The depth of Turkish geopolitics - in the AKP's foreign policy. From Europe to an extended - Università per Stranieri di Perugia
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The depth
of Turkish geopolitics
in the AKP’s foreign policy.
From Europe to an extended
neighbourhood
exte
Alessia Chiriatti, Emidio Diodato, Salih Doğan,
Federico Donelli, Bahri Yılmaz
ded
TurkishCollana “Studi internazionali e comparati”
The depth of Turkish geopolitics in the AKP’s foreign policy.
From Europe to an extended neighbourhood
[ebook]
ISBN: 978-88-906524-9-3
Collana
“Studi Internazionali e comparati”
Editore
Università per Stranieri di Perugia
Piazza Fortebraccio 4, Palazzo Gallenga
06123 Perugia
www.unistrapg.it
Communication Design / Editing
Antonello Lamanna
Maria Cristina Ceccarelli
Publishing Manager
Antonello Lamanna
Published by Università per Stranieri
di Perugia
Copyright © 2014 by
Università per Stranieri di Perugia
All rights reserved.Alessia Chiriatti, Emidio Diodato, Salih Doğan
Federico Donelli, Bahri Yılmaz
The depth
of Turkish geopolitics
in the AKP’s foreign policy.
From Europe to an extended
neighbourhoodINDEX
Preface .................................................... p. 9
Bahri Yılmaz
Turkey as a model for the Middle East
and North African (MENA) states: reali-
stic or wishful thinking?.................... p. 10
Emidio Diodato
Was ‘zero-problem with neighbours’ a
failure? Turkey’s foreign policy and the
regional/global framework ................ p. 19
Federico Donelli
Turkey’s presence in Somalia: a humani-
tarian approach........................................ p. 35
Salih Doğan
Turkey’s foreign policy in Afghanistan in
the post-9/11 Era: a non-military appro-
ach............................................................... p. 52
Alessia Chiriatti
Enemies at the doors: Turkish foreign
policy between Syria and Georgia..... p. 69
Bibliography............................................ p. 85
Biographical notes.............................. p. 93“ Preface
“
Preface
This book is conceived as a spin-off of power in the age of globalization. This
activities and research developed within book aims to illustrate the types of ap-
the PhD program in Cooperation for Pe- proaches Turkey has followed to expand
ace and Development at the University its action in the last decades. The five
for Foreigners of Perugia. The academic chapters have been organized following
program has given rise to a wide range a non-standard geopolitical analysis, and
of opportunities for several researchers, considering some relevant case-studies.
international experts and scholars. The The first chapter, written by Bahri Yılm-
two most important events were a confe- az, constitutes a general introduction to a
rence entitled “Wars at the borders of the still challenging and debated argument,
Europe: uncertainties and perspective in i.e. the comprehension of Turkish foreign
the Mediterranean”, organized in October policy in the Middle East, or Turkey as a
2013, and a special session devoted to model to be followed by the others coun-
Turkish foreign policy during the Annual tries, investigating Turkish-EU relations.
Conference of the Italian Society of Politi- The second chapter, edited by Emidio
cal Science, held in September 2014. Diodato, addresses the decisive question
A whole section looking at Turkey’s forei- about the ‘zero-problems with neighbors’
gn policy was the main focus of the con- doctrine, i.e. whether it was a success or
ference. a failure. The following chapters, written
The idea to gain a clearer picture of the by Alessia Chiriatti, Salih Doğan and Fede-
‘geopolitical depth’ of Turkish foreign rico Donelli, contain analysis of specific
policy emerged during these two con- case-studies, concerning with the bilate-
ferences, and inspired the composition ral or trilateral relations between Turkey,
of this book. After decades of neutralist Georgia, Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia.
foreign policy, and retracing the ancient These case-studies have been debated
history of the Ottoman Empire, over the throughout a regional perspective, focu-
past years Ankara, under the rule of the sing also on the role of Turkish non-state
AK Party, has started an assertive and em- actors. Moreover, the states chosen to illu-
phatic approach modifying its internatio- strate the Turkish action in the extended
nal agenda. Turkish action in its extended neighborhood have some characteristics
neighborhood followed the architecture in common, even if they are totally diffe-
of the ‘strategic depth’ doctrine outlined rent among them. These countries have
by the current prime minister Davutoğlu. been faced with dramatic crises and wars
This doctrine was based on the so called that have destabilized their internal and
‘zero-problems with neighbors’ approach regional equilibrium, thus requiring an
and was strengthened by the AK Party’s external support that Turkey has tried to
dominance in the Turkish political sy- give, with obvious consequences on its
stem. But the idea of ‘geopolitical depth’ geopolitical engagement.
finds its roots in a more complex process
of re-imagination of the state as a central
9Turkey as a model for the chaotic situation will come to an end.
the Middle East and In Yemen, the situation is also unclear;
North African (MENA) and in the other Arab countries the old
regimes carry on in power. Obviously, it
states: realistic or will take a long time before these coun-
wishful thinking? tries recover from the economic, social
Bahri Yılmaz and political disasters caused by former
regimes and current revolts.
From the beginning of the Mediterrane-
an uprisings and the revolts in Tunisia,
We are currently witnessing historic
Egypt, and Libya, Turkey’s leadership
changes in the Middle Eastern and North
has been actively involved in the events,
African states (MENA), which are desti-
sometimes alone and sometimes in col-
ned to transform the region. It is a com-
laboration with Western countries. Tur-
mon belief in the West that authoritarian
key’s new foreign policy draws a great
regimes are leaving the political arena
deal of attention from America and Euro-
one after another and anti-democratic
pe. Newsweek highlighted the role of Tur-
regimes and institutions could be easily
key in the region as follows: “…with Tur-
replaced by the newly elected reformist
key flexing its muscles, we may soon face
and western-oriented governments cha-
a revived Ottoman Empire”1. The Econo-
racterized as the so-called ‘Moderate
mist similarly overstate Turkey’s new
Islam’. This conclusion is very optimistic,
role in the region stating that”…Arabs lo-
and convincing reasons are needed to
oked in Turkey for inspiration. Turkey is
make such predictions about the regi-
not just a fellow country but their former
mes.
imperial power”2.
