Greenland's Project Independence
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
NO. 10 JANUARY 2021 Introduction Greenland’s Project Independence Ambitions and Prospects after 300 Years with the Kingdom of Denmark Michael Paul An important anniversary is coming up in the Kingdom of Denmark: 12 May 2021 marks exactly three hundred years since the Protestant preacher Hans Egede set sail, with the blessing of the Danish monarch, to missionise the island of Greenland. For some Greenlanders that date symbolises the end of their autonomy: not a date to celebrate but an occasion to declare independence from Denmark, after becoming an autonomous territory in 2009. Just as controversial as Egede’s statue in the capital Nuuk was US President Donald Trump’s offer to purchase the island from Denmark. His arrogance angered Greenlanders, but also unsettled them by exposing the shaky foundations of their independence ambitions. In the absence of governmental and economic preconditions, leaving the Realm of the Danish Crown would appear to be a decidedly long-term option. But an ambitious new prime minister in Nuuk could boost the independence process in 2021. Only one political current in Greenland, tice to finances. “In the Law on Self-Govern- the populist Partii Naleraq of former Prime ment the Danes granted us the right to take Minister Hans Enoksen, would like to over thirty-two sovereign responsibilities. declare independence imminently – on And in ten years we have taken on just one National Day (21 June) 2021, the anniver- of them, oversight over resources.” Many sary of the granting of self-government people just like to talk about independence, within Denmark in 2009. Most of the popu- he says, but not to work for it. Kleist fears lation would prefer to see a more gradual that the next generation will remain trapped process of separation. Greenland does not in a mindset of dependency. yet appear ready for independence. That Kim Kielsen, prime minister since 2014, opinion is shared by Kuupik Kleist, the first underlines the long-term goal of independ- prime minister from the Inuit Ataqatigiit ence. Significant electoral losses in 2018 party, who led the territory into self-govern- notwithstanding, the governing Siumut ment in 2009. Kleist notes that Denmark party’s victory and his re-election were re- only wanted to retain control over foreign garded as affirmation of the political leader- and security policy, and Greenlanders have ship’s cautious course in the independence long had the opportunity to take control of process. The main reason cited for restraint all internal affairs, from policing and jus- is the island’s financial dependency. Kielsen
sees strengthening the economy and fur- Europe and North America can dependably
ther reducing its reliance on Denmark as land, namely Kangerlussuaq. Rather than
the central concern. But on 29 November repairing damage to the runway there
2020 he lost the Siumut (“Forwards”) leader- caused by thawing permafrost, Greenland’s
ship to Erik Jensen. Jensen intends to cam- government plans instead to extend the
paign more energetically for independence runways at the two regional airports –
and is also likely to replace Kielsen as prime near Nuuk and at the attractive coastal
minister when parliament reconvenes for tourist destination of Ilulissat – to allow
its first session of 2021. international flights to land there from
Achieving Greenlandic statehood is a 2023. Qaqortoq in southern Greenland,
tricky process. But national borders in the which like most of the territory’s airstrips
Arctic also transect the transnational settle- currently handles only helicopters, is also
ment areas of indigenous populations. The to be turned into a regional airport.
Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) for exam- This unspectacular airport project is a
ple represents groups in Alaska, Canada, highly sensitive matter in several respects:
Greenland and Chukotka. Greenland’s domestically as an important step towards
population is 56,081 (as of 1 January2020), the economic development required for in-
almost 90 percent of whom are Inuit. Green- dependence; externally as a warning sign
land’s self-government is thus part of the of impending dependency on China; and
transnational Inuit community, while at in terms of security as a symbol of defence
the same time Greenland is striving to be- cooperation with the United States. While
come a state in the traditional sense with Copenhagen naturally wants to retain
full formal – and thus also foreign policy – Greenland in the Danish realm, it must also
sovereignty. The latter is an important fund the territory’s steps towards independ-
factor for Nuuk, because enhanced inter- ence. Denying assistance would cost Den-
national status is associated with the ability mark the support of Greenland’s population,
to attract external investment. Copenhagen and ultimately its geopolitical status as an
has to tolerate this ambivalent stance, while Arctic state. The issues are broader than
at the same time attempting to influence simply promoting and developing elements
the separation process. Much will therefore of Greenlandic statehood. Denmark needs
depend on whether and how the conflicts to find ways of dealing with its intractable
of goals on both sides can be resolved. security dilemma: it cannot preserve the
island’s sovereignty on its own – but ced-
ing effective control to the United States
Infrastructure and Foreign Policy would be the end of Denmark as Arctic
state. The latter appears particularly un-
Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmus- palatable at a juncture where great power
sen visited Greenland’s capital in person rivalry in the region is growing and the
in September 2018, to present a financial security situation deteriorating.
