EGYPT'S ELECTION: NO CHANGE, MANY CHALLENGES - Ispi
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EGYPT’S ELECTION:
NO CHANGE, MANY CHALLENGES
EDITED BY GIUSEPPE DENTICE
1
The upcoming Egyptian presidential election, scheduled for March 26-28, should be a fore-
gone conclusion. Without real opponents, the incumbent President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is
waiting for a predictable verdict that will confirm him for a second term. The only question
is whether or not this election will be a plebiscite. However, even after the election, the real
struggle for a modern Egypt will persist: economic growth, social reforms, terrorism and,
most of all, the need for an inclusive and tangible democratization process are challenges
the regime cannot overlook anymore. Despite media fanfare and a certain triumphalism
promoted by an apparently strong and unchallenged regime, five years after Morsi’s ouster
the country is still far from the promise of political stability and economic prosperity
pledged by al-Sisi when he came to power in 2014. What comes next? Are we witnessing a
comeback of the Mubarak era? Or is any political space still open for the oppositions (in-
cluding the Islamists)? What role do the public sector and the military play in today’s
Egypt? What are the government’s international priorities, and what is al-Sisi’s regional vi-
sion for Egypt in a changing Middle East?
* This Dossier has been edited by Giuseppe Dentice (Catholic University and ISPI)
1. ELECTIONS IN EGYPT: WHAT PURPOSE DO THEY SERVE?,
Marina Ottaway (Wilson Center).
2. THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY’S ECONOMIC SOLUTION: IS IT WORKING?,
Zeinab Abul-Magd (Oberlin College and the American University in Cairo)
3. IN HIS WORDS: A THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF AL-SISI’S TWITTER ACCOUNT,
Matteo Colombo, (University of Milan (NASP) and ISPI)
4. ISLAMISM IN EGYPT AND THE EMERGING DIVIDE,
Massimo Campanini (University of Trento)
5. THE MARKET OF VIOLENCE IN EGYPT,
Georges Fahmi (European University Institute)
6. EGYPT VOTES AMIDST HARSH PRESS CENSORSHIP,
Giuseppe Acconcia (University of Padua)
7. THE EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION’S LONG NIGHT,
Federica Zoja (Avvenire)
8. ISRAEL, GAZA AND PALESTINE: COMMON INTERESTS, DIFFERENT VISIONS,
Tewfik Aclimandos, (Collège de France and Cairo University)
9. SISI’S SECOND TERM: THE LIBYA QUESTION,
Ziad Akl, (ACPSS)
10. EGYPT-GULF COUNTRIES: “NEW NORMAL” RELATIONS,
Giuseppe Dentice (Catholic University and ISPI)
11. CAIRO AND WASHINGTON: THE END OF A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP?,
Gianluca Pastori (Catholic University)
12. ITALY AND EGYPT, BETWEEN MORALITY AND RAISON D’ÉTAT,
Ugo Tramballi (ISPI and Il Sole 24 Ore)
2
Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
ELECTIONS IN EGYPT:
WHAT PURPOSE DO THEY SERVE?
Marina Ottaway
T
he outcome of Egyptian presidential won easily against the banned candidates.
elections scheduled for March 26 is Egyptians are tired of instability, they argue,
a foregone conclusion – incumbent and more focused on their own economic sur-
President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi will vival than on political change. The regime’s
win and serve his second term un- relentless propaganda portraying al-Sisi as the
challenged. The only question is whether he country’s savior has also had an impact.
will then abrogate the constitutional clause
If al-Sisi is certain to win, what purpose do
that imposes a two-term limit and become –
elections serve? The answer is twofold. First,
like all his predecessors — de facto president
Egyptians have always respected the letter of
for life.
the constitution, even if they often disregarded
Al-Sisi’s victory is certain because his only op- the spirit. When some constitutional clauses
ponent is Moussa Mostafa Moussa, an obscure become inconvenient for the regime, they are
politician who heads the al-Gad party, sup- amended—the process for doing so is very easy
ports al-Sisi, and was allowed to register as a in Egypt. The present constitution prescribes
candidate literally at the last moment. One elections every four years and a maximum of
does not have to be particularly conspiracy two terms. If al-Sisi decides to run again in
minded to recognize Moussa’s candidacy as a four years, he will abrogate the term limits in
maneuver orchestrated by the regime to be a legal fashion.
able to claim that al-Sisi won a competitive
The second purpose of the elections is to re-
election. Earlier, four candidates that had ex-
affirm that Egyptians want al-Sisi to stay in
pressed an interest in running were either de-
power, possibly bolstering his position within
clared ineligible for flimsy reasons or decided
the military, the real arbiter of power alloca-
to withdraw when faced with insurmountable
tion. Al-Sisi did not rise to power on the
obstacles. For example, Anwar el-Sadat, the
strength of his own leadership qualities, popu-
former president’s nephew, abandoned his pro-
larity, or charisma. He was placed there by the
ject to run when faced with the reality that no
military after the coup d’état of July 2013 that
hotel or other facility would allow him to even
removed Mohammed Morsi from power. Pre-
rent a room for a press conference announcing
sumably, the military could replace him. A
his intention to run.
vote, indeed a plebiscite, confirming his popu-
Paradoxically, both supporters and foes of the larity would be a disincentive to do so.
present regime concur that al-Sisi would have
3
Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
Nobody really knows what al-Sisi’s standing promises sapping efficiency and speed. This is
within the military and security services is at a favorite refrain of authoritarian leaders.
this point. Rumors circulate of dissatisfaction What is more unusual is that al-Sisi has taken
within the military and even of attempted no steps to create a space for officially sanc-
coups against him, but there is no specific in- tioned political activity. He has not set up a
formation. The standard reply to any inquiry party, let alone one complete with women’s
on this topic is that the military and security and youth organizations, as authoritarian
forces are “a black box.” leaders tend to do. He has not set up govern-
ment-controlled organizations of “civil society.”
