Germany and Israel Today - United by the Past, Divided by the Present?
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Germany and Israel Today United by the Past, Divided by the Present?
Germany and Israel Today Germany and Israel Today United by the Past, Divided by the Present? Authors Dr. Steffen Hagemann Dr. Roby Nathanson With a commentary by Prof. Dan Diner
Contents 4
Germany and Israel Today
Contents
Preface 6
Introduction 8
Method 10
1. The state and national identity 12
2. History and the Holocaust 20
3. Israeli-German relations today 28
4. Special relationship and responsibility 38
5. Conclusion 50
Continuity in spite of change? Thoughts on the relationship between 52
Germany and Israeli Jews – by Dan Diner
Appendix 60
References 68
About the Authors 69
Imprint 70
5
Preface
2. History and Holocaust
Preface
Liz Mohn
Vice-chair of the
Bertelsmann Stiftung
Executive Board
Because of its national history, Germany In both countries, however, many young peo-
bears a special responsibility towards the ple too are keenly interested in each other
Jewish people and the state of Israel. Ever and are committed to a future together. One
since the inception of the Bertelsmann important goal is to learn from one another,
Stiftung almost forty years ago, my husband for without such learning, we cannot succeed
and I have been committed to fostering in making our world a more equitable and
reconciliation between Germans and Israelis. more peaceful place.
On our many visits to Israel, we have always
been moved by the open and welcoming In order to continue the serious, open dialog
attitudes of its people, many of whom have between our peoples, it is important to be
become good friends of ours. Personalities aware of differences in perception and changes
like Shimon Peres, Teddy Kollek, and Dov in the way we view each other over time.
Judkowski helped us to realize important Israel is located in a political environment in
projects such as developing a German-Israeli which it is necessary to reflect on individual
Young Leaders Exchange Program, fostering perspectives – which makes it all the more
an institute for teaching democratic values, important to be aware of the hopes and fears
equality, and acceptance, and founding the of the population. The present study aims to
first school of journalism in Israel. contribute to this awareness. It is based on a
recent survey in which over 2,000 people in
Germany and Israel have drawn closer to- Germany and Israel were interviewed about
gether in the past decades, maintaining close their personal attitudes and convictions.
relations on all levels and across a broad
spectrum of fields, largely thanks to the
efforts of the generations who experienced
the horrors of the Nazi past at first hand.
These people understood the importance of
working for reconciliation and paving the
way towards a shared future.
6Germany and Israel Today
The findings of this survey can help us to un-
derstand and respect each other not only in
our similarities, but also – and perhaps espe-
cially – in our diversity. This understanding
is of crucial importance in our globalized
world. Additionally, discovering common
ground is dependent on personal encounters
and open dialog based on genuine interest
in one another. It is familiarity that breeds
understanding, and understanding is the
foundation on which we can build trust and
friendship.
7Introduction
2. History and Holocaust
Introduction
May 2015 will mark the fiftieth anniversary the most recent escalation in the conflict
of German-Israeli diplomatic relations. Dur between Israel and Hamas in the summer of
ing these fifty years, the two countries have 2014 brought deep-rooted emotions to the
intensified their political and economic ties surface. The war in the Middle East trig
and drawn closer together in a wide variety gered an increase in anti-Semitic activity in
of social spheres. They have also launched Germany that even included acts of physical
a number of joint projects such as coopera- violence against Jews. The criticism leveled
tive business and research endeavors, joint at the Israeli government in public discourse
cultural initiatives, and numerous encounter was often based on anti-Semitic stereotypes,
programs for young people from both coun- while the policies of the Israeli government
tries. All these efforts attest to the special were compared with those of the Nazis.
significance of the bilateral relations bet-
ween Israel and Germany, which also shows Thus it seems appropriate to examine the
in the annual consultations between the two exact nature of the relationship between the
governments, which began in 2008 to mark Germans and the Jewish population of Israel.
the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of What do the people of each country think
the state of Israel. about each other, what importance do they
place on the remembrance of Nazi crimes,
As a consequence of Germany’s responsibil and what do they think about German and
ity for the Holocaust, the country’s commit- Israeli policies? And finally, how have these
ment to Israel’s right to existence and to perceptions and attitudes changed in recent
bearing joint responsibility for its security years?
ranks among the seemingly unshakable
cornerstones of German foreign policy. A clear understanding of the ways in which
Leading political figures have reaffirmed Germany and Israel perceive each other
this commitment on numerous occasions. is crucial for the future of their bilateral
However, the relationship between the two relations, since the attitudes underlying
countries cannot by any stretch be descri- these perceptions may serve as indicators
bed as normal; it remains colored by the for potential future crises and challenges
past and its fragility is evident in many of and thus provide early warning signs for the
the controversies that have arisen in recent benefit of those dedicated to fostering dialog
years – such as that surrounding Günter and understanding between the two nations.
Grass’s poem “What must be said.” Similarly,
8Germany and Israel Today
This is the reasoning behind the Bertels- Our thanks go first of all to the authors Roby
mann Stiftung’s decision to reprise its 2007 Nathanson and Steffen Hagemann for their
demoscopic study and commission a new analysis and evaluation of the survey data.
survey, for which approximately 1,000 people Additionally, special thanks are also due to
over the age of 18 were interviewed in each Dan Diner for his commentary and review
of the two countries in 2013. Because of of the findings. We would also like to thank
the nature of the inquiry, the Israeli part of Roland Imhoff and Stephan Stetter for their
the survey was limited to Jewish citizens. support in the development and evaluation
Most, though not all, of the questions were of the questionnaire as well as TNS Emnid
identical in both representative studies. Also in Germany and TNS Teleseker in Israel for
available were the data from a 1991 survey conducting the surveys.
commissioned by the magazine Der Spie-
gel which, like the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Stephan Vopel
Director
surveys, sought to analyze and compare the
Living Values Program
attitudes and perceptions of Germans and
Israelis. For some of the questions, therefore,
comparisons over a longer time frame were
possible.
