Crossrail 2 BRIEFING PAPER - Number CBP 8481 , 23 January 2019 - UK Parliament
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BRIEFING PAPER
Number CBP 8481 , 23 January 2019
Crossrail 2 By Andrew Haylen
Contents:
1. Background
2. Safeguarding
3. The proposed scheme and
route
4. The business case for
Crossrail 2
5. Funding & financing
6. Recent political developments
7. Challenges for Crossrail 2
www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | papers@parliament.uk | @commonslibrary
2 Crossrail 2
Contents
Summary 3
1. Background 4
1.1 Who is responsible for delivering Crossrail 2? 5
2. Safeguarding 6
3. The proposed scheme and route 8
4. The business case for Crossrail 2 12
4.1 Benefits 13
Transport benefits 13
Wider Economic Benefits 14
4.2 Costs 15
5. Funding & financing 19
6. Recent political developments 24
7. Challenges for Crossrail 2 26
7.1 Funding 26
7.2 Political support 26
Cover page image copyright Transport for London
3 Commons Library Briefing, 23 January 2019
Summary
Crossrail 2 is a long-trailed scheme to build a new rail line along the Chelsea-Hackney
corridor. It is being jointly funded by the Mayor of London and the Secretary of State for
Transport, and subsequently jointly advanced by Transport for London (TfL) and Network
Rail, with support from the Department for Transport (DfT).
TfL has published three consultations on the design and development of Crossrail 2 and
considered two detailed route options for the scheme:
1 Metro option - a stand-alone Underground line from Wimbledon to Alexandra
Palace to provide a frequency of up to 40 trains per hour and a peak capacity of up
to 38,500 passengers per hour per direction. The trains proposed in this option
would be shorter than the regional option, with a tunnel diameter of 5.5 m, the
same as for the DLR.
2 Regional option - would be similar in operation to Crossrail. The system is more
extensive, both geographically than the Metro Option and in the length and
capacity of the trains that would be used. The alignment of the central section
would be similar but would be extended at both the northern and southern ends of
the route onto the suburban rail lines.
The Regional Option had the greatest overall level of support in the public consultations
and TfL carried it forward as its preferred scheme, though the exact design and scope of
the project is still up for consideration.
Crossrail 2 will deliver several benefits to the London transport system, particularly in
terms of easing congestion on other parts of the network and improving travel time and
accessibility for those residents who will be connected by the new line. The scheme is also
likely to deliver wider economic benefits through productivity improvements, economic
growth and employment prospects along the supply chain of the project. The latest
publicly available business case for the scheme estimates that it would produce £1.8 of
benefit for every £1 of cost (a benefit-cost ratio, or BCR of 1.8). When wider economic
benefits are included, this rises to a BCR of 2.0.
Capital costs for Crossrail 2 were estimated by TfL in 2016 at £32.6 billion. As announced
by the Chancellor in the 2017 Autumn Budget, the DfT and TfL have commissioned an
Independent Affordability Review to examine ways of making the scheme more
affordable. There are reports that the capital costs may increase to more than £45 billion.
It is not clear at this stage whether the scheme will be delivered, and it rests, to a large
extent, on whether costs can be contained and whether London can raise its share of the
funding. In a best-case scenario, Crossrail 2 is unlikely to be delivered and operational until
at least the early to mid-2030s.
Information on other rail projects and aspects of how the railways are run can be found
on the Railways Topical Page of the Parliament website. For more detailed information
about the Crossrail scheme, see the House of Commons Library Briefing Paper Crossrail
(Elizabeth Line).4 Crossrail 2
1. Background
Crossrail 2 is a long-trailed scheme to build a new rail line along the
‘Chelsea-Hackney’ corridor (from Cheshunt and Alexandra Palace in the
north via central London to Wimbledon in the south and possibly
further to one or more of Chessington, Shepperton and/or Epsom).
A west to north-east line was first proposed in 1944, when the concept
of cross-London tunnelled rail services was first introduced in the
Greater London Plan. Following this, in 1974, the London Rail Study
identified the Chelsea-Hackney Underground line as a possible scheme
to serve future demand. 1
The latest iteration of Crossrail 2 dates to the January 1989 Central
London Rail Study, which was commissioned by the Thatcher
Government to look at ways of addressing overcrowding on the London
rail system. It suggested a number of new lines and extensions,
including East-West Crossrail (Crossrail 1) and the Chelsea-Hackney line
(Crossrail 2). The East-West Crossrail had an outline capital cost
(including rolling stock) of £885 million, while the Chelsea-Hackney line
had an outline capital cost of £1.33 billion. 2
Safeguarding directions (i.e. legally protecting an area from conflicting
development) for the Chelsea-Hackney line were issued by the Secretary
of State for Transport under the Town and Country Planning General
Development Order 1988. Initial directions were issued on 7 February
1991 and revised directions issued on 12 November 1991. 3 At about
the same time (in 1992), the cost of Crossrail 1 was estimated at £1.94
billion and the Chelsea-Hackney line at £2 billion (both in 1992 prices). 4
In 1999 the Labour Government asked the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA)
to study the requirements for extra passenger capacity to and through
London. 5 The London East West Study was published in late 2000. It
recommended that both the East-West Crossrail and Hackney-Chelsea
routes be resurrected, and schemes developed to construct them. 6
A joint venture company, Cross London Rail Links Ltd (CLRLL), was
formed by Transport for London (TfL) and the SRA in 2001 and
consulted with stakeholders on possible routes for Crossrail 1 and a
feasibility study for a possible Crossrail 2 scheme. In the end, only
Crossrail 1 was taken forward.
Crossrail 2 was revived in 2008 when a route for the Chelsea-Hackney
line was safeguarded. It linked the District line’s Wimbledon branch with
the Central line’s Epping branch via Parsons Green, King’s Road, Sloane
1
Crossrail 2, History [accessed 4 January 2019]
2
DoT, British Rail and LRT, Central London Rail Study, January 1989, pp13-15
3
HC Deb 12 November 1992, c963W
4
HC Deb 3 March 1992, c87W
5
There are further details about the SRA in HC Library briefing paper SN1344
6
SRA, London East-West Study, November 20005 Commons Library Briefing, 23 January 2019
Square, Victoria, Piccadilly Circus, Tottenham Court Road, King’s Cross
St. Pancras, Angel, Essex Road, Dalston Junction, Hackney Central,
Homerton and Leytonstone (more detail around safeguarding can be
found in Section 2). As noted by Crossrail 2, “Detailed “optioneering”
then considered many possible route variations to determine the one
that best addressed transport and growth challenges.” 7
Having been through three major consultations (Section 3), the project
is now in the later stages of its initial design phase, ahead of a possible
approvals process via a hybrid bill; though the prospects for the scheme
remain uncertain in the current political climate and given developments
with Crossrail 1. The more recent political developments and the
prospects for the scheme are discussed in Section 6.