An electoral victory will not help al-Sisi unless
He has simply tried to suppress all politics,
voter turnout is high, demonstrating that he
and opposition candidates represent politics.
has real support, but this is problematic. His
Moussa Mostafa Moussa, who continues to de-
supporters have little incentive to vote, know-
clare his admiration for al-Sisi even while the-
ing that he will win in any case. Even his de-
oretically running against him, is not keeping
tractors have no reason to vote for his blatant-
politics alive but adding to the chorus of sup-
ly fake opponent. Some parties have called for
port for the regime.
an election boycott, and Abdel Moneim Aboul
Fotouh, one of the most influential advocates In March, a tired and demoralized Egypt will
of that course of action and a former high- re-elect al-Sisi. People are impoverished.
ranking leader of the Muslim Brotherhood CAPMAS, the government organization that
who broke with the organization, has been collects statistics, recently announced that the
jailed as a result. The arrest will probably put poverty rate went up to almost 28 percent as a
an end to open calls for a boycott but will not result of the decision to let the Egyptian pound
dissuade people from staying home. Low turn- float (which halved its value), and of the elim-
out was a problem in the 2014 election: in fact ination of most subsidies for food and energy.
so few voted initially that the government de- Poverty rates in Upper Egypt are as high as 50
cided to keep the polls open for an additional percent. The regime has grandiose projects, a
day and to give government employees a day vision for a new Egypt resembling the wealthy
off from work so they could vote. The govern- Gulf states, symbolized by a new administra-
ment will exaggerate the rate of participa- tive capital being built in the desert between
tion—it always does—but there is a limit to Cairo and Suez, which will be reserved for civil
what it can claim when the public has seen the servants, and only high-level civil servants at
empty polling stations. that. For most Egyptians, the reality is not
this vision of modernity and even opulence—
Another question about the forthcoming elec-
the only building completed in the new capital
tions is why the regime has bothered to ex-
at this point is a seven-star hotel that stands
clude candidates al-Sisi would have easily
fully staffed and empty in the middle of a con-
beaten. The answer is that the regime rejects
struction site—but the old Egypt with its over-
politics in general, not just political activity
crowded, dirty streets, crumbling buildings,
that would threaten its power. Al-Sisi has de-
and absence of economic opportunities. Ordi-
clared repeatedly that Egypt is facing too
nary Egyptians grumble, but not too loudly.
many problems, both in the security and the
They appear more resigned than rebellious.
economic realms, to afford the luxury of de-
Politics has been suppressed. The problems
mocracy, with its eternal debates and com-
are ever more blatant.
4
Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY’S ECONOMIC
SOLUTION: IS IT WORKING?
Zeinab Abul-Magd
E
gypt has many challenges in its his first term with sudden decisions to signifi-
domestic economy, either inherit- cantly reduce food, gas, and electricity subsi-
ed from Hosni Mubarak’s era or dies. By his midterm, al-Sisi’s regime had al-
arising during the years of politi- ready secured a large IMF loan of $12 billion,
cal turmoil and instability that which necessitated another economic shock to
followed the 2011 uprisings. During his first fix the country’s budget deficit and reduce pub-
term as president, ex-field marshal Abdel Fat- lic spending. After drastic devaluation of the
tah al-Sisi’s military regime tried to resolve Egyptian pound, the government proceeded
the country’s chronic problems in its own way. with more cuts in bread, gas, and medicine
Al-Sisi’s economic solution is based on two subsidies – amidst severe shortages and inflat-
measures: rapid liberalization according to an ing prices of these basic goods.
IMF plan, and great reliance on the military’s
However, the rationalization in government
civilian enterprises to undertake major state
spending did not apply to the ruling military in-
projects. As such solutions have been arousing
stitutions: the army’s expenditure on new arms
public discontent, it is not clear whether they
deals skyrocketed during al-Sisi’s first term.
will eventually work out – especially if they
From France alone, one deal for Rafale jets cost
continue to be adopted in an upcoming second
€5.2 billion and another for Mistral warships
presidential term for al-Sisi.
cost around €1 billion. The Ministry of Defense
This commentary will briefly detail these took loans from French banks to cover these
measures and illustrate their outcomes. Egypt deals. In addition, al-Sisi annually increased the
officially transitioned into a market economy military’s allocations in the national budget. The
in the early 1990s, which entailed fundamen- Armed Forces received an increase of LE8.3 bil-
tal cuts in public spending. A large item of lion (about $1.2 billion) in fiscal year (FY)
such spending is government subsidizes, 2014/2015, and most recently in FY 2017/2018 it
which were inherited from the 1960s’s socialist received another increase of LE 4.7 billion
state. Mubarak’s successive cabinets of neolib- (around $266 million). He also repeatedly in-
eral ministers were reluctant to eliminate food creased military pensions for retired officers.
and other subsidizes that benefited the lower
In addition to ruling the country, the Egyptian
and middle classes for fear of mass riots. In
military owns a vast business empire that in-
the summer of 2014 – immediately after win-
vests in almost every civilian economic sector,
ning the presidential election – al-Sisi began
from manufacturing to services. This empire
5
Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
developed in the 1990s-2000s,1[1] but it recent- Authority of the Armed Forces (EAAF) took
ly expanded enormously as al-Sisi has heavily charge of al-Sisi’s ambitious project of digging
relied on military contractors and manufac- a “New Suez Canal,” an extension parallel to
turers to undertake public construction pro- the old canal. National banks issued invest-
jects and provide the government with goods. ment certificates to sell to civilian citizens, and
Functioning above the free market’s competi- succeeded in collecting LE64 billion (around $9
tion rules, military contractors directly receive billion) of their savings to fund the project. Al-
government commissions to build roads, Sisi ordered the EAAF to complete the project
bridges, schools, hospitals, highways etc. Mili- within only one year, instead of the originally
tary factories provide the Ministry of Health scheduled five years, which required tapping
with drugs produced in their pharmaceuticals into the country’s limited reserves of foreign
plants, the Ministry of Power with electricity currency to hire international sub-contractors
meters, the Ministry of housing with water and rent advanced equipment from them. Ex-
sanitation equipment, and much more. vice admiral Muhab Mamish, head of the Suez
Canal Authority, promised that the project
Al-Sisi’s regime has embarked on several
would increase the canal’s annual revenue by
mega projects and assigned them to military
LE40 billion per year ($5.5 billion).
engineers, but these gigantic ventures were
not always managed with sufficient business Have these policies worked so far? Evidently,
experience and competence. The Engineering there are limited signs of their success, which
generates public discontent with the regime.