package to expand the airports at Nuuk and As a major infrastructure project, the
Ilulissat and otherwise promote the domes- airport projects fall under the auspices of
tic economy. Rasmussen hoped to resolve the regional government, which controls
two problems simultaneously, i.e. providing most aspects of political and economic life
Nuuk with the funding required for these under the Act on Greenland Self-Govern-
projects and allaying Washington’s fears ment of 2009. Copenhagen retains control
that excessive Chinese investment could only over foreign and security policy – and
leave Greenland overly dependent on Bei- regarded the project as security-relevant.
jing. The issue of concern was the China Com-
Greenland has no railways, few roads, munications Construction Company (CCCC),
and currently only one international air- which appeared on the Greenland Interna-
port at which wide-body jets from Asia, tional Airports shortlist of possible partners
SWP Comment 10
January 2021
2Map
for financing and building the airports. ing – which represents about 95 percent of
CCCC is involved in Belt and Road projects Greenland’s exports – and tourism making
through which Beijing seeks to expand its up the shortfall. But resource extraction
global influence. Denmark fears that Chi- could do so. Greenland’s reserves of rare
nese engagement could endanger its Green- earths, which are vital for a range of high-
land-related defence cooperation with the tech applications, are sufficient to meet
United States. Earlier, in 2016, Copenhagen current global demand for 150 years. The
blocked an attempt by the Chinese General island also possesses metal ores and hydro-
Nice Group to acquire the former US naval carbon deposits.
base in Grønnedal, following an interven- Although external investment is vital
tion by Washington. for independence, Nuuk wishes to avoid
The Greenland government sees the air- excessive dependency on foreign firms. A
ports as a question of infrastructure rather government strategy document seeks to
than security. Economic diversification and improve conditions for mining companies
investments are vital if they are to achieve while maximising socio-economic benefits
independence. While Nuuk possesses the for the population.
right to independence under the autonomy When tourists and investors land at the
agreement, it cannot yet afford to exercise new airports in a few years time, the rev-
it. Denmark funds almost half of Green- enues and capital they bring could help to
land’s public budget, through an annual realise independence. But numerous ob-
block grant of almost €500 million; that stacles remain to be overcome. For example
would cease in the event of independence. resource extraction is a responsibility of the
There is no prospect of revenues from fish- Greenland government, but where uranium
SWP Comment 10
January 2021
3is involved there are implications for the they are required for cutting-edge technol-
Kingdom as a whole. Uranium mining and ogies such as motors for electric vehicles,
Chinese investment raise fundamental ques- for high-performance magnets and for net-
tions over what “security” means in and for worked Industry 4.0 applications. All these
Denmark, and thus touch on Copenhagen’s technologies also have military applications,
residual rights. Copenhagen finds itself in making them crucial for the functioning of
the tricky position of having to balance and modern networked armed forces.
