Analysis selection for JCC - March 2022 Russia's invasion of Ukraine - IHS Markit
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Analysis selection for JCC
March 2022
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
30 Mar 2022 - Country Risk | Strategic Report
On 29 March, Russian and Ukrainian delegations attending direct talks in Istanbul (Turkey), mediated by
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan, both stated that more progress had been made than in any
previous negotiations. The Russian side made what it described as a confidence-building measure, offering to
significantly reduce the level of its military operations around the Ukrainian capital Kyiv and the northern city of
Chernihiv, implicitly recognising Russia’s failure to achieve its objectives. The Ukrainian delegation tabled a
proposal outlining the general parameters of an agreement, under which Ukraine would agree to adopting
neutral status, subject to its neutrality being assured by international signatories. The Ukrainian proposal
reportedly included the holding of a 15-year consultation period to determine the future status of Crimea.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has as yet made no comment on the talks, but Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelenskyi has expressed scepticism at the Russian offer to reduce its offensive operations against
Kyiv and Chernihiv, pointing out that there has as yet been no sign of this happening. On 29 March, UK Prime
Minister Boris Johnson noted “some reduction in Russian bombardment around Kyiv,” but attributed this to the
ongoing Ukrainian counter-attacks. The differences between Russia and Ukraine’s conditions for a settlement
remain formidable, and given the lack of trust on both sides, even a temporary ceasefire is unlikely to be
achieved without significantly more progress being made. On the day of the talks in Istanbul, Russian forces
employed aircraft-launched cruise missiles to target the regional administration building in Mykolaiv, killing 12
and wounding 33 people.
• Russia’s ‘blitzkrieg’ campaign has delivered limited results, except for areas in the south and
the east, and demonstrated flaws in campaign design and execution; Russian forces are
unlikely to attempt any other encroachment outside Ukrainian territory as long as the present,
if not increased, force level is committed in Ukraine. Prior to the invasion, Russia concentrated up
to 200,000 troops near the Ukrainian borders and committed them on six distinct axes. It is likely that
Russia was assuming a lack of resistance by the Ukrainian forces and support among the local
civilian population, neither of which was achieved. Russian attempts to penetrate Kyiv and Kharkiv
were unsuccessful, and Russia switched tactics to encircling major Ukrainian cities, including Sumy,
Chernihiv, and Mariupol, and laying sieges (as practised in Grozny and Aleppo). Due to significant
casualties and slow progress, Russian forces switched to air, missile and artillery strikes at Ukrainian
military and civilian targets, including residential areas, leading to mass civilian casualties and
displacement. Russian supply lines appear to be overstretched, with frontlines exceeding 2,500 km,
and there are widespread reports of low morale and desertion. Any Russian disengagement from Kyiv
and Chernihiv would enable the Russians to focus their main effort on capturing the Donbas region to
consolidate their territorial gains and cut off Ukrainian forces. The bombardment of cities across
Ukraine is likely to continue, if not intensify. In the south, if the Russians take Odesa, there will be an
increased likelihood that they will exploit their territorial gain by taking Transdniestria, a breakaway
region of Moldova, which has been under de-facto pro-Russian control since 1992. They are unlikely
to attempt any other encroachment outside Ukrainian territory as long as the present, if not increased,
force level is committed in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian armed forces and civilians continue to resist Russian advances, thanks to the
ongoing weapons resupply from the West. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated the capability to
repel penetration by Russian forces into major cities, helped by the use of modern Western-supplied
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Analysis selection for JCC - March 2022
weapons, such as anti-tank guided missiles and attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In the past
10 days, Ukraine’s General Staff has been reporting that Ukrainian forces have conducted successful
counter attacks in several areas. On 28 March, Ukrainian forces retook Irpin, one of the key satellite
towns of Kyiv, 30km east of the Ukrainian capital. Despite Russia conducting strikes on Ukrainian air
defences and air force early in the campaign, Russia has not yet achieved air superiority, especially
west of the Dnieper River. Western allies of Ukraine continue supplying Ukrainian forces with
advanced defensive weapons, including man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), via Poland
and Romania. Likely Russian air and missile attacks on key supply routes in western Ukraine from
NATO countries, as implicitly threatened by the Russian deputy foreign minister, would raise the risk
of accidental strikes on NATO countries’ territories, and/or killing NATO military personnel involved in
weapons supply transports. In response, NATO is enhancing its force posture, reflected in the
announcement made by the Pentagon on 28 March, that six US Navy EA-18G Growler electronic
warfare aircraft were being deployed to Spangdahlem airbase in Germany. While the combat roles of
these aircraft include suppression of enemy air defences, the Pentagon press secretary emphasised
that its mission would contribute to deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank, and they would not be used
against Russian forces in Ukraine.
• The humanitarian situation is likely to deteriorate further in besieged cities, with Russian
forces using indiscriminate bombardment to terrorise the civilian population to force their
surrender. Mariupol and Chernihiv have been fully encircled by Russian forces, and Kyiv and Kharkiv
are under threat of encirclement. The situation in Mariupol, where more than 95% of residential
buildings have been destroyed or damaged by Russian shelling, is especially extreme. Russian offers
of ‘humanitarian corridors’ are, as already seen, likely to be part of this strategy, with Russian forces
likely to open fire on civilians using supposedly safe routes. According to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as of 30 March, 4.01 million people have left Ukraine, mostly to
EU neighbours (Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia) and Moldova. A further 10 million
Ukrainians are estimated to be displaced internally within the country.
• Cargo risks across Ukraine are likely to remain severe, especially in eastern, southern, and
northern regions affected by the fighting. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began on 24
February, the Russian Navy has opened fire on several commercial vessels in the northwestern Black
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Analysis selection for JCC - March 2022
Sea, with one Panama-flagged ship sunk. The continued Russian military operation against Ukraine,
including potential Russian amphibious landings near Odesa, will further elevate risks to commercial
marine cargo in the northwestern Black Sea, both at ports and at sea. If amphibious operations
develop, both Russian and Ukrainian forces are likely to be exchanging missiles and Russian naval
infantry would attempt to take control of major Ukrainian seaports. Airspace over Ukraine is likely to
remain closed for the time being. Risks to ground cargo are likely to be severe, especially in regions in
the south, east, and north, where fighting continues.
