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GLOBAL BRITAIN:
VIEWS FROM ABROAD

 GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD   1

FOREWORD
‘Global Britain’ is the term coined to denote the UK’s approach to the world after
Brexit. In purely rhetorical terms, it was intended to underline the fact that the
decision to leave the European Union would usher in an era not of entrenchment,
but of renewed global engagement. More concretely, the ambitions of the
government have been laid out in a series of statements, not least the recent
Integrated Review.

However, the success of the project depends not simply on the energy and
resources devoted to it by the government in London, but also on the reactions
of potential partners. To consider what these reactions might be, The UK in a
Changing Europe teamed up with Dr David Roberts and colleagues from the
School of Security Studies at King’s College London to consider perceptions of
Global Britain across a range of different states.

As ever, I am immensely grateful to all those who contributed to this report.
They have tolerated numerous (and repeated) questions and comments with
efficient good humour.

In addition, I would like to thank David, for having the idea for this report in the
first place and being an invaluable collaborator during the publication process.
In addition, my heartfelt gratitude to Joël Reland and Sarah Overton, who edited
and commented on a number of early drafts, to Lizzie Ellen, Communications
Manager in the School of Security Studies, to Alison Howson and John-
Paul Salter, who checked the manuscript, and Navjyot Lehl who, once again,
coordinated the project and took care of the design and publication process with
her usual efficiency.

I hope you find what follows interesting and informative.

                                                                                Anand Menon

21 September 2021

The School of Security Studies is dedicated to the understanding of security issues in an
increasingly complex and uncertain world. Harnessing the depth and breadth of expertise
across the War Studies and Defence Studies Departments, and the King’s Institute for Applied
Security Studies, we are one of the largest multi-disciplinary communities of scholars in the
world engaged in the teaching and research of all aspects of conflict, war, security and defence.

2                                                           GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD

CONTENTS

Introduction                        David Roberts and Anand Menon               4

Contributors		                                                                   7

Brazil                              Vinicius de Caravalho                        8

Central Asia                        Emmanuel Karagiannis                        12

China                               Zeno Leoni                                  16

France                              Gesine Weber                                20

Germany                             Nicolai von Ondarza                         25

GCC                                 Sara Almahri                                30

India                               Saawani Raje-Byrne                          34

Italy                               Michele Groppi                              39

Japan                               Eitan Oren and William Reynolds             43

Mexico                              Raúl Zepeda Gil and Roberto Vargas Pineda   48

Nigeria                             Folahanmi Aina                              52

South Africa                        Mervyn Frost                                57

USA                                 David Des Roches                            61

GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD                                                3

INTRODUCTION
                          David Roberts and Anand Menon

The UK government has steadfastly maintained that Brexit is not about pulling
up the drawbridge and retreating into a twenty-first century version of splendid
isolation. Quite the contrary. Both Ministers since, and pro-Brexit campaigners
during, the referendum campaign of 2016 argued that, on the contrary, freedom
from EU entanglements would allow the UK to cast a wider net.

‘Global Britain’ is the term given to the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy
ambitions. The Global Britain agenda has engendered a small avalanche of
critique and discussion with commentators striving to disentangle pragmatic
plans from the rhetorical flourishes. It has been dismissed by critics as nothing
more than a rhetorical ploy intended to give the impression of an international
influence that is largely illusory.

Of course, the way the UK approaches foreign policy — particularly the
political attention paid to it and the resources invested in it — will be crucial in
determining whether Global Britain ever amounts to anything more than a slogan.
The government has already begun to put some flesh on the rhetorical bones of
the concept with its Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper.

Yet, foreign policy is a two-way street. The success of the UK’s Global Britain
strategy rests not merely on what the government does, but also on how policy
and business communities in Tokyo, New Delhi, and elsewhere receive and react
to it. Partnerships require the consent of at least two parties, and perceptions of
what the UK means by its Global Britain undertaking will help shape attitudes
around the world.

This report attempts to assess what other countries make of Global Britain. It
systematically addresses the Global Britain issue from the other side — reflecting
on how key capitals around the world see the UK as it seeks to transform its foreign
policy approach. Our contributors are a mixture of leading academics and PhD
students who share a deep understanding of the countries and regions about which
they write. To help us to compare the different approaches of different countries
more effectively, we asked each contributor to address the same questions. After
setting the scene, including reflecting on the pre-existing nature of UK relations,
they focus on the most salient concerns liable to affect the Global Britain agenda.
Subsequently, potential opportunities for mutual benefit (and indeed points of
tension which could hamper better relations) are discussed. It is worth adding that
the contributions were finalised before the US withdrew its forces from Afghanistan.

4                                                     GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD

What emerges is a complicated mixture of constraints and opportunities.
Interestingly, Brexit is a live issue only for a couple of states. For Germany, there
are fears that the UK might use the bilateral relationship to divide the EU. In
the US, because Trump was a supporter of Brexit, the instinctive reaction of his
political opponents is to dislike it. President Biden’s Irish ancestry, moreover,
means that the fate of the Northern Ireland Protocol will help shape the bilateral
relationship. Moreover, Brexit means the UK has lost one of its main advantages
in dealing with the US — acting as a bridge with the EU. Beyond this, it is
interesting to note that Global Britain has received little attention in the US, a
country that tends to assume UK interests and actions will be aligned with its
own.

Not all European states view Brexit as a constraint on cooperation. For Italy, there
is good reason to work with the UK given shared interests in countering the
influence of China and Russia. Seen from Paris, Global Britain is a good thing,
with the narrative around universal values and decisive action making the UK
‘more French than before’. There is significant scope for future cooperation on
security in particular, particularly in areas where France perceives that the EU
cannot deliver.

