GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community - Tech Industry Engagement - Lydia Khalil
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GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement Lydia Khalil GNET is a special project delivered by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King’s College London.
The author of this report is Lydia Khalil, Research Fellow, Lowy Institute. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Dr Maura Conway for her advice in the development of the survey questions, J. M. Berger for his insights, Lowy colleagues Natasha Kassam and Alex Oliver for sharing their experiences and insights from their experience developing surveys, and Dr Matteo Vergani for his input on the survey questions. This report would not be possible without the engagement of the many researchers and experts who responded to the survey despite the incessant demands on their time and resources. Any flaws in the survey design or analysis are strictly the author’s own. The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) is an academic research initiative backed by the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), an independent but industry‑funded initiative for better understanding, and counteracting, terrorist use of technology. GNET is convened and led by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), an academic research centre based within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing those, either expressed or implied, of GIFCT, GNET or ICSR. CONTACT DETAILS For questions, queries and additional copies of this report, please contact: ICSR King’s College London Strand London WC2R 2LS United Kingdom T. +44 20 7848 2098 E. mail@gnet‑research.org Twitter: @GNET_research Like all other GNET publications, this report can be downloaded free of charge from the GNET website at www.gnet‑research.org. © GNET
GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
Executive Summary
W
hat role does technology, particularly computer‑mediated
communications, play in violent extremism? This is the
animating question driving the Global Network on Extremism
and Technology (GNET) as a research‑tech industry initiative.
Since extremist actors have been some of the earliest adopters of
the Internet and recognised its potential as a communications and
mobilisation tool, researchers have been grappling with answering
questions related to the role of technology and extremism for decades,
but particularly since the advent of Islamic State and the growth in
violent extremism motivated by right‑wing ideologies, as well as the
rapid emergence of violent conspiratorial extremist movements, such
as QAnon, that was largely facilitated by the Internet.
To compliment past literature reviews on the role of Internet technology
and extremism, to gain a current understanding of the research
community’s findings that may not be included in previously reviewed
literature and to understand the academic research community’s level
of engagement with the tech industry, the Lowy Institute conducted
a survey among researchers of terrorism and violent extremism on
facets of this core question.
The findings of the survey reveal that there is a great deal of consensus
within the research community that Internet enabled communications
and social media platforms “support, encourage or mobilise real
world harm.” However, according to the responses to more detailed
survey questions, parsing the role of technology on violent extremism
is incredibly complex, multifaceted and still contested.
Survey responses to questions about researchers’ engagement
with the tech industry revealed that this is a potentially fruitful but
also fraught space – much in the same way there remain dilemmas
and considerations around collaboration with governments and
security agencies among the terrorism research community and
concerns around the securitisation of academic research. A number
of responses indicated a cynicism about tech industry engagement
with the academic community and a number of concerns including
the opacity and lack of transparency of major platforms, their reactive
nature, differing research priorities to industry and scepticism around
how seriously and effectively social media platforms are tackling violent
extremism and harmful disinformation.
1Contents
1 Introduction 5
2 Exploring the Role of Extremism and Technology 11
What the Literature Says 11
Limitations and Data 13
3 Survey 15
Role of the Internet and social media on extremism 17
Researcher Engagement with the Tech Industry 28
4 Conclusion 33
Policy Landscape 35
34
GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
1 Introduction
W
hat role does technology, particularly computer‑mediated
communications, play in violent extremism? This is such a
broad question that it practically begs for follow‑ups, such
as what role does the Internet, including social media, play in the
radicalisation process? Has the use of social media increased the
production and exposure to violent extremist content and narratives,
and does this exposure radicalise individuals to violence? Does
the use of computer‑mediated communications and social media
platforms make it easier to recruit or mobilise individuals to join
violent extremist causes? Is there something about the technologies
and platforms themselves – their design, logic, affordances and
limitations – that contributes to and facilitates extremism? Does the
precise role of technology depend on the type of extremist ideology
or organisational structure of a particular movement, or indeed the
gender or background of an individual? How does Internet technology
and computer‑mediated communications facilitate relationships
or develop online social ecologies that contribute to extremism?
Even if an individual comes to espouse extremist beliefs via online
exposure to extremist narratives and content or participation in online
subcultures, does that then necessarily lead to violence, militancy or
other offline harms?
These questions are by no means exhaustive or new. Since extremist
actors have been some of the earliest adopters of the Internet and
recognised its potential as a communications and mobilisation tool,
researchers have been grappling with these and similar questions
around the role of technology and extremism for decades, but
particularly since the advent of Islamic State, as its rapid rise, global
reach and adept use of social media challenged terrorism researchers
and counter‑terrorism officials alike.
