Algeria: Hirak is Back For How Long?

Algeria: Hirak is Back… For How Long?

Hirak is back. After almost 12 months away, the grassroots anti-government movement returned last
week to Algeria’s streets to protest the lack of change under President Abdelmadjid Tebboune. The
strong turnout shows that Hirak has survived the pandemic and a year of intensified state
repression. But it remains to be seen whether the movement can keep up momentum to realize its
ambitious vision: the replacement of Algeria’s army-dominated authoritarian system with a civilian
democratic state.

Hirak emerged in early 2019 amid widespread political and economic discontent to galvanize
citizens against a fifth term in office for the ailing and unpopular president Abdelaziz Bouteflika. On
February 22, 2019, Hirak staged the largest protests seen in Algeria in decades. After its successive
huge marches led the army to force Bouteflika to resign less than two months later, the movement
kept going, denouncing the entire power structure and calling for a complete overhaul of the
governing system—as conveyed by the slogan Yetnahaw ga3 (“they all should go”). Hirak held
marches every Friday through March 13, 2020, after which its activists halted protests due to the
coronavirus and instead gathered online.

During its first year on the streets, beyond compelling the army to remove Bouteflika—no small
feat—Hirak broke other political ground. Using a decentralized, leaderless structure; significant
organizational creativity; and nonpartisan, peaceful tactics, it generated the largest sustained pro-
democracy mobilization in Algeria’s recent history. Hirak united hundreds of thousands of protesters
of all generations and of diverse (even opposed) ideologies, such as Islamists and secularists, under
a broad demand of systemic change. The movement’s strong criticism of the army’s political role
shattered a longstanding taboo in Algeria. And Hirak remained steadfastly peaceful in the face of

repression and in a country that endured civil war only three decades ago.

Yet Hirak has not been able to compel the army leadership to make sweeping change. The army
replaced Bouteflika with Tebboune, an establishment figurehead picked to protect the existing
power structure. Brought to office through a controversial and widely boycotted December 2019
election, Tebboune has officially praised Hirak but proposed only superficial reforms and failed to
engage seriously with its demands.

Some observers argue that Hirak’s lack of a specific platform or detailed roadmap to accompany its
broad slogans is the reason why it has not been able to exert more influence on Algeria’s decision-
makers, mainly the army leadership. While Hirak discussions have flourished online during the
pandemic, with initiatives such as “Nida 22” that provide a framework for debate among activists in
all regions, there is no consensus among its supporters over whether it should organize as a group,
announce a platform, and designate spokespersons.

For one thing, it is extremely difficult even for opposition parties and civic organizations to operate
in Algeria’s highly restrictive political environment, and Hirak supporters worry about regime co-
optation if the movement becomes more structured. For another, there is a widening division
between Islamist and secular activists. Although the two camps had put their opposition aside in the
early days of Hirak, recently some more progressive activists have become reluctant to protest
alongside Islamists,[1] and the slogan Ni état islamiste, ni état militaire (“neither an Islamic state
nor a military state”) is becoming more present. This tension will make it harder to agree on a
political platform and may diminish the size of upcoming protests.

Hirak has also had to contend with stepped-up repression during the pandemic. In an aggressive
campaign to silence Hirak, the authorities arrested more than 1,500 people last year simply for
backing the movement, with many people arrested multiple times.[2] Some 150 peaceful activists
were jailed, many on charges of “insulting the president” on social media and “harming national
unity.” (According to Abderrahman Salah, a lawyer for Hirak activists, under Tebboune around 60
people have already been prosecuted for “insulting the president,” compared to five such
prosecutions during Bouteflika’s entire 20 years in power.[3])

This crackdown has forced Hirak supporters to spend a lot of energy simply trying to get people out
of detention. In an (unsuccessful) attempt to appease protestors, on February 18 Tebboune finally
announced that some 60 people would be released. So far, however, activists say that only 39 people
involved in Hirak have been freed;[4] some, such as journalist Khaled Drareni, received only a
provisional release. And the repression is continuing. The recent protests saw a heavy security
presence, police violence, and scores of new arrests. Last Friday, February 26, at least 750 people
were arrested, although reportedly all were released after a few hours.[5]

The coming period may provide answers to three key questions. First, will Hirak marches continue
to draw large crowds? Second, will Hirak move to create a platform, list of specific demands, and
leadership structure? This may be necessary to maintain its strength as a pressure movement, but it
is no easy endeavor. Third, will the opposition parties and civil society groups that align with Hirak
take up its demands in an effective way, despite their own weaknesses? As protesters return to the
streets, many activists are wary of a possible trivialization of Hirak. They warn that without evolving
from a movement that denounces into one that offers more precise proposals, Hirak may
progressively weaken, even disappear, without changing the Algerian political status quo.

