WORKING PAPER SERIES THE 'COVID WAR'? REFLECTIONS ON MECHANISMS AND IMPRINTS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC PHIL JOHNSTONE AND CAITRIONA MCLEISH - DEEP ...
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Working Paper Series
The ‘COVID war’?
Reflections on mechanisms
and imprints of the
COVID-19 pandemic
Phil Johnstone and
Caitriona McLeish
DT2020—05
25/05/2020
The ‘COVID war’? Reflections on mechanisms and imprints of the
COVID-19 pandemic
Phil Johnstone & Caitriona McLeish,
Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU),
University of Sussex. May 2020.
“We are at war”. This was the message from French President Emmanuel Macron in March as he
announced the closure of France’s land borders in response to COVID-191 . From the United Nations
Secretary General António Guterres2, to the rare public address delivered by Her Majesty the Queen
on UK television3, the Second World War has become the key reference point to convey the scale of
the challenge facing society during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the United Kingdom, this has been
particularly pronounced with talk of “war bonds”, “blitz sprit” and “spitfires”4. As recently described
in a special feature on the UK’s Channel 4 News programme, this pandemic seems to be “amplifying
the distant echo of the Second World War” 5.
It is understandable why war language is being used: it is an attempt to rouse and galvanise society; it
is imbued with a sense of urgency, making it easier for resources to be mobilised and commandeered,
and for sacrifices to be demanded; and it is understood in binary terms (you win or you lose). However
- and there is always a ‘however’ - it’s not that simple. Along with those rousing, galvanising and urgent
effects is invisible baggage which can imprint over the long term and be socially detrimental.
Many commentators have rightly pointed out the problems with this COVID-19 ‘war rhetoric’.
Historian David Egerton highlights the stark differences between conditions of war and pestilence and
the dangers of war rhetoric in fuelling myths and fantasies of wartime events6; others point out that
this rhetoric only breeds fear7, and can even be used to justify the deaths of health workers on the
‘front lines’8. We share these concerns, and in our work we have highlighted the pitfalls of applying
war rhetoric to other challenges such as climate change9. However, we argue it is useful to consider
further why it is that so many people are hearing the distant echo of the Second World War.
We agree with Schot, Gosh & Bloomfield10 that the COVID-19 pandemic is a ‘landscape shock’ that is
“changing everyday life in an immediate and stark fashion not seen, arguably, since the Second World
War”10. The keyword of the moment is “unprecedented”. In terms of its scale and scope this pandemic
is different to other recent landscape shocks such as the financial crises. At the time of writing, COVID-
19 is present in 213 countries and territories around the world and permeates through all levels of
society. No sociotechnical system or indeed individual is unaffected. It directly impacts where and how
people can move, sometimes what they can buy, whether they can work, and who they can interact
with in their daily lives. Meanwhile, governments have intervened in their citizens lives in ways not
seen in peacetime. In short, there is something total about the reach of the COVID-19 pandemic in the
way that it has suddenly interrupted and radically altered routines from the level of the individual to
international relations.
Our research has focused on the pivotal role that world wars played in the culmination of the first
deep transition11. Unlike most analyses of wartime transformation, we focused on sociotechnical
systems (energy, food, and mobility), discussing how certain rules (including maintaining an abundant
and constant supply) were amplified by the particular ‘environmental conditions’ of the world wars.
We found that after the Second World War, these amplified rules persisted as imprints in
125/05/2020
sociotechnical systems. Part of the challenge of this research was to ‘unpack’ the under-researched
‘landscape’ category of the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP). We did this by, first, building an
understanding of the mechanisms of total war and how these differed from peacetime and what
effects these mechanisms had on sociotechnical systems; and second, looking at how these effects
became imprinted onto sociotechnical systems in the post war era. We think this framework
(mechanisms and imprints) is a useful entry point into discussing the potential impacts of the COVID-
19 pandemic for the second deep transition.
To be clear, we are not equating thee current pandemic with a world war. Rather, by bringing these
two events (namely the Second World War and the COVID-19 pandemic) into productive tension, we
highlight the differences between the dynamics of these two landscape shocks so as to contribute to
discussions that concern the potential consequences of COVID-19 for the second deep transition.
Mechanisms and imprints in landscape developments
While the main focus in sustainability transitions research has been on interactive developments
between the levels of sociotechnical niche and regime, exogenous landscape factors (such as wars,
financial crises, natural disasters) and their role in influencing the directionality of technological
change have rarely been considered as focal points of analyses. Similarly, work utilising the Techno
Economic Paradigms (TEP) approach tends to focus on the internal dynamics of ‘great surges’ of
economic growth driven by particular innovations and paradigms (e.g. the ‘internal combustion engine
and mass production in the 20th century). The dynamics of exogenous ‘tipping points’ have not
received significant attention12. The Deep Transitions framework is attentive towards landscape
developments including both the long-running slow development of industrial modernity over
hundreds of years13 and the more rapid and time-restricted events including world wars which has
been the focus of our work.
Given the lack of attention on the role of wars and the military in sustainability transitions research, a
key challenge was to unpack the dynamics of the two World Wars. We drew on historical literatures
to identify mechanisms of war14,15 as well as literature examining the exceptional conditions of total
wars16–18 to build an understanding of how these periods differ from peacetime conditions. We now
outline these mechanisms.
