Cus A Delicacy That Can Wait - Edelweiss Research
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November 2021
Initiating Coverage
Zomato
f
cus
A Delicacy That Can Wait
Pranav Kshatriya Nihal Mahesh Jham
+91 22 4040 7495 +91 22 6623 3352
Pranav.Kshatriya@edelweissfin.com Nihal.Jham@edelweissfin.com
Sandip Agarwal Pulkit Chawla
+91 22 6623 3474 Pulkit.Chawla@edelweissfin.com
Sandip.Agarwal@edelweissfin.com Edelweiss Securities Limited
India Equity Research Internet November 29, 2021
ZOMATO
INITIATING COVERAGE
KEY DATA
Rating HOLD
A delicacy that can wait
Sector relative Neutral
Price (INR) 150
12 month price target (INR) 151 Zomato is the leader in India’s nascent online food delivery business
Market cap (INR bn/USD bn)
Free float/Foreign ownership (%)
1,117/16.2
96.4/67.8
with a massive growth playfield. The stock’s current price though
factors in runaway growth, making it no less than a delicacy. Beating
such lofty expectations calls for a structural uptick in its key drivers.
INVESTMENT METRICS
335
Adjacencies – side orders – can however add palpable flavour (value)
115 over medium-to-long term considering Zomato’s deep engagement
-105
and compelling market power. The company boasts a superior growth
-325
-545 profile and quality vis-a-vis global peers, but at 24.3x FY22E EV/sales,
Sales Growth EPS Growth RoE PE
(%) (%) (%) (x) the stock’s indeed expensive. On balance, we are initiating Zomato at
Internet ZOMATO IN EQUITY
‘HOLD’ with a TP of INR151. Key risks: regulations around gig workers,
quality of disclosures and execution vis-a-vis archrival Swiggy.
FINANCIALS (INR mn) Food delivery business can scale up
Year to March FY21A FY22E FY23E FY24E
Dishing out customer convenience, online food delivery apps have gained scale
Revenue 19,938 43,939 63,733 89,860
EBITDA (4,672) (20,255) (17,351) (12,931)
across the globe. After food delivery apps’ 140% CAGR over 2016–19 and a
Adjusted profit (8,128) (13,442) (9,957) (6,536) pandemic-led blip in 2020, we expect them to deliver a 22% CAGR over 2019–30.
Diluted EPS (INR) (1.5) (1.7) (1.3) (0.8) This would catapult the industry size to USD35bn, or 16.2% of total by 2030, from
EPS growth (%) (72.1) 15.4 (27.1) (35.4) 4.2% currently, even topping current penetration in mature markets such as the US
RoAE (%) (18.5) (10.8) (6.0) (3.9)
(6%), South Asia (10.2%) and China (15.6%). As a pointer, e-commerce with a five-
P/E (x) nm nm nm nm
EV/EBITDA (x) (260.1) (55.6) (64.8) (86.5)
year head start over online food delivery, is logging similar growth rates. Such growth
Dividend yield (%) 0 0 0 0 is indeed achievable, but sustaining it would require acceleration of GDP growth,
urbanisation trends, female workforce participation, etc.
PRICE PERFORMANCE Adjacencies can create value—not grocery, maybe cloud kitchen
175 62,000
We believe shelving the grocery business is a good strategic move by Zomato as
155 60,000 supply chains of food delivery platforms complement only those for instant
135 58,000 grocery—a small, less profitable segment of the overall grocery market. We do see
115 56,000
95 54,000
opportunities in adjacencies though: cloud kitchen, table booking, advertisements
75 52,000 restaurant supplies, etc. While Zomato is committed to staying away from cloud
Jul-21 Aug-21 Sep-21 Oct-21 Nov-21 kitchens, it can exploit consumer insights to create better products and capture a
ZOMATO IN EQUITY Sensex
higher share of the value chain, a la private labels in e-commerce.
Outlook and valuation: Strong growth priced in; initiate with ‘HOLD’
Explore: We estimate Zomato would clock a lip-smacking 50.6% revenue CAGR over FY21–25,
riding a 46.1% CAGR in delivery volumes. As it focuses on gaining scale and market
share, we estimate contribution profit/ order would drop to INR7.6 in FY22 (INR20.5
in FY21) and increase to INR16.6 by FY25. Zomato would turn in positive cash EBITDA
by FY24E, but would report positive EBITDA in FY26 due to high ESOP costs.
Financial model Podcast
The stock is trading at 16.7x FY23E EV/sales, a significant premium to global peers
due to its superior growth rates and long growth runway. We arrive at a TP of
INR151, wherein we value core food delivery at INR140 using DCF and optionality for
Corporate access Video adjacencies at INR12. We are initiating coverage with a ‘HOLD’ recommendation and
‘Sector Neutral’ rating along with a TP of INR151. Regulatory risks, execution vis-à-
vis versus Swiggy, and quality of disclosures are the key risks to our call.
Pranav Kshatriya Nihal Mahesh Jham Sandip Agarwal Pulkit Chawla
+91 (22) 4040 7495 +91 (22) 6623 3352 +91 (22) 6623 3474
Pranav.Kshatriya@edelweissfin.com Nihal.Jham@edelweissfin.com Sandip.Agarwal@edelweissfin.com Pulkit.Chawla@edelweissfin.com
Edelweiss Research is also available on www.edelweissresearch.com, Bloomberg - EDEL, Thomson Reuters, and Factset Edelweiss Securities Limited
ZOMATO
Executive Summary
Zomato’s IPO and its performance since demonstrate public market
investors are willing to back a loss-making enterprise if the quality of
engagement is high, even if the road to profitability is long. Since the
profits are distant, we study long-term growth expectations for the
food delivery industry, benchmark it to other countries, and compare
it with e-commerce.
We infer the food delivery industry might well bulge to USD35bn by
2030, from USD4.2bn in 2019. Even stronger growth is possible,
subject to acceleration in GDP growth, urbanisation trends, female
workforce participation, etc.
“Execution is extremely under-rated. All
the big things (strategy) are a sum total Network effect, the overarching driver in online businesses, is actually
of small things (execution)”
modest in the food delivery business. Accordingly, we expect Zomato
Deepinder Goyal. to achieve a large scale with a dominant share of 50%-plus, without
Founder & CEO, Zomato any major expansion in take-rates. Value creation, we anticipate,
would stem from expansion to adjacencies a la typical high-
engagement platforms.