Ilhem Rachidi is a Morocco-based freelance reporter focusing on human rights and protest

movements in Algeria and Morocco. She has published with POMED, Al-Monitor, the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Christian Science Monitor, Rue89, and Foreign Policy, among
others. She is on Twitter @Ilhemrachidi.

NOTES
1. Author’s communication with Hirak activists in Algeria, March 2, 2021.
2. Author’s interviews during 2020 and 2021 with Hirak activists in Algeria.
3. Author’s communication with Abderrahman Salah, March 3, 2021.
4. As of March 3, 2021, 33 Algerians are incarcerated for politically related motives, with three
incarcerated just in recent days, according to the Algerian Detainees website run by activists:
https://www.algerian-detainees.org/
5. Author’s communication with a Hirak activist in Algeria, February 28, 2021.

Photo Credit: Zine Ghebouli on Twitter

Deputy Director for Research Amy
Hawthorne featured in Atlantic Council

In a November 22, 2021 Atlantic Council article by Alissa Pavia, Karim Mezran, and Yaseen Rashed,
“Tunisia has a new government. How will challenges be addressed?” Deputy Director for Research
Amy Hawthorne comments on President Kais Saied’s effect on democracy in Tunisia.

      QUESTION: Do you think democracy in Tunisia is at risk?

      In recent years, ordinary Tunisians have chafed under a freely elected but feckless ruling
      elite that failed to use democracy to improve their lives. Unfortunately, “outsider”
      President Kais Saied’s response to this crisis has been to shut down parliament, grant
      himself unchecked powers, and demonize his critics. After trampling on the 2014
      constitution, Saied wants to impose his own system, likely with a supercharged
      presidency, subservient legislature, and curtailed pluralism. That, so far, Saied enjoys
      popular support and has refrained from widespread repression, must not obscure this
      clear assault on democracy.

      With his esoteric ideas, disdain for other actors, and possibly unrealistic economic and
      anti-corruption promises—and without a political structure behind him—Saied’s attempt
      at emperorship might fall apart. But democracy would still be in deep trouble. Many
      Tunisians have soured on politics, parties are discredited, civil society is fragmented,
      and the abusive Interior Ministry is unreformed. As Saied has brought back one-man
      rule and otherwise severely eroded democratic norms, the international community has
      largely been silent. All this could open the door for a more experienced and ruthless
      autocrat to replace Saied and successfully resurrect the police state.

Read full article.

Photo Credit: Présidence Tunisie on Facebook

Advocacy Director Seth Binder featured in
HuffPost

In a November 9, 2021 article by Akbar Shahid Ahmed, “Joe Biden Promised To Take On Saudi
Arabia Over Jamal Khashoggi. The Saudis Won,” Advocacy Director Seth Binder criticizes the Biden
administration’s response to repressive regimes, particularly the Saudi regime and it’s involvement
in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

     “As Trump’s prospects of winning the 2020 election declined, human rights campaigners
     felt that their opponents were on the back foot for once.

     ‘Whether it’s the Saudi regime or the Egyptian regime, those governments were
     concerned coming into this administration with the strong rhetoric that [Biden]
     presented centering democracy and human rights,’ said Seth Binder, the advocacy
     director at the nonprofit Project on Middle East Democracy.

     …

     Today, however, the Saudis and their peers don’t face any major new limits on their
     repression.

     “In many respects, they’ve called the Biden administration’s bluff,” Binder said.

     …

According to the congressional research service, a previous regulation would allow the
      State Department to name people who are banned from visiting the U.S. over human
      rights violations. The Biden administration said it would consider using that regulation
      to identify people covered by the Khashoggi ban, but it has not yet done so.

      Biden could also release or gather more intelligence to boost the assessment blaming
      MBS and expose the still-murky role of his allies, like the government of Egypt, as well
      as complete and publish his promised review of U.S.-Saudi relations, said Binder of the
      Project on Middle East Democracy.”

Read the full article.

Photo Credit: U.S. Department of State on Flickr

Advocacy Director Seth Binder featured in
The Guardian

In an October 27, 2021 Guardian article by Stephanie Kirchgaessner and Bethan McKernan,
“Biden’s $500m Saudi deal contradicts policy on ‘offensive’ weapons, critics say,” Advocacy Director

Seth Binder comments on the latest U.S.-Saudi military contract and the Biden administration’s
failed promise to end its support of offensive weaponry in Saudi Arabia.