For other countries, Brexit provides real opportunities. The Brazilian intellectual
and diplomatic establishments have tended to be strong proponents of European
integration for largely geopolitical reasons. However, Brazil has long fretted about
what it sees as the EU’s protectionist tendencies. Consequently, Brexit and
Global Britain open the possibility of more far-reaching agreements with London
in areas such as investment and trade facilitation than was possible while the
UK was a member state. Opportunities to further consolidate trade and security
relations lie open with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which views the UK
as an important partner in these areas, however inter-GCC disagreements mean
the region lacks a united approach to Global Britain.

Others are less positive. China sees Global Britain as directed against Beijing.
The UK needs to find a way to reconcile its relatively new tougher stance towards
Beijing with a desire to preserve economic ties. It must also, not least as part of
its much-heralded ‘Indo-Pacific tilt,’ forge relations with like-minded partners in
the region.

Japan is one such potential partner though Tokyo, while welcoming the UK’s
Indo-Pacific tilt, views Beijing as a more immediate military threat than does
London. The UK’s cooler relationship with China could also enhance prospects of
deepening security relationship with India, which is looking to create an alliance
in the Indo-Pacific. Yet while there are opportunities, these could be mitigated if
the UK is not prepared to offer more visas to Indian professionals.

GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD                                                       5

Turning to regions in which the UK has perhaps tended to show relatively little
interest, Central Asia might, in the light of events in Afghanistan, become more
of a focus and a real test of the UK’s ability of Global Britain to be truly global.
Mexico-UK relations have primarily been based on trade, and while Brexit could
mean fewer tariffs on certain goods, this is an issue of secondary interest to a
country working on deepening its ties with the EU, and for whom the US remains
the most significant actor.

When it comes to sub-Saharan Africa, which does not seem a priority for Global
Britain, the UK faces competition for influence, partly because of the growth of
intra-African trade, and partly because of the increased role of India, Japan and
particularly China. In the case of South Africa, the ongoing consequences of the
unrest following the trial of former president Jacob Zuma present an opportunity
for the UK to become a leading ally in reconstruction. Meanwhile when it comes
to the continent’s most populous country, Nigeria, trade will be key to the
evolving relationship, though there is potential for closer cooperation on security,
healthcare and attracting Nigerian students to study in the UK. Much will depend
on the UK’s willingness to treat Nigeria as an equal partner, and an open question
is whether, under the rubric of Global Britain, the UK will be more vocal when it
comes to improving electoral processes in the country.

This is, of necessity, merely a rapid overview of what are rich and detailed
contributions to the debate about Global Britain. It serves, however, to underline
the tremendous variation in the responses to the concept from different states
in different parts of the world. Geography, history, and cultural ties all play their
part in shaping perceptions of the UK but ultimately, of course, interests are key.
Whatever the government wants Global Britain to mean, it is clear that its foreign
policy agenda will only be a success if it understands and addresses the diverse
and at times conflicting interests of other states in a rapidly evolving world.

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Folahanmi Aina                                Eitan Oren
Is a Doctoral Fellow in Leadership Studies,   Teaching Fellow, Japan Programme/
African Leadership Centre, King’s College     Department of War Studies at King’s
London                                        College London
Sara Almahri                                  Saawani Raje-Byrne
Research Student, Defence Studies             Lecturer in Defence Studies, Defence
Department at King’s College London           Studies Department at King’s College
                                              London
Vinicius de Caravalho
Director, King’s Brazil Institute at King’s   William Reynolds
College London                                PhD Candidate, Leverhulme Doctoral
                                              Fellow at Department of War Studies,
David Des Roches
                                              King’s College London
Associate Professor at the Near East
South Asia Center for Security Studies, at    Roberto Vargas Pineda
the National Defense University               Economist by the National Autonomous
                                              University of Mexico and currently
Mervyn Frost
                                              postgraduate student at CIDE, Mexico
Professor of International Relations,
Fellow of King’s College London               Nicolai von Ondarza
                                              Head of Research Division at the German
Michele Groppi
                                              Institute for International and Security
Teaching Fellow in the Defence Studies
                                              Affairs
Department at King’s College London
                                              Gesine Weber
Emmanuel Karagiannis
                                              PhD Candidate, Defence Studies
Reader in conflict and security, and
                                              Department at King’s College London
international relations, Defence Studies
Department at King’s College London           Raúl Zepeda Gil
                                              PhD Candidate, Defence Studies
Zeno Leoni
                                              Department at King’s College London
Teaching Fellow, Defence Studies
Department at King’s College London

GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD                                                    7

BRAZIL
                       Vinicius Mariano de Carvalho

INTRODUCTION

In 2021, Peter Wilson, the newly appointed UK Ambassador to Brazil, highlighted
five priorities for the UK’s relationship with Brazil: trade, climate, science,
security and the promotion of open societies. He asserted that the UK wants
‘broad and deep relations with Brazil and a partnership for the 21st century, based
on the historical relations between the two countries’. What, however, does such
a partnership look like? The UK answer to this question will define the Brazilian
view of Global Britain.

CONTEXT

Relations between Brazil and the UK have a long history. As early as 1825, the
UK recognised Brazilian independence (proclaimed in 1822). In 1919, Brazil and
the UK made their delegations in London and Rio de Janeiro into embassies. The
two countries have always maintained stable diplomatic and trade relations. In
the two hundred years since independence, Brazil has viewed the UK as a partner,
because of the convergence in their values and interests.

