HANDS? INVISIBLE European corporations and the deforestation of the Amazon and Cerrado biomes - European Network of Corporate ...
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„
INVISIBLE
HANDS?“
European corporations and the
deforestation of the Amazon
and Cerrado biomes
SUMMARY
1 INTRODUCTION 04
1.1 The legacy of destruction: understanding 04
“INVISIBLE HANDS?“ the crisis in Amazon and Cerrado regions
1.2 Why investigating European corporations? 06
European corporations and the
deforestation of the Amazon 2 SOY 08
and Cerrado biomes 2.1 Soy production chain in the Amazon and Cerrado region 08
2.2 Tracing the soy chain: the participation of European corporate actors 12
Box 1 Logistic infrastructure of in Amazon and Cerrado: at what cost? 13
3 MEAT, CATTLE AND DESTRUCTION 18
CREDITS 3.1 Meat production chain in the Amazon and Cerrado region 18
Editors: Vigência - Daniel Martins Silva, Gonzalo Berrón Box 1 Deplorable working conditions, deforesta- 20
tion, land-grabbing and flawed auditing
Authors:
3.2 Tracing the meat chain: the participation of European corporate actors 21
Daniel Angelim
Débora Assumpção e Lima Box 2 Cattle don’t need trees – Deforestation, fo- 23
Patrícia Laczynski rest risk commodities and illegal wood market
Renata Boulos
Yamila Goldfarb
4 MINING 25
Proofreader: Chris Simon
4.1 Mining chain in the Amazon and Cerrado region 25
Published by: European Network of Corporate Observatoires (ENCO) 4.2 Tracing the mining chain: the 27
https://corpwatchers.eu/
participation of European corporate actors
Design: Cesar Habert Paciornik - HPDesign Box 3 Fracking 29
Cover picture: Bruno Kelly - Amazonia Real
5 SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF THE 30
March 2021 COMMODITY INDUSTRY IN AMAZON AND CERRADO
Contents of the report may be quoted or reproduced for non-commercial 6 CONCLUSION 32
purposes, provided that the source is properly cited. Please note that the
copyright for the images remains with the photographers.
7 RECOMMENDATIONS 33
8 REFERENCES 36
3
“Invisible hands? European corporations and the deforestation of the Amazon and Cerrado biomes” Apresentação
1
attempting to discredit deforestation estimates from
Introduction Map 1 D
eforestation and land use in INPE’s monitoring system (the national space agen-
cy); j) Indigenous lands and the forestry services,
Amazon and Cerrado biomes which were originally operated by two national agen-
cies (INCRA and FUNAI), were transferred to the
Ministry of Agriculture, headed by one of the main
former leaders from the ‘ruralist bench’ in Congress
1.1 THE LEGACY OF DESTRUCTION: and uncertain future for the conservation of nature (RAJAO et al, 2020).
UNDERSTANDING THE CRISIS IN spots and the lives of forest people. The irresponsible
AMAZON AND CERRADO REGIONS advance of the agro-industry in Northern areas of From Bolsonaro’s perspective, ‘the Brazilian envi-
O
the country, which has relied on livestock and a large ronmental laws are some of the most restrictive in the
ver the last three decades, Brazil’s depen- monoculture of profitable commodities (i.e. soy- world’ and he has ‘zero tolerance for environmental
dence on the export of commodities has beans, meat, timber) is recognized as the main factor crimes’, despite the recent forgiveness of deforestation
not only oriented Brazilian governments’ behind an environmental and social crisis not suffi- and environmental fines. In 2019, however, widespread
policies in search of a more robust GDP ciently known in Brazil nor abroad. Also, mining ac- fires in Brazil devastated large portions of the Amazon
but also has been the primary cause of un- tivities and illegal logging related to the commodity rainforests, the majority of which were a result of a
precedented rates of deforestation and over-exploita- industries put pressure on the biomes’ depredation. primitive and unsustainable practice of opening areas
tion of nature in the two richest biomes of Brazil: the for livestock grazing. The number of fire spots identi-
Amazon1 and the Cerrado2 (savannah). Along with At the beginning of the 2000s, an international out- fied in the Amazon region in August 2019 were the
the Congo rainforest in Central Africa, the Amazon is cry, combined with policy measures and market-inter- highest since 2010, and twice as high as the figures reg-
a key ecosystem for global environmental health, as it ventions in supply-chains governance, curbed the de- istered in the same period of the previous year.
influences climate change through its role as a carbon forestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon. The Soy
sink and storage mechanism, which affects weather Moratorium5, a voluntary zero-deforestation agree- In 2020 Brazil held municipal elections for mayors
patterns across South America and Africa (UN,20193). ment signed in 2006 by soybean traders, was one of the Source Mapbiomas (2020). and local councilors nationwide. Among the candi-
The Cerrado, in turn, has been considered the richest measures taken. Today, current evidence points out dates, there were 118 who had had environmental
savannah in the world, with a vast biodiversity pro- that new frontiers of the commodity industry expan- fines levied against them9. Moreover, while very few
viding a significant contribution to waters that flow sion put Brazil on a path of rampant deforestation, The current national government, under the presi- candidates approached the issue of food security in
into the rivers of Brazil’s hydrologic system4. which risks the protection of the Amazon and Cerrado dency of Jair Bolsonaro, has been dismantling the en- their campaigns, in the same year the federal govern-
biomes, and could lead in the future to an irreversible vironmental state institutions and regulations. Major ment approved 46 new pesticides, of which many are
Beyond the extreme abundance of endemic and degradation. After the Soy Moratorium in the region, actions undertaken by his government include: a) the prohibited in Europe.
