Blurred Lines Cultural Support Teams in Afghanistan
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In addition to their daily duties within Combat Logistics Battalion 6, Marine Expeditionary Brigade–Afghanistan, Marines also serve as FET members to establish rapport with locals (U.S. Marine Corps/Justin Shemanski) Blurred Lines Cultural Support Teams in Afghanistan By Megan Katt llowing women in combat is have conducted counterinsurgency and A a highly controversial subject. Yet regardless of their offi- cial military occupational specialty stability operations—so-called irregu- lar warfare activities that lack clearly defined “frontlines” against enemies Megan Katt is a Research Analyst in the Center (MOS), female Servicemembers have who do not wear uniforms. These for Stability and Development at the Center for often found themselves in combat types of operating environments force- Naval Analyses. She is a co-author (with Jerry situations—most recently in Iraq and fully negate any biological sex combat Meyerle and Jim Gavrilis) of the book On the Ground in Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. In both combat zones, restrictions as the lives of both men and Practice (Marine Corps University Press, 2012). male and female Servicemembers alike women are at risk. 106 Features / Cultural Support Teams in Afghanistan JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Along with the highly trained Moving across “Frontlines” To counter this insurgent tactic in and capable special operations forces Women’s roles in the military have Iraq, the U.S. military developed what (SOF) operating in remote locations necessarily evolved over the past several became known as the Lioness Program. throughout Afghanistan, lesser known decades, while still limited by DOD As part of this initiative, the military teams of female Soldiers, Marines, and restrictions on the types of positions posted female Soldiers and Marines at Sailors have worked to develop endur- they could fill. In 1988, DOD created control points to interdict and search ing relationships with Afghan women. the so-called Risk Rule, which excluded women for weapons, explosives, and These enabling units, which evolved women from units that had a high other contraband. However, these teams from earlier female engagement ef- probability of engaging in ground were staffed in ad hoc fashion by female forts and ultimately became known combat, hostile fire, or capture.3 In Servicemembers who were pulled from as Cultural Support Teams (CSTs), 1994, DOD replaced that regulation their regular duties and who received have supported SOF units conduct- with the Direct Ground Combat Defi- minimal training for these new responsi- ing village stability operations (VSO). nition and Assignment Rule, otherwise bilities. In addition, the narrowly focused While skirting Department of Defense known as the DOD Combat Exclusion program did not provide opportunities (DOD)-imposed restrictions on women Policy, which restricted the assignment for persistent engagement with the fe- in combat that had been in place since of women to units below the brigade male population. 1994, the women on CSTs faced sub- level whose primary mission was to In an attempt to develop better rela- stantial personal and physical risk. By engage in direct ground combat.4 tionships with Iraqi women and identify stepping “outside the wire” to converse According to the policy, female Ser- sources of instability, the Marines devel- with locals, they placed themselves in vicemembers were restricted from jobs oped the Iraqi Women’s Engagement harm’s way,1 engaged in firefights, and, in a primary MOS of ground combat, Program. Unfortunately, not much is in some cases, were specifically targeted such as in the infantry. Yet with these written about the program—in part pos- by insurgents. At a time when the U.S. rules in place, women have increasingly sibly due to potential controversy over military is pulling back from a large-scale been allowed to serve in a wider range women being placed in combat situa- irregular warfare mission in Afghanistan of combat support roles, including as tions. What little is known is that a group and trying to rebalance the Armed explosive ordnance disposal technicians, of female Civil Affairs (CA) Marines re- Forces for more traditional operations, it military police, interpreters, drivers, portedly began the program in Al Anbar is worth examining whether these types and working dog handlers. In irregular Province in 2006. The uniformed women of all-female teams will be relevant to warfare, where frontlines are nonexis- aimed to build trust with local women future operating environments. tent, many of these supporting jobs can by discussing their concerns over cups Based primarily on author interviews take women into the line of fire, often of tea. Later, these efforts also included with CST and SOF personnel,2 this with little ground combat training. talking to women during sewing clinics article describes the CST program; why Counterinsurgency and stability and medical engagements. The indirect it was created and how it evolved from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan chal- effect of these engagements was a nascent previous efforts; how some CST mem- lenged U.S. forces to identify