Depoliticizing discourses - The role of editorials in the reproduction of consensus: assessing the media coverage of the Yellow Vest movement - DIVA
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Depoliticizing discourses
The role of editorials in the reproduction of consensus: assessing the media
coverage of the Yellow Vest movement
Mathilde Colin
Human rights
Bachelor thesis
15 ECTS
Spring term 2019
Supervisor: Jonna Pettersson
1Abstract
The purpose of this thesis was to study how Yellow Vest protests, which started 17 November
2018, and protesters themselves, were being described in the French mainstream press. The
material consisted in 19 editorials from 5 of the most-circulated newspapers in the country.
They were analyzed using Norman Fairclough’s model of critical discourse analysis and within
a theoretical framework drawn from Chantal Mouffe’s discussion of the notion of consensus.
The findings suggest that the mainstream discourse on Yellow Vests is one which denies their
legitimacy within the political realm through a process of depoliticization supported by
discourses of contempt, republicanism, and unity. This study illustrates the struggle of
protesters to be granted space and legitimacy within contemporary democracies to properly
exercise their civil and political rights.
Keywords: consensus, democracy, France, media, Yellow Vests
Word count: 14145
2List of Abbreviations
ACPM – Alliance for press and media figures (Alliance pour les chiffres de la presse et des
médias)
CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis
EU – European Union
FN – National Front (Front National, now RN, Rassemblement National)
IGF – General Inspectorate of Finances (Inspection Générale des Finances)
IGPN – General Inspectorate of the National Police (Inspectorat Général de la Police
Nationale)
LFI – Unbowed France (La France Insoumise)
LR – The Republicans (Les Républicains)
LREM – The Republic on the Move (La République en Marche)
PS – Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste)
RIC – People's Referendum (Référendum d'Initiative Citoyenne)
RWB – Reporters Without Borders
TICPE – Domestic consumption tax on energy products (Taxe intérieure de consommation
sur les produits énergétiques)
UN – United Nations
3Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Introduction to the topic .................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Research aim and questions .............................................................................................................. 6
1.3 Relevance to human rights ................................................................................................................ 7
1.3.1 The overall context of repression .............................................................................................. 7
1.3.2 Media, protest movements and human rights: the “guard dogs” perspective ........................... 9
1.4 Delimitations ................................................................................................................................... 10
1.5 Thesis outline .................................................................................................................................. 11
2. Context ............................................................................................................................................. 12
2.1 French politics................................................................................................................................. 12
2.1.1 The political system ................................................................................................................ 12
2.1.2 The political culture ................................................................................................................ 13
2.1.3 Emmanuel Macron's election .................................................................................................. 15
2.2 French media ................................................................................................................................... 16
2.2.1 The media system ................................................................................................................... 16
2.2.2 The role and status of the editorial .......................................................................................... 18
2.3 The Yellow Vest movement ........................................................................................................... 19
3. Literature review ............................................................................................................................ 22
3.1 Media and protest movements ........................................................................................................ 22
3.2 News coverage of protest in French media ..................................................................................... 23
4. Theoretical framework ................................................................................................................... 26
4.1 Defining consensus ......................................................................................................................... 26
4.2 Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action ........................................................................ 26
4.3 Chantal Mouffe's model of agonistic democracy ............................................................................ 26
5. Methodology .................................................................................................................................... 29
5.1 Critical discourse analysis............................................................................................................... 29
5.1.1 Norman Fairclough's framework ............................................................................................ 29
5.1.2 Norman Fairclough's perspective on media discourse ............................................................ 30
5.2 Introduction to the media material .................................................................................................. 31
5.3 Data collection ................................................................................................................................ 34
5.4 Ethical considerations ..................................................................................................................... 34
6. Analysis ............................................................................................................................................ 36
6.1 Discourse of contempt .................................................................................................................... 36
6.2 Discourse of republicanism............................................................................................................. 40
6.3 Discourse of unity ........................................................................................................................... 43
7. Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................... 46
Appendix 1: List of editorials............................................................................................................. 48
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 49
41. Introduction
1.1 Introduction to the topic
On April 17, 2017, President-to-be Emmanuel Macron gave a speech in the AccorHotels
Arena, east of Paris. “You have understood it,” the En Marche ! candidate President tells the
crowd. “We will have to, at the same time, live, work, and learn. Excuse me, you have probably
noticed, I said: at the same time.” Immediately, the crowd laughs, applauses, and starts shouting
“At the same time!” (en même temps). “Some say it’s a verbal tic,” Macron continues. “But
that it’s a verbal tic that means I am not clear [...] because, you know, some people like boxes,
categorized ideologies [...] well, I will keep using ‘at the same time’ because it means that we
take into account imperatives [...] whose conciliation is indispensable. [...] I chose the best of
the right and the best of the left.”
Just under a year before that speech, Chantal Mouffe’s On The Political was translated into
French under the title L’illusion du consensus (‘The Illusion of Consensus’)1. The essay tackles
the post-political Zeitgest which she argues denies existing antagonisms. According to Mouffe,
the nature of consensus is not to be accommodating, a one-size-fits-all, win-win solution to
complex issues, but rather, “all forms of consensus are by necessity based on acts of
exclusion2.” In response to antagonism, rather than referring to the inherently depoliticizing
notions of consensus and of the ‘end of history,’ Mouffe argues, “a central task of democratic
politics is to provide the institutions which will permit conflicts to take an ‘agonistic’ form,
where the opponents are not enemies but adversaries among whom exists a conflictual
consensus3.” In other words, in pluralist democracies, institutions are to accommodate
antagonisms.