Cloud kitchen could be a key adjacency contender, but we are less
optimistic on grocery as the food delivery network can address only
a small portion of general grocery demand. There are other
adjacencies though that can become large in the future, such as
advertising, restaurant supplies, restaurant table bookings and bill
payments.
At FY22E EV/sales of 24.3x and EV/GMV of 11.2x, Zomato is the most
expensive listed food delivery business globally. Indeed it offers heady
growth potential vis-à-vis globally listed peers. The investor in
gourmet worries about the aftertaste though. On balance, we are
initiating coverage on Zomato at ‘HOLD’ with a target price of INR151,
derived from INR140 for the food delivery business (via DCF) plus
INR12 for adjacencies (FY30E EV/sales).
Superior growth potential aside, we sniff potential regulations
considering the market power and control exercised by online
delivery apps at large on gig workers. The shape and form of such
regulations is not yet clear, but look quite probable over medium-
to-long term.
To be sure, markets love Zomato’s delivery story, but in the first few
months since listing, its quality of disclosures has been sub-par. If
this continues, valuations could take a knock. And also with food
delivery apps demonstrating monopolistic nature, Zomato must
decisively outdo Swiggy, a well-funded large player chasing it fast
in its playfield.
2 Edelweiss Research is also available on www.edelweissresearch.com, Bloomberg - EDEL, Thomson Reuters, and Factset Edelweiss Securities Limited
ZOMATO
Main course: What will it take to deliver?
India is witnessing rapid growth in online food delivery off a low base. Industry
reports build in a 35% CAGR over 2020–25 and a 22% CAGR over 2025–30. At
this rate, online food delivery will grow to a USD35bn industry by 2030,
from USD4.2bn in 2019.
Meanwhile, the contribution of food delivery to restaurant business is expected to
increase from 6.5% in 2019 to 16.2% by 2030, which is much higher than current
penetration in more mature markets such as US (6%), South Asia (10.2%), and China
(15.6%). E-commerce is witnessing similar deceleration trends as the base increased.
Considering these factors, we believe current growth forecasts capture potential
upside in the prevailing context, and bettering them would require acceleration in
GDP growth, urbanisation trends, female workforce participation, etc.
Side orders: Adjacencies drive value creation in platform business
High-engagement platforms can create significant value outside their core expertise
as they are extremely important for consumers for a certain function, which gives
them an opportunity to expand into adjacent areas and address a larger market.
We believe cloud kitchen could be a large opportunity for food delivery platforms
considering their consumer insights. We view this as an opportunity similar to what
private labels are to e-commerce. Globally, most food delivery apps have expanded
into grocery delivery. Zomato tried too, but it has scaled back. Even so, it may
attempt such a foray again with Grofers.
Given point-to-point last-mile supply chain of food delivery aggregators, their addressable
market is limited to instant grocery delivery, a small sub-segment of the market with less
compelling unit economics. Meanwhile, Zomato has expanded into advertising, restaurant
supplies, restaurant table bookings and bill payments, among others, which are currently
small but can potentially scale up into larger businesses as the ecosystem evolves.
Repeat orders: Focus on order growth; take-rate to stay steady
Zomato’s premium valuation is premised on expectations of its long growth runway,
and hence there will be a disproportionate focus on volume growth. Despite its
leadership in a large market, i.e. India, Zomato is making only 239mn deliveries
annually (FY21) versus Meituan’s 10bn, Doordash’s 816mn and JustEat Takeaway’s
588mn. We are building in 1.4bn orders by FY25 and 3.8bn orders by FY30.
Considering competition from a well-funded Swiggy, investors might be willing to
overlook profitability in the short run, but lack of order growth would raise questions
on sustainability of long-term growth and/or execution capability. Both can
influence valuations greatly. We expect take-rates to remain stable as restaurants’
increasing disintermediation drive will keep platform power in check.
Testing the taste: AOV to dip before rising, discounts to taper down
During FY21, AOV shot up to INR397, from INR278 in FY20, as the pandemic
catalysed the ordering pattern to family orders from single orders. Moreover,
premium dine-in only restaurants adopted online food delivery platforms to keep
the business going while consumers preferred them for their focus on hygiene.
Small part of it will reverse in FY22, which would cause a dip in AOV to INR381. FY22
onwards though we expect sub-inflationary 1–3% growth in AOV as some inflation
and premiumisation will offset higher growth from smaller cities.
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ZOMATO
Similarly, discounts too vanished in FY21 as platforms focused on containing costs.
Discount per order dipped to INR8.3 in FY21, from INR21.7 in FY20. And as focus on
volume growth comes back, we expect discounts to increase to INR15 in FY22 and
then taper down to INR7 by FY30.
In fact, we expect contribution profit per order to dip to INR7.6 in FY22, from INR20.5
in FY21 and a loss of INR30.5 in FY20. We expect contribution profit per order to inch
back to INR22.7 by FY30.
Not a stock blend: Network effect modest for food delivery platforms
As opposed to typical online platforms wherein network effect predominates, in
food delivery platform the network effect is curtailed due to local clustering,
commoditised offering and vulnerability to multi-homing. Network effect for food
delivery platforms is somewhat similar to ride hailing, and is lower than global
platforms such as messaging and social media.
Typically a large player dominates the food delivery market with a market share in
excess of 50%, even in large markets (US, China). Nevertheless, the large player has
limited pricing power and hence low profitability. Restaurants are trying to
disintermediate food delivery platforms by going direct, but considering challenges
of on-boarding customers on individual restaurant platforms, they may succeed only
in gourmet food or high-order value cases.
Outlook and valuation: Too full to digest; initiate with ‘HOLD’
Zomato’s global peers trade at 5–12x one-year forward price to sales. The multiple
is contingent on growth potential of a market and market share of the player. For
Zomato, we use a two-stage DCF model, which yields a value of INR1.1tn
(USD15.1bn). Our assumptions: 38% revenue CAGR over FY21–30, 12% FCF growth
for FY31–38, and 4% terminal growth.
While we do expect higher growth levels to sustain given the market’s relatively
nascent stage, at 26.5x FY22E P/S, Zomato’s pricing in full growth. On top of it, the
valuation shows high sensitivity to AOV; for instance, a mere INR10 change in AOV
swings the valuation by 5%. We believe Zomato’s valuation depends on its ability to
sustain and fortify its leadership in the Indian food delivery market.