1For detailed info on the military business empire see: Zeinab Abul- The expedited economic liberalization scheme
Magd, Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in has not adequately brought foreign direct in-
Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), ch.3.
6
Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
vestment back into the country yet. Whereas shortage as a result, and its head was sacked
Egypt’s FDI peaked to $11.8 billion in 2007, it after asserting that the project consumed huge
remained lower than this figure with $8.1 bil- quantities of his bank’s foreign currency to be
lion in 2016, which is mostly Arabian Gulf cap- unnecessarily completed in a short period.
ital and with little technology transfer in- Moreover, despite the regime’s ambitious prom-
volved. As a result of the scarcity of foreign in- ises of sizable increases, the Canal’s annual
vestment, the unemployment rate remains revenue declined as soon as the extension
high: it reached 11.6 percent in 2017. Instead opened, due to slower international trade. It
of economic prosperity, the hasty liberalization dropped from $5.46 billion in 2014 to $5 billion
scheme has brought about new waves of mass in 2016. The potential contribution of other
protests. In early 2017, bread riots erupted in mega projects managed by military engineers,
reaction to the decision of the Ministry of Sup- such as the “New Administrative Capital,” to
ply – headed recently by two ex-generals in a economic growth are similarly questioned.
row – to decrease amounts of subsidized bread Economist Galal Amin asserts that they are
for lower-class families. Security forces dis- merely real estate investments, rather than
persed the protests across the north and south long-term economic development ventures,
of the country. Similar protests erupted in re- mostly funded by oil money and serving the up-
action to severe shortages in medicine and ba- per classes in a “hungry country.”2
by formula after cutting their subsidies.
Al-Sisi will win another presidential term in
The economic value of the public mega projects this month’s election. Along with other gener-
executed by the military has come under harsh als and ex-generals in the military ruling elite,
scrutiny. For example, the military engineers it seems unlikely that the current economic
financially mismanaged the Suez Canal’s ex- policies will change. Since they have not
tension project, as its high cost drained the worked well during his first term, it is doubt-
country’s reserve of foreign currency. The Egyp- ful that Egypt’s increasing economic dilemmas
tian Central Bank suffered a crisis of dollar could be resolved in the foreseeable future.
2 Galal Amin, “Tanmiya Iqtisadiyya am Tanmiya ‘Aqariyya,” al-
Shorouk, 14 April 2015; Raniya Badawi, “Galal Amin Ustadh al-Iqtisad
bi-l-Jami‘a al-Amrikiyya: Tajdid al-Khitab al-Dini fi Balad Ja’i‘ Madya‘a
li-l-Waqt,” al-Masry al-Youm, 5 May 2015.
7
Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
IN HIS WORDS. A THEMATIC ANALYSIS
OF AL-SISI’S TWITTER ACCOUNT
Matteo Colombo
A
bdel Fattah al-Sisi’s online com- growth to all Egyptians, especially the weaker
munication strategy has mostly sections of society.
centred on two themes: economic 4. There are powerful forces, including inter-
development and a call for unity national jihadists, working to derail the future
to all Egyptians, regardless of of Egypt. These forces can only be countered
their faiths and political orientations, in the by preserving national unity and through pub-
name of the greater good of the country. Draw- lic support for the security forces.
ing from 174 tweets from the official Twitter
account of the Egyptian president over the last Praise to all the Egyptian people
six months1, four recurrent ideas emerge in
President al-Sisi does not miss a chance to
the al-Sisi narrative:
praise the Egyptian people for overcoming a
1. The Egyptian people should be praised for difficult period in the aftermath of the revolu-
their achievements in the previous four years. tion and attaining their current achievements.
However, it is essential to overcome religious, The tweets that convey nationalistic ideas
social and ideological differences to preserve make up 13.8 per cent of the total. Some of
these fragile results. them refer to women, Christians and youth to
2. The will of Egyptians legitimates the presi- stress their full membership in the national
dent's decisions. The President works for a community. In a tweet on 19 January, for ex-
more transparent and open society by fighting ample, al-Sisi proudly stated that “everything
corruption and discussing current problems we achieved in the land of Egypt has been
openly with citizens. achieved thanks to the wisdom and unity of
3. Infrastructure, such as the New Suez Canal, the great people”.
and foreign investments are the keys to boost-
ing economic development. The President’s in-
tention is to extend the benefits of economic
1 It is worth mentioning that the collected tweets have always been
posted on the President’s Facebook page, which includes an addition-
al 40-50 posts that have appeared only on this social platform. The
two pages had 1.69 million followers (Twitter) and 7.2 million follow-
ers (Facebook) on March 11.
8
Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
On the same day, he also added that “the real This nationalist discourse can be understood as
heroes in the battle for preserving the state a pragmatic strategy to maintain internal order
are the Egyptians themselves”. and to present controversial decisions to citi-
zens in the light of national interest. Further-
more, it has proven a useful tool for convincing
Egyptians to finance infrastructure projects,
such as the New Suez Canal, which has been
mostly funded by the purchase of state-issued
bonds. Finally, al-Sisi uses nationalism because
it is an ideology that has deep roots in Egypt
and contributes to uniting all strands of society
A day before Orthodox Christmas (January 7), that would otherwise define themselves in ideo-
he posted pictures of his visit to the recently logical or religious terms.
built cathedral in the new administrative capi-
tal to express his support for Egyptian Chris- My country asks me
tians, who he claims to be “original Egyp-
Al-Sisi’s online discourse conveys the idea that
tians”.
his legitimacy to govern relies mostly on his
ability to solve people’s problems. A good
18.4% of the collected tweets contain the con-
cept of “people’s will” for justifying his current
power. For example, on 10 January he launched
an online initiative for citizens to ask the presi-
dent questions on Twitter by using the hashtag
#( حكاية_وطنNational narrative). It is interesting
to note that this online initiative was launched
Many other tweets praise Egyptian women shortly before announcing al-Sisi’s candidacy in
(5.2 per cent of the total tweets), often defined the presidential elections, to once again stress
as an indispensable part of Egyptian society. his determination to solve peoples’ problems. In
In one tweet, al-Sisi claimed that ”everyone answering citizens’ questions, President al-Sisi
must bow to the sacrifices made by Egyptian openly claims: “I have borne the responsibility of
women”, trusteeship and I have made every effort to pro-
tect the nation and assure you that I cannot stay
against your will”.
while in another he praised their ability to work
for peace and against terrorism. Finally, the
President addressed Egyptian youth in many To further reinforce the message, he solemnly
tweets during the “Egypt’s Youth Forum”, even proclaimed being “ready to sacrifice my soul
launching the hashtag #WeNeedToTalk. Unfor- for my country”.
tunately for al-Sisi, the hashtag was quickly
adopted by activists to accuse the security forces
of human rights violations.
