360 -NATO: Mobilization on all Fronts - Sabine Lösing (Ed.) - DIE LINKE. im Europaparlament

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360 -NATO: Mobilization on all Fronts - Sabine Lösing (Ed.) - DIE LINKE. im Europaparlament
Information on Politics and Society 								                                              No. 12, April 2017
News, Reports and Analyses from the European Parliament. Edited by Sabine Lösing, MEP.
                                                                                                                      Sabine Lösing (Ed.)

                                                                                         360°-NATO:
                                                                                         Mobilization on all Fronts
360 -NATO: Mobilization on all Fronts - Sabine Lösing (Ed.) - DIE LINKE. im Europaparlament
Sabine Lösing, MEP

European Parliament
Sabine Lösing, MEP
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www.sabine-loesing.de
360°-NATO: Mobilization on all Fronts
Editors of the brochure are Sabine Lösing, MEP and
the Parliamentary Group GUE/NGL in the European
Parliament.
Editing by: Informationsstelle Militarisierung e.V.,
Hechinger Straße 203, 72072 Tübingen,
www.imi-online.de
English Translation: Richard van Ess
Publication date: April 2017 (Layout: Daniel Josten)
Circulation: 1000
Table of Contents

I. Introduction

   NATO’s 360 Degree Approach:
   Heading Towards Confrontation with Russia and the Rest of the World
   Jürgen Wagner...........................................................................................................................................................................................6

II. Missions

   Occupied, looted, divided: NATO in Kosovo
   Jürgen Wagner.........................................................................................................................................................................................15
   NATO in Afghanistan: A never ending story
   Anne Labinski..........................................................................................................................................................................................19
   Mission accomplished: Why NATO has destroyed Libya and destabilized the region
   Jürgen Wagner .........................................................................................................................................................................................24
   The Militarization of NATO’s Eastern Flank
   Restructuring of NATO policy in the light of the conflict in Ukraine and the Russian crisis
   Nathalie Schüler......................................................................................................................................................................................30
   NATO’s (hybrid) role in Syria’s devastation
   Christoph Marischka................................................................................................................................................................................37

III. Strategies

   NATO Centres of Excellence – Planning the Next War
   Christopher Schwitanski..........................................................................................................................................................................43
   NATO at sea… The Alliance as a maritime power
   Claudia Haydt..........................................................................................................................................................................................52
   Cyberwar and information space: NATO and war on the fifth battlefield
   Thomas Gruber........................................................................................................................................................................................54
   Militarization of information: NATO propaganda is now called Strategic Communications
   Christopher Schwitanski.........................................................................................................................................................................58
   Allied Ground Surveillance: NATO’s eyes and ears above Eastern Europe
   Marius Pletsch.........................................................................................................................................................................................61
   Atomic Sabre-rattling: NATO’s Nuclear Offensive
   Jürgen Wagner.........................................................................................................................................................................................62

IV. Protest

    Resistance against NATO structures in Germany - EUCOM in Stuttgart
    Thomas Mickan......................................................................................................................................................................................69
    No NATO: Mapping the Protest Sites
    Jacqueline Andres..................................................................................................................................................................................71

                                                                                                                                                                                                               5
NATO’s 360 Degree Approach:
Heading Towards Confrontation with Russia and the Rest of the World
by Jürgen Wagner                                   NATO 1.0: Strategic Focus Soviet Union            an independent European strategy during
                                                                                                     the postwar decades. This held especially
It was former NATO Secretary General               The formerly top secret US Policy Planning        true for Foreign and Security Policy.”6
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who, already in             Study 23 (PPS/23), issued on 8 February
2010, brought forward the argument that            1948, provides an insight into the purpose        With the decline of the Soviet Union, these
the Western military alliance was in the           of NATO’s establishment, which had been           frame conditions changed fundamentally at
process of transition into NATO 3.0.1 As a         instituted roughly one year later: “[w]e have     the beginning of the nineties. The adver-
matter of fact, the development of NATO            about 50% of the world’s wealth but only          sary’s system was defeated, thus heralding
from its foundation in 1949 until now can be       6.3 of its population. […] In his situation,      “the end of history” (Francis Fukuyama),
roughly classified into three stages: Initially,   we cannot fail to be the object of envy and       the ultimate victory of the Western neolib-
the conflict with the Soviet Union was piv-        resentment. Our real task in the coming pe-       eral model of global economics, as it was
otal (NATO 1.0). Following the end of East-        riod is to devise a pattern of relationships,     understood at that time. Subsequently,
West confrontation NATO focused on the             which will permit us to maintain this posi-       all efforts were aimed at enforcing this
transformation towards a worldwide alliance        tion of disparity without positive detriment      model on a global level – and NATO was
for military interventions as well as on the       to our national security. To do so we will        one of the essential means to this end.
expansion of its sphere of influence (NATO         have to dispense with all sentimentality and
2.0). For several years now, conflicts with        daydreaming; and our attention will have tob      NATO 2.0: Conversion into an
Russia and an arms build-up at the Eastern         e concentrated everywhere on our immedi-          alliance for intervention
flank have gained considerably in impor-           ate national objectives. We need not de-
tance again. This by no means implies, how-        ceive ourselves that we can afford today the      With the Cold War’s end in the early nine-
ever, that the Alliance would shift away from      luxury of altruism and world benefaction.         ties (which turned out to be just tempo-
its claim to intervene militarily anywhere         […] We should cease to talk about vague           rary, as one might argue from today’s
– including in cyberspace – wherever its           – and for the Far East – unreal objectives        perspective) NATO needed a new mission
future interests lie. In fact, having the best     such as human rights, the raising of living       if it was going to continue to ensure the
of both worlds is the credo of NATO 3.0!           standards, and democratization. The day is        Western hegemony it had just obtained
                                                   not far off when we are going to have to deal     against potential r­ ivals like the Soviet
In June 2015, the NATO Defence Ministers           in straight power concepts. The less we are       Union (subsequently Russia) and China.
put this claim for an omnipresent projec-          hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.“3     Since these rivals underwent a tempo-
tion of force and power in a nutshell and                                                            rary period of weakness, though, NATO
created a narrative for a NATO with a 360°         Subsequently, when asked about the                turned toward a program of expanding
approach, which has been used constantly           primary tasks of the alliance, Lord Ismay,        and safeguarding the neoliberal economic
ever since: “Russia is challenging Euro-           NATO’s first Secretary General of NATO,           system, by military force if necessary.
Atlantic security through military action,         replied in a slightly more careful way: “to
coercion and intimidation of its neighbours.       keep the Russians out, the Americans in,          The new mission included the “protection“
We continue to be concerned about Russia’s         and the Germans down.”4 Thus, the grid            of Western economic interests like access
aggressive actions […]. We are also con-           of the Cold War and its constellation of          to essential mineral resources and trade
cerned about the growing instability to our        interests had been specified quite accu-          routes, but also more fundamental consid-
South […]. To address all these challenges         rately: The mission of the Alliance was the       erations: One consequence of this mission
and threats to the East and to the South,          triumph of the US-led Western-capitalist          has been the impoverishment of large parts
NATO continues to provide a 360-degree             bloc against the Soviet Union, while at the       of the global population, as a direct result
approach to deter threats and, if necessary,       same time ensuring that Germany would             of the neoliberal global economic system.
defend Allies against any adversary.”2             never again strive for power by conquest.         These economic strains are considered to
                                                                                                     be an essential factor in the violent escala-
Naturally, the fact that NATO has brought          It was primarily due to the power of the          tion of conflicts and the breakout of civil
forth these “challenges“ by its militarism         Soviet Union that this general framework re-      wars. Since NATO member states show
and heavy-handed use of political power            mained more or less stable for the duration       no inclination to change their neoliberal
is not being mentioned. Instead of tak-            of the Cold War. Furthermore, this conflict       economic policies, it is inevitable that NATO
ing a critical look into their own court, the      resulted in keeping any expansionist ambi-        will repeatedly need to use military power to
Alliance causes more and more chaos,               tions pursued by NATO tightly in check and        keep the lid on the boiler that they are over-
conflicts and destruction. This, in turn, is       limited its field of action by and large to the   heating themselves.7 As Birgit Mahnkopf
closely connected to the fact that one thing       Western sphere of influence.5 Because EU          critically points out, this was NATO’s aim at
has remained constant in all those years           member states lacked the military capabili-       an early stage: “Given the extension of the
of its existence: NATO is, and will always         ties to counter this supposed existential         definition of security, which NATO […] has
be, the armed branch of the Western-               threat from the Soviet Union – at least it        conducted at the beginning of the nine-
capitalist bloc, serving the interests of          was perceived as such – the United States         ties, the North-South conflict, which has
its biggest member states by threat or             became the undisputed leading power               certainly a lot to with the absence of global
use of force – at all costs, if necessary!         within the Western alliance: “Given the con-      justice and a growing global imbalance of
                                                   ditions of US hegemony and the competition        opportunities in life, was re-interpreted as
                                                   of systems, there was nothing of the sort of      a ‘global security problem’. […] The pow-