Profound historic changes have re-
In this context, two critical questions
cently taken place in Tunisia, Libya and
can be asked: first, how has Turkey’s
Egypt. After the assassination of Colonel
Middle East policy changed? And secon-
Qaddafi in Libya and the resulting civil
dly, can Turkey serve as a model to the
unrest, it is no longer clear who governs
MENA countries, which has been sugge-
the country, making it hard to deal with
sted both by the United States and the
armed elements who fought against the
European Union3?
old regime and want to take a share in the
The Ottoman Empire stretching from
power. In Egypt, the recently elected Pre-
the Adriatic Sea to Yemen ruled the Mid-
sident Mohamed Morsi, a leading mem-
dle East and North Africa for more than
ber in the Muslim Brotherhood was ru-
400 years. After its collapse in 1918, the
ling the country, but now the military has
newly founded Republic of Turkey rose
taken over power. Its rule of the country
in 1923. In the early years, Turkey fa-
has been marked with violence and de-
ced very serious economic, political and
monstrations against the military gover-
social problems. Under the leadership
nment continue with increasing violence
of Atatürk, reforms were initiated with
in Tahrir Square; in Syria Bashar al-As-
the intent of transforming the economic
sad is still in power: nobody knows how
10and political structures inherited from decisive role in the alienation from the
the Ottoman Empire. The main goal of Middle East and shift to the West. The
Turkey’s new republican elites, predo- pro-western elite including the leader-
minantly high ranging military officers ship of the newly established Republic
who had served in the Ottoman army, was strongly convinced, as it remains,
was to build a modern state and to shed that Turkey can only catch up with We-
the Ottoman legacy. Three of these revo- stern civilization if the country continues
lutionary reforms were beyond question to reject the basing of the state on Isla-
vitally important for an Islamic society: mic principles. Secularism was and still
introducing secularism, upgrading the is used as a tool for the elimination of
status of women and the adoption and Islamic influences on politics and society
implementation of a European legal sy- and it was considered a pre-condition
stem. for becoming part of the European civi-
Since the late 1940s, all Turkish govern- lisation. In addition, recent historical and
ments have given top priority to Western contemporary experiences between Tur-
institutions and their foreign and secu- key and the Arab World have been nega-
rity policies have favoured cooperation tive and Ninety years after the collapse
with the West as opposed to the Middle of the Ottoman Empire, despite being
East. Thus the so-called “Westernisation” largely unfounded, mutual suspicions
process aimed at catching up with Euro- persist. Thus, for a long time reciprocal
pean civilisation and the full integration mistrust was evident between Turkey
of the country into Europe in all realms and the Arab States. Another factor was
once and for all. Thanks to its pro-we- the emergence of the state of Israel in
stern policy, Turkey became a member of 1948. Turkey was one of the first Muslim
western political, economic and security countries to recognise Israel officially in
institutions such as NATO and the Orga- 1949. As a consequence, Arab countries
nization for Economic Co-Operation and associated Turkey with anti–Islamic sen-
Development(OECD). Turkey’s applica- timents, Israel-friendly policies and the
tion for membership into the European support of Western powers in the region.
Union in 1959 predates those of most For more than eighty years, Turkey’s
present member states. Middle East policy was driven above all
Consequently, Turkey’s post-1923 by the principles of non-interference and
orientation towards the West was only non-involvement in the domestic politics
one aspect of its new policy. The other and interstate conflicts of the other coun-
was a changed attitude towards the Mid- tries in the region.
dle East. Turkey combined its embracing
of the West with a distancing of itself What has changed?
from the Middle East. Thus, the weight The Turkish economy has demonstrated
of Turkey’s foreign policy predominant- a tremendous growth and remarkable re-
ly lay in the Western hemisphere and its covery after the 2001 economic and finan-
ties with the region were slackened. cial crisis. In the period from 2002 to 2008,
There are various factors that played a the Turkish economy grew impressively,
11at an average of 7.3 percent annually. Its liberalism: profit-orientation and global
GDP reached approximately US$750 bil- operations, while their social and cultu-
lion, and the GDP per capita rose to ap- ral relations are conservative, preferring
proximately US$10,067 in 2010. Today, an Islamic identity to a national secular
Turkey has the world’s sixteenth largest identity.
economy and it is a member of the G-20. There are two main reasons for Tur-
Furthermore, it is the sixth strongest key’s rapprochement with the Middle
economy in Europe. East. First, the world economy is cur-
The impressive economic performance rently going through its deepest reces-
between 2002 and 2008 is due, not only sion since the Great Depression, which
to a favourable international environment started in 1929. Economies around the
based on expanding world trade, relati- world have been heavily affected by the
vely low inflation, low interest rates and financial crisis. As a consequence, the
a strong demand for emerging market demand for Turkey’s export goods has
assets, but also the implementation of a diminished, especially in the European
structural reform process, sound fiscal markets. In order to create new markets
and monetary policies, all of which led to to make up for the lack of demand in Tur-
macroeconomic stability. All this is than- key’s traditional trading partners, Anka-
ks to the external anchor of the Internatio- ra has created a “free trade zone without
nal Monetary Fund (IMF) and European visa restrictions” under the motto “zero
Union, and finally to the reform of eco- problems with neighbouring countries”5.
nomic institutions under the pressure of Ankara intensified its bilateral trade re-
external anchors and the full engagement lations with neighbouring countries
and participation of the state apparatus in regardless of their political system and
the reform process. leadership. Secondly, the present govern-
This high economic growth rates are ment has discovered the strong and two-
strongly related to the remarkable export way relationship between economic and
performance of a new class of entrepre- political relations. Ankara’s intention is
neurs called the ‘Anatolian Tigers’ who to build up its foreign relations on stabile
are located outside the big industrial and economic grounds, which are called trade
commercial power centres in Anatolia. driven external relations. But this is only
This newly emerged business class can possible if the markets can be expan-
be referred to as the Islamic Calvinists. ded in the MENA countries. The share of
The famous German sociologist Max We- export of MENA countries in Turkey’s to-
ber regarded Calvinism as the main sour- tal export rose from 13 percent in 2002
ce of the capitalist spirit, since it made it to around 20.7 percent in 20116.