      “Saudi Arabia was given permission by the state department to enter a contract to
      support the Royal Saudi Land Forces Aviation Command’s fleet of Apache helicopters,
      Blackhawks, and a future fleet of Chinook helicopters. It includes training and the
      service of 350 US contractors for the next two years, as well as two US government
      staff. The deal was first announced in September.

      ‘To my mind, this is a direct contradiction to the administration’s policy. This equipment
      can absolutely be used in offensive operations, so I find this particularly troubling,’ said
      Seth Binder, director of advocacy at the Project on Middle East Democracy.

      The decision to approve the military maintenance contract comes as the Biden
      administration appears to be softening its approach to the kingdom, with several high-
      level meetings between senior administration officials and their Saudi counterparts.

      …

      While the US is engaged in negotiations [in Yemen], Seth Binder said, its efforts have so
      far been unsuccessful. ‘They haven’t been able to change the dynamics on the ground or
      the calculus of the major players.'”

Read the full article.

Photo Credit: The White House on Flickr

Advocacy Director Seth Binder Featured in
Associated Press

In an October 15, 2021 article by Karin Laub, “More repression, fewer jobs: Jordanians face bleak
outlook,” Advocacy Director Seth Binder comments on shifting U.S. foreign policy priorities in
Jordan and highlights POMED’s recent report on President Biden’s FY22 Foreign Affairs Budget.

     “Any hint of instability should worry Jordan’s Western allies, foremost the United States,
     who value the kingdom for its help in the fight against Islamic extremists, its security
     ties with Israel and its willingness to host refugees.

     But the focus of the Biden administration has shifted to the Indo-Pacific, with Middle
     East policy in maintenance mode and the approach to Jordan seemingly on autopilot,
     said Seth Binder of the Project on Middle East Democracy, a Washington-based
     advocacy group….

     In a report circulated among Washington decision-makers in September, Binder’s group
     called for more stringent conditions to be attached to direct cash transfers, and to
     eventually phase them out. Aid should be leveraged in a push for economic and political
     reforms, it said.

     ‘A cash transfer to the government is a privilege that should be reserved for U.S.
     partners committed to democracy and human rights and not known for rampant
     corruption,’ the report said.

The State Department said in a response that aid to Jordan is in the direct national
      security interest of the U.S., describing the kingdom as an ‘invaluable ally.’ It said the
      U.S. carefully monitors its aid programs to Jordan and that the U.S. routinely engages
      the Jordanian government on a wide range of issues, including human rights.”

Read the full article.

Photo Credit: The White House on Flickr

“Fundamentally a Political, Not a Legal,
Case” – A Conversation with Meral Danış
Beştaş on Turkey’s Move to Close the HDP

Makaleyi Türkçe okuyun.

Bi Kurdî bixwînin.

                                                                                  Read this as a PDF.

                                     On June 21, Turkey’s Constitutional Court agreed to review a
case brought by a top prosecutor in Ankara to close down the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). The
move launched a highly controversial and consequential judicial process. The HDP is Turkey’s
second-largest opposition party and its largest predominantly Kurdish party. With a uniquely
progressive platform that promotes social diversity and pluralism, the HDP is the parliament’s most
vocal advocate for the rights for Kurds and all marginalized communities, including the country’s
ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities.

If the Court rules for the HDP’s closure, the move would disenfranchise millions of voters—and call
into question the integrity of Turkey’s upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, scheduled
for 2023. In the worst case, the party closure could trigger social unrest and violence.

Since the HDP became the first predominantly Kurdish party to enter the Turkish parliament in
2015, it has been the target of constant attacks and pressure from the government and its allies.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), and the AKP’s
junior ally, the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), all seek to delegitimize the HDP
by constantly equating it with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terrorist
group. Nearly all 56 HDP lawmakers are facing criminal investigations for alleged links to terrorism
and for spreading propaganda on behalf of a terror organization, accusations that are based on an
overly broad definition of terrorism and propaganda. Thousands of party members, including its
former co-chairs and several elected mayors, have been detained on terrorism charges. Several HDP
lawmakers, including prominent human rights defender Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, have been
removed from parliament on flimsy pretexts.

