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ANTHROPOS
104.2009: 499–517
Kosovo’s Masters and Their Influence on the Local Population
throughout History
Hanna Kienzler
Abstract. – On 17 February 2008, the Kosovo Assembly de- Introduction
clared its independence from Serbia. Nevertheless, Kosovo’s po-
litical status is highly contested, and Kosovar Albanian as well
as Western politicians and academics employ political as well
On 17 February 2008, the Kosovo Assembly de-
as intellectual sources in an attempt to free the country from its clared its independence from Serbia. Yet, Kosovo’s
historical chains and to provide it with an authentic historical political status is highly contested and its nego-
past. However, their wide sweeping arguments need to be han- tiation is affected by “competing historical un-
dled with caution. In the following, I will delineate how various derstandings” as well as “national identifications”
external power regimes impacted on local Kosovar culture and
how the latter was continuously adapted as well as transformed
(Di Lellio and Schwandner-Sievers 2006: 513). Of-
by the local population throughout history. I will mainly focus ficial talks about the future status of the province
on the influence exerted by political and legal institutions prior began in Vienna on 20 February 2006. Under the di-
to the arrival of the Ottomans; during the Ottoman Empire; the rection of Martti Ahtisaari, the former Finish Presi-
conflictual periods during the Balkan Wars as well as First and dent, Kosovo Albanian and Serbian delegates met
Second World Wars; the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY);
the war in Kosovo in 1998/1999; and UNMIK’s governance regularly in order to draft agreements on issues
since the war. [Kosovo, history, local culture, external power related to decentralisation, religious heritage, and
regimes, transformation] minority rights (Judah 2006: 214). Although well
organised, the procedure was an arduous one as it
Hanna Kienzler, (M. A. Tübingen 2004), Ph. D. candidate at failed to yield a resolution between Serb’s willing-
the anthropology department of McGill University. The focus
of her research is the differential impacts of war and trauma on ness to grant a high degree of autonomy and the
Kosovar Albanian women living in post-war Kosovo. She con- Albanian’s call for full independence for Kosovo
ducted her doctoral research in Kosovo and investigated three (Brown 2005: 1).
interconnected issues affecting Kosovar society in the aftermath Most Western diplomats seemed to agree that
of secession conflict: How Kosovar Albanian women perceive,
adapt, or otherwise respond to their personal war-traumas; how
the status of Kosovo as a province of the Republic
memories of traumatic events affect the women’s social relations of Serbia under the jurisdiction of the United Na-
and activities; and how changing political and economic circum- tions could not be maintained, and that partition as
stances affect women’s status and participation within Kosovar well as unification with neighbouring states must be
society. – She has conducted ethnographic research in two Koso- avoided. Instead, they supported a compromise so-
var villages in 2007 and 2008; at the Mental Health Center in
Peja, Kosovo in 2004; on three Hutterite colonies in Canada and lution of “conditional independence,” which would
the United States in 2002 and 2003; and in Kyrgyzstan in 2001. cut the sovereign link between Serbia and Kosovo,
– She has published articles related to Hutterite culture as well without granting Kosovo full state status.1 Yet, the
as war-trauma and posttraumatic stress disorder and is author majority of the Albanians in Kosovo accepted noth-
of “Gender and Communal Longevity among Hutterites. How
Hutterite Women Establish, Maintain, and Change Colony Life”
ing less than self-determination and independence.
(Aachen 2005).
1 Brown (2005: 2); Di Lellio (2006: xxii); Judah (2006: 214).
https://doi.org/10.5771/0257-9774-2009-2-499
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For example, Albin Kurti, leader of the Self De- nore cultural change as well as complex (political)
termination Movement claimed that only uncom- events that shaped the cultural life of the region. In
promised sovereignty could “[disable] Serbia’s in- relation to this argument, I will show how occupiers
trusion and [allow] freedom for development” that throughout history have affected and sometimes vi-
is, “[it] is key to both integration and security for olently controlled Kosovo’s cultural reality.
all communities” (2006: 153). These calls for sov-
ereignty and independence are echoed by many
Western scholars, especially historians. According Kosovo’s Postconflict Administration
to some of them, the United Nations Interim Ad- and Its Affects on the Lives of Citizens
ministration Mission in Kosovo’s (UNMIK) recon-
struction strategy has undermined Kosovo’s indige- International Governance in Kosovo
nous capacity for recovering by imposing abstract
and universal standards for all Kosovo. It is argued Political reconstruction in Kosovo has been based
that local institutions such as village councils and upon the extreme solution of imposing an inter-
informal networks were ignored and, thus, dele- national administration to take full responsibility
gitimised.2 A similar stance is taken by scholars during the postconflict period. The United Nations
who contributed to the book “The Case for Kosova. is authorized to govern Kosovo through its Interim
Passage to Independence” (Di Lellio [ed.] 2006). Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), with
By addressing “representative questions,” debunk- a mandate to equip Kosovo with a “transitional
ing historical distortions, and deconstructing essen- administration while establishing and overseeing
tialist arguments, they make the case that an inde- the development of provisional democratic self-
pendent and fully sovereign Kosovo “can be demo- governing institutions to ensure conditions for a
cratic, economically viable, secure, and respectful peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in
of the rule of law and minority rights, and that this Kosovo” (UNMIK 2006). On 10 June 1999, the
outcome is not only possible, but legitimate and UN Security Council had adopted the Resolution
desirable” (Di Lellio 2006: xxi). 1244 during its 4011th meeting with 14 votes in
Apparently, politicians and historians employ favour and a Chinese abstention (United Nations
political as well as intellectual sources in an attempt Security Council 1999). Del Re envisions the struc-
to free Kosovo from its historical chains, to provide ture of UNMIK as a façade of a classical temple.