possible to “worship God and Mammon Besides the economic factors, other
at the same time”4. Turkey’s new busi- features have played an important role
ness class seems to be able to combine its in Turkey’s changed relations with the
economic activities with Islamic princi- MENA countries, and Turkey’s EU mem-
ples and the rules of the capitalist game. bership has been postponed indefinitely
The Anatolian Tigers stand for economic because of the resistance of some EU
12member states. This disappointment has West. But due to the Arab-Israeli conflict
slowed down the negotiations betwe- and Israel’s close relations with the West,
en Ankara and Brussels. In addition the Israel is out of the question as a mediator
ruling Justice and Development Party with the countries of the Mashreq. This
(AKP) emerged from an Islamic move- unresolved conflict constitutes a serious
ment and a pro-Islamic party. The party barrier to the improvement of political
members and its sympathisers feel great and economic relations in the region.
empathy with Arab countries since they Turkey, on the other hand, has been re-
share their religiosity and the same faith. garded as a strategic partner by both the
Therefore, it is easier for the leadership EU and U.S. administrations. Turkey is a
of the AK PARTY to intensify its econo- member of NATO, but at the same time is
mic relations with neighbouring Muslim regarded as an integral part of the Midd-
countries than it would be for a different le East. As such, it has common borders
government to do. Finally, the confidence with several crucial countries such as
backed by economic success allows the Syria, Iran and Iraq. Yet Turkey is also an
present government headed by Erdoğan Islamic country and its inhabitants share
to take the role of global player in the their faith with the populations of Arab
Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle countries and Iran. Therefore, the West
East. can more easily democratise the autho-
ritarian regimes in the region via Turkey
What role can Turkey play in than from Europe. The failed attempt at
the MENA region? democratizing Iraq by America and Bri-
After the initial uncertainty as to what tain has left a political and security va-
stance to take, the EU members and the cuum in the region, which Turkey could
United States, particularly the former fill on behalf of the West. Finally, Anka-
French President Sarkozy and U.S. Pre- ra would make a good mediator since it
sident Obama, decided to support the has been intensifying its economic and
reformist movements in the region. For political relations with the MENA coun-
economic and security reasons, the Euro- tries since 2002 and, as a consequence, is
pean Union and the United States have a more involved in the events of the region
great interest in the stability of the MENA than any previous Turkish government.
countries. Both countries are looking for
strategic partners that are reliable and The EU and Mediterranean
ready to collaborate with Brussels and Partnership
Washington. They could also act as me- The Barcelona Process/Euro-Medi-
diators and help negotiate the transfor- terranean Partnership (BP/EMP) was
mation process in the Islamic countries initiated in 1995 to provide foreign po-
smoothly and successfully. licy instruments for handling the EU’s
In this respect, Turkey and Israel come southern neighbourhood. The BP/EMP
to mind: Turkey as a NATO member and aims at creating an area of peace, stabi-
partially democratised Muslim country, lity and prosperity. But the results so far
and Israel as a strategic partner of the have been poor. Former French President
13Sarkozy had tried to replace the Barcelo- fundamentalism, illegal migration and
na Process with the concept of a Union of terrorism.
the Mediterranean. The reasons for the The question, therefore, is how the co-
failure of the Barcelona Process is that operation between Ankara and Brussels
the enlargement waves of the Europe- can be improved. Brussels intends to
an Union in 2004 and 2007 have added keep the negotiation over Turkey’s EU
twelve new members to the European membership and a strategic partnership
Union, ten of which are ex-Soviet states as two separate issues. This means that
situated in Central and Eastern Europe. Brussels wants to collaborate with Tur-
This massive, eastern-oriented enlarge- key in a Middle East policy within the
ment induced the European Commission framework of a strategic partnership but
to introduce a Wider Europe through the without promising full EU membership.
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Ankara wants to combine the EU negotia-
to establish a secure and coherent nei- tion process with a strategic partnership
ghbourhood along its new borders in the since it is not interested in close coope-
East. Although the ENP aims at including ration in Middle East policies in the fra-
both the East and the South of Europe, mework of a strategic partnership alone.
the pro-Eastern policy preferences of
the newly admitted member states along The role of the USA in the re-
with Germany caused the ENP to pay gion
more attention to the East at the expense The United States supports Israel mili-
of the South. This affects the present and tarily and economically without any re-
future of the BP/EMP negatively. straints and is solely interested in secu-
There is not yet a well-defined Europe- rity matters and the fighting of terrorist
an security and foreign policy regarding activities. Another important policy aim
the Middle East, Central Asia and the of Washington is to protect the energy
Caucasus. As a close partner of the At- sources and supply of oil produced in
lantic alliance in the European Union, the the Arab Organization of the Petroleum
British government continues to coope- Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries,
rate with Washington in order to establi- namely the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and
sh security and to foster modernization Iraq7.
in the region. Each member country fol- The United States and the European
lows its own interests and takes its own Union agree that the Arab world or the
decisions, as seen in the Iraq war in 2003. wider Mediterranean region should be-
Only Euro-Mediterranean member states come more democratic. However, they
such as France, Spain, and Italy seem to have different approaches to resolving
be more involved due to their geographic the Arab-Israeli conflict. American and
proximity to the MENA countries. The Israeli commentators tend to claim that
European Union as a whole still consi- as long as Arab states cannot create de-
ders Turkey as a bridge between Europe mocratic states it would be premature,
and the Middle East, and as a bulwark to resume serious peace efforts in the
against the growing danger of Islamic Middle East. European policy makers,
14on the other hand, are willing to support affairs and education. The expectations
reform-minded forces in these countries on both sides were set very high. At the
to resolve the conflicts through dialogue, time, the slogan for Turkey was the “Star
material support and forms of conditio- of the Orient” in Der Spiegel8 and political
nality. leaders in Ankara saw this as a unique
Brussels and Washington are of the opportunity to actively participate in and
common opinion that Turkey’s growing settle political issues from the Balkans to
strategic importance shows its ability to China. Former Prime Minister Demirel
be a worthy representative of the inte- confidently announced in the newspaper
rest of the West to overcome the confli- Cumhuriyet that with the collapse of the
cts. President Obama and his administra- Soviet Union a “gigantic Turkish world”
tion have changed their attitude towards was emerging from the Adriatic Sea to
Turkey witnessed by their early consul- the Great Wall of China9.