stabilise the relationship with its former Major rare earth reserves are believed to
colony – which is already historically bur- exist in Kringlerne and Kvanefjeld in south-
dened and complicated by the independ- ern Greenland. The Australian Greenland
ence issue – in the context of interest- Minerals and Energy (GME), in which the
driven rivalry between great powers. Chinese Shenghe Resources holds a stake,
also intends to mine uranium there. But
the signing of a cooperation agreement
Greenland and the between Shenghe and the China National
Sino-American Rivalry Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) in 2019 led the
opposition Inuit Ataqatigiit party to raise
Nuuk has proactively encouraged a Chinese critical questions concerning the content of
presence in Greenland; like his predecessor the agreement, the environmental impact
Aleqa Hammond, Prime Minister Kielsen has and Chinese interests. Currently three suc-
tried to attract foreign involvement in Green- cessive environmental impact assessments
land’s mining industry, while other political have rejected rare earth and uranium min-
forces expressed reservations over – and in ing although a majority of Greenland’s par-
the case of uranium mining rejected – liament supports mining. The aforemen-
such investments. In October 2017 he led a tioned General Nice Group also holds the
delegation to Beijing, presumably lobbying rights to a mine at Isua in the west, and a
for investments. zinc mine is planned at Citronen Fjord in
But Beijing is interested in Greenland the extreme north, for which the Australian
for both economic and strategic reasons. It firm Ironbark has signed an agreement
regards the island as a potential hub in its with China Nonferrous Metal.
Belt and Road project. A paper by Chinese The island’s rich resources and strategic
Arctic researchers discussed the prospect location have led the United States to make
that the “small and weak Greenland nation” formal purchase offers several times, in 1867,
could become “the most important link 1946/47 and 1960. So President Trump’s
for successful realisation of the Polar Silk idea of buying Greenland and its popula-
Road”. In this context US Secretary of State tion from Denmark in “a large real estate
Mike Pompeo – like Danish Prime Minister deal” was not entirely new. Alongside its
Rasmussen – pointed to China’s actions in major reserves of rare earths, Greenland’s
the Indo-Pacific region, where governments strategic significance for the United States
became “ensnared by debt and corruption”. has been underlined by Russian missile de-
But such a strategy is not yet discernible in velopments, specifically hypersonic weapons.
the Arctic. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen,
Greenland possesses large reserves of who took over from Rasmussen in June
rare earths. The global market is dominated 2019, rejected Trump’s proposal as
by China, which possesses a market share “absurd”. Greenland’s Prime Minister
of more than 80 percent and controls practi- Kielsen declared that Greenland was not for
cally the entire supply chain in an “extreme sale, a sentiment echoed on the Twitter
example of Western reliance on Chinese account of the territory’s foreign ministry:
production”. The United States currently “We’re open for business, not for sale.”
imports most of its rare earths from China. Quite apart from the intricacies of interna-
Global demand for these metals is rising; tional law, under the Act on Greenland
SWP Comment 10
January 2021
4Self-Government it would be for Nuuk tained by local firms from 2024), the agree-
(rather than Copenhagen) to decide whether ment is of great value to Nuuk because it
Greenland should become part of the treats Greenland as a foreign policy actor.
United States. Despite her firm rejection, In 2020 Washington opened a diplomatic
Frederiksen assured Washington that representation in Nuuk after a hiatus of al-
Denmark would welcome “increased most seven decades, and offered a financial
strategic cooperation in the Arctic”, which package worth US$12.1 million to develop
can be read as an open admission of secu- Greenland’s resources, tourism and educa-
rity dependencies on Washington. tion (although most of the money is ear-
Greenland and specifically the Thule Air marked for American consultancy services).
Base are indeed exceptionally important The US offers met with little support
for the United States. From the geostrategic and tended to be regarded as an attempt
perspective Greenland forms one of North to undermine Danish-Greenland relations
America’s extremities; the importance rather than a genuine offer of support.
of the island’s dominant dimension in the Trump’s offer to buy Greenland ultimately
Arctic Ocean for Washington has only spurred the Danish parliament to think
grown as Greenland seeks independence about creating a better future for Greenland
and China’s presence expands. Additionally within the Danish realm.
almost all Russian reconnaissance flights
over the North Atlantic pass across or close
to Greenland, which lies on the shortest Lost Homeland or Treasure Island?
