kadyrov regime no longer supports the commemora-
nationalists, who wanted the law to set out the tion of the deportation of entire ethnic groups from
dominant status of ethnic Russians, and of non-Rus- the North Caucasus ordered by Stalin in 1943–1944,
sian elites, who sensed an attempt to rob them of such as the Chechens and Ingush. 26
their privileges.
Ideological and cultural tensions
between the centre and the regions
also exist concerning the
representation of history.
Ideological and cultural tensions between the
centre and the regions also exist concerning the 23 Valery Dzutsati, “History Widens the Divide between
the North Caucasus and the Rest of Russia”, Jamestown
20 “Regional’nye elity priznali svoju otstranennost’ ot Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, 30 March 2015.
politiki” [Regional elites have noticed their alienation from 24 Paul Goble, “Russian Regions Erecting Statues to Those
politics], Vedomosti, 16 March 2017. Who Resisted Muscovite Expansion”, Jamestown Foundation
21 Cf. Paul Goble, “Hyper-Centralization of Russia Threat- Eurasia Daily Monitor, 14 March 2017.
ens Its Development and Survival”, Jamestown Foundation 25 Cf. Alexander Morrison, “Russia’s Colonial Allergy”,
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 19 October 2017. EurasiaNet, 19 December 2016.
22 Igor Torbakov, “What Is To Be Done about the ‘Russian 26 Cf. this study’s chapter “Kadyrov’s Cultural Policy:
Question’?”, EurasiaNet, 27 October 2017. Back to Chechen Tradition?”, below, p. 16.
SWP Berlin
Chechnya’s Status within the Russian Federation
May 2018
12“Pax Ramzana”: The “Pacification” of Chechnya in Kadyrov’s Private State
“Pax Ramzana”:
The “Pacification” of Chechnya
in Kadyrov’s Private State
At the regional level, another power vertical was his authorisation. He uses collective punishment
developed in Chechnya by the Kadyrov dynasty, against his adversaries and persecutes them even out-
particularly Ramzan Kadyrov. It seems limitless and side of Chechnya. He also pursues a cultural and
is thus an exception within Russia. The mayor of the religious policy that, according to his critics, amounts
republic’s capital Grozny, Muslim Khachiyev, has to transforming the republic into an Islamic state. 29
said: “Everything of any real significance that hap- Born in 1976, Ramzan Kadyrov fought on the side
pens [in Chechnya] happens on Kadyrov’s watch. He of the separatists against Russian troops in the first
is accountable for everything to the people, to God, Chechen War (1994–1996). Thereafter, he served as
and to the president [of Russia]”. 27 body guard to his father Akhmat, who was the acting
The head of the Chechen republic has repeatedly mufti of the de-facto independent republic. At the
pointed out that except for President Putin nothing start of the second war in autumn 1999, both father
and no-one could limit or control his authority – and son defected to the side of the Russian security
neither parliament nor the media nor judicial mecha- forces. During the chaotic phase from 1996 to 1999, it
nisms, let alone the opposition. “We have no oppo- had become clear to the Kadyrovs that Chechnya was
sition. That’s a system to undermine state sovereignty highly unlikely to win a renewed war against Russia.
[vlast]. I don’t allow anyone to play games with the Once Russian troops had regained control over the
people.” 28 No political parties exist in Chechnya other renegade autonomous republic, President Putin pro-
than the governing party, United Russia. Consequently, moted Akhmat Kadyrov to be its ruler. The young
as the governing party’s candidate in regional elec- Ramzan headed his father’s security apparatus, which
tions, Kadyrov receives almost 100 percent of the became known as “Kadyrovtsy” and now numbers
vote. The same is true of his feudal lord Putin. Chech- over 30,000 men. In March 2003 a new Chechen con-
nya occupies first place among the so-called electoral stitution was passed by referendum, and entered into
sultanates, i.e. about 15 regions in which the results force a month later. It guarantees a measure of
obtained by Putin and the governing party in presi- autonomy for the republic, but subordinates it to the
dential and parliamentary elections are far above the Russian Federation and central government. During
national average. the questionable presidential election in the republic
As a reward for his loyalty to Putin, vassal Kadyrov in October 2003, Moscow’s candidate Akhmat Kadyrov
gets to treat Chechnya as his personal fiefdom. He was elected with 80 percent of the votes cast. On 9
has threatened to open fire on police units from other May 2004 he was assassinated. His successor was in-
parts of Russia if they operate in Chechnya without terior minister Alu Alkhanov, since Kadyrov’s son was
still too young for the presidency. However, as Putin’s
protégé, Ramzan climbed rapidly to become the de
27 Quoted in “Chechen Strongman Builds Cult of Personality facto ruler. In March 2006 he was made prime minis-
through Sport”, Financial Times, 4 August. ter and proceeded to fill most government and ad-
28 Quoted in Il’ja Jashin, Ugroza nacional’noj bezopasnosti.
Nezavisimij expertnyj doklad [Threat to national security.
