Future Combat Air System: Too Big to Fail - Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
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NO. 2 JANUARY 2021 Introduction Future Combat Air System: Too Big to Fail Differing Perceptions and High Complexity Jeopardise Success of Strategic Armament Project Dominic Vogel The development of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) is Europe’s most important defence project. Both technologically and militarily, the project has the potential to set new standards and revolutionise the use of air power. Politically, the multinational project is a litmus test for the extent to which Europe is capable of cooperating on security policy, developing its own capabilities and putting national interests to one side for this purpose. The success of the project rides to a great extent on Germany and France. However, the different perspectives and procedures of these two coun- tries place FCAS at risk of collapse – a failure that would have serious disadvantages for all involved. The beginnings of the Future Combat Air systems (e.g. Eurofighters or Tiger combat System date back to 2001, when the first helicopters), but also new platforms such studies were carried out on the develop- as the Eurodrone and a Next Generation ment of new combat aircraft by a European Weapon System (NGWS). The NGWS is alliance. The FCAS project is scheduled to the innovative core of the FCAS project. It be ready for deployment by 2040. The term consists of a new fighter aircraft, the Next Future Combat Air System or its acronym Generation Fighter (NGF), as well as remote FCAS is often used in a misleading way. carriers (RCs), all of which are connected Although there are, of course, connections to each other in a protected data exchange to the successor solution for the Tornado system called the Air Combat Cloud (ACC). fleet, FCAS is much more than a combat FCAS and NGWS are not synonymous, aircraft project. but the latter is an integral part of the for- The German government’s military avia- mer. The overarching FCAS system can be tion strategy describes it as a “system of sys- imagined as an arrangement of concentric tems” that is to form the backbone of the circles: In the centre is the NGF, the next air force in the long term. FCAS is in fact generation combat aircraft. In the inner not a single flying platform, but rather an circle, together with the remote carriers, operational network composed of existing is the Next Generation Weapon System,
which is connected and controlled via the intention is not to wait until all compo-
Air Combat Cloud. In the outer circle, the nents have been fully developed, but rather
NGWS is linked with other systems. These to make interim results available in order
include fighter aircraft, such as the Euro- to gather practical knowledge for the rest
fighter or the French Rafale, but also of the process.
tankers, naval vessels, satellites and assets Germany and France are key players in
of the other integrated armed forces. This the development fields, while Spain joined
is what makes up the Future Combat Air the organisation at a later stage. Opportuni-
System, in which all elements must con- ties for Spanish companies to participate
stantly communicate with each other to arise firstly from gaps that are still emerg-
form a cohesive system. ing and need to be filled in a meaningful
The military value will therefore lie less way and, secondly, from Spain’s industrial
in the individual platforms than in the way policy interests. Although it is emphasised
they are combined. If this architecture is that all seven pillars will make significant
transferred to the Bundeswehr’s existing contributions to future developments, the
systems, it means that the Eurofighter will most tangible and formative results are cer-
be further developed and will continue to tainly to be expected in the areas of aircraft
be operated within the FCAS framework, development, including the engine and
while the Tornado will be replaced by an- drones (remote carriers).
other system that will also have to be inte- The perception of FCAS as a Franco-Ger-
grated into the FCAS. man project has in fact become obsolete
The conceptual complexity makes a fact- since Spain joined. In view of the division
based debate difficult. Some publications of development packages between Germany
are dedicated to FCAS, but in essence only and France and the progress of the project,
refer to the combat aircraft component. this view nevertheless remains valid. One
This results in a loss of definition and depth of the central tasks for the further develop-
of detail. Reducing FCAS to the NGF com- ment of the project is the full integration
ponent underestimates the complexity and of Spain, which can also serve as a blue-
scope of the project and neglects relevant print for the later inclusion of other part-
subcomponents such as the development ners. Here, it is important to allow Spain
of remote carriers, i.e. the development of to participate in the progress of the project
a technology for armed drones that are at as quickly as possible to create a common
least semi-autonomous. starting point for the three sponsoring
The actual form FCAS takes may differ nations.