it with an authentic historical past, and to convince Its architraves represent the headquarters, which
the international community to grant the Albanians is currently headed by the Special Representative
in Kosovo independence, sovereignty, as well as of the Secretary General (SRSG), Joachim Rücker
territorial integrity. However, their wide sweeping (United Nations Special and Personal Representa-
arguments need to be handled with caution. It is of- tive). The headquarters are supported by four or-
ten not clear what these researchers mean when re- ganisational pillars, each embracing different re-
ferring to issues such as delegitimised, suppressed, sponsibilities: civil administration falls under the
and ignored “local culture,” “local resources,” and remit of UNMIK itself; humanitarian assistance
“local ways of organisation.” I, therefore, seek to and issues concerning refugees is preserve of the
delineate how political processes influenced Koso- United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees
var culture and ways of organisation throughout (UNHCR); democratisation, institution building,
history. First, I will provide an outline of Kosovo’s human rights, and elections are covered by the Or-
postconflict administration and its affects on the ganisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
local population. Thereupon, I will make the ar- (OSCE); and reconstruction and economic devel-
gument that, despite the legitimate critique against opment are ordered by the European Union (EU)
UNMIK’s governance and ignorance of local cul- (del Re 2003: 88; UNMIK 2001).
ture, it should not be forgotten that Kosovo’s “lo- After one year of municipal institution building
cal culture,” “local resources,” and “local ways of and the establishment of Joint Interim Administra-
organisation” were subject to a range of transfor- tive Departments, a Kosovo Constitutional Frame-
mations throughout history. By either not defining work for Interim Self-Government was drafted and
or reducing local issues to buzzwords such as ka- approved by international and local experts in May
nun (customary law), blood feud, village councils, 2001. The goal was to establish Provisional In-
and elders, some researchers have the tendency to stitutions of Self-Government (PISG) in Kosovo
essentialise and folklorise Balkan culture and ig- through elections. In 2001 the new Assembly of
Kosovo was elected. This was followed by the
2 Blumi (2000: 18); Pupavac (2004). elected Assembly Members’ selection of a Kosovar
Anthropos 104.2009
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president, Ibrahim Rugova. In early 2002, the pres- munities and their members, decentralisation of lo-
ident assumed responsibility for the appointment cal government, the justice system, religious and
of a prime minister, Bajram Rexhepi. In the PISG, cultural heritage, international dept, property and
100 of 120 seats of the Assembly were distributed archives, the Kosovo security sector, an interna-
among all parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives, tional civilian representative, European Security
and independent candidates in proportion to the and Defense Policy Rule of Law Mission, interna-
number of valid votes received by them in the elec- tional military presence (continuation of KFOR),
tion to the Assembly. Twenty out of 120 seats were and a legislative agenda. Under the Ahtisaari Plan
reserved for the additional representation of non- the legal system is foreseen to be based on terms
Albanian Kosovo communities including Kosovo of the European Union Rule of Law Mission
Serbs, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians, Bosniaks, Turk- (EULEX). This rule of law mission is projected as
ish, and Gorani. Although the PISG had no author- a continuation of the international civil presence in
ity over the resorts of justice, foreign affairs, and Kosovo envisaged by the United Nations Security
defence (Schwarz 2002: 530), the UNDP Human Council Resolution 1244, although Russia and Ser-
Development Report described these developments bia perceive the mission as illegal. Until now, the
as “defining moments in extending representation mission’s program is vague and its website does not
and participation in Kosovo’s formal political pro- provide more information than “Specific projects
cesses” (UNDP 2004: 62). However, Caplan points are being developed in all relevant areas, based on
out that bureaucracies in Kosovo remain highly an analysis of the needs as evident during the plan-
politicised and minority recruitment is difficult to ning phase. This assessment has been done along-
achieve. More specifically, “[b]y October 2002, side the relevant Kosovo stakeholders, and is there-
a fair proportion of minorities had been employed fore reflecting a shared view of the problems and
in only eight out of 24 ethnically mixed munici- opportunities in the area of rule of law” (EULEX
palities, the most serious obstacles being security 2008).
concerns, inter-ethnic tension in the workplace and UN and EU planners are not the only ones in-
a limited number of qualified minorities willing to terfering in postwar Kosovo. According to Pan-
accept civil service positions” (Caplan 2004: 242). dolfi (2003), the true agents of military-economic-
In addition, the Resolution 1244 authorized a humanitarian action are the various international
Kosovo Force (KFOR) intervention. On 12 June organizations, agencies, foundations, and NGOs.
1999, KFOR entered Kosovo under the United Na- Due to outside financial support, the number
tions mandate. Its objectives are “to deter renewed of NGOs increased significantly across Kosovo
hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav (UNDP 2004: 53). Underlying this support, is the
and Serb forces; to establish a secure environment assumption that a “healthy” civil society sector
and ensure public safety and order; to demilitarise tends to be equated with a large number of NGOs
the Kosovo Liberation Army; to support the inter- as it is supposed “to provide the proper ‘climate’
national humanitarian effort; and coordinate with for the development of democratic culture, for the
and support the international civil presence” (NATO promotion of human rights, and for an effective,
Topics 2008). To facilitate peacekeeping, KFOR accountable government” (Sampson 2003: 136).
set up five multinational zones led by the UK, Sampson analyses this foreign presence at two lev-
US, France, Italy, and Germany respectively. All els: institutions which tend to employ both outside
national contingents are supposed to pursue the supervisors and local staff, and the foreign individ-
same objective that is, to maintain a secure envi- uals, the so-called “internationals,” who have their
ronment in Kosovo. One of the first tasks of KFOR own work routines, social life, and daily practice
was to demilitarise the Kosovo Liberation Army (Sampson 2003: 147). Pandolfi shows that actors
(KLA). On 20 June 1999, the KLA stroke a deal in these circuits develop an “internal rhetoric” to
with KFOR which envisaged the gradual disarma- which local elites have to adapt in order to “main-
ment and abandonment of their positions as well as tain their international position of power” (Pandolfi
checkpoints. In return, members of the KLA were 2008: 176). A striking example is Bajram Rexhe-
granted the possibility to participate in the adminis- pi’s (Kosovo’s former prime minister) special con-
tration and the newly established police force (Pe- tribution to the Human Development Report in
tritsch und Pichler 2004: 288 f.). 2004:
Since its declaration of independence, Kosovo “A fragile economy, high unemployment, and a
is charged with putting forward an Ahtisaari (UN wide spectrum of social groups in need of special
Special Envoy) Plan which includes provisions assistance are just some of the pressing issues grap-
covering constitutional provisions, rights of com- pled with by Kosovo’s new and fragile institutions.