flight path from Russia’s Western Military Ambivalent Consequences of
District to the American East Coast (the same Climate Change
applies to missiles). The facilities located at
Thule include the largest and most northerly The loss of the polar sea ice has multiple glo-
of America’s ballistic missile early warning bal impacts of its own. Even more dramatic
installations, part of its global satellite con- will be the consequences of the melting of
trol network and its northernmost deep-sea the ice sheet that covers about 80 percent of
port. Greenland also forms the western end Greenland’s land surface; more than three
of the “GIUK Gap”, the choke point between kilometres thick in places, it represents one
Greenland, Iceland and the northern extrem- of the world’s largest reservoirs of fresh
ity of the United Kingdom through which water. Between 2002 and 2016 Greenland
ships and submarines of the Russian North- lost ice at an average rate of about 280 bil-
ern Fleet have to pass to enter the Atlantic. lion tonnes/year, and the speed of loss
Crucial civilian and military maritime infra- has quadrupled since then. Greenland’s ice
structure (undersea cables) lies south of the sheet is currently the largest single contribu-
GIUK Gap and the Labrador Sea. tor to the global rise in sea level. A further
In 2017 Greenland’s Foreign and Indus- acceleration was reported in 2020.
try Minister Vittus Qujaukitsoq demanded A survey in August 2019 found that about
renegotiation of the agreement that grants 92 percent of Greenlanders believe that
Washington sovereignty over Thule Air climate change is real, and 76 percent said
Base (Pituffik); it was time, he said, for Green- they noticed the effects in their everyday
land to regain its “security autonomy” life. Three out of four families said they
(which it never actually had). In a trilateral lived from hunting, and more than half
agreement in October 2020 the United States, feared that climate change would harm their
Denmark and Greenland declared that the livelihood; almost half thought fishing
security and prosperity of all three parties would also be affected. Some Inuit feel fear
will continue to depend on strong transat- and sadness when confronted – sometimes
lantic cooperation, for which the Thule daily – with the habitat losses. In that sense,
base is of central importance. As well as the environmental harm has triggered a cul-
economic benefits (the base is to be main- tural catastrophe: The preservation and
SWP Comment 10
January 2021
5long-term protection of the living resources Cruise ship visits are also expected to con-
on which life in the Arctic has always tribute to growth, but must exhibit “the
depended lies at the heart of Inuit culture. utmost consideration for the fragile, natu-
It is paradoxical that some fear and ral environment, local cultures and cultural
others even welcome the effects of global remains”, as the Association of Arctic Ex-
warming: “The faster the glaciers melt, the pedition Cruise Operators (AECO) puts it.
more attention our country gets”, said for- On the other hand Greenland can probably
mer industry minister Jens-Erik Kirkegaard, thank its small visitor numbers for its cur-
declaring the island a beneficiary of en- rently relatively low incidence of Covid-19.
vironmental change. Climate change, he Finance Minister Qujaukitsoq wishes
says, is like free advertising because it is to see investment and tourism promoting
getting easier to attract capital. Halibut and Greenland’s development regardless where
cod mature more quickly in the warming the funds come from: China, the United
waters, and the grass-growing season in the States or Canada. The important thing, he
south of the island is longer, reducing the says, is better training and more jobs. Ulti-
need to import sheep feed. Global warming mately, he adds, an independent Greenland
is causing change already, even if it is likely will remain a member of NATO and not –
to be decades before Greenland becomes like Djibouti in Africa – host military bases
the “green land” the Vikings dreamt of. for rival powers like China.