across the different partner nations, and the
integrated platforms may vary. It is possible
that in the future, individual states will Cultural and Structural Differ-
only use the inner circle with the NGWS or ences between Paris and Berlin
only deploy the NGF or individual remote
carriers in their armed forces. Despite all Germany has previously favoured multi-
these options, it is important that FCAS is national European cooperation for the
always understood as an overarching sys- Tornado and Eurofighter. France, on the
tem. The design of the project’s architectural other hand, has opted for national devel-
framework takes this into account. FCAS is opment approaches. Berlin and Paris are
divided into a total of seven development unequal partners, united in an ambitious,
fields (pillars), each of which is led by one sometimes visionary armament project.
company (see Figure 1). However, their different political and stra-
Development within these separate pil- tegic cultures also influence joint projects
lars proceeds at different speeds and on the such as FCAS. France’s centralist presiden-
basis of separate contracts. The system fol- tial system contrasts with Germany’s strong
lows an incremental approach. The explicit parliamentary system, while France’s claim
SWP Comment 2
January 2021
2Figure 1
to be capable of unilateral military action rights (IPRs) is essential for the further
contrasts with Germany’s orientation progress of the project and impacts many
towards multilateral structures. FCAS is other issues. For example, how the use of
therefore just as much a political project as the individual components is organised will
a military one – misunderstandings and ultimately depend on this. Are maintenance
thus risks can always arise from the above- and repair work only to be carried out by the
mentioned differences, and these need to lead manufacturer, or is access to the docu-
be addressed at the governmental level. In mentation guaranteed to such an extent
view of the complexity and the manifold that this can largely be done within the
implications of the project, the German armed forces supported by national indus-
participants need to be clear about their trial cooperation? If only the manufacturer
own, the French and the general European can and is permitted to carry out certain
interests. parts of the maintenance, this might also
In FCAS, the “best athlete” principle affect operational readiness.
is applied: Each participating company is Legal questions like this are also relevant
responsible for the area in which it has for adaptations to and further developments
already proven capabilities. The individual of FCAS, such as the integration of new weap-
nation heading/leading a specific pillar will ons or avionics systems. Today, Germany
be supported by a main partner. This divi- and France use different, to some extent
sion mainly pertains to the upcoming nationally developed armament systems for
demonstration phases of the project (phase their aircraft. If certain parts of the tech-
1B and 2). nical documentation remain under lock and
A crucial question that arises at this key, a bottleneck could also develop here.
point concerns the protection of emerging In addition to these rather practical im-
or existing intellectual property: to what pacts of the aforementioned legal issues,
extent should companies disclose their pro- industrial policy aspects also play a particu-
cesses and know-how, to what extent will larly important role. German interests in
technical specifications be made available terms of national key technologies (e.g. sen-
to the other partners later? An agreement sor technology and electronic warfare) and
on how to deal with intellectual property French interests in maintaining national
SWP Comment 2
January 2021
3industrial strategic autonomy (e.g. the abil- the Bundeswehr, through its procurement
ity to develop a fighter aircraft completely office (BAAINBw); and finally, industry,
independently) come up against each other. through individual companies or through
The goal of a European solution needs to be its umbrella organisations, each with differ-
to minimise, ideally completely avoid, tech- ent roles and interests. This structural dif-
nological black boxes, as is often the case ference generally favours France’s position
now with US imports. Before FCAS can pro- and especially in the case of the fighter air-
ceed to Phase 1B and thus towards the de- craft, where it is the development leader.
velopment of demonstrators, these issues Ultimately, this also shows that the German
must be resolved and contractually fixed procurement process needs to be reformed.
in the individual project pillars.
Berlin and Paris each pursue their own
national (economic) interests in industrial The Different “Generations” of
policy. France’s defence sector, however, is Fighter Aircraft
structured fundamentally differently from
its German counterpart. The French defence The French-led Next Generation Fighter,
industry is closely interlinked with the state the core of FCAS, is also described as a sixth-
and resembles a cohesive entity. The state- generation fighter. It would thus formally
run Direction générale de l’armement (DGA) be at the forefront of technical development.
functions as the highest level of coordina- The US F-22 and F-35 models, for example,
tion for all defence projects and the central form the so-called fifth generation, which
point of contact for all equipment issues. are currently the most modern fighters.
