Grolsch: Growing Globally - Pankaj Ghemawat
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PANKAJ GHEMAWAT
SM – 1529 – E
O – 308 - 029
JORDAN MITCHELL
Grolsch: Growing Globally
In November 2007, SAB Miller, the world´s second largest brewer,1 announced the friendly takeover
of the world’s 51st largest, Royal Grolsch N.V. of the Netherlands, for €816m in cash - 84% more than
Grolsch’s value over the previous month. Nick Fell, SABMiller’s Marketing Director, explained the logic
of the deal:
“[Grolsch is] a fantastic brand. It’s North European, it’s a fantastic product, it’s got
unimpeachable brewing credentials and authenticity and credibility. And it’s a damn good
product. So for anybody interested in developing their premium beer business, this is an
absolute peach of a brand to get hold of… we see huge potential for it in our global footprint,
particularly in markets like Latin America and Africa where we’ve got a strong route to market
but where the premium beer business is still in its infancy.”2
Grolsch had hitherto focused on developed markets, particularly the UK, US, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand and France, in pursuit of its goal of becoming one of the world’s top 10 global beer
brands. Groslch was already the world’s 21st largest global brand, measured by international (non-
domestic) volume (see Exhibit 1). International volume had grown to account for slightly over one-
half of total volume and, going forward, seemed to offer much more potential. Drinkers often rated
Grolsch higher than larger brands, including Heineken, the top global brand as well as the leader in
Grolsch’s home market (see Exhibit 2). And Grolsch had started up a state-of-the art brewery in 2004
that could be expanded at little incremental cost.
The acquisition closed and in February 2008, Grolsch became an independent subsidiary of
SABMiller. Rob Snel, head of Grolsch International since 1999 and an employee since 1984, was
named Grolsch’s new CEO shortly thereafter. He had to decide what changes, if any, to recommend
to its global strategy.
1 This compares the relative positions of SABMiller with the two other major breweries, InBev and Anheuser-Busch as of the
end of 2006. SABMiller’s fiscal year ends in March.
2 “Q&A with Nick Fell, Marketing Director, SABMiller,” SABMiller, www.sabmiller.com. Accessed Nov. 30, 2007.
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
This case was prepared by Professor Pankaj Ghemawat and Jordan Mitchell, Research Assistant, as the basis for class discussion rather than
to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. August 2008.
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Last edited: 10/10/08
1SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
Company Evolution
Grolsch traced its history back to a brewery, in the Dutch town of Groenlo near the German
border3 that was purchased by Willem Neerfeldt in 1615. By the late 1800s, the brewery had come
under the control of Theo J. De Groen. In 1897, he introduced Grolsch’s iconic - and trademarked -
ceramic swingtop bottle, which was advertised as easy to open and allowing storage of beer for later
consumption. Marketing of the Grolsch brand began in 1918. In 1922, this operation merged with a
brewery in nearby Enschede (see Exhibit 3 for a map of the Netherlands), but Grolsch was retained
as the principal brand. By the 1960s, Grolsch had grown from a “regional” brand to become the
country’s second most popular, behind Heineken.
After the death of the head of the De Groen family in 1982, the next generation of family members
agreed to an initial public offering (IPO) on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in 1984.4 Subsequently, a
non-family member was brought in to manage the company for the first time since the De Groens
had assumed ownership. By the end of the 1980s, there were no De Groens on the company’s
executive committee, but the family continued to own one-third of Grolsch’s shares and was
represented on its supervisory committee.
Due to its stature in the Netherlands, the Dutch government honored the company with the
coveted “Royal” title in 1995, and the company was renamed Royal Grolsch N.V. In 1997, Grolsch
celebrated the 100th anniversary of its swingtop bottle; a company representative said, “After 100
years, the swingtop is a great differentiator and still makes the Grolsch brand famous today.” In 1998,
the company decided to build a modern brewery which, after disruptions and delays (see below
under “Operations”), started up in 2004.
Grolsch had been incorporated as a two-tier company under Dutch law and had two major, fully-
owned subsidiaries: Grolsche Bierbrouwerij Nederland, which handled sales and marketing of Grolsch
in the Netherlands and also housed most production, logistics and facilities support except operations
with foreign partners; and, Grolsch International, which was responsible for the worldwide sales and
marketing of Grolsch (and other brands) outside the Netherlands and the UK and Ireland. The UK and
Ireland were handled by a 51:49 sales and marketing joint venture with Coors called Grolsch (UK) Ltd.,
which brewed Grolsch under license locally.
Exhibit 4 summarizes Grolsch’s recent financial and operating history. In 2007, Grolsch’s total
volumes (including beers sold under exclusive distribution rights) increased by 3.1% to 3.3 million
hectolitres (hl),5 with volumes derived specifically from Grolsch brands decreasing by 3.4% to 2.8
million hl. Revenues grew by 4.8% from €317.6m to €332.9m and net profits edged forward from
€19.2m to €20m during the same period.
Prior to the takeover by SABMiller, Grolsch had emphasized growing faster than its key markets
while achieving a return on investment that exceeded its average cost of capital (estimated to be 7.5%
by one investment bank6), steadily increasing earnings and dividends per share, and maintaining a
healthy balance sheet. It paid attention to non-financial stakeholders as well, especially employees
3 Groenlo means Green Forest in Dutch. The town was also known as Grol and Grolle.
4 Dominic Walsh, “Swing was the thing when popped tops reached Top of The Pops,” Times Online, Nov. 20, 2007,
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/consumer_goods/article2903549.ece
5 1 hl = 100 litres. An average bottle holds 333 millilitres (0.333 litres). Cases vary from 8 to 12 litres by volume.
6 “Grolsch: How much to pay for U.S. fantasy?” Fortis Investment Bank, Feb. 23, 2007, p. 4.
2SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
and its local community. Indicators of employee welfare ranged from an average payroll cost of
€60,000 per employee (payroll accounted for 15% of revenues) to the complimentary case of Grolsch
beer traditionally delivered every week to employees’ homes. About 850 of the 875 employees were
based in the Netherlands, as were all members of the executive and supervisory committees. The
company had particularly strong ties to the eastern part of the Netherlands, especially Enschede
(population 155,000), home to its headquarters and the new brewery. It did, however, seek managers
and sales people with multiple language skills and international experience and education.
To achieve its objectives, Grolsch had articulated the following vision and mission:
Vision: The brewing industry has failed to keep pace with the changes in consumers’
preferences for drinks. This has created a mainstream category that is under pressure from
other drinks. Grolsch believes in the strength of beer in the drinks market.
Mission: Grolsch is going to break through the mainstream and restore beer’s premium status.
In its presentations to investors, Grolsch emphasized that it targeted a premium, differentiated
position in the markets in which it competed. It also highlighted adaptation around its core products
as its key strategy for achieving international growth (see Exhibit 5).