Anthropos 104.2009
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Yet, for every institution charged with improving fied. According to him, it is questionable whether
the living conditions of all Kosovans, time and the NATO intervention in Kosovo was a multina-
practical experience are needed to transform them tional effort fought exclusively for humanitarian
into effective, accountable, and more democratic reasons. Instead, he argues that the establishment
arms of government . . . I strongly believe that de- of a new world order is marketed and headed by
mocracy cannot be a second order priority. No so- “enlightened states” which “happen to be the rich
ciety can afford to disregard fundamental demo- and powerful”, and possess enough military might
cratic principles and human rights as it paves the to turn a blind eye on international law and world
long road toward human development. Democracy opinion (Chomsky 1999: 11).
is the prerequisite for tackling other pressing issues In a similar vein, Ottaway and Lacina compare
in society . . . While it cannot guarantee develop- the external imposition of a new political frame-
ment, it has the potential to trigger a virtuous circle work through UNMIK to imperialistic practices.
of freedoms that empower people and communities Although international missions of this kind do not
to shape good policies that expand economic and exploit resources (in fact, they bring new ones) and
social opportunities. Indeed, I believe democracy is do not intend to develop caste systems of racial
integral to development itself” (UNDP 2004). superiority, they, nevertheless, transform govern-
Rexhepi clearly adopted the international com- ing systems and restructure existing states (Ott-
munity’s jargon based on buzzwords such as “trans- away and Lacina 2003: 75–77). The former justice
formation,” “democracy and democratisation,” expert of the international administration in Bos-
“human rights,” “human development” . . . Inter- nia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, Dr. Schwarz, even
estingly, however, his contribution does not men- speaks of a “return to absolutism” by comparing
tion the violent outbursts in March 2004, which the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-
revealed a more sobering reality. On 15 March, an General (SRSG) to a “princepts legibus solutus”
Albanian youth was shot in the village Caglavica (Schwarz 2002: 527).
near Pristina and, as a consequence, first clashes From an anthropological perspective, Pandolfi
between Albanian und Serbian citizens were noted. states that we are witnessing a massive transforma-
On the following day, the situation escalated when tion in the nature of global governance in Kosovo,
three Albanian children drowned in the Ibar, and which claims its legitimacy to interfere in the
surviving children claimed that Serbian children name of “coping with ‘economic’ and ‘democratic’
and their dogs chased them into the water. The emergencies” (2008: 159). Intervention, according
Albanian community decided that enough was to Pandolfi, is a mobile phenomenon which may
enough and organized themselves in outrage, vio- be conceived of as “a network of military forces,
lently breaking through KFOR control posts into non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and in-
the northern part of Mitrovica (Petritsch und Pich- ternational institutions . . . ” (2008: 158). These in-
ler 2004: 333). The unrests resulted in nineteen terfering transnational institutions attempt to link
deaths, the displacement of about 4,500 Kosovo transnational forms of domination to local politi-
Serbs, nearly 900 injured, and the destruction of cal practices and, thus, affected almost all forms
over 700 homes and up to ten public buildings of local life in Kosovo (Pandolfi 2003: 369). For
(UNDP 2004: 45). Observers accredited the sudden example, UNMIK permits that were only valid for
violent outbursts to the international interim gov- a short period of time were substituted by Yugoslav
ernment’s failure to acknowledge and effectively passports; the World Health Organisation (WHO)
react to high unemployment, poverty, uncertainty, received special power comparable to a ministry
extremism, and organized crime. of health; and international organisations instituted
priorities and divided the territory according to “ra-
tionalised criteria of intervention that had been es-
Sovereignty versus Imperialism tablished by donor countries, much of which hailed
from the West” (Pandolfi 2008: 171).
Both the political measures with regards to the sta- Despite the legitimate critique towards the gov-
tus question and the governance of the international ernance of the so-called international community,
community in Kosovo are criticized scathingly it should be remembered that the latter is not the
by historians, social scientists, as well as policy first external regime to occupy and restructure the
makers. In his book “The New Military Human- Kosovar region. The following chapter will show
ism. Lessons from Kosovo” (1999), Chomsky chal- that occupiers throughout history have affected and
lenges what he calls the “new humanism” with controlled Kosovo’s cultural reality that is, its local
which unauthorized military intervention is justi- culture, resources, and ways of organization.
Anthropos 104.2009
https://doi.org/10.5771/0257-9774-2009-2-499
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Kosovo’s Masters and Their Influence population (Illyrians, Wallachians, Thracians, Dar-
on Local Culture, Resources, and Ways of danians) back to the highland pastures (Vickers
Organization 1998: 6). This interpretation is largely contested by
Serbian scholars as well as politicians. According
Kosovo has been occupied and annexed succes- to them, Kosovo was virtually empty and inhab-
sively and each occupation was accompanied by ited almost exclusively by Serbians until the 17th
violence and suppression. Throughout the various and 18th centuries (Dannreuther 2001: 13; Guzina
occupations, the Albanians of Kosovo were pur- 2003: 31). Thus, Kosovo has a crucial significance
posefully marginalized and remained largely in for the Serbian national consciousness and tends to
their traditional structures. These so-called tradi- be referred to as “the cradle of Serbian civilization”
tional structures are primarily associated with kin (Clark 2000: xix).
groups, clan alliances, village communities, so- A more balanced view is held by Sima Cirkovic,
cial networks, informal associations, charities, and a Serbian historian, who notes: “Careful and un-
patron-client relations (Sampson 2003: 145). Some biased research proves that the thesis previously
of these concepts still have meaning for Kosovo held among historians that there were no Albani-
today whereas others have lost their importance. ans on the territory of what is presently Kosovo
In the following I will delineate how the various can no longer be upheld. Nor can one accept the
external power regimes impacted on local Koso- assertion made by some Albanian historians and
var culture, and how the latter was continuously publishers that Kosovo has been inhabited by Al-
adapted as well as transformed by the local pop- banians without interruption since ancient times.
ulation throughout history. I will mainly focus on Modern Kosovo was far from regions where Alba-
the influence exerted by political and legal institu- nians seem to have settled in the early Middle Age”
tions prior to the arrival of the Ottomans; during (Cirkovic cited in von Kohl and Libal 1997: 15).
the Ottoman Empire; the conflictual periods during Nonetheless, it should not be overlooked that lo-
the Balkan Wars as well as First and Second World cal archaeological findings at Bronze Age sites are
Wars; the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY); mainly Illyrian in character and do not support Ser-
and the war in Kosovo in 1998/1999. bian assumptions (Vickers 1998: 3).