However, it is more than just a French pro- Fighter aircraft have long been divided
curement office. For example, the DGA is into generations by experts. This system
responsible for a national pool of military makes it possible to distinguish fighter air-
engineers (corps des ingénieurs des études et tech- craft models without having to deal with
niques de l’armement, IETA), who are specifi- the exact technical specifications each time.
cally trained through assignments in the The categorisation is essentially based
military, but also in industry placements. on the characteristics of the technical stage
Thus, there is a much higher degree of per- of development and the period of develop-
meability between the army and industry, as ment. The division into generations is there-
well as strong cultural and personnel links. fore rather sketchy and becomes blurred at
The government has no qualms about being the transitions between two levels. Further-
linked with the defence industry; on the more, the generations in question are not
contrary, the flow of information between uniformly defined, generally recognised
government and industry is formalised and standards. There are even several approaches
a natural part of national defence policy. to the division of generations, some of which
The German side not only lacks an insti- differ greatly from one another. In 1990,
tutional counterpart to the DGA; German for example, the historian Richard Hallion
industry is also far less homogeneous. This already identified six generations, whereby
imbalance both from an institutional per- the then common, now obsolete designs
spective and in terms of the engineering such as the Tornado, Mirage 2000 or F-14
culture leads to misunderstandings on both represented the sixth and most modern
sides. Whereas in France the DGA, as the generation.
point of contact, centrally controls every- These days, more common systems use
thing, from signing the contract to issues a different methodology, which is focused
around development and utilisation, in more on technology than era. The model
Germany various actors play a role, both published by the American Air Force Maga-
internally and externally: the government, zine in 2009 is particularly widely used (see
represented by the Ministry of Defence and Figure 2). It identifies five existing genera-
Ministry for Economic Affairs, respectively; tions based on technological milestones.
SWP Comment 2
January 2021
4Figure 2
This system presents the prospect of a sixth without an intermediate step. This is un-
generation as the next step in development, likely to be possible, above all, because
to which it attributes features such as op- characteristic features of both the fifth and
tional manning. The Tornado and the Euro- the sixth generation, such as stealth tech-
fighter are classified as Generation 4 (Tor- nology, have not yet been manufactured by
nado) or 4+ (Eurofighter), which is also the any of the companies involved and are con-
consensus in the German discourse on sidered very ambitious technologies.
the issue. The French Rafale (4+) and Mirage On the other hand, the term “next gen-
2000 (4) are on the same spectrum. The eration” can also refer to the aircraft that
assignment of an aircraft type to a certain exist today. This would relativise the NGF
generation can therefore be quite contro- somewhat, because it would then “only” be
versial and is ultimately always an aspect classified as being more modern than the
of the marketing efforts of the manufactur- Eurofighter and Rafale and would no longer
ing companies. have to explicitly form the sixth generation.
For each generation, several criteria have From a German point of view, it is reason-
been defined that must be fulfilled for classi- able for the development of the NGF to con-
fication. What is unclear, however, is wheth- sider the technological status of the Euro-
er these criteria can be weighed against fighter as a basis. In this case, further devel-
each other. For example, does better radar opment in the direction of the NGF should
capability compensate for a lack of speed? primarily take place in those areas that the
If the term “generation” is used, it must Eurofighter does not currently cover, i.e. pri-
be complemented by further classification marily electronic combat as a key national
and explanation rather than being used as technology.
a standalone designation. The label “Next
Generation”, as used in the components
of FCAS, refers to the system described (see The Nuclear Dimension of a
Figure 2), but also allows other interpreta- Future Combat Air System
tions. If the claim that the NGF is to be a
sixth-generation fighter is accepted, the Questions of technology sovereignty and
F-35 is considered the technological bench- the generational allocation of the NGF also
mark. This also implies that one generation play a decisive role when it comes to the
needs to be skipped if we are to get from nuclear capability of FCAS. France regards
the Eurofighter to the sixth-generation NGF nuclear deterrence as an essential corner-
SWP Comment 2
January 2021
5stone of its own and European sovereignty weapon carrier in this scenario. However,
and has earmarked 37 billion euros for it in this aircraft does not have the necessary
its military budget until 2025. With around nuclear certification from the USA. Later,
300 warheads, France’s nuclear potential is the NGF would have to take over the
the fourth largest in the world. In addition nuclear role, for which it would also need
to ballistic missile-equipped submarines, certification. This circumstance appears
France has nuclear cruise missiles that are particularly problematic from today’s per-
carried by the Rafale fighter aircraft, partly spective: Firstly, a technical solution would
from aircraft carriers. From a French perspec- have to be found to meet the requirement
tive, the NGF, as the successor to the Rafale, that this aircraft would have to be able to
must be capable of performing this task. Two carry both the American and the French
capability requirements result from this: weapon. There is currently no aircraft
firstly, the carrying of the nuclear stand-off capable of doing this. It would make the
weapon ASMP, and secondly, the capability project even more complex because not
to operate from aircraft carriers. only technical (gravity weapon vs. cruise
For Germany, the link between FCAS and missile) but also confidentiality aspects
the nuclear role is more indirect. Today, the would have to be clarified.