9
Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
Big projects and ribbon-cutting
The economic recovery is the most common
topic of al-Sisi’s communication strategy. Al-
most 1 out of 4 posts (23 per cent) refers to
Egypt’s economy and al-Sisi’s endless efforts to
improve his citizens’ material conditions, espe-
During the same online initiative, he also cially those of the weaker. The two key words
stated that he is working to build a more dem- which al-Sisi often uses to present his devel-
ocratic Egypt, by stressing that the elections opment strategy to the citizens are “infrastruc-
will be “fair and transparent”. ture” and “investments”. “Infrastructure” often
refers to big projects, including the construc-
tion of the new administrative capital, which
al-Sisi considers essential for the development
of the country. For example, he stated in a
tweet from last January that “no country
wants to build an ambitious economy without
sophisticate infrastructures”.
This rhetoric is pivotal to justifying al-Sisi’s
power, which emerged in the context of the mil-
itary stance against President Morsi. Al-Sisi
makes a considerable effort to present all his
decisions within the framework of the people’s
will and constitutional rules. For example,
shortly after announcing that he would run in
the presidential elections, he tweeted pictures
of the documents needed to present his candi- Investments are also essential in al-Sisi’s eco-
dacy to demonstrate that he was following pro- nomic vision, especially those that come from
cedures like other candidates and that people foreign countries. It is not a coincidence that
the visits of Gulf rulers are the occasion for al-
Sisi to present new projects and show his citi-
zens that there is an interest in investing in
the country as long as stability is preserved. In
a tweet he thus proudly stated that “the Egyp-
tian state has been working around the clock
to win the trust of foreign investors”.
were asking him to serve a second term.
10Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
Foreign investments are also presented by al- rarely speaks about international issues, but
Sisi as a way to partially solve the problem of when he does he often links them to the issue
unemployment, which is one of the main wor- of internal cohesion. An example is this tweet:
ries for Egyptian families. Finally, al-Sisi often “Our foreign policies are strong with the unity
addresses the importance of sustainable devel- and cohesion of the Egyptians” to stress that
opment, which could provide an improvement of any contestation of his rule and Egyptian in-
conditions for the weaker members of society. stitutions is helping the enemies of Egypt to
destabilise the country.
Fighting the enemies of Egypt
The issue of security comprises only 10.3 per
cent of the analysed tweets. This percentage is
quite low compared to the other topics, which
seems to be quite surprising when considering
that backing from the security forces has been
pivotal to al-Sisi’s power. However, the Egyp-
tian president does not need to win support Conclusions
from this group of society, which is already The analysis of al-Sisi’s communication strat-
widely supporting his presidency. He thus re- egy shows interesting insights into the often-
fers to the army mostly in tweets on the war underestimated reasons for his support within
against terrorism and national cohesion. For Egyptian society. The Egyptian president pre-
example, in one tweet al-Sisi praised “The sons sents himself as a caring father who is driven
of the armed forces and the police [who] fought only by patriotism and the will of the people to
a huge battle against the forces of darkness”. serve his country. Al-Sisi does not refrain from
addressing some controversial issues, such as
terrorism in Sinai and human rights, but rein-
terprets them within the framework of nation-
alism and the will of Egyptians. In this re-
spect, al-Sisi presents himself as a pragmatic
leader who mostly addresses issues like the
economy and security, which pertain to all
Egyptians, regardless of their ideological ide-
as. In al-Sisi’s view, all enemies come from
He also regularly pays homage to the relatives outside the country, while all the Egyptians
of the victims of terrorism among the security who are contesting this representation of na-
forces. The Egyptian president describes secu- tional harmony are just serving foreign inter-
rity forces as an indispensable pillar for na- ests to undermine Egypt. On his side are all
tional cohesion against external forces who the good Egyptians, those that promote na-
want to destabilise Egypt: a reference which tional cohesion based on shared nationality
might refer to the Muslim Brotherhood but al- and Egyptian identity and regardless of their
so to other international foreign powers. In differences.
this respect, it is worth noting that al-Sisi
11Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
ISLAMISM IN EGYPT:
THE EMERGING DIVIDE
Massimo Campanini
W
e could say that the history of ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi’s coup d’etat destroyed
the Muslim Brotherhood, born the organizational web of the Brotherhood (it
in Egypt in 1928 and wiped out is enough to remember the hundreds of deaths
by ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi’s coup in Rabi‘a al-Adhawiyya Square). The crack-
d’etat in 2013, has been a his- down in the summer of 2013 allowed the new
tory of failed opportunities. For although the regime to accuse the Brotherhood of all past
Muslim Brotherhood has been a grass-roots and present (and future) misdeeds that oc-
movement, deeply entrenched in civil society, curred and will occur in Egypt. It is practically
it failed for decades to seize political power, impossible to know if and how the Brother-
and when finally, for two years (2011-2013) it hood is re-organizing itself under the radar,
succeeded in achieving its goal, its perfor- and, moreover, if and how this re-organization
mance was poor. Applying Gramsci’s catego- will be successful. No doubt, the crackdown’s
ries, we could say that the Muslim Brother- harshness could lead to further radicalization,
hood was never able to capitalize on the credit encouraging the Brotherhood to seek a link
it earned deploying a counter-hegemonic oppo- with jihadist groups operating in Egypt. After
sition under Sadat (1970-1981) and Mubarak all, Sayyid Qutb’s jihadism in the Sixties was
(1981-2011). It is true that many scholars and born precisely as a reaction to the Nasser re-
observers argued that the Muslim Brother- gime’s repression.
hood’s opposition was a smokescreen conceal-
The vacuum left in the landscape of Political
ing its effective will to be legitimized and co-
Islam in Egypt could be filled by Salafism.
