Commercial Nuclear Power - Mission Critical Operational Reliability and Safety: Learning from the Transformation of - Strategic Talent Solutions
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dec/jan13
the magazine for maintenance reliability professionals
Mission Critical Operational
Reliability and Safety:
Learning from the Transformation of
Commercial
Nuclear Power
uptimemagazine.com
Three Mile Island
Mission Critical Operational
Reliability and Safety:
Learning from the Transformation of
Commercial Nuclear Power
Mary Jo Rogers
Over the past 30 years, despite intense regulatory oversight and they were individually.5 To that end, they
formed the Institute of Nuclear Power Opera-
public skepticism faced by the nuclear industry following the ac- tions (INPO), which was incorporated in 1979
cidents at Three Mile Island (TMI), Chernobyl, and more recently even before the President’s commission re-
leased its final report on the TMI accident at
Fukushima, Japan, nuclear plants in the United States have under- the end of that year.6 The World Association of
gone a complete transformation. Nuclear Operators (WANO) was formed after
the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.
Through INPO, U.S. industry leaders took it
They are now the most productive, the most such heavy scrutiny and regulation? And what upon themselves to address the commission’s
reliable and the safest they have ever been: can other industries learn from this transfor- recommendations and figure out how self-
mation? The lessons learned through its prac- regulation could work. Crucial to the success of
• U.S. nuclear power capacity factor has tice and research program suggest that there INPO was the cooperation of senior leadership.
gone from 48 percent in 1971 to an aver-
are four key answers to these questions: Cooperation and Information Sharing. Par-
age of 90 percent over the past decade.1
• Industry leadership, ticularly through its plant evaluation and
• Nuclear electricity production costs training programs, INPO played a key role in
dropped to 2.14 cents per kilowatt-hour • Self-regulation,
improving reliability and safety. The industry’s
in 2010.2 • Evolution of a safety culture, cooperative approach to sharing informa-
• Total industrial safety accident rate was • First-line supervisor. tion, best practices and even resources was
0.09 (industrial accidents per 200,000 a powerful factor in sustained performance
worker hours) in 2010.3 In fact, it is now Role of Industry Leadership improvements.
safer working at a nuclear power plant Forming INPO. In the aftermath of the TMI A good example of this cooperation oc-
than in a school setting.4 incident, utility CEOs recognized they were curred at River Bend Station, which is owned
How did the nuclear industry become safer, better positioned to address regulatory and and operated by Entergy. In 2006, the plant
more reliable and more profitable while under plant performance challenges together than had a number of reactivity management is-
dec/jan13 Strategic Talent Solutions
sues that forced them to take power reductions and shutdowns to deal U.S. Nuclear Industry Capacity Factor
with problems that were going to impact the reactor fuel. One of their 1971-2011
reactor operators contacted Ed McVey, Exelon’s manager of reactor en-
gineering oversight, whom he had met at a meeting of the Reactivity
Control Review Committee.
Although Exelon and Entergy are competitors, Ed spent a week with
the River Bend operations department, providing feedback and sug-
gestions that they implemented very successfully over the next year.
Ed’s decision to spend a week at River Bend was fully supported all the
way up his management chain.7
Self-regulation through INPO
INPO’s overarching standard is excellence in operational reliability
and safety, and their primary means of holding the industry to this
standard are their regularly conducted in-depth assessments of all U.S.
nuclear power plants.