The closure case is the culmination of this six-year campaign against the HDP. The whopping 843-
page indictment charges the HDP with colluding with the PKK and with attempting to “destroy the
unity of the state” and seeks to ban 451 party members from politics. The Constitutional Court could
rule against the government; in a surprise decision in July, it ordered the release of HDP MP
Gergerlioğlu, saying that his rights had been violated. (Parliament restored his MP status on July
16.) At the same time, this court has a history of shutting down political parties and could well rule
against the HDP. The Turkish judiciary is under heavy political pressure, and the closure case
materialized only after persistent calls this spring from MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli for such a
prosecution. The court will certainly be paying attention to the opinion of Erdoğan and his MHP

allies before it makes a decision.

To better understand the closure case, its motives, and the potential consequences of banning the
party, POMED’s Merve Tahiroğlu spoke with the HDP’s Meral Danış Beştaş, an MP representing
Siirt and chair of the HDP’s parliamentary group.

POMED: Why is the government trying to shut down the HDP?

Meral Danış Beştaş: I want to start with a reminder that the AKP itself has survived two
unsuccessful closure attempts (in 2002 and 2008). It has therefore suffered from the incurable
wounds that party closures have inflicted on Turkey. The AKP used precisely this experience to push
for constitutional amendments, approved in a September 2010 referendum, to make it harder for the
courts to ban political parties. In fact, the AKP relied on this particular issue to garner broader
public sympathy for its whole package of constitutional amendments.

The process to close the HDP actually began back in June 2015 (after the HDP’s strong electoral
showing caused the AKP to lose its longstanding parliamentary majority). Erdoğan’s bad policies, his
government’s interventions against people’s way of life, his response to the 2013 Gezi protests, his
party’s corruption scandals, and his entirely insincere approach to the Kurdish problem all led to
that rebuke in the June 7, 2015 general election.[1] The results showed that people do not want the
AKP to rule the country on its own—and that they consider the HDP an important political actor.

Ever since, the AKP has been responding to its defeat with revanchist policies. One tactic has been
gross human rights violations. Curfews in the Kurdish provinces, the burning of people in the
basements of the Kurdish-majority town of Cizre, the torture inflicted by security forces on people’s
dead bodies, the death threats put on the walls of people’s homes—all of these actions were part of
the ruling party’s destructive response to the HDP’s rise. They tried to destroy our party from
within. The replacement of our mayors with trustees after the 2016 coup attempt and the arrests of
our mayors and lawmakers are examples of this approach.

But despite these repressive policies, the AKP continued to lose at the ballot box. It saw this over
and again in the general elections of June 24, 2018 (when it suffered a 7-percent drop in its vote
share and lost its parliamentary majority), and in the municipal elections of March 31, 2019 (when it
lost key cities, including Ankara and Istanbul, to opposition parties).

Today, the AKP is facing a total failure of all its policies, not least its economic policies. As it sees
that it cannot win through the ballot box, it strives to stay in power through extrajudicial means. For
its own survival, the ruling party has to silence the people and to inflict oppression. And as the AKP
sees the HDP as a massive and undefeatable force, it has decided to go after us. It is using the
judiciary as a tool to destroy the HDP.

What would be the implications if the Constitutional Court rules in favor of the HDP’s
closure?

The forced shutdown of a political party will undoubtedly damage Turkish democracy. Such a
practice is without question putschist. And as precedents show, the damage caused by party
closures is not really possible to repair. The short-, medium-, and long-term consequences of an HDP
shutdown are all the same: a totally dark future. The HDP’s possible shutdown does not only concern
our voters. We are talking about something that has an impact on the entire country. A closure

would affect those who support all political parties, and even those who are apolitical. The closure of
a party through an indictment that defies the law will amount to an official declaration that there is
no justice in the country.

We make this point all the time, so it has lost some of its value, but if there is no justice in a country,
then there is no country. The more a state strays from its constitution, the more it loses its legality;
it becomes an illegal state. If there is no trust in the judiciary, there can be no trust in the economy.
This means that as people are forced to face more oppression, they also will be forced to face more
hunger and poverty. Human rights will be suspended altogether. We will see chaos that is even
greater than the chaos of today. If the HDP is closed, the economy will not be any better; there won’t
be democracy! On the contrary, if the HDP is closed, the oppressive policies will expand to all
factions of society. The youth, the elderly, women, children, the disabled, minorities, and even those
who think they represent the majority…everyone except the Palace and its close allies will be hurt.

What is the timeline for this case, and what process will the Constitutional Court follow?

The HDP received the indictment on July 9. Normally, the indicted party has one month to submit its
defense, but it can demand extra time depending on the scope of the indictment. The court gave us
60 days and scheduled our defense for September 7. On August 11 we asked for an extension, and
the court could now give us up to 90 more days.

