Cultural Outreach: Cinema and Soft Power - De Gruyter
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
J. Chin. Film Stud. 2021; 1(1): 187–203
Gary D. Rawnsley*
Cultural Outreach: Cinema and Soft Power
https://doi.org/10.1515/jcfs-2021-0012
Received February 15, 2021; accepted February 15, 2021;
published online March 12, 2021
Abstract: This paper introduces soft power as a political construct and thus
questions its relevance to cinema. Rather than seeing movies as representatives of
soft power in and of themselves, cinema is an instrument whereby soft power is
projected – a tool rather than a resource. The paper argues that cinema is an
example of “soft power by accident”, meaning that it is best understood as a
natural by-product of a cultural creative process for non-political purposes.
However, when we analyse Chinese cinema, the boundaries between political and
non-political break down, revealing some of the problems and limitations in both
Chinese soft power and cultural outreach.
Keywords: soft power, culture, cinema, China
1 Cultural Outreach: Cinema and Soft Power
All governments now generate soft power … or perhaps more accurately, all
governments recognise the need to be seen generating soft power. The distinction is
important, for despite the growing number of research papers, monographs, and
academic conferences on the subject, as well as the tremendous volume of resources
devoted by governments to strategic thinking around the area, soft power remains a
confused, misunderstood, and often overused term.
In part the confusion derives from conflating soft power with culture instead of
understanding its political meaning and impact. After all, power is political, and it is
difficult to progress towards any incisive grasp of what soft power is, how it works, and
what it may achieve unless we admit the centrality of its “political” characteristics.
This is not to deny the reality of a compelling relationship between art, culture,
and politics. After all, George Orwell famously wrote that “All art is propaganda”,
suggesting that behind culture lay political and ideological motivations. While I
would argue vigorously against Orwell’s rather cynical generalisation – I am
comforted by the fact that art for art’s sake exists and that culture continues to
*Corresponding author: Gary D. Rawnsley, University of Nottingham Ningbo China (UNNC), Ningbo,
China, E-mail: Gary.Rawnsley@nottingham.edu.cn188 G. D. Rawnsley
nourish the soul, feed our curiosity, and progress civilisation without necessarily
pursuing political objectives or interests – I am equally aware that politics and
culture do connect and occasionally collide. The arts, including cinema, help us
make sense of the political world and our place in it; they can challenge and satirise
the powerful and give a voice to the powerless. If art is not political, how can we
explain Picasso’s Guernica, the protest songs of Pete Seeger, and the persecution of
Ai Weiwei? Moreover, culture can be driven by political framing, especially in a
political system that we (prematurely?) describe as “post-colonial”. Questions about
whose culture is represented and whose culture is marginalised, and who has the
authority to decide, all revolve around notions of “power” and are therefore political.
Moreover, some governments consider limiting access to culture – created by
domestic and foreign sources – as an appropriate response to perceived threats to
identity, nation-building, values, and even security. At a time when we are all urged
to confront our darker pasts, when national monuments and memorials are subject
to political and public scrutiny, and universities are pressed to “decolonise” their
curriculum, we can see clearly the specific political concerns that connect culture
with the formation, distribution, and exercise of power within society.
In this paper I will consider how cinema contributes to China’s generation of soft
power; but more specifically, I will review the value of cinema as an instrument by
which China’s soft power is communicated via cultural diplomacy and cultural
relations. These are activities that involve multiple government and non-government
stakeholders pursuing equally multiple objectives. However, there are overlapping
areas of activity and responsibility as often the cultural industries and the government
or state institutions depend on each other: the political does indeed intersect with art,
perhaps more than we care to admit.
2 Soft Power
I begin with a consideration of soft power, a concept that has evolved (though some
many argue “mutated” is a more apt description) into one of the most famous,
misunderstood, and much abused ideas in international politics. It is a familiar
theme in journalism and in the speeches and writing of politicians and statesmen;
and while it is gratifying to see so many people from different backgrounds and
academic disciplines taking time to think about soft power, the term is used casually,
often as a convenient catch-all term to mean influence, persuasion, or attraction. It is
used incorrectly as a synonym for public diplomacy, for cultural relations, and even
nation branding. Given the confusion we should not be surprised that the US
Secretary of State for Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, told a US General that he did notCultural Outreach: Cinema and Soft Power 189
know what soft power is. Most governments who claim to “do” soft power fail to
define it adequately, or to explain how or whether it works.
Soft power is far more complicated than many governments assume. Un-
derstanding how it works and what it may accomplish requires awareness of
what “power” is, as much of the literature focuses far more on the “soft” aspect of
soft power and loses sight of the “power” side of the concept. This means we
forego the opportunity to understand how soft power is generated by political
culture and how it may help accomplish political and strategic ambitions. Cul-
ture is not the only source of soft power: I refer to the “power of example”,
meaning the ideas, principles, values, and ultimately the behaviour and there-
fore credibility and moral authority of the agent. At the heart of all discussions
about soft power is recognition that how a country or government is perceived –
the legitimacy and credibility of its behaviour and political institutions, as well
perhaps as its cultural attraction – adds or subtracts power. So the core of my
argument is that soft power is generated by how states behave at home and
abroad, and that we judge states by the company they keep. It is most visible
when governments, states and other political actors do the right thing for the sake
of doing the right thing, and accepts that actions speak louder than words.