friend from dialogue on the factors of instability in bers were selected and trained; the types foe as they operated among civilians, the area. of activities that members of these teams including many women and children. conducted; the challenges that arose; Perceived indiscriminate use of force and Providing Opportunities and the lessons that can be drawn from culturally prohibited contact between for Engagement their experiences. While this article does male Servicemembers and local women The Iraq experience, although limited, provide some background on gender (for instance, during night raids) angered highlighted the positive effects of policy restrictions, it does not argue local populations and proved counter- female engagement in that type of either for or against making combat po- productive to the overall mission. In an environment and the need for a similar sitions available to women. The nature effort to avoid these confrontations and tool in Afghanistan. In a society with of conflict in these types of environments show more respect for the local culture, limited women’s rights and restrictions belies the idea that women can simply U.S. forces largely ignored the female on contact between the sexes, Afghan be kept out of combat. Therefore, this population. Insurgents, in turn, took women were culturally off-limits to article focuses on what some female advantage of these cultural sensitivities by outside men. Male Servicemembers ran Servicemembers were able to accomplish disguising themselves in women’s cloth- the risk of showing disrespect to locals executing population-focused operations ing to avoid detection during searches. if they engaged with women during under the combat restrictions in place at Men wearing traditional burkas—full patrols, raids, or other operations. As in the time. It concludes by discussing po- body cloaks worn by some Muslim Iraq, Soldiers and Marines realized there tential implications of the sexual policy women—could escape the military’s was a need to fill that gap, as well as to restrictions debate on the future of a grasp by blending in with women. build rapport with the female portion CST-like capability. of the population. This requirement JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 Katt 107
FET Team 11 members in Helmand Province listen to other Marines talk about their deployment experiences (U.S. Marine Corps/Katherine Keleher) resulted in the Female Engagement a female interpreter, provided the same By 2010, the Army and Marine Team (FET) initiative, which com- search function that the Lioness Program Corps began to send dedicated FETs, bined the Lioness Program’s efforts to had in Iraq. Yet the team also visited with which ranged from two to five women search women with the Iraqi Women’s Afghan women in their homes and distrib- per FET, to support battalion and Engagement Program’s efforts to uted humanitarian supplies in an effort to company commanders across an area of address underlying causes of instability, develop goodwill. Later that year, a similar operation. The first trained, dedicated, merging them into even broader opera- FET was established after insurgents were and full-time Marine FETs arrived in tional roles. able to escape a military cordon by dress- Southwest Afghanistan in the spring of The Army and Marine Corps as- ing like Afghan women. These early FETs 2010. Depending on the need, FETs, sembled FETs on an ad hoc basis upon largely conducted short-term search and sometimes augmented by a female inter- the request of maneuver units. As a engagement missions. preter or medic, accompanied all-male result, female Servicemembers already In late 2009, the commander of the infantry patrols in Helmand Province. on the ground were pulled from their International Security Assistance Force Similar to the Afghan women who regular jobs and had little or no time to (ISAF) institutionalized the FET concept needed to be escorted by a male relative train for their additional FET responsi- by directing all deploying military units in public, female Servicemembers needed bilities. Moreover, because these women to create all-female teams to develop to be escorted by their male colleagues did not have a ground combat MOS or and improve relationships with Afghan outside the wire due to force protec- any of the training that would accompany women. To quickly fill the requirement, tion restrictions.6 This created resource it, some have argued that this staffing initial FET training was limited and constraints for units every time they took put them and the men serving alongside ranged from just a few days to months. FETs outside the wire. While FETs were them at greater risk.5 Generally speaking, training focused on generally sent to areas that had largely The first reported FET was assembled combat activities but also included some been cleared of insurgents, they still took on an ad hoc basis to support a specific instruction on Afghan culture, language a combat-training refresher course and cordon and search operation in western (Dari or Pashto), use of interpreters, and carried M-4 carbine rifles with the full Afghanistan in February 2009. The team, other softer skill sets relevant to operating expectation that they would be exposed which consisted of female Marines and among the population. to combat situations. 