UK officials have expressed support for Brazil’s accession to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Brazil was and still is the UK’s
main trading partner in Latin America. Trade in goods was $5.3 billion in 2019
(exports to the UK of $3 billion and imports of $2.3 billion). The UK was also,
in 2019, the third largest destination for Brazilian service exports and the third
largest source for Brazilian service imports. The UK is Brazil’s 16th largest trading
partner and the third most important when it comes to services; it is the seventh
largest direct investor in Brazil, with $23.4 billion in direct investments, according
to the Brazilian Central Bank. In 2019, the UK was the largest direct investor in
the electricity, gas and other utilities sectors, accounting for $2 billion or 40%
of the total invested in this sector in 2019. Looking the other way, the UK is, for
its part, the main destination for Brazilian exports of high-tech products to the
European continent, in sectors such as aeronautics and aerospace, automotive
vehicles and electronic and communications devices. In the first half of 2020, in
the context of the pandemic, exports of goods from Brazil to the UK totalled $1.1
billion — a decrease of 30.3% compared to the same period in 2019. Brazilian
imports of British products totalled $1.1 billion, having increased by 13.4%
compared to the first half of 2019.

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CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

Brazil views post-Brexit Britain in both geopolitical and commercial terms, yet
the two perspectives do not converge.

From a geopolitical point of view, Brexit was seen by many scholars and
political analysts as a worrying manifestation of nationalism and isolationism.
This perception has been expressed both in the diplomatic environment and in
academia, more explicitly in the latter. European integration tends to be viewed
positively by the Brazilian intelligentsia and the diplomatic establishment;
Brexit was thus interpreted as a severe blow to the stable multilateralism
that the European Union represents and viewed as a rekindling of the kinds of
nationalist ideas that have caused considerable global upheavals. Some Brazilian
analysts consider British foreign policy after Brexit to be based on the illusion
that the UK could exert the same influence in Europe and in the world as it did
beforehand.

In general, however, the UK’s foreign policy has continued to reflect a
commitment to multilateralism, demonstrating that its global interests continue
to be pursued through its participation in the main international decision-making
bodies (the UN Security Council, G7, G20 and WTO).

From an economic–commercial point of view, however, perceptions of the UK
after Brexit have been positive. This is particularly true for agribusiness, a
sector in which Brazil is competitive and a global player (the country is the
biggest producer of soya beans, coffee and citrus in the world). Although there is
admiration for the European integration process, there has always been discomfort
with the way the EU treats Brazil (and Mercosur) in the commercial context.
There is a sense of injustice in Brazil about the way Europeans treat certain
Brazilian productive sectors and much of the private sector suffers from trade
restrictions imposed by the EU, including the imposition of rigorous sanitary
rules, giant subsidies for European agricultural products and restrictive technical
requirements for Brazilian products. Brazilians tend to regard such restrictive
measures as indicative of the EU’s protectionist instincts. The UK has always
been seen by Brazil as an ally within the EU, although it has not been able to
avoid these barriers considered abusive by Brazil — the hopes are that, outside
the EU, the UK will adopt a less protectionist approach.

OPPORTUNITIES

Brazil views Brexit as an opportunity to negotiate a new set of agreements with
the UK. The two economies have a number of interests in common. In addition to
renegotiating import quotas previously set within the scope of the EU directly

GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD                                                     9

with the UK, Brazil is hoping to secure a series of agreements, including a free
trade deal, as well as agreements on investments, trade facilitation, double
taxation and social security. The UK is seen as less protectionist than the EU and
there is significant UK domestic demand for Brazilian products.

A commercial relationship between Brazil and the UK cannot be raised without
including Mercosur. It does not appear that the Mercosur–EU agreement will
be approved anytime soon, largely because of environmental issues not properly
addressed by Brazil. This negotiation has been ongoing for many years and has
proven difficult and complex; however, it offers a good starting point for an
agreement with the UK, because lessons have been learned by both countries.
Negotiations for a free trade agreement between the UK and Mercosur are a
priority for both sides after Brexit. Both the UK and Brazilian government have
signalled an interest in deepening trade relations through a future agreement. In
the view of the Brazilian private sector, this commitment should seek to equalise
conditions of access to markets in goods, services, public procurement and
investments
vis-à-vis partners who already have trade agreements with the British.

At the meeting of the Joint Economic and Trade Committee between Brazil and
the United Kingdom (JETCO), held in November 2020, the issues of market
access and an intensification of preparations for a Free Trade Agreement were
discussed.

The two countries also recognised that an agreement to avoid double taxation
would facilitate a substantial increase in bilateral trade and investment flows.
Among the main European economies, the UK and Germany are the only ones
with which Brazil has not entered into this type of agreement.
The changes needed to reach a consensus with the British government are mainly
related to Brazil’s tax treatment of income from technical services and to transfer
pricing rules. The latter relate to transactions in the purchase and sale of goods
and services made between companies belonging to the same economic group but
operating in different countries. Brazil and the United Kingdom have promoted
a more intense exchange of views on access to markets, services, intellectual
property, trade facilitation and the business environment to increase bilateral
cooperation and trade and investment flows.

In addition, there is a Brazilian interest in implementing a work plan on
regulation, within the scope of the UK Prosperity Fund’s Trade Facilitation
Programme. The British government’s inter-ministerial fund has a pre-approved
allocation for the development of projects in Brazil in the areas of trade
facilitation, business environment, energy, smart cities, green finance and health.
The Prosperity Fund operates several branches in Brazil and can contribute

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to boosting the development of sectors important to the British, such as
sustainability and health.

CONCLUSION

The British Ambassador, Peter Wilson, will not face a hostile reception in Brazil
when promoting post-Brexit Britain, especially in commercial terms. British
diplomacy has a good reputation in Brazil and historically has demonstrated an
ability to preserve the UK’s interests in the country. The complex world setting
today, with the pandemic, the post-Brexit UK, and the internal political issues
facing Brazil, requires sophisticated diplomatic skills. Ambassador Wilson’s
biggest challenge will be to ensure his definition of a partnership for the 21st
century is understood as a real partnership, and not simply an arrangement
convenient for the UK. Brazil is undoubtedly open to engaging the post-Brexit
UK, especially if it feels it is being seen and treated as an equal partner.

GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD                                                   11

CENTRAL ASIA
                           Emmanuel Karagiannis

INTRODUCTION

The Central Asian region, largely ignored by Western powers for most of the 20th
century, has stepped into the political limelight in recent years. The disintegration
of the USSR in December 1991 led to the establishment of five independent
Central Asian republics: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan. The new states have struggled ever since to build viable political
systems and economies. The events of 9/11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan
increased their visibility and strategic importance considerably.

CONTEXT

Following the unexpected defeat in the Crimean war by the British and French
in 1854, the Russian army invaded the region of Transoxiana. Russian control
of Central Asia triggered a standoff with the British Empire, which sought to
safeguard its interests in the Indian subcontinent — with this competition widely
known by Rudyard Kipling’s phrase the ‘Great Game’. The First and Second
Anglo-Afghan Wars (1878–80) resulted from British fears of Russian penetration
into Afghanistan, a neutral country at the time. Russia and Great Britain ended
their border dispute in Central Asia in 1886, dividing the Tajik-populated
territories along the line that later became the Tajik-Afghan border in the Pamiri
Mountains.

British influence in Russian-controlled Central Asia declined rapidly in the
early 20th century, as the Red Army forcibly incorporated the region into the
new Soviet state. After many experiments and changes of borders, five new
Soviet socialist republics — or SSRs — were formed in Central Asia: those
of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were declared in 1924, Turkmenistan in 1925,
Tajikistan in 1929 and Kirgizia in 1936.

For 70 years, the region was practically forgotten and overshadowed by the
Cold War. The collapse of communism and disintegration of the Soviet Union
led to the establishment of five Central Asian republics in December 1991.
In Central Asia there are few checks and balances restraining political elites.
The independence of the judiciary remains delicate. The absence of a strong
opposition, a robust political party system and independent media all reflect and
reinforce the fact of political repression in the region. Although an emergent
middle class demands participation in the decision-making process, regimes have
adopted a strategy of authoritarianism to maintain power.

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Kazakhstan is the largest country in the region, with a multi-ethnic population
of 18.5 million and significant energy reserves. With an estimated 33 million
inhabitants, Uzbekistan has the largest population, and it has become less
authoritarian following the death of Islam Karimov in 2016. Kyrgyzstan has a
population of 6.5 million, which is the smallest in the region, yet it has been
viewed by the international community as an island of democracy and stability.
Tajikistan is the only country to experience a civil war following the break-up
of the Soviet Union. It has a population of nine million, with the majority aged
under 25, in part due to high unemployment pushing Tajik men to emigrate to
Russia. Turkmenistan is rich in natural gas, holding the world’s fourth largest
reserves. Yet, the country of six million has remained isolated, often described as
the North Korea of Central Asia due to the highly repressive nature of the regime.

During the premiership of David Cameron, the UK attempted to build a strategic
partnership with Kazakhstan for three reasons. First, the country played an
important role for the withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan. Second,
the UK is one of the biggest investors in Kazakhstan’s economy. Third, the
regime avoided massive crackdowns such as those carried out in neighbouring
Uzbekistan. Indeed, British foreign policy in the region can be characterized as
Kazakhstani-centric. Although London has not reached out to other Central
Asian republics with the same enthusiasm, there is tentative evidence that
this may change soon. In 2019, the British–Uzbek Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement was signed to foster relationships in various fields.

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

Central Asia will represent an important test of London’s ability to act globally
due to geographical distance involved, competition from Russia and China, and
the lack of UK vital interests in the region. Indeed, the UK does not yet have a
strategy towards the region’s security; whereas the situation in Afghanistan has
preoccupied British attention for decades, Central Asia has not, even though it
faces numerous problems.

The Ferghana Valley is a hotbed of inter-ethnic conflict. Home to more than
14 million people, the valley is divided among Uzbekistan (60% of the valley’s
territory), Tajikistan (25%) and Kyrgyzstan (15%). Complicating the boundary
issue in the Valley is the presence of seven small enclaves. Moscow drew its
borders in the 1920s, based mainly on political considerations, and with the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, these lines became the international borders
of three sovereign countries, thus disrupting the ordinary flow of people, goods
and trade in the Ferghana Valley. It is hardly a coincidence that all major outbreaks
of ethnic violence in the region have taken place there.

GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD                                                   13

Moreover, the region has experienced its share of terrorist attacks organised by
Islamist extremists affiliated to al-Qaeda. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU) was the most active terrorist group in Central Asia. Rather than its original
goal of establishing an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, the group sought the creation
of an Islamic state in Central Asia, which would include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and China’s Xinjiang province. Eventually,
the IMU disintegrated into different subgroups, which are based in the tribal
areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The threat from Islamist militancy has become more severe since the outbreak
of the Syrian civil war. Thousands of Central Asian Muslims have joined jihadi
groups in Syria. The international spill-over of regional conflicts into domestic
terrorist attacks presents a unique challenge to British officials.

The British government has been viewed as a stakeholder in the regional security
architecture because it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Yet,
the UK has showed little interest in regional security. British indifference is not
surprising because Central Asia was largely perceived as a Russian sphere of
influence for many years.