So while culture has a role in generating and communicating soft power, it is not
the sole source of attraction; and while culture certainly helps increase familiarity, it
does not necessarily translate into soft power. For one thing, it is difficult to measure
and evaluate the impact of culture. It is relatively straightforward to quantify the
reach of cultural products – how many people have watched a particular movie in
the cinema, or how many viewers does an international news channel attract – but
such measures fail to disclose any valuable information about impact: did the movie
in some way shape or change the audience’s opinion? Has our behaviour towards
Country X been influenced by watching its international television channel?
In soft power there is no necessary chain of causation because culture is
subjective. What appeals to one audience member may not necessarily appeal to,
or provoke the same reaction by, another. We all react differently to different
cultural products, and this reveals the central reality about soft power: the real
power does not lie with the government, the cultural industries, or the media.
Rather, the most powerful actor is the receiver – the active meaning maker – who
decides whether to consume the product in the first place (we go to the cinema and
choose to watch one movie over another) and then react to it on an individual level.
The audience response may be far different from the expectations of the producer
or distributor, and there is nothing that can be done. The power lies with the
audience.190 G. D. Rawnsley
3 Culture in Foreign Policy
The value of culture and ideas as instruments of foreign policy has long been
recognised, by scholars and statesmen alike – from Confucius, Sun Tzu, and
Empress Wu Zetian in China, and the Indian ruler Ashoka, through diplomacy at
European courts, the Enlightenment and America’s Founding Fathers, to theorists
of international relations including E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz,
and of course Joseph Nye. The logic is simple: the more cultures understand and
engage with each other, the easier it is to build and sustain relationships that may
yield strategic benefit. For example, Senator J. William Fulbright connected culture
with international relations, anticipating “soft power” by almost 30 years.
“Foreign policy,” he wrote in 1964, “cannot be based on military posture and
diplomatic activities alone … The shape of the world a generation from now will be
influenced far more by how well we communicate the values of our society to the
others than by our military or diplomatic superiority” (Coombs 1964, ix). In 1996,
Jacques Delors, former President of the European Commission, argued that greater
levels of cultural interaction help confront common “risks and challenges”,
“induce people to implement … projects” and manage … inevitable conflicts in an
intelligent and peaceful way” (Delores 1996, 23). The preamble to the Constitution
of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)
states “… since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the
defences of peace must be constructed.” Benjamin R. Barber followed this logic
when he wrote in 1992:
[C]ulture has become more potent than armaments. What is the power of the Pentagon
compared with Disneyland? Can the Sixth Fleet keep up with CNN? McDonald’s in Moscow
and Coke in China will do more to create a global culture than military colonization ever
could. It is less the goods than the brand names that do the work, for they convey life-style
images that alter perceptions and challenge behaviour. They make up the seductive software
of McWorld’s common (at times, much too common) soul (Barber 1992).
Pavan Varma, the head of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, has noted that
culture
has the potential to shape, alter and impact the ideas and opinions of public communities.
From a wide-ranging perspective, culture has the capacity to resolve tensions and preju-
dices – ethnic, religious, communal, national and international. It can create a climate of
tolerance, respect and understanding among nations, religions and entire regions. It is thus
an essential medium for peaceful and tolerant contact and communication (Varma 2007: 128).Cultural Outreach: Cinema and Soft Power 191
In 2005, a report by the new Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, created
by the US Congress to advise the Secretary of State, emphasised the value of culture
to the pursuit of American foreign policy:
… it is in cultural activities that a nation’s idea of itself is best represented. And cultural
diplomacy can enhance our national security in subtle, wide-ranging and sustainable ways.
Indeed history may record that America’s cultural riches played no less a role than military
action in shaping our international leadership, including the war on terror. For the values
embedded in our artistic and intellectual traditions form a bulwark against the forces of
darkness (US Department of State 2005, 1).
It is worth noting that the US State Department published this so-called “Linchpin”
report at a time when cultural engagement was viewed as a way of repairing some
of the damage done to American authority following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It
eschewed the Cold War models of cultural engagement based on demonstrating
how exposure to American culture would help defeat communism, focussing
instead on how cultural dialogue and exchange could build and maintain
relationships:
Listening is central to this effort. To practice effective cultural diplomacy, we must first listen
to our counterparts in other lands, seeking common ground with curators and writers,
filmmakers and theatre directors, choreographers and educators – that is, with those who are
engaged in exploring the universal values of truth and freedom. The quest for meaning is
shared by everyone, and every culture has its own way of seeking to understand our walk in
the sun. We must not imagine that our attempts to describe reality hold for everyone (US
Department of State 2005, 5).