6
At the 1999 NATO Summit a new intervention strategy was established. (Source: US Department of Defense/R. D. Ward)

ers of the capitalist regime try to get rid       United Nations operations. With little          turning the province into a de facto Western
of the disorder, which is caused especially       notice, they had completed the transforma-      protectorate while reorganizing Kosovo’s
by the economy and which is external-             tion from an alliance of defense into one       economic system in a strictly neoliberal
ized by the market within the structure           for intervention, which amounted to an          manner (see the article by Jürgen Wagner).
of reproduction of the global system, by          “informal change of the treaty”.10 Starting
means of political and military force.”8          in 1992, this new strategy of intervention      On 24 April 1999, just one month after the
                                                  was implemented when NATO controlled            first air strikes on Yugoslavia, NATO adopted
Consequently, NATO quickly transformed            the arms embargo against Yugoslavia. A          a new strategy that interpreted similar
from being - at least nominally - oriented        number of additional operations like the air    interventions as its core task. Addressing
along the fault lines of national t­ erritorial   combat campaigns in Bosnia-Herzegovina          the topic of violation of international law,
defense into being an interventionist al-         in 1994 followed. In December 1995 NATO         the document included the following telling
liance, willing to act on a global scale. At      took over the command of the Implemen-          statement: “NATO will seek, in cooperation
the summit meeting in Rome in November            tation Force (IFOR, subsequently SFOR),         with other organisations, to prevent conflict,
1991 NATO adopted a new strategic con-            which occupied the country and tempo-           or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to
cept: the “predictable” danger attributed         rarily deploying up to 60.000 troops.           its effective management, consistent with
to the Eastern bloc had been replaced by                                                          international law, including through the
“multi-directional” threats. At that time this    This transformation climaxed in March           possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis
included nuclear proliferation, the spreading     1999: Without a UN Security Council man-        response operations. […] In this context
of weapons of mass destruction, ­terrorism        date, and thus in clear violation of interna-   NATO recalls its subsequent decisions
and other asymmetrical threats, and the           tional law, NATO began an offensive air war     with respect to crisis response operations
disruption of access to vital economic            against the independent state of Yugoslavia.    in the Balkans.”11 The reference “consist-
resources.9 In June 1992 NATO decided             The Alliance had emphasized its readiness       ent with international law”, while the line
to be willing to conduct missions for the         to intervene “out-of-area” by acting indepen-   of action in the Balkans was addressed as
Centre for Strategic Cooperation in Europe        dently of the United Nations Security Coun-     being a model for future operations, was
(CSCE; today: OSCE) even if they would            cil and therefore avoiding the veto powers      quite disturbing. The entire statement, in
take place outside the Alliance’s borders         of Russia and China. After the armistice        fact, runs contrary to the NATO treaty itself,
(“out-of-area”). By the end of the year this      of 10 June 1999, NATO occupied Kosovo           as there is no provision in the treaty for
resolution was enhanced to also include           with more than 50.000 KFOR troops, thus         military interventions outside the territory

