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National Security Program Foreign Policy Project From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy Ambassadors Morton I. Abramowitz and Eric S. Edelman, Co-Chairs October 2013
ABOUT BPC Founded in 2007 by former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Tom Daschle, Bob Dole and George Mitchell, the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) is a non-profit organization that drives principled solutions through rigorous analysis, reasoned negotiation and respectful dialogue. With projects in multiple issue areas, BPC combines politically balanced policymaking with strong, proactive advocacy and outreach. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The conclusions and insights contained in this report were shaped, in part, by a range of conversations that initiative and staff members had with government officials, politicians, journalists, and activists in Turkey. We are indebted to them for their time and thoughtful commentary. We would like to thank former BPC Foreign Policy Project staff members Michael Makovsky and Jonathan Ruhe for their invaluable assistance in all phases of this report. We also thank BPC interns Jarrod Bouchard, Anders Rosen, Michael Hoopes, Brendan Reardon, and Harry Parkhouse for their contributions. Finally, we gratefully acknowledge the generous support of the Stuart Family Foundation. DISCLAIMER This report is a product of BPC’s Foreign Policy Project. The findings expressed herein are those solely of the Foreign Policy Project and the Turkey Initiative, though no member may be satisfied with every formulation in the report. The report does not necessarily represent the views or opinions of BPC, its founders, or its board of directors.
From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy 1
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Chapter 4: Evolution of Turkish
Turkey’s Current Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Foreign Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Foreign Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 AKP Foreign Policy Changes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Domestic Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Zero Problems: 2007–2011. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Implications for U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Sectarian Drift: 2011–Present. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Areas of U.S. Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Syria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Chapter 2: Where Do U.S-Turkish Iraq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Relations Stand?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
History and Significance of U.S-Turkey Relations. . . . . . 15
Current Status of the Relationship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Chapter 5: Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Chapter 3: Turkey’s Domestic Reframing U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Focus on Turkey’s Domestic Stability and
Political Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Democratic Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Recent Developments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Replace Rhetoric with Open and Honest Dialogue. . . . . . . . 47
The AKP’s Rising Majoritarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Areas for Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Taksim Protests and Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Support Turkey’s Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Kurdish Peace Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Set Realistic Foreign Policy Expectations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Prosecution of Military and Critics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Economy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Appendix: Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Erdogan’s Political Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Areas of U.S. Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Endnotes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Treatment of Minorities and Opposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Press Freedom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Stalled EU Accession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Constitutional Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
National Security Program Foreign Policy Project
From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy 3
Foreign Policy Project
TURKEY INITIATIVE Co-Chairs
Ambassador Morton Abramowitz Ambassador Eric Edelman
Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
TURKEY INITIATIVE Members
Henri Barkey John Hannah Aaron Lobel
Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Former Assistant for National Security Founder and President, America
Professor of Internal Relations, Lehigh Affairs to the Vice President Abroad Media
University
Ed Husain Michael Makovsky
Svante Cornell Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Chief Executive Officer, JINSA
Research Director, Central Asia- Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Caucasus Institute and Silk Road
Admiral (ret.) Gregory Johnson
Studies Program
Former Commander of U.S. Naval
Ambassador Paula Dobriansky Forces, Europe; Senior Advisor,
Former Under Secretary of State for Bipartisan Policy Center
Global Affairs; Senior Fellow, Bipartisan
David Kramer
Policy Center
Executive Director, Freedom House
Foreign Policy Project Staff
Blaise Misztal Jessica Michek
Acting Director Research Assistant
Ashton Kunkle
Program Assistant
National Security Program Foreign Policy Project
From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy 5
Chapter 1: Executive Summary
Since its genesis during the Cold War, the U.S.-Turkey region’s tumult, it does not stand apart. Due to its long
relationship has significantly evolved. Once in continuing border with Syria, government decisions by Ankara, and
need of foreign aid for development and to fend off Soviet an already massive and growing refugee problem, Turkey
encroachment, Turkey has risen to become the world’s has not been immune from the turbulence spreading
17th-largest economy, a developing democracy, and a through its neighborhood. This Syrian conflict, and the
strong military ally and NATO member. AKP’s handling of it, has significantly divided the country
and colored its approach to the rest of the region.
The foreign policies of the United States and Turkey
have recently focused on the Middle East, and each Indeed, Turkey’s response to Syria forced a shift to
has suffered serious setbacks. The region-wide political sectarianism in the rest of Turkey’s foreign policy, an
upheaval, which began more than two years ago, has approach that has only further diminished its influence in
given both countries an important interest in containing the region. And, with three elections—local, presidential,
and minimizing the spreading instability and chaos. and parliamentary—looming in the next 18 months,
Today, to secure those interests, the United States and Turkey faces growing political unrest, including among
Turkey need a strong, cooperative partnership. But minorities badly affected by the Syrian civil war, and
challenges to such a partnership have steadily mounted. a faltering economy at home. Yet, the government’s
response to these challenges thus far does not inspire
Over the past decade, the government of the Justice and confidence; AKP officials have chosen authoritarianism
Development Party (AKP) has impressively expanded and sectarianism over compromise and cooperation
trade and investment in regional economies while at almost every turn. In short, at precisely the time that
aspiring to replace the West as the major influence in the United States would most benefit from a strong and
the Middle East. It has sought alliances with regimes cooperative Turkey, Turkey’s ability to fill that role has
shunned by the international community, such as Iran, diminished. Meanwhile, the United States struggles, not
Syria, and Hamas; pursued sectarian policies supporting too successfully, to articulate a coherent policy toward
the Muslim Brotherhood across the region; given both Turkey and the broader region.
little support for important U.S. regional efforts, such
as preventing a nuclear Iran; and broke off relations The United States needs to coolly examine these
with America’s other most important Middle Eastern changing dynamics and adjust how it deals with Turkey.