108 Features / Cultural Support Teams in Afghanistan JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Marine FETs conducted a range of Marine officer, two enlisted personnel, Identifying Suitable Candidates engagements during their 7-month tours. and a Navy corpsman from their day Per USSOCOM’s directive, each of Generally, after a team arrived in a village, jobs to support a Special Operations the Services began to recruit female female Marines went door to door to Task Force (SOTF) in this new role.7 Servicemembers to work alongside engage women and learn about the area Because these women lacked specific the military’s most elite units. Some and villagers’ concerns. Once inside an training and were pulled from their Services solely recruited volunteers, Afghan compound, they removed their regular duties, the effort was less than whereas others, which had larger oper- weapons and body armor as a sign of seamless; however, this did not dissuade ating requirements, reportedly assigned respect. They also replaced their helmets MARSOC from the concept. Instead, personnel to these teams. Because these with headscarves to be culturally sensi- MARSOC deployed a female unit with CSTs are designed to support SOF tive. In many areas, the FETs found that the sole purpose of conducting the teams at the lowest levels, the qualifica- Afghan men were also willing to engage FET mission in an organic capability to tion requirements and selection process with them. Yet while the FET members support a SOF unit in June 2010. of these women has been demanding. could listen to the concerns and issues The SOF female engagement pro- Each Service conducts a thorough raised by villagers, in many cases they did gram was formally created in 2010 under assessment to locate candidates who are not have the authority or capability to ad- the direction of the USSOCOM com- both physically and mentally fit. Like dress them. In addition, some criticized mander. The United States Army Special special operators, the Services look for the FET program because the teams were Operations Command, Naval Special specific selection criteria in identifying unable to create lasting effects due to the Warfare Command, and MARSOC ex- suitable candidates. Many women have episodic and temporary nature of their panded on the FET concept by developing reportedly been turned down during engagement as coalition forces moved what became known as Cultural Support the assessment process. through an area, never to return. Teams (CSTs). The term itself took sex out MARSOC evaluators held female In addition to engagement, each of the equation; however, the teams still candidates to the standards similar to FET was tasked with a variety of respon- solely comprised female Servicemembers. MARSOC male special operators, known sibilities—perhaps more than the name The primary difference between the as Critical Skills Operators (CSOs), since of the program implies. In addition to two was that FETs were used to soften they would be working alongside each engaging with and gathering information coalition forces’ footprint as they moved other. MARSOC candidates needed top from Afghan families, they distributed through an area, whereas CSTs were de- physical fitness test and general technical information, facilitated CA programs (for signed to provide persistent presence and scores. Prior deployment experience was example, distributed school supplies and engagement—a key tenet of population- also a factor. If women met these criteria, opened schools or clinics), supported focused operations conducted by SOF. MARSOC psychologists then adminis- female-focused governance and devel- These two-person CSTs were given tered the same four psychology exams that opment projects (developing women’s a wider mission set to support SOF potential CSOs receive to ensure that their centers, providing micro-grants), held conducting “non-direct ground combat personalities and psychological profiles key leader engagements and women missions,” specifically village stability op- were compatible with the individuals with only-shuras, conducted medical outreach, erations. As part of VSO, small SOF teams whom they would deploy and that they assisted with cordon and knock opera- aimed to disrupt the insurgency and foster could make the necessary adjustments to tions, and searched women. stability in relatively remote villages where keep up with the distributed, fast-paced the Afghan government was not repre- nature of the Afghanistan mission. Finally, Developing a SOF-Specific sented by its own security forces. Special MARSOC evaluators conducted an oral Female Engagement Capability operators engaged influential local leaders interview with eligible candidates to gauge Meanwhile, similar female engage- in an effort to recruit community defense interest and determine whether they could ment capabilities were quietly being forces, empower local governance, and “think on their feet” to make quick deci- developed within the special operations bolster economic development—all in an sions on the ground. community to fit mission requirements. effort to expand the reach of the Afghan The qualified Marines ultimately The ISAF commander began to pres- government and disrupt insurgent influ- selected