Hapag-Lloyd Analyst Day - CFO Nicolás Burr & COO Dr. Maximilian Rothkopf
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Today’s Agenda 1 Recap on Financials & Strategy 2023 incl. Q&A Market Fundamentals Financial Performance Strategy 2023 Recap 2 THE Alliance & IMO 2020 incl. Q&A THE Alliance – Setup 2020 IMO 2020 – Implementation at Hapag-Lloyd 2
Consolidation has been shaping the industry – Hapag-Lloyd has been at the forefront Industry consolidation Global capacity share [%] Carrier capacity [TEU m] 2.5 2.3 Ranking end of 2013 Top 5 1.5 Top 6-10 Remaining 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 44% 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 65% Maersk MSC CMA Ever- COSCOHapag- Hanjin APL CSCL MOL NYK HSüd OOCL Yang PIL K-Line ZIM Hyundai UASC CSAV CGM green Lloyd Ming 17% 4.0 Ranking as of 2019 3.4 2.9 2.7 19% 39% 1.7 1.6 1.3 0.7 0.4 0.4 16% 0.3 Maersk MSC COSCO CMA CGM Hapag-Lloyd ONE Evergreen Yang Ming Hyundai PIL ZIM 2013 2019 5
The orderbook remains historically low at only 11%… Orderbook-to-fleet Newly placed orders [TEU m, %] [TEU m, %] Vessels ordered after 30 September 2019 61% Orderbook 2.0 2.2 6.5 50% Vessels > 13,999 TEU 1.8 Share of world fleet 1.2 6.0 1.1 38% 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.2 5.0 27% 28% 21% 21% 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 YTD 4.3 18% 19% October 16% 3.9 13% 12% 2019 3.8 11% 3.4 3.6 Idle fleet 3.3 3.2 [TTEU] Share of world fleet 4.9% 2.8 2.5 2.5 28 October 2019 1,359 1,420 (increase driven by scrubber retrofits) 809 1,123 595 779 628 417 228 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 YTD Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 October 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 6 Source: MDS Transmodal (October 2019), Drewry Forecaster (various issues), Clarksons (October 2019), Alphaliner weekly (various sources)
…and scrapping is expected to increase, which indicates a healthier outlook for the industry Scheduled vessel deliveries Scrapping [TEUm] [% of world fleet] 1.7 3.3% 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 2.0% 1.5% 1.7% 1.1% 0.9% 0.6% 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019e 2020e 2021e 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019e 2020e 2021e Net capacity growth in 2019e Supply / demand balance 5.1% 9 8.0% 8.0% 8 7 6.3% 5.8% 3.7% 6.1% -0.9% 5.5% 4.6% 5.6% 6 -0.5% 5 7.6% 3.7% 3.9% 4 3.3% 4.7% 4.9% -1.2% 3 4.3% 2 3.8% 3.2% 2.1% 1 2.2% 1.2% 0 Gross capacity Scrapping Slippage Net capacity Estimated Fleet 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019e 2020e growth growth ’Out of Service’ Demand Supply for scrubber retrofits 7 Source: Drewry (Forecaster 3Q19), Clarksons (October 2019)
Alliances have taken measures to actively manage capacity on the Far East and Transpacific trades in 2019 Far East Transpacific Far East Trade (~408,000 TEU weekly capacity) THE Alliance and Ocean Alliance have removed more than 150,000 Peak Season TEU capacity during peak season and have announced blank sailings around Golden Week Extra-loaders have been added during peak season Temporary suspension of 2M´s AE2/Swan loop ~18,000 TEU/week to North Europe equal to 18% of 2M’s trade capacity; ~4% of total trade capacity & ~7% of North Europe related capacity Post Peak Season 2M has announced three blank sailings in the first half of October 31,000 TEU/week equal to ~8% of total trade capacity; ~6% of North Carriers have announced 9 blank sailings to US WC Europe related capacity & ~10% of Med related capacity Carriers have announced 6 blank sailings to US EC / US HMM withdrew it‘s standalone AEX-service GC ~4,900 TEU/week to North Europe equal to ~1% of total trade capacity & ~2% of North Europe related capacity 8