We are now in a similar moment with the growth in violent extremism
motivated by right‑wing ideologies and conspiracies. There has
been a 205% increase in far right terrorism in the past five years,1
as well as the rapid emergence of violent conspiratorial extremist
movements, namely QAnon, facilitated by the Internet. While some
claim that the fear of QAnon may be overblown,2 the conspiracy
movement has been labelled as a domestic extremist threat by the
FBI3 and has been the motivation for a number of recent violent
attacks.4 During the coronavirus pandemic, many people have lived
under a cloud of anxiety and insecurity, while also spending copious
amounts of time online. The rise in Internet usage has prompted
1 Global Terrorism Index (2020), Institute for Economics and Peace, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/global-
terrorism-index-2020-the-ten-countries-most-impacted-by-terrorism/
2 CIVIQS (2021) “QAnon Support, Registered Voters” live survey, https://civiqs.com/results/qanon_support?unce
rtainty=true&annotations=true&zoomIn=true
3 Jana Winter (2019) “FBI document warns that conspiracy theories are a new domestic terrorism threat”,
Yahoo News, https://news.yahoo.com/fbi-documents-conspiracy-theories-terrorism-160000507.html
4 Amarnath Amarasingham and Marc-André Argentino (July 2020) “The QAnon Conspiracy Theory: A Security
Threat in the Making?” CTC Sentinel vol. 13 no. 7: pp.37–41, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-qanon-conspiracy-
theory-a-security-threat-in-the-making/
5GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
concerns, as yet unsubstantiated, that this has increased the
risk of radicalisation online, or at least of the exposure to extremist
content online.5
Dr Maura Conway facilitated this conversation around the role of
technology in violent extremism in 2017 with her article, “Determining
the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism:
Six Suggestions for Progressing Research”.6 In it she describes
how the terrorism research community grapples with the role of the
Internet. But as Dr Conway noted at the time, there is “insufficient
substantive empirically grounded social science research [that] has
been undertaken to date in order to allow us to convincingly answer
these questions”.7
There are still few definitive answers, but since the article’s publication,
the extremism and terrorism research community has made progress
in answering questions around the role of the Internet, causality and
the affordances that particular technologies or platforms provide to
violent extremist actors. There has been a great deal of new research
into the role of the Internet and other technologies in extremism and
terrorism in the past five years. There has been greater collaboration
among data scientists and terrorism researchers from the social
sciences. There is now more attention paid in the field of Internet
studies to extremism and terrorism – in a similar fashion to when
media and communications studies and social psychology also
interacted with terrorism studies.
The very establishment of the Global Network on Extremism and
Technology, and the greater willingness of the tech industry to
acknowledge, however haltingly, that their platforms and technologies
are not only exploited by extremist actors but that their affordances
have contributed to the rapid spread of extremist ideologies, has
progressed our understanding.8 Mainstream platforms are now
grappling with their role in the creation of extremist online milieus9
and their contribution to the changing nature of extremism and
its organisational structure.10 Industry is also more engaged with
work coming from the violent extremism research community.
The growing body of evidence does indeed demonstrate Internet
technology can be an important factor in facilitating extremism. At the
same time, there is an acknowledgement that we need to dig more
deeply into what that exactly means for such a broad conclusion to
make any kind of useful sense. There has emerged a more nuanced
understanding that Internet technology, while not necessarily causing
violent extremism, can have multiple and various roles in facilitating
radicalisation and mobilisation to violent extremism.11
5 Caleb Spencer (2020) “Children may have been radicalised during lockdown”, BBC News, https://www.bbc.
com/news/uk-wales-53082476
6 Maura Conway (2017) “Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Six
Suggestions for Progressing Research”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism vol. 40 no. 1: pp.77–98, DOI:
10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157408
7 Ibid.
8 Mason Youngblood (2020) “Extremist ideology as a complex contagion: the spread of far-right radicalization
in the United States between 2005 and 2017”, Humanities and Social Science Communications vol. 7 no. 1:
pp.1–10, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-020-00546-3
9 Department of Security Studies and Criminology (2020) “Mapping Networks and Narratives of Online Right-
Wing Extremists in New South Wales”, http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4071472
10 Bruce Hoffman and Colin Clarke (2020) “The Growing Irrelevance of Organizational Structure of Domestic
Terrorism”, The Cipher Brief, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/united-states/the-next-american-terrorist
11 Paul Gill, Emily Corner, Amy Thornton and Maura Conway (2015) “What are the roles of the internet in terrorism?
Measuring online behaviours of convicted UK terrorists”, VOXPol Network of Excellence, https://www.voxpol.eu/
download/vox-pol_publication/What-are-the-Roles-of-the-Internet-in-Terrorism.pdf
6GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
Additionally, we now understand that there is “no easy online and
offline dichotomy” when it comes to actual violent behaviours
motivated by extremist beliefs.12 Furthermore, instead of
conceptualising ‘online radicalisation’ writ large, there is a greater
awareness that Internet technologies have different roles in the
extremism process and that these technologies afford various uses
and allow for various actions.13
There is also an awareness that the role of technology in
radicalisation and mobilisation to violence has shifted over the
decades alongside advances in technology itself. The shift from
static websites and closed forums to public social networking sites
back to alt‑tech platforms and skulking in the ‘dark web’ or ‘deep
web’14 by extremist actors has significantly changed the role of the
Internet and other technologies related to extremism, depending on
the affordances of each platform or technology. Current technology
that did not exist in previous years, such as end‑to‑end encryption
messaging services and drone technology, has impacted the tactics,
communications and operations of extremist actors. Further advances
in technology will prompt similar shifts. As David Benson notes in
his article examining whether the Internet has led to an increase
in transnational terrorism, “Since the Internet is ubiquitous, it would
be strange if today’s terrorists did not use the Internet, just as it
would be strange if past terrorists did not use the postal service
or telephones.”15 Just as advances in technology shift every aspect
of our lives, so too will they impact extremism and terrorism.
Until recently, there was an understanding that Internet technology
is a “facilitative tool”: radicalisation to violence, recruitment,
mobilisation and attack planning could be aided but were not
necessarily dependent on the Internet; nor did the Internet cause
radicalisation.16 That may still be the case. However, during the
pandemic, and particularly after the Capitol Siege in the United
States, concerns about the causality of Internet technology gained
new urgency. The Capitol Siege brought together a wide array of
networks, groups and individuals, from organised militant groups
to individual QAnon believers and pro‑Trump activists, who all
believed in the ‘Big Lie’, perpetuated and spread largely as online
disinformation, that the US presidential election was fraudulent.