unique species, lavish water and a large biodiversity, the Cerrado was converted into large areas of crop- dissolution of the offices of the Secretaries of Climate
the Amazon and Cerrado regions are the habitat of lands and cattle pastures. There is an estimate that Change and of the Environment under the Ministries In this new political and environmental reality,
many traditional communities (i.e. Indigenous peo- considers that around 80% of the Cerrado’s original of Environment and Foreign Affairs; b) transfer of the government ministries have proposed unproven and
ples, small farmers, riparian/riverine dwellers, ba- vegetation has already been modified by the expan- Forestry Service, responsible for Brazil’s environmen- contradictory solutions for combating the forest fires,
bassu coconut breakers and Afro-descendant com- sion of the agroindustry in the previous decades. In tal registry of rural properties (CAR), to the Ministry such as increasing the number of cattle, as they claim
munities) who have been living for centuries in the Matopiba6 region, approximately 62% of the agri- of Agriculture; c) militarization of ICMBio’s chief po- that the cattle breeding controls the vegetation which
coexistence among a local economy and the sustain- cultural expansion replaced native Cerrado vegetation sitions (Brazilian Institute for the Conservation consequently could avoid large fires10. All these cur-
ability of natural resources. During the past few de- (Strassburg et al., 2014)7. In 2018, only 2.85% of the Cer- Units); d) reduction from 96 to 23 members of the civ- rent facts reflect an atmosphere of impunity. The
cades, vast lands of these biomes have been threat- rado was formally protected through areas managed il society participating in the National Council for the graphic below shows the relationship between the
ened by many economic interests, posing a serious by federal or state agencies, such as national parks and Environment (CONAMA); e) blocking through offi- deforestation registered in Brazil and the decreasing
biological reserves. Also, 4.1% of the total area from cial objections international funding to local socio-en- number of fines issued by the federal agency respon-
the Cerrado is encompassed by Indigenous lands. vironmental NGOs and changing regulation on the sible for environmental law enforcement since 2018:
1 The Amazon region includes the Brazilian states of Acre, Amapá, Amazon Fund8; f) leaving vacant or slow replacement
Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima, Tocantins
and a portion of the State of Maranhão (west of 44º west long.).
Brazil’s success in reducing deforestation in the of IBAMA’s (the National Environmental Law en- Today, the Amazon and Cerrado regions are terri-
According to official data, it represents around 67% of the world Amazon has undergone a tremendous setback that forcement Agency) superintendents in the 27 states of tories with political, economic, and environmental
tropical forests. began with the reduction of the Forest Code in 2012. the union and other key positions with inexperienced disputes. These disputes center on not only internal
2 The Cerrado biome is considered the second biggest biome from Since then, attempts to roll back conservation nominees; g) dissolution of the board of advisors of competition among the economic sectors that have
the South America, occupying an area of 2,036,448 km², and achievements have increasingly stimulated the rise the Amazon fund, triggering the suspension of ap- been increasingly exploiting soybean, corn, beef,
around 22% of the Brazilian territories of Goiás, Tocantins, Mato of deforestation. Map 1, below, shows the current proximately US$ 1 billion in donations from Norway leather, timber, sugarcane, cotton and mineral re-
Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Bahia Maranhão, Piauí,
Rondônia, Paraná and São Paulo State are among those where
level of land use and deforestation across the Brazil- and Germany to socio-environmental projects in sources but also on conflicts between large and me-
the Cerrado biome is found. The Cerrado contains water springs, ian territory. Amazonia; h) reduction of environmental field en- dium agro-corporations (politically supported by
aquifers and groundwaters, and rivers from eight major basins in forcement with a decrease of 37% in environmental Jair Bolsonaro’s government) against the communi-
the country (Xingu, Tocantins, Araguaia, São Francisco, Parnaíba, fining by IBAMA in the Amazon; i) confrontation by ties that live in the forest. Aggressions, eviction, and
Jequitinhonha, Paraná rivers; Guarani and Urucuia aquifers).
3 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/document-
s/24797GSDR_report_2019.pdf 5 https://science.sciencemag.org/content/347/6220/377 8 https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2019/07/17/politica-an-
4 https://www.nationalgeographicbrasil.com/natgeo-ilustra/cer- 6 MMA, 2018. Website of Ministério do Meio Ambiente. Bioma ti-ambiental-de-bolsonaro-ameaca-o-fundo-amazonia- 9 Available at:https://apublica.org/2020/10/na-amazonia-118-poli-
rado#:~:text=%E2%80%9CO%20Cerrado%20%C3%A9%20 Cerrado. http://www.mma.gov.br/biomas/cerrado -entenda-os-riscos ; https://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/ ticos-com-multas-ambientais-concorrem-as-eleicoes/
o%20bioma,Mata%20Atl%C3%A2ntica%20e%20a%20Ama- 7 Available at: https://www.wwf.org.br/natureza_brasileira/areas_ governo-bolsonaro-tenta-mudar-fundo-amazonia-mas-noruega- 10 Available at: https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/bra-
z%C3%B4nia. prioritarias/cerrado/manifestodocerrado/cerrado_conversion_zero/ -alemanha-dizem-nao-23731725 sil-54199255
4 5
“Invisible hands? European corporations and the deforestation of the Amazon and Cerrado biomes” 1.2 Why investigating European corporations?
displacements from traditional communities keep 1.2 WHY INVESTIGATING common options are debt (corporate loans, including ronmental policies, the private sector sustains the in-
rising as a structural agrarian form of violence. Be- EUROPEAN CORPORATIONS? revolving credit facilities and project finance, bond vestments on land and commodity chains in Brazil.
tween 2015 and 2019, the ruralist bench was respon- holdings, underwriting of bond issuances) and equi- The land market, the green market and the global
sible for changing and proposing 111 laws restrict-
ing traditional community rights and 136 laws to
loosen nature protection.11 Vulnerable groups are
W hile the national private sector has been driving
a destructive process in both biomes (through
many corporate capture mechanisms), their power is
ty financing (share issuances, shareholdings, under-
writing of share issuances).
agro-system allow foreign investors to site their capi-
tal into a location without having the ‘real’ knowl-
edge of the local dynamics. In the age of the financial-
struggling for the preservation of their territories leveraged by the support of transnational corpora- During the past few years, illegal deforestation pro- ization of nature, most investors in international
against the strong opposing forces of agribusiness, tions, which invest and import those commodities voked direct impacts on the operations of the compa- funds and indirect investors are unaware of local re-
extractive industries and financial agents focused into global value chains. In 2008, the European Union nies involved in the commodity production chain, in- alities where their investments are allocated. When
on land speculation. The pandemic quarantine add- was the second largest foreign driver of deforestation cluding financial institutions and other transnational thinking about future capital projection/speculation
ed a new challenge, as state agencies are also quar- in Brazil and until 2006, it was even the largest. Be- firms that are part of the supply chain. In 2016, for ex- (mainly in the mid/long term for land, mining and
antined and the rights of several communities in fore, in 2005, when the EU’s impact on deforestation ample, Santander Bank was fined US$15 million for timber and short/midterm for soy and cattle), the in-
Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia, and Maranhão12are in Brazil was highest, the bloc was responsible for providing financial support to crops cultivated on ille- vestors may not have sufficient information regard-
being contravened. 19% of all deforestation and 18% of all deforestation gally deforested areas. Big grain trading firms, includ- ing social and environmental impacts such as defor-
emissions there (Zell-Ziegler, 2017). ing Cargill and Bunge, were fined a total of US$29 mil- estation, excessive use of pesticides, water
lion after an investigation of IBAMA revealed that contamination and slave work.