Once we submit our defense, the prosecutor will be called to make the state’s argument before the
court, and we will offer our defense. Then the court rapporteur will submit its notes, and the court
will make its final judgment. If the court rules that the HDP is acting as a “center of anti-
constitutional actions,” as the indictment alleges, it can decide to either shut us down or to ban
financial support from the state to the party. These decisions require a two-thirds majority vote,
meaning 10 of the Constitutional Court’s 15 members.

The timing depends on the court’s agenda and on how long we take to submit our defense. While
there are party-closure cases that have been waiting for two years, there are other such cases that
have been resolved within four months. So the legal process could take years, or just a few months.
The crucial point is that we cannot foresee how the process will go because this is fundamentally a
political, not a legal, case.

Do you think the Constitutional Court is likely to rule in favor of HDP’s closure?

This is a very important question. While the Court has made quite just and democratic decisions in
the past, the public also knows that it can sometimes issue rulings that are contradictory and unjust.
Here, if the court makes a just ruling, it will not shut down the party. This is definitely possible. This
is an institution that can make just and legal decisions—as we have seen with the recent case of
(Ömer Faruk) Gergerlioğlu.

It is crucial to keep in mind, however, that the Constitutional Court has a history of banning political
parties. Over the last 60 years, it has shut down 25 political parties—and this number does not even
include the party closures that occurred under military regimes. Six parties were shut down under
the 1961 Constitution, and 19 under the 1982 Constitution. With the exception of the Welfare Party,
all these parties were closed down for “threatening the country’s territorial integrity.”[2]

Significantly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found the Turkish court’s reasoning in

each of these closure cases to be unjust. This shows that the Constitutional Court has always made
wrong and ideological rulings against universal legal norms. Indeed, all of Turkey’s legal texts—the
Constitution, the penal code, the criminal code, terrorism laws, electoral laws, etc.—unfortunately
have measures that restrict democracy and even make democratic politics impossible.

It is also obvious that the Constitutional Court is under immense threat and pressure from the
government. Our case aside, there are demands for the Constitutional Court itself to be shut down.
But the last word I will say on this is that should the Court stray from justice and decide to shut
down the HDP, it should just go ahead and dissolve itself.

What role can Europe play throughout this process?

First we must look at what the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the ECtHR,
which implements the ECHR, have to say about party closures. The ECHR’s Article 11 protects
freedom of association, and Article 10 protects freedom of expression. The closure of a party
amounts to limiting these freedoms, and the only legal pretext for doing so is if such action is
required to protect democratic society. Even more important, the ECtHR has stated that political
parties are an essential form of association for a democracy to function properly, and thus that solid
reasoning is especially required in party closure cases—more so even than for NGO closure cases.
The ECtHR has a history of judgments against party closures, and its most important decisions
involve Turkey.[3]

Meanwhile, the Venice Commission (or the “European Commission for Democracy through Law”),
the Council of Europe main advisory body on constitutional matters, has also warned against the
criminalization of political parties without solid cause, emphasizing the need to protect a lawful
democratic party’s right to express ideas about amending a country’s constitution. For political
parties to seek change or even to question a state’s fundamental organization is an essential element
of democracy.[4]

In short, the ECtHR is an institution that has determined that Turkey’s party closures violate the
ECHR. Taking this reality into account, Europe must defend its own political principles. That said,
Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe and a candidate to join the European Union (EU). For
this reason, decisions made by the ECtHR are binding for Turkey. And for a country that seeks to
join the EU, following that body’s jurisprudence concerning party closures is a must.

What role can the United States play?

Upon taking office, President Joe Biden declared to the international community that his
administration would follow a foreign policy that prioritizes human rights and democracy. It is clear
that this closure case violates those very values. It is the international community’s expectation that
the United States will defend its own principles and make clear its human rights policies.

Meral Danış Beştaş is the Chair of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP)’s parliamentary group and
a Member of Parliament representing Siirt. She is a human rights lawyer who has brought cases
before the European Court of Human Rights. In previous years, Beştaş served as director of Amnesty
International’s Turkey branch, as director and deputy chair at the Board of Diyarbakır Bar, as well
as the director of the Bar’s Consultation and Application Center on Women Rights. @meraldanis.

Merve Tahiroğlu is POMED’s Turkey program coordinator. @MerveTahiroglu.

NOTES:

1. Ed. note: In the June 7, 2015 general election, the AKP lost its parliamentary majority for the first
time since coming to power in 2002, and the HDP won 13 percent of the votes, becoming the first
Kurdish-led party in history to enter parliament by crossing the 10 percent electoral threshold.