OPPORTUNITIES

Since the early 1990s, the UK has opened embassies in all Central Asian
countries to foster bilateral relations. The major British interests in the region are
to ensure access to oil and gas produced in the Caspian Sea, to promote British
economic interests in the region and to prevent the spread of Islamist extremism.
Yet despite wanting to ensure good relations with all the countries in the region,
the UK does not want to become diplomatically engaged in Central Asia. As it
has prioritised other regions (such as the Indo-Pacific), the UK has been reluctant
to commit resources to this volatile part of the world.

Consequently, the UK government has placed greater emphasis on trade and
investment than on security and geopolitics. London has traditionally focused
the bulk of its attention on the need to ensure access to the region’s vast oil and
gas supplies. Increasing demand for consumer goods and various infrastructure
projects in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are sources of revenue for British
companies. In fact, British exports to some countries in the region have been
steadily increasing, if only because of strong demographic growth that is bound to
continue for at least the next twenty years. In addition, Turkmenistan has huge
potential as there is an enormous need for investment in economic infrastructure,
including energy. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are projected to remain
small economies with limited opportunities.

14                                                   GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD

Opportunities originate from the region’s economic potential that as yet remain
outside the circuits of the world economy. However, the advent of Global Britain
alone will not make British companies more competitive in the region; widespread
corruption hinders trade and development.

CONCLUSION

The UK policy towards the region is based on security and predominantly its
economic concerns. The pursuit and protection of British interests demand a
level of relative stability and predictability and, as far as possible, the existence
of governments well-disposed towards the UK. Nevertheless, Central Asia is not
of paramount importance in the framework of Britain’s overall foreign policy. The
EU and transatlantic relations, as well as relations with China and India, have far
greater political and economic significance. However, following the withdrawal of
US and coalition troops from Afghanistan, the region will inevitably become more
important for British policy makers.

GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD                                                       15

CHINA
                                   Zeno Leoni

INTRODUCTION

The UK’s post-Brexit strategy for engaging with the world, at a time when the
global geopolitical landscape is changing, has been strongly criticised by Chinese
sources because, in their view, it aims to contain China. China regards Global
Britain as confirmation of the UK standing on the side of the United States in
a new Cold War between Washington and Beijing. China also believes that a
‘declining Britain’ does not have the capabilities to become an influential player in
the Indo-Pacific region. For China, therefore, Global Britain is more a question of
rhetoric rather than of reality.

CONTEXT

Sino-British relations have shifted remarkably over the past decade, progressing
from a so-called ‘Golden Era’ under David Cameron to far frostier relations during
Boris Johnson’s premiership. The ‘Golden Era’ saw the UK join the China-led
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and London host one of the first
renminbi (RMB) clearing banks outside China, in addition to significant Chinese
investments in strategic British infrastructure — such as the Hinkley Point C
nuclear power station and Thames Water.

However, the imbalanced strategy of the Cameron era — in which economic
interests undermined security calculations — increasingly came to be seen as
unsustainable following China’s human rights violations in Xinjiang and Hong
Kong, the ongoing militarization of the South China Sea and the new cold war
between China and the US, among other tensions. The UK now faces an economy–
security dilemma in its relationship with China. The pro-China camp has financial
stakes and spans a broad economic spectrum, including HSBC, Standard Chartered,
Shell and Jardine Matheson, together with many other businesses. Meanwhile,
in the anti-China camp, where security concerns are prioritised, one finds
GCHQ, UK spy agencies and a group of Conservative MPs in the China Research
Group, among others. Moreover, the view that China acted in an unhelpful and
opaque manner during the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic ‘has given …
momentum’ to the anti-China camp to end the ‘Golden Era’.

The first notable victim of this shift was the Chinese tech giant Huawei. In
2020, Boris Johnson came under intense pressure from around fifty Conservative
MPs who wanted to reduce the presence of Huawei to a 35% share of the

16                                                  GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD

British network. Further pressure also emanated from abroad, with other reports
intimating that the British government killed the 5G deal with Huawei due to
pressure from US President Donald Trump. Additionally, Sino-British relations
were shaken by reports of China’s violation of human rights in Xinjiang and Hong
Kong throughout 2019 and 2020, which led the Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab,
to declare that the treatment of Uighurs amounted to ‘one of the worst human
rights crises of our time’.

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

China’s perception of Global Britain reveals its geopolitical concerns. An official
Chinese white paper published in 2019 described the security environment as
increasingly hostile towards Beijing, stating that ‘strategic competition becomes
more acute’ while there is a ‘Cold War mentality of encirclement’, ‘[h]egemonism
and power politics’, and ‘[t]he law of the jungle and zero-sum games have found
new soil in which to breed’.

The Chinese government sees Global Britain as representing the UK’s support for
an anti-China military coalition in the Indo-Pacific, a perspective that hardened
in the Chinese media between 2020 and 2021. In early January 2020, responding
to the announcement that the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth would be
deployed to the Pacific region, a Chinese Ministry of Defence spokesperson
warned against the dispatch of British navy warships to the South China Sea. In
February 2021, the Global Times — a paper that reflects the views of the Chinese
Communist Party — stated that the UK sees this era as ‘one of a major-power
competition, where there is disorder it can take advantage of to increase its
strength and expand its influence’. It added that post-Brexit Britain ‘has shown a
tendency to take sides with Washington against Beijing’; because the UK is
‘[f]eeling more insecure’. Global Britain according to this analysis, is a means for
the UK to ‘increase, its international status’, to exploit ‘[g]lobal disorder’ and
‘make trouble’.

Since the Integrated Review, China’s view of Global Britain has become
increasingly negative. The review stressed that ‘China’s military modernisation
and growing international assertiveness within the … [Indo-Pacific] region …
will pose an increasing risk to UK interests’. Again, the Global Times reported
that Global Britain represents an ‘immature’ decision stemming from ‘London’s
fantasy of reviving its past glory as a world superpower’ but that it ‘downgrades
itself as a toady of the US’ and ‘exposes [its] over-optimism of its current
international status’. The same article denounced the UK’s new focus on the
Indo-Pacific region as a means ‘to moderate China’s global dominance’, but
concluded that ‘the so-called “competition” launched by a declining UK’ is
merely a ‘war of words’.

GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD                                                      17

This rhetoric was echoed in Chinese reactions to the Huawei ban in the summer
of 2020. The China Daily — often described as the CCP’s ‘mouthpiece’ —
argued that ‘London capitulated to Washington’s demand’, adding that ‘[r]ather
than “taking back control”, as one of the Brexit slogans misleadingly claimed,
the UK is now dancing like a puppet as Washington pulls the strings’. The UK
was described as ‘chief cheerleader’ in the US-led anti-China coalition, while
‘truly global Britain … rings as hollow as the snappy slogans’ used by the UK
government ‘which spoon-feeds them like Valium to the British public’.

OPPORTUNITIES

There are three areas that the UK should consider in its relationship with China.
On a grand strategic level, Britain and the West must rebalance their economic
and security priorities compared to the post-Cold War years. The Integrated
Review marks a step in the right direction, at least on paper, because it updates
the British government’s view of the recent international system. The UK
government needs to (re)build state-led resilience in the face of debilitating
events and regain control over sensitive industrial areas. Plans such as ‘Project
Defend’, a strategy that seeks to securitise Britain’s critical supply chains, should
be realistically financed. At the G7 in June, however, it seemed that Boris Johnson
was keen not to make this policy about China, whereas President Biden sought to
coalesce Western allies against Beijing.

On a diplomatic level, the new cold war between Washington, D.C. and Beijing
represents a source of tension for the UK, which must address the clash between
its economic and security interests in its relationship with Beijing. Yet, there
are opportunities to partner with alternative coalitions rather than taking sides.
To influence China, the UK must coordinate with its European partners to take
common actions — as in the case of recent sanctions over Xinjiang. Given the
scale of Chinese economic and political power, the UK will have to work with an
inclusive group of allies if it wants to influence the PRC, and from this viewpoint
Brexit offers no benefits. Similarly, the UK should leverage its former colonial ties
and learn from ASEAN members as to how to manage such tensions. ASEAN’s
strategy is one of neutrality and the UK should share best practices with this
group to address the economy–security dilemma in Sino-British relations.
British military endeavours in the Indo-Pacific should be coordinated
multilaterally with local powers and not be conducted ‘purely to demonstrate
military power, or as a sign of Britain’s global presence’. Nonetheless, current
Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) have been seen to achieve little
success vis-à-vis China’s subthreshold and island-building activities. Although
the British government is keen to maintain these operations, a review is required
over the next few years if an impasse is to be avoided.

18                                                   GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD

CONCLUSION

China’s view of Global Britain is not a friendly one. To Beijing, it sounds like
geostrategic encirclement. So, what may the future hold? There are two aspects
to consider. Firstly, the future relationship will depend on whether the current
deterioration in Sino-British relations is a short-term issue triggered by Covid-19
or if it has been caused by geopolitical issues such as the US–UK special
relationship. In reality, the posture of Johnson’s government remains ambiguous:
whereas China is described as a ‘systemic competitor’ in the Integrated Review,
there have been several statements confirming that the UK does not want
diplomatic tensions to undermine economic relations with Beijing. For instance,
Dominic Raab stated in a (leaked) message to civil servants that the UK ‘ought to
be trading liberally around the world’ regardless of whether commercial partners
comply with human rights standards. In addition, the G7 demonstrated that,
at the moment, the UK is less excited about the special relationship with the
US: ahead of the summit it was reported that Johnson does not find the phrase
adequate. For the time being it appears UK–China relations will be binary and
played out on two different levels, one diplomatic and the other economic.

GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD                                                  19

FRANCE
                                  Gesine Weber

INTRODUCTION

For Paris, the long-awaited Integrated Review is good news. It finally outlines the
kind of partnership France can expect from the UK, with Global Britain primarily
viewed from a security perspective. Although other major areas of cooperation —
such as trade — have been institutionalised through the EU, military cooperation
has always been considered the cornerstone of Franco-British bilateral relations.
Since Brexit, both sides have affirmed their willingness to maintain close ties
through government statements and parliamentary declarations.

The Review suggests that the UK remains limited in its ambitions for future
cooperation with the EU, asserting somewhat tersely that ‘we will work with
the EU where our interests coincide’. However, Global Britain offers major
opportunities from a French perspective. London and Paris have many shared
interests and might, despite or perhaps even because of the Brexit, find common
ground for close future cooperation. Potentially, the future of Franco-British
cooperation might lie in policy areas where the UK and France share objectives
that France cannot achieve via the EU. In Paris, there is little doubt that the UK
and France will need strong and reliable partners to realise their aspirations and to
avoid relative decline. The inclusion of the UK in flexible and ad hoc coalitions is
a priority for the French Foreign Ministry.

CONTEXT

Since the signature of the Entente Cordiale in 1904, France and the UK have
repeatedly joined forces to ensure their respective security and prosperity. Despite
different domestic nation-building processes and economic and social models,
France and the UK share many characteristics that partly account for their
common global aspirations and help explain why Paris and London often agree on
objectives while disagreeing on methods.

Both long-standing European nations founded in the 18th century, France and
the UK were involved in colonialism and power projection abroad. Both have
distinctive ties with their former colonies, reflected in their immigration histories
and also in strategic priorities and interests abroad. France, for example, describes
stability in Africa as a central French national security interest.