1.1 Who is responsible for delivering
Crossrail 2?
Crossrail 2 is being jointly sponsored by the Mayor of London and the
Secretary of State for Transport. Since April 2016, TfL’s Managing
Director of Crossrail 2, Michèle Dix CBE, has led an integrated TfL and
Network Rail project team in developing the scheme, with support from
the DfT.
Crossrail 2 also has a Programme Board, which was established in July
2016, and whose job is to “make recommendations to the Mayor of
London and Secretary of State for Transport on matters regarding the
development of Crossrail 2”. 8 The Programme Board Acts as an advisory
forum for the Crossrail 2 team and their work supporting these reviews,
not as a decision-making body. Organisations represented on the
Programme Board include:
• Crossrail 2
• Department for Transport
• Transport for London
• Network Rail
• HM Treasury
• Department for Communities and Local Government
• Greater London Authority
• Infrastructure and Projects Authority
The Programme Board also includes several independent members with
international experience in major project delivery. The Board is chaired
by Lord Adonis, former chair of the National Infrastructure Commission
and Labour Secretary of State for Transport. 9
7
Crossrail 2, History [accessed 4 January 2019]
8
Crossrail 2, Programme Board [accessed 12 April 2017]
9
Appointed in 2016, see: DfT press notice, Lord Adonis proposed as new chair of
Crossrail 2, 24 May 20166 Crossrail 2
2. Safeguarding
Safeguarding is an established part of the planning system, designed to
protect land which has been earmarked for major infrastructure from
conflicting developments which might otherwise occur.
Safeguarding Directions were first issued on 7 February 1991 under
articles 14(1) and 18(3) of the Town and Country Planning General
Development Order 1988. The Safeguarding Directions safeguarded the
route corridor for the proposed Chelsea-Hackney Railway Line Project
from Parsons Green to Leytonstone, Grosvenor Road to Ebury Bridge
and at Wimbledon and Putney Bridge. 10
The Safeguarding Directions issued on 7 February 1991 were replaced
by new Directions issued by the Secretary of State for Transport on 12
November 1991 under article 14(1), 18(3) and 30 of the 1988 Order.
These were replaced by new Directions issued by the Secretary of State
for Transport on 18 June 2008 under articles 10(3), 14(1) and 27 of the
Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order
1995 to safeguard the whole of the proposed route alignment of the
Chelsea-Hackney line:
a. Between Parsons Green and Leytonstone;
b. Between Battersea Park and Ebury Bridge; and
c. At Wimbledon and Putney Bridge. 11
In 2009 the Department for Transport (DfT) requested that Transport for
London (TfL) bring forward proposals to review and amend the
Safeguarding Directions for the Chelsea-Hackney line. The review took
place in the context of the Mayor of London’s Transport Strategy
published in May 2010. Following this review, new Safeguarding
Directions (‘the Directions’) were issued under articles 16(4), 25(1) and
29(6) of the Town and Country Planning (Development Management
Procedure) (England) Order 2010 to safeguard the central section of the
proposed route alignment:
a. Between Wimbledon and New Southgate;
b. Between Stoke Newington and Tottenham Hale;
c. Between Shoreditch Park and Hackney Central. 12
More recent developments have required changes and extensions to the
safeguarded route. In October 2014 TfL and Network Rail lodged plans
with the Government for safeguarding a preferred route for Crossrail 2.
The Government published a consultation on safeguarding the route in
November 2014. 13 The main changes to be safeguarded were:
10
DfT, Guidance and explanatory notes for local planning authorities to accompany
safeguarding directions issues for the Crossrail 2 project, 24 March 2015
11
ibid.
12
ibid.
13
Mayor of London press notice, ‘‘Crossrail 2 vital to support London’s growth’, says
Mayor’, 28 October 20147 Commons Library Briefing, 23 January 2019
• The route from Wimbledon to Victoria using the District line
between Wimbledon and Fulham Broadway to be altered in
favour of one via Tooting Broadway and either World’s End,
Chelsea, or Kings Road, Chelsea;
• A deviation between Tottenham Court Road and Angel to an
alignment north of the Euston Road;
• The approach to Dalston north of Angel changed to a north–
south axis rather than the previous east–west one;
• The route from Dalston Junction to Leytonstone and connection
with the Central line abandoned in favour of a route to Alexandra
Palace and New Southgate;
• A possible branch to Hackney Central safeguarded between Angel
and Dalston Junction;
• The routes to New Southgate and Tottenham Hale to diverge at a
second junction at South Tottenham; and
• Connection into the Network Rail lines at Tottenham Hale. 14
The response to the consultation document and new safeguarding
directions were issued in March 2015. 15 The 2015 safeguarded route is
available to interactively view on the Crossrail 2 website and for more
detail around safeguarding for Crossrail 2, see the Crossrail 2 website.
In February 2018, a TfL Programmes and Investment Committee paper
acknowledged that there was a risk emerging related to land and
property costs because the existing safeguarding directions do not
reflect the strategic outline business case route alignment. It had
previously been intended that a revision to the directions would be
made following a route-wide consultation in early 2018. However, that
consultation has been postponed pending the outcome of the funding,
financing and affordability work. 16
14
DfT, Crossrail 2 Safeguarding Direction Consultation Document, 20 November 2014,
pp12-13
15
DfT, Summary of responses and the government's response to the consultation on
updating the safeguarding for Crossrail 2, 24 March 2015; and Crossrail 2,
Safeguarding [accessed 12 April 2017]
16
TfL, Programmes and Investment Committee – Crossrail 2, 21 February 20188 Crossrail 2
3. The proposed scheme and
route
To date, TfL has published three consultations on the design and
development of Crossrail 2. The initial consultation in May 2013 was
conducted to provide stakeholders and the general public with
information on the need for and background to the proposed new line
and the development of possible future options. 17 It specifically
proposed two detailed route options for Crossrail 2: 18
1 Metro option - a stand-alone Underground line from
Wimbledon to Alexandra Palace to provide a frequency of up to
40 trains per hour and a peak capacity of up to 38,500
passengers per hour per direction. The trains proposed in this
option would be shorter than the regional option, with a tunnel
diameter of 5.5 m, the same as for the DLR. This option shared
most of its core route with the 2008 safeguarded alignment. 19
Crossrail 2 metro option 20
2 Regional option - would be similar in operation to Crossrail. The
system is more extensive geographically than the Metro Option
and in the length and capacity of the trains that would be used.