tations with Ankara concerning the re- However it was not long before this eu-
volutions in Egypt and Libya. U.S.-Turki- phoria was dampened by reality. The ini-
sh relations are now closer than during tial enthusiasm was followed by a return
former President Bush’s era. Turkey was to business as usual. Mere rhetoric was
among the few regional states consulted not enough for Turkey to be regarded as
and Ankara’s growing influence in the one of the new regional powers of the
Middle East is now widely acknowled- new international order, words needed
ged. Washington also aims to balance to be followed by deeds. In particular, the
Iran’s growing weight in the region with economic expectations of the partners
the help of Turkey. were too high and the hoped-for ‘privi-
leged partnership’ could not be establi-
Turkey as a role model for shed. It soon became clear that Turkey’s
MENA countries: can Turkey financial and technological resources
live up to high expectations? were too limited to meet the immense
Western experts, politicians and jour- socio-economic needs of the underde-
nalists hold up Turkey as a model whe- veloped former Soviet republics. At the
never political and economic turmoil same time, there was a reserved respon-
breaks out in any Muslim country. After se to the so-called ‘Turkish model’ in the
the collapse of the Soviet Union and Com- Turkic republics. Turkey had to turn back
munism in the 1990s, it was commonly to ‘real-politic’ and began to develop its
held that the ‘Turkish model’ based on relations on a more pragmatic basis.
secularism, pluralist-parliamentarian European and American think tanks
democracy and a free-market economy and experts present us with a similar
could make an essential contribution to scenario with a new trade market called
the economic and political re-structuring ‘Neo- Ottomanism’ which should follow
processes of the Turkic republics in Cen- the ‘Arab Spring,’ namely Turkey as a mo-
tral Asia. Turkey was expected to offer del for the Arab world. How relevant is
them close co-operation in the fields of the so-called Turkish experience to the
trade, economic construction, cultural Arab world?
15The major difference between Turkey in November 2011, indicating that it is
and other Islamic countries is the secu- very likely that Islam will dominate the
lar basis of its state, which it adopted Arab world politically in the coming ye-
from France in the 1930s. According to ars. Most Arab countries will probably
this model, by definition everybody has continue to be governed by the military
the right to their own beliefs with reli- and authoritarian regimes where Islamic
gion considered a part of private life. In identity may continue to persist at least
addition religious affairs are not admit- for a while under different names and
ted in the public sphere and religious dresses.
communities must operate under public Another important characteristic of the
law. However Turkey has had difficulties MENA countries, with the exception of
enforcing and instituting its secularist Libya and Algeria, is that they are poor
principles due to strong resistance to se- economically. The ‘Euro Med 2030’ re-
cularism within the Turkish population. port published by the EU Commission
There is still a gap between the rhetoric lists a slow growth rate, high unemploy-
and reality of secularism in Turkey in ment among young people, poverty and
that religion is not fully divorced from worsening income distribution. In order
the state but under the control of the to reduce the unemployment rate by
state10. The radical changes and rising 2030, 55 million new jobs would have to
political Islamic movement in the MENA be created.11. All these economic factors
states may accelerate the re-islamisation contributed to the revolutionary move-
processes in Turkey rather than its being ment in the MENA countries. Financial
viewed as a model of government in the- capital from Europe, the United States,
se countries. China and the oil-exporting Arab states
The most important characteristic of is urgently needed. Yet the fundamental
the MENA countries is their strong Isla- and urgent question remains unanswe-
mic identity, which is inseparably linked red: who is going to finance these poor
to their cultural, social and economic life. countries? The MENA countries over-e-
Thus, it seems to be difficult to adopt and stimate Turkey’s capabilities since Tur-
implement the separation of state and key itself also suffers from high youth
religious affairs in the coming decades. unemployment, current account deficit,
The election results in Morocco in 2011, poverty and a worsening income distri-
Tunisia and Egypt confirm that political bution. At the same time, a pessimistic
Islam is on the rise. For example, Nahda view gaining ground among experts that
(Party of Renaissance) an Islamist party Turkey’s economic growth will fall from
won Tunisia’s general election. In Egypt, 8 or 9 percent to 2 percent due to the
the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justi- expected economic recession in Europe
ce Party won with the majority, and the in the coming years. Furthermore, the
Party of Nour (Party of Light) showed a economic conditions of Turkey’s neigh-
striking performance. In Morocco, the bours are worsening as a consequence
Justice and Development Party won 107 of political instability. Besides all these
seats in the 395-member parliament facts, Turkey might be able to make con-
16tributions to education and economic in- been shown in the improvement for full
stitutions building by exporting human membership and there are also no signs
capital to these economies, if it is deman- of when the negotiation process will be
ded. completed. Ankara has, in a fit of frustra-
According to the progress reports publi- tion turned its face to the Middle and Far
shed by the EU Commission and various East. Recently the Turkish Prime Mini-
global rankings, Turkey is seriously un- ster Erdogan stated that “…Turkey can
derperforming in a wide range of areas. It join the Shanghai Cooperation Organi-
stands 67th in the Economic Freedom In- zation (SCO - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
dex 2010, 58th in Transparency Interna- Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia and China)
tional’s 2010 Corruption Index, 83rd in instead of its accession to the European
the latest UN Human Development Index, Union”. He described that group as “bet-
138th in the Reporters Without Borders ter and more powerful than the E.U.” on
2010 Press Freedom Index and 123rd in top of which these states share “common
the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap values” with Turkey13. It is obvious that
Index.12 Under these circumstances, it Turkey’s leadership is frustrated and is
makes more sense for Turkey to deal first loosing its orientation to the West and
with its own internal priorities such as moving East. Unfortunately, if the deci-
the implementation of universal values, sion makers in Europe start believing
before it can be accepted as a model by that Ankara is bluffing in an attempt to
the Arab world. However, it is unclear if force Brussels into serious negotiations,
there is any strong demand, besides from this could be costly for both partners14. If
some liberal-minded Arab intellectuals, the relations between Ankara and Brus-
by MENA countries to adopt and to im- sels should remain unchanged for the
plement the so-called Turkish model. coming years, nobody would be surpri-
It is also pertinent to ask if whether the sed. Further, I would emphasize that we
Turkish model is perfectly replicable or could come face to face with an entirely
suitable for the region’s democratisation different Turkey in political and social
process. While it is clearly the case that norms if it were anchored in the Middle
these countries can learn some impor- East.