So governments and non-governmental actors alike have long used culture – by
promoting or limiting access to it – as a tactical instrument to achieve specific
political objectives. For example, cultural boycotts are used regularly to protest
behaviour. Punishing violations of expected conduct in this way reflects confi-
dence that “a greater effort will be achieved in the boycotted country, and before
world opinion, by restriction than by maintenance of normal cultural relations”
(Mitchell 1986, 6). Specific examples include cultural and sporting boycotts of the
Soviet Union following the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, the clampdown on the
Solidarity trades union in Poland in 1980, and the boycott of South African culture
and arts during the apartheid era with the essential support of the National African
Congress.
It is customary to separate cultural diplomacy from cultural relations. The
former refers to the deliberate programming of cultural activities sponsored or
organised by government or state actors and institutions to advance predetermined
political, strategic, or national interests; and it reinforces the representation192 G. D. Rawnsley
undertaken by official envoys (Rivera 2015, 35). Milton C. Cummings has described
“cultural diplomacy as “the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of
culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding”
(Cummings 2003, 1). Walter Lacqueur claimed that cultural diplomacy is “the use of
creative expression and exchange of ideas, information, and people to increase
mutual understanding” (Lacqueur 1994, 20). It “can only be said to take place when
formal diplomats, serving national governments, try to shape and channel the
natural flow [of culture] to advance national interests” (Arndt 2005, xviii).
Cultural relations tend to refer to activities that “grow naturally and organically”
and maybe either organised by the cultural industries without, and sometimes
despite government intervention, or occur within civil society without the involve-
ment of cultural or artistic elites:
Artists engage in cross-cultural exchange not to proselytize about their own values, but rather
to understand different cultural traditions, to find news sources of imaginative inspiration, to
discover new methods, and ways of working to exchange ideas with people whose world-
views differ from their own. They want to be influenced rather than influence (emphasis added.
Channick 2005, 1).
4 Politics and Culture
So it is possible to formally separate the two by actor and motivation: cultural
diplomacy is state led and aims to achieve specific objectives; cultural relations are
undertaken by the cultural industries or by groups and individuals in civil society
pursuing “art for art’s sake”. In reality, however, the distinction is far from clear-cut,
and different societies use different terms to describe these activities: prior to using
“exterior cultural action” (Raymond 2000) the French call such activities “cultural
projection”; Germany favours “cultural foreign policy”, while others opt for “inter-
national cultural relations” (Wyszomirski, Burgess, and Peila 2003, 9). Mariano
Martin Zamorano summaries neatly the international confusion: “the definition of
cultural diplomacy is almost as varied as the number of countries that claim to use it”
(Zamorano 2016: 169). M. Berger advocated a more appropriate position, claiming
that cultural diplomacy is labelled as such, “Not because it is the work that diplo-
mats should do, but because it is an interaction that requires diplomatic skills on a
human level” (Berger 2008, 3).
Cultural diplomacy and cultural relations share discourses of co-operation
and exchange, relationship building, and mutual respect. Cultural approaches to
foreign policy are not about ameliorating differences. Rather they acknowledge
and embrace diversity and express “willingness to engage with the other”. Culture,Cultural Outreach: Cinema and Soft Power 193
writes John Tomlinson, “is an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward
divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrast rather than uniformity”
(Tomlinson 1999, 185). The problem is that when politics and culture collide,
political interests sometimes override the will to accept diversity. Some societies
believe their identities are threatened by culture seeping in from outside or from
artists within who dare challenge the status quo. Hence, the all too familiar cases
where societies close in on themselves and seek more stringent ways of protecting
their own cultures. In the most extreme examples political institutions seek to ex-
ercise their power and authority over the production and consumption of culture,
and “art for art’s sake” is difficult to preserve. Political forces – domestic and foreign,
hostile or friendly – do intervene regularly in the cultural sector, thus blurring any
academic distinctions between cultural diplomacy and cultural relations. This is
most noticeable in cinema where government intervention is often deemed neces-
sary to protect local film industries. Quota systems in South Korea, France and
elsewhere limit the number of Hollywood movies shown in cinemas in an effort to
encourage the production of films locally (Freeman 2003; Zhou 2015).
Moreover, state and government institutions create and maintain the
infrastructures that enable the cultural industries to continue their work. Examples
include lenient tax regimes, helping cultural actors obtain travel documents,
building national stadiums (think the Millennium Dome in London or the Birds Nest
stadium in Beijing), providing subsidies for museums and heritage sites. The global
phenomenon of K-Pop and the “Hallyu wave” would have been impossible without
a deliberate government strategy of investment in South Korea’s cultural industries
following the 1997 financial crisis (Hong 2014; Kim 2017). The cultural industries
have been among those hardest hits by Covid-19, with theatres and museums forced
to close and employees and performers out of work. With government support the
UK’s Arts Council is subsidising the recovery of cultural industries, while the German
government has launched a bridging loan for the cultural sector; and the European
Commission introduced the Temporary Framework for state aid to support the
cultural industries in members countries. Artists and the cultural industries can be a
beneficiary of state resources and in turn can be co-opted by the state for delivery of
policy-enabling outputs. Again, the distinction between public and private, art and
political is blurred through the often mutually dependent relationship of the state
and the cultural industries.