2. Ed. note: The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) was the AKP’s predecessor and was closed in 1998 for
“threatening secularism.” The last party closure in Turkey was in 2009, when the court banned the
Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) for “threatening Turkey’s territorial
integrity.”

3. These are: the January 30, 1998 case of the United Communist Party/Turkey (Birleşik Komünist
Partisi/Türkiye); the May 25, 1998 case of the Socialist Party/Turkey (Sosyalist Parti/Türkiye); the
December 8, 1999 case of the Freedom and Democracy Party/Turkey (ÖZDEP/Türkiye); the April 9,
2002 case of Yazar/Türkiye; and the February 13, 2003 case of Welfare Party/Turkey
(Refah/Türkiye).

4. Ed. note: This is a reference to the prosecutor’s charge in the indictment that the HDP poses a
threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity by allegedly supporting Kurdish secession from Turkey. The
HDP does not advocate for Kurdish separatism; however, it strongly supports decentralization and
more regional autonomy in Turkey.

Photo Credit: Peoples’ Democratic Party – HDP on Facebook

How COVID-19 Helped Legitimate the
Tunisian President’s Power Grab

Among the many factors that led to Tunisian President Kaïs Saïed’s power grab on July 25 was the
COVID-19 pandemic. In this piece, I describe precisely how the pandemic has shaped the power
grab, making two primary points: 1) COVID-19 exacerbated the economic and political crisis that
then facilitated Kaïs Saïed’s actions, and 2) Saïed’s relatively more effective response to COVID-19
in the past couple of weeks has helped legitimate his takeover of the government.

Tunisia handled the first wave of the pandemic relatively well, considerably better than its peers.
But it has been hit hard since, particularly by the Delta variant, which caused a massive spike in
cases in July 2021, immediately preceding Saïed’s July 25 takeover.

For perspective, the map below shows how severe this July 2021 spike was, plotting the per capita
number of COVID-19 cases on July 11 by country. As can be seen, Tunisia had one of the highest per
capita numbers of COVID-19 cases anywhere in the world, second only to Cyprus on a per capita
basis.

This spike in cases overwhelmed Tunisia’s health care system. “We are in a catastrophic situation,”
warned Ministry of Health spokesperson Nissaf Ben Alaya on July 8. “The health system collapsed.
We are struggling to provide oxygen…doctors are suffering from unprecedented fatigue…the boat is
sinking.”

Even prior to this spike, the pandemic was wreaking havoc on Tunisia’s economy. Since 2020,
tourism had all but stopped, businesses had closed, and there was not a sufficient safety net in place
to help people make ends meet. Meanwhile, the government took on more debt and was nearing a
“Greek scenario” of a complete default, in the words of journalist Haythem El Mekki. Real GDP
contracted by 8.8 percent in 2020 and shrank by another 3 percent in the first quarter of 2021.
According to polls by Emrhod Consulting, the percentage of Tunisians who said that the economy is
getting worse nearly doubled from 44 percent in January 2020, prior to the pandemic, to 85 percent
in January 2021. By July 2021, the economic crisis had reached a fever pitch, with inflation topping
6.4 percent.

“I cannot live anymore,” noted one protester who turned out for angry demonstrations on July 25,
hours before Saïed’s announcement that he was invoking exceptional powers and freezing the
parliament. “I feel like crying as I am talking to you. I went out because I am fed up. We’re hungry.”

The health and economic crises in turn had major political repercussions, first and foremost by
delegitimizing the government of former Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi. Beyond that, the
pandemic also helped to delegitimize the semi-presidential system that Tunisia had set up through
the 2014 constitution. Wary of a powerful presidency that might revert to dictatorship, Tunisians
after the 2011 revolution opted for a system in which a president would share power with a prime
minister whose authority derived from the parliament. This divided system, however, was producing
an incoherent response to the pandemic, with the president and prime minister struggling over

power and failing to agree on a common strategy.

On April 9, 2021, for instance, Prime Minister Mechichi, seeing the rise in cases, attempted to move
the curfew earlier, from 10pm to 7pm. But President Saïed overruled him, arguing, “There is a
scientific side. But there is also a social and economic side . . . the nighttime curfew should be
reviewed.”