Lecture by an independent expert] (Moscow: Open Russia, 29 Georgy Bovt, “Will Moscow Allow Polygamy in Chech-
February 2016), 12, https://openrussia.org/post/view/12965/. nya?”, The Moscow Times, 13 May 2015.
SWP Berlin
Chechnya’s Status within the Russian Federation
May 2018
13“Pax Ramzana”: The “Pacification” of Chechnya in Kadyrov’s Private State
ministrative positions with his acolytes. In 2007 The Kadyrovtsy largely replaced the Russian troops
Alkhanov resigned as president, and the office was as the leading force in fighting terrorists. Their main
assumed by Ramzan Kadyrov. tool was collective punishment, which was not lim-
A fundamental reason for the special status of ited to close relatives of the remaining insurgents and
the republic’s ruler is that the Kadyrovs, on Putin’s terror suspects. The most common practice was to
orders, helped to transform the phase of full-scale war burn down houses. Ramzan Kadyrov’s punitive and
violence in Chechnya into a more selective and more deterrent measures also targeted the Chechen dias-
targeted fight against the adversary. The Second Che- pora in Europe.
chen War was, like the First, characterised by devas- According to a study from 2010, the targeted
tating violence. After Russian troops took Grozny counter-insurgency practised by local security forces
in March 2000, the armed resistance withdrew to in- resulted in a 40 percent decrease in violent activities
accessible mountain regions and launched a partisan by the armed guerrillas compared to the Russian
war against Russian forces. The Russian troops in turn army’s methods. 33 In 2009 Moscow officially lifted
proceeded with disproportionate force against entire Chechnya’s special status as a counter-terrorism loca-
cities and settlement areas, bombarding them with tion. In February 2010 a British delegation visited the
artillery, bombing them from the air, and carrying Caucasian republic. It was led by Frank Judd, former
out massive punitive operations. 30 However, their rapporteur for the Council of Europe on the human-
methods were ultimately unsuccessful. A Russian rights situation in Chechnya. The delegation reported
general reported from the battlefield in Chechnya that people living in Chechnya were noticeably safer
as late as 2004 that the Russian army was primarily than during the war, but that the human-rights
occupied with keeping its own troops safe and was situation continued to be precarious. 34
unable to counter the guerrillas effectively. 31 Once the fiercest phase of military confrontation
had come to an end, violence levels in Chechnya
Since 2002 the Kremlin has in- did decline. However, simultaneously the Islamist
creasingly relied on pro-Russian local revolutionary movement spread to other parts of
paramilitary units under the ultimate the North Caucasus. In 2007 the last Chechen under-
command of the Kadyrovs ground president, Doku Umarov, proclaimed the so-
called Caucasus Emirate. While it never ruled over a
Since 2002 the Kremlin has increasingly relied on compact territory, it did make efforts to coordinate
pro-Russian local paramilitary units under the ulti- local underground cells (jama’at) in various parts of
mate command of the Kadyrovs, who have had first- the North Caucasus and motivate them ideologically.
hand experience of guerrilla warfare as former Fighting throughout the entire region has only de-
resistance fighters against Russia. These local units, clined since about 2013, with markedly fewer casual-
which integrated growing numbers of defectors from ties. This was primarily due to many jihadi fighters
the insurgency, 32 had more detailed knowledge than moving from the Caucasus and other parts of Russia
the Russian troops of the sociocultural terrain and to combat zones in Syria and Iraq. 35
of their adversaries’ modus operandi. Gradually, the Field studies have raised doubts about the loyalty
Second Chechen War turned into a local civil war. of the Chechen people to the head of their republic –
and even of some Kadyrovtsy to their commander.
30 Emil Aslan Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev, How Socio-
Jean-François Ratelle and Emil Aslan Souleimanov
cultural Codes Shaped Violent Mobilization and Pro-insurgent Sup-
port in the Chechen Wars (Cham: Springer/Palgrave Macmillan, 33 Jean-François Ratelle and Emil Aslan Souleimanov,
2017), 38. On Russian warfare, cf. Mark Galeotti, Russia’s “A Perfect Counterinsurgency? Making Sense of Moscow’s
Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009 (Oxford, 2014). Policy of Chechenisation”, Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 8 (2016):
31 Emil Aslan Souleimanov, The North Caucasus Insurgency: 1287–1341 (1289); Jason Lyall, “Are Coethnics More Effec-
Dead or Alive? (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: The United States Army tive Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen
War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2017), 35. War”, American Political Science Review 104, no. 1 (2010): 1–20.