In order to verify whether attitudes in the
German population had changed appreci-
ably since the beginning of 2013, mainly
due to the Gaza war in the summer of 2014,
seven of the questions were asked again in a
representative survey in Germany in October
2014. The results show that many attitudes
remain relatively stable over time. However,
the German population had a significantly
lower opinion of Israel in October 2014 than
at the time of the 2013 survey and seems to
be increasingly frustrated and perplexed by
the issue of whether to support Israel or the
Palestinians.
9Method
2. History and Holocaust
Method
The data were collected through telephone interviews, using a Computer-Assisted
Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system, according to the following parameters:
Country Population Sample Size Dates of Fielding
Germany 18+ 1,000 7-19/1/2013
Israel (Jews) 18+ 1,001 7-10/1/2013
Similar surveys were conducted in Israel and Germany in both 1991 and 2007
in cooperation with local partners TNS Teleseker; some of the questions were
repeated here for tracking purposes (comparing data over time), while others were
original. The German data were collected by TNS Emnid. Data collection in Ger-
many began with a pilot study that was used to determine the proper proportions
of landlines and mobile phones, and then a dual-frame method was used to reach
samples of both landlines and mobile users.
The survey results have a 90-percent confidence rate and the margin of error is
+/–3 percent for n = 1,000.
With reference to the Israeli data, it should be noted that Arab citizens of Israel
were not surveyed. The Israeli sample included in this survey was limited to
Jewish respondents, since the results regarding the relationship between the two
countries are directly related to ethnicity.
10Germany and Israel Today
111. The state and national identity
1. THistory
2. he state
and
and
Holocaust
national identity
The memory of the Holocaust has greatly “The memory of the
affected the political culture of German and Holocaust has greatly affected
Israeli society since World War II. Narratives
of national identity had to relate to the per-
the political culture of
secution of the Jewish people in one way or German and Israeli society.”
another. History therefore not only continues
to shape self-awareness and constructions
of collective identity, but also remains a neg In Israel, the history of the Holocaust consti-
ative reference point in bilateral relations. tuted an important narrative of justification
After World War II, German society experi- for the founding of the state in that, accor-
enced a rupture of identity: The Holocaust ding to the Zionist leadership, the destruc-
made it difficult to identify with the nation tion of Europe’s Jewry was the ultimate
in an unambiguously positive way. The con- proof of the necessity of a Jewish State. This
sciousness of complete defeat and collective self-conception of Israel shapes its national
catastrophe weakened a nationalism that identity to this day. Moreover, narratives of
had previously flourished. In the first decade justification retain a high relevance in the
after World War II, this crisis of identity was Israeli discourse, since the state-building
overcome by disregarding or even suppres- enterprise is an unfinished project which
sing the memory of the Holocaust. It was is challenged from both the inside and the
not until later that the commemoration of outside. In the following chapter we will
the persecution of the Jews gained relevance discuss the effects of these different political
and importance for the German collective cultures on national identification and collec-
memory. Since then, criticism of any form of tive identity formation.
national belonging and universal values and
norms have become constitutive factors in Nation and identity
the reshaping of German identity. But at the
same time, traditions of an ethnic under In total, 80 percent of Germans agree with
standing of German nationalism remain the statement that being German is an
anchored in German political culture. important part of their identity, but less
than half (40 percent) of them feel strong
agreement (see figure 1). In Israel, an over-
whelming majority of 90 percent agrees that
being Israeli is important, with 74 percent
having a strong national attachment.
12Germany and Israel Today
Figure 1: Identification with own country (%)
100
80
60 40
74
40
22
20
18 10
6
0
Germany Israel
Scale 1 (“I fully agree“) 6 (“I absolutely disagree“). Displayed are responses 1, 2 and 3.
Response of “1” (Fully agree) Response of “2” Response of “3”
Agreement with the statement: “Being German/Israeli is an important part of my identity.”
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
A similar pattern emerges on the question the agreement rate is 62 percent (see figure
of the moral superiority of the respective 2). Nearly 80 percent agree that Israel is
nation: 40 percent of Germans agree some- very moral compared to other nations, and
what strongly with the statement that their nearly half completely agree (three times
country is very moral compared to other more than the Germans who completely
countries – far fewer than in Israel, where agree with a similar statement about their
131. The state and national identity
Figure 2: Attitudes towards morality of own country (%)
80
15
60
46
25
40
16
20
36
17
0
Germany Israel
Scale 1 (“I fully agree“) 6 (“I absolutely disagree“). Displayed are responses 1, 2 and 3.
Response of “1” (Fully agree) Response of “2” Response of “3”
Agreement with the statement: “Compared to other nations Germany/Israel is a very moral nation.”
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
country – the total agreement is similar in Our findings reveal that 14 percent firmly
both communities, but Germans take a much believe that it is disloyal for Germans to
more qualified stance). The fact that, despite criticize Germany (a total of half agree at
the Holocaust, 76 percent of Germans con- some level), and roughly half do not agree –
sider Germany (to varying degrees) to be a while two-thirds of Israelis view criticism
very moral nation compared to other nations as disloyalty. We will discuss this in more
might be connected to the commemoration detail below.
or Aufarbeitung of the Holocaust in Germany
and the country’s resultant self-image of a
“mature nation” that has learned the lessons
of the past.
These data reveal a dichotomy that is typical
of German feelings today: While the national
and cultural identity is clearly important, it
is considered wrong or even dangerous in
the post-war environment to be too openly
demonstrative about national pride for fear
of cultivating nationalism. German national
attachment therefore remains strong but
more qualified than in Israel.