The commodities and the primary sector represent around 3,000 tons of grain produced by five grain trad-
about 30% of the Brazilian GDP and was the only sec- ing houses were produced in areas off-limits to farm- In this sense, this report aims to provide a brief
tor that was forecast to grow in 2020, with rates of ing under environmental rules. Also, investors and overview with a political, social, economic and envi-
11 MITIDIERO JUNIOR, M. A.; MARTINS, L. A.; MOIZES, B. C.. O 2%13. Transnational companies can finance com- asset management firms, such as Lord Rothschild, Jim ronmental perspective of the crisis continuously ex-
Parlamento e o Executivo na luta contra a reforma agrária e a modity activities in many different ways. The most Slater and Valiance Capital (an UK based asset manag- perienced in the Amazon and Cerrado biomes and in
preservação da natureza. CONFLITOS NO CAMPO BRASIL, v. 1, er) have been placed in the limelight of the commodity which ways European companies are supporting the
p. 196-206, 2020. expansion in Brazil over fragile biomes, with involve- irresponsible advance of commodity production over
12 https://apublica.org/2020/01/centenas-de-familias-podem-ser- 13 Available at: https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/economia/noti- ment in conflicts related to green grabbing, illegal land fragile Brazilian biomes. The study explored the soy-
-despejadas-em-mais-de-50-acampamentos-na-amazonia- cia/2019-11/pib-do-agronegocio-cresce-mais-que-conjunto-da-
-em-2020 -economia-em-2019-e-2020
acquisitions in public lands, or even using traditional bean, meat, and mining sectors. With that in mind,
communities’ lands for environmental compensation, and considering the lack of systematization of the
“green” eolic and solar energy contracts, and land dig- various aspects and information on these issues, this
italization (FARIHEAD; LEACH, SCOONES, 2012; investigation aims to present recent data and prob-
Graphic 1 Deforestation in Amazon and Cerrado Biomes and number of fines FLEXOR, LEITE, 2017;PROBST et al., 2020 ). lematize the corporate power of transnational com-
panies, including financial firms and commodity
Even though the contradiction exists between the traders, especially those from countries belonging to
government discourse and the inconsistency of envi- the European Union.
Source Rajão et al. (2020).
6 7
“Invisible hands? European corporations and the deforestation of the Amazon and Cerrado biomes” 2.1 Soy production chain in the Amazon and Cerrado region
2 Soy Graph 2 E volution of the soya area in disagreement
with the moratory in the states of MT, PA, RO, MA, AP, TO
and RR in THE YEARS 2012/13 TO 2018/19
2.1 SOY PRODUCTION CHAIN IN THE When Brazilian and EU governors and companies
AMAZON AND CERRADO REGION cooperated under the Soy Moratorium, it was a signif-
O
icant commercial asset, as it was signed by 94% of the
ut of all commodities involving environ- national soy producers in the Amazon and Cerrado
mental risk, soy (crops and oil production) biomes. The soy, free from deforestation, has opened
is the most negotiated in international the door to expand the Brazilian agribusiness market
markets. In 2016, three South American share. Between 2006 and 2016, deforestation has fallen
countries (Brazil, Argentina and Para- by 86% in the 76 municipalities reached by the Mora-
guay) were the origin of 50% of the soy produced torium, which produce 98% of the soybeans from the
globally, with combined growing regions corre- Amazon Biome, while the planted area increased by
sponding to an area of approximately 56 million 170% in the same period16. With Brazilian President
hectares. In 2018, the Brazilian trade soy volume was Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016, policy chang-
117,887,685 tons (Trase, 2018).. es in Brazil and the EU, the flexibilization of environ-
mental laws and the decrease of environmental fines,
Three crops – soybean, sugarcane, and corn – occu- deforestation started to increase abruptly. In Decem-
py 70% of the agricultural area and represent over ber of 2020, the president of the Brazilian Association
60% of the country’s total value of agricultural pro- of Soy Producers (Aprosoja Brasil) rejected an attempt-
duction. Since 1997, soybean production alone has ed moratorium for the Cerrado region. He demanded
increased by 400% to reach a record 124 million tons that the EU corporations respect Brazilian sovereign-
in 2019/2020 (CONAB, 2020). The soybean chain con- ty17. Graph 2, below, presents the extent to which soy
stitutes an important component of Brazilian agri- production has advanced over two Brazilian states
business exports and, the grain sales outweigh prod- (Mato Grosso and Pará) in the Amazon biome:
ucts made from soybeans, which suggest the
specialization in products are less likely to generate A study conducted in 2013 revealed that land use
added value, therefore increasing the level of exter- impact from agribusiness in South America repre-
nal economic vulnerability14. sented the second overall environmental impact in
monetary terms, with activities generating US$354
The soy crops in Brazil were initially planted in the billion of negative externalities on only $16.6 billion of
Southern region, an area more adapted to the soy revenue (Trucost, 2013). Therefore, concerns on how
seed. After the 1970s and the Green Revolution, com- agriculture sectors fail in producing enough revenue
panies such as Sygenta and Pioneer invested in ge- to cover the environmental damage produced by
netically modified seeds adapted to the Cerrado bi- them raises a debate regarding corporate responsibil-
ome with the support of the Brazilian government ity as it relates to the maintenance of ecosystems and
through the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corpo- to the impact on the lives of communities. Although
ration15, also known as Embrapa, for a more efficient half of the deforestation risk associated with Brazil-
agriculture expansion. Regardless, soy production ian soy is linked to Chinese imports18, in absolute
and the area’s expansion are also related to the past terms over the past few years European markets have Source Rajão et al. (2020).
five years of deforestation, a period for agribusiness been the drivers of higher deforestation risks (Esco-
to productively incorporate the new commodity re- bar at al., 2020). According to Trase data, the Nether-
gion. With the ‘successful’ domination of the savan- lands and Spain are the core destinations in the EU Matopiba region, which covers part of the Amazon mate that around two million tons annually of illegal-
nahs, the expansion of agribusiness has been moving for soy related to deforestation in Brazil. and Cerrado biomes. More recently, nearly 90% of the ly planted soy reached the European market during
towards the Amazon biome since the 2000s. deforestation risk associated with Brazilian soy expor- the past few years, with 500,000 tons having been pro-
Regarding soy exports, it is worth noting that soy-re- tation has been centered in this region (Trase, 2019). duced in the Amazon region. This production has
lated deforestation has been highly concentrated in the Although 7% of the EU’s total soy imports from Brazil been responsible for the indirect emission of approxi-
14 In 1996, the federal government created the Complementary came from areas in states where the Amazon and Cer- mately 11.7 million metric tons of CO2 between 2009
Law no 87, also know as “Kandir Law”. The Kandir Law provi- rado biomes are present, it accounted for 61% of the and 2017. This is especially concerning in areas of bi-
des exemption from taxes on the exportation of primary pro- 16 Regardless the soy production and the area expansion are also EU’s exposure to soy deforestation risk (Trase, 2020). omes in risk. Producers on 45% of rural properties in
related to the past 5 years of deforestation, period for the agri-
ducts – as commodities – and services, creating an environment
business to incorporate productively the new commodity area.