For perspective, archrival Swiggy’s valuation is lower than Zomato’s, but as per latest
disclosures, the former is now clocking a similar number of orders. Consequently,
Zomato would need to execute better than Swiggy to sustain leadership. Moreover,
Zomato’s quality of disclosures leaves a lot desirable, and that may have implications
for its valuation in the long term.
Hurdles to steady delivery: Tech obsolescence, inefficient allocation
Gig economy regulation and unbridled market power: Rapid emergence of a gig
economy has thrown up challenges for governments across the globe. Considering
the disproportionate market power of platforms, several countries are taking steps
to protect the interest of stakeholders of these companies, gig workers included.
Any adverse regulations would not only influence profitability and market power,
but might fundamentally alter – or even distort – the business model.
Other key risks to watch out for: i) increase in competition, leading to weaker unit
economics and higher costs; ii) deeper-than-anticipated fall in AOV; iii) delivery and
other cost escalations, and the platform’s inability to pass-through such costs; and
iv) despite low odds of success in direct delivery, an unlikely success can potentially
disrupt food delivery platforms’ business models, including Zomato’s.
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ZOMATO
The Story in Charts
A global trend: Food delivery as a proportion of restaurant food is on the rise in various geographies
20.0
16.0 16.2 16.5
15.6
12.0 11.8
10.2 10.2
8.0 8.7
6.5 6.0
4.0 3.7
2.2
-
2019 2020 2025 2030 2019 2020 2019 2020 2019 2020 2025
India US China SE Asia
Source: Redseer, company filings, Edelweiss Research
..so has the food delivery GMV in India E-commerce has already matured over years
40 160 30 90
120 24 72
30
80 18 54
(USD bn)
(USD bn)
(%)
(%)
20
40 12 36
10
0 6 18
0 -40 0 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2025E2030E FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20P
Foodtech GMV (USD bn) YoY growth (%) Ecommerce in India YoY Growth rate (%)
Zomato MAUs and MTUs to drive growth… …but AOV to decline in FY22 before recovering
100 45 450
397 395 400
80 36 389
400 381
60 27
(mn)
350
(%)
(INR)
40 18
300 282 278
20 9
250
0 -
FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22E FY23E FY24E FY25E
200
MAU MTU Proportion of transacting users FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22E FY23E FY24E FY25E
Source: Company, Industry Reports, Edelweiss Research
Edelweiss Research is also available on www.edelweissresearch.com, Bloomberg - EDEL, Thomson Reuters, and Factset Edelweiss Securities Limited 5
ZOMATO
Financial Statements
Income Statement (INR mn) Balance Sheet (INR mn)
Year to March FY21A FY22E FY23E FY24E Year to March FY21A FY22E FY23E FY24E
Total operating income 19,938 43,939 63,733 89,860 Share capital 0 7,692 7,817 7,941
Employee costs 7,408 18,032 21,387 25,310 Reserves 80,987 1,59,329 1,59,471 1,63,842
SG&A expenses 0 0 0 07 Shareholders funds 80,987 1,67,021 1,67,288 1,71,783
Other expenses 15,283 42,695 53,605 67,080 Minority interest (57) (93) (129) (165)
EBITDA (4,672) (20,255) (17,351) (12,931) Borrowings 14 14 14 14
Depreciation 1,377 792 848 833 Trade payables 2,972 7,358 9,286 11,764
Less: Interest expense 101 1 1 1 Other liabs & prov 2,192 2,192 2,192 2,192
Add: Other income 1,246 3,029 4,840 4,979 Total liabilities 87,035 1,77,419 1,79,578 1,86,515
Profit before tax (4,904) (18,019) (13,360) (8,786) Net block 234 234 234 234
Prov for tax 13 (4,541) (3,367) (2,214) Intangible assets 15,158 14,791 14,412 14,016
Less: Other adj (3,248) 0 0 0 Capital WIP 0 0 0 0
Reported profit (8,128) (13,442) (9,957) (6,536) Total fixed assets 15,392 15,025 14,645 14,249
Less: Excp.item (net) 0 0 0 0 Non current inv 0 0 0 0
Adjusted profit (8,128) (13,442) (9,957) (6,536) Cash/cash equivalent 9,037 98,298 99,580 1,05,257
Diluted shares o/s 5,366 7,692 7,817 7,942 Sundry debtors 1,299 2,788 4,043 5,701
Adjusted diluted EPS (1.5) (1.7) (1.3) (0.8) Loans & advances 0 0 0 0
DPS (INR) 0 0 0 0 Other assets 31,224 31,224 31,224 31,224
Tax rate (%) 0.3 25.2 25.2 25.2 Total assets 87,035 1,77,419 1,79,578 1,86,515
Important Ratios (%) Free Cash Flow (INR mn)
Year to March FY21A FY22E FY23E FY24E Year to March FY21A FY22E FY23E FY24E
Revenue growth (%) (23.5) 120.4 45.0 41.0 Reported profit (8,128) (13,442) (9,957) (6,536)
Gross Margin (%) 90.4 92.1 90.4 88.4 Add: Depreciation 1,377 792 848 833
Other cost (% of Rev) 76.7 97.2 84.1 74.6 Interest (net of tax) 101 1 1 1
EBITDA margin (%) (23.4) (46.1) (27.2) (14.4) Others (29,149) 7,539 3,201 5,318
Net profit margin (%) (40.8) (30.6) (15.6) (7.3) Less: Changes in WC 25,434 (2,897) (672) (820)
Revenue growth (% YoY) (23.5) 120.4 45.0 41.0 Operating cash flow (10,179) (3,466) (3,213) 1,011
EBITDA growth (% YoY) (79.7) 333.6 (14.3) (25.5) Less: Capex (48) (424) (469) (437)
Adj. profit growth (%) (65.7) 65.4 (25.9) (34.4) Free cash flow (10,227) (3,891) (3,682) 574
Assumptions (%) Key Ratios
Year to March FY21A FY22E FY23E FY24E Year to March FY21A FY22E FY23E FY24E
GDP (YoY %) (8.0) 9.0 7.0 7.0 RoE (%) (18.5) (10.8) (6.0) (3.9)
Repo rate (%) 4.0 4.0 4.3 5.3 RoCE (%) (10.9) (14.5) (8.0) (5.2)
USD/INR (average) 75.0 73.0 72.0 71.0 Inventory days 18 16 9 5
Capex 48.0 424.4 468.5 437.0 Receivable days 23 17 20 20
Tax rate (%) (0.3) 25.2 25.2 25.2 Payable days 538 544 499 369
Payable days 41.7 41.7 41.7 41.7 Working cap (% sales) 134.7 54.5 36.5 25.0
Recievable days 23.2 23.2 23.2 23.2 Gross debt/equity (x) 0 0 0 0
Dividend per share 0 0 0 0 Net debt/equity (x) (0.1) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6)
Employee exp (% of rev) 37.2 41.0 33.6 28.2 Interest coverage (x) (60.0) (19,329.8) (16,714.2) (12,641.3)
Valuation Metrics Valuation Drivers
Year to March FY21A FY22E FY23E FY24E Year to March FY21A FY22E FY23E FY24E
Diluted P/E (x) nm nm nm nm EPS growth (%) (72.1) 15.4 (27.1) (35.4)
Price/BV (x) 10.3 7.2 7.3 7.2 RoE (%) (18.5) (10.8) (6.0) (3.9)
EV/EBITDA (x) (260.1) (55.6) (64.8) (86.5) EBITDA growth (%) (79.7) 333.6 (14.3) (25.5)
Dividend yield (%) 0 0 0 0 Payout ratio (%) nm nm nm nm
Source: Company and Edelweiss estimates
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ZOMATO
Investment Rationale
Street exuberant about food delivery growth
India is clocking rapid growth in online food delivery—off a low base. Industry
forecasts build in CAGRs of 35% over 2020–25 and 18% over 2025–30. These
growth rates are similar to the ones for e-commerce.