More serious was the attempted national vaccination day on July 20, which served as the spark for
Kaïs Saïed’s power grab. Announced just one day before, the mass health event turned into a major
disaster, with Tunisians waiting in huge lines in the hot sun only to be turned away due to vaccine
shortages. Clashes even broke out as people competed for the limited supply. Prime Minister
Mechichi claimed he was not even informed of the event and fired Health Minister Faouzi Mehdi.
Kaïs Saïed instead praised Mehdi, before tasking the army with leading the COVID-19 response.

The incoherent approach resulting from the semi-presidential system in turn led protesters to call
for a stronger presidency that could respond more effectively. “The conflict between the two heads
of the executive branch of the country will lead us into the abyss,” observed Khalifa al-Harbawi, a
civil servant. Fueled in part by the health and economic crises, protesters on July 25 demanded the
dissolution of the parliament and the dismissal of the prime minister. “They stole from us,” one
protester said, referring to the members of parliament. “There isn’t even enough oxygen to help the
sick people. It was they who brought on this sickness of the country.”

Saïed, of course, complied with the protesters’ demands. Leveraging the vaccine day catastrophe,
Saïed struck on July 25, sacking Mechichi, freezing the parliament, and lifting MPs’ immunity. As of
August 22, Saïed has yet to appoint a new prime minister or announce a roadmap, and has instead
been ruling by decree.

A more effective COVID-19 response?

Since Saïed’s takeover, Tunisia’s COVID-19 response has undoubtedly improved. Tunisia held two
considerably more successful vaccination days on August 8 and 15, vaccinating 551,008 people over
40 years old on the first then another 594,141 aged 18-39 on the second. As a result, since July 25,
the share of the population who has received one dose has doubled from about 15 percent to 30
percent. The number of COVID-19 cases has also dropped rapidly. Saïed in turn relaxed COVID-19
curfew restrictions and increased assistance to low-income families.

There are many possible reasons for this improved response under Saïed. Part of it may be the move
towards a streamlined, presidential system. Part of it also could be his tasking of the military to lead
the response, including the director general of military health, General Mustapha Ferjani, and the
new health minister, Colonel Major Ali Mrabet. There has also likely been some bureaucratic
learning from the previous failures.

But perhaps the most important reason has been foreign support. In what some view as an attempt
to “vie for influence” over Saïed, Tunisia has received a flood of medical supplies and vaccines from
foreign powers in recent weeks. The United States sent one million liters of oxygen on July 26, and
then one million Moderna vaccines on August 1. Italy followed suit, sending medical supplies on July
27 and then 1.5 million vaccines on August 1. China sent 400,000 Sinovac vaccines on August 2. The
UAE sent oxygen and other supplies on August 3, and Egypt did the same on August 9. Already by
August 2, Saïed said Tunisia had received six million total vaccines from “friendly countries.”[1]

Regardless of the reason, Kaïs Saïed appears to be getting the credit for the improved pandemic
situation. “We feel a huge difference compared to how the Mechichi government handled the
vaccine campaign,” noted analyst Henda Fella. Saïed has accordingly been soaring high in the polls.
A July 26-28 survey by Emrhod Consulting claimed that 87 percent of respondents supported Saïed’s
actions on July 25, while a later August 4-13 poll by Sigma Conseil found this figure had increased to
94 percent. While both figures should be taken with a grain of salt—there is likely considerable
social pressure right now to say yes to pollsters, and even fear of punishment for saying no—it is
likely that a majority of Tunisians are supportive of Saïed and in particular his more effective
response to COVID-19. In that sense, COVID-19 has both contributed to and now helped legitimate
Kaïs Saïed’s power grab.

Sharan Grewal is an assistant professor of government at the College of William & Mary, a
nonresident senior fellow at POMED, and a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution. He is on
Twitter @sh_grewal.

NOTE:

[1] This figure likely also includes vaccines donated just prior to the power grab, including one
million from Saudi Arabia, one million from France, half a million from the UAE, half a million from
China, and a quarter million from Algeria.

Photo Credit: Ministère de la santé ‫وزارة اﻟﺼﺤﺔ‬

Report – Popular Politics in Egypt: From the
2011 Revolution to al-Sisi’s Authoritarian
Revival

                                    On August 14, 2013, Egyptian security forces massacred more
than 900 demonstrators at Cairo’s Raba’a and Nahda squares. This dark day of state violence, for
which no Egyptian official has ever been held accountable, marked a key juncture in Abdel Fattah al-

Sisi’s reestablishment of authoritarian rule after the July 3, 2013 military coup.