                                                                                                                                              7
of the Alliance. The member states make          Adenauer-Stiftung, writing on behalf of the      “In light of the complex and unpredictable
a mockery of their own treaty, which had         NATO Defense College, summed up this             security climate likely to prevail through the
remained unmodified since 1949, by invent-       development: “in its broadest sense, NATO        coming decade, it is not possible to rule
ing so-called non-Article 5 operations.          today is the protector of globalization.         out NATO’s future participation in similar
Article 5 of the NATO treaty does not            By […] projecting security and stability in      (although hopefully less extended) stabilisa-
include an obligation for military assistance    critical regions of the world NATO simulta-      tion missions.”17 The reformulation of the
by the member states: The NATO states            neously drives and protects the process of       NATO strategy, which was released shortly
are held to exhibit solidarity in case of an     modernization and liberalization.”13 Keller’s    afterwards, sounded quite similar demand-
attack against another NATO member state.        statement clearly reveals the mission of         ing once again to “improve” the capabilities
Individual states are allowed to determine       NATO 2.0 – to emphasize the Western              of the Alliance to accomplish operations like
their own course of action in following this     rules of the world (economic) order and to       these “successfully”: “we will […] further
provision. Nevertheless, a case for extra-ter-   enforce these rules with military force.         develop doctrine and military capabilities for
ritorial operations for the Alliance was made                                                     expeditionary operations, including counter-
following the attacks on the US on 11 Sep-       NATO 3.0a: Out-of-Area without end               insurgency, stabilization and reconstruction
tember 2001. The invasion of Afghanistan                                                          operations.”18 In the NATO Centers of Excel-
by NATO began less than a month later. The       During the first decade of the 21st century,     lence they work hard to generate the know-
justification for NATO’s operation against Af-   the wars in Iraq (where not NATO itself but      how deemed necessary for this purpose
ghanistan was that the nation was providing      several of its member states, such as the        (see the article by Christopher Schwitanski).
shelter to Al Qaida and their leader, Osama      US and Great Britain were fighting) and in
bin Laden, who were blamed for the attacks.      Afghanistan developed increasingly out of        At the same time, due to the risks ­outlined
Offers by the Taliban, Afghanistan’s de facto    the West’s control. In the Hindu Kush NATO       above, skepticism over interventions
ruling party, to extradite bin Laden, were       “failed soundly”14 in its largest military       utilizing a large number of Western troops
ignored.12 In August 2003 NATO took over         operation ever, particularly in light of its     considerably increased over time. Because
the governance of Afghanistan with its Inter-    stated objectives for military action –          they didn’t want to back away from their
national Security Assistance Force (ISAF).       namely to bring security, democracy, human       aspirations for military intervention, a
With the deployment of - at times - more         rights and economic growth to the country.       feverish search for alternative military op-
than 130.000 troops, Afghanistan became          Fifteen years of war and occupation have         tions that didn’t involve massive numbers
the central setting for NATO to prove that it    devastated Afghanistan and produced              of ground forces began in the Western
was capable of permanently seizing control       countless civilian victims. Pulling out of       capitals. Thus, ever since 2011 they in-
of a conflict area. The Afghanistan mission      Afghanistan was never seriously consid-          creasingly rely on the training and arma-
was and still is of enormous importance to       ered despite the lip service paid to this        ment of local forces, while operating with
Germany, as well, as it is its most extensive    option by political leaders. ISAF’s succes-      smaller numbers of special forces units.
combat operation since World War Two and         sor, operation “Resolute Support,” is being      The Western aerial bombing campaigns
it thus became an expression of Germany’s        extended again and again – sometimes             continued apace as they are considered to
growing ambitions in terms of military           there is even frank and open talk of NATO        be relatively free of risk.19 The increased
policy (see the article by Anne Labinski).       fighting for decades in the Hindu Kush.15        use of armed drones has similarly become
                                                                                                  an important weapon in this “low-risk”
The last big operation clearly being initiated   The reason for such stubborn adherence           doctrine (see the article by Marius Pletsch).
within the stage of NATO 2.0 is “Operation       to the war in Afghanistan is quite simple: If
Allied Provider” at the Horn of Africa, which    NATO officially confessed its failure at its     Probably the most vital prototype for this
was launched in 2008 and continues to the        most important operation, future interven-       new form of intervention was the war
present under the name “Operation Ocean          tions would only become more difficult           against Libya, started by an ad hoc coali-
Shield”. As a consequence of a Us-led            to legitimize and carry out. The Alliance’s      tion on 19 March 2011. On 31 March 2011,
military intervention in Somalia in 2006, the    concern is to prove that NATO is not only        the entire conduct of war was given to the
country descended into total chaos. From         willing but also able to “successfully”          “Operation Unified Protector” (OUP) and
the West’s point of view, however, the most      intervene out-of-area. As German chan-           thereby to NATO. This operation displayed
significant consequence was that the pirate      cellor Angela Merkel blatantly expressed         several unique features: First, It was not led
groups operating within that chaos became        already years ago: “I believe it is safe to      by the US, but by France and Great Britain.
the sole focus of attention. These pirate        say […] that the stabilization of Afghanistan    Second, with its non-involvement, Berlin
groups grew larger and became more em-           is currently one of the greatest challenges      stood not only against Washington and
boldened so they began capturing commer-         for NATO and its member states. At the           London, but also against Paris for the first
cial ships and h­ olding them for ransom. This   same time, it is, in some sense, a litmus        time. This initiated a downright propaganda
development threatened the free movement         test for successful crisis management and        offensive in Germany claiming that a faux
of Western trade and, thus, it was argued,       for a NATO capable of taking action.”16          pas like this should never happen again. The
fell under the purview of NATO. Since these                                                       war also relied solely on air strikes except
pirates were threatening one of the world’s      Although the political, personal and financial   for the deployment of special forces. Finally,
most important maritime trade routes, NATO       costs of the operations were rising dramati-     in contrast to the NATO missions in Kosovo
and the European Union (Operation ATAL-          cally, a high-ranking commission of experts      and in Afghanistan, it didn’t turn into a mili-
ANTA) have been dispatching warships into        for the development of a new NATO strategy       tary occupation on the ground after its com-
that region since 2008 to literally attack the   avowed in May 2010 that operations similar       pletion on 30 October 2011, after Libya’s
problem (see the article by Claudia Haydt).      to those in Afghanistan would belong to the      ruler, Muammar al-Gaddafi, was murdered.
Patrick Keller, member of the Konrad-            core business of the Alliance in the future:     In Libya, NATO had substantiated its readi-

8
ness for further military interventions. Ac-      Gorbachev clearly viewed NATO’s eastern         For a long time Moscow has been anxiously
cording to former NATO Secretary General          expansion as a violation of these pledges:      observing NATO’s plans for missile defense.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen one of the most             “The decision for the US and its allies to      These plans were reasonably interpreted by
important lessons of this intervention was        expand Nato into the east was decisively        Moscow as a specific attempt to neutral-
that “those who claimed that Afghanistan          made in 1993. I called this a big mistake       ize Russia’s second-strike capability.26 In
was to be NATO’s last out-of-area mission”        from the very beginning. It was definitely      2003, the so-called “color revolutions”
had been disabused.20 Although the opera-         a violation of the spirit of the statements     started. Pro-Russian rulers were replaced
tion resulted in civil war, chaos and destruc-    and assurances made to us in 1990.”24           by pro-Western rulers in nations directly at
tion within Libya itself, and even destabilized   The demand to expand NATO in the direc-         Moscow’s doorstep. This included espe-
the entire region, especially Mali21, some        tion of the former Eastern bloc was fed         cially those coup d’états that were in part
regard it as a role model for future – for the    into the debate as early as 1993 by former      substantially supported by the West in
West – “inexpensive” military interventions       German Secretary of Defence Volker Rühe.        Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kirgizia
by NATO (see the article by Jürgen Wagner).       One year later, the “Partnership for Peace”     (2005). Taken together, these measures

In response to the political violence and civil
war in Syria, influential politicians on both
sides of the Atlantic Ocean have long-since
pushed for direct military intervention. At
the NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016
the heads of state and government finally
gave the go-ahead for NATO’s AWACS-
airplanes equipped with radar and commu-
nication technology to control the airspace
above Syria (and Iraq) and, thus, to join the
fight against the so-called “Islamic State
group” (see the article by Christoph Mari-
schka). With the new US president Donald
Trump, who took office on 20 January 2017,
NATO’s efforts to be militarily active in the
region will likely grow even further: “In terms
of his priorities, Trump has stressed repeat-
edly that fighting jihadist groups, especially
Daesh, is his security policy priority.”22

