WISCONSIN PROFESSIONAL MANAGER RESPONSE TO COVID-19 - MICHAEL R. FORD, PHD SAMANTHA J. LARSON, PHD
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Wisconsin Professional Manager
Response to COVID-19
Michael R. Ford, PhD
Samantha J. Larson, PhD
March 15, 2022
800 Algoma Blvd., Oshkosh, WI 54901
(920) 424-1580
uwosh.edu/whitburn-center/About the Whitburn Center
Mission Statement
The Whitburn Center conducts practical applied research focused on evaluating and improving governance,
professional management, and public policy in Wisconsin and beyond.
Philosophy and Values
Our vision is to build local government, nonprofit, and community capacity to promote the common good. We
will bring people together across ideological divides to discover nonpartisan solutions. The Whitburn Center
will share innovative, research-based knowledge, equipping our partners to address their most pressing needs,
while utilizing equitable, efficient, and effective strategies.
Advisory Board Members
• Gerald Whitburn, Ex-Officio Member and Founding Donor
• Scott McCallum, Inaugural Advisory Board Chair
• Raymond P. Taffora, Member
• Ellen Nowak, Member
• Kathryn Schauf, Member
• Mark Rohloff, Member
• Benjamin Krumenauer, Member
• Sachin Shivaram, Member
• Christine Thomas, Member
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Whitburn Center for Governance and Policy ResearchExecutive Summary
The Issue: In Spring of 2020 local government managers across Wisconsin faced the difficult task of
responding to a global pandemic with limited information. The successes, and failures, of their re-
sponse can yield insights that improve the response to future public health crises.
The Method: In September 2021 we surveyed 38 City Managers and Village Administrators through-
out Wisconsin. We also conducted in-depth ZOOM interviews with seven municipal managers serv-
ing Wisconsin municipalities.
The Findings: Respondents felt their position as professional managers facilitated their ability to
respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. We also found:
• Local measures were mostly limited to information sharing and maintaining service delivery.
• Local managers were often reacting to fast changing guidance as opposed to proactively respond-
ing to COVID-19.
• Who had authority for what was ambiguous, creating conflicts between state and local govern-
ment. Conflict was heightened by poor intergovernmental cooperation.
• Local government leaders were very dissatisfied with state response to COVID-19.
• The legal battles between the state executive and legislative branches eroded public confidence in
the government response to COVID-19.
• Cities and villages with more experienced leadership teams fared better throughout the pandemic.
The Lesson: Professional managers’ experiences with COVID-19 illustrate a need for improved com-
munication between governments, and between local governments and residents. There is also need
to clarify the balance of state and local authority in regards to public health. Other recommendations
included:
• Clarifying, in statute and ordinance, what levels of government are in charge of specific aspects of
public health before the next crisis.
• Incorporating public health crisis response into public sector leadership education.
• Improving government communication systems so that they align with how residents actually
consume information.
• Aligning authority to make public health decisions with public health competencies (i.e., having
public health mandates come from governments with health departments).
• Address morale in the government workforce and the professional manager profession through
new mentorship programming, increased professional development for staff, and fair and just
compensation.
In closing, resources are noted for local government managers interested in addressing these needs.
Links are provided to articles, tools, and trainings offered by the League of Wisconsin Municipalities,
Wisconsin City/County Management Association, International City/County Management Associa-
tion, National League of Cities, and National Association of Counties.
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Whitburn Center for Governance and Policy ResearchIntroduction
The governor may issue an executive order de-
In Spring of 2020 local government managers claring a state of emergency for the state or any
across Wisconsin faced the difficult task of re- portion of the state if he or she determines that an
sponding to a global pandemic with limited in- emergency resulting from a disaster or the immi-
formation. Just over one year later, we surveyed nent threat of a disaster exists. If the governor de-
38 municipal managers, and conducted seven termines that a public health emergency exists, he
in-depth interviews with municipal managers or she may issue an executive order declaring a
representing a set of diverse communities in the state of emergency related to public health for the
state, in order to better understand how profes- state or any portion of the state and may desig-
sionally managed local governments responded nate the department of health services as the lead
to the COVID-19 pandemic. state agency to respond to that emergency. If the
governor determines that the emergency is related
Our focus on professional managers, i.e., City to computer or telecommunication systems, he
Managers and Village Administrators, was or she may designate the department of admin-
deliberate. The presence of a professional man- istration as the lead agency to respond to that
ager hired by an elected City Council or Village emergency. A state of emergency shall not exceed
Board is designed to insulate the day-to-day 60 days, unless the state of emergency is extended
operations of government from politics. Howev- by joint resolution of the legislature. A copy of the
er, a popular critique of professional managers executive order shall be filed with the secretary
is that their distance from direct electoral ac- of state. The executive order may be revoked at
countability prevents the public from evaluating the discretion of either the governor by executive
their performance.1 As the COVID-19 pandem- order or the legislature by joint resolution.