the Amazon biome and 48% of farmlands in the Cer-
for low added value production. http://www.planalto.gov.br/
ccivil_03/leis/lcp/lcp87.htm 17 Available at: https://www.canalrural.com.br/programas/infor- Approximately 41% (13.6 million tons) of the soy im- rado region, which supply soy and beef for exports,
15 Embrapa is also related to the expansion of transgenic soy crops macao/mercado-e-cia/soja-abiove-moratoria-cerrado/ ported annually by the European Union is from Bra- are not complying with the limits on deforestation
in Mozambique and Brazilian companies to the transgenic rice 18 More information available at:https://www.tandfonline.com/ zil. From this total imported, 69% is soy produced in laid out in Brazil’s Forest Code (Rajao et al 2020).
crops on Ghana. doi/abs/10.1080/14747731.2017.1377374 the Amazon and Cerrado regions. Recent studies esti-
8 9
“Invisible hands? European corporations and the deforestation of the Amazon and Cerrado biomes” 2.1 Soy production chain in the Amazon and Cerrado region
The state of Mato Grosso, in the Center-West of Bra-
Map 2 Potentially illegal deforestation and de- zil, was responsible for 28% of the soy produced in Figure 1 S ource and country destinations of soy potentially contaminated with potentially
the country in 2019. A large part of the production is
forestation-contaminated soy per municipality. located in areas near the Amazon biome within the
illegal deforestation. Estimated annual average between 2009 and 2017
state. Over 85% of the deforestation in Mato Grosso,
between August 2018 and July 2019, was illegal (be-
yond the 20% that is permitted by the law).
Map 2 illustrates that some of the highest rates of
deforestation in Brazil come from the state of Mato
Grosso, with 16% concentrated in the the state’s Cer-
rado region and 31% in its Amazon region (Rajão et
al., 2020; Trase, 2020).The region of Mato Grosso (MT)
which appears in red on all three maps contains the
municipalities of Lucas Verde, Sorriso and Sinop, the
core agribusiness zone along BR163, the road that
ends at port of Itaituba in Pará, on the Amazon river.
The other hotspots of destruction in the Cerrado bi-
ome are the western region of the state of Bahia (BA),
which includes the municipalities of Luis Eduardo
Magalhães, Formosa do Rio Preto, Correntina and
Barreiras , a core agribusiness zone since the 1980s, as
well as the southern region of the state of Maranhão,
in the area surrounding the municipality of Balsas.
Since 2000, the state of Pará has been considered a
new soy frontier, with farms and infrastructure for
soy chain production being established across many
municipalities and rural areas.
In these regions, some business activities, includ-
ing the growing of large-scale soy crops, would not
be viable without the support provided by powerful
international financial institutions. However, the soy
crops grown with hybrid seeds and agrochemicals Source Trase (2020).
are not lucrative in and of themselves. The profit rates
are low, and the gains come from the large amount of
tons of soy produced and from agriculture subsidies. While some of the European financial institutions ian farmers may search for financial support from
For example, the costs for farming one acre of soy is and companies have developed their own deforesta- three different sources: commercial financial institu-
around R$3,000 (around 500 euros), producing on av- tion policies, the self-regulation of the private sector tions (national or international banks or credit agen-
erage three tons in the Cerrado biome (comparative- created a more devastating scenario, as these compa- cies, for instance), subsidized rural credit (disbursed
ly, the production per acre in the Amazon is less). nies were not penalized when criteria are ignored. through various programs via the Brazilian Develop-
Most of the cost of soybean production per hectare is Seven European countries (Denmark, France, Germa- ment Bank) and barter from traders and input suppli-
related to the direct costs of farming, which are in- ny, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom ers (indirect funding mechanism led by companies
puts (seeds, fertilizers and pesticides) sold by compa- and Italy), which together in 2019 represented 22% of that produce seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and agri-
nies such as US-based Monsanto and Germany’s Bay- the Brazilian soy exports, signed the Amsterdam cultural machines).
er , the Swiss/Chinese corporation Syngenta and Declaration in 2015, which aims to promote the elim-
DuPont, which , while based in the US, has multiple ination of deforestation as a result of agricultural After the 2008 financial crisis,19 the new dynamics
subsidiaries.. Based on the Statement of Income for commodity production. However, while new ze- of the farmland market deepened the devastation of
the Year (DRE) available by Conab for the period ro-deforestation commitments have arisen during the native areas. International investors have increasing-
2006-2019, the input supplier companies, even with- last few years, only half of the soy exported from the ly turned to a strategy of channeling capital to direct
out being directly linked to planting/farming activi- Cerrado region in 2016 was covered by them. Hence, farmland purchases, and to territorial expansion of
ty, concentrate the capital of the production chain. In there are real risks that the Cerrado could suffer a agribusiness (especially soy), in which land is also
2019, the production costs of the technological pack- larger forest devastation. Also, the majority of the ze- used as a financial asset. Due to the financial ex-
age required to guarantee another crop of sterile ro-deforestation commitments signed by corpora- ploitation of lands, the price of Brazilian farmlands,
GMO (genetically modified organisms) soy seed rep- tions have very little information on how these mea- especially in the Cerrado, increased exponentially in
resented 69.58% of total soy production in Brazil for sures will be implemented in the production chain, the last 10 years. Institutional investors, such as pen-
2019 (R$2029.94) in Tocantins, 56.96% (R$1746.65) in and how progress will be monitored (Trase, 2018).
Maranhão and 52.87% in Bahia (R$1,584.08) (CONAB,
2020; LIMA, 2019). Concerning actors and dynamics, the soy produc- 19 https://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pi-
Source Rajão et al. 2020. tion chain in Brazil has a complex structure. Brazil- d=S0102-85292017000200393
10 11
“Invisible hands? European corporations and the deforestation of the Amazon and Cerrado biomes” 2.2 Tracing the soy chain: the participation of European corporate actors
sion funds and private equity, real estate firms and
agribusiness, operate a business model, producing Table 1 EU participation on TIAA funds Figure 2 Funds and companies related to TIAA-CREF
land valorization by acquiring and clearing areas of
native vegetation for farming, rather than basing its Investment Owner Share Country
revenues on commodity production. Usually, many vehicles of origin
cases of land acquisition in rural areas of the North- TIAA-CREF
ern region of Brazil, recently used for soy croplands, TCGA II AP2 Ag-land 25% Sweden
are linked to illegal land grabbing, which provoke Investments KB
forced removals of traditional communities (Chain (AP2) – Suécia Mansilia Participações Ltda TIAA Global Ag Holdco LLC
Reaction Research, 2017).