ally: Israel. Washington, for its part, has hardly been This task force—part of the Foreign Policy Project at
a gracious partner, most recently misleading Turkey the Bipartisan Policy Center—and report began as an
over its intentions in Syria, contributing to disastrous examination of how Turkey was using its influence in
consequences for that country. Yet the reality of this the Middle East and how both countries could agree on
underperforming relationship has been obscured by the and pursue shared objectives in the region. However,
effusive rhetoric American and Turkish officials alike the events of the past year—the Taksim Square protests
deploy in describing their ties. in Turkey, the Turkish government’s incomplete peace
process with its Kurdish minority, Turkey’s deepening
Although Turkey is politically and economically stronger sectarian schisms, the military ouster of Mohamed
and more dynamic than those countries caught up in the Morsi in Egypt, and the deepening disaster in Syria and
6 Chapter 1: Executive Summary
Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons, as well as countries—seeking to establish itself as a regional
the subsequent U.S.-Russian deal—have led the task power. Increasingly, Turkey’s policies began to diverge
force to conclude that, after a decade of focusing largely from those of the United States, even when the two
on Turkey’s role in the region, American policymakers partners claimed to share the same goals. But, a wave
should focus more on the stability of Turkey’s political of political upheaval swept through the region, seriously
institutions, the freedom of its society, and the dynamism complicating Turkey’s attempts to cultivate strong
of its economy. The state of Turkey’s domestic politics relationships with Middle Eastern regimes and forcing the
is of vital importance to its future political stability, its AKP to chart a new foreign policy course.
economic growth, its ability to wield influence in the
region, and, therefore, its ties to the United States. Having to choose between supporting regimes—such
as that in Damascus, which repressed its citizens or
the crowds demanding its ouster—Turkey pivoted to
Turkey’s Current Situation supporting the people. Amid the political movements
The AKP came to power more than a decade ago shaping the region, the AKP found allies among its
promising to carry out a “silent revolution” and to break ideological brethren: the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood
with Turkey’s Kemalist past—including the dominance and its various supporters. Worse, without any major
of the military, strong ethno-nationalism, vigilantly international or, particularly, U.S. efforts to oust Assad or
guarded secularism, and a general reluctance to become arm the rebels, Turkey has been lending support not only
involved in the Middle East.1 During its first term, it largely to the mainstream factions among the Syrian opposition
lived up to this rhetoric. Under the leadership of Prime but also to its most extreme elements, including the
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the AKP government terrorist organization Jabhat al-Nusra, as the most
implemented some of the most thorough economic effective anti-Assad forces in the country.
and political reforms in Turkey’s history, which led to an
The AKP fully committed to its new sectarian policy,
extended period of high growth and broadened minority
positioning itself as a “source of inspiration” for Sunni
rights. It also, in a continuation of Kemalist policy, courted
Islamist groups seeking, for the first time, to claim power
the European Union, beginning membership negotiations
in their countries. And when, Turkey hoped, the same
in 2005.
political wave that carried the Muslim Brotherhood to
These early successes, however, are now in danger. victory in Egypt brought its other Sunni allies to power,
Ankara would have a number of client states in the region
Foreign Policy looking to the AKP for political support and guidance.
By 2007, the geographic focus of Turkey’s foreign policy Just as “zero problems” did not give Turkey the influence
had shifted eastward. Under a strategy developed by it expected, this sectarian turn has also borne little
its foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoloğu, and termed fruit. The failure to overthrow Assad and of the Muslim
“zero problems with neighbors,” Turkey began building Brotherhood to hold on to power in Egypt has left Ankara
relationships in the Middle East—with Alawite-dominated with even fewer friends and less sway in the region
Syria, Iraq, Shiite Iran, Sunni Hamas, and other than before, undermining its regional ambitions. One of
From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy 7
Turkey’s few remaining functioning relationships is with Such politically motivated harassment, arrests, and
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern convictions have not been limited to the media, however.
Iraq. Yet, this sole success story of Turkish foreign policy The AKP has conducted several large-scale criminal
puts it askew of current U.S. policy, which is to support trials for coup plotting—known as “Sledgehammer” and
the Iraqi central government in Baghdad despite its “Ergenekon”—targeting primarily the military, in an effort
affinity for Iran and support of Assad. to diminish its political power in Turkish society and its
frequent propensity to intervene in politics, including as
Publicly at least, the Turkish government appears recently as 1997. They have led to the arrest, detention,
unconcerned about these developments. “This,” in the prosecution, and imprisonment of hundreds of high-
words of Ibrahim Kalin, one of Erdoğan’s chief foreign ranking military officials and AKP critics. Not all were
policy advisors, “is a worthy solitude.”2 innocent; the senior military hated the AKP. But the trials
have raised concerns about due process, civil rights, and
Domestic Policy
judicial neutrality.
Turkey’s domestic development has also suffered
Erdoğan’s style of rule—viewed by many Turks as an
setbacks. After a decade of significant economic growth
authoritarian swerve from the democratic reforms that
and considerable democratization, Turkey’s reforms,
marked AKP’s first years in power—sowed the seeds of
European integration efforts, and economy have slowed
dissent. In May 2013, those seeds blossomed in Gezi
considerably. At the same time, the unpopular Syrian
Park. Protests initially sparked by the government’s
war, the AKP’s expanding Islamist political agenda, and
planned razing of this rare green space in Istanbul soon
Erdoğan’s personalist and authoritarian ruling style are
spilled into the adjacent Taksim Square and spread to
deeply polarizing the country.
many parts of the country.