opted in power. However, in the frenzied con-
Salafism is today a growing phenomenon
text of the first months of the Egyptian “revo-
throughout the Muslim world, due to several
lution” (or perhaps better “revolt”) of 2011, the
factors. From the ideological point of view,
Brotherhood actually did capitalize on a great
many people yearn to reproduce the Prophet
deal of its credit, winning the polls and the re-
Muhammad’s perfect age, and from the politi-
public’s presidency with Muhammad Morsi. In
cal point of view Salafi propaganda is assertive
their management of power until the military
and vociferous. At least two issues prevent
crackdown of July 2013, the Brotherhood
Salafism’s growth, however. On the one hand,
made a number of serious mistakes, trying to
the very little room ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi’s re-
impose from above an “Islamist” constitution
gime grants to any kind of opposition, especial-
and failing to improve the economy.
ly if religious. On the other, the silent alliance
12Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
between the Egyptian government and the of- opposition; the latter refers to a particular, ex-
ficial Islamic establishment, represented treme and often distorted, reading of the tradi-
mainly by the al-Azhar network. The govern- tional sources extolling violence through a bi-
ment and al-Azhar need each other: the former ased interpretation of some controversial
in order to find legitimization; the latter in or- Qur’anic verses. Moreover, “Islamist” thought
der to extend its influence in society and espe- is not always violent: on the contrary, a num-
cially in education. The al-Azhar network en- ber of Salafis are apolitical. And jihadism is a
rolls about a half million (and probably more) largely minority phenomenon. What then are
students at all levels of education, from ele- the connections between religious thought and
mentary school to university. It is arguable Political Islam? Has Political Islam a future in
that a substantial part of Egypt’s future intel- Egypt? And in the Muslim world at large?
ligentsia will be educated in this cultural con-
An answer can be only tentative. The “old”
text. The al-Azhar establishment needs the
shayks with their red turbans, walking proud-
government’s benevolence to increase its au-
ly in Cairo’s streets, still enjoy wide prestige
thority; the government could find in al-Azhar
among the populace. Islamic political thought
(at least tacit) support for its policies.
again rotates around the concept of shura
A commonly neglected actor in Islamic polity (consultation) and ijma‘ (consensus), but with-
is the establishment, the grassroots Islam tan- out explaining how these classical categories
tamount to the Catholic parish system. Nor- must be interpreted in contemporary society.
mally all eyes are concentrated on extremism Sometimes, Islamic political thought gives the
and violence, which are on the contrary mar- impression of being in a stalemate. “Islamist”
ginal and involve few people, while scant at- thought is in itself Manichaean and conceptu-
tention is paid to institutional religion. In fact ally rigid, albeit sometimes more sophisticated
institutional organizations represent the than would seem from outside. The idea of an
backbone of religious systems in almost all Islamic state as a “civil state” (dawla
Muslim countries. It is within this framework madaniyya), that is, a state grounded upon
that most of religious thought is elaborated. law and not “theocratic”, (an idea especially
supported by, among others, famous Egyptian
Religious thought in contemporary Egypt
‘alims like Yusuf al-Qaradawi), is widespread
seems less lively and original even in compari-
among Islamic thinkers in Egypt and abroad.
son with the most recent past. Al-Azhar’s
“Islamist” thinkers never managed to clarify
shayks often take conservative stances as if
what the effective meaning is of God’s sover-
they were besieged in a fortress: the times of
eignty (hakimiyya). Although the two trends
great figures like Mahmud Shaltut or Mu-
are not completely at odds – sharing for exam-
hammad al-Ghazali seem over. Other intellec-
ple the concept of shura –, the differences are
tuals are engaged in pure speculation. Cur-
equally evident, both in tactics (education vs
rently, secularism is also progressing in the
compulsion) and in objectives (civil state vs
Muslim world, and this progress sometimes
God’s sovereignty). A number of scholars con-
arouses the concern of religious establish-
tinue to prophesize the death of Political Is-
ments, as it fosters the blind violence of radi-
lam. I believe that we must be more cautious
cal ideologies. It is important to stress that Is-
and that Egypt could return to being a labora-
lamic thought is not “Islamist” thought: the
tory of intellectual Islamic recovery
former refers to classical paradigms and is
normally an enemy of extremism and armed
13Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
14Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
THE MARKET OF VIOLENCE IN EGYPT
Georges Fahmi
W
hile Egypt approaches the like Hassm and Liwa al-Thawra, however, re-
upcoming presidential elec- ject the concept of excommunication and insist
tions with an almost uncom- that state officials should be resisted not be-
petitive political sphere, the cause of their faith but for their actions. The
spectrum of violence in groups of the latter category also do not ad-
Egypt has become more diverse over the last here to the concept of Islamic governance. Ac-
few years. It has developed to the extent that cording to Liwa al-Thawra, it is up to a nation
we could speak of a “market of violence” to decide how to govern itself. While the
among different groups who seek to maximize movement questions the Western roots of de-
their respective market shares. These compet- mocracy, it also rejects the establishment of a
ing groups can be divided into three main cat- despotic religious rule.
egories: groups affiliated with the Islamic
While all of these groups seek to topple the
State (IS), that include those operating in
current regime, they apply different strategies
northern Sinai known as Wilayat Sinai (Sinai
to achieve this goal. IS in general targets both
Province or Islamic State in the Sinai) and
state officials and civilians and attacks
groups operating in mainland Egypt under the
mosques and churches alike. Over the last
name of The Islamic State in Egypt. Another
couple of years, The Islamic State in Egypt has
category is those affiliated with al-Qaeda and
carried out three major terrorist attacks
includes groups like Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of
against Coptic Orthodox churches in Cairo,
Islam) operating in the Western Desert and
Alexandria, and Tanta that left more than 80
Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam) operating
dead, while the Islamic State in Sinai stands
in northern Sinai. Lastly, there are the groups
accused of being behind the November 2017
emerging from the Muslim Brotherhood such
attack on al-Rawdah mosque in northern Sinai
as Hassm (The Arms of Egypt Movement) and
that left more than 300 dead. On their part,
Liwa al-Thawra (The Banner of the Revolu-
Hassm and Liwa al-Thawra target both secu-
tion) that operate in mainland Egypt.
rity and religious figures connected to the re-
These different groups differ in ideology and gime. However, and unlike IS, they refuse to
strategy. On the ideological level the groups target civilians or religious minorities. Both
affiliated to both the Islamic State and al- groups condemned the IS attacks against Cop-
Qaeda adhere to Salafi-jihadism, which relies tic churches and the mosque in northern Sinai.