Just over a year after that speech, the Yellow Vest movement emerged, granting the
“President of consensus” with all-time low rates of approval4. Originally a tax revolt protesting
raising diesel fuel prices, the Yellow Vest movement would become an all- encompassing
protest which, rather than opposing a specific law or draft law, aims at identifying the structural,
systemic causes to an array of issues such as poverty, unemployment, and police brutality. Soon
enough, the movement would make the headlines. On December 2, 2018, the most commonly
occurring words on the cover of the country’s main dailies were “chaos,” “fever,” “anger,”
“burning/burns,” “black” and “escalation,”
1 Chantal Mouffe (2016). L’illusion du consensus. Paris: Albin Michel.
2 Chantal Mouffe (2009). The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso, p. 93.
3 Chantal Mouffe (2013). Agonistics: Thinking The World Politically. London: Verso, p. XII.
4 IFOP (2018). “Le tableau de bord politique–Décembre 2018.”
5according to a study published in Le Figaro5. On television and on the radio, too, words caught
the attention of observers. “The movement is on the way to cretinization,” said editorialist
Dominique Seux on LCI on February 19, 2019. “Because of human rights, we are crying about
people being wounded by flash-balls. But it’s murderers we have in front of us,” says F., an
auditor on radio channel RMC on March 18, 2019, calling for the police to “fire real bullets”
at protesters, as show co-host Olivier Truchot approves. “Let [the police] use their weapons
once and for all,” suggested philosopher and former Minister for Youth, National Education
and Research Luc Ferry on Radio Classique on January 7, 2019. A direct consequence of the
coverage of the Yellow Vest movement, trust in the media dropped by a whopping 11 points
to reach 24%–the second lowest of all countries studied by the Reuters Institute for the Study
of Journalism for its 2019 media consumption report6. Critique of the media became central to
the movement itself. On the back of some of the notorious yellow vests, which had become
receptacles for their wearers’ thoughts, one could read things such as “Media=lies. Show our
real face! Be the people7!,” “The government pisses all over us–the media says its raining8,”
and “Corrupt government, muzzled media. Demos kratos–hope is yellow9.”
Although criticism of protest movements is necessary in a pluralist democracy, the belief at
the core of this essay is that the ubiquity and nature of the criticism formulated towards the
Yellow Vest movement is not constitutive of agonism as defined by Mouffe. Rather, it is
criticism aimed at defending and perpetuating the consensus surrounding existing structures of
power. Applying critical discourse analysis to a corpus of nineteen editorials from five of the
most-circulated French newspapers, I will be attempting to identify the specificities of the
media discourse on the Yellow Vest. As such, I hope to elucidate on the notion of consensus
as well as remedy a lack of research on the coverage of protest by French news outlets.
1.2 Research aim and questions
The aim of this research is to identify features within editorials on the Yellow Vest
movement to elucidate on the coverage of protest movements by mainstream media and, more
specifically, on the specific function of editorials. To fulfill said aim, I will be applying
5 Blandine Le Cain, Julien Boudisseau and FIG Data (2018). “Comment les « gilets jaunes » se sont
progressivement imposés en une de la presse.” Le Figaro, December 19.
6 Nic Newman et al. (2019). Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019. Reuters Institute for the Study of
Journalism, p. 9.
7 Plein le dos (n.d.). “Acte 11.”
8 Plein le dos (n.d.). “Acte 15.”
9 Plein le dos (n.d.). “Acte 30.”
6a critical discourse analysis (CDA) on a total of nineteen editorials published between
November 22, 2018 and May 21, 2019 in five of the most-circulated newspapers in France. On
a theoretical level, this research aims at unfolding the notion of consensus in Chantal Mouffe's
understanding.
The research questions which will be guiding my research are the following:
– What discourses on the Yellow Vests can be identified in editorials from the French
press?
– From the study of those discourses, what can be understood about the space allocated
to protest movements in the political realm?
1.3 Relevance to human rights
1.3.1 The overall context of repression
Since the very beginning of the movement, a number of organisms, such as the United
Nations (UN), the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and Amnesty International,
have drawn attention to a number of human rights abuses within the Yellow Vest movement.
Three main areas of concern were at the core of their observations.
The first and perhaps main preoccupation of said organisms is with the policing of the
movement, deemed “excessive” by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle
Bachelet, and “disproportionate” by the European Parliament, asking respectively for an in-
depth investigation into alleged cases of police brutality10 and the prohibition of riot control
weapon LBD-4011. Since January 2019, in collaboration with independent investigation
newspaper Médiapart, journalist David Dufresne, who specializes in matters of policing and
civil liberties, has been listing on his professional Twitter account, @davduf, every account of
abuse of force and injury during a Yellow Vest protest which he has received in-depth
information about. His tweets begin as such: "Hello, @Place_Beauvau12? I'd like to report..."
followed by information, and often pictures or videos, about the event, in a perhaps symbolic
attempt at alerting the authorities, encouraging victims to report incidents to the General
Inspectorate of the National Police (IGPN). Although exact figures are impossible to obtain,
the Minister of the Interior estimated that there had been a total of 2 448 protesters injured as
of May 2019. As of July 20, 2019, Dufresne has received 860 individual complaints,
10 Libération (2019). “Gilets jaunes : l’ONU réclame une enquête sur « l’usage excessif de la force », le
gouvernement réplique.” March 6.
11 Le Monde (2019). “Le Parlement européen condamne le « recours disproportionné à la force » contre les
manifestants.” February 14.
12 Place Beauvau refers to the Square Beauvau on which the Minister of the Interior, responsible for the
general interior security of the country, is found, and has grown to refer to the institution itself metonymically.