• The Russian military’s use of force in taking over nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Ukraine
represents an elevated risk of nuclear contamination. Russian forces have taken control of the
Chernobyl (decommissioned) and the Zaporizhska (operational) NPPs. Russian forces opened fire on
the Zaporizhska complex and temporarily turned off the electricity supply at Chernobyl. This creates
an elevated risk of deliberate or accidental incidents at the plants, leading to radioactive materials
being released into the environment, and potentially across the region.
• The Russian government’s readiness to re-engage diplomatically with Ukraine is an indicator
of Moscow’s tacit acceptance of its inability to achieve its original objective to take over all of
Ukraine by military force. Under pressure from the expenditure of ‘blood and treasure’, and the
growing impact of more robust and wide-ranging sanctions than anticipated, modified Russian
objectives are likely to include Kyiv’s recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, and of the
independence of the two separatist entities in Donbas. The Ukrainian government is most unlikely to
accept any settlement on these terms, even in the case of its defeat on the battlefield. The impact of
unprecedented Western sanctions on the Russian economy, likely to be expanded in the case of
further Russian territorial gains in Ukraine, is also likely to have a moderating influence on the
Russian position, especially over the three-month outlook. Continued fighting will increase the
likelihood of Russia and Ukraine agreeing on temporary ceasefires, potentially leading to a stalemate
‘frozen conflict’, with some territories in Ukraine, especially in Donbas and the south, remaining under
de-facto Russian occupation.
Indicators of changing risk environment
Increasing risk
• The Russian offer to reduce offensive operations near Kyiv and Chernihiv is implemented, but the
Russian military maintain their bombardment of these cities, albeit at a reduced level, and redeploy
troops to reinforce an offensive in Donbas (likely).
• If the estimated 60–70,000 Ukrainian forces are cut off in the Donbas conflict zone, this would restrict
potential redeployment, significantly restricting Ukraine’s ability to fight in other regions, including Kyiv
and the south.
• If Kyiv is taken by the Russian forces and the Ukrainian government is forced to relocate to Lviv, this
will be presented by the Kremlin as vindicating the Russian strategy of indiscriminate use of force.
• If Ukrainian armed forces conduct missile/air strikes or insurgent activity on Russian territory or in
Crimea, this would elevate the scale and depth of punitive Russian strikes in Ukraine, including
against civilian targets.
• Leaked intelligence/commercial satellites showing additional formations in Russia’s Central and
Southern Military Districts preparing for additional heavy equipment to be moved by rail would most
likely indicate their commitment to the campaign in Ukraine.
• Increased aircraft activity at airfields across the Russian border would indicate that Russian special
forces and airborne units are preparing for new operations aimed at taking key airfields in areas
currently outside their control for use as airheads through which ‘heavy’ forces can be air landed.
• Russian government warnings about alleged plans by Ukrainian forces planning to use CBRN
weapons against Russian forces would indicate a growing likelihood of Russian forces using chemical
weapons against both Ukrainian combatants and civilians.
• Resignation of senior Russian government or central bank officials further narrows in the short term
the options for alternative internal views moderating the conduct of the war, but potentially creates a
new internal political grouping to challenge Putin.
|3Analysis selection for JCC - March 2022
• If Russian forces conduct successful amphibious landings near Odesa and occupy significant areas in
Odesa region, linking with the Russian forces in the breakaway Transdniestria region in Moldova, the
fighting would be likely to spill into Moldova.
• If Russia conducts air or missile strikes on main roads and railways in western Ukraine, near the
Polish and Romanian borders, which are used by Western allies to resupply Ukraine, the severity of
Western responses to Russian actions will be further elevated.
• If Russian forces conduct air and missile strikes on key supply routes in western Ukraine from Poland
and Romania, aimed at interdicting critical supplies from NATO countries to Ukraine, it would raise the
risk of stray Russian ordnance landing on NATO members’ territory and/ or casualties among NATO
military personnel involved in the transport.
• Further Russian allegations that Ukraine or the US are using sites in Ukraine to develop chemical or
biological weapons would increase the likelihood of Russia using chemical weapons against either
Ukrainian troop concentrations or, more likely, population centres. Reports of Russian mobilisation of
reservists and/or of delays in demobilisation of conscripts would imply a renewed major offensive by
reinforced and fresh ground forces, coupled with an intensification of targeting of population centres
and civil infrastructure by long-range missiles and artillery.
Decreasing risk
• Russian forces adhere to the undertaking to reduce offensive ground operations near, and
bombardment of, Kyiv and Chernihiv and do not take the opportunity to redeploy troops to mount an
offensive in the Donbas (unlikely).
• The financial value of Kremlin-aligned oligarchs’ assets collapses under Western sanctions,
motivating key Putin allies to press for a moderation of the current strategy in Ukraine.
• Leaked intelligence reports and/or increasing bilateral contacts signal that Putin is coming under
diplomatic pressure from Russia’s key partners, China and/or India, to agree to a ceasefire.
• Evidence of the Russian defence ministry’s failure to mobilise significant forces for deployment in
Ukraine, either for gaining new territory or for protracted occupation, would force the Russian
leadership to moderate its strategic objectives.
• Social and other media circumvent Russian government control, disseminating alternative information
and messages about the on-the-ground situation in Ukraine, as economic impacts of sanctions affect
Russians, sparking a wider protest movement and diluting Putin’s political support base.
• Continuing Russian failure to capture key targets, including Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa, would elevate
the likelihood of the Kremlin offering negotiations aimed to consolidate current gains, moderating risks
to people, infrastructure, and assets should an agreement on a ceasefire be made.
• Further successful Ukrainian counter-attacks, especially near key urban centres such as Kyiv,
Kharkiv, or Mykolaiv, would be likely to modify the Russian position, pushing Moscow towards
reaching a ceasefire agreement.
Impact of Ukraine’s refugee outflow
24 Mar 2022 - Country Risk | Strategic Report
According to the latest data by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), over 3.6
million Ukrainians have fled their country since Russia launched an open invasion of Ukraine on 24 February,
representing what the UNHCR’s Filippo Grandi described on 6 March as “the fastest growing refugee crisis in
Europe since World War II”. Ukraine’s neighbours are likely to continue to keep their borders open, facilitating
the evacuation of civilians and permitting cargo transit, although significant border delays will remain highly
likely.