The alignment of the central section would be similar, but would
be extended at both the northern and southern ends of the route
onto the suburban rail lines. The route could be built in stages and
eventually serve the area shown in the figure below. 21
17
TfL, Crossrail 2 Consultation, 14 May 2013
18
TfL, Crossrail 2: Summary of Option Development, May 2013
19
ibid.
20
TfL, Crossrail 2 metro option, May 2013
21
op. cit., Crossrail 2: Summary of Option Development9 Commons Library Briefing, 23 January 2019
Crossrail 2 region option 22
There was an overwhelmingly positive response to the initial
consultation. Of the more than 13,000 replies received, 96% of the
public respondents supported the principle of Crossrail 2. Support was
high for both route options, but the Regional Option had the greatest
overall level of support. 23 TfL said it would support as the preferred
route for Crossrail 2 as it:
…has the potential to generate greater benefits in terms of
accessibility, congestion relief and contribution towards
supporting London’s growth than the Metro option. Although
more expensive than the Metro option, it addresses more of
London’s long-term transport needs. 24
A second consultation was conducted in June 2014 on some potential
minor changes to the regional route option, including:
• Two route alignment options north of Angel serving Hackney or
Dalston Junction;
• An alternative option for a possible new station in Chelsea; and
• A short extension of the route from Alexandra Palace to New
Southgate. 25
22
TfL, Crossrail 2 regional option, May 2013
23
TfL, Crossrail 2 2013 Consultation – Response to issues raise, October 2013
24
TfL, Crossrail 2: Supplementary Consultation, 9 June 2014
25
For full detail, see: TfL, Crossrail 2 2014 Consultation – Non Technical Summary, June
201410 Crossrail 2
Crossrail 2 Route, as at Autumn 2015 26
TfL published a third consultation in October 2015. This was concerned
with new information relating to the preferred location of station
entrances and exits, tunnel portals, shafts, depots, and construction
worksites for the tunnelled section of the scheme, as well as proposed
service patterns. 27 In July 2016 TfL published its response to the
consultation. It stated that:
No final decisions have yet been made on the proposed route for
Crossrail 2 and this work will help to continue to develop
proposals and inform that decision. At several locations -
Wimbledon, Balham, Tooting Broadway, King's Road Chelsea,
and the decisions on which stations should be served on the New
26
Mayor of London, Mayor’s Transport Strategy, March 2018, p172
27
TfL, Crossrail 2 - third consultation, 27 October 2015; a consultation analysis was
published in March 2016, see: Steer Davies Gleave, Crossrail 2 Consultation Analysis,
17 March 201611 Commons Library Briefing, 23 January 2019
Southgate Branch- more work needs to be done to work through
the issues, which include complex engineering challenges. 28
A further public consultation was expected in autumn 2016 but none
was published. 29 Crossrail 2 published an update for the project in May
2018, again reiterating that no final decisions had been made around
the route. It has been exploring the feedback received from the 2015
consultation and has carried out further work to develop its approach,
looking at ways to reduce the impact of the proposals across the whole
of the route. Crossrail 2 intends to conduct a further route-wide public
consultation on the latest proposals following the outcome of the
Independent Affordability Review and decisions on the updated
Strategic Outline Business Case. 30
28
TfL press notice, Crossrail 2 developed further in response to community comments, 7
July 2016
29
TfL press notice, Crossrail 2 developed further in response to community comments, 7
July 2016
30
Crossrail 2, Crossrail 2 Project Update, May 201812 Crossrail 2
4. The business case for Crossrail 2
Various proposals, with accompanying business cases, for a new rail line
connecting the Chelsea-Hackney corridor have been made over the last
few decades. This section provides a snapshot of the findings from
those business cases, as well as those from the most recently available
estimates. It should be noted that the benefits, costs and ratios provided
below are not necessarily directly comparable because of changes to
scheme scope across the various appraisal and they are not in equivalent
real term prices.
The latest iteration of Crossrail 2 dates to the January 1989 Central
The latest publicly
London Rail Study, which was commissioned by the Thatcher available business
Government. The business case outlined in that study revealed that a case for the scheme
Chelsea-Hackney scheme produce 90p of benefit for every £1 of cost (a estimates that it
benefit-cost ratio, or BCR of 0.9); by comparison the East-West Crossrail would produce
had a BCR of 1.6. 31 An economic assessment published in the Strategic £1.8 of benefit for
Rail Authority’s 2000 London East-West study found that a Crossrail line every £1 of cost (a
between Wimbledon-Hackney had a BCR of 2.1. 32 benefit-cost ratio,
or BCR of 1.8).
A more recent February 2014 London First report gave the project a When wider
benefit-cost ratio of 1.8 (4.1 including Wider Economic Benefits), while economic benefits
PwC published a report commissioned by TfL in November 2014 are included, this
estimating that, without wider economic benefits, the Regional Option rises to a BCR of 2.