7including 315 reporting head injuries, 24 lost eyes, 5 blown-up hands and 2 deaths–that of 80
year-old Zined Redouane, and that of 24 year-old Steve Maia Caniço13 14. Of the 265 inquiries
led by the IGPN about complaints from victims of police violence, not one has resulted in a
court conviction and, according to the “police of the police,” “there is no such thing as police
brutality15.”
The second preoccupation is with the great amount of people arrested, put in custody, kept
in detention awaiting trial, sent to immediate trial hearing, forbidden from joining future
demonstrations, or sentenced to prison, fines, or community service. Here, too, exact, up-to-
date figures are difficult to obtain. Contacted by media outlet StreetPress, the ministry of Justice
gave its most recent account in early July. In nine months, about 11 000 people were kept in
custody, and a little over 3 000 sentences were rendered, out of which about a third were non-
suspended prison sentences, from a few months up to three years16. Preventive arrests and
detentions are made possible by a law from March 2, 2010 enacted with the express purpose
of tackling violence in so-called “sensitive” neighborhoods17 and reinforced with a circular
promulgated on September 20, 2016, during the State of emergency, in reaction to the
establishment of so-called ZADs18 19. Furthermore, on November 22, 2018, through a so-called
“yellow vest” circular, Minister of Justice Nicole Belloubet explicitly allowed police officers
to subject to identity checks and searches anyone out of their homes on Saturdays in Paris,
major towns, and the roads leading there20. After her January visit to Paris, the Council of
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, denounced, among other things,
the arbitrary nature of arrests during demonstrations, arguing that such practices “constitute
serious interferences with the exercise of the freedom of movement and the freedoms of
assembly and expression21.”
13 Steve Maia Caniço’s death was unrelated to the protests. He allegedly fell into the Loire during the Fête de
la Musique, an annual celebration throughout the country, after the police came to dislodge partygoers using
teargas. Not knowing how to swim, Steve was not rescued from the waters. His body was not searched for
immediately, and it was found five weeks later, a time during which the question of knowing “where is Steve”
(Où est Steve ?) became a major preoccupation for protesters.
14 David Dufresne (2019). “« Allô place Beauvau, c’est pour un bilan », une cartographie des violences
policières.” Médiapart, January 25.
15 Le Figaro (2019). “« Gilets jaunes » : « Pas de violences policières », selon l’IGPN.” June 14.
16 StreetPress (2019). “Envoyés en prison comme 440 autres Gilets jaunes, ils racontent.” September 16.
17 Code pénal. Article 222-14-2.
18 A zone à défendre, “zone to defend,” is a French neologism which refers to the political occupation of an
area in order to oppose a development project
19 Ministère de la Justice (2016). Circulaire du 20 septembre 2016 relative à la lutte contre les infractions
commises à l’occasion des manifestations et autres mouvements collectifs.
20 Ministère de la Justice (2018). Circulaire du 22 novembre 2018 relative au traitement judiciaire des
infractions commises en lien avec le mouvement de contestation dit « des gilets jaunes ».
21 The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (2019). “Memorandum on maintaining public
order and freedom of assembly in the context of the “yellow vest” movement in France.” February 26.
8Mijatović also expressed concern about the introduction of an administrative ban on
demonstrating, which is a third concern surrounding the response to the Yellow Vest
movement. Although the controversial article providing for the prohibition of participation in
a demonstration as a preventive measure and as the result of an administrative decision has
since been censored by the Constitutional Council on the basis that it was a breach of article
11 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen22, concern remains. Indeed,
article 6 of the law n°2019-290 of April 11, 2019 also contains a provision aiming at taking
into custody and potentially sentencing to prison, rather than just fining as was the case before,
anybody intentionally hiding all or part of one’s face in a demonstration. According to Amnesty
International, such a legal arsenal impedes Yellow Vests’ right to protest as embedded in
international law, because protesters are automatically, arbitrarily treated as if they were
guilty23, which follows from Minister of the Interior Christophe Castaner’s conception that
“those who join demonstrations where degradations are expected become accomplices to those
degradations24”. In the beginning of July, Amnesty started an inquiry among protesters aimed
at identifying the consequences of such a law.
1.3.2 Media, protest movements and human rights: the “guard dogs” perspective
The belief which grounds this research is that where negative news coverage of protest is
prominent, it denies protesters’ legitimacy as political actors and impedes their civil and
political rights. The role of the media is crucial in drawing attention to protesters’ demands and
in helping protesters’ achieve desired outcomes, and the notion that there might be a positive
influence of coverage which amplifies protesters’ voice is supported by research25.
In 1995, Donohue et al. developed a 'guard dog' perspective on the role of the media which
has since became a key concept within journalism studies26 and is attached to a vast discussion
on the degree of power of the media and its autonomy from other powers. It is distinct from
both the watch-dog perspective of media which surveils government policies and excesses and
the lapdog view of media as largely submissive to existing powers27. The conception of the
press as a “forum for the people” and “freedom-seeker-and-defender,”
22 Conseil constitutionnel (2019). Décision n°2019-780 DC, Loi visant à renforcer et garantir le maintien
de l'ordre public lors des manifestations.
23 Amnesty International (2019). La casse du droit de manifester.
24 Huffington Post (2019). “Pour Christophe Castaner, ceux qui manifestent là où il a de la casse annoncée
savent qu’ils seront complices.” January 11.
25 William A. Gamson and Gadi Wolfsfeld (1993). “Movements and Media as Interacting Systems.” The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 528.
26 George A. Denohue, Philip J. Tichenor and Clarice N. Olien (1995). “A Guard Dog Perspective on the
Role of Media.” Journal of Communication, Vol 45, No 2.
27 Ibid., p. 115.
9Donohue et al. argue, springs from Edmund Burke's 'fourth estate' conception, was largely
popularized by fiction, and is only supported by relatively rare acts of bravery within the
profession28.