Also, the consolidation is beginning to materialize in less volatile freight rates on a global level CTS global rate index and rate volatility vs. carrier consolidation Comments 120 40 30 The industry has reached an [Index: 2008 = 100] [USD] [% capacity share] unprecedented level of global rate 35 stability Top 10 carrier control of global capacity 40 Absolut difference between highest 105 and lowest rate in past 12 month 30 Volatility at a global scale has 45 CTS Global Rate Index diminished sharply over the 50 decade 90 55 20 Individual trades will always show 60 higher levels of volatility due to 75 65 capacity shifts 70 10 Clear correlation between 60 75 reduction in rate volatility and 80 degree of industry consolidation 45 0 85 Development clearly shows that the Jan.-10 Jan.-11 Jan.-12 Jan.-13 Jan.-14 Jan.-15 Jan.-16 Jan.-17 Jan.-18 Jan.-19 Jan.-09 Jan.-10 Jan.-11 Jan.-12 Jan.-13 Jan.-14 Jan.-15 Jan.-16 Jan.-17 Jan.-18 Jan.-19 industry is changing already 9 Source: CTS Oct. 2019, Transmodal Oct. 2019
On the back of two mergers, Hapag-Lloyd was able to significantly increase transport volume and revenues Volume and Revenue Development Q1 2014 – Q3 2019 Capacity 1,009 966 963 1,573 1,643 1,670 year end [TTEU] 3,356 3,608 3,268 3,565 3,534 3,569 Transport Volume [TTEU] 3,221 3,478 3,119 Revenue [USDm] 3,052 3,038 3,045 2,987 2,974 2,861 2,807 2,774 +69.4% 2,593 2,620 2,629 2,929 2,411 2,376 2,276 2,271 2,287 2,229 2,225 2,182 2,124 2,152 2,088 +117.7% 1,945 1,934 2,130 1,861 1,822 1,811 1,774 1,947 1,950 1,560 1,892 1,474 1,473 1,399 1Q14 2Q14 3Q14 4Q14 1Q15 2Q15 3Q15 4Q15 1Q16 2Q16 3Q16 4Q16 1Q17 2Q17 3Q17 4Q17 1Q18 2Q18 3Q18 4Q18 1Q19 2Q19 3Q19 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 11
While bunker prices increased since 2016, freight rates have remained stable Freight Rate vs. Bunker Price Q1 2014 – Q3 2019 Freight Rate [USD] 1,448 1,422 1,426 1,412 Combined Bunker Price [USD/mt] 1,331 1,264 1,189 1,116 1,084 1,079 1,063 1,084 1,067 1,056 1,072 1,065 1,055 1,019 1,027 1,033 1,030 1,029 1,010 595 592 585 525 446 467 425 434 416 399 362 372 338 312 306 313 312 308 245 257 224 178 182 1Q14 2Q14 3Q14 4Q14 1Q15 2Q15 3Q15 4Q15 1Q16 2Q16 3Q16 4Q16 1Q17 2Q17 3Q17 4Q17 1Q18 2Q18 3Q18 4Q18 1Q19 2Q19 3Q19 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 12 Note: For the financial year 2018, revenues for additional services in Latin America and Turkey were included in the calculation of freight rates. The previous year´s figures have not been adjusted
We were able to substantially improve our cost structure Cost per TEU development 2014 – 2018 (ex bunker) 9M 2019 vs. 9M 2018 (ex bunker) Limited comparability due to new Transport- volume P&L structure and IFRS 16 TTEU 5,907 7,401 7,599 9,803 11,874 8,900 9,011 New PL structure [USD] -26% 1,165 IFRS 16 999 895 865 863 859 858 1,057 929 825 785 766 796 755 108 70 70 74 92 69 108 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 9M 2018 9M 2019 Purchased services ex. Bunker Depreciation Transport costs ex. Bunker Depreciation 13
Results have been improving consistently since Q2 2016 despite a challenging industry environment EBITDA and EBIT Development Q1 2014 – Q3 2019 EBITDA USDm EBITDA USDm ex. IFRS 16 EBIT USDm 617 556 524 453 479 415 443 390 392 372 319 266 282 231 247 253 251 243 219 206 202 196 248 197 150 152 167 136 144 103 90 111 92 88 83 73 62 47 164 34 18 4 5 8 -29 -50 -110 -109 -403 1Q14 2Q14 3Q14 4Q14 1Q15 2Q15 3Q15 4Q15 1Q16 2Q16 3Q16 4Q16 1Q17 2Q17 3Q17 4Q17 1Q18 2Q18 3Q18 4Q18 1Q19 2Q19 3Q19 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 14