The proportion of food delivery market to restaurant is expected to increase from
6.5% in 2019 to 16.2% by 2030, outdoing current penetration in more mature
markets such as the US (6%), South Asia (10.2%) and China (15.6%).
At this rate of growth, India’s online food delivery will become a USD30bn
industry by 2030, from USD4.2bn in 2019. These growth expectations are indeed
steep, but can be met with acceleration in GDP growth, urbanisation, etc.
Convenience: A key factor aiding online food delivery market growth
India’s online food delivery industry has Food delivery platforms have made online food ordering experience incredibly
logged staggering 143% CAGR over 2015– convenient. These platforms have also made on-demand delivery fleet available to
19 to reach to USD4.2bn restaurants, thereby significantly widening their catchment area, as well as making
more restaurants available to consumers.
This cocktail of convenience and wider catchment has fired up stupendous growth
in online food delivery services across the world, and India is no exception. India’s
online food delivery industry has logged a staggering 143% CAGR over 2015–19,
expanding to USD4.2bn. However, with the pandemic nibbling away at the business,
the industry had to swallow a 31% decline in 2020 to USD2.9bn.
According to industry estimates, India food As more users are opting for online food delivery and ordering frequency increases,
delivery GMV is expected to grow at a 35% growth will remain high. India food delivery GMV is expected to expand at a 35%
CAGR over 2020–25 to USD13bn by 2025, CAGR over 2020–25 to USD13bn by 2025, from USD2.9bn in 2020. Furthermore, by
from USD2.9bn in 2020 and USD30bn by 2030, the online food delivery industry is expected to reach USD30bn, implying an
2030, implying an 18% CAGR over 2025–30. 18% CAGR over 2025–30.
While growth rates look moderate against a staggering 143% CAGR over 2015–19,
we have seen growth taper as the base expands. We believe growth rate
expectations are fair and a further increase thereof is contingent on rising GDP per
capita, rapid urbanisation, higher female workforce participation, etc.
We note that female labour workforce participation has a high correlation with
expenditure on food away from home. In India, the female labour workforce
participation languishes at just over 20% compared with 57% in the US and 61% in
China. A disproportionate increase in female workforce participation can drive
higher growth for food aggregators.
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ZOMATO
India online food delivery GMV and growth rates
40 160
32 120
24 80
(USD bn)
(%)
16 40
8 0
0 -40
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2025E 2030E
Foodtech GMV (USD bn) YoY growth (%)
Source: Redseer, Industry Reports, Edelweiss Research
India food delivery penetration to accelerate
Proportion of food delivery in India is With the pandemic clamping down movements of entire populations, especially in
expected to increase to 11.8% by 2025 and public places such as restaurants, adoption of food delivery has accelerated. In India,
16.2% in 2030. contribution of food delivery to restaurants rose to 8.7% in 2020 from 6.5% in 2019.
In the US, China and South East Asia, it increased from 2.2% to 6%, 10.2% to 15.6%
and 3.7% to 10.2%, respectively.
According to Industry forecasts, the proportion of food delivery in India would
increase to 11.8% by 2025 and 16.2% in 2030. In China, a mature market that has
among the highest proportions of food delivery, the ratio increased to 15.6% in
2020.
We note that the proportion of food delivery also depends on GDP per capita. On
this count, India ranks much lower than peers and, to that extent, a 16.2%
proportion of food delivery by 2030 factors in many industry tailwinds.
Food delivery as a proportion of restaurant food in various geographies
Source: Redseer, company filings, Edelweiss Research
E-commerce growth rates tapered down too
While e-commerce in India clocked strong growth until FY16, its growth tapered
down as the base expanded (refer to exhibit 8): from a 70% CAGR over FY14–16 to
a 27% CAGR over FY16–20. Furthermore, e-commerce growth will fall under 20% for
FY20–25 as the industry matures.
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ZOMATO
We envisage similar trends in food delivery. In the initial stages, growth is driven by
higher adoption by consumers that have the spending power/ability to pay for
convenience, but as the pie starts expanding, newer consumers have relatively little
spending power; growth rates hence tend to taper down.
E-commerce growth in India
30 85
24 68
18 51
(USD bn)
(%)
12 34
6 17
0 0
FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20P
Ecommerce in India YoY Growth rate (%)
Source: Industry reports, Edelweiss Research
Adjacencies can drive value creation
While food delivery in itself will start generating cash as it scales up, we believe
further value creation will require creating product market fit in adjacent areas.
Globally, most food delivery apps are expanding into grocery delivery. However,
due to point-to-point last-mile supply chain of food delivery aggregators, their
addressable market is limited to instant grocery delivery, a small sub-segment of
the market with less compelling unit economics.
Zomato has also expanded into advertising, restaurant supplies, restaurant table
bookings and bill payments, etc, which complement its business model.
Globally, similar companies have ventured into cloud kitchen, on-demand courier
service, payments, etc.