Eight years later, scholars continue to debate the failure of Egypt’s short-lived experiment in
democracy, including central questions such as:

      What led Egyptians to pour into the streets in January 2011 against then-President Hosni
      Mubarak?
      Why did the Tahrir protests succeed but the attempt to create a post-Mubarak democracy fail?
      How did al-Sisi consolidate a new regime even more repressive than Mubarak’s?

In a new POMED report, Scott Williamson examines how a growing body of political science
scholarship has tried to answer these questions, with a focus on the understudied role of popular
politics. His literature review concludes with a consideration of what might trigger a new uprising in
Egypt and how a second transition might play out.

Read the report, “Popular Politics in Egypt: From the 2011 Revolution to al-Sisi’s Authoritarian
Revival What Do Political Scientists Say?”

Watch our Q&A with the author here:

Scott Williamson is an incoming assistant professor in the Department of Social and Political
Sciences at Bocconi University and a former postdoctoral associate at New York University Abu
Dhabi. He received his PhD in Political Science from Stanford University in 2020, with a dissertation
about how authoritarian rulers avoid blame. Find him on Twitter @scottrw630.

Photo Credit: Collage of photos from Lilian Wagdy and the AbdelFattah Elsisi Official Facebook page

Turkey Program Coordinator Merve
Tahiroğlu featured on the Greek Current
Podcast

Turkey Program Coordinator Merve Tahiroğlu appears on the July 22nd episode of the Greek
Current podcast, “Key Senators voice heavy criticism of the Turkish government to State
Department official.” She joins Thanos Davelis to discuss the recent Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearing and senators’ response to Turkey’s human rights violations and foreign relations.

     There’s an ongoing case in Turkey since last month about closing the HDP. Senator
     Murphy and Menendez both specifically raised this question. I thought that was
     important.

     …

     Given that this party represents not only millions of people, millions of voters, but also
     millions of Kurdish voters–who are Turkey’s largest ethnic minority–if this party were to
     be banned, we would seriously question the legitimacy of the upcoming elections. By
     upcoming, I mean in two years, but that’s still pretty significant for Turkey. In previous
     elections in the last five years, consistently international observers have brought up the
     fact that elections are not taking place in a fair system. That has to do with the media
     being totally skewed and dominated by Erdoğan’s friends and family. There may be
     other pressure points that the government is targeting: political opposition members,
     lawmakers and being dismissed from the parliament; pretty trumped up, thinly
     evidenced terrorism charges–this has become a major problem in Turkey.

So, already there are big questions around the Turkish elections and whether they are
      democratic or fair or even free. But if this party [HDP] were to be shut down, I think it
      would seriously undermine the legitimacy of the 2023 elections.

      …

      Given that this is sort of the state of play, the administration says that it is raising this
      issue with their Turkish counterparts on every level. But to be honest, other than one
      State Department statement back in the Spring–I believe it was March or April–we
      haven’t really seen any real, public pressure on this issue. And, we have no indication
      because the administration has been sort of tightlipped after the phone call and after the
      in-person meeting with President Biden and President Erdoğan. There hasn’t really been
      much of a statement coming out of the White House on this. So, we really have no
      indication that there has been any mention of this or pressure on this in private from the
      US side. Hopefully, we will see more of that now that several senators in this hearing
      have raised this issue.

Listen to the full episode here.

Photo Credit: Office of Senator Bob Menendez

Advocacy Director Seth Binder featured in
Middle East Eye

In a July 7 article by Umar A. Farooq for Middle East Eye, “‘Abhorrent’: Rights advocates denounce
US welcome for Saudi prince,” Advocacy Director Seth Binder discussed the Saudi Arabian Deputy
Defense Minister’s upcoming visit to Washington and its alarming implications for human rights
under the Biden administration.

      Human rights advocates and NGOs have for months called on the Biden administration
      to hold Saudi Arabia to account over its dismal human rights record.

      And while they have applauded some efforts, including ending offensive support for the
      Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen, they say the administration is continuing to fall short
      of its commitments.

      “The administration is falling far short of its stated emphasis on human rights and the
      need to hold the [murderers] of Jamal Khashoggi accountable and centre human rights
      in the relationship,” Seth Binder, advocacy director at the Project on Middle East
      Democracy, told MEE.

      “There’s any number of things that the administration can and should be doing, and they
      need to do those with this visit, with future engagements with other Saudi officials, and
      going forward. And they haven’t lived up to that.”

      …

      “To look at Khalid bin Salman’s Twitter feed, particularly his pictures with senior US
      officials, is to understand what the Saudis wanted out of this trip. It’s hard to see how
      this is even a “recalibration” of the relationship.”

Read the full piece here.

Photo Credit: The Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Facebook