Effects of sector consolidation can also be seen in stabilizing results across the industry over the past quarters 7.8% 9M 2019 7.0% 6.1% 6.9% Hapag-Lloyd 6.8% 5.4% 5.5% 5.1% 4.6% COSCO 4.9% 1) 3.5% Maersk 4.7% 3.4% 5.0% 2.9% Wan Hai 3.7% 1.9% 1.8% 2.1% 1.3% 1.3% Evergreen 2.6% 0.4% 2.7% 0.2% 0.6% Yang Ming -0.8% 1.4% 2) HMM -7.2% -0.9% -1.2% -2.4% -3.0% Q3 2019 Hapag-Lloyd 7.8% -5.8% Maersk 1) 7.3% COSCO 4.8% -7.7% -8.5% Wan Hai 3.6% -8.1% Evergreen 2.7% Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Yang Ming -1.5% 2016 2017 2018 2019 HMM 2) -4.7% Average carrier EBIT margin Hapag-Lloyd EBIT margin 15 Average values are based on a varying number of carriers due to differences in data availability in the respective quarters 1) Based on Maersk Group as Maersk has stopped to publish a liner EBIT in Q1 2018; 2) HMM incl. bulk business due to unavailability of liner business only
Stable equity base of USD 7.3 bn, very strong cash flow generation of USD 1.7 bn and reduced net debt to EBITDA of 3.2x Equity base [USD m] Net debt [USD m] Equity ratio 41.3% 45.5% 44.6% 40.9% 40.9% 40.2% LTM LTM Net debt / Gearing 72.1% 66.1% 71.0% 93.8% 85.5% 92.0% 27.9x 3.9x 5.7x 5.7x 4.8x 3.2x EBITDA 7,332 7,595 7,272 7,263 7,171 783 737 6,084 5,068 5,497 5,342 636 4,518 4,256 4,415 Cash 1) 865 625 622 6,812 6,535 5,448 Net debt 3,653 3,631 3,793 2014 2015 2016 2017 9M 2018 9M 2019 2014 2015 2016 2017 9M 2018 9M 2019 Operating cash flow [USD m] Invested capital [USD m] & ROIC [%] Free CF 159 -38 109 1,048 651 1,483 14.134 13.749 14.076 1,727 8.722 9.128 9.136 6,5% 3,1% 3,1% 1,3% 1,020 872 4,1% 635 501 461 -6,0% 2014 2015 2016 2017 9M 2018 9M 2019 2014 2015 2016 2017 9M 2018 9M 2019 16 1) Includes Restricted Cash booked as other assets
Financial Highlights 9M 2019 – Clearly improved financial results compared to previous year Transport volume [TEU m] Freight rate [USD/TEU] Revenue [USD m] +1.2% +4.2% +5.1% 9.0 1,075 10.7 8.9 10.1 1,032 9M 2018 9M 2019 9M 9M 9M 2018 9M 2019 2018 2019 EBIT [USD m] EAT [USD m] Operating CF [USD m] +102.2% +USD 318 m +98.1% 722 333 1,727 26* 399* 357 872 696 363 1,328 15 -30* 9M 2018 9M 2019 9M 2018 9M 2019 9M 2018 9M 2019 17 * IFRS 16 impact
Agenda 1 Market Fundamentals 2 Financial Performance 3 Strategy 2023 Recap 18
Our Strategy 2023 has 3 overarching goals Number 1 Be profitable Profitability Deliver unparalleled for quality throughout the cycle quality, be customer-oriented, and create value for customers as well as capture value for Hapag-Lloyd Global Reinforce strongholds player Focus on customer Expand in key growth markets segments willing to Global market share (excluding pay for value Intra Asia) greater than 10% 19
Overview of core elements to achieve the goals of our Strategy 2023 Continuously earn and keep Mid and long-term differentiating strategy the “right to play” Environmental No. 1 quality carrier responsibility Continuous Cost Management Superior land side Best-in-class capabilities Web Channel Sustainable value creation Revenue Management Focus on selected attractive markets Opportunistic M&A and segments Digitization & Automation Agile Organization 20
Tangible steps made on Strategy 2023 in 9M 2019 GLOBAL PLAYER BE PROFITABLE # 1 FOR QUALITY We have reinforced our market share We are on-track to deliver on We have made further progress and expanded in niche markets profitability and deleveraging targets in achieving our quality targets Global market share stable around Financial result significantly up, Quick Quotes (Web Channel) with 10% (excl. IRT Asia) EBIT +102% vs. 9M 2018 ongoing strong growth rates in 2019 Continued growth in reefer and Financial debt reduced by special equipment towards 10% USD ~800m (excl. IFRS 16) , A new CRM tool for our sales force market share target e.g. due to early Bond repayments launched in summer 2019 Strengthened position in Net leverage improved to 3.2x Further Quality Service Centers attractive markets by