Stichting Pen- 6.67% Nether-
LandMatrix mapped20 314 foreign land contracts in sioenfonds ABP lands
Radas Propriedades Agrícolas S/A TIAA-CREF Global Agriculture LLC
Brazil, controlling 5,886,732 ha, or 9.8% of the coun-
try’s cultivated land. EU investors might be con-
TCGA I Andra 32,5% Sweden
trolling 3,092,632 ha. Despite the territorial percent- AP-Fonden AP2
age still not being very expressive (0.6%), the control (AP2) – Suécia Cosan TIAA-CREF Global Afgriculture BR
of foreign companies happens in many aspects of the Caisse de
soy chain, and not only regarding the controlling of
Ärztever- 32,5% Germany
sorgung Terraviva Brasil Participações Ltda Nova Gaia dêpot et
land. Other aspects include: farming production; placement
Brasil Partici-
capitalization of income and land speculation as Westfalen-Li-
pações Ltda
forms of capital appreciation; the creation of new ppe (AVWL)
Tellus Brasil Participações Ltda bclMC
farms, with capitalization via differential income
and asset creation (purchase of land for investments Source US Securities and Exchange Comission (December 2016)
in production, machinery), adding work for the pur-
pose of future sale; and the land as merely a specula- contribute to the operation of land companies in the Nova Ibiajara Propriedades Terrainvest Propriedades Terra do Sol Propriedades Agrobio Investimentos
tive form, via financial capital. Cerrado region: the German Pension Fund (Ärztever- Agrícolas S/A Agrícolas S/A Agrícolas S/Ab e Participações S/A
sorgung Westfalen-Lippe), the Dutch Pension Fund,
The Netherlands’s Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioen-
2.2 TRACING THE SOY CHAIN: THE PARTICIPA- fonds (ABP) and Sweden’s Andra AP-fonden (AP2) (the
TION OF EUROPEAN CORPORATE ACTORS Second Swedish National Pension Fund). These pen- Most of the farmland owned by foreign companies Agrícola is exercised by the SLC Group (owned by
sion funds invest in the TIAA-CREF Global Agricul- in the Cerrado region are invested through TIAA. Be- Schneider Logemann, a Brazilian family), with
E uropean corporate actors are involved in the Bra-
zilian soybean chain in the Cerrado and Amazon
regions through the farmland market investment
ture (TCGA I and TCGA II) investment funds man-
aged by TIAA (Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association of America). TIAA is a private and
yond the TCGA I and TCGA II, TIAA also operates in
the farmland market through firms such as ‘Radar
Propriedades Agrícolas’ (a joint venture among a
51.03% of the shares. The Odey Asset Management
LLP, a British investment management company and
Kopernik Global Investors LLC, based in the US,
funds, soy trading companies, trading companies’ non-profit pension fund, which is currently consid- Brazilian company, Cosan22,and the Mansilla Partic- owns 9.33% and 5.16% of SLC, respectively. Deutsche
direct financers, and input suppliers. ered the largest investor in agricultural lands and the ipações, a company totally owned by TIAA) and the Bank obtained 6.28% of the SLC’s public offering on
third-largest global commercial real estate manager. Tellus Brasil Participações, a national subsidiary fo- the stock exchange23.
The irresponsible agribusiness expansion in both bi- TCGA I was set up by TIAA in 2012 and today holds cused on land acquisition, in which TIAA has a sig-
omes begins with land speculation, a more profitable assets worth US$2 billion across Brazil (Environmen- nificant ownership (49%). A complex network of com- Between 2011 and 2017, SLC cleared more than
business than agricultural production. Over the past tal Justice Atlas, 2020). In 2015, a second fund was panies was created by TIAA in order to buy and 30,000 ha of native Cerrado vegetation to expand its
15 years, many land companies were created, fully launched, the TCGA II, worth US$3 billion. The multi- invest in farmlands, escaping legal restrictions im- farm complex. This high number is due to the low
concentrated on acquiring, selling, leasing and man- ple capital constitutions of those funds’ companies posed by national laws on foreigners’ land property. protection percentage in the Cerrado, which is around
aging farmlands. In the Cerrado region, vast native make them difficult to understand, and have a clear Radar have around 555 properties, totaling 270,000 20%-35% of the farmland, much lower compared to
areas, formally owned by the Federal Union (state) are subject or target related to the commodity chains. ha in Brazil, all of them in areas of the Amazon and the 80% established in the agriculture areas in the
illegally enclosed. This process usually results in a vi- TIAA is an US fund, but Global Agriculture (TCGA I Cerrado. National subsidiaries operate in specific ar- Amazon biome24. Currently, there is a broader aware-
olent eviction of inhabitants (many of them from tra- and TCGA II), a fund managed by TIAA, is formed by eas. For example, Tellus is focused on land in the ness, including from big retail companies, of the need
ditional communities or poor rural populations), as EU funds, especially TCGA I. The table below shows states of Maranhão, Bahia and Piauí; Cosan in the to be in advance of the Brazilian law; that is to say,
well as extensive clearing or deforesting. Lately, these the total percentage of European funds investment state of São Paulo; while Terra do Sol and Nova Ibia- protect higher percentages of native vegetation. In
farm areas are being sold to agribusiness corporations participation in TCGA I and TCGA II: jara operate in the state of Mato Grosso. 2019, the SLC had R$2.6 million in potential loss with
or to land companies, which may lease or sell the land. an environmental judicial process moved by IBAMA,
From the investment groups mentioned in the table Another case in which European investments sup- the federal agency for environmental protection. The
At Matopiba, studies have revealed that pension 1, some are in conflict with their own environmental port the land speculation related to soybean produc- main revenue source from the soy produced on SLC
funds from the United States and Europe play a key and social governance policies, such as the AP2 (which tion in fragile biomes regards SLC Agricola’s activi-
role in backing actors that operate on the ground, declared the intention of achieving zero-deforestation ties in the Matopiba region. The share control of SLC
while financial institutions channel huge amounts of in funds on farmland managed by the Nuveen, TIAA’s 23 Nascimento, R. C., Frederico, S., & Saweljew, Y. M. (2019). FI-
capital into this business and feed the harmful aspects asset manager), and the Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP, NANCIAL CAPITAL AND LAND CONTROL: NEW RENTIERS ON
THE BRAZILIAN AGRICULTURAL FRONTIER/. REVISTA NERA,
of the soy production chain, including the practice of which signed the Cerrado Manifesto21. companies in the commodities supply chain, in order to prevent (50), 261-286.