had a BCR of 1.8 compared to 1.3 for the Metro Option. When wider
economic benefits are included, it was estimated that the Regional
Option offered better value for money with a BCR of 2.0, compared to
1.6 for the Metro Option. This is “driven by the benefits of enhancing
accessibility to employment, especially from areas of London such as the
Upper Lea Valley.” 33
A detailed business case has been submitted to the Secretary of State by
the integrated project team but it is not publicly available. The National
Infrastructure Commission (NIC) had previously emphasised the need for
the business case to maximise the benefits of the scheme, to ensure its
deliverability and to improve its affordability. 34 Specifically, it said that
the business case should:
…include detailed options to reduce and phase the costs of the
scheme. The most promising option identified to enhance
affordability would be to delay the construction of the
northwestern branch to New Southgate. This could reduce the
costs of the initial scheme in the 2020s by around £4 billion. 35
The Crossrail 2 Growth Commission, set up by former Mayor Boris
Johnson in 2015, also commented that “further technical work on
31
DoT, British Rail and LRT, Central London Rail Study, January 1989, p19
32
SRA, London East-West Study, November 2000, p13
33
PwC, Crossrail 2 – Funding and financing study, 27 November 2014, p11
34
op cit., Transport for a world city, p58
35
op cit., Transport for a world city, p1213 Commons Library Briefing, 23 January 2019
growth opportunities and on key policy and delivery requirements
should be done as the business case is updated.” 36
4.1 Benefits
Crossrail 2 would deliver several benefits to the London transport
system, particularly in terms of easing congestion on other parts of the
network and improving travel time and accessibility for those residents
who will be connected by the new line. The scheme is also likely to
deliver wider economic benefits through productivity improvements,
economic growth and a boost in employment prospects along the
supply chain of the project. According to PwC, “the benefits will be
widely spread both within and outside the London boundaries.” 37
Transport benefits
In March 2016 the NIC published its report on London transport
infrastructure which set out several of the possible transport benefits
that would likely be delivered by the Crossrail 2 scheme and included: 38
• Provide vital relief for the congested southern end of the
Northern Line and for the Victoria Line through north-east
and central London. These are forecast to see much of the
highest levels of crowding anywhere on the Underground,
after the opening of Crossrail 1.
• Provide an alternative route, via its connection to Crossrail
1, from southwest London to the City and Canary Wharf,
reducing passenger numbers on the overcrowded Waterloo
and City line and the eastern part of the Jubilee Line.
• Relieve capacity constraints on the critically over-crowded
south-west London commuter lines coming into the capital
through Wimbledon, Clapham Junction and Waterloo by
providing an alternative route for inner suburban services
via a new tunnel from Wimbledon into Central London.
• Reduce terminal congestion at the UK’s busiest station,
Waterloo, as well as cutting crowding levels at Clapham
Junction, Vauxhall and Wimbledon, all of which are
forecast to face insuperable operational difficulties due to
the volume of passengers at peak hours.
• Release capacity on the existing south-west network for
longer distance services from Basingstoke, Woking,
Guildford, Southampton and beyond.
• Provide four tracks on the West Anglia Mainline to enable
faster services on the London-Stansted-Cambridge
Corridor.
• Link with Euston/St Pancras, to provide onwards dispersal
for those arriving into London from the north on HS2,
which is planned to be completed to Manchester and Leeds
in 2033.
36
Crossrail 2 Growth Commission, Crossrail 2 - Delivering Growth in London
and the South East, October 2016, p13
37
op cit., Crossrail 2 – Funding and financing study, p5
38
op cit., Transport for a world city, p914 Crossrail 2
• Establish a turn-up-and-go level of service at a range of
underserved destinations allowing for regeneration around
transport hubs in Hackney, Haringey, Enfield and
Tottenham.
In identifying these benefits, the NIC concluded that “no alternative
proposal or proposals have been found that effectively deal with the
challenge of Underground capacity once all proposed Underground line
upgrades are exhausted, or which can effectively mitigate the crowding
and dispersal challenges at Waterloo, Euston, Victoria and Clapham
Junction.” 39
Wider Economic Benefits
The conventional economic assessment of the Crossrail scheme is based
primarily on benefits to existing transport users. A parallel strand of
analysis was undertaken by KPMG, on behalf of TfL, to quantify the
potential Gross Value Added (GVA) benefits from the Crossrail 2
scheme as a consequence of providing capacity that removes the
transport constraints to delivering the full productivity/economic density
potential of London’s Central Activity Zones. According to the NIC, “this
work was work commissioned in response to concerns that traditional
transport appraisal methodology did not capture all of the benefits of
transport infrastructure investments of this scale.” 40
The conclusion of the work was a range of UK net GVA impact of
between £16bn and £102bn Present Value (PV) (at 2011 prices)
depending on model assumptions and nature and scale of elasticity
adopted, with a mid-point PV range of between £33bn and £47bn. The
report also found that Crossrail 2 could deliver 200,000 new homes and
support 200,000 jobs across London and the South East, with the
supply chain supporting thousands more jobs around the country,
adding over £1bn to the West Midlands economy, over £200m to the
North East and up to £170m to the Scottish economy. 41
How accurate are estimates of wider economic benefits?
It should be noted that the wider economic benefit estimated for
Crossrail 2 are based on new and developing methodologies and,
according to the NIC, “are highly uncertain in comparison to
traditional value-for-money assessments.” Such methodologies
have been applied to other major infrastructure projects, including
Crossrail 1, HS2 and the Heathrow Third Runway scheme. The main
reason for applying these methodologies is to improve the business
cases of these schemes, highlighting the more transformational
economic change that may be delivered by these ‘mega projects’,
compared to other smaller schemes.
These methodologies have not been spared from criticism. For
example, a panel of experts told the Treasury select committee that
a KMPG report into HS2's regional economic impacts published in
39
op cit., Transport for a world city, p10
40
op cit., Transport for a world city, p36
41
TfL press notice, Research confirms benefits of Crossrail 2, 28 September 201515 Commons Library Briefing, 23 January 2019
September overstated the benefits by six to eight times. Criticism
was also levelled at the way the wider economic benefits were
estimated as part of the business case for the Heathrow Third
Runway scheme. The Airports Commission’s expert economic
advisers expressed concerns about the findings generated by the S-
CGE model, cautioning the Airports Commission against “attaching
significant weight either to the absolute or relative results of the S-
CGE approach within the Economic Case.”
In short, it is reasonable to conclude, in general terms, that the
wider economic benefits of such schemes exist but it is difficult to
precisely estimate the extent of those benefits. This is reflected in
the range of estimated wider economic benefits for Crossrail 2.
The NIC recommended that “[…] TfL and DfT in conjunction with other
government departments and relevant bodies, use the next stage of
development to set out a clear, transformative plan to turn the
proposed 200,000 homes into a reality.” 42 It made two further
recommendations on key elements of the scheme. In summary these
were:
• Strong measures to maximise the new housing enabled by
the scheme should be included in the ‘London deal for
Crossrail 2’–this could include the establishment of one or
more development corporations to lead the master
planning and delivery of new housing and urban realm
provision, and revised planning guidance for the whole
route. These measures should be considered as a potential
model for improving housing delivery more widely.