The ground for the Capitol Siege was laid for months on online
forums by a variety of established extremist groups17 and the
disinformation around the election process and election results was
awash in the open Internet and mainstream social media platforms.18
Social media also featured prominently as the Siege was conducted:
a preliminary report by George Washington University’s Program on
12 Paul Gill, Emily Corner, Maura Conway, Amy Thornton, Mia Bloom and John Horgan (2017) “Terrorist Use of the
Internet by the Numbers”, Criminology and Public Policy vol. 16 no. 1: pp.99–117
13 Gill et al. “What are the roles of the internet in terrorism?”
14 According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the dark web is defined as “a set of web pages on the World
Wide Web that cannot be indexed by search engines, are not viewable in a standard Web browser, require
specific means (such as specialised software or network configuration to access, and use encryption to provide
anonymity and privacy for users.”
15 David C. Benson (2014) “Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism”, Security Studies vol. 23 no. 2:
pp.293–328, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2014.905353
16 Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Nick Kaderbhai (2017) “Research Perspectives on Online Radicalisation
a literature review, 2006–2016”, VoxPol Network of Excellence, https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/
ICSR-Paper_Research-Perspectives-on-Online-Radicalisation-A-Literature-Review-2006-2016.pdf
17 Robert Evans (2021) “How the Insurgent and MAGA Right are Being Welded Together on the Streets of
Washington D.C.”, Bellingcat, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2021/01/05/how-the-insurgent-and-
maga-right-are-being-welded-together-on-the-streets-of-washington-d-c/
18 Network Contagion Research Institute (2021) “NCRI Assessment of the Capitol Riots – Violent Actors and
Ideologies Behind the Events of January 6, 2021”, https://networkcontagion.us/wp-content/uploads/NCRI-
Assessment-of-the-Capitol-Riots.pdf
7GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
Extremism found that 68% of participants who have been charged
by law enforcement “documented their alleged crimes in real‑time at
the Capitol.”19
The report also found that social media also “played a central role in
the organization of the siege and the dissemination of material which
helped to inspire involvement in it.” Social media also played a role in
allowing the disparate groups and individuals that participated in the
Capitol Siege to interact and eventually coalesce in Washington, DC,
on 6 January 2021.20 Cases profiled in the report detail how social
media facilitated the formation of spontaneous ‘clusters’ of previously
unknown individuals finding each other and travelling together to
participate in the siege with little planning21 – in many ways echoing
the process of ISIS‑inspired foreign travellers but with less lead time,
distance or barriers to travel.
As social media and algorithmic technologies become more and
more embedded in our daily lives, could the Internet not only facilitate
but actively enable violent extremism? In their 2015 study of the
online behaviours of convicted UK terrorists, Paul Gill, Emily Corner,
Amy Thornton and Maura Conway found that “The Internet has not
led to a rise in terrorism. It is largely a facilitative tool; radicalisation
is enabled by the Internet rather than being dependent upon it.”22
But are we witnessing an emergence of “a new of terrorism that can’t
exist without the internet”?23 Was the Capitol Siege an example of the
Internet enabling and leading to mass digital radicalisation and mass
mobilisation?24 Did the Internet usage of some of individuals involved
in the siege and their steady exposure to extremist narratives and
disinformation online – particularly those not affiliated with already
established organisations – accelerate their process of radicalisation
to violence? In fact, was their radicalisation to violence in this instance
actually determined by or dependent on the Internet? Has the ‘logic’
of various platforms contributed to the growth of extremism and
does it now play a more significant part in an individual’s trajectory
to radicalisation to violence?
In attempting to outline the new social media logic and understand
the ways in which social media platforms have “penetrated deeply
into the mechanics of everyday life” and affected institutional
structures and people’s interactions, José van Dijck and Thomas
Poell have compared social media logic to the mass media logic that
emerged before it and theorised that social media has created a new
ecosystem that “reshapes social orders or chains of events.” Because
social media has the ability to transport its logic outside its platforms
via the “strategies, mechanisms and economies underpinning social
media platforms’ dynamics,” broader society becomes subject to its
logic and principles.25
19 George Washington University’s Program on Extremism (2021) “This is Our House! A Preliminary Assessment of
the Capitol Hill Siege Participants”, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/This-Is-Our-House.pdf
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Gill et al. “What are the roles of the internet in terrorism?”