forest burning. Three European investment funds runaway destruction of the biome. 24 Available at: https://brasil.mongabay.com/2020/12/grilagem-
22 Cosan also has a joint venture with Shell called Raízen, related -no-cerrado-baiano-resvala-na-cargill-e-em-fundo-de-pensao-
21 The Cerrado Manifesto is a two-page document that puts the to sugar cane and biofuel production. -dos-eua/
20 https://landmatrix.org/data/?region=419 onus on soy and meat producers and traders, as well as other
12 13
“Invisible hands? European corporations and the deforestation of the Amazon and Cerrado biomes” 2.2 Tracing the soy chain: the participation of European corporate actors
farms, in 2019, came from three big soy traders: Car- interest rates that may be negotiable or pre-estab-
gill (25.7%), Amaggi-Louis Dreyfuss (20.3%) and lished by the government. Currently it represents Figure 4 European investment at Bunge Limited (2018)
Bunge (12.1%). In 2020 alone, SLC deforested 5,200 ha one-fourth of the total finance in regions with the
in the town of Formosa do Rio Preto, one of the top largest soy production in Brazil (IPAM, 2019).
deforested municipalities in the Cerrado
A comparison of the most powerful soy traders oper- u it y Government Pension Norges Bank Invest- Norges Government
Soy traders and direct financiers The soy produc- ating in Brazil, analyzing data on yearly legal and il- Eq Fund o Norway ment Management Bank of Norway
tion chain in Brazil is dominated by five large global legal deforestation produced/associated deforesta-
trading corporations: ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Louis tion risk, showed that Bunge and Cargill are the Equity
Dreyfus and the COFCO, which traded more than topmost unsustainable companies in the sector25 , in BUNGE Marathon Asset
50% of the soy exported from Brazil. Among the top the chain, and level of transparency. In the Cerrado LIMITED Management LLP
10 countries receiving soy exports from the Amazon region, evidence estimates that both companies have
and Cerrado are The Netherlands (36%), Spain (21%),
Germany (10%) and France (10%) (Trase, 2020). Eq
uit UBS (LUX) Equity UBS Fund UBS AG UBS AG
25 The deforestation risk exposure is an indicator, used by Trase y
Trading companies are amongst those providing the
Sicav - Long term Management (Investment Group
Earth, measured in hectares. It assesses a company’s exposure to
main financial support to big national soy farmers in the deforestation risk associated with the commodity it is sour- Themes (USD) (Luxembour) SA Management)
Brazil. Soy traders are directly backed by many fi- cing based on the region where it was produced on annual ba-
nancial institutions which are linked to them via eq- sis. Although it does not attribute responsibility to specific com-
Elaborated by the author, based on Trase Finance (2020)
panies, it estimates the level of deforestation in which the soy
uity (mainly shareholdings and private ownership) traders are exposed in their supply chain. Data on precise sour-
and debt (such as bonds, loans and revolving credit cing patterns to individual farms are not publicly available See
facilities). Financial institutions provide credit with more at: https://trase.finance/methodology Figure 5 European direct investments (loans) to Cargill (2018)
Banco Bil- Credit BNP ING
Deutsche ABN Commerz-
bao Vizcaya Suisse AG Paribas Groep
CARGIL Bank Ltd Amro (Ne- bank AG
Figure 3 SLC Agricola financial composition Argentaria (Switzer- Group NV (Ne-
Global Loans (Germany) therlands) (Germany)
AS (Spain) land) (France) therlands)
Funding
PLC Groupe Landes- Crédit Crédit Intesa Skandi- Société
51,03% BPCE bank Mutuel Agrico- Sanpaolo naviska Générale
(France) Hessen- CIC le SA (Italy) Enskilda (France)
Financial Grupo
Thringen Group (France) Banken
market (Germany) (France) (Sweden)
Loans
Elaborated by the author, based on Trase Finance (2020).
Table 2 - Top 10 Owners of Bunge Ltd (2020) Table 3 - Top 10 Mutual Funds Holding Bunge Ltd
Investment Fund Production Farms
Neuberg Berman Llc 5,03% Fazenda Paiaguás Stockholder Share Mutual Fund Share
Verde Fundo de Investimento 5,67% Agrícola Fazenda Planorte
T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. 11.30% T Rowe Price Mid Cap Value Fund 4.29%
Deustche Invest I Global Agribusiness 5,67% Fazenda Pamplona
Fazenda Planalto The Vanguard Group, Inc. 8.99% Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund 2.69%
Fazenda Parnaíba
(SLC LandCo) BlackRock Fund Advisors 4.29% Vanguard Small Cap Index Fund 2.27%
Fazenda Parnaguá
Valiance Asset Managment Limited 29,7% Fazenda Paineira
Continental Grain Company Corp. 2.82% Vanguard Extended Market Index Fund 1.40%
Fazenda Parceiro ( SSgA Funds Management, Inc. 2.64% Vanguard Small Cap Value Index Fund 1.36%
SLC LandCo)
Fazenda Palmares Dimensional Fund Advisors LP 2.26% American Funds Income Fund of America 1.03%
Moore Capital Management LP 2.09% Government Pension Fund - Global 0.98%
LandCo
Joint Venture Adage Capital Management LP 2.08% UBS (Lux) Equity SICAV - Long Term Themes 0,95%
Production farms
MIT Fazenda
Pioneira
Millennium Management LLC
Marathon Asset Management LLP
1.57%
1.40%
Fidelity Growth Company Fund
T Rowe Price Equity Income Fund
0.63%
0.52%
Fazenda Panorama Dois Vales
Fazenda Piratini
Fazenda Planesta MITSUI & Co Ltda Participações Source https://money.cnn.com/quote/shareholders/shareholders. Source https://money.cnn.com/quote/shareholders/shareholders.