on the principle of takfir – the process of ex- As for Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, they avoid
communication as the basis for the military attacking civilians and mainly target security
struggle against state institutions to establish officers. They also condemned the attack on al-
Islamic governance based on sharia. Groups Rawdah mosque: Jund al-Islam described it as
15Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
“a great sin”, although they did not condemn Over the last few years, IS has been more ac-
the attacks against the Coptic churches. tive in attracting Muslim Brotherhood youths
to their ranks, particularly from inside pris-
Despite sharing the same goal, there is fierce
ons. Testimonies from inside prisons show that
competition between these groups for influence
the percentage of Muslim Brotherhood mem-
and resources. A crisis of leadership within the
bers who became more willing to join Salafi
Muslim Brotherhood has led the other groups
jihadi groups amounts to more than 20 per
to solicit Muslim Brotherhood youths to join
cent among detainees. An Egyptian newspaper
their ranks instead.
even referred to one of the prisons as “a gov-
While some members of Hassm and Liwa al- ernmental centre to recruit members for IS”1.
Thawra were previously associated with the Its military setback in Syria and Iraq over the
Muslim Brotherhood, the movement failed to past year, in addition to its new strategy of at-
attract large numbers of Brotherhood youth to tacking places of worship in Egypt, including
their ranks. This is mainly due to the rejection mosques, are likely however to drive most of
of both the ideological frame and the strategies the Muslim Brotherhood youths away from IS.
that were promoted by the historical leaders of The return of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups to the
the Muslim Brotherhood. Those who still be- market, on the other hand, and their strategy
lieve in the Muslim Brotherhood are not likely of mainly targeting security officials might of-
to join these new groups, while the youths who fer an alternative to the disappointed Muslim
gave up on the Muslim Brotherhood ideology Brotherhood youths.
altogether will not join them either, as these
The threat of violent extremism is likely to
people are looking for a more radical approach
remain a key challenge for President Abdul
and would hence be more likely join Salafi ji-
Fattah al-Sisi in his second mandate. Alt-
hadi groups instead.
hough, until now, only a minority within the
Last month the Islamic State in Sinai and the Muslim Brotherhood has taken up arms, the
leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, each main risk remains that large numbers of
posted a video message criticizing the Muslim Brotherhood youths will abandon their organi-
Brotherhood’s non-violent political approach. zation and join Salafi jihadi groups. While IS
The Province of Sinai revealed in its video that has attracted many youths, particularly from
Omar al-Deeb, a member of the Muslim inside prisons, al-Qaeda-affiliated groups with
Brotherhood who was killed in September a more radical discourse than that of Hassm
2017 in Cairo, had both left the Brotherhood and Liwa al-Thawra and a more nuanced
and had pledged allegiance to the Islamic strategy than that of IS seem to be the more
State. This statement was included so as to long-term competitors in this market of vio-
implicitly encourage other Muslim Brother- lence in Egypt.
hood youths to follow in his path. Ayman al-
Zawahiri’s message in turn was critical of a
statement that Mohammad Badie had made
on the occasion of the 2013 Rabaa sit-in.
Badie, the supreme guide of the Muslim
Brotherhood since 2010, had proclaimed that,
“Our peaceful approach is stronger than bul-
lets,” and al-Zawahiri insisted that the result
of this approach was the killing of thousands
without any resistance. 1 Mohamed Khayal, Hona Toura: Markaz Hikoumi li-tajnid al-
dawa’sh (“Here is Torah: a governmental centre to recruit members
for IS”), Shorouk newspaper, 21 April 2016, available online (Arabic).
16Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
EGYPT VOTES AMID HARSH
PRESS CENSORSHIP
Giuseppe Acconcia
T
he Egyptians are going to vote in the ence to the awful description, given in the
presidential elections amid harsh British documentary, of the human rights’ vio-
press censorship. This is happening lations in prison. The victim of the violence,
both to local and international media Zubeida Ibrahim, recently appeared on the TV
outlets working in Egypt. For this talk-show al-Youm, denying her mother's
reason, on March 7, the UN High Commis- claims. However, many observers expressed
sioner for Human Rights, Zeid Raad al- doubts about the authenticity of her interview.
Hussein, accused Egyptian authorities of cre- Her mother was later arrested on suspicion of
ating a “pervasive climate of intimidation” af- spreading “fake news”.
ter freedom of expression for local media was
Following the broadcast, SIS demanded a boy-
suppressed. In this report, the UN criticised
cott of the BBC. This was a good occasion for
several measures taken by President Abdel
the local authorities to stigmatise all foreign
Fattah al-Sisi before the 2018 presidential
media based in Egypt. According to a SIS
elections. “Legislation prevents candidates and
statement, foreign broadcasts should never
supporters from organising rallies. Independ-
publish news that has not been previously ap-
ent media have been silenced, with over 400
proved by pro-government agencies. According
media and NGO websites completely blocked”,
to the Reuters correspondent in Cairo, Eric
the report argued.
Knecht, this is a clear attempt to intimidate in
more general terms all foreign correspondents
“The shadow over Egypt” and the BBC case
based in Egypt.
Egyptian authorities harshly criticised a BBC
The most recent case of censorship involved
documentary produced by the British public
Mohammad Hashem, a young atheist, invited
television correspondent, Orla Guerin. In “The
as a guest on the TV show al-Hadath al-Youm
shadow over Egypt”,the mother of a young
in a debate with a sheikh of al-Azhar,
Egyptian woman, victim of “enforced disap-
Mahmoud Ashour. Before expelling him from
pearance”, Zubeida Ibrahim, was interviewed.
the broadcast for his “disruptive and inappro-
The BBC's broadcast focused on the constant
priate ideas”, sheikh Ashour and the TV pre-
human rights' violations occurring in Egypt.