Instant grocery: Clear synergies with food delivery, but…
While Zomato’s core focus is food delivery, it is likely to leverage its customer
engagement and market power to foray into adjacent areas such as cloud kitchen,
grocery delivery, fitness, nutrition, etc. Globally, many food delivery aggregators
have expanded into grocery, especially into instant grocery, leveraging their existing
point-to-point supply chains and the delivery fleet’s idle time during non-peak hours.
Zomato launched its grocery vertical during the pandemic, but scaled it back and
eventually shut down due to unfavourable unit economics. The company has
invested USD100mn for a 9.3% stake in Grofers, an online grocer, and may look at
leveraging its on-demand delivery fleet for instant delivery of groceries.
Grocery and food delivery supply chains are
We note that most grocers create their own supply chain, largely on the hub-and-
fundamentally different: food delivery has spoke model, to ensure quality control and optimized shipping. Most of the
point-to-point supply chain while grocery consumers also prefer planned ordering of most of the grocery items once in a
delivery works on a hub-and-spoke model. week/fortnight. At times though, consumers require instant grocery delivery of
certain items that can be fulfilled by the local grocer using the food delivery
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aggregator fleet. Global food delivery firms such as Doordash, Deliveroo, Uber Eats
and Just Eat Takeaway have also ventured into instant grocery delivery, lured by the
large market size and high growth opportunity. For Deliveroo, grocery delivery now
makes up 10% of the delivery and has become its fastest growing segment.
Most of these platforms have entered the on-demand grocery service segment
offering to deliver within a stipulated period of time. Consequently, gross margins
for grocery delivery would be higher in this case as discounts and cheap products is
not the USP.
Despite higher gross margins for this segment (relative to value-grocery), grocery
delivery margins continue to be lower than food delivery margins. A case in point is
Deliveroo’s gross profit per order for grocery delivery was GBP2.1 compared with
GBP2.4 for food delivery. We suspect even a lower EBITDA margin as investments
required for onboarding suppliers and into the overall supply chain could be higher.
Global food delivery platforms have expanded to grocery delivery
Source: Company, Edelweiss Research
Zomato may collaborate with Grofers for instant grocery delivery
While Zomato followed international peers for its foray into on-demand grocery
delivery, it rapidly scaled back, and eventually shut it down, possibly due to poor
unit economics and execution challenges. We do see online grocery scaling up
significantly in coming years, but we expect this space to be dominated by the
specialists (Big Basket, JioMart, DMart, etc), and food delivery players will have
limited play due to incompatibility of the two supply chains. To that extent, we
believe Zomato’s decision to get out of grocery delivery is prescient.
Grofers can utilize Zomato’s delivery fleet for
That said, Zomato invested USD100mn for a 9.3% stake in Grofers, an online grocer.
instant delivery of groceries, thereby While there are no details on the nature of collaboration or the synergies it can yield,
reducing costs for both platforms Zomato may consider availing its on-demand delivery fleet to Grofers for instant
delivery of groceries. This will optimise its delivery fleet’s utilisation by increasing
turnover during non-peak hours.
On aggregate, this can also reduce the delivery cost for Zomato as the delivery
personnel will be able to do more deliveries in a day and drive up utilisation. While
there is no official announcement, we believe financial investments by Zomato will
help build confidence among management teams of the two companies to explore
such a tie-up.
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Comparison of food and grocery delivery margin
Food Grocery
Details
Delivery Delivery
Commission
is higher for
food delivery
Commission/ Margin (including additional given
20% 18%
income) restaurants
high
dependence
on platforms
Storing in
warehouses
and other
Delivery/ Supply Chain Costs 10% 15% costs results
in higher
supply chain
costs
No
Discounts/ Cashbacks 2% 2%
difference
No
Other Variable Costs 3% 3%
difference
Contribution Margin 5% -2%
Source: Edelweiss Research
Cloud kitchen foray can create value for food delivery platforms
Food delivery apps have dramatically increased the volume of restaurant food
ordering. Increased scale, absence of high street retail cost and other overheads of
restaurants have made the cloud kitchen business viable and scalable.
Cloud kitchen is a backward integration
However, cloud kitchens depend greatly on food delivery platforms for their
strategy for food delivery platforms to business. This makes cloud kitchens a natural extension for food delivery platforms
increase their share of value addition, and as: i) food delivery platforms can leverage ordering data to understand consumers’
hence profit pool preferences about menu items, pricing, etc by area; ii) they can promote cloud
kitchens on their (food delivery) platforms to drive traffic; and iii) it helps food
delivery platforms capture value of the order not only from ordering and delivery,
but also from food preparation.
Globally, Doordash, Deliveroo, JET and Uber Eats have already ventured into this
business. And the pandemic led to a sharp increase in business for these cloud
kitchens. In the US, prior to the pandemic, cloud kitchens accounted for 10–15% of
the USD66bn restaurant market, which has now jumped to 21%. According to
Redseer, cloud kitchens are expected to expand to a USD2bn industry in India by
2024 from USD400mn in 2019.
Zomato has categorically denied opening cloud kitchens as it may present a conflict
with restaurant partners. However, its primary competitor, Swiggy has been
aggressively expanding in this space over the last couple of years. However, a key
difference between the cloud kitchens set up by Swiggy and its global counterparts
is that most global businesses collaborate with top restaurants for cloud kitchens,
whereas Swiggy runs its own cloud kitchens.
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Global companies – Cloud kitchens
Source: Company, Edelweiss Research
Deliveroo was one of the first major companies to launch its shared kitchen in
London in 2016. It has since gradually expanded to eight countries and operates
more than 250 cloud kitchens. The company has tied up with top restaurants such
as Blend, Petit Camodge, Tripletta and Santosha while opening its cloud kitchen in
Paris.
Similarly, Doordash has tied up with the likes of Aria Korean Street Food, Canter’s
Deli, Curry Up Now, Milk Bar, The Melt Express, and Chick-fil-A to cater to the areas
wherein demand has been high.
While Doordash had started experimenting with the concept of ‘Ghost’ or ‘cloud’
kitchens in 2019, it could not find much success as restaurants complained that costs
were still elevated. Now, Doordash is absorbing most of the other costs, thereby
reducing the burden on restaurants. This model has proven to be more successful
with more restaurants now adopting this system, given downside is capped.