NATO 3.0b: NATO at a new
Cold War against Russia

Yet at another front massive trouble started
to loom again in the course of the 2000s:
In the middle of the decade, the longstand-       Vladimir Putins speech at the Munich Security Conference 2007. (Source: Antje Wildgrube)
ing anti-Russian NATO-policy resulted in a
complete change of sentiments towards             programme was issued. It was especially         formed a critical mass that resulted in a
the West, which had been friendly minded          aimed at the gradual introduction of the        fundamental Russian policy shift. ­Russia
in the beginning. NATOs pretense of trust         former Warsaw Pact countries into the Al-       perceived these measures as hostile
based on partnership toward Russia after          liance. Consequently, Poland, Hungary and       and determined to use its own means to
the end of the Cold War was revealed to be        the Czech Republic were formally invited to     oppose NATO’s policy of expansion.
nothing more than a strategy to impede the        join NATO in 1997, and were admitted on 12
reemergence of state power from Russia            March 1999. This occurred at the same time      Western observers first became aware of
at any cost. NATO’s expansion into former         NATO started its war of aggression against      this shift in Russia’s attitude when Vladimir
Soviet territory was predestined to serve         Yugoslavia, which represented, as has al-       Putin aggressively spoke out against these
as the main tool to produce this result.          ready been mentioned, a drastic violation of    expansions at the 2007 Munich Security
                                                  international law since the war was conduct-    Conference. The resulting conflict reached
The violation of promises given to former         ed without a mandate by the UN Security         its first climax in the summer of 2008,
Soviet Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev        Council and, thus, bypassing the Russian        when Russia answered the Georgian war
in return for ending the Cold War and for the     right of veto. Subsequently, NATO pushed        of aggression against South Ossetia with
NATO membership of a reunified Germany,           further: In November 2002 it was decided        a severe military counterattack. Moscow
has been the object of heated debates until       to incorporate seven more states into the       unambiguously signalized its readiness
today. This controversy, which has often          Alliance, even including states that formerly   to shoot the bolt against further Western
been maintained by means of very quirky           comprised the Soviet Union. Estonia, Latvia     expansions by the use of force if neces-
arguments23, is driven by the fact that these     and Lithuania became members of the             sary. Western reactions to Russia’s use of
verbal promises were given and that               Alliance, even though Moscow had always         military force in Georgia were particularly
­Gorbachev obviously assumed their validity.      called this a “red line” not to be crossed.25   strident. As a result, already at that time

                                                                                                                                              9
there was talk of a “New Cold War” brew-           of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in               further escalation, Russia moved ahead
ing up between Russia and the West.27              Brussels, stated in 2009: “We will experi-             with a two-pronged approach. As an option
                                                   ence fierce competition and severe conflicts           for cooperative de-escalation, the Russian
Generally, it was argued that a confrontation      of interest among the rising great powers              president at the time, Dmitry Medvedev,
of blocs between “democracies” (U.S. and           in an increasing number of spheres. This               announced in June 2008 that he was
EU) and “autocracies” (China and Russia)           requires a determined global presence of               seeking to create a “Euro-Atlantic Security
was in the making and that the West had to         the West, and that means not only of the               Agreement”. Although first elements of its
brace itself against it. In the US, it was the     US. […] They will be less and less able,               content were leaked shortly afterwards,
influential political scientist Robert Kagan       though, to bear the burden on their own.               the draft treaty was published in detail
who summed up this argument in his book            […] Europe won’t be able to subsist as                 only at the end of November 2009. The
“The Return Of History And The End Of              one big peace movement in a world full                 intended contracting parties were sup-
Dreams”, published in 2008: “The old com-          of rough geopolitical rivalries, but has to            posed to come from all countries “from
petition between liberalism and autocracy          develop its own ambitious diplomacy and                Vancouver to Vladivostok” (i.e. including
has also reemerged, with the world’s great         self-confident appearance. This problem                the US and Canada) as well as the respec-
powers lining up according to the nature of        cannot be solved by creating more p   ­ ositions       tive international structures (NATO, OSCE,
their regimes. […] History has returned, and       and structures in Brussels, but instead                CIS …). The core of the treaty is “indivis-
the democracies must come together to              the elites in the large member states need             ible security”, meaning that no contracting
shape it, or others will shape it for them.”28     to develop more readiness to jointly face              party may undertake any actions that have
                                                   up to tough issues of power politics.”29               a negative effect on any other’s security.30
On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean                                                                   Thus, the treaty would have given Russia
numerous representatives of the political          To be able to present solutions to the crisis          a full voice in European security ­matters,
establishment internalized this position as        which culminated in 2008 and simultane-                including military interventions. Not sur-
well. Thus, Nikolaus Busse, correspondent          ously getting prepared for any possible                prisingly, there was no positive response

                                                                   Secretary General

                                                  supports                chairman                   supports

                chairman           Private Office                                                                                   chairman
                                                                                                         International Staff (IS)
                             of the Secretary General

                                                                      North Atlantic
                                                                      Council (NAC)
                                                                                                                         Committees:
          Nuclear Planning Group
                  (NPG)                                                                                                   Euro-Atlantic Partnership
                                            advises on
                                          military matters                                                                     Council (EAPC)

                                                                         decides on                                         NATO-Russia Council
                                                                         proceeding                                               (NRC)

                                         Military Committee
                                                 (MC)                                                                                ...

          Supreme Allied                       advises                          Supreme Allied
                                                                                 Commander
        Commander Europe                                                        Transformation
            (SACEUR)                     International Military
                                              Staff (IMS)                           (SACT)
               leads                                                                 leads
                             instructs                            instructs
          Allied Command                                                        Allied Command
          Operation (ACO)                                                     Transformation (ACT)