for MARSOC CSTs came from sure U.S. Special Operations Command ence. The CSTs provided an opportunity a variety of occupational specialties, (USSOCOM) to develop its own FET- for SOF to communicate with Afghan ranging from judge advocate to military like capabilities to embed with SOF women, something they had been limited police officer to automotive mainte- units to assist with engaging Afghan from doing previously due to cultural nance technician. The most common women in support of direct opera- sensitivities. In short, VSO became a occupational fields included logistics, tions. Marine Corps Forces Special loophole for female Servicemembers communications, and military police, in- Operations Command (MARSOC) to operate alongside the most highly vestigations, and corrections. Most were was one of the first to experiment with trained—and exclusively male—forces on enlisted personnel ranging from sergeant using an FET in 2010 by pulling one the battlefield. to gunnery sergeant. In addition, Marine JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 Katt 109
teams were also often supplemented students received an additional MOS Finally, MARSOC provided them with by medically trained Sailors, such as in CA. CMO skills are particularly interactive software and books so that Independent Duty Corpsmen. useful in an irregular environment they could learn Dari. By August 2013, and provided CSTs with an addi- a total of 18 Marines and 5 Sailors had Preparing Women to tional capability they could bring to completed MARSOC’s CST training Be SOF Enablers their assigned SOF team if CA per- program, which then deployed with even Subtle differences also existed in how sonnel were unavailable. higher numbers from the other Services. each Service trained its female candi- •• The fourth block of instruction dates for the mission. According to consisted of the basic MARSOC Deploying with SOF many accounts, individual augmentees special operations training course, The first formalized CSTs from the received varying amounts of training to which all MARSOC enablers attend Army and Marines began to deploy in fill the emerging requirement. As the in order to prepare for the rigors of a two-woman teams in early 2011. Due program expanded, the Services slowly combat deployment with a MARSOC to DOD restrictions below the battalion developed their own formalized train- SOTF, company, or team. There, level, CSTs were formally attached to ing packages for CSTs. For example, CST candidates received an introduc- larger special operations units—gener- MARSOC developed a series of training tion to SOF operations and learned ally SOTFs—and then distributed organized into blocks. For a total of how CSOs operate. In addition, the throughout the battlespace as needed. 109 days, its female volunteers were course provides a basic combat skills Not every VSO site and SOF unit trained to the same standards as other refresher course (that is, “shoot, received a CST. Instead, attachments MARSOC enablers: move, and communicate”) to dust off were based on demand. After a special those skills and add a special opera- operations team secured a VSO site and •• The first block of instruction began tions approach. CST candidates were identified a need for a CST, the SOTF by focusing on engagements and also trained to master the weapon (an attached one based on the team’s capa- rapport-building with an Afghan M-4 rifle and/or a pistol) that they bilities. In addition to initially attaching focus. MARSOC hired female were assigned and would carry with them to units, the SOTF could rear- subject matter experts in negotia- them during their deployments. Even range CSTs based on mission require- tions and Afghan culture (tailored though CSTs have supported nondi- ments and CST members’ individual to the region in which the women rect combat missions, they have still skill sets. In many cases, teams have would deploy) for both discus- operated in a combat environment. been split—sometimes over different sion and practical application. CST As an integrated member of a special districts—to divide responsibilities and members learned about Afghanistan, operations team, each CST member leverage particular skill sets based on Afghan values, and the nuanced roles had to be prepared to engage in local needs (such as medical care). of women in that society. direct combat in case a situation took CSTs have supported a broad spec- •• The second block of instruction a kinetic turn. trum of activities across all three lines taught female Servicemembers the •• The fifth block of instruction of operations: security, governance, and basics of how CSTs would fit into included MARSOC’s full-spectrum development. Special operations teams the MARSOC intelligence process, survival, evasion, resistance, and have incorporated CSTs differently into as well as additional instruction on escape course, which incorporates their missions depending on the local combative training, riot control, field survival basics, including situation. As designed, many have ac- and increased observation and hostage and detainee operations. companied special operators into villages situational awareness. In addition, In addition to preparing them for on patrols to engage and help build rap- CST candidates participated in the survival, it