Successive AKP electoral victories, Erdoğan’s personal
But rather than calm tensions, Erdoğan chose to solidify
involvement at all levels of policymaking, and his proud,
his base and rally his very sizeable group of core
but mercurial, personality have led him to believe he
supporters. His combative rhetoric cast the unrest in
has a mandate to remake Turkey, regardless of strong
sectarian terms and himself as the bulwark protecting
opposition to his views. From his decisions about urban
observant Sunnis from their enemies. Officials have
design to his pronouncements about how Turks should
blamed seemingly every ethnic and religious minority
conduct their lives, the Islamic orientation of his political
within Turkey for having a hand in the protests.
vision has also become more apparent. The government
Such narratives have only further polarized Turkish
has increasingly sought to muzzle any disagreement
society, not simply between secular and religious, but
with its policies by reining in press freedom—by bringing
between the conservative Sunnis whose interests the
criminal and civil cases against journalists, harassing
AKP government protects and all other segments of
media outlets with raids on their offices, charging fines,
Turkish society who feel their rights are being trampled.
and friendly hands taking over or temporarily closing
Further social tension has been created by the Turkish
newspapers. Turkey is now ranked 154th out of 179
government’s aggressively pro-Sunni policy in Syria,
countries on the World Press Freedom Index, six spots
as Erdoğan has at times accused Turkey’s Alevis of
behind Russia.38 Chapter 1: Executive Summary
supporting Assad due to “sectarian solidarity” with Syrian violence. So far, however, Kurdish leader Abdullah
Alawites, misleadingly equating the two sects.4 Öcalan has shown no sign of disrupting negotiations or
returning to violence.
Turkey’s domestic uncertainty, and its government’s
strong-handed response to recent protests, has also The AKP no longer seems invincible or inevitable,
served to roil the economy. After nearly a decade perhaps setting the stage for another period of
of explosive growth, Turkey’s economy has slowed uncertainty in Turkish politics, with the possibility of
dramatically, though it is still performing well compared more outbursts of public frustration and more potential
with most of Europe, and faces several challenges. political challenges to its rule. With a series of elections
The prospect of climbing interest rates in the United looming—three in the span of the next 18 months—
States, investors’ worries about the stability of Turkey’s Turkey is approaching an inflection point. To one side
political climate, and Erdoğan’s own tirades against lies the chance to finally address some of the republic’s
bankers are reducing the short-term capital flows that remaining democratic deficits—especially the role of
Turkey’s economy depends on and driving up exchange ethnicity in national identity and civil rights—that have
rates. These negative trends are intensifying structural been made even starker by recent political protests.
problems—such as growing current account deficit and But the alternative is for Turkey to fall victim to some of
foreign indebtedness—that the government has ignored its unresolved social tensions, potentially destabilizing
for too long. If Turkey’s economy continues to worsen, the country and setting back its political and economic
it will weaken the government ahead of elections and progress as well as its aspirations for regional influence.
further reduce Turkey’s regional standing. President Abdullah Gül neatly summed up the challenges
facing Turkey in a recent speech, and hinted at a schism
The major bright spot in Turkey, the ongoing peace within the AKP, declaring, “polarization obviously has the
process with the Kurds, remains politically volatile. potential to harm the social cohesion of our people.”6
The AKP’s laudable effort to end the decades-long
conflict with Kurdish militants has created an important
opportunity not just for peace, but also for expanded
Implications for U.S. Policy
civil and political rights for all of Turkey’s minorities. The Turkey has been left with little political capital to expend
package of political reforms recently introduced by the on influencing events in the Middle East. After a period
government, although carefully orchestrated to keep during which Ankara pursued the vision of “zero problems
this process from failing, has been dismissed by Kurdish with neighbors,” it now has nothing but problems. It has
representatives as not going far enough and by others called for the ouster of Syria’s Assad, refused to recognize
as more beneficial to the AKP faithful than to Turkey’s the legitimacy of Egypt’s new military government,
minorities.5 These limited reforms and the inclusion of cut off diplomatic ties with Israel, angered Iran with its
concessions for its Islamic supporters—such as lifting acceptance of a NATO radar installation and its support for
the ban on headscarves in public institutions—reflect the Syrian rebels, quarreled with the Iraqi central government
difficult political choice facing the AKP: continuing toward in Baghdad, angered key Gulf states over its support for
peace will anger Turkey’s nationalists; but failing to live Muslim Brotherhood movements throughout the region,
up to its agreement could lead to a new wave of KurdishFrom Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy 9
and alienated Europe with unfounded accusations and in Syria—one of America’s chief concerns there—has
conspiracy theories. In October, it shocked its NATO allies elicited relatively muted response from Washington.
by announcing that it would procure a missile-defense Focusing instead on admittedly close cooperation on
system from a Chinese company that is under U.S. terrorist threats elsewhere, Secretary of State John Kerry
sanctions for its dealings with Iran.7 recently announced a U.S.- and Turkish-led fund to
combat violent extremism, declaring, “Turkey has been
Yet, Turkey’s ability to rebuild its regional standing will and will continue to be a very valued partner in this effort.”8
be affected by domestic considerations. This summer’s
domestic turmoil has cast some doubt on its social, The persistence of excessive U.S. rhetoric despite
political, and economic stability at a crucial period these concerns, and attention solely to other areas of
for Turkey’s political development: three elections in partnership, is a testament to the importance Washington
the span of 18 months amid rising political tension, a attaches to the relationship with Turkey. But it also
historic attempt at peace with the Kurdistan Workers’ serves to obscure the reality of a partnership that is
Party (PKK), and a slowing economy. But it is precisely underperforming and to hinder any attempts at improving
Turkey’s blend—adroitly managed by the AKP at the it.
