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The Arab-Israeli Conflict Revisited
Keys
Are Palestinians on the Road to
Independence?
The Arab-Israeli Conflict Revisited
Nadim N. Rouhana1 occupied Palestinian territories in 1967 and the Pal-
Professor of International Affairs and Conflict Studies estinians, but also to consider strategies and even
Director, Program on International Negotiation and ventures that would be less likely under more con-
Conflict Resolution
straining international conditions.
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
These circumstances emerge at a time when many
University, Medford
among the Palestinian political class – that is mainly
the class outside the circles of the Palestinian Au-
thority – believe that it has become impractical and
The fact that a question like the one raised in the ti- unrealistic to define the goals of a Palestinian nation-
tle of this article can be seriously posed by so many, al project in terms of an independent Palestinian
including some Palestinians, reveals the extent to state in the West Bank and Gaza. This is mainly be-
which doubts about the future of Palestinian inde- cause of Israel’s active undermining of such an op-
pendence permeate current thinking about Pales- tion, best represented by settlement activities and
40
tine. These doubts emerge in an unprecedentedly the incorporation of more than 700,0002 settlers and
difficult alignment of local, regional, and internation- close to 2503 settlements and outposts into Israel’s
al circumstances for the Palestinians: Israel’s mili- society, politics, military, and all other institutions. It is
tary, economic, and international standing is at a also because the Israeli political map has been trans-
peak; in contrast, the Palestinians are at a low point formed in ways that give right-wing political forces,
in terms of their political power, due to internal divi- including those of the settler movement and religious
sions, a leadership crisis, and the absence of a well- nationalists, increasing control over Israel’s strategic
defined national project; the Arab world is occupied agenda (see Shindler, 2015). Thus, it is no wonder
with internal struggles between receding revolution- that under these conditions, Palestinian statehood in
ary, counter-revolutionary, and organized terrorist the West Bank or the West Bank and Gaza, even
forces; and many international powers, or more ac- when promoted by arguably one of the least biased
curately, significant political forces within some of (in favour of Israel) American administrations (such
these powers – the US, some European states, and as during the most recent negotiation phase under
India, for example – are invoking religion and nation- Secretary of State John Kerry from 2013 to 2014),
alism to guide their domestic and international poli- would have, in its best-case scenario, provided Pal-
IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2017
tics and hence find themselves closer to Israel – a estinians a state that would have redefined both the
political embodiment of nationalism nurtured by reli- Palestinian people (as being only Palestinians resid-
gious underpinnings. These circumstances provide ing in the West Bank and Gaza) and Palestine (as
Israel with unprecedented conditions not only to act being limited to the territory on which this new state
upon its political plans regarding the future of the would have been established). The Palestinian citi-
1 Nadim N Rouhana is also the Founding director of Mada al-Carmel – The Arab Centre for Applied Social Research in Haifa, Israel.
2 Israel’s Housing Minister estimated the number of settlers in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) at between 700,000 and 750,000 as
early as 2014 (Reuters 2014).
3 Peace Now estimated the number of settlements and outposts (including in East Jerusalem) at 240 in 2016. See Peace Now 2017a; Peace
Now 2017b.zens of Israel would have been doomed to constitu- ent on both sides. The Israeli leadership is looking
Keys
tional inequality in Israel as a Jewish state and those for ways to guarantee the continued incorporation
of them who are internal refugees would have never of the largest possible portions of the West Bank
had their claims addressed; the Palestinian refugees into Israel and to guarantee full and permanent dom-
in exile would have been prevented from returning; ination of the Palestinians in order to thwart their
and the State itself would have been demilitarized ability to challenge these policies. As for the Pales-
The Arab-Israeli Conflict Revisited
and placed under strict Israeli control.4 tinians, under the complex international and regional
Now however, with the end of the Obama Adminis- circumstances and given the stagnation of the lead-
tration, the current hegemonic Israeli political class ership represented in the Palestinian Authority, Pal-
– the right wing and the religious nationalists repre- estinian political and intellectual elites have not
sented in the Israeli government – oppose the idea been able to define a new vision for a Palestinian
of any independent Palestinian state in the West national project to replace the disappearing goal
Bank and Gaza and champion ongoing settler-colo- based on a two-state solution. Indeed, this is a most
nial policies that have made even such a limited challenging task as the alternatives that stand be-
state unlikely to emerge. It has also become clear fore the Palestinians under the current circumstanc-
that for the increasingly insignificant “Zionist left” es are hard even to envision. The transitional phase
and for the Zionist centre too, the question of Pales- will be a period of looking for new strategies – an-
tinian statehood is not on the Israeli agenda, even chored in new thinking – to achieve liberation and
with the impossible conditions that Israel usually im- decolonization in their homeland. As I argue below,
poses (such as requiring Palestinians to recognize there are signs of some stirrings in that direction.