• For housing provision to be a success across the whole
route, the London deal for Crossrail 2 will need to have
buy-in from the GLA and London boroughs along the route
as well as counties and boroughs outside of London which
benefit from the new line. All parties will need to ensure
the housing unlocked by Crossrail 2 is sustainable and
meets the needs of Londoners and those in commuter
regions around London. 43
4.2 Costs
The Chelsea-Hackney line had an outline capital cost of £1.33 billion
when it was estimated as part of the 1989 Central London Rail Study. 44
The costs for the project were later estimated at £2 billion (in 1992
prices) when safeguarding directions for the Chelsea-Hackney line were
issued by the Secretary of State for Transport in 1992. 45 The 2000
London East West Study estimated the cost of the scheme at £5.3
billion (in 2000 prices). 46
42
op cit., Transport for a world city, p13
43
ibid., pp12-13 [recommendations 4 and 6]
44
DoT, British Rail and LRT, Central London Rail Study, January 1989
45
HC Deb 3 March 1992, c87W
46
SRA, London East-West Study, November 2000, p1316 Crossrail 2
The February 2014 London First report, referred to earlier, put a cost
estimate on the project of £12 billion in 2012 prices (plus £8 billion
contingency). Mott MacDonald was commissioned by TfL to undertake
a full engineering feasibility and capital cost study for each of the Metro
and Regional Options, the latter of which is the option that has been
taken forward. Mott McDonald estimated that the total capital cost of
the Metro and Regional Options at £20.5 billion and £27.5 billion
respectively. A cost-break down is provided in the table below. When
appraising major projects at this stage of planning HMT guidance
requires that 66% optimism bias is added to the capital cost estimates,
which is factored into the cost breakdown below. This optimism bias is
“applied to reflect the potential for cost estimates to increase during the
development of a project, both for changes in scope and unit costs.” 47
Capital expenditure for the Regional and Metro Options, £
million, (2014/15 prices) 48
Cost category Regional Metro
Land & property 1,164 1,069
Tunnels 2,299 1,826
Stations 5,664 5,323
Systems 1,430 1,153
Surface works 2,617 490
Indirects 2,071 1,760
Rolling stock 1,352 712
Optimism bias at 66% 10,947 8,133
Total 27,544 20,466
Crossrail 2 was estimated by TfL in 2016 to be £32.6bn. With respect to
scheme costs, the NIC commented:
It is important that Crossrail 2, learns from the experiences of
Crossrail 1 and other major infrastructure projects. This includes
keeping scope and costs under review, establishing clear
governance structures and ensuring that phasing is considered in
order to maximise affordability. In particular, there is strong
potential for phasing the northern branches of Crossrail 2 to
reduce the initial costs of the scheme and this should be given
thorough consideration. 49
As announced by the Chancellor in the 2017 Autumn Budget, the DfT
and TfL have commissioned an Independent Affordability Review to
examine ways of making the scheme more affordable. Mike Gerrard,
the former managing director of Thames Tideway, has been appointed
to chair the review. 50 Reports in the Financial Times suggest that the
47
op cit., Crossrail 2 – Funding and financing study, p14
48
ibid.
49
op cit., Transport for a world city, p11
50
Crossrail 2 press notice, Major new review brings Crossrail 2 closer, 5 March 201817 Commons Library Briefing, 23 January 2019
costs “may add up to more than £45bn — significantly more than the
initial £31bn estimate, which is based on 2014 prices.” 51 Managing
Director Michèle Dix believes that the project remains in a “good place”
and said it was exploring options of way it could reduce the costs of the
scheme:
There are a number of things we have looked at in terms of
making it more affordable. One is whether you can deliver it in
phases so we could reduce pressure on us in terms of paying half
up front. If you phased construction then you could at least collect
fares and take advantage of oversite development opportunities. 52
How does Crossrail 2 compare with Crossrail1?
Crossrail 1 is the plan to integrate the mainline railways to the east and
west of London through the construction of two tunnels beneath central
London from Paddington to Liverpool Street. Construction on the scheme
started in 2009 when works got underway at Canary Wharf station.
Crossrail services were originally intended to be introduced to open in
December 2018 but have been delayed, possibly for another two years.
In terms of value for money, the 2011 business case for Crossrail 1
estimated that the scheme would produce £1.97 of benefit for every £1 of
cost (a benefit-cost ratio, or BCR of 1.97). Once wider economic benefits
were included, this increased to a BCR of 3.09. The latest publicly available
business case for Crossrail 2 estimated that it would produce a BCR of 1.8
and when wider economic benefits are included, this rises to a BCR of 2.0.
When comparing the respective value for money estimates of the two
schemes, it is important to note that neither of the stated BCRs above
reflect the actual value for money of the scheme, as the costs have
increased for Crossrail 1 since these estimates were produced and the
business case is yet to be finalised for Crossrail 2.
In terms of scheme capital costs, the original funding envelope agreed in
the 2010 Spending Review for Crossrail 1 was £14.8 billion. In December
2018, the Government formally announced Crossrail’s third additional cash
injection, bringing the overall funding envelope for the project to £17.6
billion. Crossrail 2 was estimated by TfL in 2016 to be £32.6bn. The
Crossrail 2 business case is currently being reviewed and a revised business
case is being developed, with reports suggesting that the scheme may add
up to more than £45bn.
It should be noted that it is difficult to make direct comparisons between
the capital costs of the two schemes, mainly because the projects have
been costed and will be delivered many years apart from one another. The
cost estimates above reflect the total amount of money spent or expected
to be spent, in nominal terms, over the construction period for each
scheme. If a comparison was to be made, the expenditure for both
schemes would have to be converted into equivalent prices. The spending
profile of the schemes is not publicly available and as such this comparison
cannot be made in this paper.
In terms of the construction timelines, Crossrail 1 will have taken over 10
years to complete from when construction started in 2009. Similar
timescales are projected for Crossrail 2, with a hybrid bill hoped to be
approved by 2021/22 and the project finished in the early 2030s.
51
‘Transport for London warns Crossrail 2 could be delayed by decade’, Financial Times,
3 October 2017
52
The Crossrail 2 conundrum: How will the £30bn scheme be paid for?, Infrastructure
Intelligence, 7 December 201818 Crossrail 2
For more detailed information about the Crossrail scheme, see the House
of Commons Library Briefing Paper Crossrail (Elizabeth Line).19 Commons Library Briefing, 23 January 2019
5. Funding & financing
Funding and financing are terms which are often used interchangeably.