ic became increasingly politicized, professional
managers were forced to navigate a public health As the situation deteriorated further, Wiscon-
crisis from an apolitical position while pandemic sin Secretary of Health Andrea Palm issued, on
politics raged around them. As one City Man- March 24, 2020, emergency order #122, which,
ager put it in an interview, “Everything I do is among other things:
controversial.”
• Ordered most residents to stay at home with
The Context exceptions for certain essential workers.
• Closed non-essential business.
The severity of the COVID-19 crisis evolved • Prohibited public gatherings.
over the first few months of 2020. In late 2019 • Closed schools, libraries and salons.
the virus was first detected in the United States. • Prohibited non-essential travel.
On March 12, 2020, Wisconsin Governor Tony
Evers declared a public health emergency for Secretary Palm’s order was extended on April
the entire state of Wisconsin under state statute 16, 2020, and was set to expire on May 26, 2020.3
323.10. The statute states: However, the new order was struck down by the
1. Carr, J. B. (2015). What have we learned about the per- 2. https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/COVID19/EMO12-Saf-
formance of council‐manager government? A review and erAtHome.pdf
synthesis of the research. Public Administration Review, 3. https://www.wpr.org/gov-tony-evers-extends-safer-
75(5), 673-689. home-order
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Whitburn Center for Governance and Policy ResearchWisconsin Supreme Court on May 13, 2020.4 A care, fire, health or police protection, or other
new COVID-19 surge in Fall 2020 prompted critical systems of the local unit of government.
the September 22, 2020 issuance of Emergency The period of the emergency shall be limited by
Order #1, which implemented a statewide mask the ordinance or resolution to the time during
mandate for indoor spaces.5 That mandate was which the emergency conditions exist or are likely
repealed by the state legislature on February 4, to exist.
2021. One hour later, Governor Evers issued
a new order reinstating the mask mandate.6 In summary, the context in which local govern-
The issuance of a new emergency order for the ment leaders have operated during the pan-
same public health emergency prompted a legal demic has been challenging. Guidance changed
challenge, and on March 31, 2021, the Wiscon- quickly, zones of discretion were often unclear,
sin Supreme Court ruled that Governor Evers and the public was frequently divided over spe-
had exceeded his authority and could not issue a cific actions.
new emergency order related to COVID-19.7
Survey Results
The legal back and forth created challenges for
local government officials attempting to respond We developed a 15-item survey to learn what
to COVID-19. Because local governments exist measures Wisconsin professional managers
due to the authority granted by the state, mu- took in response to the COVID-19 disruption.
nicipalities were bound by state orders when The survey instrument was piloted with two
they were issued. Similarly, the local regulatory Wisconsin municipal managers before being
environment shifted quickly when orders were sent digitally to 98 City Managers and Village
repealed and/or reinstated. Some municipalities, Administrators in Wisconsin. Thirty-Eight sur-
often larger, implemented their own public mask veys were returned for a response rate of 38.9%.
mandates as well as their own limits on public The response rate was higher than other recent
gatherings. Most used Wisconsin State Statute research targeting local government officials in
323.11 to declare a local emergency. That statute Wisconsin.8
reads as follows:
Actions Taken
The governing body of any local unit of govern-
ment may declare, by ordinance or resolution, We began by asking what measures, if any,
an emergency existing within the local unit of professional managers took locally in response
government whenever conditions arise by rea-
son of a riot or civil commotion, a disaster, or 8. See Ford, M. R., & Ihrke, D. M. (2018). The impact of
an imminent threat of a disaster, that impairs Wisconsin’s Act 10 on municipal management in smaller
transportation, food or fuel supplies, medical municipalities: Views from local elected officials. Public
Policy and Administration, 33(2), 170-189.