Israel as a Jewish state).5
What we are witnessing in both Palestinian and Is-
raeli politics is a period of transition, at the centre of Israel beyond the Two-State Solution
which is the demise of the idea of an independent
41
Palestinian state in the territories Israel occupied in The Israeli discourse on the future of the Palestini-
1967, and complete disintegration of trust in the ans has moved beyond two states. As mentioned
“peace process.” On the Palestinian side, this tran- above, there is no significant political party in Israel
sition is taking the form of an end to an era that start- within the Zionist spectrum that accepts full Pales-
ed in the mid-1970s – the struggle towards an inde- tinian independence in a Palestinian state in the
pendent Palestinian state – to a new era, the West Bank and Gaza.
characteristics of which are still undefined. On the
Israeli side, the transition is different – from an era in
which some efforts were made – sometimes genu- Palestinian political and intellectual
ine as under Prime Minister Olmert from 2006 to elites have not been able to define a
2009, and sometimes disingenuous as under Net-
new vision for a Palestinian national
anyahu since then6 – to a time when peace efforts
are perceived as either futile (see, for example, Al- project to replace the disappearing
pher, 2016) or as a threat that has to be dealt with. goal based on a two-state solution
The sense on both sides of being in a transitional
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period moving towards an as yet undefined phase is
similar in two respects: (i) it is not clear what new The questions within the ruling coalition – the he-
phase will follow the demise of the two-state solu- gemonic political class in Israel – are not on the fu-
tion; and (ii) the belief is widely shared that this con- ture relations between two states or the shape of a
flict will not be settled any time soon. Other than Palestinian state. The new debate in the Israeli rul-
that, the transitional period is fundamentally differ- ing circles is whether to annex the whole of the
4For some of the security arrangements considered under the Kerry negotiations, see Tibon and Harel 2017.
5 For views of the Zionist Camp (the successor of Labor), see Wootliff 2016; for views of the Zionist centre, represented by Yesh Atid, see
Edelman 2017.
6 See Ravid and Levinson (2017) for how Netanyahu explains the need to deal with Trump’s efforts to reach a settlement.West Bank or just parts - and if so, which parts -, the homeland between the settlers and the indig-
Keys
and what future should Palestinians have in it (resi- enous population.
dents, citizens, autonomy in Bantustans, or even ex-
pulsion). The views range from full annexation with
civil rights, through annexation of area C (about Palestinians beyond the Two-State Solution:
60% of the West Bank), to annexation of large tracts Re-Conceptualizing the Conflict
The Arab-Israeli Conflict Revisited
of land usually called the “settlement blocs.”7 As for
the future of the Palestinians, views range from giv- On the Palestinian side, a new paradigm for under-
ing them the choice between leaving or accepting standing the conflict between themselves and Israel
second-class citizenship, as articulated by Knesset is emerging (or more accurately re-emerging) with
member Bezalel Smotrich (with an implication of far-reaching implications that are yet to be fully ex-
killing them all off as a third choice; see Blatman, amined. Palestinians are increasingly articulating
2017), to pushing them into Bantustans, or giving their conflict with Israel as a conflict between the
them civil rights in a state of the Jewish people, as indigenous population of Palestine and a settler-co-
Israeli President Rivlin would support (Lis, 2017). lonial movement represented by Zionism. Such an
The status quo of continued occupation is perhaps articulation is becoming possible as a result of par-
the preferred Israeli option for the time being, be- allel developments in Palestinian politics and soci-
cause beneath it an aggressive colonization project ety in the territories under occupation since 1967
can continue until the regional, international, and lo- and in Israel, as well as among Palestinian commu-
cal circumstances ripen for one of the options men- nities in exile. A paradigm shift to redefine the con-
tioned above. flict between the Palestinians and Israel as a strug-
gle against a settler colonial project is gaining
momentum.