Products
Exhibit 6 shows the company’s product range, which was organized into two main brand
families: Grolsch and Amsterdam (the company also distributed small amounts of imported Belgian
beer such as Grimbergen). The Grolsch brand was the centerpiece of the company’s strategy. Its
flagship product, Grolsch Premium Lager, represented 90% of the company’s domestic volume,
although nine variations were also marketed in the Netherlands. The Grolsch brand was the focus, as
well, of the company’s UK joint venture and the brand accounted for two-thirds of all exports, with
Grolsch Premium Lager being the only product sold in many markets.
Grolsch Premium Lager was classed as a pale lager7 and the company emphasized that its malty,
relatively bitter taste made it distinctively refreshing. Groslch was brewed to one recipe, which was
in strict conformance with German purity laws, and was aged for a minimum of six weeks, compared
to two to four weeks for many of its competitors. One beer enthusiast described the aroma as a
“peppery hop with a spritzy citric edge to it,” and its taste as “an obviously well-attenuated beer
whose balance is toward the dry and bitter [that is] quite refreshing.”8 Beer guru, Michael Jackson
agreed: “it has a fresher, more herbal, hop character than most international lagers, and a cleaner malt
background,” but provocatively asked, “is that enough?” His conclusion? “Not today. The differences
between popular lagers are refinements.”9 Grolsch management strongly disagreed.
7 A lager is a type of beer that is brewed by using a bottom-fermenting yeast in comparison to ales, which are brewed with a
top-fermenting yeast. While the tastes of both lagers and ales vary greatly depending on the ingredients and process, lagers are
generally lighter and crisper whereas ales tend to be darker and stronger. Lagers dominate the overall market for beer.
8 Blog, http://www.epinions.com/content_129738444420. Accessed April 2, 2008.
9 M. Jackson, “Behind the mystery of Grolsch,” originally published in The Observer, July 1, 2001,
http://www.beerhunter.com/documents/19133-001561.html, July 9, 2001. Accessed April 1, 2008.
3SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
In addition to its core Grolsch products, the company devoted considerable attention to
packaging. The green swingtop bottle played a particularly key role in entering foreign markets. As
Tom Wilms, Consumer and Market Insight Manager, put it:
“We use the swingtop as a door opener especially in a market that is very crowded in the
premium segment…Once the volume starts picking up, we introduce the crown cork (i.e.,
regular bottle cap). In nearly all of our key markets, most of the volume is in crown cork
bottles.”
In 2007, a new, standardized green crown cork bottle, with a stylish look, an embossed Grolsch
logo on flattened sides and an accompanying crate, was introduced with much fanfare worldwide,
after a two-year development process. In early 2008, the company was also in the process of
introducing a new green swingtop bottle globally. This marked a particularly significant change in
the Netherlands, where the swingtop bottle had been brown for 111 years. Bottles for the Dutch
market were mostly returnable whereas bottles sold elsewhere were non-returnable. Bottles shipped
out of the country were offered in more varied sizes and had country-specific labels. Aside from
bottles, cans accounted for 30% of total volume and were more standardized, although there were
two different designs (one for the domestic market and another for international markets). Kegs were
significant as well, particularly at home in the Netherlands.
Grolsch’s other product range centered on Amsterdam, positioned as a non-premium brand and
sold mostly in tall 500-millilitre cans at supermarkets and smaller independent shops. Amsterdam
beers were available in five varieties and were considered to have a smooth but strong taste: the
strongest, the Maximator, had 11.9% alcohol content by volume (compared to 5% for Grolsch
Premium Lager). Four markets – France, Russia, Australia and Africa – accounted for 95% of
Amsterdam’s volume.
Despite the company’s clear focus on the premium Grolsch brand, the brand’s total volume had
actually declined from 3.2 million hl in 2003 to 2.8 million hl in 2007, as exports more or less
stagnated while the Dutch and UK markets shrank. Total volume (including Amsterdam and other
smaller local brands under license) changed from 3.4 million hl to 3.3 million hl over the same period,
with the growth of the Amsterdam brand making up for some of the decline in the Grolsch brand.
Markets
Although Grolsch dated back to the beginning of the 17th century, it began to look beyond the
Dutch market only in the middle of the 20th century. Exports commenced after World War II and in
1946, amounted to 3,000hl or 10% of total production. (Indonesia, the largest foreign market,
absorbed 1,000hl.) However, exports were curtailed in the 1950s by buoyant domestic demand.
Interest in internationalization revived in the 1970s with domestic stagnation and shrinkage, and the
example of Heineken, Grolsch’s larger Dutch rival, making impressive headway (see Exhibit 7 for
comparative timelines). In the second half of the 1970s, Grolsch set up its own import organizations
in the United States and the United Kingdom. Distribution deals in Canada, Australia and New
Zealand followed in the mid-1980s.
The 1990s saw investments, for the first time, in foreign production, starting in developed
markets. In 1990, Grolsch acquired Wickuler, a regional German brewer, in a move that doubled its
capacity. And in 1992, after having grown Grolsch into the UK’s third largest premium lager brand, it
bought Ruddles, a small UK brewer, as much for its distribution network as for its ale brands. But
4SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
both moves were quickly unwound. It sold Wickuler in 1994 to one of Germany’s largest brewers,
Brau and Brunnen, and signed an agreement to distribute Grolsch in Germany with the latter. That
same year, it formed a joint venture partnership with Bass, under which the latter took over
production and distribution for the UK. Ruddles was divested in 1997.
The opening up of Eastern Europe in particular prompted a shift in focus in the second half of the
1990s, towards emerging markets: Grolsch invested in Poland and Russia and set up representative
offices in Brazil and China. In Poland, Grolsch acquired an indirect stake in a brewery in 1995 but
sold it in 1998 because of poor profitability and an inability to build up its stake to a majority level.
One Grolsch executive added, “The Polish brand Zywiec was bought by Heineken and there was no
need for two Dutch players in the Polish market.” A distribution agreement with the purchaser was
later annulled. In Russia, Grolsch paid in 10% of the capital for a small new brewery in 1999, but sold
its stake to the majority owners in 2000. They, in turn, sold it to Turkish brewer Efes in 2004, whom
Grolsch still licensed to brew and distribute the Amsterdam brand in Russia.
The Asian financial crisis, had significant ripple effects in Eastern Europe, including a massive
devaluation of the ruble in Russia, and pushed Grolsch back to focusing on developed markets. It
entered France in 1999 by setting up its own distributorship - the only country with such an
arrangement - which focused on selling the Amsterdam brand. Grolsch stepped up efforts on the
Iberian Peninsula with an investment in Portuguese distributor Cereuro and a distribution agreement
with Spain’s La Cruz del Campo. The Cereuro investment was halved in 200510 and in Spain,
Heineken bought out La Cruz del Campo.