4. https://www.wpr.org/wisconsin-supreme-court-strikes-
down-safer-home-order-0 And
5. https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/COVID19/
EmO01-SeptFaceCoverings.pdf Ford, M. R., & Ihrke, D. M. (2016). Do school board gover-
6. https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/04/politics/wiscon- nance best practices improve district performance? Testing
sin-mask-mandate/index.html the key work of school boards in Wisconsin. International
7. https://www.wpr.org/sites/default/files/033121_fabick_ Journal of Public Administration, 39(2), 87-94.
scowis_opinion.pdf
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Whitburn Center for Governance and Policy ResearchFigure One: What actions did your municipality take in
response to COVID-19 (Please select all that apply)?
Other (Please explain). 23.7%
Municipality-sponsored v acci nation sites. 28.9%
Municipality-sponsored test ing sites. 18.4%
Limited public access to City/Vill age Hall. 71.1%
Virtual municipal meetings (i.e. council and boards… 71.1%
Mask mandate. 23.7%
Occupancy limits on businesses. 5.3%
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0%
to COVID-19. As can be seen in Figure One, a • Yes, a Facebook page was set up to provide
majority of respondents limited access to public updated information to the public and our
buildings and moved in-person meetings to a Library staff managed it to keep them work-
virtual format. A much smaller but still sizable ing.
percentage instituted public mask mandates and • Yes, press releases, public meetings, and
sponsored testing and vaccination sites. Very few virtual public interactive sessions.
municipalities instituted any type of occupancy • We placed signage at all highway entrances
limits on private business. to the City reminding travelers of CDC best
practices, i.e. masking, hand washing.
Respondents were able to share other actions • Managed multi jurisdictional Emergency
taken that did not appear on our survey. Several Operations Center with surrounding mu-
responded they instituted a mask mandate for nicipalities, in conjunction with County
public buildings even though there was not a Health. Ran a heavy PR campaign relative to
public mask mandate. Several also distributed elections, encouraging absentee voting and
personal protection equipment in the commu- assuring safe locations for voting.
nity, and, offered relief and/or grants to local • Yes, not uniformly driven. Mostly staff
businesses. reposting information from CDC, DHS, or
local health officials.
Public Information Efforts • Yes. We provided news blasts, government
updates on openings/closings, passed infor-
A total of 39.5% of respondents indicated their mation along to partners and facilitated free
municipality participated in a public informa- public wifi and free access to video/phone
tion effort regarding COVID-19. Those public meeting tools.
information efforts took many forms. The results • Masking PR efforts.
of the open-ended responses are below: • We simply reposted on our WWW site and
social media info from County, State, and
Fed.
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Whitburn Center for Governance and Policy Research• COVID-19 Dedicated Page on Website,
Figure 2: Does your municipality
Facebook Messaging, COVID-19 Press
have its own health department?
Releases. This was done by all department
heads and our communication specialist.
• We participated in social media, television
and newspaper public information efforts 19.4%
on our own and in conjunction with other
health departments. Our City health depart-
ment led the effort.
80.7%
• Shared on Facebook/website.
As can be seen, public information efforts varied
in their sophistication. Many municipal manag-
Yes No
ers amplified public health guidance given from
other organizations, while several launched their
own unique campaigns.
Figure 3: Would it have been
easier to navigate your Covid-19
Health Departments
response if you had your own
health department?
In preliminary conversations with municipal
managers, it became clear that the fragmented
nature of local health departments was often
a challenge during the height of the pandem- 34.8%
ic. Some municipalities had their own public
health departments, while most coordinated 65.2%
efforts with County health departments with
varying levels of success. Figure Two indicates
that 80.7% of respondents did not have their
Yes No
own health department. Figure Three indicates
that just over one-third of those without a health
• County Health was beholden to a County
department feel having their own department
board that did not consider the needs of a
would have made things easier to navigate.
central city.