Within the guard dog perspective, the role of the media is to act as a security system for the
powerful, “a sentry not for the community as a whole, but for groups having sufficient power
and influence29.” “In the consensus atmosphere,” Donohue et al. argue, “the media are sleeping
guard dogs,” except “when external forces present a threat to the community leadership30.”
Drawing from that perspective, this thesis argues that in the midst of a protest movement, if the
media acts like a 'guard dog' for the oligarchy rather than as a 'watch-dog' of civil, political,
and socio-economic rights, the overcoming of the inequalities addressed by protesters is
jeopardized. In addition, this research draws attention to the causes of a relatively poor freedom
of the press and journalistic culture in France.
1.4 Delimitations
The limits reached by this thesis are many and lead way for potentially fruitful future
research. Time and space restrictions, but mostly boundaries set by my own knowledge and
skills, have compelled quite restrictive choices.
CDA was preferred over other methods because a strictly qualitative study seemed a better
fit when dealing with little data. The chosen corpus allows for an in-depth analysis within said
limits, but the number and nature of the chosen texts prohibits certain assertions. There is
pluralism within the French press and I am only focusing on five of the most-circulated daily
newspapers. As such, this study will not be able to make claims about the impact of a media
outlet's location, political affiliation, ownership and other specificities not accounted for on its
coverage of social movements. Given the choice of methods, this study will not be able to make
claims about the potential change in discourses over time, either. Another, prominent difficulty
with the chosen methods is that it rests highly on the interpretation of whoever is conducting
the study. Another author may have read the text material differently, and raised different
arguments.
Furthermore, due to my attempt at making French society intelligible to foreign readers, I
am touching on a variety of topics which fall beyond the scope of this essay and will not be
elaborated upon. A perhaps bigger difficulty lies in that the studied material is, evidently,
28 Ibid., p. 118.
29 Ibid., p. 116.
30 Idem.
10exclusively in French. As there is no official English translation of the selected outlets, all
translations of the studied texts are mine. Although I am a native French speaker, some words
and expressions cannot be translated without losing some of their substance. I am producing
the most literal translation possible and, as access to most articles is restricted, I will be
providing the original texts in footnotes for greater transparency.
Lastly, it is important to specify that as of July 2019, the movement is still going on.
Conclusions must therefore be drawn with precaution and taken with a grain of salt.
1.5 Thesis outline
Having given a brief introduction to my topic, I will begin my thesis per se by providing
some context, touching upon the French political and media systems and cultures as well as the
Yellow Vest movement. I will then review the literature on the news coverage of protest and
examine cases from France. This will be giving way to my own research. I will be introducing
the reader to the theoretical framework for my thesis, clarifying the notion of consensus and its
relevance to the present study. After explaining my research design and laying out the material
that I will be using, I will be proceeding to the analysis.
112. Context
2.1 French politics
A political system is defined as an array of institutions and interest groups, their interactions,
and the norms and rules which govern them31. It differs from political culture, which is defined
as “the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political
process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the
political system […]. [Political culture] is the product of both the collective history of a political
system and the life histories of its members32”.
2.1.1 The political system
The French political system is a republic. The present regime, called the Fifth Republic, is
the product of a deep-rooted history of instability–since the 1789 Revolution, there had been a
tight succession of republican, orleanist (monarchist), and bonapartist regimes–and was created
in reaction to the failing of the parliamentary-based Fourth (1946-1958) Republic to deal with
crises such as the beginning of the Cold War and processes of decolonization–most notably,
the Algerian War of Independence33. Within the typology established by Maurice Duverger34,
the French Fifth Republic is a semi-presidential system, characterized by two executive leaders:
a President and a Prime Minister. However, the purpose of the Fifth Republic was to grant
much power to the President–the French political system is often referred to as a "republican
monarchy" and the French Presidency, "the most powerful office in the democratic world35.”
Elected by direct suffrage for a five-year term, the role of the French President is highly
symbolic–he is expected to, among other things, provide a vision, keep antagonisms under
control, and incarnate national unity. Beyond those symbolic aspects, the Constitution grants
him an array of powers. Articles 67 and 68 make him irresponsible, meaning that he cannot be
held accountable nor removed from office before the end of his term. In addition to electing
ministers, a power granted by article 8 of the Constitution, the President gets to appoint holders
of an array of offices in such thing as the judiciary and the military as inscribed in articles 13,
14, and 56. Lastly, articles 13 and 49 grant him the power to bypass Parliamentary vote36. The
French parliament is bi-cameral: the
31 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (2008). “Political System.”
32 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (2008). “Political Culture.”
33 Andrew Knapp and Vincent Wright (2006). The Government and Politics of France. 5th edn. London:
Routledge, p. 49.
34 Maurice Duverger (1978). Echec au roi. Paris: Albin Michel.
35 Robert Tombs (2017). “France’s Presidency Is Too Powerful To Work.” Foreign Policy, May 2.
36 Article 49-3 of the Constitution allows the government to make a bill a “question of confidence,” halting
12lower house, the National Assembly, is subject to a direct election every five years while the
upper house, the Senate, is elected by local representatives37.
The party system of France underwent major transformations in the past years. Although
the terms 'right' and 'left' originated in the French Revolution and the division of the National
Assembly between, to the left, supporters of the revolution and, to the right, supporters of the
king, this dichotomy is increasingly considered outdated, which reflects in the variety of French
political parties. Since 1958, France went from a strong multipartism characterized by the co-
existence of up to 5 or 6 'relevant' parties38 to a system dominated by three parties39, landing
into instability in 2017 due to the decline of traditional parties. The 2017 presidential election
was characterized by the appearance of liberal party La République en Marche (LREM, 1st
place), the rise of far-left La France Insoumise (LFI, 4th place), and the decline of centre-left
Parti Socialiste (PS, 5th place) while far-right Front National (FN) and right Les Républicains
(LR) came respectively 2nd and 3rd, not suffering any major change40. The 2019 European
election confirmed the decline of traditional parties, with the PS and LR both obtaining under
10% of the vote41.