After many years of severe conflict between the
Serbian population and the Bulgarian and Byzan-
Patterns of Political and Social Organization tine Empire, the Serbian Nemania Dynasty gained
Prior to the Arrival of the Ottomans control over the region in the 13th century. Kosovo,
thus, became “the heart of the Serbian Empire” and
Historians largely agree that the Albanian popu- expanded rapidly under Emperor Stephan Dushan
lation in Kosovo descends from the Illyrians who from the Danube to the Aegean and Ionian Seas
inhabited the territory of former Yugoslavia and (von Kohl and Libal 1997: 13). From the early 13th
Albania until the 5th century B.P.3 For exam- century on, the region became Serbia’s economic
ple, Ducellier explains with full confidence: “In as well as religious center. It was and still is the
Kosova, it is evidently the Slavs, or the Slavish peo- seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the site
ples, Bulgars and Serbs, who occupied, from the of its most sacred places (Malcolm 1998: 12). De-
seventh century, a region the population of which spite the strong Serbian influence, Petritsch and
was solidly Illyro-Albanian since Antiquity” (cited Pichler argue that Kosovo was a region where eth-
in Norris 1996: 10). According to several scholars, nic boundaries played a rather insignificant role.
the Illyrians resisted the rule by the Greeks as well That is, ethnic boundaries were not perceived as
as the Romans for centuries, but were eventually barriers but as flexible realms based on interaction
occupied by the Roman Empire under Emperor Au- (Petritsch und Pichler 2004: 23 f.).
gust in 28 B.P. After the division of the Roman Before the establishment of a stable national
Empire, Kosovo has repeatedly changed its national government in the Kosovar region, Albanians as
affiliation. well as Slavs were organized according to “various
During the reign of the Eastern Roman (Byzan- levels of inclusiveness and exclusiveness” based
tine) Empire in the 7th century, Slavic popu- upon local administration, territory, and kinship
lations (Slovenes, Croats, and Serbians) entered (Reineck 1991: 41). More specifically, Albanians
the western Balkans and pushed the “indigenous” were and still are divided into two groups based
upon language dialects and way of life: the Ghegs,
3 Reineck (1991: 20); Norris (1996: 10); Vickers (1998: 2); inhabiting the north of the Shkumbin River in Alba-
Wilkes (1992: 27). nia and the Tosks inhabiting the south. The specific
Anthropos 104.2009
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form of social organization of the Kosovo Alba- macy of kinship and seniority: the old had prece-
nian Ghegs was the clans (fis), which were deter- dence over the young and males over females
mined by the principle of patrilineal descent from a (Hammel 1984: 223; Kaser 1995: 60). According
common male ancestor (Kaser 1992: 192; Malcolm to the customary law, the kanun, control over the
1998: 14 f.). Each fis was subdivided into a num- household belonged to the head of the house who
ber of segments, of which the first level of descent was either the oldest male member or his first
smaller than the fis was the so-called farefis. Rein- brother. Preferably he was chosen by the acting
eck explains that the farefis constituted the widest head of the house, but should the predecessor have
group of relatives whose blood ties were, generally, died before a successor was appointed, the next
known: “All individuals, whether or not they know leader was elected by the remaining men of the
their clan, place themselves within a group of ‘rel- house. The rights, obligations, and duties of the
atives.’ They are all farefis – literally ‘seeds of the head of the house are spelled out in detail in the
clan’ ” (Reineck 1991: 44). Similar to the fis, fare- paragraphs twenty and twenty one of the kanun.
fis were believed to have their respective founding Most importantly, he had the right over the earn-
fathers, which were typically envisioned as a set ings of the house; to buy, sell, and alter the land;
of brothers, the vllazni (brotherhood). Their lead- to construct houses, cottages, and pastures; to as-
ing organizational principle was exogamy, which sign household members to work inside or outside;
served to avoid incest and to create enduring bonds and to punish them, when they do not behave in
between other families and their clans. It was en- the interest of the house (Kanuni I Lekë Dukagjinit
forced strictly because the sentiment prevailed that 1989: 13–16).
even potential spouses within the farefis were al- Women were controlled indirectly by the head of
most family (Reineck 1991: 44). the house through the mistress of the house, who
Farefis, on the other hand, were divided into was “either the headman’s wife or the senior wom-
several joint or extended families. According to an of the household capable of leadership” (Rein-
Hammel, the zadruga 4 was “a patrilocal joint or eck 1991: 56). Her main obligations were to ensure
extended family around an agnatic core of father the just treatment of the members of the household
and married sons, or of brothers, sometimes of pa- and their children; to apportion everything pro-
trilateral cousins” (Hammel 1995: 232). Moreover, duced in the house; and to appoint household
the zadruga was characterized by a continual cycle chores (Kanuni I Lekë Dukagjinit 1989: 15–18).
of expansion and fission. That is, once the father Generally, however, women played a rather second-
died and the children of the sons approached mar- ary role in the household as well as in the society
riageable age, the household was usually divided (Denich 1974). It was expected from them to en-
into equal shares inherited by the respective broth- gage in ceaseless housework and labour in the
ers (Hammel 1984: 223; 1995: 232). In his defini- fields and to avoid contacts to the world outside
tion of the extended family, Hammel emphasises the family until they were old. Moreover, women
the patrilineal and patrilocal aspects of the fam- did not have the right to choose their own husband,
ily formation process. Halpern and Halpern extend and postmarital residence was patrilocal (Malcolm
this definition arguing that although patrilocality 1998: 20).