Demand pressures in a war preparation phase include the need to ensure there are sufficient numbers
of healthy and adequately skilled people that can be recruited for wartime activities and that there
are sufficient quantities of key resources such as energy, food and transport available. Having these is
not enough however; they must be conveyed to the theatres of war; be engaged in the conduct of
war itself; and be sustained. Particularly during war, other sets of challenges arise which extend to
defending against attack and sabotage.
Directionality, is changed during war including power relations in politics, society, and industrial
relations. Examples include the increased bargaining position of trade unions because of the essential
role those they represent play in the war effort, and a changing relationship to, and with, previously
marginalised groups, as their central role in the war effort becomes visible. Changing power relations
are also found in our relations to technology as the search for ‘solutions’ to pressing demand
challenges exposes weaknesses in dominant technologies or practices, and new technologies and
practices ‘break through’19.
The disruption and demand challenges created by war often necessitate increased levels of state
intervention to coordinate, for example, economic activity and direct command and control measures.
225/05/2020
This increased intervention can necessitate the creation of new policy capacities, including new
institutions to manage collaborations between the state and industry. Collaborations within sectors
were also experienced including by pooling resources.
Total war requires cooperation and shared sacrifice, including “mass loyalty” to stabilise the home
front and assist in meeting the goal of victory. Popular compliance is required in light of necessary
access requirements to key resources and the curtailment of certain activities and social practices. If
society ‘buys into’ the singular goal of victory, they will accept the required sacrifices; if they do not,
then they will resist.
In our working paper we detail a complex story of how these mechanisms impinged on the three socio-
technical systems we examined11. While trends vary considerably across the transatlantic zone - from
the productive centre of the USA and Canada to occupied Europe - some broad observations can be
summarised. These include that the Second World War resulted in:
• An acceleration in developments in sociotechnical activities including novel pipeline
infrastructure that had no market prior to the war, refinery capacity, jet engines, new types
of mass-produced aircraft, centralised and interconnected electricity systems, intensified and
industrial agricultural practices, food preservation techniques, nutritional science, and
plastics.
• The creation of new policy capacities including nationalisations, price fixing, and vast state
expenditure programmes were implemented and new institutions were created to manage
these areas (such as the Petroleum Administrator for War in the USA).
• High levels of cooperation and shared sacrifice including society volunteering to engage in
wartime activities, accepting limitations to their use of resources such as food and energy,
and particular sectors, such as farmers, changing their routines to ensure a constant and
abundant supply.
• Formerly competing companies including in the oil20 and automobile sectors21, collaborating
and actively sharing innovations to achieve wartime goals.
In short, we identified how mechanisms of war amplified and accelerated a range of developments in
the culmination of the first deep transition.
The next step in our analysis was to understand the longer-term effects of these changes. We drew
on the concept of imprinting from organisational studies which draws on biological metaphor to
understand how the ‘environmental conditions’ of a particular time-sensitive period continue to
influence patterns of behaviour after this period has ended22.
We examined whether the particular trends and changed routines that were amplified during war
could also be detected in peacetime. This is where the key concept of rules comes in. Taking into
account how activities related to energy, food and mobility were altered in response to the demand
pressures of total war, and through an interpretive analysis of developments in these systems until
the early 1970s, we identified a number of rules that had been amplified by war. These include:
• centralisation
• maintaining abundance and constancy of supply
• collaboration
• achieving synergies with military imperatives.
325/05/2020
To again simplify the complex story relayed in our working paper, we found that while these rules
were amplified by the conditions of the First World War, they decayed in the interwar period.
However, after the Second World War, these rules persisted in each sociotechnical system with:
• abundance driving the intensification of agriculture, road construction, the diffusion of the
automobile, and oil policy
• centralisation persisting in state-led policy interventions in all three systems as well as
manifesting in technologies such as interconnected electricity grids23,24 and
• collaboration continuing in new close relationships between industry, science, the military
and government as the ‘military industrial complex’25.
That these rules persisted in all systems means they are meta-rules. In amplifying these meta-rules,
the Second World War accelerated the coordination of multiple systems in a similar direction as part
of the culmination of the first deep transition.
Seeing the COVID-19 pandemic through mechanisms of war
If as our research has found, the Second World War was a tipping point in accelerating and shaping
the directionality of the culmination of the first deep transition, what might be the role of the COVID-
19 pandemic for the directionality of a potential second deep transition?
Though it may be an unprecedented landscape shock, COVID-19 is not a war. There are a number of
obvious differences including that the current pandemic does not, for example, recreate many of the
condition of full societal mobilisation. Instead, as Adam Tooze notes, the pandemic has resulted in an
unprecedented demobilisation of the economy26; with latest figures suggests that 33 million people
have been made unemployed in the USA during this pandemic, which breaks all post-war records for
unemployment in that country27. However, analysing COVID-19 through the perspective of war
mechanisms opens up a starting point for understanding how these two events differ in the ways they
impinge on sociotechnical systems. In the following section we consider how the ‘war time
mechanisms’ of demand, directionality and new policy capacities have played out in the energy, food
and mobility systems during the COVID-19 pandemics.
Demand, directionality and new policy capacities in the energy system
Energy demand has fallen in many European countries as lockdowns were imposed and economies
ground to a halt28. This reduction in demand is due to reduced industrial usage. By contrast, home use
of electricity has increased and accordingly the peaks and troughs of electricity use has changed.