Source SLC (2018) html?symb=BG&subView=institutional html?symb=BG&subView=institutional
14 15
“Invisible hands? European corporations and the deforestation of the Amazon and Cerrado biomes” 2.2 Tracing the soy chain: the participation of European corporate actors
significant connections with soy driven by deforesta- million to the main soy traders that operate in the ALZ Grãos has invested in soy storage, wholesale and Glencore and AZL Grãos are two of them. On the
tion (along with the suppliers), with Cargill produc- Cerrado region and linked to deforestation. facilities and has share in the Tegram (Itaqui Port), at storage and silos for the agribusiness in Amazon and
ing 32,437 ha of deforestation (7,518 ha being illegal Maranhão State, through a consortium with the com- Cerrado, ADM controls 62 silos 2.391.235 tons of
clearance), and Bunge, with close to 10,000 ha (1,402 Furthermore, an analysis on the deforestation risk panies “Terminal Corredor Norte”, linked to the Jap- grains; Amaggi 54 silos (6 AZL and 1 Amaggi and
ha being illegal) in the first half of 202026. of the main global soy traders in the Cerrado and anese group Toyota Tsusho), “Glencore Serviços” Louis Dreyfus only in Tegram) with a storage capaci-
Amazon biome, which assess how much deforesta- (from the Glencore) and the “Corredor Logístico e ty of 2.697.600 tons grains and sugar cane; Bunge 80
As already mentioned, foreign banks and investment tion has been purchased in the chain, showed their Infraestrutura”. silos (2.758.153 ha); Cargil 116 silos, 3.649.908 ha of
funds are behind the financial power of soy trading key role on the unsustainable practices of soybean storage capacity; Louis Dreyfus, 28 silos (1.649.942
companies that operate in Brazil, especially in the production (Figure 5). According to the analysis, in The Tegram Port is located in São Luis Maranhão, tons) and Raizen/Shell with 49 silos ( storage capaci-
Matopiba region. The financial composition of Bunge 2018, a French-Brazilian joint venture was considered where 4 companies have a long-term consortium, ty of 575.860 ha).
and Cargill includes many connected financial cor- the most tainted soy trader chain, behind Bunge: the
porations, with some of them being European, as Amaggi & LD, partnership between Amaggi and the
shown in the figures below: Louis Dreyfus, that lately incorporated the japonese Table 4 L oans from Dutch banks to soy Table 5 U
nderwritings by Dutch banks in
Zen-Noh, launching the “ALZ Grãos” company. traders (2015-2020, million USD) share and bonds issuances in soy
There are at least 3 Dutch banking groups, 6 insur-
traders (2015-2020, million USD)
ance companies (Achmea, Aegon, Allianz, ASR, NN After the entry of the Zen-Noh in the Louis Drey- Bank Group ABN ING Rabo- Total
and Vivat) and 9 pensions funds (ABP, BPF Bouw, BPL fus and Amaggi’s joint venture, the risk of deforesta- Bank Group ABN ING Rabo- Total
Amro bank
Pensioen, Pensioenfonds Detailhandel, Pensioen- tion of the companies has increased substantially. Amro bank
fonds Horeca en Catering, Pensioenfonds Vervoer, The joint venture is the second largest exporter of soy Archer Da- 104.81 104.81 104.81 314.43
Archer Da- - - 77.55 77.55
Pensioenfonds Zorg en Welzijn, PME, PMT) support- (25%) in Formosa do Rio Preto, on Bahia State (along niels Midland niels Midland
ing big soy producer companies through the provi- with Bunge), the third largest soy-producing munici-
sion of loans, underwriting services and other credits, pality in Brazil in 2018. Cases of land grabbing were Bunge 285.13 715.13 185.13 1,185.38
Bunge 90.20 207.85 97.20 395.24
as well as investments in the shares and bonds issued registered in the city, connected with ALZ Grãos, Cargill 782.10 1,012.48 983.59 2,778.18 Cargill - - 83.33 83.33
by these companies. Between 2015 and 2020, ABN Bunge and Cargill, that own warehouses in a rural
Amro, ING and Robobank provided USD 5.817,47 area linked to the Property Fazenda São José from Louis Dreyfus 562.69 356.83 619.96 1,539.48 Louis Dreyfus 75.00 - - 75.00
the JJF Holding company, accused of leading two of Company Company
the largest land grabbing incidents in Brazil and oth-
26 Ranking Soy Traders’ Performance on Deforestation. Mighty er illegal land acquirements. Total 1,734.73 2,189.25 1,893.49 5,817.47 Total 165.20 207.85 258.08 631.12
Earth, September 2020. Available at: https://stories.might- Source Elaborated by the author based on information from Van Source Elaborated by the author based on information from Van
yearth.org/soy-trader-rankings/index.html
Gelder, J.W. and B. Kuepper (2020) Gelder, J.W. and B. Kuepper (2020)
state of Pará, and goes down the tional Logistic Plan (PNL 2018- Figure 5 Estimated soy traders’ deforestion risk in Brazil (2020, in hectare)
The arc of destruction: logistic Amazon River to the Atlantic 2025). Between 2017 and 2018,
BUNGE 10.900
infrastructure at what cost? Ocean, where the transported the quality of the environmental
grain is separated as exports of impact studies and the public
Amaggi & LD 7.390
T he ongoing interest in consol-
idating a logistics route for
grain exportation, added to the
commodities to other countries.
With seven port terminals, Arco
Norte plays a key role in the fu-
consultation proceedings related
to the project were questioned
twice by legal institutions. How-
ADM 5.320
strong agriculture lobby pressure ture expansion of soy and corn ex- ever, the Ferrogrão followed the CARGILL 5.090
on easing the existing environ- portation produced in Mato Gros- cycle and public audiences were
GLENCORE 4.710
mental rules have been pushing so, the largest grain-producing approved in July 2020.
initiatives for investing and build- state in Brazil. In 2017, shipments The concession for the railway is COFCO 2.500
ing a large infrastructure in the through the ports of Arco Norte expected to be approved in 2021,
Amazon region. Although logis- grew 80% compared to a national with China being the most likely Source Elaborated by the author, based on Trase Finance (2020)
tics infrastructure can represent a average of 8.0% (Source: Antaq). candidate for winning the con-
significant advance for the re- In the Arco Norte region, the struction contract. Among the
gion’s socioeconomic develop- Ferrogrão railway is one of the European companies that have Figure 6 Louis Dreyfus’s joint ventures (2018)
ment, it is extremely necessary to most emblematic projects. It is an already demonstrated interest in
consider the fragilities and singu- initiative originally conceived and the concession are the Spanish
Investment Activity Joint Venture Ownership Net value
larities of the Amazon biome, as- executed by soy trading compa- Acciola and Sacyr, and the Italian
sessing the impacts generated by nies’ consortium (comprised by Impregilo. To ensure that the rail- Amaggi Louis Dreyfus Grain and soya sto- ALZ Grãos 33% 14
the construction and operation Amaggi, ADM, Bunge, Cargill, way project will go ahead, the Zen Noh Graos S.A rage and processing
of new transport infrastructure. Dreyfus and EDLP) and was re- Brazilian government announced
Arco Norte is a grain export cently included in the govern- that it would make available up Amaggi Louis Dreyfus Logistics facilities Terminal de Grãos 33% 14
route that runs from the state of ment portfolio of the Program of to R$2.2 billion (US$462 million) Zen Noh Graos S.A do Maranhão
Mato Grosso, in the Brazilian mid- Investment and Partnerships, as to the winning concession com- (Tegram)
west, to the Tapajós River, in the well as incorporated in the Na- pany for ‘non-manageable risks’.