32 According to the then-ruler of the republic, Alu Alkha- 34 Quoted in “British MPs ‘Disturbed’ by Chechnya Visit”,
nov, in October 2005 half the local security forces already The Moscow News, 25 February 2010.
consisted of (about 7,000) former insurgents, who had de- 35 Uwe Halbach, Russland und der Nordkaukasus im Umfeld
fected. John Russell, Chechnya – Russia’s War on Terror (London des globalen Jihadismus, SWP-Aktuell 23/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung
and New York: Routledge, 2007), 88. Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2017).
SWP Berlin
Chechnya’s Status within the Russian Federation
May 2018
14“Pax Ramzana”: The “Pacification” of Chechnya in Kadyrov’s Private State
conducted interviews from 2008 to 2013 in which pacified, as the official interpretation suggests. 39
some interlocutors complained, for example, that Chechen society is still traumatised by the two wars;
only towns and localities linked to the Kadyrov clan there were casualties in almost every family. Even
had profited from the reconstruction programmes though today’s minors did not experience the wars
in Chechnya. 36 At the same time, the two researchers themselves, the trauma is being passed down to them
concede that Putin’s Chechenisation policy and his by their parents’ generation. The shiny new facades
alliance with the Kadyrov family have been remark- in the capital Grozny cannot belie the fact that a large
ably successful. For them, the Russian president has part of the population lives at or below the poverty
attained three fundamental objectives: first, war threshold. Kadyrov’s acolytes, on the other hand, can
casualties among the population declined. Second, display their wealth and luxury unhindered. “There
transferring the counter-insurgency fight to the Kady- are those for whom everything is allowed. And there’s
rovtsy helped Moscow to distance itself from the the mass of the people who have no rights at all, [...]
battlefield of Chechnya and the violence committed who have to gather in public to support the govern-
against local civilians, and thus to avoid accusations ment, who have to follow their religion in the way
of human-rights violations. Third, Kadyrov actually prescribed by the regime.” 40 The experts emphasise,
managed to drive back the insurgency – unlike, for however, that even under these circumstances there
example, the leader of the neighbouring republic is no large-scale support for IS. They stress that the
of Dagestan. Moreover, they believe that Kadyrov, limited potential followers are recruited not only
despite taking the law entirely in his own hands in from underprivileged social strata, and instead have a
Chechnya, has remained loyal to the Russian presi- more complex social and educational profile. Accord-
dent. 37 ing to statements by the Chechen interior minister,
Whether it is possible to thereby derive lasting in 2017 there were eight IS “sleeper cells” discovered
stability is questionable. Two instruments used by the and 18 underground fighters killed. 41
Kadyrovs in fighting the insurgency make this par-
ticularly doubtful, namely collective punishment and
vendetta, which have historically played a role in tri-
bal Chechen society. 38
Chechen society is still traumatised
by the two wars; there were casualties
in almost every family.
Russian human-rights activists and regional ex-
perts, such as Ekaterina Sokiryanskaya, Svetlana Gan-
nushkina and Aleksei Malashenko, believe that ele-
ments of Chechen youth are receptive to Islamic State
(IS) propaganda because Chechnya is not at all lastingly
36 “Moscow has managed to maintain control over the
Chechen state in general and Chechen elites in particular.
[…] Unlike in Afghanistan and Iraq, where sectarian division
and the empowerment of local ethnic allies have delivered
mixed results for the US Army, Chechenisation represents a
model where Moscow has been able to find the right balance 39 “Eksperty nazvali prichiny interesa chechenskoj mo-
between autonomy and control.” Ratelle and Souleimanov, lodezhi k ideologii IG” [Experts give the reasons for Chechen
“A Perfect Counterinsurgency?” (see note 33), 1310. youths’ interests in IS ideology], Kavkazkii Uzel, 15 March
37 Ibid. 2017, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/299244/.
38 “Krovnaja mest’ – kak teper’ ubivajut na Kavkaze” 40 Quotation by Yekaterina Sokiryanskaya, ibid.