Overall, this reduction in demand has presented challenges for grid operators in terms of how to
manage the problem of low demand and high electricity production from renewables. Problems have
included sudden changes in frequency, or the electricity system being overloaded resulting in
blackouts29. Demand for oil has also plummeted and this has created significant infrastructural
challenges in the USA, including the problem of running out of oil storage space due to a fall in
consumption and managing the resulting negative oil prices30. The condition of low demand both with
regards to electricity and oil is markedly different to the demand pressures during the Second World
War in countries like the USA and UK where the central challenge was the risk of under capacity.
In terms of directionality, alongside a reduction in demand has been the considerable increase in share
of renewables in power generation which has climbed to a 70% share of power generation in some
European countries. This has led some analysts to suggest that renewables have become the new
425/05/2020
“baseload”31 during the COVID-19 pandemic. As renewables can be switched on and off much more
easily than traditional generators like coal or nuclear, they are thought to have a strategic advantage
to this new condition of especially low demand grid operation. Accordingly, grid operators have had
to experiment with technical responses and work flexibly to respond to new patterns of demand
fluctuations.
The International Energy Agency suggests that CO2 are set to decline by 8% this year according to the
International Energy Agency32. Arguably, this unprecedented reduction in emissions shines a light on
the potential of prioritising demand measures to achieve rapid emissions reductions. While the
production of coal, gas, and nuclear are set to reduce this year, the IEA points out that “only
renewables are holding up during the previously unheard-of slump in electricity use”33.
Another potential advantage for renewables illuminated during the COVID-19 pandemic is that they
are less reliant on labour supply for their operation. Worker sickness and/or social distancing
measures could jeopardise operations within power stations and also lead to safety issues. Reports
have indicated that nuclear power production is particularly threatened by pandemics because of their
reliance on a small number of highly skilled workers34,indeed, key nuclear activities have been shut
down during the pandemic including the Sellafield site in the UK35.
A key part of the incumbent sociotechnical energy regime that has been further destabilised by the
COVID-19 pandemic is the oil industry. High fixed costs of oil pipelines and refineries and associated
infrastructure makes the oil industry particularly susceptible to demand fluctuations and profit is
achieved through maintaining constant flows. The insecurity of the geopolitics on which the oil
industry depends has also been amplified during the COVID pandemics with “price wars” between
Saudi Arabia and Russia occurring in the early stages of the pandemic. Jeff Currie from Goldman Sacks
argues, this pandemic could “permanently alter the energy industry and its geopolitics, restrict
demand as economic activity normalises and shift the debate around climate change”36.
In the energy sector, new policy capacities have been experimented with in response to the demand
pressures cause by the COVID-19 pandemic. Electricity grid operators have intervened to avoid
overload of the grid and manage frequency issues caused by significantly lower demand. This has
included paying flexible wind farms to switch off, cutting electricity imports from continental Europe
to avoid the grid becoming overloaded, paying hydroelectric plants to act as ‘giant virtual batteries’ to
use excess electricity to power pumping water up into lochs, and paying households to use electricity
as negative pricing takes place29. In the UK it is now being forecasted that demand may fall below the
power produced from ‘inflexible’ “baseload” plants alone. Thus, policy measures have been brought
in to reduce the output of nuclear power plants. In the UK this can only be done (at considerable cost)
with Sizewell B, a modern Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), as the rest of the older nuclear fleet is
not designed to significantly vary its power ouput37. Therefore, flexibility issues are being amplified by
the COVID-19 pandemic.
Policy capacities to save incumbents have also been enacted and proposed38. This has included $72
million of COVID-19 relief going to oil and gas companies in the USA. Tax relief measures to the tune
of $79 million dollars in Canada, and in the UK, despite strong commitments to climate mitigation
targets, the Bank of England has allowed the debt of BP and Shell to be eligible under the banks
boosted corporate bond purchase scheme.
525/05/2020
Demand, directionality and new policy capacities in the food system
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the vulnerabilities and insecurity within many countries of
relying on high levels of food imports and ‘just in time’ food supply networks39. “Panic buying” in the
early stages of the pandemic was widely reported as placing national and international food supply
networks under pressure40. Global logistics of air, ship, and truck freight to deliver food supplies were
also put under pressure as border controls became stricter and social distancing measures were put
in place41. As a result food security emerged as a major policy issue, and a key logistical challenge has
been ensuring that adequate food supplies reach at risk-groups in the community42.
The pandemic has highlighted how vulnerable high-import-dependent countries are to disruption in
international trade also in terms of labour supply. In the UK, for example, 50% of UK food is imported43;
empty supermarket shelves exposed the vulnerability in her food system in the early weeks of the
lockdown and at the time of writing, her reliance on a seasonal migrant labour force to produce a
nation’s food supply is coming under the spotlight44.
At a global level, The UN have raised the possibility of famines of “biblical proportions” particularly in
parts of East Africa, due to the disruption of food production and supply. 45 Questions have also been
raised about particular food practices and the risks that high meat diets and industrial meat
production may have for increasing the risk of zoonotic virus transmission to humans46. Some reports
suggest that the pandemic may lead to an increase in plant-based diets as the increased risk of disease
transmission caused by meat production and consumption becomes more widely recognised in
society47.
There is evidence that in some countries local systems of food provision and distribution have played
an enhanced role in maintaining food supplies during the COVID-19 pandemic. This includes increased
production from allotments and multi-actor local food networks ensuring food distribution for the
vulnerable within society including through voluntary self-organising mutual aid networks48.