2.1.2 The political culture
Compared to other Western and specifically West European countries, France averages
lower scores in democracy and freedom of expression indexes. In The Economist’s 2018
Democracy Index, France ranks 29th–in between Botswana and Israel–and classifies as a
flawed democracy42. When looking closer at the country’s scores, one notices that France ranks
particularly low in what The Economist calls political culture, with a score of 5.63 out of 10.
The Economist defines a democratic political culture as one in which there are elections at the
result of which "the losing parties and their supporters accept the judgment of the voters, and
allow for the peaceful transfer of power," as opposed to "a culture of passivity
the parliamentary discussion. Opponents must then table a “motion of censure” within twenty-four hours and
vote it by an absolute majority of all members of the National Assembly, otherwise the bill is considered passed.
37 Andrew Knapp and Vincent Wright, op. cit., p. 57.
38 In the 1997 legislative election, the Parti Communiste Français, Parti Socialiste, Les Verts (Greens),
Union pour la Démocratie Française, Rassemblement Pour la République and Front National all obtained over
5% of the vote.
39 In the 2015 election, the Parti Socialiste, Républicains, and Front National all obtained over 23% of votes
while no other party obtained over 4%.
40 Ministère de l’Intérieur (2017). “Résultats de l’élection présidentielle 2017.”
41 Ministère de l'Intérieur (2019). “Résultats des élections européennes 2019.”
42 Economist Intelligence Unit (2018). EIU Democracy Index 2018–World Democracy Report.
13and apathy, an obedient and docile citizenry43." Criteria to define a country's political culture
include such things as the degree of societal consensus surrounding representative democracy,
the perception of leadership, the likelihood of endorsement of technocratic or military leaders,
and secularism44. Similarly, according to Freedom House, France, despite having an aggregate
‘freedom’ score of 90 out of 100, classifies as slightly less free than its neighbors45. Freedom
House largely attributes this score to the state of emergency. Originally implemented in 2015
after the 13 November attacks, it was not repealed before October 2017, when it was made into
permanent law, containing notably provisions which increased the powers of the police.
Freedom House also pointed at the French government's habit of bypassing parliamentary
debate using either Article 49.3 of the French constitution or the ordonnance process, lingering,
large scale corruption, high concentration of media ownership, government surveillance,
restrictions on freedom of assembly and an excessive use of force by the police46. Criticism of
these indexes, their understanding of democracy– keen to that of Almond and Verba47–and their
methodology, falls beyond the scope of this thesis.
The French political culture is multifaceted. Most importantly, it is characterized by a legacy
of conflict and a strong State. Debating politics is central to the French way of life and is done
in all occasions, including at the Christmas dinner table–to the extent that on December 22, in
the midst of the Yellow Vest movement, the government published a guide to help its
supporters defend its politics during holiday family dinners48. Since 1789, a dozen regimes have
ruled France and most transitional periods were characterized by insurrections and
bloodbaths49. On the other hand, the history of France is also one of state-building, of the
continuous struggle to unite disparate and coveted provinces into a nation50. The strong French
statism is most obvious to the foreign observers in such things as France's extreme
centralization and its peculiar secularism (laïcité). In face of a hectic people, the French State
maintains its hegemony through a culture of hierarchism and elitism supported by
Cartesianism–as the joke goes, a Frenchman is somebody who asks “The idea works just fine
43 Laza Kekic (2007). The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of democracy. Economist Intelligence Unit,
p. 2.
44 Ibid., p. 10-11.
45 Michael J. Abramowitz (2018). Freedom in the World 2018–Democracy in Crisis. Freedom House.
46 Freedom House (2018). Freedom in the World 2018–France Profile.
47 Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba (1963). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five
Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
48 Gouvernement (2018). “Repas de Famille.”
49 Andrew Knapp and Vincent Wright, op. cit., p. 3.
50 Ibid., p. 14.
14in practice, but will it work in theory?”–and a sense of destiny51. French elitism is best
illustrated by the French classes préparatoires, which consist in two years of study in order to
prepare high school graduates for enrollment in the grandes écoles–highly selective,
prestigious institutions which fundamentally provide leaders for the country’s public and
private sectors. French elitism isn’t merit-based, as was demonstrated in the works of Pierre
Bourdieu and is supported by research up to this day52. French hierarchism is best illustrated
by the lack of trust of the population in its elites. The very low trust in vaccines–one in three
disagrees that they are safe, the highest percentage globally53–is one of many examples. The
lingering skepticism of the French can be partly explained by the many lies and treasons of the
elites, including former president François Mitterrand having a secret family and lying about
it54 and the infamous infected blood scandal, causing hemophiliac patients to be infected with
HIV55.
2.1.3 Emmanuel Macron's election
The 2019 presidential election had a voter turnout of 74.5%, among which 8.5% were blank,
and Emmanuel Macron was elected with 66% of expressed votes56. Before turning to politics,
Macron worked in finance, first in the General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF), then as an
investment banker at Rothschild & Co57. During both employment periods, Macron also
worked for Jacques Attali’s “Commission to Unleash French Growth58.” In 2014, he was
appointed Minister of the Economy before resigning in 2016, invoking “our political system's
[…] failure to generate an in-depth, ideological consensus.” Simultaneously, he created En
Marche ! ('Forward!', now LREM), in the hopes of “gathering everybody who shares” his
“project to serve the general interest” and “indifferent of their political allegiance.” Some
commented-upon reforms include the wealth tax repeal (replaced with a real estate tax), the
decrease in housing tax, the turning of the state railway service into a joint-stock company and
the plan to privatize Paris airports59.