In addition to the markets mentioned above, Grolsch sold beer in many other countries, making a
total of about 70 export markets. As of 2007, international volume accounted for 51.5% of the
company total. Grolsch did not systematically disaggregate sales or profits by market, but it did
supply partial information that could be supplemented with analysts’ inferences.
Key Markets
According to Grolsch, Western Europe accounted for 88% of its revenues and 94% of its
contribution margins, i.e., Western European markets’ average contribution margin was twice as high
as others’ (23% vs. 11%).11 If fixed production costs (13% of revenues) were allocated in proportion to
revenues, Western Europe accounted for 103% of operating profit (EBIT). But in order to build
international volume, beer exports from the Netherlands were actually transferred to Grolsch
International at variable production cost.
Grolsch’s home market of the Netherlands accounted for close to one-half its total volume, an
estimated 65% of revenues, and a much greater share of EBIT. That said, market shrinkage and
discounting had put Dutch brewers under significant long-term profit pressure. Grolsch, with 13% of
volume, was part of a second tier of competitors that included Bavaria (17%) and Interbrew (14%),
behind market leader Heineken (46%), which controlled the country’s two largest brands, Heineken
and Amstel. Grolsch was the third largest brand, and was particularly strong in the eastern
Netherlands.
10 “Portugal Sumolis Boosts Stake in Cereuro to 90.05 Pct,” Portuguese News Digest, April 15, 2005.
11 Grolsch Annual Report 2007, Dec. 31, 2007, p. 52.
5SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally Grolsch’s second largest market was the United Kingdom, where it owned 51% of Grolsch (UK) Ltd., a joint venture that brewed Grolsch under license, in partnership with MolsonCoors (which came in after Bass was taken over and broken up). The UK accounted for 25% of Grolsch’s total volume and 1.5% of the UK market. Grolsch was ranked fifth in the premium lager market behind the top three brands: Stella Artois, Kronenbourg and Budweiser.12 In 2007, Grolsch’s 51% stake in it generated about 12% of its operating profit, down from 18% the previous year because of market shrinkage and supermarket pricing pressures. Grolsch’s third largest market was the United States, to which - like virtually all other markets - it exported beer from the Netherlands. Analysts estimated that Grolsch’s US volume had stagnated at about 140,000hl - 4% of the company’s total and 0.5% of US import volume (overall, imported beer represented close to 15% of total US consumption). Grolsch was ranked 11th in the imported premium beer market (the top three brands were Corona, Heineken and Beck’s).13 An agreement in 2006 with market leader Anheuser-Busch to distribute Grolsch in the US had been hailed as key to become a top 10 imported brand by quadrupling volume. But the acquisition by SABMiller, which owned Anheuser-Busch’s biggest US competitor, Miller, ended that arrangement. France was Grolsch’s fourth-largest market with volumes estimated to be around 100,000hl, almost all of which was made up by the Amsterdam brand. The Amsterdam brand was ranked second in strong beers behind Bavaria.14 Canada was the next in line (and the fourth-largest for the Grolsch brand), with volumes estimated to be about one-half those in the US. Grolsch had given its Canadian distributor, Sleeman, a license to brew Grolsch Premium Lager nationally. Grolsch was ranked fifth in imported premium beers (the top three were Heineken, Corona and Miller Genuine Draft).15 The remaining markets - including the two other markets classified as “key,” Australia and New Zealand - individually represented less than 1% of Grolsch’s total volume. In Australia, Grolsch occupied fifth place in the international premium segment behind the top three: Corona, Heineken and Stella Artois.16 The MABA Framework Over time, Grolsch had developed a MABA (Market Attractiveness, Business Assessment) framework to assess international opportunities. The Market Attractiveness (“MA”) analysis included: total volume and volume growth in hectolitres of the international premium lager segment; the price premium between the international premium lager segment and the top volume lager brands; and, the geographic and cultural distance between the market and Grolsch’s home base in the Netherlands. The distance measure had four components: differences in languages; non-membership vs. membership of the European Union (of which the Netherlands was a founding member); the landed cost of transport; and differences in GDP per capita. The Business Assessment (“BA”) involved the total volume and volume growth of Grolsch premium lager, variable commercial contribution 12 Grolsch Company Book, “Brewing for the Future,” 2006, p. 35. 13 Ibidem. 14 Ibidem. 15 Ibidem. 16 Ibidem. 6
SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
(contribution margin minus the direct expenses associated with serving a market), and Grolsch’s
share of the premium lager segment. Exhibit 8 provides more detail.
Each year, the company worked through these calculations to assign aggregate scores to each
market being considered. Markets with high scores were classified as “key,” those with somewhat
lower scores as “seeding,” and those with low scores as “trading”. Exhibit 9 shows the output of the
2006 MABA analysis. A Grolsch executive commented that: “The MABA is a tool that informs us in
our decisions. At the end of the day, the senior management decides on whether a market is key,
seeding or trading each year during the annual strategic planning sessions.” Key/seeding markets
were served by one of two main groups within the sales organization, Brand Builders, and trading
markets by the other, Direct Export. The Grolsch policy for trading markets was to generate profits
each year. The profitability was measured by ensuring that exports to trading markets covered at
least variable costs and the direct expenses associated with management such as transportation, sales
people, marketing and customer service.
Operations
Grolsch followed German purity laws and emphasized the finest natural ingredients, the absence
of additives such as stabilizers, the combination of two types of hops - an innovation dating back to
the 1600s that was celebrated in the company’s logo - and a long maturation process. Some attention
to procurement scale had recently been overlaid on the traditional emphasis on high-quality
ingredients: in 2002, Grolsch formed a purchasing alliance with German brewer, Warsteiner.17 And
internal training programs reinforced the legacy of craft-like, high quality brewing by emphasizing
the theme of “Craftsmanship is Mastery.”
In 1998, Grolsch began to plan for a large new brewery to consolidate its two relatively old
facilities: the Groenlo brewery, which produced for export, and the Enschede brewery, which
produced for the Dutch market. The two towns waited anxiously as Grolsch chose between them and
finally opted for a location outside Enschede. During the planning phase, an explosion destroyed
parts of the old Enschede brewery, forcing a major scramble to keep operations going. In 2001, after
delays, Grolsch received governmental approval to build. When the new brewery opened in April
2004, it had cost €277m,18 and had a capacity of 3.2 million hl that could be increased to as much as 6
million hl. (In the short run, expansion to 3.7 million hl was planned at an additional cost of €10m).
Grolsch estimated that it would save €1m in operating costs annually by optimizing production, but
no significant headcount reductions were anticipated. Pride in the new brewery - described as the
most modern in the world - focused on its state-of-the-art, environmentally friendly technology.