Commentary has highlighted the advantages and resilience offered by local food production and
distribution networks49, and calls have been made for greater self-sufficiency in food production
rather than reliance on global networks.
In light of these pressures on the food system, governments around the world have enacted new
policy capacities. This has in some respect been top-down with the Food and Agricultural Association
(FAO) of the United Nations describing the need for an “emergency footing” and “battle plan” to
respond to food insecurity issues amplified by COVID-1950.
In many countries there has been the extension of food assistance programs such as food stamps to
protect the most vulnerable. Under the COVID-19 Emergency Act, the UK government has new powers
to compel supermarkets to work together and communicate effectively on supply chain issues if they
are not doing so51.
Given the pressing problems of relying on migrant labour, again echoing war rhetoric, the need for a
“land army” of British residents to pick fruit given the absence of 80,000 migrant workers has been
announced. Environment secretary George Eustice proclaimed that we need to “mobilise the British
workforce”52. New schemes have been deployed, such as the “pick for Britain” recruitment service
created by the Department of Environment and Rural Affairs (DEFA) to encourage furloughed British
workers and students to apply for jobs in the agricultural sector.
625/05/2020
Demand, directionality and new policy capacities in the mobility system
Within the transport system, there has also seen plummeting demand for most forms of mobility53 54.
In countries under lockdown, there has been a sudden reduction in automobile use with the daily
commute now no longer necessary for many55. This has presented significant challenges for industries
within the mobility system many of which are facing significant financial hardship. On the other hand,
there is evidence that during the pandemic there has been an increased demand for other forms of
mobility including bicycling and walking in urban environments. In Philadelphia, USA for example
cycling has increased by 150% 56, and in the UK a ‘cycling boom’ has led to a shortage of bicycles in
stock57.
In terms of directionality, some commentators suggest a lasting effect of the pandemic experience
could be a fundamental reshaping of mobility industries 58. Pre-pandemic routines, such as frequent
international travel has been curtailed and innovative technical solutions, such as the use of online
communication platforms lead some to now question returning to those established routines.
The pandemic experience also opens up an opportunity to challenge transport systems within cities.
The reduced volume of car traffic and the increased use of cycling has led to scrutiny of why cities
devote so much space to the automobile59. Calls are already being made to use this moment to
reshape cities around more sustainable forms of transport60. As such we can see new policy capacities
being created. In Italy, for example, Milan has begun a scheme to reallocate street space from cars to
bicycles and walking61 with plans in place to redesign 35 km of street space to accommodate walking
and cycling. In France, the Paris mayor has announced plans to set up 50 km of new cycle lanes and in
Brussels, Belgium, a so-called “Velorution” has been announced, with the inner ring of the city labelled
as a zone of calm traffic where pedestrians will be able to walk everywhere in the inner ring, and speed
limits will be limited to 20 km an hour. The UK government has announced statutory guidance for local
authorities for the “reallocation of road space” to encourage and sustain the increase in cycling and
walking that has occurred during the pandemic. For many commentators this pandemic offers the
best opportunity yet for rapidly redesigning cities and destabilising the car regime through the rapid
imposition of new policies to steer urban areas towards bicycling and walking62.
Whilst is may be welcomed, there is also expressed concern that the use of public transport - required
to truly destabilise the car regime - will be negatively affected by the fear-based rhetoric associated
with COVID-19. ‘Corona-phobia’ as the medial has named it, together with the imprinting of during-
pandemic messaging (e.g. the 2m social distance) could lead to an unwillingness to share confined
spaces. There is therefore a significant potential for an automobile ‘rebound’. In some countries who
are easing lockdown measures, use of public transport is actively discouraged.
Cooperation and shared sacrifice
One of the key ways in which parallels have been drawn between World War II and the COVID-19 crisis
is the way that both events entail calls for everyone to “do their bit”. It has been pointed that in both
times of total war and COVID-19 activities are centred on (albeit very different) single goals which act
as a coordinating mechanism for behaviours and routines in society 4. As a result, the language of
“shared sacrifice” has returned. Just as those on the home front during war were given the strong
message that their individual sacrifice was to help those on the frontline, messages from government
to stay at home and socially distance are framed around protecting healthcare workers.
However, there are key differences. During the war, measures were put in place to curb the excesses
of the rich as part of a “great levelling” where, in some cases, inequalities were vastly reduced63.
725/05/2020
Commentators note that the COVID-19 pandemic has seen no great levelling in economic terms but
rather, has seen existing inequalities exacerbated by the pandemic64.
However, in some cases similarities can be seen. It can be argued that there has been a partial
mobilisation of the scientific and industry communities, for example in the search for vaccines and
production of protective equipment. Some companies have reoriented their activities to assist the
“fight” against COVID-19, including F1 car racing engineers producing ventilators, Gin companies
producing hand sanitiser, universities and 3D printing facilities producing Personal Protective
Equipment (PPE), and outdoor gear manufacturers repurchasing materials (including snorkels into
ventilator parts and sewing masks and gowns)65. The language of cooperation and shared sacrifice
surrounding these activities is significant, even though the degree to which these have been successful
in countries like the UK in actually producing what is required is questionable.