helped prepare them port with local women, much like FETs. MARSOC intelligence course’s mentally and physically by gaining There have also been cases in which culminating exercise, which not only a better understanding of the other CSTs have effectively engaged women gave them a chance to practice what women they would deploy with and and children after alleged civilian casualty they had learned but also allowed the their limitations. incidents. By developing relationships MARSOC students the opportunity with the local population and sharing the to leverage every asset available to Additionally, CST candidates received information (sometimes time-sensitive them to complete their mission. training in tactical questioning, basic information) that they gather with their •• The third block of instruction medical skills, and tactical driving—all teams, special operators can develop a focused on civil-military operations of which made them more useful to the more complete picture of the operating (CMO). MARSOC sent its can- special operations team to which they environment than was previously attain- didates to the Marine Corps Civil would be attached and created additional able. Like FETs, CST activities include Military Operations School to receive opportunities to get outside the wire providing medical support and humani- CMO training, at the end of which to engage with the local population. tarian assistance, conducting key leader 110 Features / Cultural Support Teams in Afghanistan JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Afghan children gather around FET member during shura to discuss current local issues (U.S. Marine Corps/Andrea M. Olguin) engagements, exploring girls’ education western Afghanistan, CST accomplish- enabling capabilities, there has also been issues, and performing searches on the ments included opening a clinic and a the risk that abilities did not measure female population. In many cases, CST girls’ school, in addition to organizing a up to expectations or that personalities members have established rapport with women-only shura. CST members also would clash. locals, exchanged cell phone numbers, worked with government ministries, such In my discussions with both CST and been invited to visit women’s homes. as the Department of Women’s Affairs and SOF members, a number of recur- Their capabilities are also broader than and the Labor Union, in an advising role. ring challenges emerged. CST members those of FETs. CSTs can follow special Finally, a CST member could also discussed challenges with integrating operators into areas after they have been provide value to the team by conducting into teams, misperceptions of their ca- secured, including after raids. In those tasks related to her MOS, such as com- pabilities, and a lack of capable female situations, CSTs then use search and munications, CA, or driving. interpreters. Special operators identi- seizure techniques to find hidden items fied additional challenges such as site on females (for example, weapons or con- Recurring Challenges selection, security limitations and consid- traband)—and, like FETs, occasionally CSTs, like their predecessors, have erations, and sexual tension between CST uncover a militant dressed as a woman. received mixed reviews. While their and SOF members. CST activities can be largely operational impact is difficult to Some CST members indicated that dependent on location and the permis- measure, many special operations teams it could be difficult to integrate with a sibility of the environment. In northern have spoken highly of the enabling special operations team as an outsider Afghanistan, for example, governance capabilities they have provided in the to a “band of brothers”—a concern and development were primary goals in execution of VSO in persistent situa- similarly raised by members of other en- 2012. At one site, a CST member with tions, particularly in gathering informa- abler units (for instance, CA) as well. In medical training focused on conduct- tion. In other cases, special operations northern Afghanistan, one CST Soldier ing medical engagements. At another teams either have not known how to described her team’s integration with an site, her CST partner worked with the best use their capabilities or have not Army Operational Detachment–Alpha Ministry of Education to reform educa- been able to due to limitations based (ODA) as a train wreck. The SOF unit tion syllabi. Around the same time in on the security situation. Like other had misperceptions about the capabilities JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 Katt 111