Each U.S. plant is evaluated once every two years against INPO’s per-
U.S. Electricity Production Costs
formance objectives and criteria. As part of this process, an assessment
1995-2010
team, including INPO personnel and experienced professionals from
other nuclear sites, spends two weeks observing how the site func-
tions and reviewing data on its operating units. The assessment team’s
final report identifies
strengths and areas
for improvement, and
INPO’s overarching plant leadership writes
standard is excellence a response indicating
what they will do to
in operational reliabil- improve their problem
areas.
ity and safety, and their Part of the impetus
primary means of to improve and fol-
low INPO’s counsel has
holding the industry to come from peer pres-
this standard are their sure. For example, ev-
ery year INPO holds a
regularly conducted conference developed U.S. Nuclear Industrial Safety Accident Rate
exclusively for CEOs, 1997-2010
in- depth assessments Chief Nuclear Officers
of all U.S. nuclear and Senior VPs of nu-
clear operating com-
power plants. panies. This includes a
closed session in which
the CEOs are presented
with a forced ranking of best to worst performers. Lower-performing
plants and the utilities that own them are thus strongly challenged to
improve.
This practice contributes to an important piece of the nuclear indus-
try’s transformation, which is the sense that industry leaders have of
being “hostages of each other.” In 1994, Joseph Rees’s book by this title
described how the industry changed after the formation of INPO due to
leaders’ belief that a disastrous incident at one plant would seriously im-
pact the entire industry.8 Safety culture does not just mean avoiding accidents and injuries
and creating a SCWE. It also includes process rigor: defining the correct,
Evolution of a Nuclear safe way of doing something and ensuring it is consistently done that
Safety Culture way. In Strategic Talent Solutions’ (STS) work with 35 different stations in
A nuclear safety culture is defined by INPO as “an organization’s the U.S. and England, it has become clear that building a stronger safety
values and behaviors—modeled by its leaders and internalized by its culture translates into getting better safety and production results in
members—that serve to make nuclear safety the overriding priority.”9 the long run. Field experience and the experience of senior leaders indi-
Last fall, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) officially defined cate that the following are useful ways to improve safety culture:
safety culture as “the core values and behaviors resulting from a col- • Ensure that members of the leadership team have high standards
lective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety around safety and reliability, that these are reflected in their behav-
over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environ- ior and that they are holding the organization to these standards.
ment.”10 INPO and the NRC both agree that safety culture includes hav- • Identify, track and respond to precursors or small events before
ing a safety-conscious work environment (SCWE), or an environment in they have the opportunity to contribute to significant accidents.
which people feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retribu- • Enforce the rigorous use of human error prevention tools. Nuclear
tion. power has built these simple practices (including peer checks,
Strategic Talent Solutions dec/jan13
three-way communication and proce- problems.12 INPO emphasized that supervisors
References
dure adherence) into many of its process- need to be in the field, but also need to have a
es to help ensure safety and reliability. greater oversight role, confront worker behav- 1. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). 2012.
• Regularly assess safety culture. Evalu- iors and be more aligned with site leadership. U.S. Nuclear Industry Capacity Fac-
In an STS research study on what makes tors (1971-2011). http://www.nei.org/
ate how safety norms and attitudes are
resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/
actually demonstrated daily in behavior, first-line supervisors most effective, the au-
reliableandaffordableenergy/graphic-
decision-making and progress on safety thors found that supervisors who felt more sandcharts/usnuclearindustrycapacity-
results. This helps identify both the gaps like members of the management team were factors/
in the safety culture and the areas in the more effective at their jobs. And the most
organization that are most at risk. powerful ways to get supervisors to show 2. NEI. 2011. U.S. Electricity Production
that alignment were to: (1) treat them as core Costs 1995–2010. http://www.nei.org/
• Build self-criticality and a learning orienta- resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/
tion. Plants and companies that are willing members of the management team, (2) give
reliableandaffordableenergy/ graphic-
to be open about performance are also them enough time with their own managers sandcharts/
in a better position to preempt problems and (3) tell them the reasons behind major de-
cisions.13 3. Nuclear News. INPO’s U.S. Reactor Fleet
because they identify them proactively. Performance Indicators for 2010 Show
They are also more open to feedback from Shift change. Over the next several years, the
Mixed Results. June 2011. pages 30–31.