Source https://www.ldc.com/wp-content/uploads/LDC_AR2018_S-1.pdf
16 17
“Invisible hands? European corporations and the deforestation of the Amazon and Cerrado biomes” 3.1 Meat production chain in the Amazon and Cerrado region
3
Meat, Graph 5 Livestock in Brazil 1990-2019
Cattle
and
destruction
3.1 M
eat production chain in In 2019, São Felix do Xingu deforested 3,800
the Amazon and Cerrado region square kilometers of forest, according to data from
T
Inpe28. With a jump of 100% in relation to the previ-
here are more cows than people in Brazil. ous year, the municipality alone accounts for one-
And, as most people know, the great majori- third of the forest destruction in the entire Amazon
ty of the meat consumed and exported is in- biome in 2019.
dustrially produced, coming from animals
that are proven to have a much shorter life It wasn’t until the beginning of the 2000s that Bra-
than those living in open spaces and who are usually zil witnessed an increase in the meat processing sec-
fed with antibiotics and soy27. tor. The growth in the industry has put Latin Ameri-
ca on the map as the largest exporter of meat and Source PPM/IBGE (2021)AR2018_S-1.pdf
At the time this report was written in 2021, Brazil poultry in the world. And although the consumption
had 214,893,800 livestock, and the numbers continue of dairy and meat, together, are responsible for 18.7%
to rise, primarily in the Amazon (states of Mato Gros- of the daily diet of a Brazilian person, most of the These subsidies helped companies to grow and buy The growth of these multinational companies, nev-
so and Pará) and Cerrado (states of Minas Gerais and production is exported29. In 2019 Brazil exported 1.84 new companies, as in the case of Marfrig, which be- ertheless, did not happen without an expensive price
Goiás) biomes. million tons of beef, obtained revenues of US$7.59 bil- came the third-largest producer of meat in the world, to be paid: the massive increase in the destruction of
lion and consolidated itself as the largest world ex- operating all around the globe. JBS became the num- the Amazon and Cerrado biomes, along with the de-
São Felix do Xingu, a municipality located in south- porter of the product, according to the Brazilian As- ber one producer of meat in the world and is among plorable labor conditions to which their employees
eastern Pará, is home to the most cattle in Brazil.. Cur- sociation of Meat Exporting Industries (Abiec)30. the ten largest food and beverage companies on the are subjected.
rently the cattle population stands at approximately planet, selling US$ 38.7 billion in 201232 and having a
2.5 million cows. The city, which is twice the size of Although the meat sector has been run by big na- daily capacity to slaughter 85,000 cows, 70,000 pigs The terrible conditions of the meat production chain,
the Netherlands, has 128,000 inhabitants and record- tional corporations, it is financed by national and for- and 12 million birds. As an exporter, JBS sourced for the cattle and humans who work in it, are nothing
ed an 18% increase in the number of cows in the last eign capital with the European Union being the sec- from 1,324 municipalities, or 47% of the beef produc- new. In the soy chain, the situation is similar: due to
decade, a proportion equaling 17 cows per resident. ond most important buyer after China. In 2017, the tion municipalities in 2017(Trase, 2020). degrading work conditions, slave labor and land grab-
EU bought 180,236 tons of Brazilian meat. bing, Brazil is able to keep production costs low and
Also supported by these subsides is BRF, a poultry export commodities at very low prices, producing the
The export policy was very much encouraged by processing company which became one of the largest cheapest meat in the world in the Amazon. According
27 razil is the largest producer of soy in the world (average of 90 the National Government through the creation, in exporters in the world with two processing plants in to the documentary Carne e Osso, in the beginning of
million tons/year) 2008, of a program to support ‘national champions’. Europe (Holland and England) and nine in Argenti- the 2010s there were 750,000 employees working in
The National Bank for Economic and Social Develop- na. The subsides program is said to end in 2020. meat, poultry and pork processing plants in Brazil. In
ment (BNDES) developed a series of subsides31 to these plants, there was a 743% excess risk of wrist in-
stimulate a few companies in specific sectors, such as Today JBS is the second largest debtor to the Bra- juries and three times more chances of having mental
Map 4 Livestock in Brazil per State
meat processing, as a form of encouragement for zilian Social Security Ministry (R$1.8 Billion) and illness, among other serious records. Those workers
their growth. financed political campaigns of more than 160 poli- are exposed to a temperature five degrees lower than
ticians who were related to the Agribusiness Group the minimum accepted by regulation and to conveyor
Meat processing companies such as JBS and Mar- in Congress. It is important to notice the rise of the belts running non-stop at a rapid speed. After a grow-
frig received R$8.1 billion and R$3.6 billion in subsi- amount destined for the political campaigns: in ing lobby effort from the union, in 2013 a new norm
dies and participated in their stock markets to be- 2002, JBS donated R$200,00033; in 2006 JBS donated was created, NR 36, aiming to mitigate the tempera-
come ‘giants’. They are able to compete R$19.7 million34; in 2010, R$83 million35; in 2014, ture and the conveyor belts’ speed problems, and re-
internationally in global chains, contributing 65% of R$300 million36. ducing injuries that are a result of repetitive move-
the total amount of resources available. ments. However, many workers are still complaining
that there is no auditing nor accountability and the
32 Atlas da Carne problems faced remain37.
33 https://web.archive.org/web/20150518080304if_/http://www.
brasilagro.com.br/conteudo/jbs-maior-doador-concentra-repas-
28 http://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/ ses-a-governistas.html#.VVmc0ej7Q2x
biomes/legal_amazon/rates 34 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/09/1519452-maior-
29 Atlas da Carne -doador-de-campanhas-concentra-repasses-a-governistas.shtml
30 http://abiec.com.br/publicacoes/beef-report-2020/ 35 https://www.hojeemdia.com.br/primeiro-plano/pol%- -doou-mais-de-r-300-milhoes-campanhas-em-2014-aponta-
31 https://www.ft.com/content/c510368e-968e-11e4-922f- C3%ADtica/estudo-mapeia-as-doa%C3%A7%C3%B5es-de- -fgv.html
-00144feabdc0 -empresas-durante-as-elei%C3%A7%C3%B5es-1.277680 37 https://chainreactionresearch.com/report/brazilian-beef-supply-
Source PPM/IBGE (2021)AR2018_S-1.pdf 36 https://epocanegocios.globo.com/Brasil/noticia/2017/05/jbs- -chain-under-pressure-amid-worsening-esg-impacts/
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