[Vendetta: How murders are carried out in the Caucasus 41 “Russia: Chechnya Media Highlights 15–28 January
today], Kavkazkii Uzel, 26 December 2017, http://www.kavkaz- 2018”, BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union
uzel.eu/articles/296137/. Political File, 1 February 2018.
SWP Berlin
Chechnya’s Status within the Russian Federation
May 2018
15Kadyrov’s Cultural Policy: Back to Chechen Tradition?
Kadyrov’s Cultural Policy:
Back to Chechen Tradition?
Ramzan Kadyrov insists that Chechnya is part and bring about the breakup of Russia. 43 In the past few
parcel of the Russian Federation and, more than any years, Kadyrov has repeatedly claimed that Western
other regional leader, promotes a cult of President actors are undermining his republic’s stability and
Putin, whom he has asked to remain in power for life. Russia’s territorial integrity.
In Grozny, Putin’s birthday is celebrated by a mass Ramzan Kadyrov organises his own personality cult
parade. Ramzan Kadyrov has promoted the Russian through manliness rituals, martial-arts performances
President (alongside his father Akhmat and himself) in which his sons occasionally participate, and other
to a state icon. In Chechen society, this tripartite bizarre means. In February 2013 he set up his own
iconology is satirically known as “Father, Son and the Instagram page, on which he posted comments on
Holy Spirit”. The father, Akhmat Kadyrov, is at the Chechnya, Russia and the rest of the world. His on-
pinnacle of this personality cult – comparable to line audience grew to over 4 million visitors. How-
Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan, the father of the current ever, as of 23 December 2017, access to Kadyrov’s
president Ilham Aliyev. Azerbaijan and Chechnya are Instagram and Facebook pages was no longer pos-
the two political entities in the post-Soviet area in sible. They were blocked three days after the US gov-
which authoritarian ruling families have established ernment had put Kadyrov on its sanctions list under
themselves as dynasties. The largest mosque in the the Magnitsky Act for human-rights abuses. 44 The
whole North Caucasus stands in the Chechen capital measure triggered indignant reactions not only in
Grozny. Not only the mosque has been named after Chechnya, but all over Russia. 45
the former mufti and head of the republic, Akhmat Kadyrov cultivates the image of a helper to those
Kadyrov, but so have streets and buildings in Grozny in need not only in his own territory but all across
and other localities in the republic. In 2017 the Russia. He has boasted of helping free Russian jour-
father-figure cult was further bolstered: the Chechen nalists held in Ukraine, and members of the Russian
football club RFK Terek Grozny, which plays in the marine imprisoned in Libya. In 2017 he became in-
top Russian league, was renamed FK Akhmat Grozny. volved in the repatriation of Russian women and
The 66th birthday of its namesake was celebrated in children stranded in IS territories conquered by Iraqi
the capital on 22 August 2017 – with the participa- and Syrian troops. From August to October 2017 alone,
tion of former colleagues and representatives from Kadyrov’s special envoy to the Middle East and North
parliament, public organisations and the muftiate Africa, Ziyad Sabsazi, brought back about 50 of them
clergy. The guest of honour from Moscow was the
Minister for North Caucasus Affairs, Lev Kuznetsov. 42
During the celebrations, Ramzan Kadyrov addressed 43 “Russia: Chechnya Media Highlights 21–27 August
the Islamic world: prominent Islam scholars from 2017”, BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union
dozens of countries had acknowledged that his father Political File, 3 September 2017.
had sacrificed his life for God and the salvation of 44 The “Magnitsky Act” was passed by the US Congress
the Chechen people. However, international terrorists in 2012 and signed by President Obama. It placed Russian
were preparing to sacrifice the Chechen people to officials on a sanctions list whom it held responsible for the
death of the tax accountant Sergei Magnitsky, who had been
arrested in 2009 and died in prison.
42 A ministry specifically dedicated to North Caucasus 45 “Chechen Leader’s Social Media Ban Causes Outrage
affairs (Minkavkaz) was established in Moscow in March in Russia”, BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union
2014. Political File, 25 December 2017.
SWP Berlin
Chechnya’s Status within the Russian Federation
May 2018
16Kadyrov’s Cultural Policy: Back to Chechen Tradition?
from the war zones. 46 Kadyrov’s carefully cultivated Kadyrov emphasises the proximity
image is popular in Russia’s interior, even though of Islamic morals and tradition to
its inhabitants have reservations about Chechens and Russia’s Christian-Orthodox
other North Caucasians. In an opinion poll carried traditionalism.