In terms of the three systems, the demand pressures of the COVID-19 pandemic do not seem to entail
any shared sacrifice for society with regards to energy use. In fact, the opposite challenge seems to
be the case, namely that not enough electricity is being used rather than citizens needing to curtail
their use in order to maintain adequate supply. With regards to the food system however, there are
signs of grassroots societal responses and niche activities that have been influenced by sense of duty
and mutual aid66. Indeed, in many countries, “mutual aid” groups have emerged with local self-
organising community groups delivering food for the most vulnerable. In the UK, an estimated 2.5
million people in the UK became members of these mutual aid groups and the government has tapped
in to these networks to ensure food supplies were delivered. Allotments have also been encouraged
to ‘grow an extra row’ to donate to charity food organisations 67. The UK Government’s approach to
the national COVID-19 pandemic and food supply has seen the relaxation of trade and competition
laws to allow supermarkets to “work together” and “collaborate and share resources” to ensure
adequate food supplies are maintained51. It could be argued that there has been shared sacrifice with
regards to mobility. The use of public transport during COVID-19 has required social distancing
measures to be put in place (although sometimes governments have failed to ensure this) that people
have by and large adhered to. The same can be said with mobility in the city including bicycling and
walking, where the continuation of these forms of mobility during lockdown has been dependent and
indeed policed around everyone doing their bit to maintain a social distance.
Unlocking from COVID-19 and the post COVID world
A feature of the First and Second World Wars is that they have a date at which hostilities began for a
country and a date at which they ceased. Can the same be said for COVID-19? Reports indicate that
some during-pandemic-behaviours such as social distancing and altered working practices could
remain in place for a significant period of time. However as the initial lockdown measures as easing
for countries in the northern hemisphere, question are being asked of what the world could/should
look like once ‘normality’ has resumed. In this the echo of the Second World War can again often be
heard.
We discussed in section 2 how a range of systemic imprints occurred in energy, food, and mobility,
were amplified rules in wartime and persisted in the post-war era. New collectively-held ideas about
the world and its future possibilities also emerged from the Second World War. They focused on
reconstruction and ‘building the peace’ and calls of “never again” were broadly shared across societies
emerging from the horrors of war. As historian Keith Lowe argues, as societies emerged from the
Second World War there was a shared sense of fear at the horrors of war, but also expectations around
825/05/2020
a new freedom that could be built as a ‘new world’ emerged from the ashes. These collectively-held
sentiments strongly influenced post-war developments68.
We refer to these broader collectively-held structures of meaning emerging from the war as landscape
imprints in our third paper currently being drafted. This included how, for example, the fear of another
total war that would utilise nuclear weapons shaped continuing interactions between military systems
and other sociotechnical systems. But there was also hope around the freedom and abundance that
could be achieved from the scientific and technological achievements of the Second World War69,
including nuclear power and the dream of ‘limitless’ and abundant electricity supplies 70.
It is too early to identify the systemic and landscape imprints of COVID-19 but an argument can be
made that new experiments have emerged that have amplified particular rules geared towards more
sustainable pathways. These include the benefits of resilient localised food production; the use of
renewable energy sources; demand reduction as perhaps the quickest tool for reducing emissions;
bicycling and walking as a new normal behaviour for short distance urban mobility; and cooperative
and mutualistic forms of social organisation. Perhaps more importantly, COVID-19 has shone light on
some of the disadvantages of oil, automobiles, aviation, inflexible modes of power production and an
over-reliance on global food networks. The interventionist policy capacities enacted by government
during the pandemic in releasing immense financial resource and directing industry towards particular
ends, provides a template for how governmental intervention towards a particular goal could be used
to ‘mobilise’ for rapid climate mitigation. But to what extent might these imprints remain or decay as
some form of ‘normality’ returns?
Our research11 contains a caution: landscape shocks in themselves don’t change anything.
In addition to the Second World War, we also looked at the First World War and its impact on the
three systems. We found that significant and lasting changes did occur, particularly in relation to
welfare and health. However, many of the imprints that had been amplified in sociotechnical systems
during the conflict had decayed by the mid-1920s. In most contexts, for example, electricity networks
remained fragmented, centralised policies and market intervention were abandoned in favour of
laissez faire approaches, international policy capacities that were provoked by the demand pressures
of wartime, such as the League of Nations partly also decayed.
Other landscape shocks examined in the course of our research also serve as a point of reflection on
how quickly patterns can return to ‘normal’ in some contexts71. For example, following the 1973 oil
crisis perpetual abundance based on oil was for the first time challenged72. In the United States,
President Jimmy Carter announced that Americans needed the ‘moral equivalent of war’ to come
together to reduce the nation’s dependence on oil and pursue energy efficiency and renewable
solutions. His call proved very unpopular with the electorate and was reversed by the new President
Ronald Reagan. America’s thirst for oil intensified even more rapidly with oil wars and global instability
as a consequence73.
The financial crisis of 2008 provides another cautionary example. In the aftermath of this shock there
was calls for a new economic order to be established with growth based around a Green New Deal
given the urgent issue of climate change74. Despite being coined as the “last chance to save the world”,
the Copenhagen Climate Conference was a great disappointment and no green deal ensued. Instead,
in many instances, destructive and unsustainable austerity was put in place and insignificant action
was taken to mobilise economies for rapid decarbonisation.
925/05/2020
As economies are unlocked from COVID-19 there is likely to be a period of serious economic recession
or even depression. During-pandemic investments in, for example, renewable sources of energy may
plummet and massive rebound effects ensue, such as an overall increase in C02 emissions
The likely long-term nature of the COVID-19 pandemic presents a particular set of challenges,
including how to maintain compliance in regards to social distancing. Reluctance to use public
transport could see individual car use rapidly increase rather than decrease and continual practice of
social distancing behaviours seem likely to be solved either by increased use of private cars or by a
mass extension of cycle and walking space in our cities. It is difficult to see effective pursuit of both.
