Excessive pricing during the COVID 19 crisis in the EU: An empirical inquiry
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Concurrences REVUE DES DROITS DE LA CONCURRENCE | COMPETITION LAW REVIEW Excessive pricing during the COVID-19 crisis in the EU: An empirical inquiry Legal Practice l Concurrences N° 1-2021 l pp. 250-259 Behrang Kianzad behrang.kianzad@jur.ku.dk PhD-Fellow Centre for Advanced Studies in Biomedical Innovation Law (CeBIL), Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen
Legal Practice
Behrang Kianzad
Excessive pricing
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
behrang.kianzad@jur.ku.dk
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
PhD-Fellow
during the
Centre for Advanced Studies in
Biomedical Innovation Law (CeBIL),
Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen
COVID-19
ABSTRACT crisis in the EU:
An empirical
The COVID-19 crisis noted many reports
of dramatic price increases of essential items
such as face masks, hand sanitizers and
disinfectants. In order to provide a bird-eye
inquiry
view of such practices around the EU and
subsequent competition law responses,
an inquiry was sent to all European
competition authorities in June 2020.
The results indicate a divergent occurrence,
as well as competition law and regulatory
responses, to alleged excessive pricing during
the pandemic. The European approach differs
from the approaches chosen in the US and
South Africa, where crisis-specific price
gouging laws have been enacted and applied
by the competition authorities. There is room
I. Introduction
to reflect on the normative and empirical
EU competition law approaches to unfair,
exploitative pricing abuses, both during
and beyond the pandemic.
1. The COVID-19 crisis noted many reports1 of dramatic price increases of es‑
La crise COVID-19 a fait ressortir
de nombreux cas de hausses de prix sential items such as face masks, hand sanitizers and disinfectants, as well as food
spectaculaires de produits essentiels tels que items, funeral services and so on. Already in March 2020 the competition au‑
les masques, les nettoyants pour les mains et thorities in Europe, by way of a joint statement by the European Competition
les désinfectants. Afin d’avoir une vue
d’ensemble de ces pratiques dans l’UE et
Network and individual public announcements, cautioned against price gouging
des réponses ultérieures au droit practices and reaffirmed their commitment to pursue such practices vigorously.2
de la concurrence, une enquête a été envoyée
à toutes les autorités européennes
de la concurrence en juin 2020. Les résultats
2. Excessive pricing categorizes a situation where a dominant undertaking, often
indiquent des divergences dans la manière a legal monopolist, is able to reap supra-competitive profits, not being sufficiently
dont le droit de la concurrence et les réponses challenged by normal forces of competition. The supra-competitive profits are
réglementaires ont été appliqués aux prix held to produce deadweight losses and allocative inefficiencies as well as harm
excessifs qui auraient été pratiqués pendant
la pandémie. L’approche européenne diffère to consumers in the form of undue wealth transfer, depending on what economic
des approches choisies aux États-Unis et theory of harm one avails oneself of.3 The historical roots4 and the near-univer‑
en Afrique du Sud, où des lois sur les prix sal codification5 of the concept of excessive pricing have, however, not mitigated
excessifs spécifiques à la crise ont été
promulguées et appliquées par les autorités
the rather antagonistic debate alongside seemingly unreconcilable legal-economic
de la concurrence. Il y a lieu de réfléchir
aux approches normatives et empiriques
du droit de la concurrence de l’UE en matière
d’abus de prix déloyaux et d’exploitation,
tant pendant la pandémie qu’après celle-ci. 1 US Department of Justice, Justice Department Cautions Business Community Against Violating Antitrust Laws in the Man-
ufacturing, Distribution, and Sale of Public Health Products, March 9, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-de-
partment-cautions-business-community-against-violating-antitrust-laws-manufacturing; S. Butler, Do not exploit corona-
virus panic, watchdog warns retailers, The Guardian, March 5, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/05/
do-not-take-advantage-of-coronavirus-panic-cma-warns-retailers; J. Verdon, Amid the Coronavirus Outbreak, Retailers Try to
Combat Price-Gouging Online, Forbes, March 4, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/joanverdon/2020/03/04/coronavirus-re-
lated-price-gouging-is-a-risky-business-for-retailers; Over 500 Complaints Received of Excessive Price-Hikes Since Start of
Lockdown, iAfrica, https://iafrica.com/over-500-complaints-received-of-excessive-price-hikes-since-start-of-lockdown.
2 UK Competition and Markets Authority, CMA approach to business cooperation in response to coronavirus (COVID-19), March
25, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cma-approach-to-business-cooperation-in-response-to-covid-19 (ac-
cessed September 20, 2020); European Competition Network (ECN), Antitrust: Joint statement by the European Competition
Network (ECN) on application of competition law during the Corona crisis, March 23, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/
ecn/202003_joint-statement_ecn_corona-crisis.pdf.
*The author wishes to extend his thanks to all 3 R. D. Atkinson and D. B. Audretsch (2011), Economic Doctrines and Approaches to Antitrust, Indiana University-Bloomington:
competition authorities around the EU for their School of Public & Environmental Affairs Research Paper Series No. 2011-01-02, SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1750259.
kind and generous assistance in providing source
data and insightful comments. The author further 4 E. Watkins, The Law and the Profits, The Yale Law Journal 32, No. 1 (November 1922): 29, https://doi.org/10.2307/789272.
wishes to thank Verda Sigura, student assistant
at CeBIL, for generous help with data visualization 5 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Excessive Prices, DAF/COMP(2011)18, February 7, 2012, http://www.oecd.org/competition/
and graphs. abuse/49604207.pdf (accessed October 20, 2020).