5 The Hard Character of Soft Power
So cultural engagement is relational and communicative. Therefore, it follows that
culture encourages us to think about how we see ourselves and each other; it194 G. D. Rawnsley
makes us more aware of the ideological assumptions and biases that determine
and (re)negotiate all our social relations – cultural or otherwise; and it prioritises
how audiences construct and filter information and images.
Consider the depiction of Asians in cinema. Representation of the “other” in
American cinema has often conformed to stereotypes that have reflected the
particular social and political climate of the time in which the movies were made. In
1935, Anna May Wong was passed over to play O-Lan in the film version of The Good
Earth in favour of white actress Luise Rainer at a time when Asian actors were
prohibited from playing the lead in Hollywood movies. A string of white actors cast
as Asians followed: Lee J. Cobb as a Chinese warlord in The Left Hand of God (1955);
Marlon Brando as a comic Japanese character in The Teahouse of the August Moon
(1956), an embarrassing role for The Wild One and future Godfather; John Wayne as
Genghis Khan in The Conqueror (1956); Peter Sellers as a stereotype Indian doctor in
The Party (1968); Mickey Rooney giving an offensive portrayal of the Japanese Mr
Yunioshi in Breakfast at Tiffany’s (1961). Famously, the British actor Christopher Lee
played Chinese super villain Fu Man Chu in a series of films, reinforcing the mystery
and threat of the “Yellow Peril” during the Cold War. Revealing the “hard character”
of soft power (Mattern 2005), such caricatures of the exotic, sometimes comical and
often evil Asian “other” suggests that cinema can define and reinforce social mores
rather than challenge them and reinforces biases towards the perceived relevance of
“cultural imperialism” in global cultural flows.
The hard character of soft power has driven some government to feel insecure
when faced with cultural imports. They see deliberate acts of sabotage against
national cultural values that will advance the political or strategic interests of the
source. Lee (2011, 22) describes the hard character of soft power: a “target audience”,
he says, “may find a sender’s promotion of cultural and political values (such as
democracy to be an act of coercion, not persuasion). A sender’s cultural and political
values themselves may be interpreted … to be the potential source of threat to
society.”
While there is still much suspicion of China’s Confucius Institutes and CGTN
(China Global Television News) as agents of propaganda (Rawnsley 2015), China’s
government has long accused western cultural engagement of having hard char-
acteristics. President Hu Jintao talked of a “strategic plot” to westernise and divide
China through culture, and called on the Chinese people to “remain vigilant and take
forceful measures …” in response (Wong 2012). More recently, President Xi Jinping
has advocated a “cultural renaissance” to renew China’s “cultural self-confidence”
and challenge western values (Chen 2016). This discourse revolves around a
perceived threat from non-Chinese cultures that aim to change China. Given the way
China has plugged into the flow of global commercial products – Starbucks, Mac-
Donalds and Ikea are now as dominant in international shopping malls as localCultural Outreach: Cinema and Soft Power 195
retailers – and their popularity makes it difficult to imagine how the government
may hold back the tide. China has taken strict measures to stem local access to
foreign cultural products, most famously blocking access to Facebook, Twitter, and
Google, while also censoring foreign television news channels and western films
available on local streaming services. Starbucks, it seems, is far less of a threat to
Chinese cultural identity than Hollywood.
6 Some Thoughts About China
Spending circa. $US10 billion per annum on its soft power strategy, the People’s
Republic of China has a strong capacity for cultural engagement. A look back
through recent history confirms that the governments of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and
Xi Jinping have recognised the value of culture and have called for the strategic
deployment of cultural assets, including cinema, as part of China’s foreign policy. In
2003, Hu Jintao declared a new foreign policy of China’s “peaceful rise” as reas-
surance to the international community that a rising China was not a threat. This
policy was reflected in China’s new commitment to showcasing its power and
influence after keeping a “low profile” during the Deng Xiaoping era. Hu Jintao was
the first to use the phrase “soft power” to indicate China’s growing use of culture to
reinforce the country’s peaceful rise, and introduced the discourse of the “harmo-
nious world” (d’Hooghe 2007). Hu said that “culture has become a more and more
important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing sig-
nificance in the competition in overall national strength” (Xinhuanet 2007). Under
Hu Jintao’s leadership, the Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms spear-
headed China’s cultural engagement. The first Confucius Institute opened in 2004 in
Seoul; by 2019, there were 530 across the world but many had been forced to close
following public and political pressure from their host countries.
President Xi Jinping has reinforced the value of culture to China’s external
engagement. For example, the final communiqué of the 17th Central Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party in 2007 called on China to “build our country
into a socialist cultural superpower”, with Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” and Belt
and Road Initiative, building on memories of the great Silk Roads of the past,
leading the way. Cai Mingzhao, president of Xinhua and former vice minister of
the Propaganda Department responsible for overseas publicity, said in 2013 that
promoting Xi’s vision of the Chinese Dream would be the priority of external
engagement (Cai 2013); and in the same year Liu Yunshan, in charge of China’s
propaganda, ordered that the idea of the Chinese Dream be included in all school
textbooks (Economist, 4 May 2013).196 G. D. Rawnsley
The key objectives of such programmes are increasing familiarity with China
and changing the global conversation about the country, challenging the alleged
distortions and biases about the country reported by western (i.e. non-Chinese)
media organisations. There have been claims that the image of China “in world
opinion is seriously inconsistent with the actual situation” (Zhao 2012, ii) and thus
the need for China to “present an accurate picture of itself” and “help foreign publics
learn about the real China” (People’s Daily, 30 March 2007). President Xi himself has
encouraged the media to “tell China’s story well, spread China’s voice well, let the
world know a three-dimensional, colourful China …” The president has also
suggested increasing “China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better
communicate China’s messages to the world”.