• The impact of high refugee flows on Ukraine’s neighbours will be uneven, affecting to the
greatest extent Poland. The impact on Polish state resources and capacity is likely to be mitigated
by the disbursement of part of the EUR500 million in EU funding allocated for humanitarian aid for
Ukrainians to Poland. Poland is likely to continue providing humanitarian assistance to Ukrainian
refugees while condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. According to UNHCR data, as of 22 March,
over 2 million Ukrainian refugees had crossed into Poland since Russia invaded Ukraine on 24
February. Most civilians fleeing Ukraine have travelled towards the Polish border, the easiest to
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access from Western Ukrainian cities including Lviv, Ternopil, or Ivano-Frankivsk. The Medyka border
crossing between Poland and Ukraine has foot crossing access and has been one of the main points
of exit from Ukraine for refugees. Among other preparations, the Polish government has lifted
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)-related checks at the border to fast-track the entry of refugees.
Despite fast-tracked procedures and all crossings being open, border delays at Medyka, Dorohusk,
and Hrebenne have reached around 72 hours, with other crossings experiencing at least 24 hours of
wait time. This will continue to have a significant impact on road cargo for trucks still transporting
goods and aid between Poland and Western Ukraine.
• Growing delays at the Polish-Ukrainian border are likely to increase the number of crossings
into Slovakia and Hungary, challenging response capacity. In contrast to Hungary’s opposition
since 2015 to irregular arrivals, primarily from Syria, and which were then using Hungary as one of the
main transit routes to Western Europe, Hungarian authorities have said that they would be “accepting
asylum requests of refugees” while also providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine’s Transcarpathia
Oblast, which has a sizeable Hungarian minority. All border crossings between Slovakia and Ukraine
are also open. However, westward traffic – including road cargo (the route is used for among other
things transporting coal, iron ore, and other material for manufacturing and other industries) – from
Ukraine is subject to up to 35-hour waiting times, with priority given to passenger traffic.
• The lack of state co-ordination and management is likely to increase the risk of opportunistic
and organised crime including human trafficking. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Slovak
authorities said that they were prepared for around 30,000 arrivals in terms of housing and basic
provisions. Slovakia, on average, has been experiencing over 12,000 people entering its borders on a
daily basis, mainly through the border crossings in Ubľa, Vyšné Nemecké, and Veľké Slemence. The
number of arrivals has therefore largely surpassed the expected capacity, with logistical organisation,
transport, and accommodation being provided primarily by Slovak volunteers. Unconfirmed anecdotal
evidence cited in Slovak media suggests some individuals offering transport to Ukrainians for EUR500
per journey or offering transport “only to young girls”. Slovakia has been a transit destination for
trafficked women and children, with the Slovak-Ukrainian border serving as a crucial entry point for
illegal immigrants.
• Refugee numbers to Romania and Moldova are likely to remain smaller than to Poland, but
they will result in pressure particularly on Moldova’s capacity to host refugees. Onward
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migration to Bulgaria and Greece is likely to continue. According to UNHCR data, over 555,000
refugees had crossed into Romania as of 22 March. Initiatives by civil society groups and non-profit
organisations to support incoming refugees and the distribution of EU funds will offset costs on the
government, but authorities are unlikely to quickly build the capacity to host more than several
thousand people for a prolonged period of time. State capacity to host refugees is likely to be
substantially strained in Moldova even with support provided by EU partners, with over 100,000
people having already arrived from Ukraine. Refugee movements from Moldova into Romania and
further into Bulgaria are highly likely to continue, causing traffic delays of up to days in the coming
weeks. Cargo disruption and traffic delays of at least several hours are likely at border crossings in
Romania, especially at Sighetu Marmației, Siret, and Isaccea.
Indicators of changing risk environment
Increasing risk
• The Russian military’s capture of major cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Odesa would lead to
protracted urban warfare, leading to mass civilian casualties/fatalities, catastrophic damage to
property and infrastructure, and an increased outflow of Ukrainian refugees to the European Union
and Moldova.
• The closure of selected border crossings and/or all crossings among Ukraine’s neighbours over those
government’s concerns about proximity of military action would likely significantly increase pressure
on remaining countries to absorb numbers above planned capacity.
Decreasing risk
• Significant setbacks of Russian advances on the ground would elevate the likelihood of the Kremlin
offering a summit meeting and lead to localised, rather than nationwide, fighting in Ukraine, reducing
the flow of refugees.
• The announcement of official EU assistance, including routes for refugee relocation to countries such
as Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, would alleviate pressure on Ukraine’s neighbours and help them
manage the influx.
RISK NOTE: If confirmed, free-floating mines would drift through Black Sea
approaches to Romanian, Bulgarian ports and into Bosphorus
22 Mar 2022 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis
Russia’s Federal Security Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, FSB), which includes the national
Border Service, in a press statement on 18 March claimed that several Ukrainian sea mines deployed in the
approaches to the Black Sea ports of Odesa, Ochakiv, Chornomorsk, and Pivdenny had come loose from
their anchors in a storm and were floating freely in the Black Sea. The Ukrainian government dismissed the
statement as disinformation aimed at justifying Russia’s closure of parts of the Black Sea.
• Other media reports claim that Russia has itself been laying mines to disrupt shipping in the Black
Sea. Ukraine-based website BlackSeaNews said on 19 March that the Russian navy had deployed
sea mines in northwestern and western areas of the Black Sea, with the objective of accusing
Ukraine. There have so far been no independently verified sightings of free-floating mines in the Black
Sea, but this could be linked to reduced commercial marine movements in the area since the start of
Russia’s invasion into Ukraine on 24 February.
• The surface current in the northwestern Black Sea is generally cyclonic. If the Russian claims are
true, free-floating mines would most likely drift south from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports along the
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coastline, passing through the main approaches to Romanian and Bulgarian ports over the coming
weeks, and potentially enter the Bosphorus Strait. Contact with a drifting mine would be likely to result
in an explosion large enough to disable, if not sink, a large commercial vessel, and would probably
penetrate double-hulled tankers and cause loss of cargo.