23 Craig Timberg, Drew Harwell, Razzan Nakhlawi and Harrison Smith (2021), “Nothing can stop what’s
coming: far right forums that fomented Capitol riots voice glee in aftermath”, The Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/07/trump-online-siege/
24 Robert Pape and Keven Ruby (2021), “The Capitol Rioters Aren’t Like Other Extremists,” The Atlanic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/02/the-capitol-rioters-arent-like-other-extremists/617895/
25 José van Dijck and Thomas Poell (2013) “Understanding Social Media Logic”, Media and Communication vol 1
no. 1: pp.2–14, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2309065
8GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
While van Dijck and Poell do not focus on extremism specifically,
extremism researcher J. M. Berger has outlined a similar
argument around how the logic and nature of computer‑enabled
communications, and social media in particular, have fundamentally
changed the conditions around social interaction and reorganised
our public sphere in such a way that has led to extremism. This rise
of the Internet, especially social media, according to Berger, has
contributed to greater uncertainty and frayed “consensus reality”
by creating “a volatile and unwelcoming environment for the idea of
objective truth.” Social media platforms have increased uncertainty
because they have allowed all manner of contradictory information,
opinions and analysis to populate their platforms.26 Berger posits that
“Social media creates an environment in which multiple alternative
views of reality can win support by attracting measurable levels of
engagement sufficient to be understood by audience members as
consensus. To reconcile the uncertainty created by these conflicting
viewpoints, audience members are likely to rely on in‑group validation
of perceived reality, which is often accompanied by hostility toward
out‑group views”.27 It is human nature to meet this fracturing of
consensus reality with a corresponding effort to seek out certainty via
“exclusive, all‑encompassing identities – many of which are toxic and
fragile – and hold the seed of violent extremism”.28 Extremism also
emerges because an out‑group’s consensus is experienced as an
existential threat that must be countered. Berger also contends that
there are critical differences between old and new media, particularly
regarding the lack of gate keepers or content regulation, the low
cost of production and “engagement metrics bundled inextricably
with distribution.”29
26 J. M. Berger (2020) “Our Consensus Reality Has Shattered”, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/
archive/2020/10/year-living-uncertainly/616648/
27 Interview with J. M. Berger, via message (6 April 2021).
28 J. M. Berger, “Our Consensus Reality Has Shattered”
29 Interview with J. M. Berger, via message (6 April 2021).
910
GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
2 Exploring the Role
of Extremism and
Technology
C
onducting a literature review of the available research is one
way to respond to the enduring debates around the roles of
technology in relation to violent extremism and examining the
newer issues and questions that have arisen. Indeed, there have been
a number of high‑quality literature reviews on the role of the Internet
and technology on radicalisation and violent extremism over the years.
What the Literature Says
In 2013, a study by RAND Europe incorporated a literature review
as one part of their study Radicalisation in the digital era, which
explored how the Internet is used by individuals in the process of
radicalisation. That study found in its literature review, in combination
with primary research, that the Internet did “enhance opportunities
to become radicalised, as a result of being available to many people,
and enabling connection with like‑minded individuals from across the
world 24/7.” It also found that the Internet can act as an echo chamber
and provides greater opportunities than offline interactions to affirm
extremist beliefs. But it further found that, at the time, the Internet
didn’t necessarily accelerate this radicalisation nor serve as a substitute
for the need for in‑person interaction during the radicalisation process.30
In 2017, Alexander Meleagrou‑Hitchens and Nick Kaderbhai conducted
a literature review into online radicalisation and similarly found that the
“Consensus is that the Internet alone is not a cause of radicalisation,
but a facilitator and catalyser of an individual’s trajectory towards
violent political acts.” They cite literature that cautions against
overemphasising the role of the Internet, such as Benson in 2014
who finds that existing studies also “lack independent and dependent
variables that would include both the use of the Internet by terrorists
and states, thus omitting negative cases which would help to
‘determine the net effect of the Internet on transnational terrorism.’”31
Meleagrou‑Hitchens and Kaderbhai also note that the literature on
the role of technology and the online environment on radicalisation
is contested because the concept of radicalisation in extremism
studies itself remains contested. However, there is consensus that
radicalisation to violence is a social process and that the Internet,
particularly social media, provides social spaces that foster the creation
of in‑groups and out‑groups, assist in identity formation, as well as
provide platforms for influencers and leaders.
30 Ines von Behr, Anais Reding, Charlie Edwards NS Luke Gribbon (n.d.) “Radicalisation in the digital era”, RAND,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf
31 Meleagrou-Hitchens and Kaderbhai, “Research Perspectives on Online Radicalisation”
11GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
They conclude that “the vast majority of authors argue that, while the
Internet plays a facilitating role, in most cases the individual must still
also be in contact with real‑world networks. An investigation into an
individual’s trajectory is thus often an investigation into the unique
interplay between online and offline interactions.”32 However, more
recent research in 2020 by Tinia Gaudette, Ryan Scrivens and Vivek
Venkatesh, which relied on in‑depth interviews with Canadian former
violent extremists, found that “regardless of how individuals are first
exposed to violent extremist ideologies and groups, it is the Internet
that eventually facilitates processes of violent radicalisation by enabling
them to immerse themselves in extremist content and networks –
a finding supported by empirical research on the role of the Internet
in facilitating an array of violent extremist movements in general
and the extreme right‑wing movement in particular.”33 This study of
Canadian former extremists echoed the findings of Koehler’s earlier
2014 study of German ex‑extremists and their use of the Internet,
which found that, “Compared to other ‘socialization institutions’, such
as offline group activities, music and concerts, rallies and political
trainings, the Internet appears as the most important element driving
individual radicalization processes, according to the used material.”34
Another systematic review conducted in 2018 sought to answer
what the links between online exposure to violent radicalized content
and online or offline violent radical outcomes are by solely reviewing
empirical studies. It found that “The Internet’s role thus seems to be
one of decision‑shaping, which, in association with offline factors, can
be associated to decision‑making.” But of the 5,182 studies generated
from the systematic review’s search, only eleven, a shockingly low
figure, were eligible for inclusion35 – which serves to highlight the lack
of empirically based research at the time.