Bundeswehr participates in NATO’s nuclear Secondly, the question of whether the
sharing with its Tornado fleet. In addition, Eurofighter could be certified as a nuclear
nuclear gravity bombs are stationed in Ger- carrier has already shown that this issue
many. The future of this role is politically will be associated with major hurdles. For
controversial. Among other things, critics this certification, the technical documenta-
are calling for an end to nuclear sharing, tion of the fighter and all other equipment
since it does not guarantee any influence involved in the mission must be disclosed
on US nuclear strategy and the use of on a regular basis. Since all user states must
nuclear weapons is ethically unacceptable give their consent, the matter is very sen-
under international law. This debate crys- sitive for reasons of military and industrial
tallised around the question of the suc- secrecy. Since the NGF will officially be the
cessor to the Tornado. French nuclear weapon carrier, it is part of
From the federal government’s point of France’s strategic autonomy. The necessary
view, the continuation of nuclear sharing French approval for certification therefore
is a fundamental capability requirement in seems uncertain from today’s perspective –
the choice of combat aircraft. The opposi- after all, this is also a question of intellectu-
tion, on the other hand, tabled a motion in al property rights, an issue which is a com-
the German Bundestag to end operational mon thread running throughout the project.
nuclear sharing and no longer certify a com- If Germany sticks with the F-18 bridging
bat aircraft for this purpose. In April 2020, solution, it might have a new nuclear car-
the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) pro- rier, but would face the challenge of inte-
posed a solution whereby it would like to grating this aircraft into the overarching
replace the Tornados in the German Air FCAS system. An implicit weakening of the
Force with American F-18 models (Genera- alliance and additional costs for fleet man-
tion 4+). It refers to this as a “bridging solu- agement would be the result. In the worst
tion” because the aim is to ensure opera- case, it could even become apparent that
tional readiness in the period between the the NGF would not be considered a replace-
imminent phase-out of the Tornado and the ment in the nuclear role. Since Germany
NGF, which will presumably not be avail- might not have a successor for the F-18s, it
able until 2040. However, there is no con- would be forced to use a Generation 4+ sys-
crete indication of how the nuclear role tem for decades.
will be taken into account in the future. Even today, doubts are being raised
If the “bridging” logic is followed, the about the operational suitability of airborne
American F-18 would be the next nuclear nuclear sharing and the older the carrier
SWP Comment 2
January 2021
6aircraft, the more justified these qualms in This is one of the reasons why it is so im-
fact are. It is therefore not unlikely that the portant to view FCAS as a holistic system.
bridging solution will either become perma- The project schedule is very ambitious
nent or that nuclear sharing in its current given the complexity of the project and
form will be put into question nolens volens. the many unknowns. The first flight of the
Germany and France tackle this dimension NGF planned for 2035 and the start of the
from different positions on deterrence and roll-out in 2040 will only be possible if all
sovereignty, which is reflected in the debate measures run smoothly without delay,
on development at all levels. FCAS is un- which is unlikely from today’s perspective.
deniably a nuclear project as well. Paris ar- The most pressing issue is the regulation
ticulates this clearly; Berlin must not ignore of IPRs.
this reality, but instead should also assert We have to accept the fact that there will
their rights to shape it in this context. The of course be some delays. Additional post-
future of nuclear sharing should be explicitly ponements due to political ambiguities,
addressed in the next legislative period. If lack of financial security and procedural
the German government simply allows FCAS inconsistencies must, however, be avoided.
to continue in this direction, it will limit its The German side is certainly lagging further
own scope for action, which may have con- behind. A necessary vehicle for improve-
sequences for Germany’s role in NATO. ment is a fundamental reform of the pro-
curement process.