This underscores the point that there is nothing causal about this landscape shock. Just because
certain sustainable practices have been amplified does not mean they will be imprinted in a post-
COVID-19 world. There is every chance that the reverse could occur.
Yet, many continue to be optimistic and recognise the unique opportunity this moment presents as a
turning point to shift towards sustainable trajectories. But this brings us to the question of why rules
and meta-rules amplified during the Second World War persisted as imprints in the post-war era
rather than decaying as they did after the First World War?
The Second World War, according to Carlota Perez, laid the foundations of the institutional
arrangements that supported the stabilisation of the ‘fourth surge’, the final surge in the culmination
of the first deep transition75. The sociotechnical challenges of the Second World War provoked a dual
movement in terms of new policy capacities and institutions. This included autarkic policies aimed at
self-sufficiency and centralised national interventions, and unprecedented international collaboration
as we highlight in our research11. Building the peace was dependent on strengthening these
international institutions and they emerged as important locations for the diffusion of meta-rules and
the stability of the ‘fourth surge’ after a period of frenzy. Work done by deep transitions colleagues
Florian Kern and Helen Sharp, have focussed on the more contemporary role of international
institutions in this diffusion process76.
Yet, it is been widely commented on that during the COVID-19 pandemic there has been an absence
of international collaboration. Long-term ripples from the financial crisis has seen the building up of
nationalism and disruption of the global ‘rules based’ order. Indeed, these pre-pandemic behaviours
have also been amplified. If, during the COVID-19 pandemic, there has indeed been experimentation
with sustainable solutions and amplification of particular rules that challenge unsustainable
trajectories, then what will be the national and international governance mechanisms through which
these rules could diffuse most effectively?
Finally, after the Second World War there was immense political pressure from society for a more
equal and prosperous world that (along with the threat of communist revolution) forced governments
to enact progressive welfare policies. Without such political mobilisation following this pandemic it is
questionable whether a new system of anything will emerge. Could this moment be just ‘another crisis
gone to waste’, or like the novelist Arundhati Roy comments77, could it be a moment where we “break
with the past and imagine [the] world anew”. As she continues, this moment “…is a portal, a gateway
between one world and the next.” It remains to be seen whether this new world will be a more
sustainable one or not.
1025/05/2020
References
1. BBC News. Coronavirus: ‘We are at war’ - Macron. BBC News Online
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/51917380/coronavirus-we-are-at-war-macron (2020).
2. Euronews. We need a ‘war economy’ to deal with COVID-19 crisis, UN chief Antonio Guterres
tells Euronews. Euronews Online https://www.euronews.com/2020/03/25/coronavirus-
antonio-guterres-speaks-to-euronews-about-un-s-covid-19-response (2020).
3. Economic Times. Queen Elizabeth II invokes war-time spirit of self-discipline in special Covid-
19 address, says ‘we will succeed’. India Times (2020).
4. Ford, J. The new wartime economy in the era of coronavirus. The Financial Times Online
(2020).
5. Channel 4 News. Channel 4 news, 8th May 2020. (2020).
6. Edgerton, D. Why the coronavirus crisis should not be compared to the Second World War.
The New Statesman https://www.newstatesman.com/science-tech/2020/04/why-
coronavirus-crisis-should-not-be-compared-second-world-war (2020).
7. Tisdall, S. Lay off those war metaphors, world leaders. You could be the next casualty. The
Guardian Online (2020).
8. Lavin, T. Calling Healthcare Workers War “Heroes” Sets Them Up to Be Sacrificed. GQ Online
https://www.gq.com/story/essential-workers-martyrdom (2020).
9. Johnstone, P. & McLeish, C. Episode 3: Imprints of War in Deep Transitions. Deep Transitions
Podcast Series https://deeptransitions.net/podcast/episode-3-imprints-of-war-in-deep-
transitions/ (2020).
10. Schot, J., Gosh, B. & Bloomfield, G. CONVERSATIONS ON COVID-19: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE
SECOND DEEP TRANSITION AND THE SUSTAINABILITY REVOLUTION. Deep Transitions website
https://deeptransitions.net/2020/03/25/conversations-on-covid-19-consequences-for-the-
second-deep-transition-and-the-sustainability-revolution/ (2020).
11. Johnstone, P. & McLeish, C. The role of war in Deep Transitions: Exploring mechanisms,
imprints and rules in sociotechnical systems. (2020).
12. Schot, J. & Kanger, L. Deep transitions: Emergence, acceleration, stabilization and
directionality. Res. Policy 47, 1045–1059 (2018).
13. Kanger, L. & Schot, J. Deep transitions: Theorizing the long-term patterns of socio-technical
change. Environ. Innov. Soc. Transitions 0–1 (2018) doi:10.1016/j.eist.2018.07.006.
14. Smith, T. . The two World Wars and social policy in France. in Warfare & Welfare: Military
conflcit and welfare state development in Western countries (eds. Obinger, H., Petersen, K. &
Starke, P.) 127–148 (Oxford University Press, 2018).