Alternatively, a “green growth” strategy
could develop environmentally sustainable
economic sectors. Greenland’s Industry and Rights for Greenland and Security
Energy Minister Jess Svane (since May 2020 for the Whole Kingdom
Minister for the Labour Market, Research
and Environment) announced plans to turn Greenland and the Faroe Islands still belong
meltwater from the ice sheet into drinking to Denmark. But both already enjoy exten-
water for export. The power of the melt- sive self-administration and remain by their
water could also be harnessed to generate own choice outside the EU. While they are
clean electricity for energy-intensive com- not entitled to pursue absolutely autono-
puting centres. The Arctic climate makes mous foreign and security policies, they can
the High North as a whole an ideal location maintain their own international contacts
for innovative technologies and services, providing these do not contradict the offi-
as the European Commission recognised cial Danish line. Erik Jensen, new leader of
in 2016: “Harsh climatic conditions and Siumut and probably the next prime minis-
the fragile environment require specialised ter from 2021, intends to plough more en-
technology and know-how to meet high ergy into independence than his predeces-
environmental standards. Opportunities in sor Kielsen. He also plans to take more re-
the ‘Green Economy’, such as sustainable sponsibilities from Copenhagen; concretely
multi-source energy systems, eco-tourism that means veterinary controls, immigra-
and low-emission food production, could tion, shipping and greater responsibility for
be developed further.” The Commission foreign policy.
wants to support the search for sustainable As a sovereign state Greenland could
economic alternatives, naming explicitly still continue cooperation with Denmark in
“‘Blue Economy’ sectors such as aquacul- questions of defence and foreign policy, as
ture, fisheries, offshore renewable energy, well as financial policy. Copenhagen would
maritime tourism and marine biotechnol- have an interest in that, because Greenland
ogy”. Energy can be a growth sector in is the key to Denmark’s access to the Arctic
Greenland (as in Iceland); the availability with all its resources and attributes: miner-
of geothermal and hydro power back up als, fishing grounds, oil and gas, power and
that expectation. international recognition. In order to main-
tain the status associated with this, Copen-
SWP Comment 10
January 2021
6hagen will have to invest more in protect- European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA).
ing and defending its rights. While EMSA data allows identification of
As the Arctic polar sea ice melts shipping oil spills for example, it cannot locate a sur-
traffic has been increasing. Since 2006 there face vessel or submarine determined to con-
has also been a growing number of vessels ceal its presence.
entering Danish-controlled waters without Growing Russian military activity in the
observing the usual protocols. In August region has led a number of states to demon-
2017 the Chinese ice-breaker Xue Long (Snow stratively expand their presence in support
Dragon) appeared unannounced off the capi- of the Nordic NATO members. In August
tal Nuuk. Cases of piracy, illegal fishing or 2020, the USS Thomas Hudner became the
terrorism have not yet come to light. But first Arleigh Burke class destroyer to enter
how should maritime security be ensured the deep fjord behind Nuuk; in the same
as shipping traffic increases? month Danish and French warships con-
The Royal Danish Navy possesses three ducted joint exercises with a USCG vessel
ice-breakers and serves as Greenland’s coast- off Greenland’s west coast. In September
guard. The forces in Greenland currently Denmark conducted joint manoeuvres in
operate one aircraft, four helicopters and the Barents Sea with the United States, the
four ships (as well as the legendary Sirius United Kingdom and Norway. In the first
Dog Sled Patrol) – to guard the world’s such operation for twenty years, naval
largest island with 44,000 kilometres of forces demonstrated freedom of navigation
coastline. With these personnel and re- above the Arctic Circle. On 1 October 2020
sources, they also have to defend the sover- an operational coordination arrangement
eignty of the realm, monitor fisheries, pro- came into effect between NATO’s Maritime
vide maritime services, transport patients Command (MARCOM) and the Danish Joint
and assist with other social services, and Arctic Command (JACO) in Greenland; its
conduct search and rescue (SAR) missions. purposes include exchanging situation
The SAR deficits in the Arctic are consider- reports and enhancing cooperation. JACO
able. What had been less well known until was founded in October 2012. It functions
recently was how weak the land, air and sea as the connection point between the Danish
reconnaissance capabilities are, despite the armed forces and the Greenland authori-
US base in Thule. “Things start to get pretty ties; its headquarters is in Nuuk.