launching (excl. IFRS 16), earlier than expected (QSCs) to strengthen our delivery new services e.g. from Turkey to consistency and organizational Strong cash conversion (>90%) and North America East Coast (Apr efficiency adequate liquidity reserve of 2019), from South East India to USD >1.1 bn available Substantial improvement in Europe (Oct 2019) and from Middle Net Promoter Score (NPS) East / India to Africa Cost Management Program (Oct 2019) (incl. restructuring of unprofitable services) on track with positive effect on unit cost Overall good results achieved with Revenue Management 21
Cost management program with substantial savings ramp-up in 2019 Cost savings potential Full run rate [USD m] Cost savings ramp up [USD m] 350 – 4001) 350 – 4001) Savings implemented for 2019 Network Container Collaboration Terminal Procurement Total 2019 2020 2021 Steering Partnering Full savings run rate 22 1) Compared to a FY 2017 cost base (incl. UASC business for 12 months) Subject to further evaluation and specification in 2019/20
We are well on track in implementing our planned savings initiatives Degree of Implementation Measures Advanced analytics tool developed NETWORK Optimize share of transshipment and direct cargo Optimization of all shipsystems 90% Raise service level and reduce costs Establish standardized procurement tools/methods across Hapag-Lloyd PROCUREMENT Build up partnerships with key suppliers 70% Timely exchange of information TERMINAL Reduced waiting time Improved productivity PARTNERING Early departure 20% Reduce empty moves CONTAINER Advanced analytics further enhanced Avoid container type imbalances through substitution STEERING Direct moves between customers to avoid depots 95% Enhanced and jointly operated Feeder network Shift volumes from 3rd-party feeder to own services COLLABORATION Review and expand collaboration opportunities 20% 23
Example Network: Restructured services CCI, IMX and AGX contribute mid double digit USD m savings in 9M 2019 Measures CCI IMX AGX Combination of 2 services Reduction by 1 vessel Implemented: June 2018 Implemented: December 2018 Implemented: January 2019 9M cumulated savings [USD m] Optimization of Mid double digit vessel size Joint operation in new partnerships Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 24
We have further built on our foundation of new Revenue Management with the implementation of advanced revenue optimization drivers ▪ Improved Transhipment attractiveness Examples steering Cargo Mix ▪ Building of Inland Products Far East Trade1) Asia – LatAm Trade1) Capabilities ▪ Cargo Mix Optimization tool with constraint Jan-19 Sep-19 Jan-19 Sep-19 based rule set 6.1% Uptake ▪ Advanced Booking Acceptance engine 9.2% 7.9% 9.5% Management ▪ Granular booking uptake analytics -1.8ppt -0.3ppt Tools ▪ Rule Based Price Setting Key Concepts ▪ Quick Quotes Improvement in cargo mix optimizes profitability of ship systems Pricing ▪ Shipping Guarantee and trades Techniques A 100% fully optimized ship system will never occur ▪ Cargo Insurance Different trades can have very different optimization potentials ▪ Low contributing cargo steering 25 1) A lower figure represent a more optimized scenario
We remain ambitious and are confident to achieve the goals we have set our self Financial Targets to be achieved until 2023 Non-Financial Targets to be achieved until 2023 Achieve best in class Net Promoter Score (NPS) Profitability ROIC (throughout the cycle) > WACC Quality Measure and improve On Time Delivery Superior Increase share of door-to-door business Deleveraging Net Debt / EBITDA ≤ 3.0x landside to over 40% of total by 2023 Grow volume in selected attractive markets and Attractive Equity Equity ratio > 45% achieve a market share of ~10% Markets (excl. Intra Asia) in reefer market by 2023 Comply with or exceed all environmental Liquidity Adequate liquidity reserve of ~ USD 1.1 bn Environmental regulations (incl. IMO) Grow volume booked via Web Channel Web Channel to 15% by 2023 26