and patrilineality are the most important formal au- Although these social and familial structures
thority patterns of a zadruga, it assembles a cor- seem rather rigid and stable, they have been con-
porative production and consumption unit. That is, stantly adapted to the respective political, econom-
land, buildings as well as technological equipment ic, and social circumstances, and, thus, underwent
belong to the household at large and personal be- substantive changes throughout history.
longings may only include small, portable goods:
“A prototypical household [is] headed by a father
residing together with his married sons and their The Influence of the Ottoman Empire
associated nuclear families in a social unit function- on Kosovo’s Political and Social Organisation
ing as a unified socioeconomic entity” (Halpern and
Halpern 1986: 212). In 1386, a new power emerged on the political land-
According to several scholars, traditional family scape of the Balkans when the Ottoman Turks man-
role relationships carried expectations of the pri- aged to extend their frontiers towards the edge of
the Byzantine Empire conquering Macedonia and
invading Serbia (Vickers 1998: 11 f.). According to
4 Zadruga is the Serbian terminology for the concept “ex- Serbian epics, the Ottoman Sultan Murad is said to
tended family.” have summoned the Serbian Prince Lazar to grid
Anthropos 104.2009
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himself for the battle at Kosovo Polje (the Field well as the fact that the Turks started to declare
of Blackbirds): “The Sultan Murad falling like a the valleys and plains as the Port’s property, the
hawk, falling on Kosovo, writes written words, he population retreated into the mountain regions once
writes and sends to the city of Krushevats to the again. Organised in tribal structures, these moun-
knees of Lazar, Prince of Serbia: ‘Ah, Lazar, Lord tain dwellers were inclined to resist Ottoman domi-
of Serbia, this has never been and never can be: one nation and were, thence, granted autonomy and tax
territory under two masters, only one people to pay exemption (Backer 2003: 58). In return, they had
two taxes; we cannot both of us be ruler, send every to hand over one boy to the military service of the
key to me and every tax . . . And if you will not send Port. Along these lines, peasants were enabled to
these things to me, then come to Kosovo meadow, join the soldier class and establish their patronage
and we shall do division with our swords’ ” (cited toward their families and villages of origin (Mal-
in Judah 2000: 4). Lazar accomplished to organise colm 1998: 95).
a coalition army led by Serbian, Hungarian, Bul- Not only the young soldiers but also the popu-
garian, Bosnian, and Albanian nobles determined lation in general was converted to the Islamic faith.
to confront the Ottoman army (Vickers 1998: 13). Mass conversions to Islam took place largely in the
Although no clear historical accounts exist on what 17th and 18th century. Mainly affected were Al-
exactly happened during the battle, it is known that banians while other Balkan Christians were deter-
both, the Sultan and the Prince, died. Consequently, mined to resist the encroachment. Most researchers
Serbia did not finally fall to the Turks until 1459 agree that social and economic advantages led
(Judah 2000: 8; Vickers 1998: 14). many Albanians to convert from Christianity to Is-
During the 15th century, Ottoman colonists were lam. Anyone who shared the Islamic faith was pro-
sent to the Kosovo region and settled for the most vided the same rights as the Ottomans themselves.
part around Prizren. Under their influence, Prizren These included the right to bear arms, pay lower
as well as Pristina became important trading towns taxes, the opportunity for social and economic ad-
on the revitalised trade route from the Dalmatian vancement, and the permission to practice certain
coast to Macedonia and Constantinople. These new customs such as polygyny, the levirate, blood broth-
political and economic developments increasingly erhood, and trial marriages (Daskalovski 2003: 15;
attracted Albanian pastoralists to the region. They Reineck 1991: 25). Despite the discriminatory laws
gradually drove their cattle from the mountain pas- and practices, Catholicism did not die out since
tures to the plains where they established farming Christian communities were permitted to maintain
settlements and started to engage in trade along the existing church buildings (Malcolm 1998: 109).
trading routs (Backer 2003: 63; Vickers 1998: 17). Although the Christian belief could be practiced
According to several historians, rural life in Kosovo openly, a significant number of extended families
seemed to have thrived during the first century invented a phenomenon of “crypto-Catholicism,”
of Ottoman rule as the economic developments that is, publicly adopted Islam but received the
worked in their favour and the Ottoman adminis- Catholic sacraments in private. In other cases,
tration took little interest in local forms of organi- women remained faithful to their Christian belief
sation (Kaser 1995: 82; Malcolm 1998: 101). while the male members of the respective house-
Throughout the 16th century, the captured ter- holds formally adopted Islam (Norris 1996: 17).
ritories were divided into so-called vilajets (prov- Thus, a unique blend of Islamic, Catholic, and tribal
inces) ruled by representatives of the Port and customs could be found in the region.
other officials. Spahis, a feudal military aristocracy, In order to control the Empire’s diverse ethnic-
were responsible for military defence, the main- religious groups, the Ottoman administration im-
tenance of the civil order, and the collection of plemented sociocultural districts called millet. Mil-
taxes. In the course of time, their power as well lets were organised according to religious affilia-
as landholdings increased and soon became hered- tion and, thus, “non-Muslims were brought into the
itary. To counteract the development of their per- Muslim organisational system but remained able to
sonal power, the Sultan developed a parallel system retain their own cultural and religious freedoms”
which comprised administrators of originally non- (Vickers 1998: 21). Nevertheless, Serbian families
Muslim Slaves whose landholdings were strictly increasingly emigrated from Kosovo to other parts
conditioned by office (Backer 2003: 58). The rural of Serbia, and Albanians from the mountain re-
population was obliged to regularly assign rent as gions started to repopulate the area. According to
well as taxes in form of one tenth of their agri- Kaser, this new wave of remigration resulted from
cultural production, and Christians were expected the fact that the mountain tribal areas were over-
to pay a head tax. Due to these measurements as populated and employment opportunities as pro-
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fessional shepherds or merchants within the Otto- its leaders began to contemplate over the possi-
man territories were attractive alternatives to full- bility of interdependence (Judah 2000: 12). Yet,
time pastoralism (1995: 114). Backer writes that the Ottoman army marched into Kosovo, occupied
due to these social and demographic changes in the Prizren, and crushed the League (von Kohl and
mountain regions, new administrative units called Libal 1997: 22).