Another trend catching up in cloud kitchens globally is multiple restaurants using the
same kitchen space to dish out their products. This also allows delivery partners to
pick up multiple orders from the same location, further improving efficiency. It also
allows companies to charge a higher take rate to restaurants as they start providing
more value. The added benefit of developing deeper and stickier relationships with
restaurants is also no less significant for food aggregators.
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Quality of network effect is modest
The network effect in food delivery platforms is curtailed due to local clustering,
commoditised offerings and vulnerability to multi-homing.
Network effect for food delivery platforms is somewhat similar to ride hailing
and is lower than global platforms in messaging and social media.
Typically a large player dominates food delivery, even in large markets (US,
China); nevertheless, it has limited pricing power and hence low profitability.
Restaurants are trying to disintermediate food delivery platforms by going direct,
but considering challenges of on-boarding customers on individual restaurant
platforms, they may succeed only in gourmet food or high-order value cases.
Network effects are weaker in food delivery versus other businesses
Network effect is determined by network While almost all platform businesses boast network effect, the quality of network
clustering, commoditised or differentiated effect varies across different businesses; it is determined by many factors such as
supply, vulnerability to multi-homing and network clustering, commoditised versus differentiated supply, venerability to
risk of disintermediation multi-homing and risk of disintermediation. Network effects for food delivery
business are modest compared to other industries such as social media, search
engines, classifieds, etc. Weak network effects are largely on account of local
clustering, that is the customer is concerned about the choice and quality of services
in a micro-market and hence as long as he/she has better experience than any other
platform, he’ll be loyal to the platform.
Network effects in food delivery are modest
Commoditized/
Network Vulnerability to Risk of
Industry Examples Differentiated Overall
Clustering multi-homing disintermediation
Supply
Social Media Facebook, Twitter 5 5 5 5 20
Search Engine Google, Bing 5 4 5 5 19
Content Platforms Netflix, Hotstar 5 4 4 3 16
B2B Classified IndiaMART, Udaan 4 3 4 4 15
Dating Tinder, Bumble 3 4 4 3 14
E-commerce Amazon, Flipkart 4 3 2 4 13
Matrimony Matrimony, Shaadi 3 4 3 3 13
P2P payment platforms PayTM, GooglePay 4 2 3 3 12
Food Delivery Platforms Zomato, Swiggy 1 3 3 3 10
Ride Hailing Uber, Ola 2 2 2 3 9
Travel portal MakeMyTrip, EaseMyTrip 4 2 1 2 9
Source: Edelweiss Research
Network effect helps achieve scale, but pricing power is limited
Various factors determine the quality of network effect, such as: i) network
clustering (local or global clustering); ii) commoditized or differentiated supply; iii)
vulnerability to multi-homing; and iv) risk of disintermediation.
Besides, the gradient of customer acquisition cost (CAC) over time series is a good
measure of the quality of network effect. Exhibit 13 summarises network effects in
case of food delivery platforms.
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Scorecard for quality of network effect for food delivery platforms
Parameter Score Remark
Food delivery platforms are local in nature as a limited
Network clustering Low
number of restaurants can cater to a cluster
Commoditized or
Medium Few exclusive cloud kitchen and restaurants tie-ups
differentiated supply
Multi-homing is possible but only a few platforms are
Vulnerability to multi-
Medium there and consumer can be locked into with loyalty
homing
program
Risk of
High Risk of disintermediation is real only in high-value items
disintermediation
Network effect strong enough to drive scale but not
Overall Medium
pricing power
Source: Company
Network clustering
In terms of network clustering, food delivery platforms are local in nature; these
platforms may boast a large number of restaurants, but for a customer, only the
number of restaurants that can deliver to them matters. Hence, if in one locality a
platform can on-board a higher number of restaurants and a have sufficient delivery
fleet to match another platform, consumers in that area will want to migrate to that
platform considering more choice is offered.
Hence, a higher number of restaurants at overall level does not add value to the
network if the size of the network in certain area is weak. Localisation reduces the
barrier to entry and hence there have been examples of existing players losing
market shares to newer and more efficient players. Despite DoorDash’s late entry in
the US food delivery market, it captured a 55% market share on the back of its
efficiencies.
Food delivery platforms are local in nature
Initially, the US too had more localised monopolies, creating an oligopolistic
as only a limited number of restaurants can structure at a national level. Grubhub was a leader at the national level. However,
cater to a cluster DoorDash scaled up much faster than any other player during the pandemic with
better execution—largely around the number of restaurants, delivery speed, etc.
This helped DoorDash notch up a nearly 55% market share, whereas other players
lost market share.
We note that even in larger markets, superior execution can rapidly drive market
share. Hence in a market like India, which has a long growth runway, better
execution to drive growth is key to value creation.
Food delivery market share in US
Source: Bloomberg second measure
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Commoditized or differentiated supply
Food delivery platforms can differentiate via
Food delivery platforms tend to fall somewhere between commoditized and
exclusive tie-ups with local popular differentiated supply. On the one hand, the supply is differentiated because there
restaurants, but it comes at a cost are many restaurants and types of foods to choose from. Some platforms even have
an exclusive partnership with popular restaurants. On the other hand, if all of these
food delivery platforms provide more or less the same menu – all restaurants are
available across platforms – the supply would get commoditized. The point
of differentiation therefore shifts to delivery cost, delivery speed, ease of use
and other features.
Vulnerability to multi-homing
Food delivery platforms are addressing Multi-homing measures the switching cost of a platform. It simply means how easy
multi-homing issues by introducing loyalty is it for users to switch among platforms that provide similar services. Food delivery
programs platforms may see multi-homing on both – consumer and delivery personnel side.
To reduce multi-homing, companies can opt for loyalty bonus or membership
offerings that promote frequent ordering on one platform, or they can enter into
exclusive partnerships with popular restaurants. Some platforms also introduce
their own cloud kitchen, which not only increases choice, but also captures a higher
portion of value from the transaction.