Major targets for 2019 and beyond continue to remain unchanged Continue to increase profitability and further deleverage our company Continuously proactively adjust to changing market conditions Successfully implement IMO 2020 Continue Revenue Management professionalization and make further progress on our Cost Management program Continue to implement our “Strategy 2023” and create more value for our customers and shareholders as we strive to become number one for quality Further develop and offer more digitalized solutions to our customers 27
THE Alliance setup and Status on IMO 2020 preparations COO Dr. Maximilian Rothkopf Hamburg, 20 November 2019
2020: A key year for operations Operational focus topics for the year 2020: Manage Further Improve Schedule Strengthen IMO 2020 enhance IT Systems Reliability THE Alliance Transition & Organization 29
Agenda 1 THE Alliance – Setup 2020 2 IMO 2020 – Implementation at Hapag-Lloyd 3 Q&A session 30
THE Alliance: Multilateral framework based on core principles defining our unique selling proposition Core principles of THE Alliance Multi-Trade agreement: THE Alliance members as from 1 April 2020 Atlantic, Far East-Europe, Asia-Middle East and Transpacific Best ship for the loop principle: Deployment of operationally most appropriate vessel in each loop, regardless of providing line – mixed loops are the norm ~280 vessels Loop allocation share: 32 services Based on core principle: “What you put in, is what you get out” – irrespective of where own vessels are deployed Organizational setup: Joint coordination center in Singapore, with agreed Joint Working Procedure for daily operation 31
THE Alliance partnership allows Hapag-Lloyd to offer a superior product on core east-west-trades Setup of joint service network Same underlying mechanisms as Use of large vessels to leverage covering a defined scope of trades a classical “vessel sharing economies of scale Alliance agreement”, but larger scope Ensure multiple weekly departures Joint deployment decisions of fleet concept from/to main east/west Frequent joint review of product based on each line’s demand destinations offering and clearly defined processes for changes Enhanced product for customers Reduced investment needs due Improved utilization over all Advantages for Multiple departures per week to vessel sharing between services Hapag-Lloyd which would be impossible in alliance partners Reduced unit costs stand-alone situation 32
HMM joining THE Alliance on 1 April 2020 brings additional ULCV capacity… Current capacity HMM New orders Total fleet Yearly transport volume: ~ 4,500 TTEU Vessels: 12 Vessels: 76 Vessel capacity: 23,000 TEU Capacity: 428,966 TEU Delivery as of Q2 2020 HMM will participate in Avg. capacity: 5,644 TEU % of future total fleet1): 33% THE Alliance on major East-West trades (such as Far East and Owned fleet Chartered fleet Transpacific) from Vessels: 8 1 April 2020 Vessels: 19 Vessels: 57 Vessel capacity: 15,000 TEU Capacity: 154,160 TEU Capacity: 274,806 TEU Delivery as of Q2 2021 Avg. capacity: 8,114 TEU Avg. capacity: 4,821 TEU % of future total fleet1): 15% % of total fleet: 36% % of total fleet: 64% 33 1) Assumption that entire current fleet will be continued; likely some return of charter vessels
…and will further strengthen THE Alliance’s competitive position Alliance capacity shares on major trades (incl. HMM) Atlantic Transpacific Far East Others 2M Others 2M Others 2M 5% 45% 8% 21% 0% 39% 36%1) ( - pp) 14% 29% (+3 pp) 42% 25% (+1 pp) 36% THE Alliance Ocean THE Alliance Ocean THE Alliance Ocean 34 Source: Alphaliner Monthly Monitor (October 2019) Note: (%) = Market share excl. HMM 1) HMM with no participation on Atlantic trade