In 2019, another systematic review was conducted that yielded 88
studies for consideration on the role of the Internet in both right‑wing
and jihadist extremism from a literature search that spanned 2000 to
2019. But these studies focused on the characteristics and content of
websites used and not on the Internet habits of the users themselves.36
The authors concluded from the study that “existing studies have thus
far not sufficiently examined the users of available sites, nor have they
studied the causal mechanisms that unfold at the intersection between
the Internet and its users.” There are very few studies that deal with
individual users, their usage histories and their motivations and
experiences online.
Most recently, in 2020, there was a literature review conducted by
Charlie Winter, Peter Neumann, Alexander Meleagrou‑Hitchens,
Magnus Ranstorp, Lorenzo Vidino and Johanna Furst on how the
Internet is used by violent extremists on both organisational and
individual levels and for what purposes.37 In their review of the
32 Ibid.
33 Tiana Gaudette, Ryan Scrivens and Vivek Venkatesh (2020) “The Role of the Internet in Violent
Extremism: Insights from Former Right-Wing Extremists”, Terrorism and Political Violence,
DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2020.1784147
34 Daniel Koehler (2014) “The Radical Online: Individual Radicalization Processes and the Role of the Internet”,
Journal for Deradicalization, vol. Winter 2014/2015 no. 1: https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/8/8
35 Ghadya Hassan et al. (2018) “Exposure to Extremist Online Content Could Lead to Violent Radicalization:
A Systematic Review of Emperical Evidence”, International Journal of Development Science vol. 12 no. 1–2:
pp.71–88
36 Ozen Odog, Anne Leiser and Klaus Boehnke (2019) “Reviewing the Role of the Internet in Radicalisation
Processes”, Journal for Deradicalisation no. 21, https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/289
37 Charlie Winter et al. (2020) “Online Extremism: Research Trends in Internet Activism, Radicalization and
Counter-strategies”, International Journal of Conflict Violence vol. 14
12GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
literature they found that just as the Internet is of central importance
to all individuals, it has “become a primary operational environment,
in which political ideologies are realized, attacks planned, and
social movements made.”38 It has become so because “much of
the time online extremism is simply intuitive usage of the Internet.”
Extremists use the Internet much in the same way we all do. And
while the prevalence of extremist propaganda online and its increased
consumption of extremist propaganda online by itself does not
lead to radicalisation, online spaces can serve as forums for social
engagement and interactions that can contribute to radicalisation
and mobilisation to violence.39 Online spaces are social spaces and
function similarly to real‑world social spaces in that they can provide
identity, validation, community and meaning. The review concludes
that, despite being unable to find any causal relationship between
Internet technologies and extremism or to draw out structural
conclusions, “there is no question that extremist organizations would
not be where they are today without their adept use of virtual terrains.”
Limitations and Data
These systematic reviews and others like them have been important
for understanding the state of the field and the research community’s
assessments of the role of Internet technologies in violent extremism.
However, as many of the literature reviews noted, the literature
reviewed was skewed towards the study of jihadist actors because of
the prevalence of research in that area. As such, reviews tended to
focus less on other ideologies, particularly right‑wing ideologies that
are now presenting a significant threat across jurisdictions globally and
are the subject of an increasing number of emerging research papers.40
The reviews were also considering research literature conducted
and written prior to the pandemic, with its full impact on society and
extremism yet to be examined.
Additionally, research conclusions are only as good as the data they
rest upon and a literature review is less able to adequately illuminate
issues around researcher access to data, which greatly impacts the
type and quality of the literature that is being reviewed, and the level
of engagement with the technology industry.
Early concerns about the state of terrorism research hinged on the
lack of access to data and the lack of data‑sharing by governments.41
But there have been advances in empirically based research42 and the
use of primary data43 in terrorism and extremism studies since early
criticisms around the lack of data‑driven research were made about
the field.44 When it comes to the role of technology and extremism,
however, even though the Internet is awash with data, as we have
seen through many of the literature reviews mentioned above, there
38 Ibid.
39 Department of Security Studies and Criminology, “Mapping Networks”
40 Meleagrou-Hitchens and Kaderbhai, “Research Perspectives on Online Radicalisation”
41 M. Sageman (2014) “The stagnation in terrorism research”, Terrorism and Political Violence vol. 26 no. 4:
pp.565–80, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2014.895649
42 Sarah Knight and David A. Keatley (2020) “How can the literature inform counter terrorism practice? Recent
advances and remaining challenges”, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression vol. 12 no. 3:
pp.217–30, DOI: 10.1080/19434472.2019.1666894
43 Bart Schuurman (2020) “Research on Terrorism, 2007–2016 Review of Data, Methods, and Authorship”,
Terrorism and Political Violence vol. 32 no. 5: pp.1,011–26, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2018.1439023
44 Bart Schuurman and Quirine Eijkman (2013) “Moving Terrorism Research Forward: The Crucial Role of Primary
Sources”, ICCT Background Note, https://www.icct.nl/app/uploads/download/file/Schuurman-and-Eijkman-
Moving-Terrorism-Research-Forward-June-2013.pdf
13GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
remains a lack of data‑driven studies on the role of technology
and online radicalisation.45 In “Terrorist Use of the Internet by the
Numbers,” published in 2017, the authors found that in examining
200 abstracts of research articles on “online radicalisation” only 6.5%
used some form of data and a mere 2% of those studies used primary
data.46 The 2018 and 2019 systematic reviews described above had
similar findings.