• Minesweeping operations will mitigate the risk but do not eliminate it entirely. While Ukrainian media
have called in recent days for a NATO minesweeping naval taskforce to be deployed to the Black
Sea’s areas of concern, there has been no confirmation of such a deployment being prepared at the
time of writing.
Reported troop concentrations in southern Belarus elevate likelihood of
Russian-led operation aimed to capture Ukraine–Poland border
23 Mar 2022 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis
Ukraine’s General Staff stated on 22 March that its intelligence service observed concentrations of Belarusian
and Russian armed forces in several locations in southern Belarus, including next to Ukraine’s border. This
includes locations near Brest in southwestern Belarus but also Khoiniki and Naroulia, both in the Homiel
region, in southeastern Belarus. The total number of these troops deployed is assessed at 10,000–15,000.
Since the start of the Russian invasion on 24 February, Russia has used Belarusian territory for staging
ground-troop attacks into Ukraine’s Cherhihiv, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr regions, and for launching missiles and
sorties of Russian military aircraft from Belarusian airfields (see chart below). At the same time, Ukraine’s
General Staff’s statement adds that, “A large number of Belarusian personnel and some commanders refuse
to participate” in a military operation against Ukraine. This is confirmed by IHS Markit’s human sources in
Belarus, although it is not clear if the number of those refusing is significant enough to prevent Belarusian
forces entering Ukraine. Additionally, Belarus’s opposition leader in exile, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya said on
22 March that her team was receiving “information about a possible invasion of Belarusian troops into
Ukraine”.
Significance: If Belarus's de-facto president Alexander Lukashenka agrees to Russian demands to send
Belarusian ground troops to accompany Russian forces, the Belarusian forces would be most likely to invade
in the Volyn and Rivne regions in northwestern Ukraine. Such an operation would probably be aimed at
seizing control of territory along Ukraine’s border with Poland, in the direction of Lviv, in order to disrupt the
supply of NATO weapons to Ukrainian forces. The success of such an operation is likely to be challenged by
both the reportedly low morale among Belarusian forces and by more challenging terrain. Belarusian military
involvement would increase the likelihood of Ukrainian armed forces conducting retaliatory artillery, missile
and air strikes onto military targets in southern Belarus, including military airfields and bases, but also key
infrastructure such as railway and roads in southern Belarus to disrupt Russian and Belarusian military supply
lines. Ukrainian forces would be unlikely to attempt to gain territory in Belarus, even in the immediate border
areas. Western countries would be likely to respond by introducing additional economic sanctions against
Lukashenka’s administration in Belarus.
Risks: Interstate war; Death and injury
Sectors or assets affected: All, but especially Defence and Security Forces
Terrorism risks in Israel
31 Mar 2022 - Country Risk | Strategic Report
On 29 March, a Palestinian assailant armed with a rifle killed five individuals in Bnei Brak, an ultraorthodox
city in Tel Aviv region, before being killed by police. Police arrested two suspected accomplices. The assailant
was from Ya’bed, near Jenin, in the northern Palestinian West Bank. According to Israeli security officials, the
assailant was known to have been affiliated with the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the armed wing of Fatah.
More such attempted attacks are likely over the coming six-to-eight weeks, with a risk of escalating protests in
response to enhanced security measures.
|7Analysis selection for JCC - March 2022
• This is the third such attack in Israel within eight days, signalling an increase in terrorism risks
largely by lone actors and inspired or encouraged by the Islamic State or Palestinian factions
such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The perpetrator of the first incident, in Beer Sheva, was an
Israeli Bedouin Arab who had been sentenced to prison in 2016 for affiliation to, and recruiting on
behalf of, the Islamic State. The second attack occurred on 27 March in Hadera, involving two
allegedly Islamic State-affiliated Arab Israeli residents of Umm al-Fahm, northern Israel, armed with
rifles. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for this attack, which coincided with the historic Negev
Summit in which Israel hosted the US secretary of state and the foreign ministers of the United Arab
Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt. IHS Markit assesses that it was unlikely to have been
strongly intended in response to the summit: unlike Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which reject the
Abraham Accords (but did not carry out that attack), the Islamic State categorically rejects all political
systems not subject to its own extreme interpretation of Islamic law.
• Islamic State-linked attacks in Israel likely derive from lone-actor opportunism and inspiration,
rather than from a systematic operational network, which also makes it more challenging for
security authorities to pre-empt. Although further such attacks are quite probable in the six-to-eight
week outlook, they are unlikely to exhibit much more operational complexity and substantial (including
improvised explosive device [IED]) capabilities. Following the Bnei Brak incident, Prime Minister
Naftali Bennett referred to a “new wave of terrorism”, with the police at the highest alert levels just
ahead of the holy Muslim month of Ramadan (2 April–2 May), the Jewish Passover (15–22 April),
Easter (17 April), Israel’s Independence Day (5 May), the first-year anniversary of Op. Guardian of the
Walls (10–21 May by the Gregorian calendar), and Nakba Day (15 May). There is often a spike in
jihadist or jihadist-inspired militant attacks during Ramadan, in particular by the Islamic State in Syria
and Iraq, and this is especially likely following the announcement of the group’s new caliph on 10
March.
• The significant increase in security measures, deployments, and arrests increases the
likelihood of protests in response, including rioting and confrontations with security
personnel. Since the Beer Sheva attack, Israeli authorities have reinforced security measures
countrywide and increased police, Border Guard, internal security (Shabak/Shin Bet), and Israel
Defence Forces deployments and operations inside Israel and the Palestinian West Bank. Israeli
authorities have exercised special caution ahead of Ramadan to avoid provoking large-scale protests
by Muslim Arabs especially on the Temple Mount, which was one of the triggers of the May 2021 war.
Although such measures would also raise the risk of violent protests (including following arrests and
preventive detention of individuals suspected of affiliation with the Islamic State), they will also be
deemed by Israeli security officials as increasingly indispensable. An additional vector of instability
stems from the heightened likelihood of riots by ultranationalist Jewish vigilantes/West Bank settlers
retaliating against Arab (both Israeli and Palestinian) individuals and businesses, as occurred during
Op. Guardian of the Walls. Given that the ceasefire talks with Israel have only been partly finalised,
Hamas, Israel’s main threat group in the Gaza Strip and itself at odds with the Islamic State, has at
present less disincentive to escalate towards another round of armed conflict, in addition to its usual
calls for Israeli Arabs to protest and carry out attacks inside Israel.