senter Abd al-Halim suggested that Hashem
Egyptian State Information Services (SIS) should go directly to “a psychiatric hospital”
harshly criticised the BBC report and called it for his behaviour. After the July 3, 2013 mili-
“baseless and full of lies”, especially in refer- tary coup, anti-atheist and anti-LGBT cam-
17Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
paigns have been conducted by the Egyptian 2011 uprisings, a law that prevented it
authorities in order to demonstrate their brought about the closure of independent me-
«moral commitments», despite the harsh re- dia in Egypt, including the Arabic and English
pression of moderate Islamists. versions of the independent blog Mada Masr
and the al-Jazeera office in Cairo, with the no-
Censoring the Internet torious trial against its journalists. One of the
Following the arrests of journalists and TV major protests involving Egyptian journalists
hosts in recent weeks, many human rights took place in front of the Cairo Journalist Syn-
NGOs asked the Egyptian authorities to put an dicate against the transfer of Tiran and Sanafir
end to the “ongoing campaign of intimidation”. islands to Saudi Arabia in March 2016. Since
then, the cases of journalists arrested or threat-
But the censorship has been even harsher on ened in Egypt have been dozens. One of the lat-
the Internet. The latest move, after blocking est cases is that of the blogger, Islam al-Refaie,
the main independent media outlets, is cen- who is still under pre-trial custody. Arrested in
sorship of cryptocurrency websites. This hap- November 2017, al-Refaie has been accused of
pened using the same hardware utilised to being a member of the outlawed organization of
block al-Jazeera and Human Rights Watch the Muslim Brotherhood and of organising un-
websites. The think tank Citizen Lab analysed authorised demonstrations. In a related case,
the means of web control used in Egypt and the public prosecutors asked for the death pen-
found evidence of important similarities with alty for the photojournalist, Mahmoud Abou
the techniques used in Turkey and Syria Zeid, better known as Shawkan, who has been
aimed at controlling cyber-activism. in prison for more than four years for his cover-
Last February, the Accelerated Mobile Pages age of the Rabaa al-Adaweya massacre in 2013.
(AMP) of Google went offline in Egypt, thus The control over local media, purportedly part
blocking access through mobile phones to inter- of the fight against terrorism, has been even
national and independent websites. The Com- harsher during the electoral campaign in
mittee for Journalists' Protection (CPJ) de- Egypt, preventing an open debate before the
manded that the local authorities ensure facili- presidential elections. In recent months the
tated access for Egyptians to information Egyptian military regime spread disinfor-
sources during the electoral campaign. Howev- mation and extended its constant censorship
er, according to the Association for Freedom of over the local and Arab press to foreign, Eng-
Expression and Thought (AFTE), the major in- lish and innovative media, in order to filter the
ternational websites recently blocked in Egypt potential diffusion of critical news during the
are The Washington Post and The New York short electoral campaign, and to completely
Times, together with the local independent blog shut down the remaining spaces of freedom of
Maswry. The New York Times, especially, has expression and dissent.
been harshly criticised
for a report on the Israe-
li military involvement
in the Sinai Peninsula.
After freedom of ex-
pression flourished in
the aftermath of the
18Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
THE EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION’S
LONG NIGHT
Federica Zoja
S
even years after the popular upris- a lawyer, Alaa had already been arrested in
ing that led to the resignation of 2006 for organizing demonstrations against
President Hosni Mubarak, political the Egyptian judicial system. But it was the
activism continues to play the al-Sisi presidency to settle accounts with him:
prominent role it had in the 18-day in 2015 Alaa was sentenced to 15 years for vio-
anti-regime demonstrations (25 January - 11 lating, in November 2013, the anti-
February 2011) and the subsequent democrat- demonstration rules imposed by the armed
ic transition, which soon got stuck. forces after the removal of Mohammed Morsi.
The sentence was then converted into 5 years,
According to the latest data released by Am-
but the Supreme Court, by virtue of continu-
nesty international, between April and Sep-
ous procedural delays, has not yet pronounced
tember 2017, 240 secular political activists
definitively and four years have already
and nearly 500 close to the Muslim Brother-
passed. The #FreeAlaa campaign not only did
hood were arrested in Egypt. Human Rights
not have the desired effect, but was “frozen” by
Watch points out the shutdown of hundreds of
the authorities on Twitter.
blogs and websites critical of the Abdel Fattah
al-Sisi presidency. Now, a few days before the Ahmed Maher, a civil engineer who founded
presidential vote on March 26, the repression the April 6 Youth Movement, the most famous
of dissent rages throughout the country using and charismatic of the groups that emerged at
every means. Because of intimidations, ar- the end of the Mubarak era, was freed at the
rests, political trials, forced disappearances beginning of 2017, but national security still
and anti-terrorism rules, free voices face end- keeps a special eye on him. Born in support of
less obstacles. The stories of all these people the workers of the Mahalla al-Kubra textile
are emblematic of an entire generation who factory, on strike in April 2008, the Movement
believed that in Midan Tahrir, the heart of the (Haraka) was able to make the most of Face-
rebellion in Cairo, they could change the book, Twitter and the blogs of the workers
course of history. themselves to relate hard days of clashes be-
tween workers and police. At the forefront in
Alaa Abd al-Fatah, the creator of “Manalaa”, a
2011, subsequently the April 6 activists never
platform of Egyptian blogs conceived together
ceased to be in opposition even in the post-
with his wife Manal Hassan, has been in jail
Mubarak period: in the autumn of 2013 they
since winter 2013-2014. Politically active as a
denounced the return of the military dictator-
teenager, the son of a university professor and
19Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
ship and the harsh repression of Islamism. party al-Dustour (The Constitution) as well as
Maher, like Alaa al-Fatah, was arrested and the Nasserist’s al-Karama (The Dignity), the
tried at the end of 2013. He served all three Egyptian Social Democratic Party and the
years to which he had been sentenced. Cur- moderate Islamist party of Misr al-Qawiya
rently, he is trying to resume his public activi- (Strong Egypt). In particular, Abd al-Moneim
ty, but other members of the Movement, split Abu al-Fotouh, the head of Strong Egypt, called
in two and declared illegal, were arrested be- for a national boycott. A doctor and former
tween the end of 2017 and the beginning of Muslim Brotherhood member, he is also known
2018. for his ability in dialogue - a quality that has
earned him some enemies in the Brotherhood.