tant lessons from Turkey’s economic de- On the one hand, Brussels would be
velopment and democratisation process, well advised first of all to re-establish
surely each country should decide and and intensify the usual relations during a
design its own modernisation model negotiation process between a candidate
and strategy by learning from the expe- country and the EU. On the other hand,
riences of various countries. the negotiation process for EU member-
To conclude, the negotiation process ship appears to be the best chance not
with Brussels for Turkey’s full member- only to reform Turkish institutions, but
ship into the EU continues to be sluggi- also to improve the political system by
sh and the relations have reached their changing the political culture in Turkey.
lowest point since 1959. On the part In this respect the Turkish government
of the EU no considerable interest has has to continue to enforce and promo-
17te the ‘Europeanization process’, namely been heavily criticised by Muslim Brotherhood:
see, same article “[…]It’s not allowed for any
restructuring and modernizing policies non-Egyptian to interfere in our constitution”,
in all realms. Whether Turkey becomes a said Mahmoud Ghazlan, a spokesman for the
Brotherhood, “if I was to advise the Turks I’d
full EU member or not, the implementa- advise them to crop the secular article in their
tion of EU legislation, norms, standards, constitution, but I’m not allowed. It’s not my
and regulations are crucial with help of right”.
11 European Commission, Euro-Med 2030.
an external anchor, namely the European Report of an Expert Group (Brussels: European
Union. Only if Turkey is able to complete Commission, 2011):11-25.
12 See Laura Schmidt and Jörg Dehnert, (2011)
its negotiations with the European Union ”Die neue Rolle der Türkei angesichts der
successfully, will its political and econo- jüngsten Entwicklungen in der Arabischen Welt,“
mic role in the region be able to markedly in Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, pp. 9-11
13 Andrew Finkel (2013), “Eastern Promises“,
change as a consequence. in Latitude, Views around the World, 29 January.
14 According to Public Opinion Surveys of
Turkish Foreign Policy 2013/1 published by
Notes EDAM, 2/3 of Turks are Euro-Pessimistic and
__________ 87 % of experts answered that Turkey’s future
1 Neil Ferguson (2011) “The Mideast’s Next lay with Europe. Less than 3 percent thought it
Dilemma,” in News Week (Jun 19,). should look elsewhere.
2 Economist, “Ottoman dreamer” (Nov 5, 2011).
3 A comprehensive paper on this topic: See Bahri
Yılmaz (2012), “Arab Spring and Revolutions in
Turkey’s Near Abroad,” in Stephen Calleya and
Monika Wohlfeld (eds) Change and Opportunities
in the Emerging Mediterranean, University of
Malta, Malta: Gutenberg Press, pp.349-370.
4 Clough Cole (145), Economic History of Europe
Boston, Heath, pp.151-152.
5 Ahmet Davutoğlu (2001) Stratejik Derinlik
Istanbul: Kure Publications, pp. 151-152.
6 State Planning Organisation, “Main economic
Indicators,” Ankara.
7 Volker Perthes (2004) “America’s Greater
Middle East and Europe”, SWP Comments in
Daniela Schwarzer and Isabelle Werenfels,
The Union for the Mediterranean: A missed
Opportunity, SWP Comments (2008).
8 Der Spiegel (February 10, 1992) p.137.
9 Cumhuriyet (February 24, 1992).
10 Prime Minister Erdoğan gave his own
interpretation of secularism in his recent visit to
Egypt. He stated “…Do not be wary of secularism.
I hope there will be a secular state in Egypt.”
He added that secularism does not mean a lack
of religion, but the creation of respect for all
religions and of religious freedom for individuals,
saying “Secularism does not mean that people
are secular. For example, I am not secular, but I
am the prime minister of a secular state” Mark
Champion, Matt Bradly, “Islamists Criticize
Turkish Premier’s Secular Remarks,” in The Wall
Street Journal, September 15, 2011. Available
at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142
4053111904491704576570670264116178.
html. The statement made by PM Erdoğan has
18Was ‘zero-problem with the points that Aras has highlighted in
neighbours’ a failure? his article, supporting Turkish foreign
Turkey’s foreign policy policy, have not addressed the main
problem: was ‘zero-problem with neigh-
and the regional/global bours’ a failure? After having taken into
framework account different approaches to Turkish
foreign policy and, above all, after having
Emidio Diodato considered some empirical examples, in
this chapter I will argue that the region-
In 2009 prime minister Recep Tayyip al/global framework has been, in the
Erdoğan and his foreign minister Ahmet last decade, and continues to be the key
Davutoğlu explicitly promoted the doc- pattern to explain Turkish foreign poli-
trine of ‘zero-problems with neighbours’ cy. That is to say that the ‘zero-problem
and predicated the idea that Turkey with neighbours policy’ was not a failure
should be a pro-active player in interna- per se, and that the country still feels
tional diplomacy, seeking closer relations more confident and secure to face global
with neighbours including Syria and Iran. changes since it is successful in operat-
Current conflicts inside the country and ing, without problems, in its regional en-
in the Arab world are certainly challeng- vironment or geopolitical milieu.