• Large-scale intercommunal violence and a renewed Israel-Gaza war, the latter still being of low
likelihood at present but marginally more likely if Palestinian confrontations with Israeli forces
intensify around the Temple Mount complex in particular, would increase Israel government
instability risks. Mansur Abbas’s Ra’am party, the first Arab party to be part of a governing Israeli
coalition, seeks to sustain the redistributive (state budget) gains it has secured in favour of Arab
communities, and hence the coalition’s longevity. Ra’am has so far backed significantly increased
police operations targeting lawlessness and illegal arms possession in Israeli Arab communities,
including among southern Israel’s Bedouins, Ra’am’s core constituency. Counterterrorism security
measures targeting Arab communities and renewed intercommunal violence, especially if leading to
another war with Gaza, would increase the risk of Mansur Abbas or any of Ra’am’s three other ethnic
Arab Members of Knesset pulling out of the coalition, potentially triggering government collapse.
Already in evidence as of the Bnei Brak attack, pressure from ultranationalist Jewish constituencies
for the resignation of Bennett – himself the head of a pro-settler, ultranationalist party – for being in a
coalition that includes Ra’am and left-wing parties also carries the risk, though very low, of the prime
|8Analysis selection for JCC - March 2022
minister and his Yamina party pulling out of the coalition to preserve remaining support within the
right-wing bloc, which would likely trigger elections.
Indicators of changing risk environment
Increasing risk
• Jewish ultranationalists riot, especially in mixed Arab-Jewish cities, targeting individuals and
businesses believed to be of Arab origins, which is likely to trigger retaliatory rioting by members of
the Arab community. Conversely, Arab protesters initiate riots, to which Jewish ultranationalists then
respond.
• Additional terrorist attacks incurring fatalities take place, drawing in larger involvement by Israeli
security forces including movement restrictions in Arab-majority cities and al-Aqsa Mosque, and
increased numbers of raids and arrests, in turn increasing the risk of protests by Israeli Arab and
Palestinian communities and confrontations between them and Israeli security forces, along with
renewed Israel-Gaza war risks.
• Further evictions of Arab families resume, including in East Jerusalem’s contested Sheikh Jarrah
district.
• The Islamic State’s leadership specifically calls for more attacks in Israel. This would likely prompt a
greater security response from Israeli authorities, which would contribute to increased protest risks.
Decreasing risk
• The Palestinian Authority (PA) co-operates by carrying out its own counterterrorism operations in the
West Bank. Although Palestinian protests could increase against the PA, it would reduce the
likelihood of direct West Bank confrontations between Palestinians and Israeli security forces, and
limit pretexts for Hamas’s claims to also defend, against Israel, the West Bank and East Jerusalem in
addition to Gaza.
• Israel and Hamas finalise the pending ceasefire talks by resolving the issues of prisoner exchange
and of Gaza’s post-war reconstruction. This would likely increase the incentive for Hamas and other
Palestinian rejectionist factions in Gaza to avoid unnecessary escalatory armed measures including
rocket fire into Israel.
Likely military reinforcements in Mexico’s Zacatecas risk retaliatory escalation
from cartels, including collateral damage to cargo, mining
30 Mar 2022 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis
In Mexico’s Fresnillo, Zacatecas state, on 26 March, gunmen fired several rounds at a private vehicle, killing
its two occupants, before setting the vehicle on fire. One of the victims, who the authorities claim was the main
target of the attack, was an off-duty state police officer. To date in 2022, criminal groups have assassinated
17 local law enforcement officials, the highest figure for any state. Targeted attacks against police officers had
already motivated a two-day strike by the State Preventive Police (Policía Estatal Preventiva: PEP) on 19–20
March to demand improved protective equipment. Low morale and the PEP’s lack of firepower are likely to
motivate the state government to request an increased military presence, over and above the 3,800 National
Guard and Army troops that the federal government has deployed since November 2021.
Significance: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación: CJNG), the dominant
criminal organisation in Zacatecas, uses the state as its main drug-trafficking route from the southern Pacific
coast ports to Mexico’s northeastern border with the United States. An increased military presence in
Zacatecas would risk an escalation in weapons used by federal security forces and criminal groups. In early
March, national media highlighted footage of troops in Zacatecas training with RL–83 Blindicide anti-tank
rocket launchers. The use of these weapons by the military is intended to counter the so-called “monsters” –
improvised armoured vehicles that are used by the CJNG, mainly against other cartels. Since February, the
Mexican Army has increased its deployment of light armoured vehicles to provide troops with mobility and
protection in areas where there is a strong presence of organised crime. If the use of the RL–83 Blindicide
|9Analysis selection for JCC - March 2022
becomes widespread among the military, the CJNG would be likely to react by escalating its selection of
weapons and tactics, including by adopting tactics that have so far been limited to Michoacán state, using
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to deliver ordnance, and planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to
deny the military freedom of movement. Such an escalation would increase the risk of collateral damage to
commercial cargo vehicles on Zacatecas’s motorways, as well as for mining companies’ assets, many of
which are located in remote areas of the state, where the organised crime gangs are based.
Risks: Death and injury; Property
Sectors or assets affected: Defence and security forces; Ground cargo; Mining
Attacks on Nigerian airport and rail line in Kaduna state indicate likely
involvement of Islamist militants
29 Mar 2022 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis
Gunmen attacked a train with 970 passengers on board in Nigeria late on 28 March, with the attackers
opening fire after detonating explosives on the track to halt the Abuja–Kaduna service. The incident took place
in Kaduna state at around 21:00 between the towns of Katari and Rijana in an area notorious for kidnappings
by gangs of organised criminals known locally as ‘bandits’. News agency Reuters reported that seven people
were killed in the attack, according to a passenger and security source, before soldiers arrived to repel the
attackers. The Abuja to Kaduna section of the country’s main Lagos to Kano rail line opened in July 2016 and
has become very popular with passengers wanting to avoid the high risk of kidnapping on Kaduna’s roads.