250 Concurrences N° 1-2021 I Legal Practice I Behrang Kianzad I Excessive pricing during the COVID-19 crisis in the EU: An empirical inquirypositions, ranging from those denying the very existence 5. The decades-old test in United Brands was most re‑
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
of excessive pricing,6 let alone endorsing enforcement,7 cently updated in the AKKA v. LAA case,12 concerning
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
to others advocating energetic enforcement against exces‑ allegedly excessive rates set by a royalty collecting soci‑
sive pricing as the prima facie core function of competi‑ ety in Latvia. The Latvian court had asked the CJEU to
tion law.8 provide guidance on the United Brands test in regard to
geographic comparisons of prices charged by similar un‑
3. European competition law prohibits imposition dertakings in other Member States. The court held that
of unfair pricing as per Article 102(a) Treaty on the the comparator must be “selected in accordance with ob-
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),9 thereby jective, appropriate and verifiable criteria,” and done on a
imposing a special responsibility on dominant undertak‑ “consistent” basis. The observed difference would in turn
ings not to misuse their position of economic strength to be “significant and persistent” and “appreciable,” and thus
reap trading benefits they otherwise would not. The stat‑ in itself “indicative of an abuse.”13
ute does not define where the boundary between a high,
competitive price, and an unfair, excessive price is to be 6. Recent years have seen a steady stream of excessive
drawn, but this question has been addressed by the juris‑ pricing cases both at the Commission14 and Member
prudence of the Commission and the Court of Justice of States level in Italy, the UK and Denmark, targeting
the European Union (CJEU). dramatic price hikes of off-patent pharmaceuticals.15
The difference between prices, markups and profit levels
4. In its seminal United Brands decision,10 the court cre‑ and their interrelation to assessment methods employed
ated a two-step assessment which still today is the gold by the CJEU and Member States have been subject of
standard in regard to the assessment of excessive pric‑ much scholarly debate. Nevertheless, on appeal, the find‑
ing, although developed and completed through subse‑ ings and assessment methods of competition authorities
quent jurisprudence and economic research. Excessive largely have been upheld.16 As noted by Advocate Gener‑
prices per Article 102(a) TFEU were in this case—which al Pitruzzella in the most recent case from the CJEU on
concerned the pricing of Chiquita bananas within the Article 102 TFEU and unfair pricing: “For a long time,
European Community—defined as prices having no rea‑ the Commission and the national competition authorities
sonable relation to the economic value of the product. pursued that type of anticompetitive practice on a rather
The excess in turn could be determined objectively if it limited basis. In recent years, however, there has been a
would be possible to calculate it through a comparison revival of the concept of ‘unfair prices’, as evidenced by
between the selling price of the product and its cost of the growing number of cases handled by the national com-
production, which would disclose the “profit margin.” petition authorities and the Commission, and by the cases
Thereafter the question to be determined would con‑ brought before the Court.”17 The supposed reluctance of
sist in answering if the disclosed difference between cost competition authorities to pursue excessive pricing cas‑
and price is “excessive,” and whether this excessive price es, and the theories of harm informing such approaches,
would be “either unfair in itself or when compared with seem to have metamorphosed.
competing products.”11 Whether the two steps are cumu‑
lative in nature, and why there would be a need to qualify 7. Dominance, a prerequisite for finding of abuse as
the “excessiveness” of the “excess” is matter of debate. So per Article 102 TFEU, has been defined as, inter alia,
is the matter of when and how a price can be “unfair in possessing more than 40% of the relevant market shares.
itself ” and what theory of price and value is selected for Concerning the dominance determination, the CJEU
such distinction. clarified this matter in its United Brands judgment as
12 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 14 September 2017, Biedrība ‘Autortiesību
Un Komunicēšanās Konsultāciju Aģentūra – Latvijas Autoru Apvienība’ v. Konkurences
Padome, Case C-177/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:689.
6 F. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 3, The Political Order of a Free People (Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1979), 72, cited in A. Robles Martín-Laborda, Exploitative Prices 13 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl delivered on 6 April 2017, C-177/16, Biedrība ‘Au-
in European Competition Law, in Abusive Practices in Competition Law, ASCOLA Com- tortiesību Un Komunicēšanās Konsultāciju Aģentūra – Latvijas Autoru Apvienība’ v.
petition Law Series, F. Di Porto and R. Podszun, eds. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), Konkurences Padome, ECLI:EU:C:2017:286.
91–108, https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788117340.00012. 14 European Commission, Press Release IP/20/1347, Antitrust: Commission seeks feedback
7 D. S. Evans and A. J. Padilla, Excessive Prices: Using Economics to Define Administrable on commitments offered by Aspen to reduce prices for six off-patent cancer medicines by
Legal Rules, Journal of Competition Law & Economics 1, Issue 1 (March 2005): 97–122, 73% to address Commission’s concerns over excessive pricing, July 14, 2020, https://ec.eu-
https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhi002. ropa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_1347.