10
from NATO.31 Consequently, Moscow                tions between Russia and NATO had hit rock         would be a start” (p. 10). Two brigades,
expedited the formation of a counter-bloc,       bottom: “The proposed European security            up to 10.000 troops, were not enough for
with Vladimir Putin announcing in July           treaty has been put on hold. […] We believe        former NATO Secretary General Wesley
2009 that Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan        that NATO’s policy towards Russia remains          Clark, who, alongside other high-ranking
were creating a customs union. On 29 May         unfriendly and generally obdurate. Speaking        NATO military officers shortly thereafter de-
2014, Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus             bluntly, we are rapidly rolling into a period of   manded the deployment of three brigades.38
signed an agreement by which the new             a new cold war. Russia has been presented          NATO’s final deployment didn’t reach these
“Eurasian Economic Union” turned into            as well-nigh the biggest threat to NATO, or        numbers, but it is sad enough that the NATO
being on 1 January 2015 with Kyrgyzstan          to Europe, America and other countries             heads of state and government ultimately
and Tajikistan joining shortly thereafter,       (and Mr Stoltenberg has just demonstrated          agreed on the permanent deployment of
while Armenia, Uzbekistan and M  ­ ongolia       that). They show frightening films about           four battalions (roughly 4.000 troops) at the
were named as further candidates.                Russians starting a nuclear war. I am some-        NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016. One
                                                 times confused: is this 2016 or 1962?”36           battalion of this enhanced forward pres-
The relations between Russia and the West                                                           ence is to be domiciled in Estonia (under
ultimately escalated over the Ukrainian          NATO 3.0c: A catalogue of                          command of Great Britain), another in Latvia
crisis, which commenced when former              armaments for the 360°-NATO                        (Canada), and a third in Poland (USA).
Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych in
November 2013 refused to firmly integrate        Another important step forward on the way          The build-up of the fourth battalion is under
the country into the Western sphere of           towards a further militarization of NATO’s           the control of Germany, which furnishes
influence by signing an association agree-       policies was the publication of a study            further evidence for how serious the
ment with the EU. This decision gave rise to     in March 2016 funded by the „German                Federal Government is with its statements
protests, which were massively supported         Marshall Fund“ and produced by numerous            of willingness to shoulder more military
by the West, culminating in a violent revolt     top-class NATO strategists. It provided a          “responsibility”. Right before the Warsaw
which resulted in Yanukovych fleeing from        view into the crystal ball, on how NATO 3.0        NATO summit Chancellor Angela Merkel
the country in February 2014.32 Russia           is planning to proceed in the future. Among        issued a government statement which
reacted to these developments in this            the participants were illustrious figures          included a passionate commitment to the
geostrategically important country with the      such as Karl-Heinz Kamp, president of the          whole range of NATO’s aggressive policies
integration of Crimea which was a violation      German Federal Academy for Security Policy         – and to Germany’s intent to play a lead-
of international law and with the support        BAKS (“Bundesakademie für Sicherheits-             ing role. The chancellor also embraced the
of separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine.         politik“), Pierre Vimont, Secretary General        ­“360°-approach”: “In the East, Russia’s
NATO responded by offensively arming its         of the European External Action Service,            actions in the Ukraine crisis have profoundly
Eastern flank. The most significant frame-       and Kurt Volker, former US ambassador               unsettled our eastern allies. […] However,
work for this purpose was the “Readiness         to NATO.37 In March 2016, they presented            we have also witnessed a dramatic deterio-
Action Plan” adopted at the NATO summit          a catalogue of measures, very obviously             ration in the security situation to the south
in Wales in September 2014. It allows for        inspired by the idea of the 360°-NATO: “[A]         of the NATO area. […] [The Readiness Action
the formation of a Very High Readiness           lliance leaders are only now beginning to           Plan] will make the Alliance faster, readier
Joint Task Force (VJTF) totaling about 5.000     focus in earnest on the question of strategy        and more operational as regards meeting
troops, with Germany playing a pivotal role      toward the south. Mediterranean security –          challenges of all kinds and in all directions,
by its own account.33 NATO also massively        long part of the NATO calculus but rarely at        thus providing a 360-degree approach.”39
extended its activity in military exercises      the forefront – has become a pressing con-
with a virtually permanent deployment of         cern in light of risks emanating from North        One of the core assumptions of the
forces on the Eastern flank, a move that         Africa and the Levant. […] NATO needs to           360-degree approach is that NATO predicts
actually represents a violation of the NATO-     look south without weakening its commit-           severe imminent conflicts with Russia. As
Russia-record: “US ready to fight and defeat     ment to deterrence and defense in the east         the authors of the Marshall Fund report
Russia in Europe”, emphasized General            and north, where Russian risks remain at           point out, these conflicts are not geo-
Breedlove, then Supreme Commander of             the center of the strategic calculus.” (p. 5)      graphically restricted to the eastern flank,
the strategic NATO command in Europe                                                                conflicts were also increasing in the far
(see the article by Nathalie Schüler).34         As far as the eastern flank was concerned,         north (keyword Arctic) and in cyberspace,
NATO Secretary General Jens S   ­ toltenberg,    their vision welcomed the existing measures        where NATO is becoming more active, too.
who took over from Denmark’s Fogh                of arms build-up, such as the formation of         Furthermore, Russian propaganda had
Rasmussen in October 2015, expressed             a “Very High Readiness Joint Task Force”           to be answered by intensified “strategic
himself satisfied with the achievements at       or the massive extension of maneuvers, but         communication” – i.e. propaganda. The
the Munich Security Conference early in          that was nowhere near enough: “[T]he alli-         report also puts special emphasis on the
2016: “NATO is undertaking the biggest           ance cannot rely solely on extended deter-         revitalization of the role of nuclear weap-
strengthening of our collective defence          rence and small mobile forces, like the […]        ons, which was imperative considering
in decades. To send a powerful signal to         VJTF […]. NATO must now shift its strategy         the deteriorated relations with Russia (see
deter any aggression or intimidation. Not        toward an increased forward presence that          the articles by Thomas Gruber, Christo-
to wage war, but to prevent war. […] We          would be in place before a conflict starts,        pher Schwitanski and Jürgen Wagner).
agreed to enhance our forward presence           and thus serve as a deterring and stabiliz-
in the eastern part of the alliance.”35 At the   ing force. […] These forces would have to          The report continues stating that the south-
same place Russian Prime Minister Dmitry         be combat-ready […]. The size of a brigade         ern flank should not to be neglected either:
Medvedev pointed out afterwards that rela-       force, one in the Baltics and one in Poland        “Russia is likely to consolidate its return as