Agenda 1 THE Alliance – Setup 2020 2 IMO 2020 – Implementation at Hapag-Lloyd 3 Q&A session 35
As of 2020, all ships will be required to use fuel with 0.5% Sulphur content or less worldwide IMO 2020 Sulphur Regulation Bunker fuel Sulphur limit % Sulphur (by weight) 4.5 Global 4.0 ECA 3.5 3.0 Emission control All international 0.5% worldwide areas (ECAs3: bunkers outside 2.5 Europe and North ECAs3 scheduled 0.1% at berth 2.0 America) with move to move to 0.5% 0.1% Emission control areas (ECAs) to 0.1% Sulphur Sulphur on Jan 1 Targeted 0.1% ECAs China 1.5 levels in 2015 2020 1.0 Fuel type Today 2020 0.5 Worldwide Only with HSFO 3.5% (excl. ECAs) 0.0 scrubbers2 2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2025 No large scale Worldwide VLSFO 0.5% use (excl. ECAs) ECAs3 + ECAs3 + MDO 0.1% EU Ports EU Ports + New ECAs China 36 1) Marine Diesel Oil (0.1% sulphur) 2) Possible use of scrubber for Sox post-treatment 3) Emission Control Area (ECAs) = The Channel, North Sea, Baltic Sea, North America, US Carribbean
There are three options to comply with IMO2020 Options for ensuring compliance 1 2 3 Compliant Scrubber (EGCS) Liquefied natural fuels gas (LNG) Current HL fuel portfolio in light of IMO 2020 Majority of fleet will use 10 Hamburg Class Pilot conversion of "Sajir“ compliant fuel 9 charter ships Potential to convert 16 additional Study further scrubber LNG-ready ships opportunities 37
Hapag-Lloyd is on its way to ensure compliance with IMO 2020 Latest date for change-over December 31st No vessel burns HSFO Carriage ban Last stocks to be debunkered for HSFO Jan 1st – February 29th (except scrubber) March 1st Consumption of HSFO is now First consumption of forbidden VLSFO Jan 1st From December 1st First VLSFO is Regulatory deadline to ensure compliant bunkered fuel is provided to every vessel Mid October 38
Transition of Hapag-Lloyd’s fleet towards IMO 2020 compliance is a complex task but well underway The objective of the IMO 2020 project group is to ensure a smooth transition of Hapag-Lloyd’s fleet while avoiding any HSFO debunkerings in 2020 Fleet Management Chartering Network & Cooperations There are certain operational requirements to ensure compliance – Tanks need to be cleaned prior to bunkering of VLSFO IMO 2020 – Ship implementation plan has to be developed Group Fuel Purchase – Debunkering to be avoided due to financial and operational risks – Contractual agreements for charter vessels have to Business be fulfilled Legal & Intelligence Insurance Working group established = Project Lead 39
The industry faces a 3-dimensional dilemma between change over date vs. risk of debunkering vs. additional costs Individual fuel change-over monitoring for each vessel Fuel change-over monitoring Key takeaways Bunker VLSFO Bunker HSFO HSFO tank capacity Consumption Change-over date ▪ Required tank ROB HSFO VLSFO tank capacity Tank cleaning cleaning reduces tank capacity for HSFO ▪ Port omissions could Fuel in metric tons disrupt bunkering and cleaning plans ▪ Speed ups might result in earlier consumption of VLSFO ▪ Additional cost could occur due to earlier change-over Port 1 Port 2 Port 3 Port 4 Port 5 Latest by 31st Dec 2019 40
We are confident that Very Low Sulphur Fuel Oil will be sufficiently available at major ports Current coverage of secured VLSFO [0.5%] Share of total Top 8 HLAG yearly volume Bunker Ports [%] A B ~ 55 Top 8 ~ 80% C D E ~ 20 F G ~5 H Other ~ 20 Total 100 41 Source: Internal assessment