bajraks were created and implemented by the Ot-
tomans. The respective local leader, the bajraktar
(standard bearer), was held formally responsible Between Assimilation and Expulsion:
for supplying fighting men, when called on. In- Albanian Politics from 1912 – 1945
formally, his role was that of a broker who was
supposed to establish linkages between the cen- The final stage of the Ottoman rule was charac-
tral power and the autonomous local communities terised by unrest, shifting alliances, and increas-
(Backer 2003: 62). In the literature, bajraks are of- ing conflict between Christians and Muslims. Tak-
ten confused with fis or farefis. Durham (1909) ing advantage of the empire’s weakness, Serbia
writes for example that Albanian tribes are divided together with Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece
into bajraks and Lowie (1947) identifies a tribe prepared the expulsion of the Ottomans and de-
with a bajrak (other examples include Amery 1948; clared the first Balkan War in October 1912 (Clark
Hasluck 1954). Nevertheless, the bajrak territories 2000: 26). Seeking control over Kosovo, the Ser-
often seemed to correspond with tribal territories bian Army marched into Kosovo, defeated the Ot-
(Malcolm 1998: 16). toman forces, and assumed power over the vilayet.
Throughout the 19th century, the central power According to Banac, the Albanian and Serbian pop-
was slowly losing control over the region. As a ulation perceived this annexation differently. For
result, the League of Defence of the Rights of Serbia it meant “the liberation of long lost territory”
the Albanian People, also known as the League as well as “the opportunity to civilise Kosovo.” For
of Prizren, could be formed on 10 June 1878. Ac- Albanians in Kosovo, on the other hand, it repre-
cording to historical records, 300 delegates (mostly sented “a violent separation from other Albanian
conservative Muslim landowners) from the four territories” (Banac 2006b: 53).
Albanian vilayets of Janina, Monastir, Prishtina, Serbian forces behaved merciless toward the Al-
and Shkoder gathered in Prizren to represent their banian population, killing about 20,000 of them
people and voice their demands.5 Their aim was and displacing others (Clewing 2000: 48; Judah
not necessarily independence but rather autonomy 2000: 18). Moreover, Serbian colonists settled in
within the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, they in- the region seizing land from the local population,
tended to organise a political and military opposi- and an array of new taxes was introduced which
tion to the dismemberment of Albanian-inhabited mainly affected the Albanian population. Accord-
territory and to petition to the Sultan to unify the ing to several historians, Serbia aimed at altering
four vilayets (von Kohl and Libal 1997: 22; Vickers the demographic statistics by creating a Serbian
1998: 44). majority in Kosovo before the new borders would
At the same time, Kosovo Serbs filed petitions be finalised at the Conference of Ambassadors in
to the Congress of Berlin demanding the vilayet London in May 1913 (Banac 2006b: 55; Malcolm
Kosovo to be united with Serbia. Since the del- 1998: 255). When the Albanian state boundaries
egates from the Ottoman Empire were unable to were defined, a great number of Albanians, espe-
defend the League, Kosovo Albanians started to cially Albanians living in Kosovo, were left outside
take the matter into their own hands arming for of the new state (Fischer 1999: 70).
political protest. According to Vickers, 16,000 Al- Although the Balkan allies had fought together
banian men in arms were prepared to confront the against the Ottoman Empire, inner frictions per-
Ottoman authority and army. When the situation sisted. In spring 1913, Greece and Serbia signed
in Kosovo worsened and anti-Christian sentiments a treaty of mutual defence in an attempt to pro-
increased, many Slav families decided to leave tect themselves against Bulgaria as well as Austro-
Kosovo and emigrate to Serbia (Vickers 1998: 45– Hungary. Nevertheless, Bulgaria launched a suc-
48). On 4 January 1881, the Albanian resistance cessful attack on Serbia as well as Greece in June
in Kosovo began in dead earnest when the League 1913, without declaring war first. Since Bulgarian
took over the command of Kosovo and some of rule was characterised by atrocities against the local
population, rebellions started to take place and, by
5 Von Kohl and Libal (1997: 21); Malcolm (1998: 221); Pe- the end of the war, Kosovo was back under the
tritsch und Pichler (2004: 26). remorseless Serbian rule (Malcolm 1998: 263).
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In November 1915, when the Austro-Hungarian an absolute Serbian majority in Kosovo by bring-
forces occupied Serbia, they were welcomed by ing another 470,000 colonists into Kosovo and ex-
Kosovo Albanians as liberators. During the First pelling 300,000 Albanians to Turkey. One of the
World War, Vienna treated Kosovo as a temporar- greatest proponents of the expulsion politics was
ily occupied part of Albania and tried to con- the academic Vasa Čubrilović who pointed out that
tent the Albanians by opening Albanian-language “[a]t a time when Germany can expel tens of thou-
schools and promoting the new Albanian literary sands of Jews . . . the shifting of a few hundred
standard (Banac 2006b: 56). However, in 1918, the thousand Albanians will not lead to the outbreak
Serbian army regrouped and pushed the central of a world war” (cited in Malcolm 2006: 60). In
powers out of Kosovo. After the disintegration of 1938, a formal treaty was signed between Bel-
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Serbian Monar- grade and Turkey, which stated that “Turkey was
chy was transformed into the Kingdom of Serbs, to take 40,000 families of ‘Turks,’ receiving a pay-
Croats, and Slovenians under the Prince Regent ment from Belgrade of 500 Turkish pounds per
Aleksandar Karaðorðević. family” (Malcolm 2006: 60 f.). According to Mal-
According to most historians, the interwar pe- colm, a family was defined as “blood relations liv-
riod was characterised by Serbian colonisation ing under one roof,” which included, in the case of
policies. For example, about 70,000 Serbian fami- Kosovo, extended families of ten and more mem-
lies were talked into immigrating to Kosovo. These bers. Formally, the treaty was never brought into
settlers received up to 50 hectares of land, free effect since the outbreak of the Second World War
transportation, some basic tolls, free use of state prevented it. However, informally, between 90,000
or communal forests and pastures, exemption from and 150,000 Albanians and other Muslims left Ko-
taxation for three years, and sometimes houses sovo as the living there had been made impossible.6
(Vickers 1998: 106). Albanians, in turn, were dis- In March 1941, Yugoslavia joined the Axis
possessed of their property as they had difficulties Pact despite the growing anti-German sentiment
providing legal proof of their title to ownership amongst the population. Following the Belgrade
(Vickers 1998: 106). military putsch, Hitler ordered the destruction of
Next to the destruction of the Albanian settle- Yugoslavia, and the whole of Kosovo was con-
ments, the assimilation of the local population was quered within only one week (Malcolm 1998:
strived for. For instance, Albanians were required 289 f.; see also Bartel 1993: 229). German gov-
to Slavicise their surnames. Numerous families ernance in Kosovo contrasted significantly with
changed their given name of the father’s father by the Serbian administration as they granted village
adding the Serbo-Croatian patronymic-possessive elders to handle most of their own affairs and
“ović ” as a suffix. Only in 1947 they were al- even opened several Albanian primary schools (Fi-
lowed to change their surnames back into Alba- scher 1999: 86). Although a noteworthy number of
nian ones (Reineck 1991: 44). Another example is Kosovo Albanians collaborated with the German
the introduction of the Serbian language education forces, Fisher states that their collaboration had
system. In 1918, the Serbian administration closed nothing to do with ideological sympathy or fascism.