dark once you get up higher than 72 de- Denmark has to pursue a delicate balance
grees north,” said former U.S. Coast Guard between its own scarce military resources
Commandant Admiral Paul Zukunft. A and the comprehensive support offered by
patrol had “stumbled upon a joint exercise its allies. An independent Greenland will
between Russia and China”, of which the not be able to defend itself on its own. Co-
intelligence services had remained unaware penhagen relies on support from Washing-
on account of the lack of satellite surveil- ton but has to avoid any appearance that
lance. A proposal to resume the “Greenland it is allowing its policies to be dictated by
Patrol” established by the US Coastguard in Washington. Trump’s offer exacerbated
1941, made in a blog of the U.S. Naval Insti- that problem because his idea is a “abso-
tute, is certainly justifiable. Future US aid, lutely radical break” with the post-1945
the author recommends, should be ear- status quo. “When small nations wake up
marked for port infrastructure to enable to the world’s superpower threatening to
them to receive US Coast Guard (USCG) unroot that relation, it’s not something
vessels if the need arises. to take lightly,” the Danish expert Martin
Copenhagen intends to increase its mili- Breum explained.
tary spending in Greenland, beginning with
1.5 billion Danish crowns for maritime
surveillance in 2019. Possessing no satellites
of its own, Denmark uses the services of the
SWP Comment 10
January 2021
7Outlook significant repercussions for Denmark’s
foreign and security policy. But the decision
Greenland will remain in some form of will ultimately be made in Nuuk.
union with Denmark for the foreseeable
future. One reason for Copenhagen to sup-
port granting Asian states observer status in
the Arctic Council was to make it easier to
find investors for Greenland and the Faroe
Islands. That in turn improves its relation-
ship with the two autonomous territories
© Stiftung Wissenschaft and weakens the centrifugal forces. These
und Politik, 2021 intentions are subsidiary to Denmark’s cen-
All rights reserved tral foreign policy objective: avoiding harm
to its relationships with the United States
This Comment reflects
and with the European Union, and to its
the author’s views.
own privileged position in the Arctic. The
The online version of new trilateral agreement for the US base
this publication contains in Thule is suited to further these interests.
functioning links to other Additionally to the ambitions of the
SWP texts and other relevant
“near-Arctic state” China and established
sources.
Arctic power Russia, Denmark’s problems
SWP Comments are subject ultimately include the associated reawaken-
to internal peer review, fact- ing of US interest in Greenland. Copenhagen
checking and copy-editing. has to balance conflicting internal interests
For further information on and – for all its understanding of the
our quality control pro-
desire for independence of its territories –
cedures, please visit the SWP
website: https://www.swp- safeguard its own foreign policy and secu-
berlin.org/en/about-swp/ rity interests. Trump’s initiative increased
quality-management-for- the price of continuing security coopera-
swp-publications/ tion. But the success of the Thule Agree-
ment indicates the possibility that an inde-
SWP
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
pendent Greenland could continue defence
Politik cooperation with the United States without
German Institute for that country (or Canada) necessarily sup-
International and planting Denmark as protector.
Security Affairs Nuuk (and Torshavn) are in the comfort-
able situation of being courted from mul-
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
10719 Berlin tiple quarters. Erik Jensen, the likely next
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 prime minister of Greenland, also wants to
Fax +49 30 880 07-100 promote independence by trading with all
www.swp-berlin.org nations, including both the United States
swp@swp-berlin.org
and China. Denmark will seek to control
ISSN 1861-1761
the centrifugal forces, allowing Nuuk to
doi: 10.18449/2021C10 become more independent while remaining
part of the Danish realm. Copenhagen knows
Translation by Meredith Dale it depends on Greenland for its seat on the
Arctic Council, and the associated interest
(English version
of the major powers. Further progress to-
of SWP-Aktuell 2/2021)
wards independence would therefore have
Dr. Michael Paul is Senior Fellow in the International Security Research Division at SWP.
SWP Comment 10
January 2021
8You can also read