Price spread between VLSFO and HSFO was estimated to be around 250 USD/mt – Current prices support our estimation Rotterdam bunker prices [USD/mt] 600 550 500 464 450 +57 400 350 +150 +248 300 250 HSFO [3.5%] VLSFO [0.5%] 200 HSFO [3.5%] Forward VLSFO [0.5%] Forward 216 150 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov May 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 42 Source: Platts data as per 30.10.2019, futures data & own calculation
We have introduced a Marine Fuel Recovery mechanism (MFR) to pass on higher bunker prices The Marine Fuel Recovery Mechanism (MFR) replaces all existing fuel charges MFR has been gradually implemented from 1 February 2019 It is causal, transparent and easy-to-understand It helps our customers predict and plan the price increases for their trade routes The calculation is based on average market data As of today, MFR has been implemented in the majority of our contracts 43
As of 1 December 2019, Hapag-Lloyd will implement an additional bunker surcharge to cover the IMO 2020 transition period (ITC) The ITC will apply to FAK and short term business Fuel price development Transitional operational expenses Inefficient fuelling expenses Expected higher fuel price based on a Tank cleaning (Riding Gangs, Additives, Due to unavailability of LSFO 0.5% in certain spread: Flushing Parcels) specific bunker ports it is possible that we cannot optimize our bunker Tank modifications purchasing and… Stripping pumps – use ULSFO 0.1% instead of HSFO debunkering VLSFO 0.5% Spread Replacing emergency fuels – bunker several times taking in smaller quantities – bunker in more expensive ports Examplary graph Competitors, such as Maersk/ Hamburg Süd, CMA CGM, ZIM and others have also announced to introduce surcharges to cover the IMO 2020 transition period, effective December 1st, 2019. 44
We have continually modernized our fleet and now need to address evolving emission regulations Fleet modernization programs 2010s 2015s 2020 "Engine power reduction to "Optimizing water resistance of "IMO 2020 compliance & Future Theme match demand" Hull" GHG regulations" Turbo charger cut out and power Replacement of traditional Installation of scrubbers and Action reduction. Improved power bulbous by float-optimized conversion to LNG dual fuel management for auxiliary engines bulbous bow, trim optimization propulsion and hull roughness Increased fuel efficiency due to Optimized floating characteristics Compliance to IMO emission Result operating on optimized design can lead to fuel savings of up to regulations by reducing CO2 point for engine 10% emissions In view of IMO 2020, we started modernizing our fleet (own and chartered) by installing 19 scrubbers and a LNG pilot by end of year 2020, and continue to look at further opportunities 45
Our 13,200 TEU Hamburg Express class vessels are currently being fitted with Scrubbers General Information Meets all current regulations Uncertain longer term outlook due to possible further restrictions Limited capex and relatively short payback time Slightly higher consumption than w/o scrubber Technical data GVU forOpen loop scrubber (hybrid ready) HIMSEN G/E At sea ~3,000 tons / hr wash water 3 wash water pumps (+1 in standby) with ~1,000 kW power consumption Switch over to compliant fuel in none discharge areas (Elbe River, Singapore, China Coast, Belgium Coast…etc.) 46
Work in progress and in plan… GVU for HIMSEN G/E … all Hamburg Express class vessels refitted by end of 2020! 47