The Israeli leadership is looking for This paradigm is not completely new to Palestinian
ways to guarantee the continued
42
political thought; Palestinians originally perceived
their conflict with Zionism as a conflict between a
incorporation of the largest possible
settler-colonial project and an indigenous Palestini-
portions of the West Bank into Israel an national movement (see, for example, Sayegh,
and to guarantee full and permanent 1965; Abu-Lughod and Abu-Laban, 1974). This
domination of the Palestinians in conceptualization, which started with the start of
the conflict itself, characterized the popular, intellec-
order to thwart their ability to tual, and cultural understanding of the conflict as
challenge these policies well as Palestinian political thought. Within this un-
derstanding the Palestinian national movement de-
fined its strategic goals as “Return and Liberation”
Notice that none of the Israeli options offers a gen- – that is, the return of Palestinian refugees to their
uine partition of the land of Palestine into two inde- land and the liberation of Palestine – the meaning of
pendent states. If partition is to be at all consid- which was not clear. It was in the 1970s that the he-
ered, the Bennett plan of annexing area C, gemonic Palestinian political leadership within the
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controlling the borders with Jordan, and concen- PLO shifted the political thinking by defining the
trating Palestinians in two or three self-rule areas goal of the Palestinian Movement in terms of estab-
akin to Bantustans with full Israeli security control lishing a Palestinian state on every part of liberated
is more like what an imposed settler-colonial parti- Palestinian territory.8 This goal developed gradually
tion will look like. In this regard, Israel will not be into the two-state solution programme articulated in
any different to other settler-colonial regimes, none 1988 in the Palestinian National Council held in Al-
of which ended with an agreed-upon partition of giers. The underlying paradigm of this political pro-
7For examples of these different options, see Lis 2017; Wootliff and Ahren 2016; and Sharon 2017.
8“The Ten Points Document” that defined this goal was approved in the 12th meeting of the Palestinian National Council in Cairo on 8 June
1974. (See Gresh 1988.)gramme was national conflict – that is, a conflict be- land and living in it with the human dignity that only
Keys
tween the Palestinian national movement and equal citizenship can deliver – a claim that is funda-
Zionism as a national movement (Rouhana, 2017). mentally incompatible with Zionism itself. Politically,
The national conflict paradigm peaked in the mid- this entails a struggle for liberation from Israel’s set-
1990s with the Oslo Accords. The international tler-colonial regime across Palestine and an attempt
support, including that of American administrations, to establish instead a new, de-Zionized order in which
The Arab-Israeli Conflict Revisited
for the two-state solution provided face validity to both colonized and colonizer are liberated from their
the paradigm. Indeed, during this period – the mid- relations as occupier and occupied, oppressor and
1970s until very recently -, the intellectual and aca- oppressed, privileged and underprivileged, and su-
demic discourse on settler colonialism among Pal- perior and inferior.
estinians has faded and almost disappeared from
the political statist discourse, although it has never
faded from the popular understanding. Redefining Palestinian Independence
While the settler-colonial paradigm has been in-
There is no significant political party creasingly endorsed in academic and intellectual
circles (see Busbridge, 2017) and among younger
in Israel within the Zionist spectrum
generations of Palestinians, it has not yet found its
that accepts full Palestinian way to the political sphere. Nor has this paradigm,
independence in a Palestinian state so far, offered a clear vision of the political future,
in the West Bank and Gaza within its framework, of the Israeli and Palestinian
peoples and the relationship between them.
Many Palestinians now share the revived realization
43
that Zionism is a settler-colonial project that is not Palestinians are increasingly
only making it impossible for them to have a state,
but which, in its dominant ideological manifesta- articulating their conflict with Israel
tions, denies the Palestinians having any authentic as a conflict between the indigenous
relationship to Palestine as a homeland. This realiza- population of Palestine and a settler-
tion is common to the various Palestinian communi-
colonial movement represented by
ties, including the Palestinian citizens in Israel, who
are becoming increasingly aware of the aggressive Zionism
Zionist claim that the homeland itself—as their moth-
erland and place of national origin—is being denied
them, beyond a mere political denial of equal citi- To become politically relevant, this paradigm has
zenship in a state defined as “the State of the Jews” to address the following question: If partition to
(see Rouhana, 2015). two states is no longer applicable, and if settler-
This growing awareness among Palestinians of colonial partition into Bantustans is naturally unac-
homeland denial is spreading among many civil soci- ceptable to Palestinians, what should their posi-
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ety activists, youth organizations, cultural and intel- tive vision be for decolonization and liberation?