the Albanian-language schools, which the Austro- Instead, “the support was an expression of nation-
Hungarians had opened during the First World War. alism” and an attempt to protect the hope for a
According to Kostovicova, education in the Serbian Greater Albania (Fischer 2006: 73). Consequently,
language was tailored to encourage the develop- resistance to the Germans grew much slower than
ment of a common identity of Serbians, Croats, and elsewhere in Yugoslavia and most Albanians were
Slovenes as well as to denationalise the Albanians. willing “to overlook the fact that German aggres-
However, the schools remained underdeveloped as sion had been responsible for the union with old
only 30.2% of school-age children in Kosovo at- Albania” (Fischer 1999: 237). Meanwhile, Serbian
tended school in the years between 1939 and 1940 and to a lesser extent Kosovar monarchic as well as
(Kostovicova 2002: 157–159; see also Bache and communist partisans launched attacks against the
Tylor 2003: 285). By 1921, Serbian authorities de- occupying forces. In 1944, Yugoslavia was widely
cided to completely deny the Albanians access to controlled by Tito’s partisan army which took offi-
education so as to keep them ignorant and illiterate cial control over both Serbia and Kosovo in 1945.
(Fischer 1999: 87).
The pressure on the Albanian population cul-
minated in the 1920s, when their expulsion from
Yugoslavia was discussed and planned by Serbian 6 Malcolm (2006: 61); see also Sundhaussen (2000: 77); Vick-
civil servants in Belgrade. Their goal was to create ers (1998: 116 – 118).
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Yugoslav Politics and Kosovar Social Organisation of Beograd and in other northern cities, especially
under Tito in Serbia proper, Vojvodina, and Croatia” (Rein-
eck 1991: 118). Typically, one man of the family
Instead of unifying Kosovo with Albania or giving migrated and left his family behind to farm the
it the status of a republic, Tito’s regime decided land and guard the moral integrity of the family.
to maintain the region within the Serbian federal In the 1960s, the intake capacity of Yugoslav cities
unit of the Yugoslav federation (Banac 2006a: 65). began to diminish, and labour migrants ventured
The unification with Serbia involved a range of re- into Western European countries. Most of them mi-
pressive measurements for Kosovo Albanians. Al- grated to Germany, Austria, France, Switzerland,
banians were deliberately excluded from political and Holland as European factories increasingly
decision-making processes, that is, no Albanian demanded labour from southern Europe (Rogers
was represented in the Politburo until 1978 and in 1985: 7).
the Yugoslav Communist Central Committee until The year 1966 marked the end of harsh Ser-
1953. Instead, the local party and leading positions bian domination since Tito expelled Rankovic from
were dominated mainly by Serbians and Montene- leadership. This was the first step in which Tito sig-
grins in the 1950s. Moreover, “Kosovo and Meto- nalled greater tolerance for critics of Serbia’s role
hija” was reinstated as the territory’s official name; in Yugoslav history: “In short, he wanted to take
Albanians were forced to adopt Serbo-Croatian as centralism, with its political locus in Serbia, a few
the official language; Albanian monuments were notches lower in general regard without stirring up
replaced by ones portraying Serbian historical or a great deal of fuss” (Banac 1992: 1087). Further
mythological heroes; street names were changed; anticentralist steps were instituted and culminated
and shopkeepers were required to have signs in in Kosovo’s new constitution in 1974. The new
Cyrillic (Clark 2000: 37, 71). constitution put Kosovo on a par with the other
The harsh Serbian domination was perpetuated Yugoslav republics by providing it with similar
by Alexander Rankovic, the head of the Yugoslav competences, a provincial party committee, its own
Secret Police as well as vice president of Yugosla- legislation, and budget authority. However, Kosovo
via. Under his regiment, Albanians were exposed was not granted the status of a republic and was,
to persecutions, terror, and violence, and mem- therefore, denied the right for secession (Banac
bers of political and democratic organizations were 2006a: 66).7
forced to flee abroad (Daskalovski 2003: 20). At After 1974, a time of increasing Albanisation set
the same time, the ordinary Albanian population in when Albanians started to claim high-ranking
suffered from great economic losses, poverty, and positions in politics and jurisdiction. As a con-
illiteracy. According to Reineck, peasant families sequence, traditional problem-solving mechanisms
were hit especially hard as they were encumbered increasingly lost their function, and the formerly
with high fertility, significant inequalities in wealth, broad influence of kinship relations were reduced
inadequate investments, and dependence on exter- to a mainly social level. From now on, inter-village
nal economic aid. Moreover, Kosovo farmers were disputes were governed by the municipality system,
required to assign high taxes and were coerced into and mechanisms of blood revenge were substituted
providing the government with large quantities of by the establishments of courts, judges, police, and
grain (Reineck 1991: 118). prisons (Backer 2003: 57, 89).