ing Turkish pro-activism, especially after
the eruption of the Syrian unrest, the Abiding persistence of inter-
Gezi Park movement, allegations of po- national threats? A critique
litical corruption and the establishment of realism
of Daesh, i.e. the co called Islamic State. During the second half of the twentieth
In October 2012, the Turkish parlia- century, discussions of Turkish foreign
ment authorized the use of military force policy were subsumed by the Cold War.
against Syria. In the summer of 2013, a Many scholars considered Turkey noth-
number of young people lost their lives ing more than a middle power abutting
protesting in Taskim square. After March on a great power, i.e. the Soviet Union.2
2014, when the Turkish government first Throughout the Second World War, Tur-
banned twitter and then blocked access key and five other European states –
to you-tube (citing reasons of national Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, the Republic
security), the image of the country as a of Ireland and Portugal – had managed
democratic and peaceful player deterio- to preserve their neutrality and indepen-
rated dramatically. The establishment of dence. However, with the beginning of
the Islamic State in 2014 seems to con- the Cold War the logic of the bipolar sys-
firm this conclusion. tem became stronger than before. Gradu-
As stated by Bülent Aras, during the ally, a defensive alliance with the United
last two years “Turkey’s new foreign States was created as the only available
policy has been exposed to severe criti- strategy and this process was considered
cism, despite the broad appreciation it the by-product of two international de-
has received from many quarters”.1 But terminants: on the one hand, Turkey’s
19importance in terms of its geostrategic ion opened up many regional conflicts.
position; and on the other, the opportuni- Although some security threats from
ty to exploit this asset to find protection Asia ended, new military crisis emerged
against the Soviet Union. This alignment in the aftermath of the Cold War, and in
with the United States remained compel- many cases, notably in Transcaucasia
ling during the Cold War, conditioning and Syria, Turkey continued to behave in
Turkish foreign policy also in the Middle contrast to Russia. Moreover, during the
East. For example, it discouraged Turkey 1990s, Turkish foreign policy was charac-
from being overly hostile to Israel dur- terized by the perception of what Şükrü
ing the Arab-Israeli conflicts in 1967 and Elekdağ – a former Under-Secretary at
1973, when Turkey, nonetheless, did not the Turkish foreign ministry – defined as
allow the United State to use the İncirlik the ‘two wars and a half’, i.e. a potential
air base to support Israel, while the Sovi- and simultaneous struggle with Greece
et Union used Turkish airspace to supply and Syria and an internal struggle with
military equipment to the Arab coun- the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).5 In
tries. this context, although the main cause of
William Hale extended this securi- Turkey’s attachment to the Western al-
ty-first logic, rooted in political realism, liance had effectively ended, a defensive
also to the post-Cold War period. In his tie with the United States still appeared
seminal book, Turkish Foreign Policy, to be the only available strategy for the
1774-2000, he stated that “for middle future.6
powers, especially those which, like Tur- However, the persistence of the strate-
key, had previously been threatened by gic logic of realism is not fully convincing
the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and, in particular, it is not helpful in un-
had obvious benefits, since it removed derstanding the foreign policy of the Jus-
the most immediate threat to their se- tice and Development (AK) party govern-
curity. However, it did not by itself end ments since 2002. In the last decade, we
regional conflicts”.3 In other words, Hale have witnessed a partial turning point in
considered that, although the end of Turkish foreign policy.7 New approach-
the Cold War generated a relative shift es, focused on state identity and social
in power politics, regional and global interaction among states, juxtaposed
threats did not decrease and Turkey still with the realist thinking in international
continued to behave like a middle power. relations. As an alternative framework,
In this regard, Turkey would offer many these perspectives put into the study of
indications as to how a medium-sized foreign policy innovative concepts like
state acts in the changing international Ottoman legacy or Turkey’s soft power.
environment. According to this point of From a radical viewpoint, some schol-
view, there is a kind of abiding persistence ars insisted that identities and interests
of the strategic logic of realism: Turkey’s were constantly redefined through so-
security problems remain essentially the cial interaction in Turkish politics.8 This
same regardless of historical change.4 point of view is the opposite of political
Effectively, the collapse of the Soviet Un- realism and is generally referred to as
20constructivism. Certainly, a security-first pro-activism, geopolitics, neighbouring
logic can survive alongside constructiv- region, regional model etc. simply became
ism, and as Hale also recognised – in a the key-words of Turkish foreign policy.
third edition of his seminal book9 – con- Even though Turkey’s commitment to
structivism and realism can coexist in pro-active foreign policy – transforming
analysing Turkish foreign policy after the itself into a model for the Arab world,
Cold War. But any attempt to link some while anchoring the country to the Eu-
constructivist concepts, like post-impe- ropean Union – was too ambitious or, as
rial legacy or soft power, to the determi- we will see, rather propagandistic, there
nants of realism should explain whether are no doubts that new contours of Turk-
the primacy of security over identity still ish foreign policy were strengthened be-
remain alive or not. tween 2003 and 2011. Despite the idea of
The most prominent attempt to give a the persistence of realism, Turkish foreign
theoretical framework to the new orien- policy became a novelty for regional and
tation was that developed by Davutoğlu international equilibrium.
himself. As a scholar, he had already out-
lined a foreign policy doctrine in several Logical pre-eminence of do-
works, of which the most famous is Stra- mestic preferences? A criti-
tegic Depth.10 Without rejecting realist que of liberalism
thinking, he continued to argue, during In the first period of the Cold War, the
his involvement in politics, that Turkey main foreign policy actors in Turkey
should have behaved as a regional play- were the foreign affairs ministry and the
er and aspired to assume a leading role, military. This secular state establishment
with regional and global strategic signif- was largely influenced by the logic of the
icance.11 This idea of proactive foreign Cold War. In a condition like that, for re-
policy was based on the historic and geo- alist scholars it was quite easy to defend
graphic depths of Turkey, amplified by its the idea of the abiding persistence of in-
Ottoman legacy and hegemonic capacity ternational threats.