51 John Lichfield (2015). “How the French Think by Sudhir Hazareesingh, book review: The theoretical
construct is all.” The Independent, June 25.
52 Pascal-Emmanuel Gaubry (2018). “France’s Gifted Youth Are Set Up to Fail.” Bloomberg, April 24.
53 Angelique Chrisafis (2019). “French scepticism over vaccines reflects distrust of government.” The
Guardian, June 19.
54 Christophe Barbier (2005). “La seconde famille de Mitterrand–derniers secrets.” L’Express, May 29.
55 Sophie Chauveau (2011). L'Affaire du sang contaminé (1983-2003). Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
56 Ministère de l’Intérieur (2017). “Résultats de l’élection présidentielle 2017.”
57 Le Monde (2012). “Emmanuel Macron, un banquier d’affaires nommé secrétaire général adjoint de
l’Elysée.” May 16.
58 France 24 (2014). “Emmanuel Macron, un ex-banquier touche-à-tout à Bercy.” August 27.
59 Le Macronomètre (n.d.). “Le suivi du quinquennat 2017-2022.”
152.2 French media
2.2.1 The media system
According to a 2018 survey, 60% of the French population reads at least parts of one
physical newspaper daily60. However, as mentioned earlier, trust in the media has fallen to
24%–well under the worldly average of 49%–as a direct consequence of the Yellow Vest
movement61. The 2019 findings of the annual face-to-face survey led by newspaper La Croix62
confirms these results. Of the 1050 people surveyed, 51% considered that the media coverage
of the Yellow Vest movement was poor. Around two thirds believe that the media is influenced
by financial and political powers. Overall, the written press is the second most trusted form of
media, right behind the radio, with about 44% of people granting some degree of trust to
newspapers. Television, specifically state-owned channels and private news channels, suffered
the most from the whopping drop in media trust63. The report also posits that alternative media
have risen in France in the past years, but show lower usage and awareness rates than in
neighboring countries64. Although the report disqualifies them on the basis of their populism,
it imputes their relative renown to their extensive coverage of social movements.
The situation of French media is a much studied issue. France ranks relatively low on the
Reporters Without Borders' 2019 World Press Freedom Index. Laying in 32nd place with a
score of 22.21, RWB blames attacks on freedom of expression such as the 2018 law on business
secrets, as well as the concentrated ownership of media outlets and ensuing censorship65.
In 1997, Serge Hamili published an essay entitled Les nouveaux chiens de garde, tackling
the reputation of French media as a "counter-power” and detailing the causes to poor journalism
in the country66. The title is a reference to Paul Nizan’s 1932 Les Chiens de garde, a pamphlet
targeting some of France's prominent philosophers, arguing that their role is to protect the moral
values and socioeconomic interests of the bourgeoisie, while being granted respect and trust
due to their status as the intellectual elite of the country67. Himself a
60 ACPM (2018). “Classement Audience One Global 2018 V3.”
61 Nic Newman et al., op. cit., p. 9.
62 Aude Carasco (2019). “Baromètre médias, les journalistes sommés de se remettre en question.” La Croix,
January 24.
63 Nic Newman et al., op.cit., p. 20.
64 Ibid., p. 23.
65 Reporters Without Borders (2019). France.
66 Serge Halimi (1997). Les nouveaux chiens de garde. Paris: Raisons d’agir.
67 Paul Nizan (1932). Les Chiens de garde. Paris: Rieder.
16journalist at Le Monde diplomatique, Halimi aimed to write a book in support of his profession,
arguing that the impact of journalism on the social world calls for responsibility68. He identified
three root issues within journalism: reverence before political power; concentrated ownership;
and market journalism.
The first kind is best understood as the overlapping of the media and political systems in
France. As the political system is extremely opaque, journalists who get close to politicians in
an effort to get information end up forming friendships and getting granted advantages which
they find difficult to renounce, or which they imagine to be inconsequential69. Furthermore,
Halimi explains, success for the mainstream media is still defined as having “whatever
politician” discuss “whatever he wants” and “whenever he wants” in one’s media outlet70. “In
France”, Halimi adds, reporting from a third source, “it is absolutely normal to discuss with the
Elysée which journalists are to interview [members of the government71].”
The second kind is best illustrated by the fact that most of the country’s wealthiest people
have invested in the sector of communication, Halimi explains. Bernard Arnault and his family,
#4 on Forbes’ 2019 Billionaire list; François Pinault and his family, #30; Patrick Drahi, #192;
the Dassault family, #272; Vincent Bolloré and his family, #343; and Xavier Niel, #478, all
own parts in one or several media outlets72.
The third kind is characterized by a broad array of problems including “plagiarism, lack of
skills and culture, laziness, lack of time given to doing proper work73” as well as the need for
media outlets to do what is most lucrative, hence making headlines with dead donkeys, ready-
made thinking, solar eclipses, gossip, and so on74.