8 R. H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The 15 B. Kianzad and T. Minssen, How Much is Too Much? Defining the Metes and Bounds of
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, Hastings Law Journal 34, No. 1 (1982): 65–151. Excessive Pricing in the Pharmaceutical Sector, European Pharmaceutical Law Review 2,
Issue 3 (2018): 133–48, https://doi.org/10.21552/eplr/2018/3/5.
9 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326,
26.10.2012, pp. 47–390, Article 102(a):“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dom- 16 The UK Pfizer/Flynn case being a notable exception as being remanded back to UK Com-
inant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as petition and Markets Authority (CMA) for further assessment; however, the England and
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Wales Court of Appeal’s judgment struck down the previous ruling by the UK Competition
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase Appeal Tribunal as being wrong in law when requiring the CMA to employ a host of assess-
or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions (. . .)” ment metrics; while the Court of Appeal at the same time criticized the CMA for not being
consistent in its own chosen method, thus offering rich pickings for scholars and councils
10 Judgment of the Court of 14 February 1978, United Brands Company and United alike. See England and Wales Court of Appeal [2020] EWCA Civ 339, paras. 272–73.
Brands Continentaal BV v. Commission of the European Communities, Case 27/76,
ECLI:EU:C:1978:22. 17 Opinion of Advocate General Pitruzzella delivered on 16 July 2020 in Belgische Verenig-
ing van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v. Weareone.World BVBA and
11 Ibid.; see paras. 250–53 regarding the test for excessive pricing. Wecandance NV, Case C-372/19, ECLI:EU:C:2020:598, para. 21.
Concurrences N° 1-2021 I Legal Practice I Behrang Kianzad I Excessive pricing during the COVID-19 crisis in the EU: An empirical inquiry 251being “a position of economic strength enjoyed by an un- 10. The paper is organized as follows. After this
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
dertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition introduction, section II details the results of the empirical
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the inquiry. Section III details some general responses
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of received regarding investigations pursued and pricing
its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consum- regulations introduced. Section IV concludes with an
ers.”18 This definition of dominance was later re-affirmed analysis with some law and policy reflections.
in the Hoffmann-La Roche case.19 Regarding the domi‑
II. Overview and
nance criteria in order for the prohibition to be triggered,
although a “rule of thumb” points to market shares of
40% and above, both jurisprudences of the CJEU, as well
as Guidance by the Commission, allow for alternative ap‑
proaches to dominance. This is structured mainly around
results of the
four themes, these being: (a) defining the relevant market
narrowly; (b) temporary dominance along the lines of
the ABG Oil case; (c) analysis of collective dominance if
empirical inquiry
several undertakings are collectively dominant; (d) con‑ 11. The empirical inquiry consisted of three questions
sidering the substantial difference (between price / cost sent to all European competition authorities via their
or between actual / competitive price) observed as an in‑ respective official email in June 2020, followed up in
dicator of dominance.20 August and September, with a deadline for responses set
in October 2020. The questions sent were as follows:
8. As the COVID-19 crisis created a surge in demand, as
well as the possibility for temporary dominance for non- – How many excessive price complaints/cases have your
dominant actors due to lack of mobility and lockdown authority received connected to the COVID-19 crisis
orders,21 given media reports of dramatic price hikes re‑ – If your authority already has opened any proceedings
garding some “essential items” such as face masks, hand or if your authority intends to do so
sanitizers and so on, an inquiry was sent to all European
competition authorities in June 2020. The inquiry sought – Any other general comments your authority might
to gather data on the number of excessive pricing/price want to express in the context of excessive pricing and
gouging complaints received by the authorities during COVID-19 crisis
the pandemic, whether investigations were open/pending,
and what general position the competition authorities as‑ 12. Responses were received from 23 of the 27 competition
sumed in regard to excessive pricing practices. authorities contacted, with Greece, Romania, Slovakia
and Hungary abstaining. As the confidentiality rules
9. A total of 27 competition authorities were contacted, regarding investigations, received complaints and
whereof 23 responded to the inquiry, providing data systems for registration of complaints differ considerably
and insights as far as confidentiality rules allowed. The between the Member States, not all responding countries
resulting picture is indeed a highly divergent one, with could provide quantitative data, with some authorities
some Member States noting several hundred and in some merely indicating complaints received/cases pursued, not
instances several thousand complaints; whereas other being to provide further in-depth quantitative data.
Member States reported few or none such complaints.
Some authorities had embarked on investigations and 13. Furthermore, it is important to note that some
monitoring practices. Other Member States had intro‑ Member States organize competition authority and
duced maximum pricing laws in regard to essential items. consumer protection authority in one body, whereas
Some authorities also provided some in-depth comments some have a strict division between these bodies. This
in regard to their position on excessive pricing both in affects the results as being not fully coherent due to this
general and during a pandemic such as the COVID-19 institutional divide, with excessive pricing/price gouging
crisis. The overall approach of authorities seemed to rely complaints in some instances thus not being reported to
on a mixture of competition law, consumer protection the competition authority but rather to the consumer
law as well as regulatory measures such as introduction protection authority. The methodological challenges
of maximum prices. detailed above caution against broad interpretations of
the results, which are only intended as what they are,
a general bird-eye view to establish a basis for some
normative reflections. The results are thus indicative and
18 Judgment of the Court of 14 February 1978, United Brands Company and United no conclusive, but they do offer a basis for some analysis
Brands Continentaal BV v. Commission of the European Communities, Case 27/76, and comparisons.
ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, para. 65.
19 Judgment of the Court of 13 February 1979, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission
of the European Communities, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para. 70, referring back
to United Brands. 1. Excessive pricing complaints
20 G. S. Cary et al., Exploitative abuses, price gouging & COVID-19: The cases pursued by
EU and national competition authorities, April 30, 2020, e-Competitions Competition
received
Law & Covid-19, art. No. 94392, p. 10.
14. The responses in turn can be divided into three
21 M. Motta, Price regulation in times of crisis can be tricky, April 22, 2020, https://www.
dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2020-04-22-price-regulation-in-times-of-crisis-can-be-
categories; Category A being countries receiving more
tricky (accessed November 20, 2020). than 500 complaints, Category B being countries receiving
252 Concurrences N° 1-2021 I Legal Practice I Behrang Kianzad I Excessive pricing during the COVID-19 crisis in the EU: An empirical inquiryFigure 1.
1–10 complaints, and Category C being countries with Figure 2.
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
no complaints received or where the number of different
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L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
reasons could not be provided quantitatively (due to
confidentiality rules, data processing issues, or due to the
institutional divide addressed above).
15. In Category A we find outliers such as the UK, Spain
and Poland (see figure 1 below). Italy22 and France23 are
not included (see footnotes for their detailed response).
Figure 1.
Netherlands and Portugal not included
Figure 2.
2. Investigations and
monitoring practices related
to COVID-19 excessive pricing
Figure 1. 17. The responses in regard to the activity at competition
authorities can further be divided into two categories;
Italy and France not included in the table as quantitative data could not
be provided
Category A representing investigations pursued in one
form or another where information could be disclosed
(see table 1), and Category B (see table 2) representing
16. Category B included Germany, Belgium, Austria and price monitoring activities, including introduction of
Denmark (see figure 2); and finally Category C included maximum pricing. It should be noted that Romania also
the rest of investigated Member States. Netherlands24 introduced price regulation.
and Portugal25 indicated “some cases received,” howev‑
er not an exact number (see footnote for their detailed Table 1.
response).
Country Investigated Cases per country
Belgium 1
Table 1.
Spain Some
Poland Some
United Kingdom 4
Figure 2. Italy Some
22 Communication to the author:“Due to data processing reasons and confidentiality rules, the
Authority is not able to provide an exact number. However, as part of its institutional activity Country Closed Cases per country
of monitoring the price trend of the goods and services most affected by the current CoVid-19 United Kingdom 4
emergency, the Competition and Market Authority sent a series of requests for information to
a group of health facilities and analytical laboratories that advertised the offer of serological
tests for the identification of antibodies directed against the SARS-Co-V-2 virus, see https:// Regarding publicly available details of investigations pursued, see sec-
www.agcm.it/media/comunicati-stampa/2020/4/DC9877.” tion III
23 Communication to the author: “The French Ministry of Economy, through the Director-
ate-General for Consumer Affairs, Competition and Fraud Control (DGCCRF), was in charge
of controlling the prices charged for the sale of hydro-alcoholic gels, the maximum prices Table 2.
of which were set by a text. As previously indicated, DGCCRF did not have excessive pricing
practices reported to us.” Maximum Price on designated essential items introduced
24 Communication to the author: “Of the over 16,000 Covid-related questions and reports Malta
received through the consumer portal, https://www.consuwijzer.nl/ since March 15th, approx-
imately less than 1 per mille (III. Overview 1. Introduction of price
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
regulations and maximum
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
of enforcement, pricing decrees
monitoring and 20. Some of the Member States opted to introduce some
price regulations, beyond issuing warnings at the onset of
pricing activities the crisis. This was the case in, e.g., France,34 regulating
the price of hydro-alcoholic sanitizers—50 ml bottles be‑
ing priced at €2, 100 ml bottles at €3, 300 ml bottles at €5
18. Competition authorities around the EU (such as
and a liter of sanitizer fixed at €15. It also fixed the price
Greece,26 France,27 Luxembourg,28 Portugal,29 Spain30
of surgical masks at €0.95.35
and the United Kingdom31) at an early stage of the pan‑
demic through public announcement made their inten‑
21. This was the case also in Romania, where the
tion known that they would closely monitor pricing be‑
Romanian Competition Authority announced that
havior regarding supply of some essential goods in high
should actions under its competences prove insufficient
demand due to COVID-19.32
to limit price increases to acceptable levels, additional
measures foreseen in statute—including introducing
19. This was part of a joint effort by the European
price caps—would be necessary.36 Other countries such as
Competition Network (ECN), which issued a joint
Malta also introduced such pricing regulations, as during
statement in regard to the applicability of competition
the peak of the crisis there were complaints regarding the
rules during the pandemic, noting: “At the same time, it
prices of masks, particularly disposable masks which,
is of utmost importance to ensure that products considered
from inspections carried out in retail pharmacies by of‑
essential to protect the health of consumers in the cur-
ficers from the Consumer Affairs Office, were being sold
rent situation (e.g. face masks and sanitising gel) remain
in the range of €1.25 to €2.25. A price order was issued
available at competitive prices. The ECN will therefore
establishing the maximum price at which these masks
not hesitate to take action against companies taking ad-
could be sold.37
vantage of the current situation by cartelising or abusing
their dominant position.”33 This section details some of
22. Similar measures were introduced in Croatia,
the enforcement and monitoring activities as reported by
where at the onset of the COVID-19 crisis the Croatian
the competition authorities insofar as the confidentiality
government, by a decision on exceptional price control
rules allowed data to be disclosed.