It is important to clarify the distinction between the two terms:
• Funding comprises the sources of income to be used to meet the
capital and revenue costs of a project over time; and
• Financing comprises the set of financial arrangements put in
place to provide committed capital to meet the costs of a project
as they are incurred, to be repaid from funding sources. 53
In November 2014 TfL published a study by PwC, which provides the
most-comprehensive analysis to date as to how the Crossrail 2 could be
funded and financed. The report revealed that up to 50% of the project
could be funded by a combination of local funding sources, with the
remainder of the funding provided by central government either
through direct grants or via Network Rail, as was the case with Crossrail
1. Of the funding envelope that was initially agreed for Crossrail 1, over
60% of the project’s funding has been provided by Londoners and
London businesses and many of the same mechanisms will be applied to
Crossrail 2. 54 The PwC study estimated that the mechanisms listed
below would account for the bulk of the London contributions for the
scheme: 55
• Farebox and ancillary revenues - analysis showed that the
project is relatively strong in terms of projected generated revenue
when compared with many other public transport projects. This
will provide about 20% of the funding requirement.
• Business Rate Supplement (BRS) 56 – the BRS will continue to be
applied once the Crossrail 1 debt has been repaid. It was expected
that BRS revenues would only be available to Crossrail 2 from
2033 as those revenues are still being directed to paying off
Crossrail 1. That is, some 3 years after opening. Whereas, the BRS
that helped finance Crossrail 1 was introduced some 8 years in
advance of the opening of Crossrail 1.
• Mayoral Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) – the CIL is a
compulsory per metre squared charge that local authorities in
England can choose to levy upon new development as a condition
of granting planning consent. In London, the Mayor has powers
(under the Planning Act 2008) to introduce a London-wide
Mayoral CIL for the purpose of delivering local and sub-regional
large-scale transport infrastructure. These revenues will be a
source of funding once the Crossrail 1 contributions from Mayoral
CIL and the Section 106 scheme of £600 million have been made.
53
op cit., Crossrail 2 – Funding and financing study, p19
54
Crossrail, Funding [accessed 10 January 2019]
55
More a comprehensive discussion of each of these mechanisms, see: PwC, Crossrail 2
– Funding and financing study, 27 November 2014
56
For more detailed information, see: London Assembly, Paying for Crossrail: business
rate supplement [accessed 3 January 2019]20 Crossrail 2
The BRS and CIL are estimated to contribute an amount
equivalent to 21% of the funding requirement of the Crossrail 2
project. It was intended that MCIL2 will be levied from April 2019
but it is uncertain now because of the project and cost overruns
with Crossrail 1. 57
• Sale of construction sites or development opportunities–
there is the potential for the sale of development opportunities
and sites required for the construction of Crossrail 2, after they
are no longer needed for the scheme.
• Council Tax Precept – The BRS being used to fund Crossrail 1 is
a property levy that is paid only by businesses. The Mayor could
obtain revenue from all types of properties by exercising his power
to levy a Council Tax Precept on homes. This is an established
mechanism used in the UK to provide funding for entities
(‘precepting authorities’) that carry out activities separately from
the local council that levies and collects Council Tax. PwC believe
that “the introduction of such a precept could be challenging
[and] could be subject to opposition from Council Tax payers,
which was the case for the Olympics Levy, where there were
certain cases of principled non-payment that received press
coverage.” 58
Funding mechanisms 59
% of funding target Cumulative total
Project generated revenue 20.0% 20.0%
BRS 15.2% 35.2%
Enhanced Mayoral CIL 5.8% 41.0%
Resale of land and property 1.9% 42.9%
Doubling of Mayoral CIL 5.8% 48.7%
Council tax precept 1.9% 50.2%
The PwC paper identified the possibility of contribution from property
and landowners by using other land value capture mechanisms. Land
value capture refers “to a set of mechanisms used to monetise the
increase in land values that arise in the catchment area of public
infrastructure projects.” 60 For example, PwC explored the possibility of
capturing the uplift in business rates and Borough CIL that would be
expected to arise from the enhanced investment activity and property
values in the areas around Crossrail 2 stations. This is a form of ‘Tax
Increment Financing’, which draws on the experience of developing the
funding package for the Northern Line Extension. But the scope of this
contribution is limited because of the administrative complexity of
57
Mayor of London, MD2123 Mayoral Community Infrastructure Levy 2 (MCIL2), 12
June 2017
58
op cit., Crossrail 2 – Funding and financing study, p39
59
ibid., p7
60
TfL, Land value capture – Final Report, February 201721 Commons Library Briefing, 23 January 2019
implementing these value capture mechanisms. Also, there are fewer
large landowners who are likely to contribute directly to the scheme, in
the same way that for example Canary Wharf Group and BAA made
direct contributions to Crossrail 1. PwC concluded that the total funding
that could be raised through this approach “is relatively small in
proportion to the scheme costs, and that there would be significant
risks attached to it.” 61 PwC estimated that value capture around
Crossrail 2’s stations would only raise an estimated 1% of the project’s
funding requirement.
The PwC report also explored the possibility of private financing, at least
in part, contributing toward the capital costs of Crossrail. It concluded
that the scope for private financing was likely to be small:
… while there are opportunities to introduce private finance into
elements of the Crossrail 2 project, the proportion of the project
that could be privately financed is relatively small, as privately
financing the core infrastructure project is unlikely to be feasible
or to provide value for money. The scale of Crossrail 2 makes it
too big for the financing market to handle as a single privately-
financed project. It may be possible to fund smaller components
of the works but these would have to be carefully selected, as it is
difficult to break down a rail network into component assets
without introducing interface risks that could increase costs. In
addition, changes to accounting and classification rules make it
less likely that structures will be considered “off balance sheet” in
circumstances where the public sector is effectively the only
customer for track access. The prime candidate for private
financing would be the rolling stock and depot, as there are viable
PFI/PPP options for such projects. Until recently, this was being
considered for Crossrail 1 rolling stock, and it may be a viable
option for Crossrail 2. 62
These conclusions on the use of private finance are consistent with the
findings of the Montague report ahead of Crossrail 1 and the
experience on Crossrail 1. 63 It also looked at the likely willingness of
Sovereign Wealth Funds, Infrastructure Funds, Pension funds and other
similar investors to invest in Crossrail 2 and concluded:
While there is no doubt that these investors are keen to invest in
infrastructure, Crossrail 2 is unlikely to meet many of their
investment requirements. The size of the project, the construction
risk, the demand risk and the likely reliance on non-patronage
revenues to pay the bulk of the project means that, without direct
government guarantees, such investors are unlikely to invest in
Crossrail 2. If such guarantees were to be put in place it is possible
that the project’s borrowing costs could be treated as public debt,
but would have a higher private sector level cost of finance. 64
The March 2016 NIC report made several recommendations on finding
appropriate funding for the scheme. In particular, it emphasised the
61
For a comprehensive discussion of land value capture mechanisms and they may apply
in London, see: TfL, Land value capture – Final Report, February 2017
62
op. cit., Crossrail 2 Funding and financing Study, 27 November 2014, p6
63
Montague, A., Crossrail Review, 2004
64
ibid., p722 Crossrail 2
need for a funding agreement, in which London contributes more than
half the costs of the scheme, to be agreed ahead of any hybrid bill
submission. It also stated that the: 65
[…] government should work with TfL and GLA to explore new
funding options, which could include consideration of further
devolution. However, even without such devolution, HM Treasury
should be in a position to recoup significant receipts from the
added Gross Value Added (GVA) benefits and the rising value of
property in London.