In 2020, Ryan Scrivens, Paul Gill and Maura Conway noted in an
updated article around how to make progress researching the
role of the Internet in violent extremism that there still remains an
issue around access, collection and interpretation of primary data.47
Their suggestions for progressing knowledge around this issue centre
mostly on data. Their five suggestions include “collecting primary
data across multiple types of populations” and “making archives
of violent extremist online content accessible for use by researchers
and on user‑friendly platforms.”48These issues around empirical
evidence have inhibited researchers from being able to come to
convincing conclusions.49
Ironically, just as terrorism research was beginning to incorporate
primary data from extremist use of social media platforms,
mainstream social media companies began to more consistently and
comprehensively deplatform violent extremist actors and more strictly
enforce their terms of service. A major reason why the debate about
the role of the Internet remains unresolved is due to issues of data
access, which remains in the hands the tech companies. Therefore,
in order to attempt to contribute to the current understanding of the
role of the Internet in extremism and terrorism, particularly around
the research community’s engagement with the social media platforms
that carry most of the data that is relevant to the study of the role
technology plays in the radicalisation to violence process, another
approach is needed.
45 Gill et al., “Terrorist Use of the Internet by the Numbers”
46 Ibid.
47 Ryan Scrivens, Paul Gill and Maura Conway (2020) “The Role of the Internet in Facilitating Violent Extremism and
Terrorism: Suggestions for Progressing Research”, in T. J. Holt, A. M. Bossler (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of
International Cybercrime and Cyberdeviance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78440-3_61
48 Ibid.
49 Meleagrou-Hitchens and Kaderbhai, “Research Perspectives on Online Radicalisation”
14GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
3 Survey
T
o compliment past literature reviews on Internet technology
and extremism, to gain a current understanding of the
research community’s findings that may not be included in
previously reviewed literature and to understand the academic
research community’s level of engagement with the tech industry,
the Lowy Institute conducted a survey among researchers of
terrorism and violent extremism.
A database of researchers was built from a number of sources.
The database consisted of researchers and experts who were
on the editorial boards of the prominent journals in the field of
terrorism and extremism studies: Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
Terrorism and Political Violence, Critical Studies on Terrorism,
Journal for Policing Intelligence and Counterterrorism, CTC
Sentinel, Perspectives on Terrorism, Journal of Democracy and
Security, Journal for DeRadicalization, Behavioral Sciences of
Terrorism and Political Aggression and Dynamics of Asymmetric
Conflict. The database also drew on GNET Associate Fellows and
GNET Insight contributors whose work focused on the Internet
and extremism. Other experts who were part of recognised
research institutes and networks, such as the George Washington
University Program on Extremism, Resolve Network, Centre for the
Analysis of Radical Right, Vox Pol, Institute for Strategic Dialogue,
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism, Hadayah, AVERT Research Network, TSAS and
others were identified and added to the database. In addition
to established career researchers, early career researchers and
those focusing on issues around terrorism and technology were
identified via research conference programmes such as the TASM
Conference on Terrorism and Social Media at Swansea University.
The web‑based questionnaire was sent to those individuals in the
database. Invitees were also encouraged to share the survey link
with others with relevant expertise. Respondents could choose
to remain anonymous and they were not required to provide their
name or affiliation. Some 158 researchers of terrorism and violent
extremism responded to the survey. This report summarises
some of the findings of the survey, presenting the results of a
number of questions. The entire survey comprised 44 questions;
this report summarises most though not all of the responses to
the questionnaire.
There are limitations to the expert survey approach. The results
reported here are based on a non‑random sample and represent
only the views of those who responded to the questionnaire.
Aside from the criteria described above for building the database
of potential respondents, we did not devise a further method to
determine individuals’ level of engagement with the issues around
technology and extremism. Given the fact that many respondents
15GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement chose to remain anonymous, we could not identify and verify the level of research expertise and experience involved in answering the survey questions. Additionally, researchers and experts who may have relevant research experience around these issues may not have responded to the survey. Of the 84 individuals who chose to respond to the prompt “current affiliation”, 72% listed university or academia as their primary sector, 12% identifying think tanks or policy institutes as their primary sector and the remaining were scattered among in‑house research within technology companies, consulting and non‑governmental and civil society organisations. The primary field of discipline for the majority of respondents (n=158) was political science (42%), with sociology, criminology, psychology, communications and history making up majority of the primary fields of the other respondents. The majority of respondents (n=158) also listed North America (44%) and Europe (48%) as their primary geographic research focus. Respondents also listed the Middle East (23%), Asia (15%) and Oceania (20%) as a geographic research focus (respondents were allowed to identity more than one geographic focus). The focus on North America and Europe is likely due to the fact that a majority of the researchers in the database and thus respondents to the survey are based in or hail from North America and Europe. But this is also likely because the current threat focus of the academic community is now on right‑wing extremism from North America, Europe and Oceania, and, to a lesser extent, from Asia. However, when respondents (n=158) were asked “on which extremist ideology have you conducted research?” and prompted to select all that applied, the same percentage of respondents (79% and 80% respectively) selected “jihadist” and “far right.” Lower percentages of respondents selected “racial or ethnically motivated violent extremism” (41%), “far left” (29%), “incel” (22%) and “other” (17%). 16
GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
Role of the Internet and social media on extremism
The first part of the survey focused on expert views of the role
the Internet – particularly social media – has played in extremism.
These questions were deliberately worded so as not to solicit opinion
or impressions but to have respondents base their answers on
“empirically based research” they have either conducted themselves
or have read or used in their work.