out by the WZIOM Institute among 1,800 citizens
of Russia in April 2017, 55 percent of those polled These contradictions are particularly visible in his
believed that Kadyrov’s activities benefited the entire religious policy. On the one hand, Kadyrov emphasises
country. The institute’s director, Valeri Fedorov, sum- the proximity of Islamic morals and tradition to Rus-
marised the poll results as follows: “The head of the sia’s Christian-Orthodox traditionalism and vehement-
Chechen republic is viewed by the majority of Rus- ly demarcates this link from “Western decadence, un-
sian citizens as a successful and patriotic leader who godliness, and hostility to tradition and the family”.
guarantees the security and development of his re- Here he resembles his patron Putin, who since 2012
public within the Russian population. Critical objec- (during his third term as president) has increasingly
tions to Ramzan Kadyrov barely resonate in the mass underpinned Russian patriotism with references to
consciousness.” 47 traditional values, and stressed their importance for
Within his sphere of control, Kadyrov rigidly steers Russia’s security and stability. 49 Kadyrov supports the
his course in religious and cultural policy under the concept of “spiritual security”, which has been inte-
motto “Back to Chechen tradition”. This “Kadyrovism” grated into Russia’s national security doctrine, elevat-
builds bridges between different groups, including ing a specific “Russian civilisation” into an object to
some that were previously hostile to each other, with be defended against external interference. 50 He main-
different interpretations of “Chechen identity”: tra- tains contacts with Patriarch Kirill and has opened
ditionalists who want to revive the norms of the com- new Russian-Orthodox churches in Chechnya despite
mon law (adat) that has been valid for centuries with- the fact that the ethnic Russian section of its popu-
in a tribal society; Islamic purists who only recognise lation has shrunk to a tiny minority. Simultaneously
sharia as a legal system; nationalists who insist on Kadyrov supports ultraconservative forces in Moscow,
Chechnya’s sovereignty, basing themselves on the such as the deputy Natalia Poklonskaya and orthodox
tradition of anti-colonial resistance; and autonomists hardliners that even the Patriarch considers suspect.
who prefer a self-determined Chechnya within great- They include groups that campaigned against the film
power Russia. 48 In this context, Ramzan Kadyrov Matilda in 2017, whose theme is the love affair be-
presents himself as the national and religious leader; tween Tsar Nicolas II and a ballet dancer, for allegedly
as the intermediary between Russia and the external violating the religious sentiments of “real Russians”.
Islamic world; as the symbol of Chechen self-deter- Chechnya’s policy towards non-traditional faith
mination and simultaneously as the guarantor of the communities is just as repressive as Moscow’s. Russia
republic’s affiliation with Russia; as an active fighter passed a law in July 2016 that places the missionary
against terrorism and religious extremism who never- activities of non-Orthodox, non-traditional denomina-
theless employs violent methods himself and dictates tions under suspicion of terrorism. In 2017 Jehovah’s
strict religious prescriptions to his own society. Witnesses in particular were criminalised as “reli-
gious extremists”. In Chechnya, the attribute “non-
traditional” is likewise used to demonise undesired
46 “Russia: Chechnya Media Highlights 31 July–6 August
religious activities. Ramzan Kadyrov calls for “tradi-
2017”, BBC Monitoring Global Newsline – Former Soviet Union tional Islam” in line with his father Akhmat’s beliefs,
Political File, 7 August 2017; Grozny-Inform, 21 October 2017. invoking in Marlène Laruelle’s words “an often gro-
On Kadyrov’s activities abroad and his special envoy Sabsazi,
cf. this study’s chapter on “Chechnya as a Cross-Border 49 Cf. Irina du Quenoy, “Russia: The Stability Implications
Actor”, p. 26. of State Policies Toward Religion and the Russian Orthodox
47 “Ramzan Kadyrov: Portret Politika”, press release Church”, in Religion, Conflict, and Stability in the Former Soviet
no. 3372, VCIOM, 12 May 2017, https://wciom.ru/index.php? Union, ed. Katya Migacheva and Bryan Frederick (Santa
id=236&uid=116195. Monica: Rand Corporation, 2018), 159–80 (171–75).
48 Cf. in particular Marlène Laruelle, Kadyrovism: Hardline 50 Cf. Veera Laine and Iiris Saarelainen, Spirituality as a
Islam as a Tool of the Kremlin?, Russie.Nei.Visions no. 99 (Paris Political Instrument. The Church, the Kremlin, and the Creation of
and Brussels: Institut français des relations internationales the “Russian World”, Working Paper (Helsinki: Finnish Insti-
[Ifri], March 2017), 9. tute of International Affairs [FIIA], September 2017).
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May 2018
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