14Germany and Israel Today
Figure 3: Attitudes towards criticism of own country (%)
80
60
37
14
40
14
11
20
22 18
0
Germany Israel
Scale 1 (“I fully agree”) 6 (“I absolutely disagree”). Displayed are responses 1, 2 and 3.
Response of “1” (Fully agree) Response of “2” Response of “3”
Agreement with the statement: “It is disloyal when Germans criticize Germany / when Israelis criticize Israel.”
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
We have seen that national pride runs high state. Certainly the strength of the senti-
among the Israeli Jews sampled here. This ments expressed by Israeli respondents con-
has been the case in the past as well: In the trasts with the more cautious and restrained
late 1990s through the mid-2000s, when German sense of identity.
Jewish Israelis were asked whether they
were proud to be Israeli, roughly 90 percent On the subject of national identity, we
expressed pride (Arian, Barnea and Ben-Nun have already seen that two-thirds of Israeli
2004). There was a slight decline in the level respondents believe that it is disloyal for
of pride as measured by this question in Israelis to criticize Israel. This contrasts with
2004, by a few percentage points, but in certain periods in Israel’s past when clear
recent years Jewish Israelis have expressed distinctions were drawn between acceptable
similar levels of pride (see the time series in criticism and activities hostile to the state.
Israeli Democracy Index surveys, 2003–2012). For example, the first Lebanon War in 1982
Given intensifying international criticism of ushered in a period in which Israelis could
Israel’s policies and the fact that Israelis are criticize state policy without accusations of
increasingly aware of such external criticism, being disloyal to the state. This era drew to a
the current high levels of patriotism in the close somewhere in the mid-1990s, when the
Israeli self-image may be fuelled partly by country responded with anger to a wave of
defensiveness and even by the fear that the terrorist strikes and came to view left-wing
legitimacy of Israel is in question, and in the critique as siding with the enemy – and
face of these concerns, respondents may therefore as inherently hostile to the state.
even be willing to sacrifice critical thinking
about the country in order to protect the
151. The state and national identity
More than twice as many Israelis say they are capable of sharing values in any perma-
“fully agree” that criticism is disloyal as nent way has permeated Israeli political life
among the German sample, and precisely from the beginning of statehood: The first
twice as many agree as disagree. The reason election created a Constitutional Assembly,
for this discrepancy is probably that, in Ger- but although this body was charged with
many, there are clearer definitions of citizen- writing a constitution, it failed to do so. The
ship and of what it means to be German. The Assembly transformed itself into the first
clearly demarcated lines of belonging in the Knesset, but Israel remains without a formal
German polity make society less defensive written constitution to this day, a marker of
about the state, since criticism does not ap- the country’s inability to reconcile its dis-
pear to threaten the identity of the country. tinct and different social components.
“In Germany, criticism does not
In Germany, the social contract is somewhat
stronger. German society is believed to con-
appear to threaten the identity sist of a fairly clearly defined and unified
of the country.” people with a common cultural identity.
Despite many challenges and upheavals at
the level of the state, the German people
This is not yet the case in Israel, which has
have historically been rather clearly delin
yet to define conclusively who belongs and
eated and not widely dispersed either geo-
does not belong to the body politic.
graphically or culturally, so that they have
had enough similar experiences to generate
There is very little demographic variation in
a sense of shared community. Modern Ger-
these feelings, save for one: Secular people
many has made strenuous efforts to hammer
are less likely to believe criticism is disloyal.
out shared social norms and values that
Just over half (58 percent) of non-religious
break from its past – indeed, with the ex-
Israelis hold this view, while religious people
press objective of breaking from its past –
are significantly more likely to do so – three-
and this is one of the reasons for its stronger
quarters of religious Israelis regard criticism
sense of social solidarity.
as disloyal. The attitudes of respondents who
describe themselves as traditional are closer
to religious people’s: 70 percent view such “Modern Germany’s express
self-criticism as disloyal.
objective of breaking
Shared society, lessons from the from its past is one of the reasons
past, and the Other for its sense
of social
solidarity.”
While a majority of Israelis believe that their
society shares clear attitudes, traditions and
values, a lower proportion of Israelis than At the same time, as will be discussed in
Germans holds this belief (74 percent com- greater detail below, 58 percent of Germans
pared to 82 percent, figure 4), and nearly half consider strong growth among the country’s
(43 percent) give only cautious agreement. cultural or religious minorities to be menac-
In light of class differences and the deep divi- ing to some degree. The positive self-image
sions in Israeli society between Jewish and of Germans seems to be increasingly chal-
Arab, religious and secular, immigrant and lenged by the growing ethnic, cultural, and
“veteran” people, it is not surprising that Israe- religious diversity in Germany. In debates
lis lack confidence in a collective identity. In about how to redefine German identity, such
fact, the uncertainty about whether Israelis as the Leitkultur (leading culture) discussion,
16Germany and Israel Today
Figure 4: Persistence of national character (%)
100
80
24
60 31
29
40
20
20
29
23
0
Germany Israel
Scale 1 (“I fully agree”) 6 (“I absolutely disagree”). Displayed are responses 1, 2 and 3.
Response of “1” (Fully agree) Response of “2” Response of “3”
Agreement with the statement: “You will always be able to describe Germans/Israelis on the basis of certain traditions and beliefs.”