The incident followed an attack shortly after midnight on 26 March on Kaduna airport by gunmen, who killed a
security guard stationed at the perimeter fence. The attackers were repelled by troops stationed within and
around the airport. Security sources said the aim was likely kidnapping of airport staff and passengers.
Significance: Bandit gangs operating out of the Rijana Forest have for some time harassed and extorted
local communities and kidnapped travellers en masse with virtual impunity from the overwhelmed security
forces. However, more-recent incidents suggest the involvement of allied Islamist militants who have
prompted the staging of attacks designed to undermine state stability, rather than maximise profits with
minimal danger. Kaduna airport has been targeted repeatedly in the past year, while the train service was also
disrupted last October after the tracks were bombed. Security forces’ sources reported in August 2021 that
two jihadist commanders and 250 fighters allied to new Boko Haram leader Bakoura Buduma had left Borno
state to provide weapons training and mass kidnapping advice to groups in Kaduna. In return for supplying
arms and training, the Islamists take a profit share and benefit from spreading their insurgency. Other Nigerian
states near Kaduna are now likely to see such attacks on infrastructure, particularly Niger state, which
President Muhammadu Buhari claimed in January was being infiltrated by “Boko Haram terrorists”.
Risks: State failure; Terrorism; Infrastructure disruption; Organised crime
Sectors or assets affected: Defence and security forces; Aviation; Cargo
Announced humanitarian ceasefire in Ethiopia’s Tigray indicates negotiation
progress, but unlikely to halt fighting between regional forces
25 Mar 2022 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis
The Ethiopian government announced on 24 March that it was declaring “an indefinite humanitarian truce
effective immediately” to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid to areas of northern Ethiopia impacted by the
conflict with the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) armed group. Later that day, the TDF-linked Government of
Tigray (GoT) responded with a statement that it was “committed to implementing a cessation of hostilities
effective immediately”, so long as “commensurate” humanitarian aid reached TDF-controlled territory “within a
reasonable timeframe”. The Ethiopian government statement also called for the TDF to “desist from all acts of
further aggression and withdraw from areas they have occupied in neighbouring regions”.
| 10Analysis selection for JCC - March 2022
• The ceasefire announcements indicate likely progress in back-channel negotiations between
the Ethiopian government and the GoT. Our sources indicate that, despite the separate
announcements, the ceasefire was agreed during recent high-level talks between government and
GoT officials. The Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) has not engaged in major ground-
fighting with the TDF since the armed group’s withdrawal back into northern Ethiopia during
November–December 2021. The forces of Ethiopia’s Amhara and Afar regions now dominate ground
confrontations with the TDF. While the ceasefire is officially ongoing, the Ethiopian government will
very likely continue to refrain from airstrikes targeting TDF-controlled territory, as it largely has since
mid-January 2022 (likely facilitating the new ceasefire), limiting risks of death and property damage
behind the front lines. This will also likely decrease the risks to low-flying aircraft of shootdown by the
TDF and of ENDF airstrikes near TDF-controlled airports. Both sides announced the ceasefire without
previously stated preconditions being fulfilled (for example, the TDF withdrawing fully into Tigray and
the Ethiopian government ending the alleged blockade of TDF-controlled territory). This indicates
willingness for a pause in fighting, but leaves these significant issues as potential spoilers. We assess
that the Ethiopian government will continue to rebuild its national forces, with the aim of establishing
the ability to enact a military solution against the TDF by late 2022 or 2023. Similarly, the TDF will
likely continue seeking to build its armed capabilities in preparation for scenarios of renewed
widespread fighting with the Ethiopian and/or Eritrean militaries.
• If the ceasefire holds for several weeks and consolidates towards a peace agreement, the
United States will likely start de-escalating sanctions on Ethiopia by 2023. On 9 February, the
US House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee passed the Ethiopia Stabilization, Peace
and Democracy Bill, known as the Malinowski Bill, outlining conditions for imposing sanctions on
Ethiopia. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is currently considering a similar bill, which would
make the merging stage (when the House and the Senate reconcile their versions to issue legislation)
with the House version relatively quick (one to two days) once the Senate passes its version. The
Senate will have to find room in its agenda to consider this bill, which has been with the Foreign
Relations Committee since November 2021. If further credible progress towards a ceasefire is made
and steps are taken towards the prosecution of perpetrators of war crimes and human rights violations
before the US Senate considers the bill, the White House will likely exert pressure on the Senate to
not pass the bill or to delay indefinitely its consideration. The White House would do this to avoid
discouraging peace efforts by seemingly imposing punishing measures on the country. Active de-
escalation of sanctions would likely start, for example, by allowing the International Monetary Fund
| 11Analysis selection for JCC - March 2022
(IMF) to re-engage actively with Ethiopia and the resuming of direct budgetary support. However,
these would require the consolidation of the ceasefire into a peace agreement through the
prosecution of individuals accused of committing war crimes and/or credible inclusion of opposition
parties (including from the GoT) in the National Dialogue.
• Ethiopia’s government is probably attempting to disengage from the conflict with the TDF,
which will likely be continued locally by forces from Afar and Amhara regions, supported by
neighbouring Eritrea. The TDF continues to occupy a significant buffer zone in Afar’s Zone 2 and, to
a lesser extent, areas of Amhara’s Wag Hamra and North Gondar zones, and Amhara forces continue
to control largely Western Tigray zone, which was part of pre-conflict Tigray. While the TDF remains
in Amhara and Afar regions, their respective administrations and forces will likely continue to obstruct
ground humanitarian aid flows into TDF-controlled territory, likely causing the GoT to accuse the
Ethiopian government of failing to prevent this. We assess that the government of neighbouring
Eritrea is seeking actively to co-operate with Amhara and Afar forces in continuing the conflict with the
TDF. Consequently, continued fighting – including with heavy weaponry acquired by regional forces
during the conflict or via the Eritrean military – will remain likely along the TDF’s lines of contact with
these opposing forces, particularly in Afar.
Indicators of changing risk environment
Increasing risk
• The GoT claiming in the one-month outlook that the Ethiopian government is still not permitting or
facilitating sufficient humanitarian aid flows into TDF-controlled territory would increase the risk of the
ceasefire ending.