Grolsch’s new brewery was located on a major highway and was about 200 kilometers from the
main Dutch shipping port, Rotterdam. Beer was transported by truck to markets within the European
Union, at costs estimated to range from about €1.47 per hectolitre to Germany to €6.68 per hectolitre
to Spain.19 Transportation to all other markets was by ship, in 20-foot, 40-foot or 45-foot20 containers
at costs estimated to be €10-15 per hectolitre (see Exhibit 10 for more detailed estimates).
17 “Grolsch, Warsteiner boost alliance with Italy deal,” Reuters News, Jan. 28, 2003.
18 Grolsch Brewery, Proleit Website, http://www.proleit.com/en/Industries/BreweryGrolsch_Neubau.php. Accessed Sept.
13, 2007.
19 Estimated by case writer.
7SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
Marketing
Grolsch’s other marketing policies, pricing, promotion and placement were meant to reinforce its
positioning as a premium product.
Pricing
Grolsch was priced similarly to Heineken and was considered a standard lager brand within the
Netherlands. Overseas, Grolsch positioned the brand at premium prices. In three of its six largest
non-domestic markets - the US, Canada and Australia - Grolsch was priced at a discount to other
leading European imports. Thus, in the US, the average off-premise21 retail price of Grolsch Premium
Lager was about $3.18 (€2.53) per litre in 2006, compared to Heineken at $3.48 (€2.77) and Budweiser
at $2.13 (€1.70). And prices in Canada approached standard rather than premium levels, with C$4.50
(€3.16) for Grolsch vs. C$6.24 (€4.38) for Heineken and C$4.44 (€3.11) for Budweiser. In the UK
pricing was comparable to the leading premium lagers: Grolsch averaged £1.90 (€2.79) per litre
versus £1.93 (€2.84) for Stella Artois, £2.11 (€3.10) for Budweiser and less than £1.50 (€2.20) for
standard lagers. In France and Russia - the markets where the Amsterdam brand was the key driver
of volume gains - Grolsch Premium Lager was priced substantially higher than other premium
lagers.
Promotion
Like most brewers, Grolsch undertook a wide array of promotional activities. For example, the
launch of the new green bottle in 2007 was supported by advertising in print media, the Internet (to
make special offers and build the customer base through music programs and fan clubs), outdoor and
on-premise displays, sponsorships (e.g., of football clubs), events (e.g., music concerts) and television
advertising. TV advertising, which had begun in the 1960s, nonetheless garnered the bulk of
promotional expenditures. In the Netherlands, Grolsch spent 4% to 6% of sales on advertising. Recent
spots featured 30-somethings in cosmopolitan settings with tag lines like “One day you won’t drink
beer anymore, you’ll drink Grolsch.” In the UK, where Grolsch enjoyed access to an extensive network
of on-premise locations through its relationship with MolsonCoors (the country’s second-largest brewer
and the owner of the largest brand, Carling), advertising reinforced the “Green Light District”
campaign in which customers were served Grolsch beer in locations saturated with Grolsch imagery.
UK TV advertising also played up Grolsch’s Dutch origins, often by poking fun at them, e.g., with a
Dutch spokesperson speaking English with an exaggerated Dutch accent.
Dutch roots were also accentuated in TV advertising in other markets since Grolsch believed that its main
locational advantage was the image of beer from Northern Europe and, especially, the Netherlands, which
became a major exporter (to England) back in the 14th century and now exported more of its production -
about 50% - than any other major producer. This country-of-origin advantage had been validated by
Heineken, which imported its beer into the United States instead of producing it locally and, as the second
largest import, behind Corona, sold more than 5 million hl of it there a year, at the highest prices in the
market. But Dutch origins had to be pitched differently in countries less familiar with the Dutch: as one
20 20-foot containers were a shipping standard and were 8 feet high x 8.5 feet wide and 20 feet long. 40-and 45-foot containers
had the same height and width as 20-foot containers with the only difference being length.
21 Off-premise was also called off-trade and referred to supermarkets, specialty stores and other shops. On-premise (or on-
trade) signified restaurants, bars, hotels and catering.
8SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
executive put it, “Few people in the US have specific knowledge about the Netherlands.” In addition,
while UK and US advertising ostensibly shared the English language, the content of the ads had to be
varied greatly to reflect other large cultural differences between the two markets (see Exhibit 11).
In the US, the allure of the Grolsch swingtop bottle featured prominently in a new commercial, “Got
that Swing” aired during the professional (US) football playoffs and throughout the year in New York’s
Times Square. This differed markedly from Grolsch’s edgier UK commercials. The broader approach, in
both the US and Canada, was to use targeted advertising and promotional campaigns to reach
trendsetters in select regions of the country. Promotional efforts in other, smaller markets, were much
more modest.
Placement/Distribution
Grolsch emphasized that it selected the best route to the consumer by market, in cooperation with
importers, distributors, brewers and retailers. Placement or distribution arrangements in the Netherlands
had had the most time to mature. In off-premise channels, Grolsch resisted aggressive price promotions
(by supermarkets, particularly) and emphasized its premium products, packaging and ancillaries such as
the PerfectDraft®22 dispenser system.23 Grolsch relied on on-premise channels more than its rivals and
owned six beverage wholesalers that handled half its sales, guaranteed financing of premises and
equipment by bar-owners and owned properties operated as bars and restaurants.24
Distribution in the United Kingdom had also been in place for some time - since 1994, despite the
change in the joint venture partner from Bass to MolsonCoors (Grolsch was MolsonCoors’s second largest
lager brand in the UK after Carling). But elsewhere, there had been more turnover. In the US, Canada,
Australia and New Zealand, Grolsch was on its third or fourth set of distributorships since the mid-1990s
(see Exhibit 12 for details). Except for France, where Grolsch owned its own local distribution and Russia,
where Efes was licensed to brew Amsterdam beer, most other countries had seen similar changes.
Industry Dynamics
In 2005, global beer volumes were 1.5 billion hl (155.2 billion litres) and total retail value –
including, in many countries, a very sizeable tax component – amounted to €354 billion.25 Globally,
volumes had grown at 2.7% per year while global value had increased by 4.7% per year between 2000
and 2005.26 Beer markets in developed regions such as North America, Western Europe and Japan
had recently been flat or had suffered slight decreases in volume between 2000 and 2005. Global
volume growth was driven by developing regions such as Eastern Europe and Asia Pacific, in both of
which volume had grown by more than 5% per year. Exhibit 13 shows information on past and
projected volumes in the 20 largest country markets. Overall, lagers accounted for nearly 95% of
market volume and 90% of value, and ales, stouts and no/low-alcohol beer for the remainder.
22 The PerfectDraft® system was an appliance developed by Philips and was an appliance designed to replicate draft beer
served at bars and restaurants. Several major beer brands marketed 6-litre kegs suitable for the appliance.