beginning of its tenure—of democratic government, a
diverse society, Islamic heritage, and strong economy Inflated Turkish rhetoric has also contributed to the
that produced its enhanced standing in the region and current state of the relationship. AKP leaders delight in
the chance to serve as a source of inspiration for aspiring pronouncements about their attachment to democracy,
democracies. Unless Turkey is able to hold on to both the secularism, and the Western alliance, pronouncements
political and economic dynamism of the last decade, it is that are increasingly divorced from reality. At the
unlikely to regain its regional standing. same time, Erdoğan and other influential AKP leaders
continually indulge in inflammatory rhetoric and
Whereas recent years have seen policy divergences unfounded conspiracy theories. As President Obama
between Washington and Ankara, a new dynamic has made clear in his recent address to the United Nations
recently been added on top of these disagreements: a General Assembly, such an irrepressible predilection for
mismatch between the needs, capabilities, and ambitions demagoguery has “a practical impact on the American
of both partners. Just as America’s need for a reliable people’s support for our involvement in the region, and
partner in the Middle East has peaked, amid the political allow leaders in the region—as well as the international
upheavals sweeping through the region, Turkey’s ability community sometimes—to avoid addressing difficult
to exert political influence in the area is ebbing. problems themselves.”9
Yet, American policymakers have not, publicly at least,
recognized this new set of challenges facing the U.S.-
Recommendations
Turkish relationship. Washington, for the most part, The Middle East remains a major foreign policy challenge
continues to lavish Turkey with praise, despite mounting for the United States, despite attempts to pivot away from
disagreements and concerns with Turkish policies. it. A cooperative and strong Turkey could be an important
Even Ankara’s role in fanning the flames of extremism partner in helping rebuild the Middle East. Indeed, there10 Chapter 1: Executive Summary
is no other country in the region that the United States endorsement of the government in Ankara and its
can turn to that could potentially play as constructive a policies, leading the regime to believe that it will enjoy
role as Turkey might be able to. But for now the reality is unwavering U.S. support regardless of its actions.
different. The high regard that Turkey, and Erdoğan personally,
places on U.S. praise, on the other hand, means that
This is not the first time that Washington and Ankara have a frank discussion of disagreements, although it might
faced turbulence in their relationship, and the task force not be immediately welcomed by Ankara, can help
believes that, as they have in the past, these ties can be motivate greater cooperation—especially on Turkey’s
reforged. But we also believe accomplishing that now stalled democratization. The United States should also
will require a different approach by Washington to the continue to point out to AKP leaders the damage their
relationship with Turkey. American policymakers should rhetoric does to Turkey’s image.
recognize these differences and the challenges currently
facing Turkey and their implications for greater U.S.- Support Turkey’s Development
Turkish cooperation. Rather than eliding these concerns,
U.S. policy should move away from rhetoric and toward a The United States should support and encourage
realistic assessment and dialogue about the state of the the continued improvement of Turkey’s democratic
relationship with Turkey. institutions, opening of its civil society, and modernization
of its economy. This should include:
Reframe U.S. Turkish Policy n Support for democratization: American officials
n Focus on Turkey’s domestic stability and democratic should publicly encourage the Turkish government’s
process: Which direction Turkey’s domestic political attempts to address its democratic deficit, especially
development follows is an increasing concern not just in relation to minority groups and political freedoms.
for Turks but also for the United States. Practically, Improvement is essential. Particularly important is
this means that Washington should be open with the ongoing Kurdish peace process, which American
Ankara about its concerns about issues like press policymakers should continue to support and
freedom, freedom of assembly, rule of law, and encourage. The positive impact its resolution could
the Turkish government’s increasing sectarianism. have on U.S. assistance in other matters, especially
American officials should obviously also recognize, attempts to resolve energy disputes between the
praise, encourage, and aid in any way possible positive central government of Iraq and its Kurdish population,
developments in these areas. is critical to further Turkish economic dynamism.
n Replace rhetoric on both sides with more candid n Stand up for civil and economic freedom: Washington
discussion: Sometimes, when the bloom is off the should speak out against the imprisonment and
rose, it is better to stop gilding the lily. This is one of firing of journalists, the targeting of businesses
those moments. Failing to enumerate and discuss belonging to opposition figures for arbitrary audits and
serious differences with Turkey at appropriate times investigations, and other means of muzzling dissent
creates the risk that they could come back to haunt that are being employed in Turkey. Turkish progress in
either party at a later time. Moreover, too often the these areas should be tied to U.S. support for including
lack of U.S. criticism is interpreted in Turkey as implicit Turkey in international trade negotiations.From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy 11
n Engage a wider cross-section of civil society: American States increases the assistance it provides to the
officials ought to engage, at the appropriate level, with mainstream Syrian opposition.
all segments of Turkish society—including minorities,
n Cooperate on common approach to Iraq: The
youth, and all political parties.
United States and Turkey share a common interest
n Encourage EU membership: Although Turkish EU in bolstering a strong, stable, Western-oriented,
membership is unlikely in the near future, the United autonomous Kurdish region—ideally, within the context
States should nevertheless continue to support Turkish of a unified Iraq where the influence of both Iran and
EU accession and to press both Turkey and America’s al-Qaeda are severely constrained. Each country has
European allies. pursued this goal in different ways; both have failed.
n Include Turkey in transatlantic free trade: The United The Syrian conflict has made this objective even more
States should work with Turkey to find a way to difficult. Washington and Ankara must engage in a
address its concerns about the ongoing Transatlantic sustained strategic dialogue on the future of Iraq with
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. the aim of developing a common approach to such
vital issues as the future of Kurdish energy exports to
n Help Turkey with Syrian refugees: The United States Turkey; the Kurdish region’s political, economic, and
should increase its contribution to United Nations’ military relations with the Iraqi central government;
refugee funds, and top American officials should help and the establishment of an effective government in
generate greater humanitarian efforts from other Baghdad that is neither under the sway of Tehran nor
governments, particularly those from Gulf countries. in support of Assad. Failure here could be catastrophic.