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
Muslim immigrants have increasingly as-
sumed the function of the Other: Survey data
“Social surveys have
show that Germans tend to hold negative repeatedly shown that
attitudes towards Muslims, with only about a Israelis view the Jewish-Arab
third reporting “positive feelings” (Pollack et
divide as the deepest division
al. 2010). In the public discourse, proponents
of cultural nationalism define the German in Israeli society.”
nation in a way that excludes Muslim immi-
grants from in-group membership. Although In the Israeli context, Jews would primari-
the adherents of a more liberal, inclusive ly associate the concept of the Other with
approach to German national identity based Arabs. Social surveys have repeatedly shown
on egalitarianism, tolerance, and the pro- that Israelis view the Jewish-Arab divide as
tection of minorities do extend the promise the deepest division in Israeli society, and
of membership to Muslim immigrants, even if anything the perception of Jewish-Arab
liberal nationalism demands that immigrants relations may have deepened over the last
become culturally assimilated to some de- decade. Among young people, for example,
gree. For example, some federal states have a study conducted in 1998 showed that
laws that forbid public school teachers from the top-ranked social schism was between
wearing the Muslim headscarf, and foreign religious and secular, but in two subsequent
nationals seeking German citizenship are tracking surveys from 2004 onward, the
required to take a naturalization test. Jewish-Arab divide was ranked highest
(Hexel and Nathanson 2010). In consider
ing Israeli attitudes towards the Other, it
171. The state and national identity
Figure 5: Lessons from history: Attitudes and values (%)
In a democracy, the rights
of the individual should not 22 19 48
be limited under any 21 16 26
circumstances
The legal protection of
ethnic and religious 27 25 28
minorities is one of the most
pressing tasks in our society 29 16 21
I consider it menacing
when cultural or religious 26 15 17
minorities in my own country 26 12 25
increase significantly
Scale 1 (“I fully agree”) 6 (“I absolutely disagree”). Displayed are responses 1, 2 and 3.
Israel Germany
Response of “1” (Fully agree) Response of “1” (Fully agree)
Response of “2” Response of “2”
Response of “3” Response of “3”
Agreement with the above statements.
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
is worth noting that the Arab community These differences between Germany and
in Israel is itself diverse even when viewed Israel can be explained by the lessons of
from the perspective of Israeli Jews. Druze World War II and by the historical and politi-
Arabs and some Bedouins, for example, even cal contexts of both countries. The Holocaust
serve in the Israeli army, but they are still is regarded by Germans as an event which
commonly lumped together as an out-group. negatively constitutes their national identity,
Therefore, the findings indicate that when which underwent highly contested, ambiva-
Israeli Jews ask themselves how Arabs think lent and contradictory processes of transfor-
and feel, they probably rely on one-dimen- mation in order to replace old traditions and
sional, negative cultural stereotypes. Since collectivist ideologies with universalistic
Arab citizens are obviously associated with values and norms. The survey shows that
the community viewed as the enemy (the this universalism, understood as a lesson of
Palestinians), the respondents also are less World War II and the Holocaust, has become
enthusiastic than Germans about advancing a constitutive factor in German national
legal protections for “ethnic and religious identity: 89 percent of Germans affirm the
minorities” (a term which most Israelis will absolute primacy of individual rights which
associate with Arabs) as a pressing need. should not be limited under any circumstan
Two-thirds support this statement, but this ces, while 80 percent agree that the legal
is significantly fewer than among German protection of ethnic and religious minorities
respondents (80 percent; see figure 5). is one of the most pressing tasks in society.
Both individual rights and the protection of
18Germany and Israel Today
minorities can be considered shared values. percent compared to 48 percent). Further,
But, unlike in Israel, these liberal commit- not all groups are equally convinced that
ments have hardly been put to the test in personal rights trump all: Just over half of
Germany, which has a physically safe geo- religious respondents in Israel (54 percent)
graphical location within Europe and a more agree compared to two-thirds of non-reli-
homogeneous population than that of Israel, gious respondents. Those with lower levels of
where a national minority accounts for more education are evenly divided.
than a fifth of the population. The fear of
growing ethnic and religious minorities in
Germany among 58 percent of the popula- “Germany does not have
tion is a warning sign that, in times of crisis,
liberal values cannot be taken for granted.
the same sense of
uncertainty and
impermanence about its existence.“
“Unlike in Israel,
liberal commitments These figures substantiate the fact that
have hardly been put to the Germany and Israeli have very different ex-
test in Germany.“ periences of the present, and this is reflected
in their attitudes towards national identity
and democratic values. Israel is living with
Israelis do share the commitment to demo- the constant possibility of attack and defeat
cratic principles, but in a more qualified way on both the military and the political front.
which reflects their different post-war experi- Germany, with all its internal complexities
ences and the country’s intractable conflicts. related to identity, including the question of
Nearly twice as many Israelis agree than minority rights and inclusion in society, does
disagree that individual freedoms should not have the same sense of uncertainty and
never be limited. However, there is much impermanence about its existence (this is es-
less agreement with that statement among pecially true after the fall of the Berlin Wall).
Israelis than among Germans, who display In the case of Israel, in contrast, the deep
a far greater commitment to freedom of the underlying threat creates an impediment to
individual. The response to this question fully embracing liberal democratic values
highlights the self-perception among Israelis even though the majority of the population
that they embrace democratic norms; yet would prefer to do so.
the open acknowledgment of over one-third
that they disagree with an injunction against
limiting individual rights quite certainly
reflects the basic understanding, shared by
many Israelis, that the constant danger to
Israel’s security – which, in the eyes of Isra-
elis, threatens the country’s very existence
– warrants the overriding of personal rights.