23 Grolsch Annual Report 2006, Dec. 31, 2006, p. 12.
24 Ibidem.
25 “The World Market for Alcoholic Drinks,” Euromonitor, p. 5.
26 Ibidem.
9SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
Partly because of the low price-elasticity of demand for beer (estimated at -0.3 for the Netherlands,
for instance), brewers responded to volume pressures by trying to build up the premium part of their
portfolios, often by launching premium line extensions to recognized brands.27 Worldwide, premium
lager represented 16% of volume and 28% of lager value in 2005, up from 15% and 23% respectively
in 2000. Standard lagers accounted for 53% of volume and 58% of value – both figures down a few
percentage points from 2000 – and economy lagers for the rest. Exhibit 14 tracks the premium lager
segment by region over time.
Total imports - mostly of premium beers - represented 5% of global volume and 10.6% of global
sales in 2005 (up from 4.3% and 8% respectively in 2000).28 Exhibit 15 disaggregates imported versus
domestic sales by region. In addition, foreign brands were sometimes brewed under license for a local
market. For example, Budweiser was brewed by Guinness for sales in Ireland. Heineken granted
licenses to breweries in which it had stakes and also forged license-to-brew agreements with small
breweries such as a deal with the Danish Brewing Group to brew Heineken for Denmark.29 Typical
royalty/licensing fees depended on the beer’s price point, volume and promotional support;
royalty/licensing fees ranged from €1 per hectolitre to €6 per hectolitre.
Nevertheless, in markets such as the US (by far the world’s largest importer), nearly all successful
foreign brands were shipped from the brewery of origin because of the perceived importance that US
consumers placed on “getting a real import.” Some of the successes had been truly spectacular, as in
Corona’s ascent, past Heineken, to the ranks of the largest import and the second largest premium
brand in the US market. But brand shares were generally stable in most developed markets,
especially in Europe, in spite of significant advertising competition that swallowed up 4 to 8% of
revenues for most major brewers. And at a global level, the combined market share of the top ten
brands stood at 18% in 2005, versus 19% in 1995.30 Most of the top ten brands generated the majority
of their volume from a single market such as Budweiser and Miller from the US (although SABMiller
did brew Miller outside the US as well) or Skol from Brazil. Some brands, however, did have a large
and broad presence outside their home markets (see Exhibit 1).
Where concentration had taken place was at the company level. Because of acquisitions and, to a
lesser extent, joint ventures and organic growth, the five largest brewers had come to account for 38%
of global volumes, up from 24% in 1996.31 As of 2006, the largest brewers were: Inbev, SABMiller,
Anheuser-Busch, Heineken and Carlsberg (for comparisons, see Exhibit 16).
• InBev resulted from an €8 billion merger between Belgium’s Interbrew and Brazil’s AmBev in
2004, and had a broad presence, with particular strengths in Europe and Latin America and
significant weakness only in North America.32
27 “The World Market for Alcoholic Drinks,” Euromonitor International, Dec. 2006, p. 12.
28 Ibidem., Dec. 2006, pp. 76-77.
29 Drinks Marketing Director, Heineken, Euromonitor 2005, p. 2.
30 Internal Grolsch Company Presentation, “Consolidation in the Global Beer Industry,” Management Team Meeting, Feb. 26,
2007, slide 18.
31 SABMiller Annual Report 2007, Online Edition, http://www.annual2007.sabmiller.com/2_gfootprint/gbeermarket.html.
Accessed Aug. 23, 2007; and, The Brewing Industry, PaineWebber Analyst Report, Feb. 25, 1998, pp. 31-32.
32 Gilles Castonguay and Nicholas Winning, “Interbrew buy of AmBev wins shareholder approval,” Reuters News, Aug. 27,
2004.
10SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
• SABMiller had been formed when SAB (South African Breweries) acquired Miller from Phillip
Morris in 2002 for €6 billion. It was strong in Africa and Eastern Europe; because of Miller, the
share of its sales accounted for by North America was even larger, but the share of profits much
smaller (see Appendix A for additional information).
• Anheuser-Busch’s footprint was the mirror image of InBev’s: very focused on North America
(in addition to its leadership in the US, it owned 50% of Mexico’s Modelo, the producer of
Corona).
• Heineken, despite its reputation as the global brand, derived nearly 70% of its revenue from
Western and Eastern Europe. This figure would increase as it absorbed the market-leading
UK operations of Scottish and Newcastle (S&N, previously the thirteenth largest brewer by
volume), which it, along with Carlsberg, had taken over and broken up in the first half of
2008.
• Carlsberg was much smaller and even more dependent on Europe, especially Western
Europe, but would end up with a more balanced European presence after absorbing S&N’s
half of their erstwhile Eastern European joint venture, Baltic Beverages Holding.
Rumors of additional deals were rife in the brewing industry. The one most talked about in early
2008 was a possible merger between In-Bev and Anheuser-Busch. The two had already moved to take
advantage of their complementary geographic positions by announcing that Anheuser Busch would
import InBev’s leading brands – Stella Artois, Beck’s, Bass Ale – to the US (casting a pall over
Grolsch’s tie-up with Anheuser-Busch for the same purpose). Some analysts were predicting that the
probability of a merger was high due to “growth in emerging economies, cost savings and
complementary geographies.”33
Despite feverish consolidation activity, evidence on its profitability was mixed. An academic
study of short-run stock market reactions to the announcement of 21 major mergers and acquisitions
in brewing between 2000 and 2005 found that 11 elicited negative reactions.34 It also concluded that
cumulated reactions of this sort were negative across transactions by Interbrew and Heineken, and
positive for SABMiller. But SABMiller’s positive record was due to just one deal: the purchase of
Bavaria, the market leader in Colombia, for much less than expected. And the stock market’s negative
reaction to the Interbrew-AmBev mega-merger, for example, seemed not to anticipate the efficiency
increases that the new management team from AmBev subsequently squeezed out of the old
Interbrew operations.
Looking at the positions that resulted from such moves suggested some additional conclusions.
According to the same academic study, the relationship between the geographic spread of 48 large
listed brewers and measures of their accounting profitability was negative and statistically
significant, and there was no simple relationship between overall company size and profitability.35
Instead, the brewers who earned the highest margins per hl seemed to combine high levels of
revenue per hl with strong scale within key national markets (see Exhibit 17). There was also evidence
33 Jonathan Ratner, “Brewers to merge, analyst says,” Financial Post, National Post, July 24, 2007, p. FP6.
34 Oliver Johannes Ebneth, “Internationalisierung Und Unternehmenserfolg Börsennotierter Braukonzerne,” Göttingen, May
2006, p. 141.