Poverty as well as population growth forced Moreover, Albanian was valorised as the offi-
many households to split. This procedure endowed cial language, Albanian books started to be printed
each son with an equal share of the land and, con- in newly established local publishing houses, lo-
sequently, the amount of land and wealth held by cal media like the Pristina Radio and Television
each family decreased rapidly (European Stabil- center cropped up, and, most importantly, Alba-
ity Initiative 2006: 14). At the same time, increas- nians took over teaching positions in educational
ing labour migration made household fission more establishments such as at the university and high
feasible. Formerly, Reineck notes that work was schools.8 Due to these developments, new employ-
sought predominantly in Istanbul, Ankara, Thessa- ment opportunities were available and, as a result,
loníki, and Sofia. However, after the Second World rural Kosovo Albanian men as well as women were
War men emigrated to Belgrade and other indus-
trialising Yugoslav cities: “Beginning around 1950, 7 In Yugoslavia the status of a republic was reserved for narodi
(constituent nations), not for narodnosti (nationalities) that
the greatest wave of rural-urban migration took realized the fullness of their statehood elsewhere (Banac
place from 1961–1971 when thousands of Alba- 2006a: 66).
nian men became manual laborers in the capital city 8 Clark (2000: 40); Banac (2006a: 66); Hetzer (2000: 113).
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able to move into employment in Pristina, Prizren, lic was identical with a call for unification with En-
and Peja. ver Hoxha’s Stalinist state” (Malcolm 1998: 337).
At the same time, agricultural production was Furthermore, Albanians were accused for driving
increasingly reduced to subsistence. Halpern argues Serbian inhabitants out of the country. Despite the
that due to the abandonment of agriculture as pri- fact that independent legal reports found out that
mary source of income, the agricultural population Kosovo had one of the lowest crime rates in Yu-
had declined to 42% of the population (half of what goslavia, media reports alleged that Albanian men
it had been in 1890). Most peasants lived in what were raping Serbian women and girls, beating up
he calls a “compromise situation,” working in the Serbian men, burning their fields, and destroy-
nearby towns in the mornings and on the farms in ing their homes. Newspapers like Politika and the
the afternoons. During the 1960s, the number of weekly NIN in Serbia increasingly printed letters
farms with peasant-workers increased by 10%, that and articles that described Kosovo Albanians as
is, more and more families were willing to come “beastly, monstrous, and disgusting” (von Kohl and
to a compromise between the security of wages Libal 1997: 73) and condemned the Serbian migra-
and the security of independent subsistence. In re- tions from Kosovo with terms like “pogrom” and
lation to these developments, the gendered divi- “genocide” (Guzina 2003: 35). These allegations
sion of labour shifted in that women had to pre- were taken up by members of the Serbian Academy
sume a larger share of agricultural work (Halpern of Sciences and Arts (SANU), who wrote in their
1975: 89). Nevertheless, family and kin units were memorandum in 1986: “In the spring of 1981, open
not destroyed since it was through kinship rela- and total war was declared on the Serbian people,
tions that initial education and job opportunities which had been carefully prepared for in advance
were perceived and obtained (Halpern 1975: 91, in the various stages of administrative, political and
95). By overcoming the urban-rural divide, kinship constitutional reforms . . . It is not just that the last
ties served to connect rather than to separate rural remnants of the Serbian nation are leaving their
and urban spheres of society. homes at an unabated rate, but according to all evi-
dence, faced with a physical, moral and psycholog-
ical reign of terror, they seem to be preparing for
Prelude to the War their final exodus” (cited in Clark 2000: 17 f.).
These clearly nationalist sentiments were instru-
After Tito’s death in 1980, the tension between the mentalised by Milošević, then president of the Ser-
dominating Serbian minority and the suppressed bian Republic, to start not only an extensive propa-
Albanian majority escalated and culminated in the ganda machinery against the Albanian population
first student protests in March 1981. They started but to formulate a new constitution that deprived
as small-scale protests demanding improved living Kosovo of its political rights. In 1989, Milošević
conditions in the dormitories and better food in the introduced the final stages of Yugoslavia with his
school cafeteria. Over time, the protests became speech at Kosovo Polje that commemorated the
political and expanded across Kosovo when con- 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. After
struction and metalworkers joined in, calling for a a brief reference to the past, describing the lost
Kosovo Republic. Officials in Belgrade denounced battle 600 years ago as a failure due to disunity
the demonstrations as “hostile, and organised by und treachery among the Serbians, Milošević went
hostile forces as part of a hostile plot to destabilise on to state that “today, six hundred years later, we
Yugoslavia and destroy its unity as a state using are fighting once again. New battles lie before us.
economic and social problems as pretext” (cited They are not military battles, although we cannot
in von Kohl and Libal 1997: 58). Moreover, the exclude such a possibility” (cited in von Kohl and
authorities declared a state of emergency and sent Libal 1997: 10). The Serbians, who arrived in char-
additional units of special police forces as well as tered busses and trains at the site, echoed these
tanks into Kosovo.9 sentiments singing the song of the Serbian trum-
According to Malcolm, the actual heterogene- peter, “Blow stronger, blow louder, oh brother and
ity of complaints voiced by young intellectuals, hero, for the Plain of the Blackbirds is Serbian once
miners, journalists as well as politicians were more” (cited in von Kohl and Libal 1997: 11).10
lumped together as “counter-revolutionary” and it
was bluntly assumed that “a call for Kosovo Repub- 10 Melody and words stem from the Balkan Wars of 1912 and
1913 when Serbs drove the Ottomans out of southern Serbia
and Macedonia and seized control of the historic battlefield
9 Judah (2000: 39); von Kohl and Libal (1997: 59); Malcolm after more than five hundred ears of Turkish rule (von Kohl
(1998: 334); Mertus (2000: 29). and Libal 1997: 11).
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