                                                                                                                                                11
a Mediterranean security actor, in Syria and    not expect a dramatic change of course           will be an increasing demand of Europe
in less visible but still meaningful ways in    in Washington Russia policy: „No matter          from our neighbours and from our partners
Egypt and Algeria. One consequence of this      who is in the White House, Washington’s          worldwide,” the EU’s High Representative
will be the spread of NATO-Russia military      imperative to contain regional hegemons          Federica Mogherini said shortly after Trump
risks southward to the Black Sea and the        will continue to be a mainstay of its foreign    won the election. “There is and there will be
Eastern Mediterranean.” (p. 16) Given this,     policy. With Europe becoming increasingly        an increasing demand for a principled global
and the rising conflicts in that region in      divided since the Brexit referendum, Russia      security provider, for a superpower that be-
general, NATO had to “[d]evelop a more          has another chance to recover from its           lieves in multilateralism and cooperation.”41
robust role in the South.” (p. 2) This went     strategic setbacks and regain influence in
along with the idea that “VJTF and enhanced     the Eurasian region in the coming year. […]      Regardless of which way we look at it,
standing naval forces […] can be employed       Ties between Washington and Moscow will          although budgets are already soaring for
                                                                                                 some time, military spending is likely
                                                                                                 to increase even further. As the NATO’s
                                                                                                 military budgets rose from $892 billion in
                                                                                                 2015 to $918 in 201642 the declaration of
                                                                                                 the Warsaw summit in June 2016 cheered:
                                                                                                 “we have turned a corner”.43 Against this
                                                                                                 background it is particularly shocking how
                                                                                                 this money could have been made use of in
                                                                                                 a more reasonable way. The “Committee on
                                                                                                 Disarmament, Peace & Security” (CDPS),
                                                                                                 a nongovernment organization engaged in
                                                                                                 peace policies, compared the spending on
                                                                                                 armament with the estimated costs that
                                                                                                 would have been necessary to reach the
                                                                                                 Millennium Development Goals that aimed
                                                                                                 among others to fight extreme poverty
                                                                                                 (MDG) until 2015. While the security goals
                                                                                                 were light-years away from being accom-
                                                                                                 plished, according to CDPS extreme poverty
                                                                                                 and hunger could have been eradicated with
                                                                                                 a yearly investment of $39 up to $54 billion.
                                                                                                 The achievement of universal primary edu-
                                                                                                 cation and the promotion of gender equality
                                                                                                 would have required another $10-30 billion.
Source: Flickr/Juska Wendland                                                                    To reduce child mortality by two-thirds and
                                                                                                 to improve maternal health, in addition to
in the south, as required.” (p. 12) Programs    certainly evolve under Trump. Some tactical      combat HIV/Aids, Malaria and other dis-
for “defense capacity building”, especially     shifts, possibly including adjustments in        eases, $20-25 would have been necessary.
in reference to the Arab states, were to        U.S. sanctions and measured cooperation          Finally, ensuring environmental sustain-
be extended: “Cooperative frameworks in         in Syria, will doubtless take place. Wash-       ability would have required $5-21 billion.
the south can also be useful for mobilizing     ington’s policy of containment, however, is      In other words, $74-140 billion would have
regional contributions to potential NATO        still very much in force, and it will continue   been necessary to implement ALL of the
operations in the Middle East and North         to feature heavily in U.S. strategy well         Millennium Development Goals – not even
Africa” (p. 17). In light of such considera-    beyond the Trump administration.”40              10-20 percent of what NATO member states
tions the heads of state and government in                                                       put into militarized security in 2015!44
the Western military alliance resolved at the   Where Trump has sent very consistent mes-
Warsaw summit in July 2016 to start a new       sages is in the area if military spending. Not   The consequences of all these measures are
NATO training mission in Libya, depending       only has he announced to hugely increase         perfectly obvious, an increasing number of
on the approval of Libya’s new unity govern-    America’s military budget. He is also exert-     conflicts from which the West reckons it has
ment. Moreover, they approved a request         ing much pressure on the European allies to      to “protect” itself or even put up a “barrier”
by the Iraqi government in May 2016 to          pay their “fair share” – i.e. to also increase   against. These are the words chosen by the
start a NATO training mission in Iraq.          their military spending dramatically. As         in-house think tank of the European Union,
                                                Trump threatened that failing to do so could     the “Institute for Security Studies” in Paris,
Money for Nothing                               put America’s commitment to NATO into            which published the report “What ambitions
                                                question, the EU side has signalled its          for European defence in 2020?” Thus, we
Although the new US President Donald            willingness to fulfill this demand – and         see a programmatic article about the most
Trump repeatedly signaled a willingness         at the same time, they are trying to take        vital tasks of Western foreign and military
to improve the relationship with Russia, it     advantage of the opportunity to “improve”        policy in the future anticipating the use of
is far from clear whether this will happen.     Europe’s role as a global power: “In the         frightening measures to fight migration:
For example the analysts from the private       months and years ahead, actually I can           “Barrier operations – shielding the global
intelligence agency Strategic Forecast do       say in the hours we are living, there is and     rich from the tensions and problems of

12
the poor. As the ratio of the world popula-       to give an answer. The Alliance is enforc-
tion living in misery and frustration will        ing the essential interests of its member        1.    The New Strategic Concept: Active
remain massive, the tensions and spillover        states and this, essentially, was NATO’s               Engagement, Modern Defence, Speech
between their world and that of the rich          purpose, from its very beginning – to make             by NATO Secretary General Anders
will continue to grow. As we are unlikely         sure that the structures of hierarchic order           Fogh Rasmussen at the German
to have solved this problem at its root by        and exploitation of the prevailing world               Marshall Fund of the United States
2020 – i.e. by curing dysfunctional societies     order are maintained in the long run: “The             (GMF), Brussels, 08.10.2010.
– we will need to strengthen our barriers.        true relevance of the Alliance is based on       2.    Statement by NATO Defence
It is a morally distasteful, losing strategy,     its ability to unite liberal democracies in a          Ministers, Brussels, 25.06.2015.
but will be unavoidable if we cannot solve        volatile world and to assure the stability and   3.    Excerpt from the Policy Planning
the problems at their root. […] Today our         well-being of the North Atlantic area” (p. 7).         Study, chapter VII. Far East, p. 524,
security is increasingly dependent upon                                                                  cited in Wikipedia: Grand Area.
global transnational functional flows. Pro-       In seeking to implement this objective,          4.    Speech by German Secretary of
tecting these flows and their critical nodes      NATO leaves behind a trail of chaos,                   State Steinmeier at the celebration
will be the main security concern of the          conflicts and destruction – whether in                 of 60 years of Germany’s NATO
globalisation stakeholders (TNC, PMC and          Afghanistan, in Libya or in reference to               membership, Berlin, 30.06.2015.
RTS) by 2020, for the very practical reason       Russia. NATO is one of the biggest factors       5.    For an on overview over NATO’s
that if these flows fail then everything else     of insecurity in the world and has to be               offensive actions at that time Guilliard,
will collapse. Challenges include friction        dissolved – immediately! Therefore, it is a            Joachim: Die NATO 1949-91: Kurze
(piracy, crime, corruption), shocks (regional     sight for sore eyes that the protests against          Bilanz einer kriegerischen Geschichte,
instability, terrorist strikes against critical   NATO have gained pace again in recent                  in: DFG-VK/IMI (Hg.): Kein Frieden mit
flows or nodes, operations by alienated           years. Hopefully, this is a foundation to              der Nato, Tübingen 2009, p. 16-17.
regimes, earthquakes), strangling (pandem-        build upon in the future (see the articles by    6.    Bieling, Hans-Jürgen: Die Globalisierungs-
ics), corrosion (poor design or maintenance)      Jacqueline Andres and Thomas Mickan)!                  und Weltordnungspolitik der
and so forth. Protecting flows will require                                                              Europäischen Union, Wiesbaden
global military policing capabilities (protect-                                                          2010, p. 53. Own translation.
ing sea lanes and critical nodes, etc.) and                                                        7.    Cf. Wagner, Jürgen: Globalisierung, Armut
some power projection (preventing choke                                                                  und Krieg. Die Krise des Neoliberalismus
operations, managing regional instability).”45                                                           und die militärischen Reaktionen des
                                                                                                         Westens, IMI-Studie 2010/10.
A current example of these operations is                                                           8.    Mahnkopf, Birgit: Neoliberale
the NATO operation in the Aegean adopted                                                                 Globalisierung und Krieg, in: Blätter
in late February 2016. As the report by the                                                              für deutsche und internationale Politik,
Marshall Fund emphasizes, this mission,                                                                  1/2004, p. 47-57. Own translation.
as well as the NATO Operation “Active                                                              9.    The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Rome,
Endeavour”, is supposed to help prevent                                                                  November 7./8., 1991, item 8 and 12.
illegalized migration. “[A] stronger capacity                                                      10.   Varwick, Johannes/Woyke,
for warning, surveillance, and response”                                                                 Wichard: Die Zukunft der NATO
is deemed to be necessary to that end                                                                    – Transatlantische Sicherheit im
among other things as well (p. 12). The                                                                  Wandel, Opladen 2000, p. 149.
close interlocking of NATO and EU op-                                                              11.   The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,
erations to fight migrants, adopted at the                                                               24.04.1999, Item 31.
Warsaw summit meeting in July 2016, is                                                             12.   Kompromisslinie. Taliban erwägen
also related to this context: “To support                                                                Auslieferung Bin Ladens an Drittstaat,
the EU Operation Sophia at the Libyan                                                                    Spiegel Online, 14.10.2001.
coast, the spectrum of tasks possible for                                                          13.   Keller, Patrick: Barack Obama’s
the current mission in the Mediterranean                                                                 foreign policy. What can NATO expect
was distinctly extended. NATO warships                                                                   from the next U.S. President?, NATO
are supposed to get involved in the fight                                                                Defense College, Research Paper
against human trafficking. Hence, the                                                                    No. 43, November 2008, p. 4.
operation in the Mediterranean is called                                                           14.   Glaßer, Michael Schulze von/
‘Sea Guardian’. It follows the Operation                                                                 Wagner, Jürgen: Krachend gescheitert.
‘Active Endeavour’, which was launched                                                                   Demokratisierungsrhetorik und
after the terrorist attacks of 11 September                                                              Besatzungsrealität in Afghanistan,
2001. The mandate for ‘Active Endeavour’                                                                 IMI-Studie 2014/04.
so far only permitted the surveillance of                                                          15.   The U.S. was supposed to leave
civil seafaring in the Mediterranean.”46                                                                 Afghanistan by 2017. Now it might take
                                                                                                         decades, Washington Post, 26.01.2016.
If we ask ourselves why NATO is pursuing                                                           16.   Handlungsfähigkeit der Nato stärken,
these militaristic policies with such a com-                                                             Spiegel Online, 25.10.2006.
mitment, we can look at the Marshall Fund                                                          17.   NATO 2020: Assured Security;
report mentioned above, which is not shy                                                                 Dynamic Engagement. Analysis