This is a stark contrast to Germany, which,
as noted above, does not perceive itself to
be under existential and security threats, so
that respondents here see no need to over-
ride individual rights. In Israel, those who
agree fully with this principle do so far less
strongly than their German counterparts (26
192. History and the Holocaust
2. History and the
Holocaust
Holocaust
Commemorating the past is closely related Continued relevance of the
to the construction and legitimization of Holocaust or call for closure?
national identities. Thus the interpretation
of the past is always influenced by the needs After 1945, it was no longer politically feasi-
of the present and by changing historical ble to promote an unambiguously positive
and societal conditions. In this sense, the national identity in Germany. The Holocaust
Holocaust and National Socialism remain acted as a negative reference point for any
highly relevant and continue to influence reconstruction of collective narratives and
self-perception, national narratives and the identifications. With generational change
perception of the Other, albeit in dynamic and the passage of almost 70 years now
and contested processes. causing the events of World War II to recede
in the public memory, there is little question
that Germans desire to move away from their
“Each society has its own
past. A large majority of 77 percent agrees
understanding and in a general sense that it is time to leave the
perceptions past behind and to focus on the problems of
of the present-day
the present and future.
relevance of history.“ A slightly higher proportion of respondents
supports this in the specific case of the
history of German persecution of the Jews,
The following chapter will discuss the ways as figure 7 shows: 81 percent of the German
in which Germans and Israelis relate to the sample prefer to put the history of the Holo-
Holocaust cognitively and emotionally. As we caust behind them, and 37 percent support
saw in the preceding chapter, the two socie- that statement strongly. Even though this
ties have some characteristics in common, group is smaller than the combined groups
but each also has its own understanding and whose approval is more qualified, a majority
perceptions of the present-day relevance of Germans is in favour of explicit closure
of history in general and the Holocaust in and no longer wishes to talk so much about
particular. the persecution of Jews.
20Germany and Israel Today
Figure 6: Leaving the past behind (%)
80
60 39
40 24
19 11
20
19 19
0
Germany Israel
0 7 9
7 8
20 9
28
40
60
80
Scale 1 (“I fully agree”) 6 (“I absolutely disagree”). Displayed are responses 1, 2 and 3
as agreement and responses 4, 5 and 6 as disagreement.
Response of “1” (Fully agree) Response of “2” Response of “3”
Response of “4” Response of “5” Response of “6”
Agreement with the statement: “We should put the history behind us and focus more on current or future problems.”
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
212. History and the Holocaust
Figure 7: Focus on current problems (%)
100
80
60 37
27
40
21
17
20
23 20
0
Germany Israel
0 6
5 6
8
7
20 19
40
60
80
100
Scale 1 (“I fully agree”) 6 (“I absolutely disagree”). Displayed are responses 1, 2 and 3
as agreement and responses 4, 5 and 6 as disagreement.
Response of “1” (Fully agree) Response of “2” Response of “3”
Response of “4” Response of “5” Response of “6”
Agreement with the statement: “We should focus on current problems rather than on the crimes committed by the Germans against the
Jews more than 60 years ago.” Not included: “Don't know, no response.”
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
In Germany the persecution of Jews is move away from the focus on the history of
viewed as a dark chapter in German history, Jewish persecution is rising steadily: from
but not as an essential part of its identity; one-fifth (20 percent) in 1991 who disagreed
quite the opposite. Germans would prefer with the statement above, to just over one-
to view it as an anomaly. While there is no third (37 percent) in 2007, to nearly half
desire to deny history, the German public is (42 percent) in the most recent survey,
clearly committed to cultivating a positive which dates from 2013.
German identity based on other aspects of
its culture, not this particular ignominious The survey reveals a significant ageing effect
chapter of its past. which could not yet be discerned in 2007.
Whereas 67 percent of the younger respon-
As a matter of fact, figure 8 shows that more dents below age 40 are in favor of closure,
than half (55 percent) agree with the state- only 51 percent of the older respondents
ment that “Today, almost 70 years after the agree with that position. The call for closure
end of World War II, we should no longer talk is supported by the majority of the genera-
so much about the persecution of the Jews, tion born after 1970, whose parents were
but finally put the past behind us.” However, often not directly involved in the crimes of
over the last two decades, the percentage the National Socialist regime. The growing
of Germans who disagree with the need to historical distance seems to correlate with
22Germany and Israel Today
Figure 8: “Putting the past behind us” (%)
80
60
40
60 58 55
20
24 24 22
0
1991 2007 2013 1991 2007 2013
Germany Israel
0
20 8
20 37 42
40 74 74 77
60
80
Right Wrong
Question: “Today, almost 70 years after the end of the Second World War, we should no longer talk so much about the persecution of
the Jews, but finally put the past behind us. Do you think this statement is right or wrong?” Not included: “Don’t know, no response.”
Source: TNS Emnid 1991, 2007, 2013
a desire to reconstruct a more positive and Israeli respondents, unlike Germans, have
future-oriented national identity, a develop- remained fairly consistent over time in their
ment which indicates an important challenge attitudes towards history. The sample is
for collective memory in Germany as the divided regarding history in a general sense,
history of the Holocaust becomes more and but there is a clear and strong majority in
more disconnected from familial experiences favor of active remembrance of the Holo-
and oral histories. caust. The statement that it is not necessary
to talk so much about the persecution of Jews
Moreover, emotions run high on this topic, anymore, but to think more about the future
especially among the younger generation. instead, is considered wrong by fully 77
Many Germans feel angry that they are still percent of Israeli respondents. The portion
being blamed for the crimes of Germany of Jewish Israelis who disagree that 70 years
against the Jews: 66 percent agree with a after World War II the persecution of the
statement to this effect, while one-third dis Jews should be consigned to the past has
agree. The younger the respondents, the even risen by a few percentage points since
more likely they are to feel outright anger: 1991 (74 percent) (see figure 8).
Almost 80 percent of the youngest age group
(18–29) are angry, compared to 58 percent Referring to a related question, whether it
of the oldest (60 and over), which still consti is time to leave the past behind in general
tutes a strong majority. Among the younger and concentrate on contemporary and future
respondents in this survey, there seems to issues, a small majority of 54 percent agrees
be a yearning for “being German” to be re- (including one-quarter who fully agree), and
garded as something “normal” (see figure 9). almost half the respondents (45 percent)
232. History and the Holocaust
Figure 9: Anger that crimes against Jews are still held
against Germans (%)
a) Total b) By age group
80
60
40 79
71 65
66 62
58
20
0
18 to 29 30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 ≥ 60
years years years years years
Displayed are figures for “I fully agree” + “I tend to agree”
Agreement with the statement: “It makes me angry when the crimes committed against Jews are still held against Germans today.”