• There would have been one point of contact
Respondents were asked to expand on why they
that we could use to evaluate and dissemi-
thought having their own health department
nate the information for officials to consider.
would or would not have made their COVID-19
• Having a professional on staff to provide the
response easier. Those who thought it would
Council guidance on local decisions would
have improved things stated:
have been much easier. Without one our
Council did not feel qualified to make local
• I am not trained in the medical field, and
specific decisions.
people wanted answers from the City Ad-
• Better able to educate and make recommen-
ministrator. We do have a County Health
dations to the public.
Department and they were wonderful; how-
• It would have better “customized” our
ever, there was not enough of them to serve
all the needs.
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Whitburn Center for Governance and Policy Researchresponse that placed our resident’s wishes dedicated individual to fall back on for deci-
at the forefront. We found that the County sions, but reality is with our fiscal status an-
health department did not always have, what other department without any other means
we believed to be, the best interests of our of funding outside of tax dollars would be
residents. difficult. Also it was beneficial to have the
• The local County Health Department was ill County and state to utilize when explaining
equipped to provide leadership. what other areas are doing for COVID.
• Politics.
Those who thought it would not have made • It was always changing and hard to keep
things easier stated: track of, no additional staff, current staff had
to handle the crisis along with their regular
• Access to real-time date and recommenda- duties.
tions would have been limited at the local • Having municipal health departments would
level. have made the COVID response even more
• I feel our County Health Department did an disorganized and fragmented than it was.
excellent job working in coordination with • Better to have coordinated direction from
the City. County government.
• A smaller community in a smaller County • We have a good relationship with the Coun-
relies on multi-jurisdictional cooperation. ty and they were very responsive to working
many smaller health departments may not with us.
have provided the same benefit as a larger • County better equipped to handle issue and
County-wide department. take a more broad approach. Individual
• In many ways I found it easier working with health departments creates greater patch-
the County and not having a department work policy.
that may contradict the County’s guidance.
• Potentially it would have been nice to have a
Figure 4: To what extent do you agree with the following
statements where 1 = Strongly Disagree and 5 = Strongly Agree:
Your municipality’s Covid-19 response remained apolitical in
the eyes of residents. 3.24
Your municipality’s Covid-19 response remained apolitical. 3.21
The County was a helpful partner in your municipality’s
Covid-19 response. 3.59
The State was a helpful partner in your municipality’s Covid-
2.62
19 response.
Residents were divided over your municipality’s Covid-19
3.52
response.
Your city council/v illage board was unified in their preferred
3.66
response to Covid-19.
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
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Whitburn Center for Governance and Policy ResearchFigure 5: How would you rate the state government's
response to Covid-19? How would you rate your
municipality's response to Covid-19?
60.0 0 %
48.3%
50.0 0 %
40.0 0 % 34.5%
31.0%
30.0 0 % 27.6%
20.7% 20.7%
20.0 0 % 13.8%
10.0 0 %
3.5%
0.0% 0.0%
0 .00 %
Very Poor Somewhat Poor Neutral Somewhat Good Very Good
State Government's Response Your Municipality's Response
Politics and Intergovernmental Relations contrast, no respondents thought their munic-
ipality’s response was poor, while just shy of 80
As discussed in the context section, local gov- percent felt their municipality’s response was
ernment leaders were forced to deal with an somewhat good or very good.
evolving set of orders that were heavily in-
fluenced by both politics, and other levels of Government Form and Lessons Learned
government. Respondents were asked to state
their level of agreement with various statements Our last two questions dealt with the specifics
where 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 of professional management, and the lessons
= Neutral, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree. learned from professional manager responses to
Respondents were strongly divided over the COVID-19. We asked “How did the structure of
extent to which the municipality’s response your government, i.e. having a professional ad-
was apolitical. Respondents were also divided ministrator, help or hinder your municipality’s
over the extent to which their governing boards COVID response?” In general, the open-end-
and residents were united in their response ed responses were positive. Most respondents
to COVID-19. The strongest finding was the pointed to their form of government as a way to
generally negative perceptions of the State as a keep politics out of the day-to-day management
partner. of COVID-19 policy, and as a way in which to
designate a single point of contact to guide staff.