                                                                                                                                                 13
and Recommendations                           38. NATO in a World of Disorder: Making
18. of the Group of Experts on a New                  the Alliance Ready for Warsaw:
    Strategic Concept, 17.05.2010, p. 32.             Making the Alliance Ready for Warsaw,
19. Active Engagement, Modern Defence,                Advisory Panel on the NATO Summit
    Strategic Concept For the Defence                 2016, German Marshall Fund, March
    and Security of The Members of the                2016. The following page numbers in
    North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,               in brackets refer to this document.
    Lisbon, 19/20.11.2010, Item 25.               39. Clark, Wesley u.a.: Closing NATO’s Baltic
20. Wagner, Jürgen: Die Rückkehr der                  Gap, ICDS-Report, May 2016, p. 7.
    Schattenkrieger. Spezialeinheiten             40. Policy statement by Federal Chancellor
    als neue Speerspitzen des                         Dr Angela Merkel, Berlin, 07.07.2016.
    Interventionismus, IMI-Studie 2013/05.        41. Washington’s Cold War Containment
21. Fogh Rasmussen, Anders: NATO                      Strategy Is Still Alive and Well,
    After Libya. The Atlantic Alliance in             Stratfor, 23.01.2017.
    Austere Times,in: Foreign Affairs,            42. Mogherini calls EU a peace
    July/August 2011, p. 2-6.                         ‘superpower’, in wake of Trump
22. Vgl. Marischka, Christoph: US-Drohnen             win, Euractiv, 10.11.2016.
    über französischen Uranminen in               43. Defence Expenditures of NATO
    Niger, IMI-Standpunkt 2013/056.                   Countries, NATO,0 7.07.2016
23. Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order?, Munich    44. Warsaw Summit Communiqué, Issued
    Security Report, February 2017, p. 14.            by the Heads of State and Government
24. See about this debate in detail                   participating in the meeting of the North
    Wagner, Jürgen: Expansion –                       Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016,
    Assoziation – Konfrontation. EUropas              Press Release (2016) 100, para. 34.
    Nachbarschaftspolitik, die Ukraine und        45. Vries, Wendela de: Reduction of
    der Neue Kalte Krieg gegen Russland,              Military Budgets - What can United
    IMI-Studie 2015/06, p. 6f..                       Nations do? Lecture University
25. Gorbachev: how we pulled down                     of Amsterdam, 08.01.2011.
    the Berlin Wall, Russia Beyond                46. Ries, Tomas: The globalising
    the Headlines, 30.10.2014.                        security environment and the EU, in:
26. The other countries were Bulgaria,                Vasconcelos, Álvaro de (ed.): What
    Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia.                  Ambitions of European Defence in
27. Neuber, Arno: Schild und Schwert:                 2020, The European Union Institute for
    Aggressive Atompolitik und Raketenabwehr          Security Studies, October 2009 (2nd
    der NATO, IMI-Analyse 2009/012.                   edition), p. 61-74, p. 73 and 69.
28. In particular, the term of a New Cold         47. Nato-Gipfel beschließt Awacs-
    War was made popular by von Lucas,                Einsatz im Kampf gegen IS, DPA,
    Edward: The New Cold War: Putin’s                 09.07.2016. Own translation.
    Russia and the Threat to the West,
    New York/Basingstoke 2008.
29. Kagan, Robert: The Return of History and
    the End of Dreams, London 2009, p. 4.
30. Busse, Nikolaus: Harte Zeiten für
    Friedensbewegte. Eine multipolare
    Welt bringt die klassische Machtpolitik
    wieder zurück, in: Internationale
    Politik, Juni 2009, p. 49-53, p. 53.
31. The draft of the European Security
    Treaty, draft, 29.11.2009.
32. Clinton sagt njet - und umwirbt die Russen,
    Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17.05.2010.
33. About the power political background of
    the Ukrainian crisis see Wagner 2015.
34. Dossier: VJTF – Speerspitze der
    NATO, bmvg.de, 18.02.2016.
35. Karas, Sonja: Nachdenkhinweisliste in
    Sachen US-Panzerbrigade für Osteuropa,
    Grüne Friedensinitiative, 02.04.2016.
36. Speech by Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich
    Security Conference, Munich, 03.02.2016.
37. Speech by Dmitry Medvedev at the Munich
    Security Conference, Munich, 14.02.2016.