Respondents ranked their opinion as “I fully agree,” “I tend to agree,” “I tend not to agree” or “I absolutely disagree.”
The question was not posed in Israel.
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
disagree. Those who disagree with the need these dynamics through their incendiary
to leave history in general behind probably rhetoric against Israel. Iran under former
reflect the strong majority in the question President Ahmadinejad provided ample
about the need to remember the events of fodder by reiterating the goal of destroying
World War II (see figure 6). Israel; this rhetoric was exploited and
emphasized constantly by Israeli Prime
In general, there is a strong emphasis in Minister Netanyahu to drive home the fear
Israeli society on the 20th-century persecu of existential threats.
tion of the Jews that preceded and contributed
to the founding of the Jewish state, which is Still, the majority prefers to leave the past
viewed as a historical inevitability, and the behind. Since this was asked in a general
state is deemed the only possible means of part of the survey, respondents may have
guaranteeing survival. This was one of the interpreted the question fairly broadly. For
primary findings of a survey by Nathanson many, “the past” probably means the perse-
and Tzameret (2000). Furthermore, in Israel cutions of the 20th century and the accompa-
today, modern threats against Israel, such as nying stereotype of the weak and victimized
Iran or the enmity with the Palestinians, are European Jew.
commonly conflated with or at least viewed
as a historical continuation of the anti-Semitic
persecutions not only of the 19th and 20th
centuries, but of earlier periods as well. Both
Iran and the Palestinians have contributed to
24Germany and Israel Today
“In the early years of its statehood, If the Nazi era is considered an anomaly
and a phenomenon unconnected with a
Israel consciously sought to
specific “German character,” it becomes
cultivate a national easier to develop a positive national identity.
identity based on the It is therefore no surprise that German
archetype of a strong, respondents identified external factors as
the main driving force behind the rise of the
assertive, and powerful Nazis: 61 percent believe that poor economic
Israeli Jew.” conditions and high unemployment helped
National Socialism come to power. In con-
In the early years of its statehood, Israel con- trast, the top reason given by Israelis was
sciously sought to leave this image behind in a character trait of the Germans, namely
order to cultivate a national identity based on their tendency to follow orders. Over half,
the archetype of a strong, assertive, and pow- 54 percent, view the “German character”
erful Israeli Jew. On the other hand, the pre- as a reason (twice as many as the German
ceding questions about Israelis who criticize respondents who agree with this). Despite
the country and the rights of minorities and these differences, it is quite surprising that
their growing presence in society may have respondents from both countries gave rather
caused some respondents to call to mind similar answers concerning the German ten-
the current conflict and its ramifications. If dency to follow orders, their fear of Nazi ter-
respondents were thinking of the narrative ror, and the economic crisis as contributing
of Palestinian suffering at the hands of factors. Israelis and Germans agree that both
Jews, including the events surrounding the external circumstances and the obedience
founding of the state, some may have stated to authority of many Germans caused the
a preference for leaving the past behind in Holocaust (see figure 10).
order to avoid addressing these issues.
Regret, guilt, responsibility?
Historical representations of the Memory and emotions
Holocaust
Commemorating the past is not only a cogni-
The desire for closure and the willingness to tive process, but also an emotional one.
leave the past behind might also be related
to different explanations of the Holocaust
among German and Israeli respondents.
“Memory evokes
emotions, which should
“If the Nazi era is considered not be construed as individual
an anomaly and a phenomenon but as group-based
unconnected with and social.”
the ‘German character,’
it becomes easier to develop a
positive national identity.”
252. History and the Holocaust
Figure 10: Presumed causes of National Socialism and the Holocaust (%)
“The Germans’ blind 67
trust in authorities” 53
“The Germans’ 54
basic character” 27
“The bad economic 52
situation and high
61
unemployment”
“The Germans’ fear 44
of Nazi terror” 45
Israel Germany
Question: “What were the causes of National Socialism and the Holocaust in Germany? Please use a scale of 1 to 5 when rating each of
the following answers. The cause was…?” Scale: 1 (“I fully agree”) to 5 (“I absolutely disagree”). Depicted responses: “1” + “2.”
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
Memory evokes emotions, which should not Perhaps most remarkably, similar numbers
be construed as individual but as group- of Germans and Israelis – just over one-third
based and social. Emotions can be felt as in each case – feel guilty and almost the
part of a group, such as shame or pride for same number – 56 percent and 55 percent
actions committed by other members of the among Germans and Israelis, respectively –
group, while society simultaneously provides feel responsible (see figure 11).
its members with guidelines for what to feel.
Moreover, emotional intensity indicates the The data about guilt indicate that a majority
salience and relevance of a topic for indi- of Germans – the two-thirds who did not
viduals and groups. It is therefore of prime say they feel “guilty” – feel removed enough
importance to assess the nature and from the war generation to move beyond
intensity of the emotions which the com personal guilt, while the fact that over half
memoration of the persecution of the Jews the German respondents (56 percent) feel re-
elicits among Germans and Israelis. sponsible shows that responsibility is a more
widely acknowledged theme than personal
Of particular interest are the uncanny guilt. With the growing historical distance,
similarities between German and Israeli it seems that less intensive emotions and
feelings about the Holocaust at the present feelings such as responsibility and regret in-
time. In both countries, roughly 90 percent crease (though 83 percent also feel outrage).
feel regret and over 80 percent are outraged; However, 39 percent declare that they feel
half of the Jews and 60 percent of Germans indifferent to the persecution of Jews under
feel shame, while half of each group feel fear. Hitler.