15. Obinger, H., Petersen, K. & Starke, P. Introduction: Studying the Welfare-War Nexus. in
Warfare and Welfare: Military conflict and welfare state development in Western countries
(eds. Obinger, H., Petersen, K. & Starke, P.) (Oxford University Press, 2018).
16. Van Creveld, M. Technology and war: From 2000 b.c to the present. (The Free Press, 1991).
17. Strachan, H. On total war and modern war. Int. Hist. Rev. 22, 341–70 (2000).
1125/05/2020
18. Shaw, M. Dialectics of War AN ESSAY IN THE SOCIAL THEORY OF TOTAL WAR. (Pluto Press,
1988).
19. Rip, A. & Kemp, R. Technological change. in Human choice and climate change. Vol. II,
Resources and Technology (eds. Rayner, S. & Malone, E. L.) 327–399 (Battelle Press, 1998).
20. Johnson, A. . Petroleum, pipelines, and public policy, 1906-19. (Harvard University Press,
1967).
21. Automobile Manufacturer’s Association. Freedom’s Arsenal: The story of the Automotive
Council for War Production. (1950).
22. Marquis, C. & Tilcsik, A. Imprinting: Toward a Multilevel Theory. Acad. Manag. Ann. 7, 195–
245 (2013).
23. Hannah, L. Electricity before nationalisation: a study of the development of the electricity
supply industry in Britain to 1948. (Macmillan Press, 1979).
24. Cohn, J. The grid: biography of an American technology. (MIT Press, 2017).
25. Mowery, D. Military R&D and Innovation. in Handbook of the Economics of Innovation.
26. Tooze, A. Coronavirus has shattered the myth that the economy must come first. The
Guardian Online https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/20/coronavirus-
myth-economy-uk-business-life-death (2020).
27. Rushe, D. & Aratani, L. US unemployment rises another 3m, bringing total to 33m since
pandemic began. The Guardian Online (2020).
28. Energy Live News. European power demand falls below five-year average amid Covid-19
outbreak. Energy Live News Website
https://www.energylivenews.com/2020/04/17/european-power-demand-falls-below-five-
year-average-amid-covid-19-outbreak/ (2020).
29. Ambrose, J. Low demand for power causes problems for National Grid. The Guardian Online
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/apr/16/low-demand-for-power-causes-
problems-for-national-grid (2020).
30. World Oil. Oil market fears U.S. is running out of crude storage capacity. World Oil Website
https://www.worldoil.com/news/2020/3/26/oil-market-fears-us-is-running-out-of-crude-
storage-capacity (2020).
31. Recharge. Wind and solar ‘step into baseload role’ as renewables’ share of power mix hits
70%. Recharge transition webpages https://www.rechargenews.com/transition/wind-and-
solar-step-into-baseload-role-as-renewables-share-of-power-mix-hits-70-/2-1-803252 (2020).
32. Evans, S. Analysis: Coronavirus set to cause largest ever annual fall in CO2 emissions. Carbon
Brief https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-coronavirus-set-to-cause-largest-ever-annual-fall-
in-co2-emissions (2020).
33. IEA. Global energy demand to plunge this year as a result of the biggest shock since the
Second World War. International Energy Agency webpages
https://www.iea.org/news/global-energy-demand-to-plunge-this-year-as-a-result-of-the-
biggest-shock-since-the-second-world-war (2020).
34. Lyman, E. Nuclear Power Safety and the COVID-19 Pandemic. Union of Concerned Scientists
webpages https://allthingsnuclear.org/elyman/nuclear-power-safety-and-the-covid-19-
pandemic (2020).
1225/05/2020
35. Ambrose, J. Sellafield nuclear waste site to close due to coronavirus. The Guardian Online
(2020).
36. Chapman, B. Could the coronavirus crisis be the beginning of the end for the oil industry? The
Independent online (2020).
37. BBC News. Coronavirus: Sizewell B could cut power output as UK energy demand slumps. BBC
News webpages https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-suffolk-52566082 (2020).
38. Climate Home News. Coronavirus: which governments are bailing out big polluters? Climate
Home News webpages https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/04/20/coronavirus-
governments-bail-airlines-oil-gas/ (2020).
39. Lang, T., Milstone, E. & Marsden, T. This is how coronavirus is affecting our already fragile
food system. The Independent online (2020).
40. Perrett, M. Food chain tackles panic buying surge. Food Manufacture
https://www.foodmanufacture.co.uk/Article/2020/03/16/Coronavirus-panic-increases-food-
supply-chain-pressure (2020).
41. News Press: International Press and News. Global logistics leaders work to keep freight
moving as Covid-19 hampers goods traffic. News Press: International Press and News website
https://www.export.org.uk/news/494487/Global-logistics-leaders-work-to-keep-freight-
moving-as-Covid-19-hampers-goods-traffic.htm (2020).
42. Trussel Trust. Organisations unite to get food to people most in need. Trussel Trust webpages
https://www.trusselltrust.org/2020/04/15/organisations-unite-get-food-people-need/
(2020).
43. Rayner, J. Diet, health, inequality: why Britain’s food supply system doesn’t work. The
Guardian Online (2020).
44. Evans, J., Terazono, E. & Abboud, L. Farmers warn over food supply with harvest workers shut
out. The Financial Times Online (2020).
45. BBC News. Coronavirus: World risks ‘biblical’ famines due to pandemic - UN. BBC News Online
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-52373888 (2020).
46. Dalton, J. Coronavirus: Industrial animal farming has caused most new infectious diseases and
risks more pandemics, experts warn. The Independent online (2020).