Swiggy Super and Zomato Pro – A comparative snapshot
Swiggy Super Zomato Pro
Price INR89 (Bit)/ INR169 (Bite)/ INR329 (Binge) per month INR200/3 months
Up to 30% extra off
Bit' plan - Five free deliveries per month.
on food deliveries
up to 40% off on
'Bite' plan - Ten free deliveries per month and one
each dining
Features 'Buy One Get One free' from restaurant partners
experience
'Binge' plan - Unlimited free deliveries and unlimited
Faster delivery with
'Buy One Get One free' offers from partner
top-rated valets
restaurants
Cities 80 41
Partner Restaurants > 7,000 >25,000
Source: Company, Edelweiss Research
Risk of disintermediation – Low in most cases
Since impromptu and frequent ordering
Food delivery platforms, for a small fee, offer consumers choice, ease and consistent
drives the bulk of order value on food ordering experience, which has led to their rapid adoption among consumers.
platforms, we believe the risk of However, for restaurants, food delivery platforms charge a significant commission
disintermediation is low for availing a higher catchment area and an on-demand delivery fleet. High take rate
impacts profitability of restaurants, especially for high-value orders. Hence,
premium restaurants are increasingly looking to connect directly with consumers for
food delivery. However, since impromptu and frequent ordering drives the bulk of
order value, we believe the risk of disintermediation remains low.
Weaker network effect has kept profitability under check
Due to local clustering of food delivery platforms, the risk of disruption by a new
player remains high. Hence, we note, largest players typically command a market
share of 50%-plus in most geographies, but they still operate at low margins.
Despite over a 65% market share in the Chinese market, Meituan’s operating profit
margin in food delivery is a meagre 4.3%. Most other companies have a negative
operating profit.
That said, we expect profitability to improve as market matures and larger players
create efficiencies of scale, which act as entry barriers for new players.
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Operating margins of global companies are low
Source: Company, Edelweiss Research
Dissecting disintermediation
Restaurants are keen on exploring solutions to reduce their dependence on food
delivery platforms considering high take rates that eat into their profitability.
SaaS-based ordering platforms such as Dotpe and Thrive are creating ordering
platforms for restaurants, along with integration of third-party logistics players
for order fulfilment.
While deploying these solutions is relatively easy, pushing consumers to adopt
direct ordering is the biggest challenge for restaurants.
We see large QSRs and chain restaurants with enough resources to drive direct
ordering; other restaurants will find it challenging to market their platforms.
Direct delivery – Crucial to restaurants’ profitability
Shift in restaurant business in favour of
Although food delivery platforms help restaurants drive volumes, they also create
delivery, from dine-in in the wake of the two challenges: i) food delivery platforms do not share customer data with
pandemic has eaten into their profitability restaurants; hence restaurants find it difficult to create patronage; and ii) food
delivery platforms charge a high fee, which hurts profitability. High fees is a major
challenge for premium restaurants. Many dine-in restaurants do not offer home
delivery due to high charges levied by delivery platforms. However, the pandemic
has significantly altered the revenue mix for restaurants with dine-in revenue almost
entirely going away.
In order to address the issue of consumer data and high commissions, some
restaurants are working with SaaS platforms such as DotPe and Thrive to create
seamless ordering systems. These ordering systems, if required, can also source
delivery fleet from third-party delivery partners such as Dunzo, WeFast and
Shadowfax.
In order to drive usage of their own platforms, restaurants are leveraging social
media platforms, such as Instagram and Facebook for popularising their services.
Indian Hotels has also launched their own app “Qmin” offering food delivery from
their restaurants and kitchens with an order threshold of INR1,000.
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DotPe – Direct delivery
Source: Company, Edelweiss Research
Discovery and variety – A key challenge for customers
In terms of experience, we note consumers are likely to go to the restaurant portal
to order only if they are aware of the direct ordering facility, are sufficiently
incentivised, and the experience is hassle-free, if not as good as ordering on a food
delivery platform. To incentivise, restaurants offer no delivery fee apart from other
discounts. Since the address and payment details are stored by SaaS platforms,
despite their web-based interface, user experience is reasonably smooth.
Discovery is the key challenge for direct
While direct-to-consumer has numerous advantages for restaurants, the main
delivery challenge continues to discovery. These companies have also realised this problem
and have hence tied up with popular payment platforms such as GPay, PhonePe and
Paytm. Using these apps, customers can search for restaurants and order directly via
these apps without the hassle of searching them individually.
Although this aids discoverability, the experience is not as sophisticated as on food
delivery platforms since there are no options to sort restaurants according to various
parameters, there is no visibility on how much time a restaurant will take to deliver,
ratings of the restaurants, etc. Considering payment apps are not sufficiently
integrated with restaurants’ and third-party logistics providers, we do not expect
discovery platforms to become as sophisticated as food delivery platforms, and thus
user experience is likely to be sub-par.
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Direct food ordering is available on multiple platforms
Source: Company
Consumer experience, outside discovery, is seamless
Technology integration for direct delivery works in such a way that SaaS platforms
can on-board restaurants in a matter of days by creating digital menus, integrating
the billing system and offering third-party delivery platforms on-the-go. For high-
ticket size, third-party delivery platform costs work out lower than those charged by
delivery platforms.
Since SaaS platforms work this through an Application Programing Interface (API),
consumers have a reasonably seamless experience with a WhatsApp or SMS update
on food dispatch with a link to track delivery personnel in real time.
Direct delivery – Impact varies for players
Impact of direct delivery will vary for each We believe different segments of restaurants face their own set of challenges –
segment of restaurants. resource availability and dependence on food delivery platforms is different – due
to which their possibility and success in adoption of direct ordering will be different.
Hence, we are evaluating the opportunities and success possibilities for each
segment separately. We are broadly classifying restaurants into three categories: i)
large QSR chains and cloud kitchens; ii) large chain restaurants; and iii) standalone
restaurants and eateries.
Large QSR chains and cloud kitchens
Large and popular QSR chains such as McDonald’s, Domino’s and KFC as well as large
cloud kitchens such as Rebel Foods (which owns brands such as Faasos, Behrouz
Biryani and Oven Story), Poncho Hospitality (which owns Box8 and Mojo Pizza),
typically have their own apps for food delivery.
These companies also possess enough financial, marketing and logistics muscle to
provide a full stack of services. Furthermore, they can drive discovery through digital
marketing branding campaigns. However, customers are unlikely to download many
QSRs or cloud kitchen apps; hence, we argue food delivery platforms would continue
to drive the bulk of delivery business.
We note that success of direct delivery has been mixed for companies. Domino’s has
been particularly successful with ‘30 minutes delivery’ addressing customers’
craving at breakneck speed. Other QSR chains and cloud kitchens are relatively less
successful due to their inability to match this speed and other factors.