26Germany and Israel Today
Figure 11: Emotions when respondents think of the persecution
of the Jews (%)
7 7 77
Regret
11 18 60
10 11 64
Outrage
14 18 51
12 8 35
Responsibility
21 15 20
13 9 29
Fear
21 10 17
10 6 33
Shame
19 15 26
7 5 24
Guilt
13 8 14
13 5 12
Indifference
20 11 8
15 9 26
Revenge
Not asked in Germany
Scale 1 (“very strongly”) 6 (“not at all”). Displayed are responses 1, 2 and 3.
Israel Germany
Response of “1” (Very strongly) Response of “1” (Very strongly)
Response of “2” Response of “2”
Response of “3” Response of “3”
Question: “When you think of the persecution of Jews under Hitler, how strongly do you experience the following emotions …”
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
Among Israelis, the one-third who express relatively healthy attitudes towards Germany
guilt most likely indicates a feeling that (as will be seen below), it is not clear who
the Jews themselves did not take action to would be the target of any active feelings of
protect themselves sufficiently or in time. vengeance.
Most likely, this feeling is accompanied by
the sense that the state of Israel provides
the framework for Jews to meet any such
threat swiftly and powerfully in the future
or to pre-empt it. In the latter context, it is
notable that half of the Israeli sample says
that for them, the Holocaust raises feelings
of vengeance – but given the prevalence of
273. Israeli-German relations today
3. IHistory
2. sraeli-German
and Holocaust
relations
today
History shapes not only the self-awareness Yet, it needs to be borne in mind that an
and collective identity of Germans and interest in finding out more about what
Israelis and the way they define otherness, is happening in other countries is always
but also bilateral relations. Bilateral relations linked to the turn of current events. This
remain marked by the trauma of the Holo- fact may help to explain the high proportions
caust and are therefore perceived as special (31 percent) which were registered in 1991
– despite growing indifference and calls for among the population of Israel with regard
the normalization of relations. to interest in information about Germany.
At the time the arson attacks against immi-
grants and refugees became a source of
“Bilateral relations concern throughout the world, and for this
reason the Israeli desire for information
remain marked and are therefore
about what was happening in Germany briefly
perceived as special despite shot up. Thus it does not come as a surprise
growing indifference and that the current interest in information about
calls for the normalization Germany is at a much lower level than in 1991.
of relations.” Germans tend to underestimate the enduring
influence of the Holocaust on the perception
and image of Germany among Jewish Israe-
Israelis are aware that the history of the
lis: 43 percent of German respondents think
Holocaust colors their views today – over
that the past hardly constitutes a burden
three-quarters say that this history has
to present relations compared to only 21
a negative impact on their feelings about
percent in Israel (see figure 13).
contemporary Germany. However, negative
feelings linked to the past do not sour rela-
tions with the modern state of Germany and
at present manifest themselves mainly in
the form of indifference: Only 16 percent
say that they express much interest in
Germany today, and this figure is almost
identical to that of 2007 (see figure 12).
28Germany and Israel Today
Figure 12: Interest in information about the other country (%)
60
60
40 56
46
40 38 38
20 31 30 30
27 28
22 23
16
13
0
2007 2013 1991 2007 2013 2007 2013 1991 2007 2013 2007 2013 1991 2007 2013
Germany Israel Germany Israel Germany Israel
Very strong/Strong Moderate Weak/None at all
Question: “How would you describe your level of interest in information about present-day Germany/Israel. Very strong, strong, moderate,
weak, none at all?” Not included: “Don’t know, no response.” This question was not posed in Germany in 1991.
Source: TNS Emnid 1991, 2007, 2013
293. Israeli-German relations today
Figure 13: Influence of the persecution of the Jews on Israeli attitudes
towards Germans (%)
80
78 77
73
60
58
52 52
40 43
39 38
20 26
21
19
0
1991 2007 2013 1991 2007 2013
Germany Israel
None/Somewhat Fairly strong/Very strong
Question: “Does the persecution of the Jews under Hitler still affect the attitude of the Israelis towards the Germans? Is its influence very
strong, fairly strong, somewhat present, or is there no influence at all?” Not included: “Don't know, no response.”
Source: TNS Emnid 1991, 2007, 2013
Interest in and perception of German respondents in this survey are
the Other divided equally between favorable and
unfavorable views of Israel: 46 percent vs.
Despite the fact that some predominantly 42 percent. Very few – only 4 percent – say
young, secular Israelis are relocating to that their view is strongly favorable, while
the German capital, and despite a modest twice as many express strong negative feel-
increase of interest in the Other, the majority ings. By contrast, Israelis feel notably more
of Israelis have only a lukewarm interest or positive about Germans: 12 percent express
no interest at all in present-day Germany. strongly positive feelings about Germany –
Germans seem to be more interested in three times as many as the Germans who
Israel, with nearly a quarter expressing very feel this way about Israel. However, there has
strong or strong interest. This disparity can been some improvement in attitudes towards
probably be explained (at least partly) by Israel compared to 2007 (see figure 14).
the disproportionate media coverage of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict leading to high
awareness of current events among the Ger-
man public. Moreover, interest in informa-
tion about the Other should not be confused
with a positive attitude towards the Other.
30Germany and Israel Today
Figure 14: Opinions about the other country (%)
80
60 12
2 7 4
40 4
50 56
46 42
20 31
not
available
0 Germany Israel Germany Israel Germany Israel
1991 2007 2013
0
not 16
available 22
30 35 34
20 8
10
10 9 8
40
60
Very good Fairly good
Fairly poor Very poor
Question: “In general, what do you think about Germany/Israel today? Do you have a very good, fairly good, fairly poor, or very poor
opinion of Germany/Israel?” Not included: “Don’t know, no response.”