47. Markets and Markets. COVID-19 Impact on Plant-Based Meat Market by Raw Material (Soy,
Wheat, Pea), Product (Burger Patties, Sausages, Strips & Nuggets, and Meatballs),
Distribution Channel (Retail Outlets, Foodservice, E-commerce), and Region - Global Forecast
to 2021.
https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/pdfdownloadNew.asp?id=255440423#utm_source=pr
newswire&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=paidpr (2020).
48. Brighton & Hove City Council. Projects in city increase food production for those in need.
Brighton & Hove City Council wepages https://new.brighton-
hove.gov.uk/news/2020/projects-city-increase-food-production-those-need (2020).
49. Fennell, S. Opinion: Local food solutions during the coronavirus crisis could have lasting
benefits. Phys.org https://phys.org/news/2020-04-opinion-local-food-solutions-
coronavirus.html (2020).
50. FAO. A battle plan for ensuring global food supplies during the COVID-19 crisis. FAO
webpages http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/1268059/icode/ (2020).
1325/05/2020
51. Chapman, B. Coronavirus: Supermarkets can now share staff, depots and data to help ’feed
the nat. The Independent Online (2020).
52. Morris, S. & O’Carroll, L. UK farmers fear huge labour shortfall despite interest in ’land army.
The Guardian Online (2020).
53. IEA. Oil Market Report - April 2020. International Energy Agency
https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-april-2020 (2020).
54. Intellegent Transport. Report reveals change in public transit demand since COVID-19
outbreak. Intellegent Transport webpages https://www.intelligenttransport.com/transport-
news/97451/report-reveals-change-in-public-transit-demand-since-covid-19-outbreak/
(2020).
55. Carrington, D. UK road travel falls to 1955 levels as Covid-19 lockdown takes hold. The
Guardian Online (2020).
56. World Resources Institute. Biking Provides a Critical Lifeline During the Coronavirus Crisis.
World Resources Institute webpages https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/04/coronavirus-biking-
critical-in-cities (2020).
57. Sherwood, H. Coronavirus cycling boom makes a good bike hard to find. The Guardian Online
(2020).
58. BBC News. Coronavirus: Six industries crying out for help. BBC News Online
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-52200386 (2020).
59. Hague, C. How Covid-19 could physically reshape our towns and cities – Cliff Hague. The
Scotsman (2020).
60. Taylor, M. & Laville, S. City leaders aim to shape green recovery from coronavirus crisis. The
Guardian Online (2020).
61. Laker, L. Milan announces ambitious scheme to reduce car use after lockdown. The Guardian
Online (2020).
62. Ostlere, L. GREEN REVOLUTION? UK CITIES HAVE ONLY ‘WEEKS’ TO DESIGN LIFE AFTER
LOCKDOWN, WARNS CHRIS BOARDMAN. The Independent online (2020).
63. Schneidel, W. The Great leveller: violence and the history of inequality from the stone age to
the twenty-first century. (Princeton University Press, 2017).
64. Drury, C. ‘The disease is not a great leveller’: Emily Maitlis praised for frank assessment of
social impacts of coronavirus. The Independent online (2020).
65. Parker, T. How Formula 1 teams and Dyson are manufacturing ventilators to help Covid-19
battle. NS Medical Services https://www.nsmedicaldevices.com/analysis/companies-
manufacturing-ventilators/ (2020).
66. Butler, P. Covid-19 Mutual Aid: how to help vulnerable people near you. The Guardian Online
(2020).
67. Ely, A. FOOD IN THE TIME OF COVID-19: HOW CAN LOCAL ACTION AND NATIONAL
COORDINATION WORK TOGETHER? STEPS Centre webpages https://steps-
centre.org/blog/food-in-the-time-of-covid-19-how-can-local-action-and-national-
coordination-work-together/ (2020).
68. Lowe, K. The Fear and the Freedom: How the Second World War changed us. (Penguin Books,
1425/05/2020
2017).
69. Pickering, A. Cyborg history and the World War II regime. Perspectives on Science vol. 3 1–48
(1995).
70. Byrne, J. & Rich, D. In Search of the Abundant Energy Machine. in The Politics of Energy
Research and Development (eds. Byrne, J. & Rich, D.) 141–160 (Transaction Books, 1986).
doi:10.4324/9781315133942-7.
71. Johnstone, P. & McLeish, C. World Wars and the Age of Energy Abundance : Unpacking
Directionality in Deep Transitions. (2020).
72. Nye, D. Energy Narratives. Am. Stud. Scand. 25, 73–91 (1993).
73. Stoff, M. . Oil, war, and American security: the search for a national policy on foreign oil,
1941-1947. (Yale University Press, 1980).
74. New Economics Foundation. A Green New Deal Joined-up policies to solve the triple crunch of
the credit crisis, climate change and high oil prices. (New Economics Foundation, 2008).
75. Perez, C. Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and
Golden Ages. (Edward Elgar, 2002).
76. Kern, F., Sharp, H. & Hachmann, S. International organisations and governance of deep
transitions: The case of a transition towards a circular economy International organisations
and the governance of deep transitions: The case of a transition towards a circular econom.
https://deeptransitions.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/International-Organisations-and-
Governance-of-Deep-transitions.pdf.
77. Roy, A. Arundhati Roy: ‘The pandemic is a portal’. The Financial Times Online (2020).
15You can also read