14
Occupied, looted, divided: NATO in Kosovo
by Jürgen Wagner                                  a drastic violation of international law and      geographical situation between the Baltic
                                                  confirmed that international law would not        Sea and Anatolia, as it had been at the
The war of aggression against Yugosla-            deter the Alliance. After putting together a      time of the height of Roman expansion.”5
via, started by NATO in March 1999, was           commission on that matter, NATO subse-
seminal in several ways: First, it marked the     quently tried to whitewash its conduct by         There is also evidence that the NATO inter-
conversion of the military organization into      using the formula “illegal but legitimate”2.      vention in Kosovo was supposed to further
a global alliance for intervention by means                                                         expand the neoliberal global economic
of cheeky lies about the cause for the war        The determination of NATO to employ ag-           system through what amounted to a colonial
as well as a blatant violation of interna-        gressive tactics indicates that the opera-        occupation. Strobe Talbott, US Deputy
tional law. Second, the ensuing neoliberal        tion was actually about protecting relevant       Secretary of State at the time, admitted
rebuilding of Kosovo, undertaken within           interests. The Kosovo operation created a         this interest quite frankly: “As nations
the context of the occupation, became a           test case to sensationally finish the process     throughout the region sought to reform their
model for subsequent operations, such as          of transforming NATO from an alliance             economies, mitigate ethnic tensions, and
Afghanistan, where the occupied area was          oriented towards national defense into an         broaden civil society, Belgrade seemed to
openly transformed into a Western colony.         alliance for intervention outside the territory   delight in continually moving in the op-
Next, a new doctrine emerged recognizing          of the Alliance. The Alliance sent a clear        posite direction. It is small wonder NATO
state secession when Kosovo was allowed           signal that NATO was not willing any more         and Yugoslavia ended up on a collision
to fully separate from the independent state      to allow the veto power of Russia and China       course. It was Yugoslavia’s resistance to the
of Serbia. Finally, a very special cooperative    in the UN Security Council to prevent the         broader trends of political and e­ conomic
strategy was developed where civilian forces      Alliance from using military force to back its    reform – not the plight of the Kosovar
(EU) worked with military forces (NATO) to        interests. Klaus Naumann, chairman of the         Albanians – that best explains NATO’s war.”6
subdue political protest, even if this was        NATO Military Committee (1996 – 1999),
the result of miserable living conditions.        wrote shortly after the end of the operation:     These justifications supported NATO’s
                                                  “[During the Kosovo war] we showed them           willingness to cause wartime destructions
1. An interest-driven war of aggression           that they had no chance to interfere with         in Yugoslavia to total DM 26 billion accord-
                                                  NATO’s interventions by a Russian veto. And       ing to estimates from a Federal Armed
The accusation that Serbian-led Yugoslavian       I hope that Moscow has understood this.”3         Forces report.7 Moreover, the Serbian
troops were committing genocide in Kosovo                                                           province of Kosovo was occupied at times
against the Kosovar Albanians was invoked         NATO’s Kosovo operation substantially             by more than 50.000 KFOR troops. NATO’s
as an official justification for the war. How-    extended NATO’s sphere of influence, and          military intervention factually transformed
ever, allegations of a massacre at Racak or       by extension that of the US as well. Heinz        Kosovo into a Western protectorate after
Operation Horseshoe were subsequently re-         Brill, a former lecturer at the University of     the ceasefire of June 10th, 1999.
vealed to be nothing more than cheeky war         the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg, for
propaganda disseminated by Germany and            instance, argued: “Against this background,       2. Neoliberal NATO colony
other actors. This is particularly ironic given   the US interest in NATO’s strategic repo-
this announcement of the day, issued by the       sitioning on the Eurasian continent and           „Protectorates are in,“ Carlo Masala of
Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) Intelli-        its periphery, which has been identified as       the NATO Defence College (NADEFCOL) in
gence Office only two days before the onset       a key motive of the Kosovo War by many            Rome explains. “From Bosnia via Kosovo,
of the aerial campaign: “Tendencies towards       observers, emerges in its full moment. If the     to Afghanistan all the way to Iraq, the
ethnic cleansings are still not perceptible.”1    political influence and the military power of     pattern of Western intervention policy is
                                                  the US – as Brzezinski argues – was only          always the same. After successful mili-
An argument can be made that NATO                 ‘immediately’ entrenched on the Eurasian          tary intervention, the ‘conquered’ regions
wanted to wage this war at any price. The         continent by mean of the NATO, the logical        are transformed into protectorates, and
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was delib-           conclusion can be inferred that an extension      the Western states attempt to introduce
erately armed by the Federal Intelligence         of NATO’s European scope, facilitated by the      liberal political systems, rule of law and
Service BND and later by the CIA. According       elimination of the Yugoslavian bolt, would        free market economy to these areas.”8
to Heinz Loquai, German liaison officer with      inevitably also expand the direct sphere of
the OSCE in Vienna at the time, the task of       influence of the US.”4 Willy Wimmer, State        In Kosovo, NATO safeguarded the activity of
the OSCE mission in Kosovo – the surveil-         Secretary in the German Ministry of De-           the UNMIK mission of the United Nations,
lance of a truce negotiated in 1998 – was         fense until 1992, also revealed that similar      which acted as an occupation authority in
intentionally undermined. Similarly, the          motives were voiced by American NATO              the country. In the absence of a state
collapse of the Rambouillet peace talks in        representatives at a conference in Bratislava     authority, UNMIK became the ultimate au-
early 1999 was a direct result of a disin-        in April 2000: “The war against the Federal       thority in Kosovo by accumulating executive,
genuous move by NATO negotiators. At the          Republic of Yugoslavia was conducted to re-       legislative and judiciary powers. Economic
last moment, in a move that anyone would          vise a false decision made by General Eisen-      historian Hannes Hofbauer confirmed the
find unacceptable, NATO negotiators added         hower in World War II [which put Yugoslavia       scope of this outcome: “The UN mission is
an appendix to the treaty (Annex B) that          outside the Western sphere of influence].         a unique case in this form: there has not
the Serbians viewed as a serious threat to        Due to strategic reasons the decision to          been a case of external and internation-
their nation’s sovereignty. Since the NATO        deploy American soldiers in the region had        ally constituted administration of a terri-
intervention was not supported by a vote          to be rectified. […] The goal of the recently     tory like this before in recent history.”9
of the UN Security Council, it represented        pending NATO expansion is to restore the

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