lectual elites, and political leaders. This is obviously What would the future of Palestinian independ-
true of the millions of Palestinians in exile, who are ence be? I argue in this paper that Palestinian in-
told that they cannot return to their homeland, which dependence itself has to be redefined in the con-
is now constituted as the homeland solely of the text of any alternative to the disappearing two-state
Jews, but is also true of Palestinians in the West option. Such redefinition will have to take into con-
Bank and Gaza who experience the physical overtak- sideration the political geographic and demo-
ing of their homeland on a daily basis. Thus, the new graphic realities of both Israelis and Palestinians.
Palestinian struggle is being increasingly defined not My arguments are anchored in thinking within the
around statehood, but around reclaiming the home- settler-colonial paradigm.Even though many Palestinians have come to the can galvanize the public support of all Palestinian
Keys
conclusion that a two-state solution is no longer communities.
feasible, many believe that abandoning the politi- In effect, all Palestinian communities suffer from
cal demand for a two-state solution, even if they the consequences of the Zionist settler-colonial
know it is unrealistic, will give Israel freer reign in project, albeit it in different ways. The Palestinian
implementing its policies in the West Bank, since refugees in exile have been prevented from return-
The Arab-Israeli Conflict Revisited
they will be giving up on an ideal that is support- ing to their homeland since their exile close to 70
ed, at least on the declaratory level, by the inter- years ago; the West Bank Palestinians have been
national community. Thus, many Palestinians are under direct occupation and continued coloniza-
trapped within the declared support for a two- tion for 50 years; the Gaza Strip is under indirect
state solution. occupation; and the Palestinians in Israel are citi-
zens in a settler-colonial system in which their citi-
zenship is constitutionally unequal (Rouhana and
Palestinian independence itself has Sabbagh-Khoury, 2014).
For Palestinians to envision their liberation, they
to be redefined in the context of any
need to offer a political project that addresses the
alternative to the disappearing two- liberation of all Palestinians from Israeli occupation
state option. Such redefinition will and domination. But beyond this, they must also
have to take into consideration the advance a vision for how Israelis and Palestinians
will live together in a new shared political order – a
political geographic and
new political system. In whatever form Palestinians
demographic realities of both envision their future with the Israelis, their inde-
Israelis and Palestinians pendence has to be redefined in a way that will in-
clude the other. There does not seem to be a po-
44
litical option in which Palestinians can envision
The lack of an alternative to a two-state solution is independence or liberation without having that de-
not only an intellectual trap but also a political trap, fined to include Israelis. Liberation and decoloniza-
enabling Israel to continue its current policies, tion for Palestinians as the colonized must include
which, paradoxically, will not only make a two-state liberation and decolonization of the Israelis – the
solution even less likely, but also facilitate the pos- colonizing. This vision is a major step that most
sible realization of a settler-colonial partition in the Palestinians are not ready to undertake. The com-
form of the annexation of major parts of the West munity that is most ready to define such a future
Bank and enclosing the population in isolated terri- are the Palestinians in Israel, who live with the Is-
tories. In the absence of an alternative Palestinian raelis in a mixed system of settler colonialism but
vision, for example a rights-based vision, around also citizenship. It is therefore no wonder that their
which Palestinians can define their national project, leading intellectual-political project of a “state for
and in light of evolving ideas on the Israeli side for its citizens” within Israeli borders (Bishara, 2017)
the Palestinians’ place in a future Israel that incor- emphasized equal citizenship in a decolonized
porates the West Bank or major parts of it, it will be state. If decolonization is applied to all of Palestine
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easier for Israel to design the future geopolitical and to all Palestinians and all Israeli Jews, this pro-
configuration of its preference. ject must be developed. In this case, Palestinian
The future of Palestinians’ realization of their self- independence will not be defined in terms of a
determination has to be redefined in profound ways. state for Palestinians but a state for Palestinians
However, the current internal Palestinian dynamics and Israeli Jews – a de-Zionized political system
make this difficult to achieve. While Palestinians that guarantees equality and group equality. While
can agree on the settler-colonial conceptualization such a vision is still elementary, the intellectual and
to understand their conflict with Zionism, they are political challenge for Palestinians is to develop it
unable to use this paradigm to advance a political and advance it to Palestinians, Israelis, and the
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