Set Realistic Foreign Policy Expectations n Finish reconciliation with Israel: Recognizing that the
current Turkish government is unlikely to have cordial
The United States should moderate its expectations for relations with Israel, American policymakers should
Turkish assistance in the broader Middle East, focusing nevertheless encourage Turkey to conclude the
instead on areas where Turkey is realistically able to ongoing reconciliation talks and reestablish diplomatic
assist, notably Syria, Iraq, Israel, and Iran: ties with Israel—in accordance with the understanding
n Encourage support for moderates in Syria: The that was personally brokered by President Obama
United States should continue to pressure Ankara to during his visit to Israel earlier in 2013.
be accountable for its support of extremist elements n Engage Turkey on Iran: American policymakers need
within the Syrian opposition—support that Turkey to engage Turkey on the topic of Iran. Keeping Ankara
denies but apparently is currently reconsidering— informed of progress in diplomatic negotiations could
and redouble its own efforts to work with Turkey avoid the sort of miscommunication that led to the 2010
and other friendly states to build up and strengthen failed Turkish-Brazilian-Iranian agreement, contribute
Syria’s more moderate, pragmatic, and non-jihadist to increased Turkish adherence to sanctions, and
opposition. Realistically, American policymakers should engender goodwill. The United States should also
understand that, in all likelihood, Turkey will only use this as an opportunity to raise the possibility that
become more cooperative on this front if the United it might be required to use force to prevent a nuclear12 Chapter 1: Executive Summary
Iran and discuss what that means for the U.S.-Turkish should leverage the recent fiscal crises in both Athens
relationship and what help the Turks could provide in and Nicosia to overcome Greek and Greek Cypriot
such an event. opposition to further negotiations, which has been
the main obstacle recently. The United States should
n Reopen dialogue on Cyprus: The United States should
create a new high-level envoy to work with both sides
use the recent discovery of significant gas reserves
and the United Nations to restart talks and seek a
off the Cypriot coast as motivation for Turkey to offer
resolution to this issue.
a more conciliatory stance toward Cyprus. Similarly, itFrom Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy 13
National Security Program Foreign Policy Project
From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy 15
Chapter 2: Where Do U.S-Turkish
Relations Stand?
After 65 years, Turkey remains a critical NATO ally of East,” that he sought to preserve with economic and
the United States. No longer, however, is Turkey a weak military assistance.11
country desperate for foreign assistance. It has come
into its own as a political and economic power, especially Turkey, for its part, readily joined the anti-communist
over the last decade under the rule of the AKP and Prime alliance, becoming a member of the North Atlantic Treaty
Minister Erdoğan. Organization (NATO) in 1952. This was a reflection not
just of the perceived Soviet threat, but also of Turkey’s
The official ties between Washington and Ankara general political orientation at the time. Mustafa Kemal
reflect this new dynamic. Turkey has emerged as an Atatürk, the father of the modern Turkish republic, sought
influential, vibrant, dynamic, and prosperous country in to create a Western-oriented, ethnically defined, secular,
the region, and, recognizing this achievement, American nation-state.
policymakers have come to expect that Ankara would
assume a role commensurate with its new standing. Kemalism, Atatürk’s ideology, was founded on the
As Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Victoria premise that the Ottoman Empire’s failures were due
Nuland told the Senate during her confirmation hearings, to its Islamic character and multinational composition,
Washington’s view has been that, “our alliance and which impeded scientific progress and centralized
relationship with Turkey is absolutely critical not only in bureaucratic rule.12 In order for the modern Turkish
the Eurasian space, but also in all the work that we’re state to be successful, in Atatürk’s view, Turkey had to
doing now in the Middle East and North Africa.”10 be remade into a “powerful, technologically capable,
and centralized state in tight control of a territory
containing a homogenous population.”13 Accomplishing
History and Significance of U.S-Turkish this transformation required, according to Atatürk, not
Relations just importing Western political models and scientific
knowledge but also a complete disengagement,
The U.S.-Turkey relationship drew its early strategic
geographically and culturally, from the Middle East.
importance from the emerging Cold War, but since
Turkey’s Cold War leaders embraced this directive.
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relationship has
developed to encompass more than just security The end of the Cold War fundamentally altered Turkey’s
concerns. strategic environment, but not the importance Ankara and
Washington accorded to their relationship. Nevertheless,
Alarmed by Soviet ambitions to expand their sphere of
the demise of the Berlin Wall and the bipolar world it had
influence south of the Black Sea, the United States—
connoted challenged the Republic’s traditional aversion
in what would become the opening salvo of the Cold
to Middle Eastern engagement, beginning with the
War—invested heavily in ensuring Turkey did not fall
1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The crisis revealed deep
into the Soviet Union’s orbit. At the time, in President
divisions within Turkey’s elite: the military establishment
Truman’s words, Turkey was in the process of “effecting
adamantly counseled against joining a military attack
that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its
on Turkey’s immediate neighbor; much of both elite and
national integrity.” It was that integrity, which he believed
public opinion agreed. Yet President Turgut Özal saw
was “essential to the preservation of order in the Middle
the opportunity to help Turkey find a new role in the16 Chapter 2: Where Do U.S-Turkish Relations Stand?
post–Cold War world while advancing Turkish interests in democracy in a region with a notable democratic deficit, a
maintaining a diversity of energy suppliers by preventing stable partner amid fast-shifting sands.