The NIC also recommended that private sector involvement in the
development and funding of stations be maximised. 66 The Crossrail 2
Growth Commission report also emphasised the need to maximise the
“gain share” from any uplift in land values.” 67 A report by property
companies, published in April 2017, suggested that London could pay
for half the cost of Crossrail 2 through further commercial development
in the West End:
Private sector funding could come from the creation of great,
much-needed new places in the country’s most economically
productive district – the West End. With Crossrail 2, the West End
could viably support more enterprise. And the commercial
development of new employment space to host that enterprise
could in turn help pay for Crossrail 2 through development taxes
or local retention. 68
London First, which is a business campaigning group, published an
updated report in July 2018 outlining how Crossrail 2 could be funded.
As part of this, it established a working group of its members to explore
potential options. In addition to the funding package identified by PwC
above, the working group identified three ‘tried and tested’ funding
options, listed below, and encouraged maximising land value capture
options identified in the PwC report: 69
• A one-off London-wide fares rise of 1% on Tube and TfL rail in
the early 2020s would generate around £30m per annum. A
similar rise on South Western Railway and West Anglia Main Line
services could generate an additional £5–10m p.a.
• Crossrail 2 precept of £40 for a band D London property could
generate around £150m p.a. A similar precept for districts in
Hertfordshire and Surrey with a Crossrail 2 station could raise
around £8.5m p.a.
• A higher BRS in the 2020s to help provide upfront funding for the
scheme. The existing BRS is forecast to bring in £270m p.a. in the
2020s – so an extra 0.5p increase would be worth around £68m
p.a.
65
op cit., Transport for a world city, p11
66
ibid., pp12-13
67
op cit., Transport for a world city, p4
68
‘We should build Crossrail 2 and the private sector is going to pay for it’, City A.M., 3
April 2017
69
London First, Paying for Crossrail 2, July 2018, p323 Commons Library Briefing, 23 January 2019 As mentioned, an updated affordability review into Crossrail 2 is ongoing and is exploring other options for funding and financing.
24 Crossrail 2
6. Recent political developments
Crossrail 2, London’s next major transport project, was supposed to
follow on from Crossrail 1 – The Elizabeth Line. There had been
widespread support for Crossrail 2, particularly from London politicians.
Consecutive Conservative and Labour mayors of London have backed
the scheme. Former Mayor of London Boris Johnson illustrated his
support of the scheme through the creation of a ‘Growth Commission’
for Crossrail 2 in July 2015. 70 Sadiq Khan has also been a strong
advocate for the scheme since assuming the Mayoralty. 71
Recent UK Government in-principle support for the scheme was
catalysed by the March 2016 National Infrastructure Commission report
that recommended Crossrail 2 be taken forward “as a priority”. 72 The
Treasury’s response to the report was published in April 2016. It agreed
with the Commission’s recommendations and stated that “the
government agrees that Crossrail 2 should be taken forward as a
priority”. 73 In response, the Chancellor committed £80m to support the
drafting of a Hybrid Bill, necessary to secure powers to construct the
scheme, with the Mayor providing a further £80m of match-funding. 74
The Chancellor’s decision was predicated on the Secretary of State for
Transport affirming his commitment to the Hybrid Bill preparation by
endorsing an updated Strategic Outline Business Case (SOBC). Mayor
Sadiq Khan had already confirmed his commitment 75 and, under the
assumption that a Government decision would be made by May 2017,
TfL believed that “a Hybrid Bill could be submitted in 2019 which could
enable construction starting in the early 2020s, with the first Crossrail 2
service running in 2033”. 76
The updated SOBC was submitted to the Government in March 2017
but the general election that year delayed the Government’s response
to it. Following an external review by the Infrastructure and Projects
Authority, 77 the Mayor of London and the Secretary of State for
Transport issued a joint statement on 24 July 2017 supporting the
scheme and agreeing to examine ways to improve affordability while
70
Mayor of London press notice, Mayor announces creation of Crossrail 2 Growth
Commission, 17 July 2015; other members of the Commission were announced in
September 2015, see: TfL press notice, Crossrail 2 Growth Commission Announced,
16 September 2015
71
Crossrail 2, 10 reasons why the UK needs Crossrail 2 now, 1 November 2016
72
NIC press notice, 'Crossrail 2 will keep London moving, we should get on with it right
away' – Adonis, 10 March 2016
73
HM Treasury, Transport for a world city: government response to the National
Infrastructure Commission's report, 13 April 2016
74
TfL, Programme and Investment Committee – Crossrail 2, 21 February 2018
75
op. cit., 10 reasons why the UK needs Crossrail 2 now
76
TfL press notice, Crossrail 2 developed further in response to community comments, 7
July 2016
77
National Infrastructure Commission, Annual Monitoring Report 2018, February 201825 Commons Library Briefing, 23 January 2019
maximising the key benefits of the scheme, with a view to London
meeting half the costs of the project during construction. 78
In his Budget Statement published on 22 November 2017, the
Chancellor said that the Government would continue to work with TfL
to develop plans for Crossrail 2. 79 DfT and TfL subsequently
commissioned an Independent Affordability Review to examine ways of
making the scheme more affordable. It was intended that at the end of
the review, Crossrail 2 would update the business case “reflecting the
affordability work, before supporting the Government’s assessment
process, formalising design changes and updating the route wide and
safeguarding consultation materials.” 80
The NIC published its annual monitoring report in February 2018 and
called “on Government to ensure the independent review of the
funding and financing of Crossrail 2 is completed as soon as possible,
with a view to setting out a firm timetable and funding proposal by the
end of 2018.” It added that the aim should be to open Crossrail 2 in the
early to mid-2030s. 81
The Mayor published his Transport Strategy in March 2018, with it
stating that “Crossrail 2 is essential to London’s future” and that the
“Mayor aims to open Crossrail 2 by the early 2030s.” 82 In a
November 2018 letter to London Assembly Transport Committee
Chair Caroline Pidgeon, Sadiq Khan that Tfl was still working with
the DfT and Network Rail to reach agreement on Crossrail 2’s shape
and scope. 83
78
DfT press notice, Crossrail 2: a way forward, 24 July 2017
79
HC Deb 22 November 2017, c1051
80
Crossrail 2, Crossrail 2 Project Update, May 2018
81
op. cit., Annual Monitoring Report 2018
82
Mayor of London, Mayor’s Transport Strategy, March 2018, p25
83
Mayor of London, Letter to Caroline Pidgeon MBE AM Chair of the Transport
Committee, 6 November 201826 Crossrail 2
7. Challenges for Crossrail 2
7.1 Funding
Funding Crossrail 2 was always going to be a difficult task and rests to a
large degree on London raising half of the funds required to cover the
capital costs of the scheme. 84 Crossrail 2 believes that London can meet
its share of the funding requirements, but so far their case rests on the
assumptions laid out in the PwC report of 2014. 85
The PwC report expressed concerns over the political feasibility of some
of these funding proposals, particularly the ability to double the Mayoral
CIL and implement a council tax precept. 86 Even if these mechanisms
were feasible, only part of the funding laid out by TfL is available in the
2020s when construction will be at its peak. 87
London’s ability to meet its end of the funding arrangements has been
made more difficult by the delays and cost overruns to Elizabeth Line.