measures for certain products (such as protective face
masks), adopted measures to control prices, indirectly
laying down the maximum prices for specific products.38
The Luxembourg Competition Council also issued an
analysis of the market for face masks and antibacterial
gels.39
26 Hellenic Competition Commission, https://www.epant.gr/enimerosi/deltia-typou/
item/831-deltio-typou-antiantagonistikes-praktikes-se-eidikes-koinonikes-kai-oikono-
mikes-synthikes.html (accessed September 20, 2020).
27 French Competition Authority, https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/coronavirus-l-au-
torite-de-la-concurrence-surveille-les-eventuels-prix-abusifs-20200316 (accessed Septem-
ber 20, 2020).
28 Luxembourg Competition Council, https://concurrence.public.lu/fr/actualites/2020/
coronavirus-responsabilite-entreprises.html (accessed September 20, 2020).
29 Portuguese Competition Authority, http://www.concorrencia.pt/vEN/News_Events/Co- 34 See the Decree issued at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORF-
municados/Pages/PressRelease_202003.aspx (accessed September 20, 2020). TEXT000041690995 (accessed October 28, 2020).
30 Spanish Competition Authority, https://www.cnmc.es/sites/default/files/editor_conteni- 35 OECD, Exploitative pricing in the time of COVID-19, May 26, 2020, Box 6, http://www.
dos/Notas%20de%20prensa/2020/20200312_NP_medidas_excepcionales_eng.pdf (ac- oecd.org/competition/Exploitative-pricing-in-the-time-of-COVID-19.pdf (accessed Oc-
cessed September 20, 2020). tober 28, 2020).
31 UK Competition and Markets Authority, CMA approach to business cooperation in re- 36 Ibid.; Romanian National News Agency, https://www.agerpres.ro/economic-in-
sponse to coronavirus (COVID-19), March 25, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/ tern/2020/03/25/chritoiu-daca-produsele-sanitare-nu-se-ieftinesc-vom-lua-masu-
publications/cma-approach-to-business-cooperation-in-response-to-covid-19 (accessed ri-de-urgenta-precum-rechizitionarea-sau-plafonarea-preturilor--473985.
September 20, 2020).
37 Price of disposable masks, face shields, capped, Times of Malta, May 3, 2020, https://
32 C. Thomas, R. Fleischer, C. Ritz, and S. Kirwitzke, COVID-19 and Competition Law timesofmalta.com/articles/view/price-of-disposable-masks-face-shields-capped.789815
– Companies Must Not Quarantine Competition Law Compliance Competition Pol- (accessed September 20, 2020).
icy International, April 2, 2020, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/
covid-19-and-competition-law-companies-must-not-quarantine-competition-law-com- 38 Decision published in Narodne Novine (NN; Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia),
pliance (accessed September 20, 2020). https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2020_03_30_672.html.
33 European Competition Network, Antitrust: Joint statement by the European Competition 39 The report is found at: https://concurrence.public.lu/fr/actualites/2020/communi-
Network (ECN) on application of competition law during the Corona crisis. que-marches-masques-et-gels.html (accessed October 28, 2020).
254 Concurrences N° 1-2021 I Legal Practice I Behrang Kianzad I Excessive pricing during the COVID-19 crisis in the EU: An empirical inquiry2. Investigations and 26. On June 18, 2020, the CMA launched four
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
investigations into suspected charging of excessive and
monitoring activities
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
unfair prices for hand sanitizer products.43 However,
three of the investigations were closed in July, where
23. As seen from the results, the activities around the CMA motivated its decision in two cases as follows:
the EU differed considerably, with some authorities “Having carefully reviewed the evidence that it has gath-
being particularly active, not the least due to the many ered, the CMA considers that it is unlikely that the retail-
complaints received, while others had received none. ers’ prices infringe competition law and that further inves-
Some had embarked on ex officio pricing monitoring tigation to reach a definitive view in these two cases would
actions, as opposed to some of their European counter‑ deliver limited, if any, consumer benefits. The decision to
parts. Furthermore, the institutional differences regard‑ close the two cases does not amount to a definitive state-
ing combination or separation of competition authority ment or finding as to whether the respective parties to the
and consumer protection authority affected the chosen investigations have infringed competition law, nor should
approaches reflected in the results. any inference be made to that effect.”44
2.1 United Kingdom 27. The third case was closed due to the CMA not
considering the price cited to be excessive under
24. On May 21, 2020, the CMA published a report40 competition law. Finally, on September 3, 2020,
which contains an analysis of complaints received by the CMA closed the last investigation citing same
the COVID-19 taskforce. As per the report, as of May motivation, however, as in the case of previous decision,
17, 2020, the CMA had received over 9,000 complaints adding: “The decision to close the case does not amount to
relating to potential excessive prices with reference to a definitive statement or finding as to whether the party to
COVID-19. Taken together, these businesses account for the investigation has infringed competition law, nor should
over 3,100 complaints, amounting to a third of the total any inference be made to that effect. The CMA’s decision
number of actionable complaints received about price to close this case does not prevent the CMA from opening
rises. an investigation in the future if it were to receive new evi-
dence which changed the assessment.”45 The CMA is nev‑
25. On July 3, 2020, the CMA published a further report,41 ertheless pursuing multiple excessive pricing cases within
showing that the number of price-related complaints had the pharmaceutical sector, unrelated to the COVID-19
decreased from 76 per day in April to 11 per day in June. pandemic.46
As per the report the CMA had investigated complaints
2.2 Poland
of unjustifiable price rises, and taken a number of steps to
prevent and address such practices. These include writing
to 277 traders that have collectively been the subject of 28. Poland is another Member State reporting the most
over 4,600 complaints—over 40% of the total number of complaints received through a dedicated complaints
actionable complaints received about price rises; opening mailbox. The complaints mainly considered the first
investigations into suspected breaches of competition law weeks of the pandemic in March 2020. At the beginning
by four pharmacies and convenience stores. As detailed of April the number of complaints began to decrease and
per the report: “Between 20 March and 28 June, the pro- their nature changed, with the share of complaints about
portion of complaints relating to food and drink vs hygiene food prices dropping from 50% to below 10%, whereas
and personal care has flipped, with the former going from the percentage of complaints about the prices of personal
around 70% to 25% and the latter doing the opposite. The protective equipment increasing dramatically.