Saddam Hussein from gaining control over greater oil
reserves. But, although he strongly supported joining the Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the
international war effort, Özal could not entirely override Bush administration accorded significant importance to
the military’s objections to allowing Turkish troops to Turkey as a “moderate Muslim” country, demonstrated
participate in the U.S.-led coalition. The extent of Turkish by a series of visits between Laura Bush and Erdoğan’s
support for Operation Desert Storm, therefore, was to headscarf-wearing wife, Emine Erdoğan, and Turkey’s
allow coalition forces to operate from Turkey’s bases and inclusion in the 2004 G8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia,
airspace.14 which produced the Partnership for Progress and a
Common Future with the Broader Middle East and North
This ushered in a new period of U.S.-Turkish security Africa.16
cooperation, with Turkey proving itself an important
NATO ally due to both its robust military and critical The significance accorded Turkey in U.S. efforts to
geostrategic position. Turkey has lived up to this role, understand and influence Islamic societies would grow
contributing to several NATO operations in the Balkans, further under the Obama administration. President
including: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Obama’s first foreign visit included Turkey, where he both
It has also participated in NATO naval operations in the acknowledged that trust in the United States “has been
Mediterranean and off the Horn of Africa, as well as strained … in many places where the Muslim faith is
joining in Baltic air policing, training Iraqi security forces, practiced,” and announced that “our partnership with the
and the Libya no-fly zone. Perhaps most importantly for Muslim world is critical.”17 Indeed, Obama found a partner
the United States, Turkish troops not only joined NATO- in Erdoğan, one of five world leaders with whom he built,
led efforts in Afghanistan, they were the first to head the in his words, the strongest “friendships and bonds of
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation trust.”18 With Turkey as one of only two—and the only
in 2002 and again in 2005, but did not participate in Muslim—democratic Middle Eastern allies, the United
combat operations. States hoped it would become an important wellspring
of democratic values and stability, especially as political
Ankara has benefited from this alliance as well. It unrest seized the region.
requested and received Patriot missile batteries during
the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, as well as in 2012 after Current Status of the Relationship
coming under artillery fire from Syria. NATO has been, in
the words of Turkey’s foreign minister, “one of the main The strength and significance of the U.S.-Turkish
pillars in our strategic planning and vision in Turkey.”15 relationship, however, have not shielded it from
disagreements and turbulence. The United States has
But as Turkish institutions have matured and the never found great favor in Turkish popular opinion.
geopolitical landscaped has evolved, the U.S.-Turkish Indeed, support for the United States among the Turkish
relationship has extended beyond just security public has fallen steadily over the years. Occasionally
cooperation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United public pressure, difference in perceived interests, or
States has also seen Turkey as a political ally—a both have kept Turkey’s leaders from backing their U.S.From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy 17
partners. The United States, additionally, has hardly been The gulf between the rhetoric and reality of the U.S.-
a gracious partner, ignoring Turkish appeals if they did Turkish relationship continues today. But, whereas
not suit U.S. interests. in recent years it resulted from policy divergences
between Washington and Ankara, a new dynamic has
The relationship entered just such a rocky period in recently been added on top of these disagreements: a
2003, when Turkey denied American troops basing rights fundamental mismatch between the needs, capabilities,
ahead of the invasion of Iraq. Washington, or at least and ambitions of both partners.
its rhetoric, recovered from this disappointment, both
because it lacked other regional partners and because Just as America’s need for a reliable partner in the Middle
of Turkey’s political and economic rise in the subsequent East has peaked, amid the political upheavals that have
years. But the friendly pronouncements by both the swept through the region, Turkey’s influence in the region
Bush and Obama administrations have belied a lack of has ebbed. And, with three elections—local, presidential,
real cooperation. The United States was slow to assist and parliamentary—looming in the next 18 months,
Turkey with its major concern following the fall of Saddam Turkey faces growing political unrest, including among
Hussein—the resurgence of the PKK in northern Iraq. minorities badly affected by the Syrian civil war, and a
Erdoğan had to undertake a frantic trip to Washington in faltering economy at home. Meanwhile, the United States
2007 before the United States agreed to share actionable struggles, not too successfully, to articulate a coherent
intelligence with the Turkish military. This was not an policy toward both Turkey and the broader region.
isolated case. Miscommunications and frustrations
mounted on both sides on other issues, too: Hamas’s Both the United States and Turkey would benefit from
assumption of power in Gaza; Iran’s nuclear program; moving their relationship back onto a more constructive
Israel; and, particularly, Syria. track. Figuring out how to do so will first require better
understanding the reality that underlies the official
rhetoric.National Security Program Foreign Policy Project Copyright by World Economic Forum swiss-image.ch. Photo by E.T. Studhalter
From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy 19
Chapter 3: Turkey’s Domestic Political
Situation
After a decade of significant economic growth and history, which led to an extended period of high growth,
considerable democratic reforms, Turkey is approaching broadened minority rights, and allowed Turkey to officially
an inflection point. To one side lies the possibility to begin negotiations for EU membership in 2005.
finally address some of the modern Republic’s remaining
democratic deficits—especially the role of ethnicity and However, once the AKP’s second term began, advances
religion in national identity and civil rights—that have in Turkey’s democratization and European integration
been made even starker by recent political protests slowed. These reversals, coupled with the AKP’s
and the spillover effects of the Syrian crisis. But the increasingly Islamist agenda and majoritarian ruling style,
alternative is for Turkey to fall victim to some of its led to Turkey’s current domestic troubles and add to the
unresolved social tensions, potentially destabilizing uncertainty surrounding its upcoming elections.
the country and setting back its political and economic
The AKP’s Rising Majoritarianism
progress as well as its aspirations for regional influence.