Source: TNS Emnid 1991, 2007, 2013
Although Jewish Israelis express strong Germany (see figure 15). In the case of both
feelings about keeping alive the memory questions, the data show that more highly
of the Holocaust and the ongoing sense of educated Israelis are somewhat more likely
Jewish persecution today, it is notable that to have a favorable opinion of Germany:
these feelings are in some ways disconnected Almost three-quarters of Israelis with the
from actual relations with Germany today. A highest levels of education have a positive
strong 68 percent majority of Jewish Israelis opinion, compared to 59 percent of those
expresses positive feelings about Germany with the lowest educational levels. Similar
overall (although a large majority of these discrepancies emerge in assessments of the
respondents gives a moderate response of German government – slightly less than
“fairly good”). half of Israelis with the lowest educational
levels have a favorable opinion compared to
“A strong majority of Jewish
two-thirds of those with the highest levels of
education.
Israelis expresses positive
feelings about Germany overall.“ The negative images arising from the past
contrast with these favorable perceptions
of modern political relations. Yet this is not
Notably, a larger proportion of Israeli Jews necessarily a contradiction, since it indicates
views Germany favorably today than in that the interpretations of Nazism and the
2007 (57 percent) and 1991 (48 percent, see Holocaust relate mainly to the Germany of
figure 14). Similarly, 63 percent of Israelis the past rather than to the contemporary
also feel positive about the government of state. We cannot say whether Israelis still
313. Israeli-German relations today
believe the negative stereotypes of the Further, the demographic variations imply
German character to which they attribute the that the narrative of right-leaning demo-
Holocaust, but if the negative feelings have graphic groups emphasizes Germany’s his-
any effect at all, they merely weaken rather torical role in perpetrating crimes against
than actually damage the positive feelings Jews – most likely as a means of justifying
evoked by the strong political relations the Israeli national narrative – which may
between the two countries. In general, the indicate that Germany is still perceived as
mainstream Israeli narrative tends to paint anti-Semitic or as a threat to the Jewish
foreign relations in broad strokes: The USA people today. The trend is confirmed by the
is understood to be for Israel, Europe is youth survey from 2010, which showed that
understood to be against it, and Germany is over time, secular young people are less and
generally viewed as a stalwart ally and thus less likely to believe that a Nazi regime could
the exception to the European rule. arise in Germany today, while roughly half
the religious youth and fully 60 percent of
the ultra-orthodox believe that it could (Hexel
“The USA is understood to be for Israel, and Nathanson 2010: 29). This is problematic
Europe is understood to be against it, because the younger generation contains
a higher and growing portion of religious,
and Germany is generally viewed ultra-orthodox, and largely right-leaning
as a stalwart ally and thus people, which indicates a possible trend in
the attitudes of future generations.
the exception to the European rule.”
At the same time, there is a notable differ- “The younger generation
ence in attitudes towards Germany and the
in Israel contains a higher and
German government among younger and
religious respondents – a profile that is typi- growing portion of religious,
cally associated with right-leaning, hard-line ultra-orthodox, and largely
attitudes. Younger and religious respondents
consistently view both Germany and the
right-leaning people.”
government more negatively by a significant
margin. It is, however, worth noting that almost two-
thirds of all the Jews in the youth sample do
Among respondents up to 29 years old, not agree with a statement that Germany is
53 percent view Germany favorably – the the same as it was during the war and that
lowest percentage of all the age groups, and a Nazi regime could arise there again (Hexel
a definite contrast to the more than 80 per- and Nathanson 2010: 103).
cent of respondents aged 60 and up who take
a favorable view of Germany. The figures Germans take a measured approach that
are much more extreme among religious distinguishes clearly between the policies of
respondents, only 37 percent of whom har- the state of Israel and the Jewish people – at
bor favorable feelings towards Germany, com- least in theory and in rhetoric: 46 percent of
pared to fully 84 percent of secular Israelis Germans have a rather good or very good
(among those who consider themselves view of Israel in general (see figure 14),
“traditional,” two-thirds are favourable). The whereas 62 percent have a fairly poor or very
situation is almost identical with regard to poor opinion about the government of Israel
attitudes towards the German government (see figure 15). The findings in figure 18
among these population groups. indicate a serious basis of criticism and
outright hostility towards Israeli policy at
32Germany and Israel Today
Figure 15: Opinions about the other country’s government (%)
80
60
40
63
20
19
0
Germany Israel
0
18
20
62
40
60
80
Very good/Fairly good Fairly poor/Very poor
Question: “In general, what do you think about the German/Israeli government? Do you have a very good, fairly good, fairly poor, or very
poor opinion of the German/Israeli government today?” Not included: “Don’t know, no response.”
Source: TNS Emnid 2013
present, with almost half the respondents Germany and Israeli-German relations are
comparing Israeli policy towards the perceived by Israelis and the way Israel is
Palestinians with the behavior of the Nazis perceived by Germans. Among five major
towards Jews. Despite attempts to distinguish countries who were polled about Israel in a
between people and government, the data 2013 Pew Global Attitudes survey, German
indicate that the harsh criticism of the Israeli respondents gave the highest “unfavourable”
government also affects the perception of rating (62 percent) compared to the US, Rus-
the Other in general, which would explain sia, France and Britain. While the present
the less favorable views of Germans about survey shows a more even division, it is clear
Israel. that Germans are not as positive about Israel
as Israelis are about Germany. Israelis may
in fact take German political support for
“The findings indicate a granted without understanding the shifting
degree of disconnect public environment and zeitgeist in Germany
today.
between the way in which Germany
and Israeli-German relations Anti-Semitism today
are perceived by Israelis and the
The Gaza war in 2014 has again borne out
way Israel is perceived by Germans.” the observation that criticism of the govern-
ment of Israel and its policies can turn into
All in all, the findings indicate a degree criticism of Jews as a collective, thereby
of disconnect between the way in which crossing the boundary between legitimate
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