medication category has grown somewhat over time, from
around 4% in March to a little over 10% in June. Overall,
the most complained about product is hand sanitiser, fol-
lowed by toilet paper, chicken, rice and other meats.”42
43 UK CMA, Hand sanitiser products: suspected excessive and unfair pricing, June 19, 2020,
https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/hand-sanitiser-products-suspected-excessive-and-un-
fair-pricing (accessed September 20, 2020).
44 UK CMA, Statement regarding the CMA’s decision to close certain investigations into
suspected charging of excessive and unfair prices for hand sanitiser products during the
coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, Case 50924, Case closed: July 13, 2020, https://as-
sets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5f0c5a7d3a6f40037ed4848c/Closure_Statement_.
pdf (accessed September 20, 2020).
45 UK CMA, Statement regarding the CMA’s decision to close an investigation into suspected
charging of excessive and unfair prices for hand sanitiser products during the coronavirus
40 UK CMA, Protecting consumers during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic: update (COVID-19) pandemic, Case 50924, Case closed: September 3, 2020, https://assets.pub-
on the work of the CMA’s Taskforce, May 21, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/ lishing.service.gov.uk/media/5f50df3f8fa8f535b650435c/3_September_2020_case_clo-
publications/cma-coronavirus-taskforce-update-21-may-2020/protecting-consumers- sure_statement.pdf (accessed September 20, 2020).
during-the-coronavirus-covid-19-pandemic-update-on-the-work-of-the-cmas-task- 46 UK CMA, Phenytoin sodium capsules: suspected unfair pricing, https://www.gov.uk/
force#fn:9 (accessed September 20, 2020). cma-cases/investigation-into-the-supply-of-pharmaceutical-products (accessed Septem-
41 UK CMA, Update on the work of the CMA’s Taskforce, July 3, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/ ber 20, 2020); UK CMA, Hydrocortisone tablets: alleged excessive and unfair pricing
government/publications/cma-coronavirus-taskforce-update-3-july-2020/update-on-the- (50277-1), https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/pharmaceutical-sector-anti-competitive-prac-
work-of-the-cmas-taskforce (accessed September 20, 2020). tices (accessed September 20, 2020); UK CMA, Liothyronine tablets: suspected excessive
and unfair pricing, https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/pharmaceutical-sector-anti-competi-
42 Ibid., Section 3, Complaint Analysis. tive-conduct (accessed September 20, 2020).
Concurrences N° 1-2021 I Legal Practice I Behrang Kianzad I Excessive pricing during the COVID-19 crisis in the EU: An empirical inquiry 25529. Regarding complaints about food prices in the 2.5 Greece
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
period from March 18 to April 30, as much as 81% of
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
complaints were received in March. The consumer 33. In Greece the Hellenic Competition Commission
complaints about food prices were, as in the case of the (HCC) launched an inquiry into possible price increases
UK, focused on the first two weeks of the epidemic, and output restrictions of healthcare materials and other
in the Polish case mainly concerning meat prices. The products, by way of requests for information to a large
Polish Competition Authority further asserted that the number of companies active in the production, import and
information on Office’s actions activities seems to have marketing of healthcare products, in particular surgical
had a disciplinary effect on businesses. masks and disposable gloves, as well as other products
such as antiseptic wipes and antiseptic solutions.55 The
HCC employed an algorithmic approach in regard to data
2.3 Italy analysis, finding some prices as outliers. The HCC made
30. In Italy, facing numerous complaints in regard to its intention known to further investigate any anti-com‑
price gouging, the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) petitive practices by imposing severe fines in case of any
commenced investigations into the pricing charged by a infringements of competition law, stating: “The develop-
private health and laboratory group for serological tests ment of algorithms that enable the automated analysis of
to identify COVID-19 antibodies.47 The ICA also initiat‑ Big Data derived from publicly available procurement data-
ed proceedings against eBay and Amazon for misleading bases is a primary goal and priority for HCC.”56
claims and price increases in the sale of masks, hand san‑
itizers and other pharmaceutical products.48 2.6 Sweden
31. Furthermore, the ICA launched an investigation into 34. Similarly in Sweden, the Swedish Competition Agency
pricing of food and detergents, disinfectants and gloves, (SCA) upon receiving news of price hikes—although no
consisting of sending requests for information regarding formal complaints were received by the authority—sent
3,800 points of sale, especially in central and southern requests to a range of providers. The news concerned a
Italy, equal to approximately 85% of the total surveyed spike of 900%57 in pricing of filtering half masks, protec‑
by Nielsen in the provinces concerned.49 There is further tive suits, certain protective goggles and visors as well as
a range of ongoing investigations at the ICA targeting surface and hand sanitizers by one of the government’s
refunds and cancellations of airlines during the pandem‑ major suppliers who cited force majeure as a reason for the
ic,50 with some offering commitments,51 and also against price increase within the framework agreement. Both the
a bus company for same practices,52 and a soccer club53 Governmental Purchasing Center, which coordinates the
for similar refunding concerns. The activities were pur‑ government framework agreements, and SKL Kommentus
sued under consumer protection law, and not under com‑ Purchasing Center, which coordinates for Sweden’s munici‑
petition law by way of application of excessive pricing palities and regions, had approved the price increase.