Recognizing these dangers, President Gül, in his last The AKP’s successive electoral victories, Erdoğan’s
address to the Turkish Parliament, outlined the need for personal involvement at all levels of policymaking,
a politics of “normalization” in Turkey to increase social and his proud, but mercurial, personality have led to
cohesion and avoid the problems plaguing Egypt and an increasingly majoritarian governing style. Erdoğan
Syria.19 has interpreted the AKP’s three electoral victories as
a mandate to remake Turkey, regardless of strong
Whether Turkey is able to meet that objective and the
opposition to his vision.
direction that its domestic political development follows
is a concern not just for Turks but also for the United Turkey’s progress toward EU accession and the political
States. Turkey’s domestic vitality—its unique combination reforms required by that process have slowed. The
of secular, democratic governance, economic dynamism, brakes have been applied by both Europeans, particularly
and Islamic heritage—is also the source of its external France and Germany, reluctant to let a Muslim nation
strength. If this is compromised, so too will be Turkey’s into the Union, and the AKP, which came to view further
ability to conduct foreign policy and serve as a progress on accession criteria as no longer in line with
constructive partner for the United States. its own political vision. With no new chapters opened
in 2011, Erdoğan declared that European nations were
Recent Developments “determined to have Turkey give up its interest in joining
the EU.”21 It appeared to do just that, as the AKP’s focus
The AKP came to power more than a decade ago shifted to consolidating its power and using the organs
promising to carry out a “silent revolution” and to break of the state to tamp down its critics, prosecuting the
with Turkey’s Kemalist past—including the dominance of opposition on charges, not entirely unfounded, of coup
the military, strong ethno-nationalism, vigilantly guarded plotting and exerting pressure on the independent media
secularism, and a reluctance to get involved in the Middle to toe the party line. Prime Minister Erdoğan publicly
East.20 During its first term, it largely lived up to this and repeatedly rebuked media outlets that criticized the
pledge. Erdoğan’s government implemented some of the government and urged the public to boycott them.22 With
most thorough economic and political reforms in Turkey’s control of the presidency, the AKP was able to put the20 Chapter 3: Turkey’s Domestic Political Situation
power of the state behind his admonitions, and, as a country and lasted much longer than any observer could
result, those media outlets that have not been co-opted have predicted.
by the state often practice self-censorship.
Almost as surprising as the protests was the government
Without any strong opposition, Prime Minister Erdoğan response. The protestors were met by riot police and
has dominated the Turkish political scene. Called the even veiled threats from Erdoğan, who called the
“mayor of Turkey” by some, for his personal involvement protestors “looters” who “burn and destroy,” warned
at almost every level of governmental decision-making, that the state’s patience “had its limits,” and invoked
Erdoğan wants to reshape Turkish society. From his the AKP’s widespread support and electoral victories,
decisions about urban design to his pronouncements saying “we can assemble one million people where the
about how Turks should conduct their personal lives, opposition assembles 100,000.”24 The protests revealed
the Islamic orientation of his political vision has also potential fault lines among Turkey’s leaders, as President
became more apparent. Erdoğan has spoken of “the Gül and Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç made more
state’s duty to raise religious generations,” which has sympathetic statements.25
been coupled with legal reform to allow a greater role for
Islam in the state and society. 23 The AKP has overseen a Rather than calm tensions and reach out to the
campaign to allow for more religious dress in the public opposition, Erdoğan has thus far chosen to solidify
sphere—including overturning the headscarf ban— his base and rally the core supporters of the AKP. His
while educational reforms in 2012 strengthened Islamic combative rhetoric has increasingly cast the unrest in
teaching in public schools, and, in 2013, the AKP passed sectarian terms and himself as the bulwark protecting
several measures increasing restrictions on alcohol sale observant Sunnis from their enemies. At the same time,
and consumption. ruling officials have sought to undermine the legitimacy
of the protests by suggesting that they were organized
This style of rule—viewed by many Turks as an by any one of a myriad of shadowy groups, including the
authoritarian swerve from the democratic reforms “interest rate lobby,” German airlines, and Jews.26 Another
that marked the AKP’s first years in power—forms the common conspiracy theory has been that the protestors
backdrop to the unrest that gripped Turkey in the summer were both secular extremists who attacked women in
of 2013. headscarves and Alevi agitators, possibly mobilized by
Syria and Iran.27
Taksim Protests and Aftermath
Such narratives only serve to further polarize Turkish
As of May 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s continued society, not simply between secular and religious, but
dominance of Turkish politics seemed all but certain. between the conservative Sunnis whose interests the
Then, a minor protest over the pending destruction of a AKP government promotes and all other segments of
small, but rare, Istanbul green space—Gezi Park—was Turkish society who feel their rights are being trampled.
violently suppressed, unleashing a decade of pent-up After Taksim, the AKP no longer seems invincible or
political frustration. Those who felt excluded by the inevitable, setting the stage for a period of greater
AKP’s politics spilled into the adjacent Taksim Square to uncertainty in Turkish politics, with the possibility of
express their discontent. The protests spread across the more outbursts of public frustration and potential politicalFrom Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy 21
challenges to the AKP, perhaps even from within the the president with new, sweeping executive powers—
party. Still, it is hard to imagine at the current moment the one that has been made unattainable by the Taksim
emergence of any political force that could successfully protests and erosion of the AKP’s support.29 With his
compete with the AKP or would be able to govern any ambitions to head a restructured Turkish government
more competently, a profound obstacle to political change dashed, Erdoğan might lose interest in moving the peace
in Turkey. process forward, as the votes of the Kurdish Peace and
Democracy Party (BDP) deputies will no longer suffice
Kurdish Peace Process to secure his desired constitutional changes. Indeed,
Erdoğan might decide that pushing for peace might cost
One positive development among the troubling
him too many votes among Turkey’s nationalists, who
backtracking on domestic reform has been the AKP’s
some believe strongly oppose greater recognition of
renewed efforts to resolve Turkey’s Kurdish issue.