Wang Guoqing, the Vice-Director of the State Council Information Office
(SCIO) explained to the World Economic Forum in 2010: “What is on out top
agenda is to find a way accepted by other nations to tell China’s story and help the
international community understand China” (quoted in Shambaugh 2013, 11).
What is interesting in this discourse is the absence of any of the language used in
cultural diplomacy: there are no references to mutual respect, mutual understand-
ing, and mutual tolerance. Rather, China’s reasons for undertaking cultural outreach
are defensive: it is not designed to engage with the world, but to preach and change
it to meet China’s interests.
Cindy Wong discussed the value of “China-sponsored” Chinese language film
festivals, claiming they “embody a deliberate effort by the PRC to show the world the
“new China”, a form of transnational diplomacy through film, with business
opportunities” (Wong 2015, 20). However, the bottom line is that cultural engage-
ment works best when governments leave the cultural industries alone to produce
appealing, and sometimes challenging works of art. C. Huygens was correct to claim
that “It is especially its distance to power and issues of the day that makes art
valuable in our understanding of societies and in international relations. It is the
independence of arts that cultural diplomacy should cherish and support” (Huygens
2008, 18).
When thinking about soft power – and especially Chinese soft power
“projected” through cinema – it is possible to argue that precisely those movies not
designed deliberately as “soft power” tools communicate the most powerful mes-
sage. Distance from government helps their credibility, the currency of modern
strategic communications. This is suggested in the need to balance market and state
imperatives, as noted by Chris Berry (2015), a prominent scholar of Chinese cinema:
[M]any corporations have had to take on board the Chinese government’s concerns about how
it and China are depicted in films. But the government has had to set aside many of its politicalCultural Outreach: Cinema and Soft Power 197
doctrines of the past, and must now play by the logic of the market to realise its soft power
goals.
Wanning Sun (2018) has talked about “soft power by accident”, which is a useful
way of discussing the role of cinema. Soft power by accident refers to the attraction
of cultural products that do not pursue overt political ambitions and are neither
created nor curated by government: “… [C]ultural products with genuine soft
power potential can only come from creative enterprises that arise organically
within the non-state sector” (Sun 2018, 208). There is a huge difference – in terms of
intention, production and audience reaction – between Love for Life (Zui ai, 2011),
the story of villagers infected and affected by HIV, and The Founding of the Republic
(Jianguo daye, 2009), a marshal retelling of China’s modern history. The lesson is
simple: movies produced independently following no political or ideological
agenda, and perhaps offering a more critical perspective of China (though within
accepted boundaries) have far greater soft power potential than cinema influenced
directly by political forces (Zhou 2015). That a film about HIV and discrimination
against those who suffer from it could be made and distributed reveals more than
The Founding of the Republic about the transformation of modern China.
Moreover, the idea of “soft power by accident” chimes with the previous
discussion about definition. I argue that soft power is less about a pre-determined
“strategy” and more about doing the right thing for the sake of doing the right
thing. It is a natural by-product of political behaviour. Of course the distinction is
not as clear as this either/or argument suggests.
China is especially interesting because of the absence of a completely
independent cinema industry, but the days of the monolithic state apparatus
funding, producing, and distributing movies for propaganda purposes alone are
long gone. Rather, since China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001,
its cinema industry is built around sets of complex relationships between
corporate players and the state – between public and private actors. For example,
whereas The Founding of the Republic was quite clearly motivated by nationalist
and political ambitions, where should we place the success of Wolf Warrior
(Zhanlang 2015), Wolf Warrior 2 (Zhanlang 2, 2017) – the all-time highest grossing
movie in China – and The Wandering Earth (Liulang diqiu, 2019)? These carry
clear patriotic narratives about China’s renewed strength embedded within
popular genres. Wolf Warrior has even given rise to a term to describe China’s
more aggressive style of political engagement, especially via social media – Wolf
Warrior Diplomacy – that became especially popular during the 2020 Covid
pandemic.
I also suggest that it is difficult to talk about cinema contributing to “national”
soft power because of the declining relevance of the state in cultural activities. It is198 G. D. Rawnsley
now much more common to identify the transnational character of cinema so that
it becomes increasingly difficult to locate a single film as belonging to a particular
place. If talent, both before and behind the camera, and funding are sourced from
many different locations, is there such a thing as “national” cinema? This was the
major finding of our study into Hero (Yingxiong 2002) that concluded this is a
strong example of a transnational rather than Chinese movie (Rawnsley and
Rawnsley 2010). Cinema today is far more involved than many other cultural and
artistic endeavours in (re)negotiating the global and the local. The modern
hybridity of global cinema, especially in an age of streaming, subscription chan-
nels, uploads and downloads (and particularly when cinemas across the world
remain closed because of the Covid-19 pandemic) challenges and rejects the simple
dichotomy of “either/or”.