The first question sought to solicit a view regarding whether online
extremist activity satiates desire for real‑world action or stokes,
encourages or mobilises individuals to take offline action. When
asked if Internet‑enabled communications and online activity by
extremist actors either “support, encourage or mobilise real world
harm,” “satisfy a desire for action or participation in extremism via
virtual activity alone,” or “both,” the majority of respondents (60%)
said either “support, encourage or mobilise real world harm,” or both
(36%) , with very few respondents saying that strictly online activity
satisfied a desire for action or participation in extremism via virtual
means alone (less than 1%). Respondents commented that Internet
activity facilitates attack planning and execution (e.g. logistics,
financing, human resources); motivation or influence to conduct
violence; and celebration or amplification of previous attacks that
can inspire similar actions by others. A number of respondents also
pointed out that the “jihadist videos [for example] on the possession
of those arrested and prosecuted for terrorism is one indicator of
the [Internet’s] support function,” as are studies of captured jihadists
who indicate that the communications were impactful on them.
The view of the majority of survey respondents, that online activity
can support, encourage or mobilise real‑world harm, is consistent
with recent findings of a representative sample in the US that
examined “e‑participation” more broadly and found that “forms of
online expression and interaction [are] associated with greater offline
citizen participation.”50
It is interesting to note that the majority of those canvassed
concluded that online activity leads to real‑world harms, particularly
as some research – and some respondents – suggested that some
individuals restrict themselves only to online activity and pose no
offline risk because their online activity has satisfied their desire to
articulate and advocate for their positions and air their grievances.51
Additionally, previous studies on jihadists found virtual activity can
carry similar legitimacy and impact as offline activity, thus potentially
mitigating the need for jihadist real‑world action. Studies by Akil
Awan and others have found that ‘virtual jihad’ or ‘media jihad’ serve
as legitimate and credible alternative options to real‑world militancy.52
Islamic State’s virtual caliphate, for example, was considered as
important53 as the territorial caliphate in Syria and Iraq; the two were
in fact intimately intertwined.54
50 K. Tai, G. Porumbescu and J. Shon (2020) “Can e-participation stimulate offline citizen participation: and
empirical test with practical implications”, DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2019.1584233
51 J. Suler (2004) “The online disinhibition effect”, Cyberpsychology and Behavior, DOI: 10.1089/1094931041291295
52 A. Hoskins, A. Awan and B. O’Loughlin (2011) Radicalisation and Media: Connectivity and Terrorism in the New
Media Ecology (1st ed.), Routledge, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203829677
53 Charlie Winter (2015) “The Virtual Caliphate: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy”, Quilliam,
https://www.stratcomcoe.org/charlie-winter-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy
54 Haroro Ingram and Craig Whiteside (2017) “In Search of the Virtual Caliphate”, War on the Rocks,
https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/in-search-of-the-virtual-caliphate-convenient-fallacy-dangerous-distraction/
17GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
Additionally, as technology use becomes more integrated into the
functions of daily life the online vs offline dichotomy is diminishing.
As one respondent noted, “‘real world harm [can] include action in
the digital world. Online action does affect the real world. Swatting,
trolling, stalking, doxxing, abusing targets online has significant
impacts in the real world.” Internet‑enabled communications and
activity have fused digital and physical settings.55 This fusion points
to a need for a more holistic conceptualisation of online vs offline.
Other respondents also added caveats to their responses by stating
that, while they would support the conclusion that online activity
leads to real‑world harm, it is not a “linear or unidirectional process.
Online and offline dynamics support and co‑create one another.”
Q7 Based on any empirically based research you have conducted or come
across on extremism and technology do you observe that internet enabled
communication and online activities
Answered: 134 Skipped: 24
Support, encourage or
mobilise real world harm
Satisfy desire for action/
participation via virtual …
I have not conducted or
come across …
Neither
Both
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Support, encourage or mobilise real world harm 59.70% 80
Satisfy desire for action/ participation via virtual activity alone 0.75% 1
I have not conducted or come across research on this topic 2.99% 4
Neither 0.75% 1
Both 35.82% 48
TOTAL 134
This broader question was broken down in subsequent questions
relating to extremist use of the Internet to fundraise, recruit, mobilise
and plan violent action.
Regarding recruitment and whether Internet‑enabled communications
have made it easier to recruit individuals to extremist movements,
there was broad agreement that this is the case. Some 90% of
respondents agreed or strongly agreed. However, even though there
55 D. Valentini, A. M. Lorusso and A. Stephan (2020) “Onlife Extremism: Dynamic Integration of Digital and Physical
Spaces in Radicalization”, Frontiers in Psychology no. 11: p.524, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00524;
B. Ducol (2015) “A Radical sociability: in defense of an online/offline multidimensional approach to radicalization”,
in M. Bouchard (ed.) Social Networks, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Radical and Connected (New York, NY:
Routledge): pp.82–104
18GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
appears to be a broad consensus around this issue, the definition
and conceptualisation of ‘recruitment’ in the online space is not
well established. It could mean specific recruitment processes via
computer‑mediated mechanisms or broader social influence or
the creation of communities via strategic communication efforts
by extremist groups online. There is also little to no comparative
research on the pre‑ and post‑Internet environments when it comes
to recruitment but there is broad agreement that the Internet, more
than other technologies of the past, has increased the reach of
extremist messaging and given extremist groups broader, quicker and
more efficient access to potential recruits. As one respondent noted,
“A range of research has demonstrated how social media allows
for otherwise unconnected individuals to reach and be reached by
extremist groups, and removes the reliance on formal organisational
structures as a means to recruit.”
Q9 The use of the internet enabled communications and/or social media
platforms by extremist actors has made it easier to recruit individuals
to extremist movements?