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However, with food aggregators gaining prominence, most of these companies have
been unable to match the ease of use provided by aggregators. User experience for
food aggregators has been far superior to those provided by these apps. We believe
that this section of restaurants will be able to get 20–30% food delivery on their own
platforms. The proportion of direct ordering will be a function of strength of the
brand and their execution capabilities.
McDonald’s, Domino’s and Faasos food delivery
Source: Company, Edelweiss Research
Popular chain restaurants
Popular chain restaurants are characterised by high patronage, repeat customers
and relatively high AOV. They typically rely on dine-in patrons for revenue, but the
pandemic changed this dynamic. Since the take rate for aggregators is high, these
restaurants have faced a major brunt, having to pay a significant amount to the likes
of Zomato and Swiggy. Discovery is not a major issue for these restaurants as they
are anyway well-known.
Popular chain restaurants have been at the
Consequently, these restaurants have been at the forefront of the direct delivery
forefront of direct delivery since they have to campaign. While these restaurants do have a certain connect with customers, their
pay high take rates to food aggregators. ability to drive these customers to direct delivery portal, by discounting, by
marketing will determine their success. We note that chain restaurants will have to
invest sufficient marketing resources to drive traffic to their own portal.
Some of SaaS based ordering platforms suggest high adoption by restaurants –DotPe
claiming 150k partner restaurants and Tribe suggests another 15k. However, we
believe that some of these restaurant partnerships would be for features other than
delivery, and only a handful of restaurants would promote their own delivery. In
terms of cost, Tribe indicated 3% of the GMV as platforms fees and third-part
delivery may charge ~INR100 for delivery. Hence, assuming a 10% marketing cost
and a 10% discount, own platform breaks even at an order value of INR1,000. This is
significantly higher than Zomato, whose AOV would be lower than INR400. Hence,
we believe that only a handful of restaurants would opt for standalone delivery
platforms, and it would drive 15–20% of their delivery volumes.
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Breakeven analysis – Own platform vis-à-vis Zomato/ Swiggy
(INR) Own Platform Zomato/ Swiggy
AOV 1000 1000
Platform Fees/ Commission 3% 30%
Platform Fees per order 30 300
Delivery Charges 70
Marketing Costs 100
Discount 100
Total Costs 300 300
Source: Edelweiss Research
Standalone restaurants
Small standalone restaurants are likely to For small standalone restaurants, while implementing order management platform
continue to remain dependent on food is relatively easy, diverting orders to their own platforms will be challenging. We
aggregators believe that restaurateurs will find it challenging to attract consumers to their
platforms. Hence, we believe that this segment is unlikely to see any traction with
direct ordering. Consequently, they will continue to remain dependent on food
aggregators for both discovery and delivery.
We believe that most restaurants are not adequately equipped to drive the
marketing campaigns for online ordering platforms. From consumers’ side, while the
ordering experience is seamless, discovery will be a challenge.
We believe that consumers are likely to order from standalone platforms only in case
they are aware exactly what they are looking to order, and are adequately informed
about the benefits thereof. Standalone restaurants will require significant marketing
support, which smaller restaurants will not be able to manage. Hence, we believe
adoption of the standalone platform will be limited to premium restaurants or larger
chains that can muscle resources for adequate marketing push.
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Valuation
The pandemic has made food delivery platforms all the more relevant for
consumers and restaurants alike, leading to a spurt in their valuations. Zomato’s
global peers are trading at one-year forward price to sales of 5–12x, depending
on market growth and maturity, and their strength in respective markets.
Our two-stage DCF yields a valuation of INR1.1tn (USD15.1bn) for Zomato’s food
delivery platform business, which implies an FY23E price to sales of 18.3x,
significantly higher than global peers, due to its superior growth profile.
We do see potential for Zomato to create value from adjacencies over the long
term considering its quality of engagement, and are building in another INR90bn
(USD1.3bn, INR12/share) value for this optionality.
Key valuations risks are: i) Change in AOV, unit economics and ordering frequency
are the biggest valuation vectors; a mere INR10 change in AOV can move the
valuation by 5%. ii) The quality of disclosures so far has been patchy, which may
impact its valuation in the future. iii) Execution vis-a-vis competition.
Global peers’ valuations depend on growth profile and market share
Meituan, the world’s largest online food delivery company, trades at a 1-year
forward P/S of 6.5x. The sharp drop in its valuation has largely been due to the
crackdown of the Chinese government on several businesses. DoorDash, which has
defied competition over the last year and emerged as the clear leader in US markets,
trades at a 1-year forward valuation of 11.3x. We note Meituan reported 17.7%
growth in CY20 while DoorDash grew by 226.1%. Delivery Hero trades at 5.5x 1-year
forward P/S.
All players have varying market positioning and growth rates, and that is driving the
difference in their valuations. On EV/EBITDA, Meituan is trading at 311.4x CY22 while
Doordash is trading at 157.6x CY22. We note that most of these platforms are
currently loss-making; hence valuations are unarguably high if we take their earnings
into consideration.
MCap/ GMV is a relevant metric to compare
In our view though m-cap/GMV is an apt way to compare the valuations of these
valuations of companies since they have companies and way more indicative since most of these companies have different
different revenue recognition policies. revenue recognition policies. On this yardstick, most companies are trading cheaper
at 1–3x at P/GMV, but Zomato is much more expensive at 12.3x. We argue that
despite Zomato’s superior growth profile and larger opportunity size, such
valuations indicate that growth is adequately priced in.
Peer comparison
2020-2024 P/S P/E P/B EV/Revenue EV/EBTIDA P/GOV
Market Cap Revenue EBITDA TTM 1 Year- Fwd 2022 2023 2021 2022 2023 2021 2022 2023 2021 2022 2023 2020
Meituan 2,12,443 37.8 87.2 8.5 6.5 79.1 13.2 13.0 11.4 7.1 5.1 3.9 311.4 54.4 2.4
Doordash 63,441 32.6 64.9 9.7 11.3 244.3 163.7 13.1 12.7 10.8 12.3 9.9 8.1 186.7 130.9 67.1 2.6
Delivery Hero 33,159 64.8 6.6 5.5 24.4 24.9 44.0 5.1 3.4 2.5 390.8 2.4
Just Eat Takeaway 14,663 40.5 19.8 3 1.0 1.1 1.2 2.8 2.1 1.7 64.4 1.3
Zomato 16,196 36.8 21.7 6.9 7.0 6.9 24.3 16.7 11.8 12.3
Source: Bloomberg, Edelweiss Research
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