The ideas of the “transnational” film with Chinese involvement will become
more pronounced. Seeking commercial profit rather than ideological or soft power
edification, Alibaba invested in the production of Hollywood blockbuster, Mission
Impossible – Rogue Nation (2015); and the China Film Group helped finance Furious
7 (2015), the latest in the Fast and the Furious franchise. Other Chinese companies,
including Huayi Bros, LeTV, and the Dalian Wanda Group have all become serious
Hollywood players: Wanda’s power is especially interesting to watch as it bought
the Los Angeles studio, Legendary Pictures, producers of Jurassic World (2015)
among other blockbusters. While Chinese movies may have limited soft power
impact overseas, the American film industry is particularly vulnerable to China’s
commercial power, while China remains an extraordinarily large market for
American movies. Some Hollywood-made films now use Chinese themes and
actors to attract audiences there and thus increase revenue. X-Men: Days of Future
Past (2014) featured Fan Bingbing in a leading role, while the casting of Jiang Wen
and Donnie Yen in Rogue One: A Star Wars Story (2016) helped the film’s popularity
in China. In Gravity (2013) a stranded astronaut played by Sandra Bullock uses a
Chinese spacecraft, the Shenzhou, docked in the Tiangong space station, to return
safely to Earth.1
7 Conclusions: the Limits of Cultural Engagement
Frank Ninkovich (1966, 58) suggested that cultural engagement is ultimately an
“act of faith”, that it has limited capacity to “move the needle” and change
opinions, attitudes, and behaviour. Moreover, while Nicholas J. Cull (2008; 2019) is
1 There are many examples of movies co-produced between China and the US since 2000. Some of
them are listed in Lee (2017: 79).Cultural Outreach: Cinema and Soft Power 199
absolutely correct to emphasise the importance of listening in public and cultural
diplomacy – after all, if we believe that cultural engagement is about building
relationships, mutual trust, and respect, then listening and actively hearing are
vital parts of the process – we must accept that sometimes we are neither heard nor
communicating in a way that encourages listening. As Milton C, Cummings (2003,
1) has commented, cultural diplomacy “can … be more of a one-way street than a
two-way exchange, as when a nation concentrates its efforts on promoting
national language, explaining its policies and point of view, or ‘telling its story’ to
the world.”
Can culture overturn negative images of governments and nations among
foreign publics? After all, watching Hollywood movies does not necessarily translate
into growing acceptance of, or sympathy for the behaviour of the American gov-
ernment, especially when its military are engaged in unpopular interventions
overseas or their President refers to the developing world as “shithole countries”.
Similarly, the Chinese government cannot expect the movie industry to overturn
negative depictions of its behaviour. In fact, as the global uproar in 2020 about
Disney filming part of Mulan in Xinjiang demonstrates, non-political cinema can be
easily politicised. It is also interesting that China’s discourses on the value of culture
in foreign relations are defensive. They emphasise the need to tell the China story, to
correct distorted images of the country, and challenge western culture and values.
Absent is any discussion of mutual understanding, respect, or tolerance, the moti-
vations claimed for cultural diplomacy in much of the scholarship on the subject.
Cultural engagement, including via cinema, is not always accepted as a
benign activity because audiences may interpret cultural products in a way that
is completely opposite to the intentions of its creator. The objective may be
mutual understanding, respect and tolerance – the familiar discourse of cultural
diplomacy – but the audience may detect more sinister motivations. This means
that the outcome of cultural engagement is determined by audiences, not the
producers (Nye 2008, xiii), and that there is no guarantee that interest in cultural
products among foreign audiences will translate into tangible outcomes: there is
no direct or necessary correlation between consuming a cultural product and a
change in opinion or behaviour (McConnell 2008; Watanbe 2006). Remember,
one man’s public diplomacy or cultural engagement is another man’s propa-
ganda: the audience decides the label.
At the end of the day, how can one determine whether or not culture has
moved the needle of opinion? When we consider cinema it is (relatively) easy to
count how many viewers watched in a cinema or in international film festival a
movie made in China. More challenging is evaluating the qualitative response of
individuals who encounter China within a cultural framework. Have their opinions
about, or behaviour towards China changed as a consequence of watching its200 G. D. Rawnsley
cinematic output? Year on year global public opinion polls such as those
conducted by Pew, Gallup, the BBC, and the Lowy Institute repeatedly tell the same
story: despite the c.US$10 billion spent by Beijing on “soft power” initiatives,
public opinion across the world remains (at best) lukewarm or (at worst) negative
about China (Wang 2017: 135–6). These polls suggest “that the issue of China’s
global reputation transcends the scope of public diplomacy, making it crucial to
look much deeper into the fundamental reasons why China has come to be seen in
an increasingly dubious light on the international stage …” (Wang 2017: 136). The
needle really is difficult to move.