prohibition.
35. The SCA conducted a study throughout the spring of
2020 regarding pricing of hand sanitization products due
2.4 Spain to media reports of significantly raised prices within a
32. In Spain the CNMC, as of June 2, 2020, had received central framework agreement. The preliminary findings
more than 500 complaints during the two months the of the study showed an initial spike in demand, in
mailbox for complaints was set-up, further announcing combination with increased production costs, resulting
investigations into certain sectors such as funeral services, in a significant but temporary rise in prices. Production
hydro-alcoholic gels and financial lending.54 Quantitative of hand sanitization products increased throughout
data could not be provided. most of the month of April, after which the curve had
flattened. Prices thus returned to a normal level within
the framework agreement in May and there were no indi‑
cations of continued concerns regarding excessive pricing
47 OECD, 2020, supra note 35, Box 3; https://www.agcm.it/media/comunicati-stam- of such products either within the framework agreement
pa/2020/4/DC9877 (accessed September 20, 2020). or in a more general sense.58
48 OECD, 2020, supra note 35, Box 5; https://www.agcm.it/media/comunicati-stam-
pa/2020/3/PS11716-PS11717 (accessed September 20, 2020).
49 See https://www.agcm.it/media/comunicati-stampa/2020/5/DS2620 (accessed October
28, 2020). 55 OECD 2020, supra note 35, Box 3; Hellenic Competition Commission, Press Release,
50 Regarding Ryan Air, EasyJet et al., see https://www.agcm.it/media/comunicati-stam- Investigation in healthcare materials, March 21, 2020, https://epant.gr/en/enimerosi/
pa/2020/9/PS11822-PS11830-PS11843-PS11865 (accessed October 28, 2020). press-releases/item/840-press-release-investigation-in-healthcare-materials.html (ac-
cessed September 20, 2020).
51 Regarding Alitalia and Volotea commitments, see https://www.agcm.it/media/comunica-
ti-stampa/2020/7/PS11820_PS11821 (accessed October 28, 2020). 56 Hellenic Competition Commission, Press Release, The interim results of HCC’s investiga-
tions on health and hospital equipment during covid-19 pandemic, September 11, 2020,
52 Regarding Flixbus, see https://www.agcm.it/media/comunicati-stampa/2020/6/PS11737 https://www.epant.gr/en/enimerosi/press-releases/item/1083-press-release-the-interim-
(accessed October 28, 2020). results-of-hcc-s-investigations-on-health-and-hospital-equipment-during-covid-19-pan-
demic.html (accessed September 20, 2020).
53 Regarding SSC Napoli, see https://www.agcm.it/media/comunicati-stampa/2020/9/
CV205 (accessed October 28, 2020). 57 Dagens Nyheter, Increases the price of vital products by over 900 percent, Höjer priset på livs-
viktiga produkter med över 900 procent, April 3, 2020, https://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/
54 Spanish National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC in Spanish), https:// hojer-priset-pa-livsviktiga-produkter-med-914-procent (accessed September 20, 2020).
www.cnmc.es/novedades/2020-06-02-la-cnmc-recibe-mas-de-500-quejas-y-consultas-
traves-del-buzon-habilitado (accessed September 20, 2020). 58 Swedish Competition Agency, Communication to the author on file, dated June 18, 2020.