• The Ethiopian government or the GoT/TDF claiming that the other side is massing forces for new
offensive operations would indicate an increasing risk of the ceasefire ending.
• The TDF launching new offensive operations deep into Amhara or Afar regions would indicate a likely
end to the ceasefire.
• The Eritrean military launching offensive operations into TDF-controlled territory would increase the
risk of widespread property destruction and death in these areas.
• The TDF launching attacks into Eritrea, which it would probably claim were pre-emptive self-defence,
would likely trigger new offensive operations into TDF-controlled territory by Eritrean, Amhara, and
Afar forces.
Decreasing risk
• The TDF withdrawing its troops from Afar and Amhara regions would decrease the likelihood of
localised fighting with regional forces and increase the likelihood of a negotiated settlement to the
conflict.
• The ENDF taking over security provision in Western Tigray zone, and the Amhara and Eritrean forces
withdrawing, would decrease the likelihood of localised fighting with the TDF and increase the
likelihood of a negotiated settlement to the conflict.
• Both the Ethiopian government and the GoT stating that the ceasefire was still being adhered to by
the other side by the end of the three-month outlook would indicate an increasing likelihood of a
negotiated settlement to the conflict.
• The Ethiopian government restoring telecoms and banking services to TDF-controlled territory would
increase the likelihood of a negotiated settlement to the conflict.
Lebanon severely impacted by war in Ukraine, with increasing food and fuel
prices likely to trigger protests
25 Mar 2022 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis
On 24 March 2022, the US Embassy in Lebanon announced that it would donate USD64 million in emergency
food assistance to Lebanon, citing severe shortages caused by import disruption due to the Russian invasion
| 12Analysis selection for JCC - March 2022
of Ukraine. The aid will consist of deliveries of non-perishable food items such as rice, pasta, and chickpeas
as well as food vouchers to local markets.
• The Russian invasion of Ukraine is severely impacting Lebanon through higher import prices
for foodstuffs, grains (wheat in particular), and higher hydrocarbon prices globally. Lebanese
reliance on Ukrainian and Russian imports increased because of the Syria conflict. In 2012, only
0.01% of total Lebanese imports came from Ukraine and Russia. In 2021, Lebanon imported 58.4% of
its cereals, 40.6% of fats and oils, 24.5% of iron and steel, and 15.6% of its minerals from Ukraine and
Russia, according to the Lebanese government’s customs website. Lebanon had wheat reserves of
only one month as of late February, according to Minister of Economy and Trade Amin Salam, as the
Beirut Port explosion of August 2020 reduced grain silo storage capacity by about half. The shortage
of iron and steel will likely also delay reconstruction efforts after the port explosion, adding to
economic slowdown and delayed recovery.
• Negotiations are underway to find alternative suppliers of wheat, oil, and fuel, but any new
suppliers are unlikely to meet immediate needs. On 23 March 2022, Salam said that Lebanon was
expecting 26,000 tonnes of wheat from Ukraine the following week, adding that it was uncertain if the
country would receive any other deliveries from Ukraine. Salam also stated that Lebanon had
prepared a tender to purchase 50,000 tonnes of wheat from India, but this required a credit line from
the central bank of USD26 million. According to IHS Markit, Lebanon only has enough foreign
currency reserves to cover 7.5 months of imports in 2022, and only 3.3 months in 2023. On 17 March,
Industry Minister George Bouchikian announced that stocks of vegetable oil were down to two and a
half months. Bouchikian also banned the export of foodstuffs without a licence on 11 March to protect
the country’s food security. Prime Minster Najib Mikati announced on 21 March that Saudi Arabia
donated USD36 million, indicating improving relations.
• Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Lebanon was already experiencing an economic crisis with
soaring inflation and lack of foreign currency reserves, diminishing its ability to purchase
basic goods. Lebanon’s consumer price index (CPI) inflation reached a record high of 240% year on
year (y/y) in January, up from 224% y/y in December, driven by rising food, transport, and utility
prices. Lebanon has a debt-to-GDP ratio of more than 200% and IHS Markit had anticipated average
inflation of 200% in 2022 and 55% in 2023. However, the forecast will likely be raised to reflect higher
food and fuel prices due to the Russia-Ukraine war. Lebanon is attempting to improve its fiscal
balance by attracting foreign investment, privatisation, and successfully negotiating restructuring of
sovereign debt, but the required extensive political, economic, and banking reforms are unlikely to be
achieved in the one-year outlook because of the vested interests of leading government figures.
• Increasing food and fuel prices are increasingly likely to trigger riots involving arson and
vandalism against banks and companies perceived as profiting. Hour-long queues at fuel
stations are likely to grow longer as fuel shortages continue, and people stockpile in fear of more price
increases. If inflation and food and fuel prices continue to rise, which is likely, protests lasting days at
a time and including roadblocks will become more frequent, probably occurring weekly. These are
likely to be predominantly peaceful, involving hundreds of people and located outside government
buildings and adjacent main squares. Vandalism and arson are, however, likely to target companies
and shops that are perceived by the public as disproportionately increasing prices or monopolising
produce. Bank branches and cash withdrawal machines remain highly likely to be vandalised by
protesters due to withdrawal restrictions and banks’ perceived culpability in the economic crisis.
Indicators of changing risk environment
Increasing risk
• Relations with Saudi Arabia do not improve due to new inflammatory remarks by Hizbullah-linked or
allied senior figures, ending prospects of resumed trade ties. Saudi Arabia is Lebanon’s third-largest
export market in 2020, amounting to USD230 million, equivalent to 5.6% of total exports.
• The electoral lists published in April show fewer alliances between parties, indicating high levels of
fragmentation complicating government formation negotiations after the 15 May elections, a delay that
would reduce prospects of trade and aid negotiations.
| 13Analysis selection for JCC - March 2022
Decreasing risk
• Lebanon successfully concludes food and import negotiations with new providers, such as Egypt,
India, Iraq, Iran, and the United States.
• Negotiations between Lebanon and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) continue to proceed
without interruptions and additional delays.