And anyway, to which audience are we referring? Given that most Chinese
movies are confined to art house cinemas they are watched by viewers already
familiar with China and Chinese cinema, rather than the mass audiences who
prefer a Hollywood blockbuster without subtitles. Wolf Warrior and Wandering
Earth may have done very well at the Chinese box office, but they have been less
successful outside China. Less than 2% of their box office revenue was earned in
overseas markets, compared with Hollywood movies which receive c.50–90% of
their revenue from global distribution. Therefore the soft power impact and
commercial success of these Chinese blockbusters outside China is limited.
In addressing these points, especially the important issue of impact, I quote at
length John Brown, a member of the US Foreign Service from 1981 until 2003
specialising in press and cultural affairs. “Of course,” he writes, “I would never
claim that [arts diplomacy] is a panacea for the low esteem held towards America
overseas …”
Arts diplomacy … will not suddenly move the needle of global public opinion in favour of the
US or its foreign policy in the way gasoline makes a motor move. Foreigners will not instantly
begin to drink Diet Coke or eat pounds after pounds of US frozen chicken if they know more
American poetry. Nor is it self-evident … that art … will necessarily lead to virtue abroad as
we Americans see it – for example, to less anti-Americanism in countries that “hate us”. How
many terrorists will automatically embrace American values after reading Moby Dick or
listening to Negro spirituals? Very few, if any, is the answer to this question, often posed by
those who think the taxpayer-supported promotion of art is a waste of time and resources
(Brown 2009, 80).
However, as Brown goes on to argue, this does not mean that such cultural
engagement should not occur. We live in an age of new security threats, the likes of
which – a global pandemic – we have never faced before in any of our lifetimes;
while the rise of populism and nationalism is determined to divide “us” from
“them”. Perhaps it is in such circumstances that we need most urgently to build
cultural bridges.Cultural Outreach: Cinema and Soft Power 201
References
Arndt, R. T. 2005. The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century.
New York: Potomac Books, Inc.
Barber, B. R. 1992. “McWorld vs. Jihad.” The Atlantic Monthly, (March). Also available at http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1992/03/jihad-vs-mcworld/303882.
Berger, M. 2008. “Introduction.” In Bridge the Gap, or Mind the Gap? Culture in Western-Arab
Relations, 3–7. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
Berry, C. 2015. “Anxieties about Chinese Film Industry Play into the Outdated Fear of “Yellow
Peril.” The Conversation, 21 August. Also available at theconversation.com/anxieties-about-
chinese-film-industry-play-into-anoutdated-fear-of-yellow-peril-30325.
Brown, J. 2009. “Arts Diplomacy: The Neglected Aspect of Cultural Diplomacy.” In Routledge
Handbook of Public Diplomacy, edited by N. Snow, and P. M. Taylor, 79–81. London:
Routledge.
Cai, M. Z. 2013. “The Chinese Dream and its Appeal.” China Pictorial. Also available at http://www.
chinapictorial.com.cn/en/features/txt/2013-12/08/content_582902.htm.
Channick, J. 2005. “The artist as cultural diplomat.” In American Theatre Magazine, May/June.
Chen, H. 2016. “Introduction to Cultural Self-Confidence.” International Journal of Arts and
Commerce 5 (9) December: 75–80.
Coombs, P. H 1964. The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs. New
York: Harper & Row.
Cull, N. J. 2008. “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories.” Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 616 (March): 31–54.
Cull, N. J. 2019. Public Diplomacy: Foundations for Global Engagement in the Digital Age.
Cambridge: Polity.
Cummings, M. C. 2003. Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey.
Washington, DC: Center for Arts and Culture.
d’Hooghe, I. 2007. “The Rise of China’s Public Diplomacy.” Clingendael Diplomacy Papers, 12.
Also available at http://clingendael.info/publications/2007/20070700_cdsp_paper_
hooghe.pdf.
Delores, J. 1996. Education: The Treasure Within. Paris: UNESCO Publishing.
Economist. 2013. “Chasing the Chinese dream.” Economist, 4 May 2013.
Freeman, D. 2013. “Cultural Policy-Making in the Free Trade Era: An Evaluation of the Impact of
Current World Trade Organization Negotiations on Audio-Visual Industries.” International
Journal of Cultural Policies 9 (3): 285–98.
Hong, E. 2014. The Birth of Korean Cool: How One Nation is Conquering the World Through its Pop
Culture. London: Simon & Schuster.
Huygens, C. 2008. “The Art of Diplomacy, the Diplomacy of Art.” In Bridge the Gap, or Mind the
Gap? Culture in Western-Arab Relations, 17–29. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of
International Relations.
Kim, H. S. 2017. “The Korean Wave as Soft Power Public Diplomacy.” In The Routledge Handbook of
Soft Power, edited by N. Chitty, L. Ji, G. D. Rawnsley, and C. Hayden, 414–24. London:
Routledge.