Answered: 134 Skipped: 24
Strongly Agree
Agree
Research is inconclusive/
Neither Agree or Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
I have not conducted or
come across …
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Strongly Agree 55.97% 75
Agree 34.33% 46
Research is inconclusive/Neither Agree or Disagree 6.72% 9
Disagree 0.00% 0
Strongly Disagree 0.00% 0
I have not conducted or come across research on this topic 2.99% 4
TOTAL 134
19GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
Likewise, when asked if the Internet has made it easier to plan attacks
or mobilise to violence, the majority of respondents, 84%, agreed or
strongly agreed. A respondent summarised the role of the Internet by
stating, “the internet and encrypted social media communications in
particular have heightened the flow of information, resources, tactical
and logistical support and real‑time contact which has in turn removed
or flattened earlier barriers to mounting attacks.” But while the Internet
may have made it easier to research, plan and coordinate violence,
it has also been a boon for law enforcement. Many plots have been
thwarted or prosecuted because of evidence collected on online
platforms. Many respondents also gave caveats to their responses
by saying that while Internet‑enabled communications, particularly
encrypted communication, may have made it easier to mobilise,
detailed attack planning in fact often occurs offline, particularly for
sophisticated plots.
Q10 The use of internet enabled communications and/or social media platforms
by extremist actors has made it easier to plan violent attacks/mobilise
Answered: 134 Skipped: 24
Strongly Agree
Agree
Research is inconclusive/
Neither Agree or Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
I have not conducted or
come across …
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Strongly Agree 35.82% 48
Agree 48.51% 65
Research is inconclusive/Neither Agree or Disagree 8.96% 12
Disagree 2.24% 3
Strongly Disagree 0.75% 1
I have not conducted or come across research on this topic 3.73% 5
TOTAL 134
Similarly, a majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed (78%)
that Internet‑enabled communications have made it easier for
extremist actors to fundraise. The Internet has enabled crowdsourced
donations, merchandise sales, ad revenue via content channels and
the use of crypto‑currencies to exchange funds anonymously and
securely. One respondent made the point that many extremist groups
or individuals actually exist as business enterprises online; they face
20GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
“monetary incentives to make the content on their sites as sensational
and engaging as possible while remaining vague enough to attract the
broadest audience possible.”
Q11 The use of internet enabled communications and/or social media platforms
by extremist actors has made it easier to fundraise
Answered: 134 Skipped: 24
Strongly Agree
Agree
Research is inconclusive/
Neither Agree or Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
I have not conducted or
come across …
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Strongly Agree 37.31% 50
Agree 40.30% 54
Research is inconclusive/Neither Agree or Disagree 9.70% 13
Disagree 1.49% 2
Strongly Disagree 0.00% 0
I have not conducted or come across research on this topic 11.19% 15
TOTAL 134
When survey participants were also asked more specifically if exposure
and engagement with extremist content leads to offline harm, the
responses were less decisive. When examining exposure to content
specifically, rather than “online activities” more broadly (encompassing
communication, fundraising, recruitment, and so on), respondents
suggested that engaging with extremist content, as the literature
reviews also indicate, can be a contributing factor but not a causal,
determinative or sufficient factor. According to one respondent,
“There are a lot of predisposing factors before any interaction with
extremist content can lead to offline actions, and the causal pathway
is not going to be discernible.”
However, this consensus may later be challenged, because, as a
majority of respondents indicated, the “research was inconclusive.”
Many respondents noted that “we don’t have enough evidence on
this,” there “simply isn’t good enough data,” “research uses very
limited data,” or “very minimal empirical research that clearly shows
connection between exposure/interaction with extremist content and
offline harm.” Again, these responses echo longstanding concerns
in the field regarding access to data.
21GNET Survey on the Role of Technology in Violent Extremism and the State of Research Community – Tech Industry Engagement
Q13 Online exposure and interaction with extremist content
contributes to offline harm?
Answered: 128 Skipped: 30
Strongly Agree
Agree
Research is inconclusive/
Neither Agree or Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
I have not conducted or
come across …
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Strongly Agree 25.78% 33
Agree 53.91% 69
Research is inconclusive/Neither Agree or Disagree 17.19% 22
Disagree 0.00% 0
Strongly Disagree 0.78% 1
I have not conducted or come across research on this topic 2.34% 3
TOTAL 128
When asked about how certain individuals accessed or were
exposed to extremist content, specifically through algorithmic
recommendation functions of social media platforms, respondents
agreed that algorithmic recommendation played an important
role in amplifying content (62% agreed or strongly agreed) but
were more circumspect about whether this played a part in an
individual’s path towards radicalisation – popularly termed as ‘going
down the rabbit hole.’ Many pointed to the fact that research was
inconclusive or that there is insufficient research on how algorithmic
recommendation factors into the radicalisation process. As one
respondent put it, this is an issue “requiring more sophisticated
understandings of enmeshed sociality and the social economies of
how communities of users actually engage and interact with what
they are viewing.”
Much of the research on extremist content and algorithmic
recommendation focuses on YouTube;56 one respondent,
who indicated that they carried out research on algorithmic
recommendation, found that “recommendation algorithms are a key
driver for recruitment, radicalization, and propaganda.” Another stated
56 Ribeiro et al. (2019) “Auditing Radicalization Pathways on YouTube”, Computers and Society; Derek O’Callaghan
et al. and Tania Bucher suggest a strong connection between algorithms and social behaviour within YouTube.
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