35 Ibidem.
11SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
of a strong correlation between market concentration and profitability at the national level (see
Exhibit 18).36
Outside of the major brewers, there were thousands upon thousands of commercial breweries
worldwide. Smaller brewers typically competed on the strength of their local reputation, history and
advertising voice. But even some of the smaller operations were, often with the help of major brewers
as well as resources generated by strong domestic positions, beginning to globalize. For example,
Baltic Beverages Holdings, the object of the tussle between S&N and Carlsberg, had begun an
aggressive pan-European export and distribution drive with its Russian Baltika brand. As Baltika’s
president put it: “The international interest in Russia and Russian business is great, and in my
opinion it would only be natural for foreigners interested in Russia to try some Russian beer. And
once they’ve tried it, the product's quality will eventually win out - just as was the case with Corona
beer, which was originally a Mexican brand.”37
Exhibit 1
Top 25 Beer Brands: Total Volume and International Volumes
Top 25 World's Brands Top 25 World's Brands
TOTAL VOLUMES NON-DOMESTIC (INTERNATIONAL) VOLUMES ONLY
Brand Brewer Volume Brand Brewer Volume
Millions of Millions of
HL (2006E) HL (2006E)
1 Bud (Light) Anheuser-Busch 50.4 1 Heineken Heineken 20.1
2 Budweiser Anheuser-Busch 47.0 2 Corona Modelo 11.9
3 Skol InBev 34.2 3 Carlsberg Carlsberg 10.8
4 Corona Modelo 32.7 4 Budweiser Anheuser-Busch 9.9
5 SNOW SABMiller 26.0 5 Amstel Heineken 9.6
6 Heineken Heineken 25.8 6 Stella Artois InBev 9.0
7 Brahma Chopp InBev 24.2 7 Guinness Guinness 8.6
8 Coors Light MCBC 22.7 8 Foster’s Foster’s/S&N 8.6
9 Miller Lite SABMiller 21.2 9 Brahma InBev 6.6
10 Super Dry Asahi 17.5 10 Tuborg Carlsberg 4.9
11 Tsingtao Tsingtao 15.6 11 Beck's InBev 3.6
12 Beijing Beer Beijing Yanjing 15.3 12 Pale Pilsen San Miguel Phillipines 3.0
13 Busch (range) Anheuser-Busch 15.2 13 Kronenbourg S&N 2.5
14 Carling Black label (Africa) SABMiller 12.8 14 Coors Light MolsonCoors 2.3
15 Carlsberg Carlsberg 12.2 15 Bavaria SABMiller 1.9
16 Amstel Heineken 12.2 16 Tiger Asia Pacific Breweries 1.9
17 Baltika(range) BBH 12.0 17 Miller Genuine Draft SABMiller 1.7
18 Schincariol/Nova Schin Schincariol 11.8 18 Labatt InBev 1.7
19 Antarctica InBev 10.8 19 Holsten Carlsberg 1.5
20 Zhujiang Zhujiang 10.7 20 Tecate FEMSA 1.4
21 Polar (range) Polar 10.4 21 Grolsch Grolsch 1.4
22 Guinness Guinness 10.1 22 Baltica BBH 1.4
23 Stella Artois InBev 9.9 23 Obolon Obolon 1.3
24 Foster’s Foster’s/S&N 9.8 24 Kozel SABMiller 1.3
25 Chang Beer Thai 9.1 25 Modelo Especial Modelo 1.2
Note: The information in "Total Volumes" excludes local brands in China.
Source: Company documents
36 Ibidem, p. 42.
37 Galina Stolyarova, “New Ambitions for Russian Beer,” Business Week, July 3, 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jul2007/gb2007073_616975.htm?chan=search. Accessed Aug. 23, 2007.
12SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
Exhibit 2
Quality Ratings and Market Share
Volumes and Average Quality Rating of Leading Beer Brands
4.50
Grolsch
4.00
3.50 Heineken
Quality Rating (1-5)
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
-
- 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0
Volumes (millions of hl)
Volumes (millions hl) Avg. Quality Rating
Heineken 20.1 3.17
Corona 11.9 3.37
Carlsberg 10.8 3.46
Budweiser 9.9 2.72
Amstel Light 9.6 3.33
Stella Artois 9.0 3.66
Guinness 8.6 3.93
Foster's 8.6 2.94
Tuborg 4.9 3.56
Beck's 3.6 3.38
San Miguel 3.0 3.73
Coors Light 2.3 2.69
Miller 1.7 3.04 13
Labatt 1.7 3.22
Tecate 1.4 3.50
Grolsch 1.4 3.82SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally Explanation: This chart places leading beer brands (based on non-domestic volume) by volume in millions of hl (shown on the x-axis) and quality rating (shown on the y-axis). Average quality ratings are subjective in nature and were gathered by users of the website (rateitall.com) rating the taste of each beer. The scale was: Terrible (1), Bad (2), Ok (3), Good (4), and Great (5). Source: Compiled by case writers based on volume information presented in Exhibit 1 and quality rating averages by searching on rateitall.com. Accessed May 28, 2008. 14
SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
Exhibit 3
Map of the Netherlands
0 25 50 km
0 25 50 mi
Delfzijl
Leeuwarden Groningen
Den
North Helder Assen
Sea
IJmuiden Zwolle
Haarlem
AMSTERDAM Enschede
The Hague Utrecht
Amhem
Europoort Rotterdam
Dordrecht Nijmegen
Tilburg
GERMANY
Terneuzen Eindhoven
BELGIUM
Maastricht
Source: Map from CIA World Factbook.
15SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
Exhibit 4
Grolsch Financial History
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Volumes (millions of hl)
Worldwide sales of the Grolsch brand 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.8
Worldwide sales of all owned brands 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.3
and beer sold under license
% of total volume sold outside the Netherlands not avail not avail 45.9% 50.4% 50.0% 48.5% 50.0% 51.5%
P&L Statement (EUR millions)
Net Sales 255.4 272.6 296.5 301.4 314.8 312.3 317.6 332.9
EBITDA 56.6 58.7 61.4 61.0 58.3 54.9 56.2 58.8
EBIT 36.9 38.6 42.9 42.4 32.1 25.2 25.7 28.6
Net profit 27.0 28.6 30.1 30.4 20.6 18.0 19.2 20.0
Balance Sheet (EUR millions)
Assets
Net intangible fixed assets 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.5 1.5 5.1 3.6 2.2
Net tangible fixed assets 77.4 86.1 134.7 261.1 316.1 312.9 299.0 307.8
Financials fixed assets (FFA) 27.1 50.9 54.3 41.8 46.7 46.5 40.8 45.8
Inventories 13.8 15.1 16.2 14.6 17.7 16.7 16.5 19.8
Receivables 48.1 36.7 41.6 39.5 46.5 56.9 57.1 80.6
Cash, cash equivalents & securities 91.2 93.9 51.0 11.8 12.8 14.4 49.8 14.5
Total Assets 257.5 282.6 298.5 369.2 441.3 452.4 466.9 470.7
Equity and Liabilities
Shareholders' equity 158.6 187.2 204.9 230.1 239.9 244.8 255.8 258.5
Provisions 16.6 13.6 12.3 11.4 18.1 19.8 24.1 23.0
Long-term interest bearing debt 1.1 0.0 1.5 53.4 101.9 104.3 76.7 111.5
Short-term interest bearing debt 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 4.0 9.9 34.0 4.1
Trade creditors 16.8 24.7 24.4 12.6 17.4 16.8 19.6 20.7
Other non-interest bearing liabilities 63.5 56.3 54.9 57.7 60.1 56.8 56.7 52.9
Shareholders' Equity and Liabilities 257.5 282.6 298.5 369.2 441.3 452.4 466.9 470.7
Performance Per Share (in EUR/share except for number of shares)
Net profit per share 1.60 1.69 1.78 1.80 1.22 1.06 1.13 1.18
Dividends* 0.68 0.72 0.76 0.77 0.59 0.63 1.00 -
Share price - year end closing 23.80 22.01 20.66 22.56 23.15 21.85 31.40 47.88
Share price - high 25.20 24.20 24.30 23.48 25.00 26.10 33.59 48.00
Share price - low 18.20 15.50 19.49 16.85 20.90 21.28 21.15 24.20
Weighted average number of ordinary shares** 16,921,507 16,921,507 16,921,507 16,921,507 16,921,507 16,921,507 16,921,507 16,921,507
Other Data
Number of Employees 862 902 882 873 895 880 868 875
*Note: In 2006, a plus dividend of 0.33 was paid on top of the basic dividend of 0.67. In 2007, no dividend was paid due to the
sale of the company.
**The number of shares entitled to dividends at year end were 16,921,507 shares for the entire period (these refer to the number
of shares held by third parties).
Source: Grolsch Analyst Report, Fortis, February 23, 2007, p. 9 with additions by case writer based on Grolsch Annual Report
2007, pp. 35-37. Volumes (2000-2003) taken from Annual Report 2003, p. 5 and volumes (2004-2007) taken from
Annual Report 2007, p. 7.
16SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
Exhibit 5
Presentation to Investors showing Strategic Adaptation
Adapted focus
and growth target
Adapted
core markets
vision/mission
Expansive on-trade
policy
Adapted market
Adapted market position
Investments:Increases in
Marketing budgets, costs of
Development and investment Adapted brand strategy
in core market - Advertising campaign
Top-line:
Focus on growth
Adapted organizational in full-grown beer Adapted product
structure: Business teams, markets Proposition
innovation department, R&D -New design
brewery -New concepts
Bottom-line:
Adapted production Focus on cost Enhancing the efficiency
and internal logistics: structure and of the new facilities: Efficiency in
Flexible labor efficiency brewing process and efficiency
in filling lines
Decrease in cost price:
Decreases in Procurement, economic
overhead expenses alliances
Source: Grolsch IR Presentation, July 2006, Combined slides 24 and 26.
17SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
Exhibit 6
Range of Grolsch Products
Grolsch Premium Lager
Swingtop Bottle New Bottle Cans
Other Products
Amber Premium Premium Amsterdam Range
Ale Weizen Blonde
Source: Company Documents.
18SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
Exhibit 7
Historical International Expansion Timeline: Grolsch vs. Heineken
1976-Grolsch
Mid-1990s:
1946-Grolsch begins importers set up
1897-The Swingtop Push into Eastern
exporting to Egypt, in the US.
is introduced Europe & Latin America
Curaçao, Surinam, 1977-Importers
2007-SABMiller
GROLSCH
Gold Coast, India, set up in the UK Early 1990s
1615 Acquisition of
1876-Builds Sri Lanka, China, Acquisitions 2004-New Grolsch
Willem Neerfeldt 1922-Two breweries
a new brewery 1895-The De Groen Malta and Indonesia in Germany Factory
Starts brewing merge
family takes over & UK
In Grolle
HEINEKEN
Early 1980s-
1592-The first 1864-Gerard 1889-Heineken 1914-
Consistent 2000s-Buys
incamation of the Heineken buys the presented at Reach 1927-First 1935-Acquires 1954-New green 1970s-
colour is used. breweries in Latin America,
Haystack in Amsterdam Haystack brewery World Fair in Paris volumes of International breweries in label and logo Buys
Amstel Light Russia, Egypt & Lebanon,
is established 300,000hl acquisition in Egypt, Dutch East with the “smiling breweries
introduced to 2004-JV with Asia Pacific
Belgium Indies & Belgian e’s” in Europe,
US Breweries for China
Congo Opens new
1917-First
1939-Heineken 1948-Freddy brewery in
exports to Early 1990s-
goes public Heineken returns
Holland Push into
the US from 2 years 1968-Heineken
1932-Establishes Eastern
in the US as a merges with Amstel:
Malayan Breweries Europe.
manager at the 50% of the Dutch
with other investors: Mid 1990s:
company market and 70%
1933-Re-enters the Buys European
of exports
US after prohibition brands
Source: By case writer based on images and data from Grolsch and Heineken’s websites.
19SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
Exhibit 8
MABA Framework
Market Attractiveness (“MA”) Criteria
MARKET ATTRACTIVENESS (MA)
Volume of International Volume Growth of Price Differentiation
Premium Lager International Premium Between International
Measures Segement in Lager Segment in Premium Lager Distance
Hectolitres Hectolitres (last three Segment and Top
years) Lager Brand
Rated 1 to 5 RANGE: RANGE: RANGE: See the four distance
from 0 hl 0 hl 0% specific measures
to over 10 million hl over 1,000 hl over 40% below
DISTANCE SPECIFIC MEASURES
DISTANCE
Language EU Relation Transport in EUROS GDP per capita
MEASURES
Rated 1 to 5 RANGE: RANGE: RANGE: RANGE:
from languages based from non-western from over 1,500 euros from less than
from on other scripts country $10,000
to English, German or to EU country to less than 500 euros to over $25,000
to Dutch
Note: Each measure is rated from 1 to 5. The ranges are shown under each heading.
Source: Drawn by case writer. Based on company documents.