others in the interest of learning and im- transition of the FLS to the management team
proving. will become increasingly critical for nuclear, as 4. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
well as other industries. As an aging workforce Labor Statistics. 2010. Incidence Rates
of experienced supervisors and workers near of Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and
Illnesses by Industry and Case Types.
retirement, a new generation of supervisors
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osh/os/
must step in to replace them. What we have ostb2813.pdf
seen work in this situation is pairing the expe-
rienced workers with the new talent in a men- 5. Rees, Joseph V. Hostages of Each Other:
toring capacity that mimics the apprentice- The Transformation of Nuclear Safety
ship model. In this way, they are more apt to Since Three Mile Island. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1994.
get engaged because they have a junior coun-
terpart looking up to them. They also may be 6. Ellis, J. O. The Role of the Institute of
more likely to feel needed in a way that isn’t Nuclear Power Operations in Self-Regu-
as physically demanding, but instead taps into lation of the Commercial Nuclear Power
their wisdom and potential desire to leave a Industry. Remarks before the National
Commission on the BP Deepwater
legacy.
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling,
August 25, 2010.
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover Summary
The nuclear power industry has changed 7. McVey, Edward. Interviewed by Mary Jo
“You have to learn from dramatically since TMI and Chernobyl, and Rogers on January 31, 2011.
both reliability and safety have improved sig-
the mistakes of others. nificantly in a highly regulated environment.
8. Rees, Joseph V. Hostages of Each Other:
The Transformation of Nuclear Safety
You won’t live long The four ways in which other industries can Since Three Mile Island. Chicago: The
learn from this transformation are: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
enough to make them • Taking leadership of change—and thereby 9. INPO. 2004. Principles for a Strong
all yourself.” taking control of your future. Nuclear Safety Culture.
• Self-regulation—use lessons learned from 10. Federal Register (Vol. 75, No. 180),
This advice is often attributed to Admi- the formation of INPO, adapting to other September 17, 2010. Nuclear Regula-
ral Hyman G. Rickover, known as the industries. tory Commission (NRC) Revised Draft
“Father of the Nuclear Navy.” • Building a safety culture that gets results in Safety Culture Policy Statement: Re-
reliability. quest for Comments.
Professionalism and Elevation • Transforming the first-line supervisor 11. Report of the President’s Commission
on the Accident at Three Mile Island.
of the First-Line Supervisor through better engagement and alignment
Washington, D.C.: October 1979.
The fourth key to sustaining improvements with senior management.
in the nuclear industry is the transformation of 12. INPO. Guidelines for Effective Nuclear
the first-line supervisor (FLS). Many years ago, Mary Jo Rogers, Ph.D., is a Supervisor Performance. November
the FLS was a foreman or step-up lineman; a
partner at the management 2007.
consulting firm, Strategic
“union guy” who was typically not necessar- Talent Solutions (STS), where 13. Rogers, M. J. & Fearing, B. K. Strategic
ily aligned with senior management. The FLS she is the practice leader for Talent Solutions, 2010. The compre-
energy and utility leadership hensive study of nuclear supervisor
functioned essentially as an experienced pair and organizational consulting.
of hands working alongside the craftsmen and Prior to STS, Dr. Rogers was the effectiveness.
expediting work. head of management development at Exelon
Nuclear, where she was also in charge of creating
After TMI, there was a push for more ex- standard processes for supervisor and leadership
tensive training, greater professionalism and assessments for all of Exelon. She is a recognized
expert in nuclear energy leadership and orga-
a more important role for the FLS.11 And al- nizational excellence. Dr. Rogers was originally
though training subsequently improved, INPO trained and licensed as a clinical psychologist .
analyses in 2004 led to the conclusion that su- Dr. Rogers’ newly released book, Nuclear Energy
Leadership: Lessons Learned from U.S. Opera-
pervisor weaknesses were still one of the most tors - ISBN 978-1-5937024-5-8.
common causes linked to plant performance
dec/jan13 Strategic Talent Solutions
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