The results displayed in Figure Five give more Responses included:
detail into how respondents felt the state han-
dled COVID-19 compared to their municipality. • Helped to keep the information circulating,
Almost 50 percent felt the state’s response was and having someone who tried to supply
somewhat or very poor, while only 31 percent the most up-to-date information to staff and
felt the response was somewhat or very good. In residents. Also, was helpful in being able to
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Whitburn Center for Governance and Policy Researchmake decisions that the Council was not able • Disorganized and slow State response and
to make due to meeting notice requirements. support network
• I think it helped keep the politics out of the • The actions of the State legislature and
day-to-day management. It did not eliminate WI Supreme Court which were politically
the stress of hot button issues such as mask charged and confused a lot of residents.
mandates. • Lack of staff, time and resources to adequate-
• Having a professional municipal manager ly respond to a (maybe) once in a lifetime
allowed for consistent policy application, pandemic in the face of growing political
adequate information presented to policy- discord and public divisiveness.
makers, and policy suggestions that are well • Lack of local unrestricted fund balance made
designed and anticipate the intent of the gov- it difficult to capitalize on federal/state fund-
erning body. ing. We have a smaller staff that taxed leader-
• It helped to gather and provide unbiased ship and department heads.
information and professional recommenda- • Politics...politics...politics and total inaction
tions when possible. by the State Assembly and Senate to address.
• It helped by providing guidance based on • Misinformation circulating among the citi-
the latest science and the guidance of the zens.
CDC and WI DHS instead of just allowing • Addressing the unknown, how you could
politics to lead discussions. catch COVID-19 and how to protect em-
• Provided a consistent flow of information to ployees. Also having to hold elections
the public and Board. during COVID.
• Staff looked to guidance from one individual • 1. The fight between the state legislature and
who had the details and could provide an the governor. 2. The do nothing approach of
adequate and timely response and/or direc- the legislature. 3. The termination of safer at
tion based on the known information. home with no state-wide contingency plan.
• Mostly helped by having an individual The delegation of state-level interests to local
spearhead response and policy changes. governments. The absence of the definition
• We had consistent leadership throughout the of success.
pandemic. Having a nonpartisan adminis- • Lack of information from state and federal
trator helped to reassure residents that their government.
best interests were being looked after. • Lack of unified messaging from federal,
state, County and local governments. Misin-
When asked “What were the most significant formation was a significant barrier.
barriers to an effective local COVID-19 re- • Ever changing regulations, overlapping regu-
sponse”, officials pointed to three main themes. lations, court involvement.
First was the politicization of the pandemic and
the spread of misinformation. Second was the Lastly, we asked respondents to reflect on their
lack of consistent messaging and goal setting leadership during the worst of the COVID-19
from state and federal government. Third was pandemic, asking “What would you change, if
the role of the judicial branch in being a de-fac- anything, about your municipality’s COVID-19
to policymaking body due to the ongoing legal response?” Responses generally indicated that
battles over the state’s authority. municipal managers felt prepared to deal with a
difficult crisis, but unprepared to deal with the
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Whitburn Center for Governance and Policy Researchspecifics of a global pandemic. Though some Twin Cities Metro region, rural southwest Wis-
spoke specifically of the need for more specifics consin, the Milwaukee Metro area, the Madison
like masking and vaccination efforts, the com- suburbs, and Northeast Wisconsin.
mon theme was a desire to have depoliticized
the crisis through improved communication. Do you feel you were prepared for COVID-19?
• From a tone standpoint, I would have tried In general subjects felt unprepared to handle the
to keep the hot button issues from being so specifics of the COVID-19 pandemic. As one
political and divisive. manager put it: “Things were changing so fast, I
• We would have been more proactive in com- was working 12 to 16 hours a day.” Another stat-
munity notices and updates. we provided a ed, “I felt prepared on the specifics of emergency
lot of news feeds, but some businesses were management, but did not have good informa-
not as impressed as others. the community tion on how to deal with COVID specifically.”
overall appeared to support the efforts. The general tone of all responses was summed
• Nothing really, I think we did the best we up by a respondent who stated, “Nobody could
could. have been prepared for this. I had capable staff,
• Figure out how to use social media to over- a supportive board, but I did not know what I
come disinformation. did not know.”
• Early on I would have better communicat-
ed that this would be a long-term (12-18 As a hired administrator, did you struggle with
months) challenge, not over in a few weeks. credibility when making COVID-19 policies?