Turkey’s Kurds, in upcoming elections.
Following an aborted opening to the Kurds in 2009, the
However, with the PKK threatening a new wave of
peace process was rejuvenated in 2013, with Erdoğan’s
violence if their deal with Erdoğan falls through, backing
government announcing negotiations with the PKK and
out now might also be politically dangerous.30 Heading
its jailed leader, Abdullah Öcalan. The talks bore fruit,
into the elections, resurgent instability will only hurt the
and, in a March 2013 letter to his followers, Öcalan
AKP’s chances of success. Turkish columnist Cengiz
declared an end to armed struggle and announced that
Çandar has captured this choice facing Erdoğan: “Will he
the PKK sought a solution to the Kurdish issue through
deal with his stronger hand for a wider democratization
further democratization.28 The rejuvenated peace process
to solve the Kurdish issue that will gain him enormous
was envisioned with three phases: first, the withdrawal
advantages especially in these most difficult days of
of PKK fighters from Turkey; second, the Turkish
his political career? Or, will he feel emboldened with his
government undertaking reforms to address Kurdish
stronger hand and ignore the steps that will satisfy the
concerns; and third, the reintegration of PKK members
Kurds but will get him into trouble with the nationalists
into Turkish society.
just as he is courting them to form a new mass
This peace process could be a major step toward fuller, coalition?”31
more inclusive democracy and improved human rights
Erdoğan cannot wait much longer to decide whether to
in Turkey. It could also have significant impact on the
proceed. The peace process is reaching a critical point
shape of the region—opening the door for Turkey to
with each side accusing the other of not acting in good
deal constructively with Kurds in Syria and for an even
faith and stalling the continuation of the process. The
stronger relationship with Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional
BDP has accused the government of inaction, asserting
Government.
that Erdoğan does not believe “in a lasting peace,” and
Success will prove a truly historic achievement for the PKK has vowed to break their cease-fire if the Turkish
Erdoğan. But at least one of his motivations has been government does not take action by October 15.32 With
his own political ambition. Erdoğan saw the peace deal this threat eliciting no response from the government,
as critical to a proximate and personal goal—becoming the PKK in early September announced that it would halt
the withdrawal of its forces, though it would maintain the
cease-fire.3322 Chapter 3: Turkey’s Domestic Political Situation
Yet, those closer to the peace process appear more member district system and lowering the threshold of
optimistic. They suggest that government rhetoric is electoral votes required for a party to receive federal
driven by Erdoğan’s fear of losing electoral support funding from 7 to 3 percent.
among nationalists by being too conciliatory to Kurds
and is meant to provide political cover while the peace AKP officials created soaring expectations for the
process progresses under the radar. Studies finding reform package, promising a “continuation of the silent
broad public support, even among nationalists, for revolution” and lauded it as “the most comprehensive
negotiations with the PKK might make it easier for reforms” Turkey has seen and a “new, decisive phase
Erdoğan to proceed.34 Similarly, even if he is concerned in the democratization of Turkey.”36 However, in many
about the political repercussions of a Kurdish deal, he areas, the reforms were seen as falling short. Those
need only stretch the process out several more months, disappointed by the package point to both its content and
until the local elections scheduled for March 2014, before its undemocratic creation, put forward unilaterally by the
he gains more room to maneuver. Öcalan, for his part, AKP without consultation with Kurdish and other minority
is likely motivated primarily by the desire to get out of jail groups.37 The package failed to fully satisfy demands
and, therefore, will be loathe to sanction the PKK’s return for Kurdish education, as critics point out that limiting
to violence. These dynamics suggest that the most likely Kurdish language education to private schools means
scenario is slow movement on the part of the government that “only the rich Kurds can learn Kurdish.”38 Additionally,
and patience on the Kurdish side. Indeed, on September the reforms failed to touch Turkey’s controversial anti-
30, Erdoğan unveiled a reform package intended to keep terror law and penal code or provide for the release of
the peace process on track.35 thousands of BDP partisans known as the Kurdistan
Communities Union (KCK) detainees. Gültan Kışanak,
Walking a political tightrope, the package included BDP co-chair, said the proposals did not do enough to
reforms designed to garner support among the AKP’s advance the peace process, and concluded that the
Islamic base, such as lifting the headscarf ban for public package “is not a democratization package; it is an
institutions, as well as recommendations focused on election package.”39 Another BDP lawmaker rejected the
keeping the Kurdish peace process from failing. The package as “just a maneuver” as “many of the changes
package includes: allowing for education in the mother were ones that the Kurds had already gained in reality.”40
tongue in private schools; restoring the original names
of villages, districts, and provinces that were changed It remains to be seen whether the proffered reform
after 1980; removing the ban on letters included in the package is enough to keep the peace process on track.
Kurdish alphabet but not the Turkish one; discontinuing If it is able to move forward despite the ongoing political
the Turkish nationalist pledge said every morning in tensions, it would signify a major accomplishment for
primary schools; and allowing for political campaigning Erdoğan and a significant step toward a more inclusive
in languages other than Turkish. Additionally, Erdoğan Turkey.
proposed, but did not make, several changes to the law
Prosecution of Military and Critics
on political parties and electoral law that would make
it easier for Kurdish parties to enter parliament: either The AKP has launched several large-scale criminal trials
lowering the 10 percent threshold to enter parliament to accusing primarily the military of coup plotting, in an effort
five percent or eliminating it entirely in favor of a singleYou can also read