TfL finances were contingent on the scheme being operational by the
end of 2018. TfL had predicted in its business plan that Crossrail would
bring £829m of operating income — tickets and commercial revenue —
in 2020-21, the first year the line would make a direct surplus. 88 Credit Crossrail 2 will
rating agency Moody’s predicted in November 2018 that TfL will lose at undoubtedly deliver
least £600 million from the delayed opening. The longer the Elizabeth benefits for London
Line is delayed, the more it will cost TfL. 89 and the wider
economy but with
There are reports that the Elizabeth line may not open in-full for another an increasingly
two years and costs may rise by over £1 billion. 90 Crossrail 2 relies upon uncertain funding
funding sources that are still being used to fund Crossrail 1, including landscape, it is not
the Business Rate Supplement. Until Crossrail 1 is paid-off, these clear if or when the
funding mechanisms remain inaccessible to Crossrail 2. project will get the
go-ahead.
7.2 Political support
Central government funding support for the project is not guaranteed
yet and rests upon Crossrail 2 delivering a viable business case to the
Secretary of State. Even then, there are wider political uncertainties
surrounding Brexit and HS2. It is not clear what such eventualities might
mean for the central government funding envelope and the
contribution to Crossrail 2.
84
Mayor and Transport Secretary agreed that London would attempt to fund half of the
scheme during construction.
85
Crossrail, Funding [accessed 14 January 2019]
86
op. cit., Crossrail 2 Funding and financing Study, p39-41
87
London First, Paying for Crossrail 2, July 2018, p3
88
TfL, Business Plan 2019/20 to 2023/24, December 2018
89
‘Crossrail delay to put ‘significant financial strain’ on TfL’, Financial Times, 28
November 2018
90
‘Crossrail scheme given £1bn bailout - paid for by London businesses’, London
Evening Standard, 10 December 201827 Commons Library Briefing, 23 January 2019
HS2 is due to submit its revised costings to feed into the upcoming
spending review. There are reports that the costs of the scheme may
rise from the £56 billion currently estimated in the latest business case. 91
Liz Truss, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, recently suggested that the
Government “must be prepared to 'junk white elephant' projects”. 92,
Were the projected costs of HS2 to increase significantly, there may be
less appetite and funding left for another major transport project such
as Crossrail 2.
While the scheme still retains strong political support, 93 it is not
universal. Several MPs and wider campaign groups have argued that
expenditure on Crossrail 2 is a continuation of a trend of higher
infrastructure spending in the South-East, 94 to the detriment of other
regions. 95
When will Crossrail 2 be delivered?
It is impossible to know with certainty when Crossrail 2 will be delivered. If
Crossrail 2 were eventually approved, a hybrid bill would be required in the
same way as Crossrail 1. TfL had previously anticipated submitting a hybrid
bill in 2019, but this is looking increasingly unlikely. Crossrail 2
subsequently expected “to seek permission to build the new line between
2021 and 2022.” 96
Parallels can be drawn with the Crossrail 1 project to understand possible
timescale for Crossrail 2. In terms of Parliamentary approval, the hybrid bill
for Crossrail 1 took over three years to receive Royal Assent, having been
presented to Parliament in February 2005. In terms of the construction
timelines, Crossrail’s construction would have taken over 10 years to
complete from its commencement in 2009.
If a hybrid bill were submitted for the Crossrail 2 scheme in 2020, and
assuming similar timescales for the Crossrail 1 hybrid bill, the scheme may
anticipate receiving parliamentary approval by 2023. In terms of
construction timelines, Crossrail 2 are anticipating a construction timeline
of around a decade. Crossrail 2, in a best-case scenario, is therefore
unlikely to be delivered and operational until at least the early to
mid-2030s.
91
‘HS2 budget ‘will balloon to £80bn’, says secret report’, The Times, 22 July 2018
92
‘Liz Truss hints controversial HS2 link could be scrapped amid spiralling costs as she
says the Government must be prepared to 'junk white elephant' infrastructure
projects’, Daily Mail, 6 January 2019
93
'Crucial stage' reached for Crossrail 2 project, London Evening Standard, 21 April
2017
94
For more detailed briefing on infrastructure spending, including a regional breakdown
of spending, see: Infrastructure policies and investment, Commons Library Briefing
Paper 6594, 10 July 2018
95
IPPR press notice, Anger growing as campaigners issue fresh demand for ‘Crossrail for
the North’, 25 July 2017
96
Crossrail 2, What are the next steps for Crossrail 2? [accessed 11 January 2018]You can also read