Scholars Hallin and Mancini have developed a typology of media systems. Their typology
is based on four clusters of variables: the development of media markets; the degree and forms
of political parallelism; journalistic professionalism; and the role of the state75. They have
identified three models: Liberal, Democratic Corporatist, and Polarized Pluralist, and consider
France to be, alongside Britain, a "mixed case76." According to them, France shares
characteristics of both the Polarized Pluralist and Democratic Corporatist models. Compared
with the Liberal model, the other two models are characterized by lower levels of journalistic
68 Serge Halimi, op. cit., p. 9.
69 Ibid., p. 35.
70 Ibid., p. 22.
71 Ibid., p. 22-23.
72 Forbes (2019). “Billionaires: The Richest People in the World.” March 5.
73 Serge Halimi, op. cit., p. 73.
74 Ibid., p. 76.
75 Daniel C. Hallin (2016). “Typology of Media Systems.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, p. 4.
76 Ibid., p. 5.
17professionalism, tighter links between the media and the political world, and a rather
interventionist role of the state77, which seems to confirm Halimi’s arguments.
2.2.2 The role and status of the editorial
The term 'editorial' was first used as a noun in the nineteenth century to mean “a newspaper
article written by or under the direct responsibility of the editor78.” Scholars Dubied and Lits
summarize the characteristics of the editorial as: “[...] an article at the head of the newspaper,
published at important moments only, engaging the editor […] and taking position, blending
passionate engagement and classical argumentation, on a subject of some importance, in a
sought-after style79.” Colored backgrounds, illustrations, bold letters and other gimmicks may
be used to distinguish the editorial from the rest of the opinion articles. Editorials have
generated considerable academic interest within the field of linguistics as “good editorials are
considered some of the best examples of persuasive writing in all countries80.” According to
Van Dijk, editorials are “probably the widest circulated opinion discourses of society” and, as
they are read by people in positions of power, they can be considered to have a concrete
influence on policy making, public opinion–even when through critical opposition to them–
and all kinds of social and political action81.
Due to their omnipresence, editorialists in France are sometimes nicknamed 'editocrats,' a
term popularized by the 2009 eponymous essay. “Anybody who has made the wild bet to go
through a whole week without bumping into Jacques Attali or Bernard-Henri Lévy […] knows
[…] that such a challenge is impossible to complete82. ” According to Le Parisien, since
September 2018, a number of television channels have been paying editorialists an average of
250 euros per appearance83. Since the decline of traditional political parties linked to Macron's
election, editorialists have replaced them as the incarnation of strong political views in the
media. However, despite their ubiquity, few editorialists clearly state where they stand
politically. On September 27, 2017, left-wing Thomas Guénolé, who then worked as an
77 Ibid., p. 4.
78 Anne Magnet and Didier Carnet (2007). “Les éditorialistes : auteurs scientifiques ou acteurs sociaux ?”
Asp, Vol 51-52, p. 97.
79 Annik Dubied and Marc Lits (1997). "L'éditorial, genre journalistique ou position discursive ?" Pratiques,
Vol 94, p. 52.
80 Ulla M. Connor (1996). Contrastive Rhetoric: Cross-Cultural Aspects of Second Language Writing.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 144.
81 Teun A. Van Dijk (1996). "Opinions and ideologies in editorials." Discourse Analysis, Language, Social
Life and Critical Thought, p. 2.
82 Olivier Cyran et al. (2009). Les éditocrates. Paris: La Découverte, introduction.
83 Le Parisien (2018). “Barbier, Joffrin, Bastié... ces éditorialistes qui font l'opinion.” November 20.
18editorialist on radio channel Europe 1, asked fellow editorialists on Twitter to undertake their
“political coming-out84.” Few answered and those who did were vague, such as Jean-Michel
Apathie telling Guénolé “[...] I've been casting blank ballots since 1988 […].” The aim of
discourse studies of editorials is to elucidate where editorialists stand politically–which, given
their importance as both opinion prescribers and expressions of a newspaper's editorial board,
is essential to understanding the political health of a society. For instance, a study of editorials
about the 2005 European Constitution Treaty referendum showed that editorialists widely
stigmatized 'No' voters85. By casting opposite views as ineligible using fatalist rhetorics of 'fear'
and 'populism,' editorialists preserved the prevailing ideology, applying what Pierre Bourdieu
would call 'politics of depoliticization86.' The debate surrounding the 2005 referendum, the
author argues, was the foremost example in France of the existence of a neoliberal consensus
which cannot be refuted. The homogeneity of opinion among editorialists can be explained
primarily by two observations: on the one hand, they overwhelmingly come from the same
milieus and have studied in the same, prestigious schools, and on the other hand, they are,
contrary to journalists, not expected to leave their office. “Fieldwork pollutes the mind of the
editorialist” said Christophe Barbier in an interview to JDD, adding that “the editorialist is a
stake on which the people, like crawling ivy, can raise87.”
2.3 The Yellow Vest movement
On May 29, 2018, Priscillia Ludosky, an entrepreneur from Seine-et-Marne, started an
online petition protesting fuel prices, attracting over a million signatures88. Since 2014, the
domestic consumption tax on energy products (TICPE) includes a carbon component in an
effort to reduce fossil fuel consumption89. In 2017 and 2018, the TICPE for diesel fuel was
raised sharply to amount to the level of the tax on petrol, and a further increase was planned
for 2019–which the so-called “MacronLeaks” revealed was planned to compensate for the tax
84 Thomas Guénolé (2017). “Les éditorialistes des grands médias sont-ils massivement pro-Macron ?”
Marianne, October 2.
85 Antoine Schwartz (2008). "Bonne Europe et mauvaise France. Les éditorialistes français interprètent la
victoire du « non » au traité constitutionnel européen." Politique et Sociétés, Vol 27 No 2, p. 158-159.
86 Pierre Bourdieu (2000). Contre la politique de la dépolitisation.
87 Le Journal du Dimanche (2017). “Christophe Barbier : « Se confronter au terrain pollue l'esprit de
l'éditorialiste. »” April 14.
88 Alexandre-Reza Kokabi (2019). “Priscillia Ludosky : Avec les Gilets jaunes, « la fraternité s’est réveillée
».” Reporterre, March 2.