256 Concurrences N° 1-2021 I Legal Practice I Behrang Kianzad I Excessive pricing during the COVID-19 crisis in the EU: An empirical inquiry2.7 Some other Member States theory) to act as price arbiters. Several authorities could
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
indeed make use of price regulation measures introduced
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
36. Some other authorities are monitoring suspicious by governments; others used preemptive measures such
pricing activities and do not rule out pursuing as sending letters to different sector players urging
investigations if deemed necessary and relevant; this them to abstain from profiteering or engage in price
is, e.g., the case of Austria. Others such as Belgium monitoring activities.
indicated pursuing cases under competition law rules,
though not being able to disclose further details about 39. Where investigations were opened, they assumed the
ongoing investigations. Luxembourg had in turn opted character of investigating and monitoring price levels,
to conduct market studies regarding the market for and as price levels subsequently had decreased, the
masks and anti-bacterial gels.59 authorities opted not to pursue the cases further—e.g.,
Sweden and the UK respectively, among others. The
institutional divide between competition authority, on
IV. Analysis the one hand, and consumer protection authority, on
the other hand, further contaminates the results and
of European complicates the analysis, as the kind of “price gouging”
in question in some jurisdictions such as the US62 is seen
as “unfair pricing practices” to be dealt with consumer
responses to excessive protection authority, sometimes as a result of the govern‑
mental decrees issued in relation to the pandemic.
pricing during 40. The results further indicate that Member States where
the COVID-19 crisis the competition authorities in the past had pursued high-
profile excessive pricing cases (notably the UK and Italy)
and early on initiated different reporting mechanisms in
37. The perceived unfairness in taking undue advantage regard to alleged excessive pricing practices were also among
of an economically dependent position, especially in those who had received the most complaints. This correla‑
times of crisis such as war and pandemic, constitutes the tion of past, high-profile cases and increased reporting of
ratio legis informing the prohibition from its inception such practices during the COVID-19 pandemic does not
centuries ago and onwards, also regarding price gouging amount to a causal relationship based on the limited scope
statues in place in jurisdictions such as the US, which of the inquiry, but is one plausible explanation regarding
normally do not prohibit excessive pricing on the federal the manifest divergence in the number of complaints.
level.60 The related concept of “price gouging” in the US
and the approach chosen by South Africa61 have target‑ 41. Generally, most competition authorities reaffirmed
ed the “unconscionable” and “unfair” price hike during their commitment to pursue excessive pricing cases
a crisis or pandemic, where pre-crisis prices are used as both during the pandemic and beyond. Nevertheless,
proxy. Liability for price gouging can be triggered if a one authority seemed to suggest that pricing levels were
10% increase in price is observed without objective justi‑ outside of the “remit” of competition law; a position
fications regarding increasing costs. which, if interpreted broadly, might conflict with the
letter of the law as explicitly prohibiting “unfair pricing”
38. As a departing point of analysis of competition as an anti-competitive practice in and of itself. How the
law dynamics in times of pandemic, a surge in demand “unfair” and “excessive” price is to be determined, and
combined with shortages in supply invariably causes the along what economic theory of harm, does not affect
prices to rise, sometimes dramatically so. Nevertheless, the validity nor applicability of the law. The string of
due to pandemic specific conditions (lockdown nullifying excessive pricing cases in the pharmaceutical is but one
mobility and choice of consumers, the necessity of face example of the increased activities on part of European
masks, hand sanitizers and disinfectants due to public competition authorities. The intertwined regulation and
orders and overall measures to combat the pandemic), competition law approach is also evident in the energy
the legal “fairness” rules ought to inform the analysis sector.63
to a greater extent, as opposed to normal times, where
competitive market forces are presumed (at least in
62 White House, President Donald J. Trump Will Not Tolerate the Price Gouging and Hoard-
ing of Critical Supplies Needed to Combat the Coronavirus, March 23, 2020, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-will-not-toler-
59 Luxembourg Competition Council, https://concurrence.public.lu/fr/actualites/2020/ ate-price-gouging-hoarding-critical-supplies-needed-combat-coronavirus.
communique-marches-masques-et-gels.html (accessed September 20, 2020). 63 R. Karova and M. Botta, Sanctioning Excessive Energy Prices as Abuse of Dominance:
60 M. S. Gal, Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust Offense in the U.S. and the EC: Two Systems Are the EU Commission and the National Competition Authorities on the Same Fre-
of Belief about Monopoly?, The Antitrust Bulletin 49, Issue 1–2 (March 2004): 343–84, quency? in Abuse of Dominance in EU Competition Law: Emerging Trends, P. L. Parcu,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X0404900109. G. Monti and M. Botta, eds. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), 169–84; see also the EU
Commission Gazprom decision: Commission Decision of 24 May 2018, Case AT.39816 –
61 Case no: CR003Apr20, The Competition Commission v Babelegi Workwear and Industrical Upstream Gas Supplies in Central and Eastern Europe, C(2018) 3106 final, paras. 62–63,
Supplies CC, available at: http://blogs.sun.ac.za/ccle/files/2020/07/Non-Confidential-Tribu- https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39816/39816_10148_3.
nal-Reasons_CR003Apr20-CC-v-Babelegi-01062020-1.pdf, accessed 2020-10-01; Case No: pdf (accessed October 1, 2020); Regarding enforcement on Member State level, see
CR008Apr20, COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA v DIS-CHEM PHAR- German Bundeskartellamt enforcement activities regarding water and energy prices,
MACIES LIMITED, available at: http://blogs.sun.ac.za/ccle/files/2020/07/Public-Reasons- e.g.: https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilun-
CC-v-Dischem-CR008Apr20.pdf, accessed 2020-10-01 gen/2015/19_10_2015_WSW.html (accessed October 29, 2020).
Concurrences N° 1-2021 I Legal Practice I Behrang Kianzad I Excessive pricing during the COVID-19 crisis in the EU: An empirical inquiry 257You can also read