LNG appears to be an attractive alternative fuel, until future emission free technologies reach commercially viable scale LNG Regulation Widely accepted technology Lower costs from carbon tax / levy, once applied Technological Medium-to-long term option to bridge gap from fossil fuels to future emission free technologies maturity Proven technology already in use with large LNG tankers and some cruise ships and smaller vessels Still in pilot mode for ULCVs Fuel availability Long-term availability of LNG appears secured (e. g. increase of US production) Infrastructure/bunkering capacity building up rapidly Gas price dropping towards expected long term floor ( e. g. new/cheaper methods such as fracking) Capex Higher Capex than scrubber but lasts for vessel lifetime (~25 years) Emissions Lowest emissions among currently available fuels Reduces SOx up to 100%, Particles up to 100%, NOx up to 95%, and CO2 between 20–25% 48
Compared to Heavy Fuel Oil (3.5%), Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) reduces emissions significantly Reduction of emissions through LNG versus HSFO (3.5%) Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Reduction by: CO2 ~20-25% LNG successfully attacks all issues with one solution NOx ~90-95% The best solution to reduce CO2 emissions in the mid-term SOx ~99-100% Particles ~98-100% 49 Source: IMO GHG study (adjusted)
For container shipping, LNG appears to be a viable mid-term option – Other fuels / technologies are all still at the concept stage High-level comparison per fuel type Fuel type Shipping readiness Timing1) LNG Commercial operation - growing order book 2020 2050 Bio fuels Demonstration - first fuel trials of up to 20% (DME, RME, Ethanol) mixtures 2020 2050 e-Methanol Concept stage 2020 2050 Synfuels Concept stage (GTL, BTL, MTBE) 2020 2050 Ammonia Concept stage 2020 2050 Hydrogen Demonstration - considered for regional ferry (+ fuel cells) operation 2020 (small) (large) 2050 Electricity Concept stage 2020 2050 (thorium energy conversion) Note: battery-electric propulsion excluded due to weight and space constraints 1) Indication based on market expert feedback 50 Source: Market research, expert interviews
Hapag-Lloyd is the first in the world to convert a large container ship to LNG – What we expect from the conversion of the „Sajir“ What to expect from the “Sajir” conversion? We want to drive environmental friendly shipping We do expect reasonable pay back times based on our business case The conversion is a pilot project for the entire industry Conversion planned to be completed by Q3 2020 Planning phase started in Q4 2018 We will gain valuable operational experience Hapag-Lloyd has further 16 LNG-ready vessels which could potentially be refitted Our A15 (11x) and A19 (6x) class vessels were built “LNG-Ready” in line with DNVGL regulations Flag Germany Breadth 368.52 m Class 15,000 TEU Draught 51.00 m Length 14.50 m 51
Disclaimer Forward-looking statements This presentation contains forward-looking statements that involve a number of risks and uncertainties. Such statements are based on a number of assumptions, estimates, projections or plans that are inherently subject to significant risks, as well as uncertainties and contingencies that are subject to change. Actual results can differ materially from those anticipated in the Company’s forward-looking statements as a result of a variety of factors, many of which are beyond the control of the Company, including those set forth from time to time in the Company’s press releases and reports and those set forth from time to time in the Company’s analyst calls and discussions. We do not assume any obligation to update the forward-looking statements contained in this presentation. This presentation does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation or offer to buy any securities of the Company, and no part of this presentation shall form the basis of or may be relied upon in connection with any offer or commitment whatsoever. This presentation is being presented solely for your information and is subject to change without notice. 52
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