in terms of soft power. One can agree or However, by the 1980’s the process of
not with Davutoğlu and his view, but it Turkey’s accession to the European in-
must be recognised that new contours stitutions began to change the domestic
of Turkish foreign policy had already balances. The role of the public became
emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War. gradually more relevant in foreign pol-
For example, as Şule Kut underlined at icy and this shift was encouraged by
the end of the 1990s, Turkey’s foreign pol- economic liberalisation, when new eco-
icy had changed after the collapse of the nomic constituencies emerged and the
Soviet Union with regard to: (i) an active state-dominated centre receded in power
foreign policy, (ii) a new geopolitical po- to the benefits of provincial and regional
sition with respect to its neighbours, (iii) elites. With the anchoring of Turkey to
an innovative regional power, and (iv) an European institutions and, later, with the
attitude of assuming the role of model.12 decline of the Cold War, liberal approach-
During the AK Party governments, es to Turkish foreign policy became well
21accepted among scholars.13 A transfor- control the military”.16 But with the modi-
mation of Turkish foreign policy was rec- fication of Article 118 of the Constitution,
ognised, in the second half of 1980s and adopted on 17 October 2001 to meet Eu-
during the 1990s, when civil society ac- ropean political standards, the role and
quired a new role in policy making. The function of the National Security Coun-
fact that civil society gained influence in cil17 in policy making in general, and in
policy making and became incorporated foreign policy in particular, changed radi-
into the foreign policy process was con- cally.18 During the AK Party governments,
sidered relevant for the study of Turkish the civilian elite enhanced its freedom of
foreign affairs. action even more, increasing its leverage
Historically, the military establishment both regionally and globally. Under the
had acted in the Turkish political system reform package introduced by the AK
not only as ‘moderator’ or ‘guardian’, but Party in July 2003, “the National Securi-
also as a ‘ruler’ and especially for exter- ty Council (NSC) was reduced to a truly
nal affairs.14 During the second half of advisory body; the requirement that the
the 1980s, there was a relevant change NSC secretary be a military officer was
that preceded the turning point of the abolished and the number of civilian
end of the Cold War. Indeed, Turkey’s members of the NSC was increased”.19
security culture has never been com- But it was only in 2007, with the failure
pletely influenced by the military. Since of the attempt to prevent the presidential
the 1950s, Westernisation of national se- election of Abdullah Gül, that the reduc-
curity culture had prepared the ground tion of the military became effective.20
for the introduction of liberal and inter- The empowerment of civil society has
nationalist elements. Furthermore, with been crucial during the last decade, es-
the beginning of the Cold War – as Ali L. pecially with the increasing performanc-
Karaosmanoğlu pointed out – the ‘offen- es of the Turkish economy. However, it
sive’ realism of the Ottoman period was is important to be careful in welcoming
gradually transformed into a ‘defensive’ this transformation. From a purely lib-
realism.15 When, after the military gov- eral viewpoint, state preferences should
ernment (1980-83), the civilian elites be determined by democratic qualities
started to participate significantly in the in terms of the incorporation of civil so-
formation of foreign policy, the country ciety into the process of policy-making.
was prepared for a public discussion on According to this literature, many schol-
foreign policy and national security. ars assert that preferences are logically
The civil-military divide has dominat- previous and invariant in response to
ed domestic political analysis in Turkey. changing international circumstances.21
At the end of the 1990s, Ümit C. Sakal- Although interdependence and inter-
lioğlu started his article in an important national organisations are considered
academic journal affirming: “The most beneficial for the peaceful behaviour of
profound contradiction marking Turkish democracies, many liberals think that
democracy in the 1990s is the demon- government structures, interest groups,
strated inability of civilian politicians to political parties, and public opinion, thus
22domestic preferences, are prior to exter- ed by domestic actors, and an external
nal ties. But this point of view is not con- force driving internal change directly.23
vincing in the Turkish case. It is probably But beyond the European anchoring, ex-
true that voluntary recourses to costly ternal influences of turmoil in the Middle
or risky foreign policy in democratic or East are also important factors. Since
egalitarian polities are much less likely 2011, as we will see, the impact of the
than in authoritarian regimes. Howev- Arab Spring on the commitment of the
er, the idea of pre-eminence of national AK Party government in foreign policy
preferences has to be demonstrated, es- has certainly been relevant.
pecially in a country constrained by re- Like realism, liberalism is also chal-
gional turmoil. lenged by constructivism. From a con-
Even though an unaccountable body structivist point of view, in explaining
such as the military does not play the Turkey’s pro-activism one needs to rec-
role of ruler any longer, democracy in ognize that the cognitive level is relevant,
Turkey is still not fully functioning. The especially when new rules and norms are
main problem is due to the historical fail- adopted by governments. In other words,
ure in settling differences between sec- process, ideas and beliefs are more im-
ular and religious elites, but also to the portant than rational, free and compet-
degree in which governments are vulner- itive preferences. As seminal construc-
able or not to external pressure. During tivist scholars argue, foreign policy is
the AK Party governments this problem part of a broader process of internalizing
probably became more compelling than identities and interests, not something
before, as also the Gezi Park movement occurring external to them.24 The Turk-
has dramatically shown in 2013. Correct- ish case points out that external and,
ly, Philip Robins pointed out that only an above all, regional constrains on state
international anchorage can support a preferences must be taken seriously into
more consensual path to democratisa- account. Particularly important is what is
tion in Turkey.22 Liberal approaches gave happening in the Middle East and in the
relevance to domestic determinants, as I Arab World, but also in other neighbour-
argued before. But also institutional de- ing countries of the former Soviet Union.
vices, through which states are able to Democratisation of Turkish foreign poli-
resolve conflicts that arose in interna- cy is strongly affected by external events.
tional society, are important. In this view,
economic interdependence between Turkey’s predisposition for
states and international institutions are the role of regional player?