Making the project a political priority
Outlook and Recommendations is both expedient and feasible in the short
term. In light of the political explosiveness
The different strategic cultures of Germany and military significance of the project, a
and France are evident in many areas. FCAS future German government should name
is another context which makes the partners FCAS as a priority and European lighthouse
aware of their differences but at the same project in the coalition agreement.
time also of their mutual dependence. From Within the framework of a Defence Plan-
the French perspective, the project is both ning Act as part of a reform of the arma-
an expression of European sovereignty and ment process, the next project phases could
an essential component of national security be defined and financed on a multi-annual
and industrial interests. In Germany, this basis. On the one hand, this would send a
strategic significance is lost in a thicket of strong signal to Paris, and, on the other, it
responsibilities within the procurement pro- would provide planning security for the
cess. For the further course of the project, it is German armed forces and industry.
important to change the way it is perceived. In addition, the European perspective of
A stronger commitment on the part of the the project must be expanded. This also in-
Federal Chancellery can help to achieve cludes considering the project, particularly
this. the NGF component, as an export commod-
FCAS is not just another expensive arma- ity and ensuring corresponding regulations.
ment project, it is so much more than that. The task of future federal governments will
It aims to develop and cultivate technologi- be firstly to fully integrate Spain and then
cal excellence within Europe that is capable to find other partners in the medium term,
of having an impact far beyond the military but as customers rather than developers.
sector. Applications such as secure Euro- The later developers enter the project, the
pean cloud services or unmanned autono- more complex their participation will be,
mous flight control are technology drivers because construction sites that have already
whose potential is just as relevant for civil- been closed would have to be reopened.
ian use. Development and data sovereignty The NGWS part of the project, in particular,
are closely linked to the call for European is further advanced than other comparable
products to be used as a matter of priority. projects in Europe, such as the British Tem-
SWP Comment 2
January 2021
7pest; further integration efforts should not
endanger this lead.
France, Spain and Germany currently do
not have a fifth-generation fighter aircraft,
unlike the UK or Italy, for example. For all
three FCAS countries, the NGF is an essen-
tial part of the future plans of their air
forces. Technologically, however, the idea
of moving straight from the fourth genera-
tion to the sixth and setting the benchmark
© Stiftung Wissenschaft is extremely challenging. Overly optimistic
und Politik, 2021 expectations should be tempered, irrespec-
All rights reserved tive of justified ambition. The objective
must be to develop a platform that repre-
This Comment reflects
sents a significant advance on both the
the author’s views.
Eurofighter and the Rafale and, moreover,
The online version of is capable of competing with the F-35 in the
this publication contains market. Defining a Generation 5+ such that
functioning links to other the jet becomes the European standard,
SWP texts and other relevant
would be better than coming up with an
sources.
expensive solution that emulates the “real”
SWP Comments are subject sixth generation but cannot be fully used
to internal peer review, fact- by any state.
checking and copy-editing. As far as the timetable is concerned,
For further information on the issue may arise as to whether more
our quality control pro-
emphasis should be placed on completing
cedures, please visit the SWP
website: https://www.swp- the NGF portion. France’s interest in this is
berlin.org/en/about-swp/ likely to be very high, if only in view of its
quality-management-for- lead role in this segment and the lack of
swp-publications/ alternatives in the area of combat aircraft.
Although the overarching idea must be to
SWP
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
see FCAS as a comprehensive system, priori-
Politik tising the most tangible part of the project
German Institute for may be the most sensible move under cer-
International and tain circumstances.
Security Affairs If this project is not successfully completed
within a European framework, future major
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
10719 Berlin joint armament projects in Europe will
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 become increasingly unlikely. Efforts to
Fax +49 30 880 07-100 consolidate European armament coopera-
www.swp-berlin.org tion would be thwarted, and dependencies
swp@swp-berlin.org
on US manufacturers would continue to
ISSN 1861-1761
grow. The partners must remain acutely
doi: 10.18449/2021C02 aware of this pan-European responsibility.
(English version of
SWP-Aktuell 98/2020)
Dominic Vogel is a Visiting Fellow with the International Security Research Division at SWP.
SWP Comment 2
January 2021
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