Lacqueur, W. 1994. “Save Public Diplomacy: Broadcasting America’s Message Matters.” Foreign
Affairs 73 (5) September – October: 19–24.202 G. D. Rawnsley
Lee, S. W. 2011. “The Theory and Reality of Soft Power: Practical Approaches in East Asia.” In Public
Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia, edited by S. J. Lee, and J. Melissen, 11–32. New York:
Palgrave.
Lee, C. S. 2017. “Foreign Capital in the Chinese Media Market After Joining the World Trade
Organization: Co-produced Films in Public Diplomacy and Investment Policies.” In Global
Media and Public Diplomacy in Sino-Western Relations, edited by J. Gao, C. Ingram, and
P. Lee, 69–85. London: Routledge.
Mattern, J. B. 2005. “Why “Soft Power” isn’t so Soft: Representational Force and the
Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics.” Millennium: Journal of
International Studies 33 (3): 583–612.
McConnell, D. L. M. 2008. “Japan’s Image Problem and the Soft Power Solution.” In Soft Power
Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States, edited by
Y. Watanabe, and D. L. McConnell, 18–36. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Mitchell, J. M. 1986. International Cultural Relations. London: Allen & Unwin.
Ninkovich, F. 1966. US Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy. New York: Foreign Policy
Association.
Nye, J. S. 2008. “Forward.” In Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and national assets of Japan and
the United States, edited by Y. Watanabe, and D. L. McConnell, ix–xiv. Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe.
Rawnsley, G. D. 2015. “To Know Us is to Love Us: Public Diplomacy and International Broadcasting
in Contemporary Russia and China.” Politics 35 (3–4): 273–86.
Rawnsley, G. D., and M. Y. T. Rawnsley, eds. 2010. Global Chinese Cinema: The Culture and Politics
of Hero. London: Routledge.
Raymond, J. F. 2000. L”action culturelle extérieure de la France. Paris: La Documentation française.
Rivera, T. 2015. “Distinguishing Cultural Relations from Cultural Diplomacy. CPD Perspectives on
Public Diplomacy.” Also available at https://www.cultureinexternalrelations.eu/2015/01/
20/distinguishingcultural-relations-from-cultural-diplomacy/.
Shambaugh, D. 2013. China Goes Global: The Partial Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sun, W. 2018. “Soft Power by Accident or by Design: If You Are the One and Chinese Television.” In
Screening China’s Soft Power, edited by P. Voci, and L. Hui. Abingdon: Routledge.
Tomlinson, J. 1999. Globalization and Culture. London: Polity.
US Department of State. 2005. Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy. Washington
DC: Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy. Also available at http://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/54374.pdf.
Varma, P. 2007. “Culture as an Instrument of Diplomacy.” In Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and
Opportunities, edited by A. Sinah, and M. Mohta, 1140–41. New Delhi: Academic Foundation.
Wang, Y. 2017. “When a Rising Giant Tries to Smile: Explaining the Quixotic Quest of China’s Media
Diplomacy in Australia and Beyond.” In Global Media and Public Diplomacy in Sino-Western
Relations, edited by J. Gao, C. Ingram, and P. Lee, 126–42. London: Routledge.
Watanabe, Y. 2006. Revisiting Soft Power. New York: Japan Foundation Center for Global
Partnership. Also available at http://www.cpg.org/articleswindow.php.
Wong, E. 2012. “China’s President Lashes Out at Western Culture.” New York Times, January 3,
2012.
Wong, C. 2015. “Chinese Film Festivals.” In Directory of World Cinema: China 2, edited by
G. Bettinson, 16–21. Chicago: Intellect.
Wyszomirski, M. J., C. Burgess, and C. Peila. 2003. “International Cultural Relations: A Multi-
Country Conparison.” Public Diplomacy Research Series 1 (1): 1–29.Cultural Outreach: Cinema and Soft Power 203
Xinhuanet. 2007. Hu Jintao Calls for Enhancing “Soft Power” of Chinese Culture. 15 October 2007.
Also available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/15/content_6883748.htm.
Zamorano, M. M. 2016. “Reframing Cultural Diplomacy: The Instrumentalization of Culture Under
the Soft Power Theory.” Culture Unbound 8 (2): 165–86.
Zhao, Q. 2012. How China Communicates: Public Diplomacy in a Global Age. Beijing: Foreign
Language Press.
Zhou, Y. 2015. “Pursuing Soft Power Through Cinema: Censorship and Double Standards in
Mainland China.” Journal of Chinese Cinemas 9 (3): 239–52.
Bionote
Gary D. Rawnsley
University of Nottingham Ningbo China (UNNC), Ningbo, China
Gary.Rawnsley@nottingham.edu.cn
Gary D. Rawnsley is Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences and Professor of Public
Diplomacy at the University of Nottingham Ningbo China. Working at the intersection of
international relations and international communications, his research focuses on public and
cultural diplomacy, soft power, propaganda, and international broadcasting. He has published on
cinema, including books on Zhang Yimou’s Hero and the cinema of Wei Te-sheng. He is currently
co-editing the Routledge Handbook of Soft Power (2nd edition) and the Edward Elgar Handbook of
Political Propaganda. He is Adjunct Professor at Asia University in Taichung and Guangdong
University of Foreign Studies.You can also read