If a CST member took up a seat, it meant that she had taken the place of another operator (with his own supplementary capabilities). In addition, taking a CST member anywhere usually required bring- ing along an interpreter and a security patrol. As a result, even though two women were on each CST, often only one would go out on each mission. That made it easier for the team to patrol and meant that they did not need to take additional operators with them for security purposes, possibly requiring an additional vehicle. Finally, operators expressed concerns about sexual tension and activity im- pacting unit effectiveness, an argument frequently cited in studies on women in combat. Working long hours in close quarters and in sometimes austere condi- tions has the potential to bring people Marines practice speed and tactical reloads while training to become augments for FETs (U.S. Marine together in any job. Some have suggested Corps/Ryan Rholes) that sexual relationships have had the po- of her team. In situations such as those, indicated that her team’s interpreters tential to impact daily operations and unit CSTs can run the risk of turning into a could not keep up on long patrols, in ef- cohesion. In addition, there have been hindrance for the special operations team fect slowing the special operators down. some complaints about a lack of maturity and can therefore be underutilized. In Therefore, without a good interpreter, the of both men and women. Yet this issue that case, it took time for the women to CST could not effectively do its job. may have been mitigated at VSO sites gain the operators’ trust and understand- According to some special operators, that had strong leadership. ing. That same CST was later moved to security has been a limiting factor in a different site where the resident ODA assigning CSTs to different sites. Some Implications for the Future made the team an extension of its own operators suggested that CSTs could The FET and CST programs were team. She believed that the primary dif- potentially be more useful to gain buy-in emergent mission-specific require- ference between the two experiences was by engaging with female villagers dur- ments, which the Services met by that the second ODA was already familiar ing the initial stages of VSO when the initially recruiting female Servicemem- with the capabilities they could provide area is less permissive. However, due to bers out of hide from other units as and how best to use them. DOD-imposed restrictions, CSTs were individual augmentees. In particular, Finding qualified female interpreters instead introduced to the village later CSTs in Afghanistan opened the was another issue identified by several when the area was relatively secure and door for female troops to operate interviewed CST members. In some male Servicemembers had already devel- alongside special operations units in areas, such as western Afghanistan, it may oped local relationships. Similarly, some the battlefield. They were specifically be culturally acceptable to use a male areas were more receptive to CSTs. At selected and trained to work with SOF interpreter. However, that is generally some of the locations where CSTs were as part of VSO. The Marine Corps not the case in ethnically Pashto areas. assigned, Afghan women were either ended its use of CSTs in Afghanistan And while it can be relatively easy to find uninformed or unwilling to share infor- in 2013 because of the drastic change male interpreters, there are generally far mation, which hindered a CST’s ability in mission when SOF moved out of fewer mentally and physically fit female to complete its mission. villages into overwatch positions. interpreters. One CST started its deploy- Ultimately, in some situations, special However, as the U.S. military contin- ment with a young female interpreter who operators determined that the costs of ues to withdraw from Afghanistan and spoke a different dialect from the one spo- using CSTs outweighed the benefits— looks to prepare and posture itself for ken in their assigned area. That same CST that is, in some cases, CSTs were not the future, it should consider whether later received a different interpreter with worth the risk for the team due to pro- CSTs are truly an enduring require- impressive language capabilities; however, tocols and security considerations. One ment for SOF, which will continue she was older and her physical ability was special operator explained that it could to conduct irregular warfare activities limited, which in turn limited team mobil- be manpower-intensive to bring CST around the globe and could benefit ity. At another location, a CST member members out to a shura or on a mission. from this enabling capability. 112 Features / Cultural Support Teams in Afghanistan JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan internal defense. In these population- male Servicemembers may be able to reflect the likely future of combat—non- centric missions, CSTs can help provide converse freely with female locals without linear and population-focused—and will access to roughly half of the population the same traditional cultural implica- increasingly place female Servicemembers through engagement activities. In ad- tions. Yet in any culture, women may in combat situations. Both men and dition, CSTs could be enormously generally feel more comfortable being women have fought and died in these beneficial during SOF training missions engaged with—and, when necessary, combat environments. Partly as a result, with partner nations. In countries that searched by—other women. Even in the DOD has recently relaxed its restric- have female soldiers or police, the addi- United States, women prefer and often tions on women in combat. In February tion of women to an otherwise all-male insist on female Transportation Security 2012, DOD modified the 1994 Combat team could give them greater access and Administration staff patting them down Exclusion Policy to increase the overall