Among the Egyptian dissidents there are also
Al-Fotouh was stopped by the police on Febru-
those who, scarred by too many battles, have
ary 14 and accused of making false and damag-
chosen to move abroad. One of them is Ayman
ing statements against President al-Sisi, speak-
Nour, founder of the al-Ghad party (The To-
ing with the British press during a stay in Lon-
morrow, 2004) and challenger of Hosni Mu-
don. Likewise, Mohamed Abd al-Latif Talaat,
barak in the 2005 elections, to whom he came
general secretary of the al-Wasat party (The
in second. Accused of falsifying signatures for
Center, moderate liberal Islamists) has been in
the registration of his party, the lawyer spent
custody since February 9.
several years in prison until 2009, when he
was released for health reasons. And in Octo- An opponent of Mubarak, Morsi and al-Sisi,
ber 2011 he founded the party Ghad al- the liberal Mohammed Esmaa Anwar al-
Thawra (The Tomorrow of the Revolution), Sadat, nephew of the president killed in 1981,
leaving his first political “creature” to his suc- was expelled from parliament a year ago and
cessor Moussa Mustafa Moussa (pro- was recently “persuaded” not to run in the
government, the only contender of al-Sisi for presidential elections.
the presidency).
The human rights lawyer Khaled Ali, a politi-
Nour also tried to run for the 2012 presiden- cal activist, decided to withdraw from the elec-
tial elections, without success. He has been liv- tion campaign on 24 January.
ing between Turkey and Lebanon since the
Ezzat Ghonim, a prominent lawyer and activ-
coup d'état of 2013, but does not stop criticiz-
ist, disappeared on March 1 while returning
ing the totalitarian drift. He was recently sus-
home from the headquarters of his NGO, the
pended by the Egyptian journalists association
Egyptian coordinator for rights and freedoms.
and has risked losing his citizenship several
times. Interviewed by The Telegraph in late January,
Mohammed Esmaa Anwar Sadat said: “There
The call for a boycott (“Stay at home” is the
is no political life any more. It’s all dead. No
campaign slogan) of the presidential elections
one can dare to compete or even to speak out
brings together all the faces of the Egyptian
or challenge anything. It’s not allowed”.
opposition who still have a voice: the liberal
20Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
EGYPT, ISRAEL, AND PALESTINE:
COMMON INTERESTS, DIFFERENT VISIONS
Tewfik Aclimandos
S
audi Arabia, Egypt and the Emir- Egyptian army’s pressure was too strong. At
ates, three close allies, are build- least key components of the Hamas leader-
ing a new regional security order ship, and maybe all the movement’s branches,
and want Israel on board. The Gulf have now changed their minds. Jihadist
countries need it for countering groups are no longer a tool but a threat. There-
Iran, Egypt needs it for the Mediterranean’s fore, Egypt wants to capitalize on this. Fourth,
security. Nevertheless, this requires a solution Egypt wants Hamas to be less dependent (at
to the Palestinian issue. least) on Iran, Turkey and Qatar. The Saudis
and the Emiratis concur, and they can fund
Some principles govern Egypt’s approach to
Gaza.
the Palestinian issue. First, it wants a unified
Palestinian leadership. Therefore, it invests a There are of course many snags: for instance,
lot in supporting a Palestinian reconciliation. the Palestinian authority’s security apparatus
It suspects both Palestinian parties to be unin- has not monitored Gaza for more than a dec-
terested in this. For the Palestinian authority, ade. It is unfamiliar with the cartography of
Gaza is a mess, and a black hole difficult to jihadists there. Hamas’ security has much
manage. Hamas does not want to relinquish deeper and more up-to-date knowledge, but is
real control of Gaza. Second, Egypt wants Ga- less reliable in the long term, as they can at
za, the branches of Hamas and Fatah in Gaza, anytime revert to their old policy of “looking
and other forces in Gaza, to have a bigger say the other way”. Why the Palestinian authority
in the Palestinian decision-making process. should accept leaving the security issue to its
Those who live in Gaza are supposed to have a former foe is also a pertinent question. So the
better understanding of Egypt’s preoccupa- question of “who should handle the security
tions and to be more sensitive to its concerns. issues” in Gaza is a matter of debate. At one
Third, Egypt wants to eradicate terror cells in point Egypt seemed closer to a solution built
Sinai. Jihadist groups collaborate with their on leaving this to Hamas. I do not know if this
Palestinian counterparts in Gaza, and Hamas is still the case. The snag is obvious: regaining
too often tolerated this, turning a blind eye, or control of Gaza is much less interesting for
worse, helped the Sinai insurgency. Gaza pro- Ramallah if these are the terms of the deal.
vided weapons and safe havens when the
21Egypt’s Elections:
No Change, Many Challenges
Of course the Egyptians keep an eye on the lem. Last, they think Israeli Prime Minister
struggle for President Abbas’ successor, and on Netanyahu is the last “realist” in Israel and
Mohammed Dahlan’s role in Gaza and his pos- the only one able to “deliver” a peace agree-
sible role in Palestinian leadership. They ap- ment. The other side considers the probable
preciate Dahlan’s clout in Gaza and the out- terms of the deal to be too unfair and, think
comes his relations with Hamas can eventual- Egyptian public opinion will not swallow a so-
ly bring, but they also know that many in Fa- lution entailing the loss of Jerusalem. The deal
tah consider him to be the “man who lost Ga- would be a serious, potentially lethal threat to
za” (in 2007). Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s stability. No deal,
they conclude, is better than this deal. If we
Everyone in the region is preparing for
are to believe The New York Times (NYT), the
Trump’s “deal of the century”. The main Arab
first camp has the upper hand. It is interest-
players think its terms will be prejudicial to
ing, however, to note that al-Azhar’s institu-
the Palestinians. The status of Jerusalem is
tions, a key regime ally, adopted a very firm
only a case in point. In Egypt’s regime circles,
stance against Trump’s decision to move the
heated debates oppose different views. To sim-
American embassy to Jerusalem. And to note
plify a complex matter, we can say that some
that the regime carefully avoided any real es-
want to capitalize on Egyptian public opinion’s
calation [reaction?]. In any case, Egypt and
unprecedented hatred for Hamas to settle the
Saudi Arabia are cooperating to define a com-
issue once for all, as it is vital for Egypt to sta-
mon stance and to better the terms of the ex-
bilize the region and to build a new security
pected deal.
order. They also add that the current balance
of power means any escalation would lead to Relations with Israel are unexpectedly good.
further Palestinian losses, notably in Jerusa- President al-Sisi and Prime Minister Netan-
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