Niger’s decision to negotiate with jihadists unlikely to prevent increased
attacks as Western troops redeploy from Mali
21 Mar 2022 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis
Twenty-one people were killed in simultaneous attacks on a bus and a truck transporting foodstuff in Niger’s
western Tillaberi region on 16 March, shortly after media reports stated that President Mohamed Bazoum had
opened talks with jihadist groups. The attack occurred in the Tera area near the border with Burkina Faso;
transport companies say they have suspended travel to Burkina Faso until further notice. In February,
President Bazoum released a number of jailed jihadists, including from the Boko Haram group, and reportedly
dispatched emissaries for talks with jihadists. Earlier this month, he sent envoys, including religious leaders
and community elders, to villages across the Tillaberi region, where the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
(ISGS) is recruiting young Nigeriens.
Significance: President Bazoum had ruled out any dialogue with jihadists previously, claiming that Niger had
no homegrown jihadist movements, unlike Mali, and therefore no local interlocutors. That policy was aligned
with that of French President Emmanuel Macron, who opposes any negotiations with jihadists. However, as
France and its European partners prepare to redeploy troops from Mali to Niger, Bazoum’s approach
suggests he is distancing himself from France’s position, as otherwise the risk of political instability would
likely increase, as indicated by mass anti-French protests in Mali and Burkina Faso. The reported decision to
open talks with jihadists also suggests an attempt to avoid a situation that could lead to a military coup, as
experienced by both Mali and Burkina Faso, where the civilian presidents were overthrown largely due to an
inability to overcome the jihadist insurgency. However, jihadist groups, and in particular ISGS, are likely to
expand operations in Niger, especially as they appear to be adopting a more-coordinated approach towards
destabilising the Sahel region by increasing the frequency and intensity of attacks in Burkina Faso and Mali.
Furthermore, the arrival of Western troops in Niger is also likely to increase its susceptibility to asymmetric
jihadist attacks, including ambushes using improvised explosive devices, disrupting road cargo and damaging
infrastructure such as bridges. These attacks, in turn, would probably increase anti-Western sentiment
gradually, as has been the case in Mali.
Risks: Terrorism; Death and injury
Sectors or assets affected: Security and defence forces; Transport; Infrastructure
CENTCOM assessment underlines growing risk of Islamic State attacks in
Afghanistan, with foreigners, airports among likely targets
18 Mar 2022 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis
US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Kenneth McKenzie expressed concern about the
“development trajectory” of the Islamic State in Afghanistan, Wilayat Khurasan (IS-WK), at a Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing on 15 March. In addition to increasing attacks domestically, General McKenzie
warned that the group could gain capability to carry out attacks beyond the Afghanistan–Pakistan region in the
one-year outlook, with the US and Europe potential targets. High impact IS-WK attacks have been rare since
the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in August 2021, barring isolated grenade and suicide bombings
against Shia mosques, including in Kabul and Kunduz in Afghanistan and Peshawar in Pakistan.
Nevertheless, US military and UN assessments concur that the IS-WK has increased its operational presence
in Afghanistan over the last six months, with as many as 4,000 local Afghan and foreign fighters believed to
| 14Analysis selection for JCC - March 2022
be affiliated with the group in the country. General McKenzie also said that the US military has not conducted
any operations against IS-WK since September 2021.
Significance: Expanded ungoverned territory in Afghanistan and the release of thousands of prisoners
across the country following the Taliban takeover – coupled with reduced US counter-terrorism pressure – are
likely to have been significant drivers of IS-WK recovery in the country. With the Taliban government
struggling to govern amid economic and humanitarian crises, its internal counter-terrorism capabilities are
likely to be limited and to enable an intensification of IS-WK attacks in Afghanistan. IS-WK fighters are likely to
target Taliban security forces primarily, but foreigners, non-governmental organisation (NGO) workers, and
airports are also high-risk targets for the group. Kabul airport in particular is likely to be targeted in complex
operations involving suicide bombers and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), which are
more likely to breach perimeter security given the Taliban’s inexperience in securing airports and responding
to attacks. However, increased IS-WK attacks or broader indicators of IS-WK resurgence in Afghanistan
would be likely to drive security co-ordination between the US and the Taliban government. While this would
not constitute US diplomatic recognition of the Taliban government, broader security co-ordination against IS-
WK between the Taliban and the US would prevent a complete international isolation of the Taliban
government.
Risks: Terrorism; Civil war; Aviation; Death and injury
Sectors or assets affected: All
Inspections of foreign-owned businesses in South African townships increase
risk of violent protests in Johannesburg, Durban
8 Mar 2022 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis
Three people were injured when members of the Alexandra Dudula Movement conducted unofficial
inspections of small retail stores looking for undocumented migrant workers in Alexandra township in
Johannesburg, South Africa, on 7 March. The Alexandra Dudula Movement is an organisation opposed to the
hiring of undocumented foreign nationals and their ownership of businesses in sectors of the economy such
as hospitality and informal retail. The inspections follow protests in February by another organisation calling
itself Operation Dudula, when around eight hundred members protested at government offices in Soweto,
Johannesburg, over the same issue.
Significance: It is highly probable that violent protests, led by similar organisations, will grow to involve more
protesters and to become more frequent in other townships of Gauteng province and in business districts of
Johannesburg and Pretoria, both in Gauteng. Violent protests are also likely in townships and central
business districts (CBDs) in the provinces of Kwa-Zulu Natal (which includes Durban) and Eastern Cape.
Organisations similar to the Alexandra Dudula Movement are very likely to be formed in the coming weeks
and months in these provinces. This follows recent legislation imposing stricter quotas on the employment of
foreign nationals by South African businesses in labour-intensive industries. Foreign nationals targeted by
protests have predominantly been from Zimbabwe, Malawi, Sudan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and
Mozambique. Protests in CBDs would very likely result in damage to storefronts, particularly those along
major roads, caused by stones thrown by protesters at businesses that resist inspections for undocumented
employees. Roads coming into CBDs will likely be blocked using tyres and boulders, preventing cargo
movement for up to three hours at a time. Security forces are likely to respond to violent confrontations
between protesters and foreign migrant workers using tear gas and stun grenades.
Risks: Protests and riots; Death and injury; Ground cargo
Sectors or assets affected: Retail; Agriculture
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