relevant determinants since they impose Some empirical evidence.
a binding constraint on state preferenc- With its efforts to liberalise domestic
es. In the case of Turkey, the European- economy, and to move from an import
ization process has been considered an substitution-led economy to an export-
external tie working both as an ‘anchor’ led economy, the Özal government
and as a ‘trigger’: that is to say a force (1983-1989) probably anticipated the
promoting domestic change spearhead- turning point in the international system
23which occurred with the end of the Cold Already in the 1980s, it became clear that
War. However, “before 1989 Turkey was certain aspects of Turkey’s geographi-
a status quo power. It neither wanted nor cal position were more auspicious (e.g.
sought change”.25 During the Cold War, with regard to tourism, transportation
Turkey’s foreign policy aimed to be as and communication). As a consequence,
distant as possible from neighbouring the monolithic political economy of a
regions. In the 1990s, Turkey started to one-party system gave way to a more
pursue liberal international policies ba- pluralistic vision of economic develop-
sed on commerce and cooperation in the ment.30 But this economic change, relat-
Black Sea region and in the Middle East. ed to geography, was strengthened only
But it was only in the next decade that after the end of the Cold War and the col-
Ankara became very engaged in regional lapse of the Soviet Union.
politics, when its “economy-oriented” In order to be effective and successful,
new activism prevailed over the “securi- any pro-active foreign policy needs to
ty-first” activism of the 1990s.26 boost its economic ties and to secure, at
As already said, ideas and beliefs are rel- the same time, geopolitical interests. This
evant in explaining this transformation. aspect has usually been neglected in the
Erdoğan has been close to the Nakşiben- analysis of the Turkish case. Whenever
di movement, an Islamic Sufi order, as the notion of regional player is invoked,
Özal was until his death.27 This connec- Turkey’s progress or decline in modern-
tion between the two leaders is impor- isation and democratisation are related
tant in order to understand the continu- only to Islamic religious traditions. In
ity of their governments: “Economic and this regard, Turkey is often judged as an
political liberalisation during the admin- “inheritor […] of a culturally distinctive
istration of Turgut Özal facilitated the de- imperial past that continue to blend with
velopment of a “religious market” in Tur- [its] contemporary “Europeanism”.31
key”.28 With the Erdoğan government it Obviously, such an argument is seen as
appeared clearer than before that – using problematic for the future of political
Işık Özel’s words – the “re-invention of Islam, as well as for global stability and
homo Islamicus within the context of Is- international security. The United States
lamic economics epitomises an ideation- and European countries are consequent-
al legitimacy in line with the dominant ly asked to promote Turkey’s anchorage
discourses of neo-liberalism”.29 to a “larger West”.32
But geopolitical factors can also explain This anchorage is invoked to contain
this transformation. During the Cold War, Turkey’s geopolitical shift and avoid a
geographical position was an economic global redistribution of power in Eura-
disadvantage for Turkey. With several sia. From a realist viewpoint, the threat
communist countries as neighbours, Tur- of China as a growing power is also cited
key faced a reduction of opportunities for to this account. However, even when Tur-
regional trade. Moreover, the Cold War key’s international orientation is related
was also a halt to economic development to the role of China in terms of global
because of the related military burden. economy, Turkish performances in the
24economic realm are rarely considered Iran. This Islamic country is often con-
important. sidered a regional competitor of Turkey,
We can look to some empirical evidence but when Turkey became more depend-
in order to clarify this point. To face the ent on Iranian energy supplies, i.e. after
realist concern about the threat of a geo- the 2003 war in Iraq, the two countries
political shift in Eurasia, liberals assigned started new diplomatic relations. In the
great relevance to the 2008 admission aftermath of the disputed 2009 elections
of new countries from Asia, Africa, and in Iran, “the Turkish government, togeth-
Latin America into the G8, transform- er with Caracas and Moscow, was among
ing this exclusive and largely Western the first to salute the election results and
club of financial decision-makers into a congratulate president Ahmadinejad on
more globally representative G20. The his re-election”.35 The height of the rela-
G20 was established in 1999, as a forum tionship between the two governments
for financial ministers in response to was in 2010, when Turkey, together with
the East Asian financial crisis and with Brazil, brokered an agreement over the
a prominent role for emerging polities, Iranian nuclear question and rejected a
particularly for China. According to Melt- UN Security Council vote on sanctions on
em Müftüler-Baç, Turkey became a full Iran.36 In response to this position, Unit-
member of the G20 only in 2003. But ed States Secretary of State Hillary Clin-
since then “Turkey’s foreign policy has ton successfully garnered Russian and
become very active in international or- Chinese support for enhanced sanctions
ganisations, as illustrated [also] through against Iran.37 How can we explain the
its presence in the Organisation of the Turkish initiative that, on one side, was
Islamic Conference (OIC), its United Na- openly in contrast with the aim of mul-
tions Security Council membership and tilateralism, and, on the other side, was
the summits it has hosted since 2003”.33 completely unable to gain a geopolitical
Many liberal scholars are inclined to con- shift of axis in Eurasia?
nect the G20 status of Turkey to multilat-
eralism in its foreign policy, and multilat- It is not easy to give an answer. But ap-
eralism itself is often related to the aim proaching Turkey’s international con-
of defusing conflicts and misunderstand- duct without linking global dynamics (i.e.
ings between the Western and Islamic multilateralism vs. great powers equilib-
worlds.34 ria) to changes in the region is reduction-
But the idea that Turkish multilateral- ist. The fact is that Turkey was attempt-
ism had been a process influenced by the ing, between 2003 and 2011, to become
European and Western anchors – and, a regional player, not to manage global
therefore, the opposite of a geopolitical dynamics directly at global or multilat-
shift of axis in Eurasia – is misleading in eral level. The G20 itself was just a tool
order to understand Turkey’s role in the in the resolution of the global economic
international arena, both for political and crisis, rather than a new mechanism for
economic activities. The first evidence multilateral global governance. Turkish
to support this argument is related to foreign policy was ‘a work in progress’
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