placement during a Joint Combined at airports, if necessary. It is not unrea- number of positions available to women.8 Exchange Training event. sonable to expect similar preferences in Then, in February 2013, DOD elimi- Looking ahead, the question ulti- other countries. Therefore, the special nated the exclusion policy and began to mately becomes whether the military operations community should more allow each Service to determine any believes that this enabling capability is closely examine how it could use or re- restrictions specific to its members.9 worth keeping at a time when every tool this enabling capability for different Each Service is now examining potential program is increasingly scrutinized due types of environments. JFQ roles for women in future operating to ongoing budget cuts. However, if environments. the program is dissolved now and the The results of these studies may help capability is needed again in the future, Notes the Services determine whether FETs it will cost a lot of resources—in both and CSTs are necessary in future operat- money and manpower—to begin anew. 1 In October 2011, First Lieutenant Ashley White, USA, became the first Cultural Sup- ing environments. For example, if the Therefore, by evolving the program to port Team member killed in the line of duty Services do choose to open all positions provide SOF with this type of enduring when an improvised explosive device (IED) to women, these all-female teams may enabling capability, it may ultimately save detonated in southern Kandahar Province. See not be necessary once units are fully resources in the long run. David Zucchino, “A Counterinsurgency Behind integrated; more trained women will po- As part of this evolution, the SOF the Burka,” Los Angeles Times, December 11, 2011. More recently, First Lieutenant Jennifer tentially be available on the battlefield to community should ensure that the Moreno, USA, was killed in an IED attack in regularly engage with female counterparts lessons learned in Afghanistan are insti- October 2013. See Gretel C. Kovach, “Female during patrols and meetings or after raids. tutionalized. Ultimately, the bulk of the Soldier Killed on SpecOps Mission,” San Diego If they do choose to leave restrictions in challenges identified herein have little to Union Tribune, October 8, 2013. place for women in combat, the Army do with gender policy restrictions. Some 2 The author also researched open source material and the Marine Corps Lessons Learned and Marine Corps may want to consider of the issues, such as capability misper- System for additional information. institutionalizing an FET-like capability ceptions and clashing personalities, are 3 David F. Burrelli, Women in Combat: within each infantry battalion, with spe- similarly faced by other types of (all-male) Issues for Congress, R42075 (Washington, DC: cial attention to the CA skill sets found enablers and can possibly be resolved as Congressional Research Service, May 9, 2013), necessary in Afghanistan. The resource the CST program matures. For example, available at . commitment would be relatively small challenges of CSTs integrating into spe- 4 Department of Defense (DOD) Memo- and would maximize a unit’s effects in cial operations teams may be overcome randum, “Direct Ground Combat Definition population-focused operations. Similarly, with additional combined training oppor- and Assignment Rule,” January 13, 1994. USSOCOM may ultimately decide tunities. In addition, CST assignments 5 See, for example, Lia B. Heeter, “Women that female Servicemembers should not would need to be monitored by leader- in Combat: Policy Barriers are Being Re- moved,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 2013. be allowed to serve in a special opera- ship and adjusted as needed. While the 6 Ann Jones makes this observation in tions–specific MOS. If that is the case, issue of deploying CSTs in heavy fighting “Woman to Woman in Afghanistan,” The Na- the potential still exists for SOF to benefit areas may possibly be a result of policy tion, October 27, 2010. from CSTs in other theaters. restrictions, it may also be a command 7 Trisha Talton, “MARSOC Looks to Regardless of the policy restrictions decision. With limited numbers of CSTs, Women for New Mission,” Marine Corps Times, November 14, 2009. debate and the Services’ findings, the it is practical for a commander to ensure 8 DOD, Report to Congress on the Review of need for a CST-like capability will endure that they face less risk. Laws, Policies and Regulations Restricting the as SOF continue to operate in irregular SOF may need to examine the need Service of Female Members in the U.S. Armed battlefields all over the world. While the for CSTs on a mission-by-mission basis. Forces, February 2012. VSO mission was designed expressly for Some have argued that the culture in 9 DOD Memorandum, “Elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Afghanistan, its roots are in traditional parts of the Middle East and South Asia Assignment Rule,” January 24, 2013. SOF missions, such as counterinsur- may be somewhat unique in terms of sex gency, stability operations, and foreign segregation. In many parts of the world, JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 Katt 113
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