20                                                   GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD

As nuclear powers and permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council, France and the UK consult regularly on global security and diplomacy,
and Security Council resolutions are frequently co-sponsored by them.
Furthermore, the foreign policies of both countries are underpinned by two of
the world’s most extensive diplomatic networks, equipping France and the UK
with similar resources for engagement abroad and securing their status as global
middle powers. Thanks to similar population sizes and GDPs, the partnership can
be considered one of equals. Indeed, these shared characteristics put France and
the UK in similar positions in the international system and consequently explain
their similar aspirations.

However, their contrasting views on European integration, especially with regard
to security and defence, has historically rendered the Franco-British relationship
challenging. Whereas France has always wanted the EU to become a global power
— not least to enhance French power through the EU — the UK has often blocked
this.

However, the pragmatism that prevails in Franco-British relations has been
an indispensable catalyst for European integration and, paradoxically, even for
European defence: a Franco-British initiative paved the way for the creation of
the Western European Union in 1948 — an intergovernmental organisation that,
from the 1970s, mostly focused on military security in Europe. The 1998 Saint-
Malo declaration calling for more European military action and capabilities,
and the Le Touquet summit of 2003, organised to overcome intra-European
divergences over the Iraq war, were important Franco-British initiatives to
navigate European defence cooperation out of impasses. A Franco-British
consensus has often constituted a meaningful middle path between US and
European visions for security cooperation that other EU member states could
agree on (much as Franco-German cooperation on economic questions could often
be the basis for pan-EU consensus). The most recent treaty advancing bilateral
cooperation — the 2010 Lancaster House treaty — constitutes a comprehensive
framework for Franco-British security cooperation, for instance through the
deployment of a Comprehensive Joint Expeditionary Force or cooperation on
nuclear issues.

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

Early in 2019, French President Macron announced that he wanted to establish a
‘very special relationship’ with the UK after Brexit. The Integrated Review makes
it clear that Global Britain will only work if this relationship is established.
Aside from the US, no other country is mentioned as often in the Review as
France — a fact received with great satisfaction in Paris.

GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD                                                  21

The Integrated Review also points to a convergence of interests in areas such as
multilateralism and the focus on the Indo-Pacific. Despite differences regarding
preferred institutions and the potential of diplomacy — France has always been
more interventionist than the UK — French and British strategic cultures have
demonstrated a high degree of convergence in so far as both take their influential
positions in the international system for granted. The French self-perception
was shaped by De Gaulle’s understanding that ‘France can never be without
greatness’, and French Presidents of whichever party have sought to live up
to this ambition. With its aspiration to translate Global Britain into palpable
diplomatic action, the UK’s narrative seems bolder and — in the eyes of Paris at
least — more French. British foreign and security policy might, at least in terms
of methods, align more with French foreign policy in the coming years: although
trade remains one of the most important tools of British influence worldwide, the
UK might seek to take a leadership role among Europeans and like-minded states,
for example in international organisations, and especially on topics of global
governance such as climate change or cybersecurity. The Integrated Review’s
narrative of the promotion of universal values chimes with the French approach to
international relations.

Global Britain is thus good news for France. Yet, with rising powers striving for
their own global influence and new theatres emerging for the pursuit of French
and British interests, mitigating relative decline will for both become more
challenging than ever. Joining forces appears less like a desirable optional extra
and more like an indispensable strategy for both partners.

OPPORTUNITIES

Paradoxically, Brexit may serve as a catalyst for greater Franco-British
cooperation. During its EU membership, the UK frequently blocked intra-EU
security cooperation because the British regard NATO as the primary European
hard security organization. As many of the initiatives to bolster European
defence through the EU were sponsored by France, this led to major frustrations
with London. France and the UK often managed to cooperate bilaterally, but this
collaboration was undermined by the lack of a common strategic doctrine or their
incompatible or insufficient capabilities — for instance in Libya in 2011.

Brexit and the UK’s quest for Global Britain may alter this. On the one hand,
Paris can push for more ambitious projects for EU security and defence
integration, and President Macron constantly underlines how France has
recently done so. On the other, the quest for Global Britain provides France
with an alternative when the EU fails to meet expectations — as was the case
with Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). London has joined several

22                                                   GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD

French-led initiatives that deepen European security cooperation outside the
EU’s institutional framework — such as the European Intervention Initiative
that aims to build a common strategic culture through joint operations, or Task
Force Takuba in Mali (composed of European anti-terror special forces and fully
integrated in the French mission Barkhane).

This willingness to contribute to French initiatives is welcomed with open
arms in Paris, as the UK’s military capabilities have much to contribute to these
formats. Furthermore, Paris views such initiatives as confirmation of French
leadership in European security and defence. These flexible cooperation formats
also constitute a major opportunity for the UK. Outside the EU’s institutional
framework and operating on a purely intergovernmental, often ad hoc basis, they
align with London’s strategic priorities and serve as a relatively uncomplicated
way of showing that the UK is still a meaningful power and credible partner for
other European states. Substantively, these formats can make a real contribution
to ensuring European security, particularly in the Southern neighbourhood.

France and Britain both plan to shift their geopolitical focus to the Indo-Pacific
in the coming years. Joint action to ensure the respect of international law in the
South China Sea and to secure the respective territorial and trade interests of the
UK and France is to be expected. Yet, cooperation will pose challenges: despite
worsening relations between London and Beijing, economic cooperation between
the two countries remains crucial, and decreasing UK trade with European
countries to the benefit of China sparks French concerns about strategic
dependence.

Nevertheless, French policy makers are aware that European action in the region
will necessitate the pooling of expertise and capabilities, which will in turn
require London’s participation. The UK’s ties with countries in the region, its
capabilities and strategic assets, including several military bases in the region,
represent a necessary component of any a European approach. The UK should
be aware of this and proactively seize this opportunity by making concrete
proposals for Franco-British cooperation in the region, which could, as in the past,
constitute the starting point for broader cooperation with Paris.