89 Ministère de la Transition écologique et solidaire (2018). “Fiscalité des énergies.” January 24.
19cuts for employers90. In 2017, the tax burden on the French population was highest of all 34
OECD nations, stealing the lead from Denmark91. In a context of increasing privatization,
dematerialization, and complexification of public services–to the extent that French
ombudsman Jacques Toubon made it his first area of concern in his 2018 report92 and with, in
particular, the closing of small train lines preconized by the so-called “Spinetta” report93–and
spiraling rents and property prices driving working classes away from city centers, another
raise on fuel prices was perceived as unfair by many. Additionally, it is likely that the respective
Benalla94 and Carlos Ghosn95 affairs, adding to a lingering feeling of impunity amongst so-
called elites, as well as Macron’s decried arrogance96, triggered the first protests.
In the months following the petition, Facebook groups were created and the movement’s
first figures started to appear. By the end of October 2018, the date was set: those who opposed
the diesel tax were to meet on November 17. G. Coutard, a service technician from Narbonne,
published a video on Facebook introducing the yellow vest as a symbol. “We all have one in
the car. Put in under the windshield [...] until the 17 [November]. A simple color code to show
that you agree with us, with the movement. [...] People will see yellow vests everywhere [...]
they’ll think: “[...] maybe something is actually about to happen [...].”97
Rapidly enough, the movement stopped being about the diesel tax only. On November 29,
2018, a group of Yellow Vests sent a list of 42 demands98 to media outlets and Parliament
members asking for, among other things, better treatment for asylum seekers; no homelessness;
the prohibition of offshoring; the end of detached work; the end of privatizations; and, what
would come to be one of the movement’s major demands, the People’s Referendum (RIC).
Due to the absence of leaders, trade unions and official spokespeople, the question of
knowing exactly who Yellow Vests are has been a main preoccupation of observers since the
beginning of the movement. A number of organisms have led inquiries to elucidate the
90 Manuel Vicuña (2018). “Taxes carburants et cadeau aux patrons : l’éternel retour d’un « Macron Leak ».”
Arrêt sur images, December 25.
91 OECD (2018). Revenue statistics 2018. Tax revenue trends in the OECD.
92 Défenseur des droits (2018). Rapport annuel d’activité. p. 15.
93 Jean-Cyril Spinetta (2018). L’avenir du Transport ferroviaire. February 15.
94 Médiapart (2018). “L’affaire Benalla sème la panique à l’Elysée.” Médiapart, July 19.
95 Le Monde (2018). “Tout comprendre à l’affaire Carlos Ghosn, qui ébranle l’Alliance Renault-Nissan-
Mitsubishi.” November 26.
96 Pauline Bock (2017). “Emmanuel Macron’s most offensive, self-centered, and disconcerting comments of
2017.” New Statesman, December 21.
97 Christophe-Cécil Garnier (2018). “Le gilet jaune, d’un siège passager aux rues européennes.” Slate,
December 10.
98 OpenDemocracy (2018). “Demands of France’s yellow vests as uploaded by France Bleu, November 29.”
December 7.
20sociology of Yellow Vests. ELABE and Institut Montaigne have undergone a large-scale
survey from December 14, 2018 to January 8, 2019 on a sample of 10 010 people from 12
regions France99. Out of the 10 010 survey participants, 21% self-describe as Yellow Vests,
while 47% support the movement but do not identify as protesters.
53% of those who self-describe as Yellow Vests are women, an unusually high number for
a social movement. 12% are single mothers, as opposed to 6% in the rest of the French
population. A short majority of Yellow Vests are aged 50 to 64, closely followed by 35 to 49
year-olds, making up respectively 30% (+5 compared to the general population) and 28% (+3)
of protesters. 11% (+5) are unemployed while, out of those who work, 26% (+9) are factory
workers and 21% (+4) are employees. 49% (+8) of Yellow Vests live in the countryside and
towns of less than 20 000 inhabitants and 22% (-8) have completed graduate studies. Their
average monthly income is lower than that of the general population by about 300 euros.
Yellow Vests also describe themselves as less happy and lonelier than the rest of the population,
reporting lacking somebody to count on and growing difficulties in feeding themselves and
seeking medical treatment when necessary. An overwhelming majority of Yellow Vests
reported distrust in the President (80%), political parties (75%) and the European Union (EU)
(61%). 33% are not affiliated to a political party, while 19% feel closest to the Front National
(FN, now RN) (far-right) and 10% to La France insoumise (LFI) (left/far-left).
According to governmental figures, a little under 300 000 people joined 2 034 gathering
spots on November 17 to undertake actions such as blocking roads, fuel depots and
supermarkets, constructing barricades, occupying toll booths to let motorist through for free
and occupying roundabouts to discuss politics and future protest100. France has the world’s
highest number of roundabouts, meaning that they are, like yellow vests, easily accessible and,
as such, federative. Day after day, however, shacks that were being set up by roundabouts were
being dismantled by police, forcing protesters to gather elsewhere101. From the first protests
which were strike-like, daily, and rather peaceful, the movement went on to focus on Saturday’s
protests and concentrate in major cities. Saturday actions are called “acts,” with Act 1 being on
November 17 up until Act 36 on July 20 and ongoing.
99 Bernad Sananes et al. (2019). “Les « Gilets jaunes » : la partie émergée de la crise sociale française ?”
Elabe and Institut Montaigne, March 21.
100 Huffington Post (2018). “Le bilan du 17 novembre des gilets jaunes, en cinq chiffres.” November 17.
101 Luc Gwiazdzinski and Olivier Frérot (2019). “Cabanes et ronds-points, un patrimoine populaire en feu.”
Libération, April 23.
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