Business Assessment (“BA”) Criteria
BUSINESS ASSESSMENT (BA)
Volume of Grolsch Volume Growth of Variable Commercial Premium Lager
Premium Lager in Grolsch Premium Contribution in euros Segment Share of
Measures
Hectolitres Lager in Hectolitres per Hectolitre Grolsch Premium
(last five years) Lager
Rated 1 to 5 Measured in hl Measured in hl Measured in euros Measured in hl
Source: Drawn by case writer. Based on company documents.SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
Exhibit 9
MABA Input and Scores
2000 2006
UK Key Key
France Seeding Key
USA Key Key
Canada Key Key
Australia Key Key
New Zealand Key Key
Sweden Trading Seeding
Russia Seeding Seeding
Poland Key Trading
MABA Graph 2006
High
USA China
Canada
Russia
UK Spain
Market Attractiveness
Medium
Poland
Australia
France
Sweden
New Zealand
Low
Strong Average Weak
Business Assessment
Source: Company Documents.SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
Exhibit 10
Shipping Cost Estimates from Grolsch’s Enschede Plant
Estimates of Transport cost/hl by Country (in Euros)
18.00
16.52
16.00
14.00 13.39
12.06
12.00
10.54
10.00
8.43
8.00 6.68
6.10 5.93
6.00 5.47
4.21
4.00
1.94 1.60 1.47
2.00 0.63
-
L
d
lia
y
en
m
a
ce
a
nd
na
n
,N
K
an
an
ad
si
ai
S
iu
ra
U
an
ed
la
hi
us
al
U
am
Sp
m
lg
an
st
Po
C
Ze
Fr
Sw
er
R
Be
Au
C
rd
G
ew
te
ot
N
R
Source: Estimated by case writer based on different shipping formats.
Exhibit 11
Cultural Differences in Advertising: UK and US (in percentage)
TV Commercials for Beer: the US vs. the UK
Value US UK Rhetoric US UK
Individualism 70.8 15.8 Direct Speech 91.7 2.6
Modernity 45.8 0.0 Emotional/Sexual Appeal 78.9 8.1
Achievement 70.8 10.5 Humorous Appeal 21.1 91.9
Tradition 4.2 44.7 Special Occasion? 85.7 16.2
Eccentricity 4.2 81.6 (24 TV ads) (38 TV ads)
Source: Zahna Caillat and Barbara Mueller, "The Influence of Culture on American and British Advertising: An Exploratory
Comparison of Beer Advertising," Journal of Advertising Research, Vol. 36, 1996.SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally
Exhibit 12
Grolsch’s Distribution in Selected Markets
Country Distribution Agreements
United States 1976-1995 Imported under its own company, Grolsch Importers Inc. in Atlanta, Georgia
1996-2001 Sales, distribution and marketing by Canada's Seagram Company
2001-2006 Sales, distribution and marketing by United States Beverage (USB)
2006-present Sales, distribution and marketing by Anheuser-Busch
United Kingdom 1977-1979 Distribution by small independent UK-based distributor
1979-1994 Imported through its own company, Grolsch (UK) Ltd.
1994-2001 Joint venture with Bass Brewers to brew, distribute and market Grolsch
2001-present Joint venture partner changed to Coors
Canada 1984-1997 Distribution by Cordevin (later named Rymax)
1997-2002 Distribution by Rollick Beverage Company
2002-present License to brew, distribution and marketing by Sleeman
Germany 1991 Purchase of two regional breweries under a single structure (Rheinisch-Bergische
Brauerei)
1994 Sale of one of the breweries (Wickueler) to Brau and Brunnen
1994-present Distribution by Brau and Brunnen
Poland 1995 Acquisition of indirect stake in Elbrewery (EB) and Hevelius Brewery
1996 Purchase of 25% of Australian equity firm Brewpole (which owned 51% of EB and
Hevelius Brewery. The other 49% was owned by the Polish government)
1998 Sale of its 25% stake of Brewpole
1998-2003 Distribution by Brewpole
2003-present Distribution by Carey Agri
Russia 1999 Investment of €115,000 in the building of a new brewery in Ufa, Bashkortostan
2000 Sale of stake in the brewery
2006-present Alliance with Efes to brew and distribute the Amsterdam brand
Portugal 2000-present Distribution by Sumolis' unit Cereuro
2001 Purchase of a 20% stake in Cereuro
2005 Sale of stake in Cereuro
Australia/NZ 1985-1991 Distribution by S. Smith and Son
1991-1998 Distribution by Cascade Brewery Co Ltd.
1998-2006 Distribution by Tucker Seabrook
2006-2007 Distribution by New Zealand's Independent Liquor
2007-present Distribution by Premium Beverages
France 1999-present Distribution under its own company, Bières d'Europe with a focus on the Amsterdam
brand
Source: Created by case writers.SM-1529-E Grolsch: Growing Globally Exhibit 13 Top 20 Countries Consumption TOP 20 COUNTRIES CONSUMPTION 2000-2011F 000s hectolitres 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006F 2008F 2011F CHINA 223,116 227,145 241,420 255,626 286,348 309,255 330,039 368,326 426,382 USA 235,047 236,654 239,676 237,484 234,969 232,582 230,721 225,901 220,522 GERMANY 103,309 101,042 100,564 97,183 95,639 94,994 94,200 93,094 91,232 BRAZIL 81,836 83,880 84,850 82,876 85,494 90,623 94,248 100,474 108,724 RUSSIA 55,174 62,987 70,713 76,252 84,790 90,225 95,650 105,257 115,908 JAPAN 71,764 71,547 69,780 65,817 66,344 63,708 63,106 60,562 56,063 UK 58,550 58,250 58,750 59,120 58,999 57,674 58,060 57,505 56,500 MEXICO 50,297 50,939 51,183 53,311 54,684 57,133 59,373 63,540 68,626 SPAIN 29,153 31,083 30,870 33,450 34,621 35,590 36,480 38,065 40,792 POLAND 25,072 25,204 27,121 28,318 28,865 30,363 31,650 33,800 36,000 SOUTH AFRICA 23,481 23,015 23,349 24,050 24,940 25,600 26,638 28,000 30,500 VENEZUELA 18,100 19,910 17,550 15,334 21,234 22,565 23,852 25,748 28,575 CANADA 20,709 21,213 21,335 21,491 22,094 22,178 22,535 23,020 23,739 UKRAINE 10,392 12,247 14,043 15,701 17,490 21,503 24,133 27,888 32,591 FRANCE 21,467 20,807 20,629 21,168 20,224 20,354 20,252 20,009 19,711 THAILAND 10,664 11,720 12,682 15,788 16,191 17,290 18,417 20,950 24,675 ITALY 16,258 16,672 16,330 17,440 17,194 17,262 17,318 17,492 17,755 COLOMBIA 15,498 14,288 15,313 15,217 15,553 17,006 17,762 19,569 21,352 AUSTRALIA 17,400 17,300 17,150 17,000 16,900 16,850 16,800 16,550 16,250 SOUTH KOREA 16,499 17,787 18,274 17,722 17,629 16,663 16,533 16,483 16,475 TOTAL TOP 20 1,103,786 1,123,689 1,151,581 1,170,347 1,220,203 1,259,418 1,297,767 1,362,233 1,452,373 Source: Canadean, Oct. 2006.
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