CONCLUSION

The Integrated Review underlines significant convergence in terms of geopolitical
strategic interests between Paris and London. Whereas the Indo-Pacific, as the
most important theatre of international security in the years to come, almost
imposes close coordination in terms of strategic objectives and policies, the first
concrete results of UK cooperation could be generated through flexible forms of
European defence cooperation in the European neighbourhood. Policy makers in

GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD                                                     23

France are keenly aware that maintaining the role of France as a global middle
power will require greater effort in the upcoming years, and that cooperation with
the UK, thanks to similar objectives and aspirations, will be of mutual benefit. At
the same time, French aspirations to strengthen European defence cooperation
— outside the institutional framework of the CSDP when the latter fails to
deliver — can open the way to more flexible cooperation with the UK. How this
might progress during the 2022 French presidency of the Council of the European
Union, immediately ahead of the French election, will be a decisive moment for
the future of French foreign and security policy in Europe. This constitutes a
major opportunity that the UK ought not to waste.

24                                                  GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD

GERMANY
                              Nicolai von Ondarza

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between Germany and the UK has become more complex
in the wake of Brexit. On the one hand, the UK remains one of Germany’s
closest international partners, with shared values and interests, membership
of international organisations like NATO, the G7, G20 and the United Nations
as well as flexible formats like the E3 (France, Germany and the UK). With a
substantial history of joint diplomatic initiatives, the two countries recently
signed a joint declaration, in which they reaffirmed their shared values and
strategic interests and put in place a regular strategic dialogue.

On the other hand, the Brexit process has placed strain on the relationship. For
Germany, the decision by the usually ‘pragmatic’ Brits to leave the EU was a
huge shock and, together with Donald Trump’s election, provided an impetus to
focus on safeguarding the EU27’s cohesion. Consequently, Berlin was careful to
avoid bilateral talks with the UK over Brexit and put its weight behind a united
EU strategy focused on protecting the integrity of the Single Market. For the
German public, the Brexit process severely damaged the UK’s trustworthiness as
a foreign policy partner. A ‘Global Britain’ that for ideological reasons is unwilling
to cooperate with the EU is viewed with a high degree of scepticism in Berlin. This
tension, together with the ongoing difficulties between the EU and the UK in their
post-Brexit relationship, weighs heavily on an otherwise strong relationship.

CONTEXT

Germany and the UK share deep political, military and cultural ties. As one of
the three Western Allies, the UK played a key role in the foundation of the Federal
Republic of Germany as well as its Westbindung (‘Western Orientation’) in foreign
and security policy after World War II. North-Rhine Westphalia, by population
Germany’s largest state and established by the British, recently celebrated 75
years of friendship with the UK. To this day, UK military forces remain stationed
in Germany. Despite a few high-profile disagreements — for instance over
interventions in Iraq (2003) and Libya (2011) — Germany and the UK have been
on the same side of most international questions in recent decades. Notable from
a German perspective, this continued throughout the Trump administration, when
the UK and Germany, often together with France, remained aligned on issues such
as the Paris climate agreement, the Iran deal and sanctions against Russia.

GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD                                                   25

Militarily, although Germany and the UK do not have integrated forces, the two
countries have jointly contributed to, and often shaped NATO operations such as
those in Kosovo and Afghanistan, or the Baltic Air Policing. Their armed forces
regularly exchange officers and cooperate in training exercises. Economically,
Germany is the UK’s second largest export market after the USA, whereas the
UK was Germany’s third until the 2016 referendum — but has since slipped to
fifth place.

However, the last decade has also been characterised by British–German
misunderstandings around the Brexit process. From a German perspective,
Brexit has been accepted but still makes little sense. In 2016, the German public
expected the UK to vote narrowly in favour of remaining in the EU. After the
initial shock, the prevalent expectation in Germany was that the UK would
opt for a close (economic) relationship with the EU and try to cherry-pick from
the existing arrangements. As a result, Berlin worked to safeguard the Single
Market’s and EU27’s integrity. German President Steinmeier characterised
Boris Johnson, then Foreign Secretary, as an ‘irresponsible politician’ who
gambled with his country’s future and weakened its international standing.
After Johnson became Prime Minister, German public confidence in the UK as a
‘trustworthy’ ally dropped to 37%, still above Trump’s America at 19%, but far
below France with 89%. When the UK formally left the EU in January 2020,
German defence minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said the democratic
decision was to be accepted. However, Kramp-Karrenbauer added it was a ‘sad
day for Germany and Europe’ and that ‘this exit, in my conviction, is to the
strategic detriment for all countries in Europe’. German politicians
continuously misjudged the UK government’s willingness to opt for a hard
Brexit and the extent to which the UK wanted to continue to work with the
EU.

Meanwhile, successive UK governments overestimated Germany’s willingness
to push for an EU position more aligned to British interests. During his
‘renegotiation’ of the UK’s status in the EU, then-Prime Minister David Cameron
built his strategy largely on convincing Chancellor Angela Merkel to support his
agenda. During Theresa May’s premiership, the UK intensified its diplomatic
activities towards Germany while Brexiteers infamously expected German car
makers to lobby the Chancellery to open the EU’s markets to the UK. On both
occasions, the UK misjudged not only the German government, but also German
industry lobby groups, who put their focus on maintaining the Single Market
and the EU (which they regard as foundational to the German economic model).
Mutual misunderstanding, as well as close cooperation, have been hallmarks of
the relationship in recent times.

26                                                 GLOBAL BRITAIN: VIEWS FROM ABROAD