• I would have provided the opportunity to
vaccinate election workers and front-line city Most respondents indicated that their posi-
hall staff sooner. tion as a hired administrator was an asset in
• More public relations, explaining of our their pandemic response. “No. If I was a mayor
decisions. worried about re-election, I would have had less
• I would have pre-stocked PPE. flexibility in my position.” Another stated “I was
• Locally we were not able to do a lot in this able to insulate my council by making decisions
political environment. as a non-partisan official.” One official serving
a smaller community did not feel the position
Interviews mattered that much, concluding “Elected or
hired, my community did not want me involved
In addition to the survey, we conducted seven with the politics surrounding COVID-19. My
semi-structured interviews with municipal ad- role was fairly limited to keeping city services
ministrators who indicated a willingness to talk going.” Lastly, multiple respondents did indicate
further about their survey results. The inter- waning credibility in the eyes of the public as the
views were conducted in September 2021 over pandemic dragged on: “I had the trust of every-
ZOOM. Each interview lasted about 45 minutes. one in the early months, that became harder to
Five of the interview subjects were City Manag- maintain during the second year of the pandem-
ers, while two were Village Administrators. Sub- ic.”
jects served a range of small and medium-sized
communities in geographically diverse parts
of the state, including northern Wisconsin, the
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Whitburn Center for Governance and Policy ResearchHow did your council/board handle COVID-19? kids. Many were out with COVID. It is a balanc-
ing act.”
Municipal leaders gave a diverse set up respons-
es regarding their council’s/board’s response It was also clear that COVID-19 has taken a toll
to COVID-19. Multiple subjects indicated that on employee morale in local government. “Our
their elected officials appreciated their manager’s clerk was unfairly demonized during the [April
ability to insulate them from difficult decisions. 2020] election. It was totally unfair.” Another
“My board was quite happy not to take this issue stated “Our staff faced an avalanche of unwar-
on.” Another stated “They appreciated that I ranted criticism.” Still another stated plainly
made the most controversial decisions.” Finally, “This whole thing has gutted employee morale.
another stated “They were great. They had my They are trying their best, but they are tired.”
back every step of the way.”
Was the state helpful?
However, one respondent indicated board turn-
over had made their job difficult. “Only two of Subjects were consistent in their disappointment
the board members who hired me are still serv- with the collective response of state officials.
ing, there is a coalition hell-bent on obstructing Comments included:
every COVID measure I take.” Another reported
division on their council around the issue of • The legislative branch was asleep and avoid-
masks: “The board supported all of my inter- ing the issue.
nal efforts with my employees, but were deeply • The sudden lifting of the safer at home order
divided over our community mask mandate.” destroyed the credibility of the state govern-
Another stated that masking at board meetings ment on COVID.
was a divisive issue: “There were a lot of hard • No. The County was helpful, but I learned
feelings about who did and did not wear a mask very quickly I could not get any assistance
at our board meetings.” from the state.
• The state gave contradicting information. I
How did your staff handle COVID-19? had hoped for much more from them.
• Watching the inaction in the legislature
In general, respondents reported a high level of made it clear to me that we were on our own.
initial support from their staff. However, sup- • The state was helpful for funding, but not
port for COVID mitigation measures waned much else.
over time. “The first thing I did was declare all • I think the executive branch was trying, but
staff essential, I think that helped build unity.” in the end was not helpful.
Another respondent stated, “Staff appreciated
our move to virtual meetings and working from What were the biggest challenges of your
home, however there was disagreement about COVID-19 Response? What if anything would
how and when to bring staff back.” Finally, you have done differently?
another respondent expressed the challenge of
managing staff during COVID-19: “Our staff is Subjects were very forthcoming about the
a cross-section of society. Some took COVID challenges they faced during COVID-19, and
more seriously than others. Some have little the lessons they learned while meeting those
challenges. Several spoke of the need for humil-
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Whitburn Center for Governance and Policy Researchity, for example: “I had to work to stay humble manager stated “I leaned on my colleagues in
and learn. I couldn’t crush small business.” other municipalities when I did not have the
Another stated “I underestimated the severity experience locally.” Finally, another stated “I
of COVID-19. In hindsight I would have better leaned heavily on professional associations to
prepared the community for a longer crisis.” guide me through the crisis.”
Finally, another stated “What felt like the right
call at the time was often not.” Lastly, interview subjects highlighted the chal-
lenge of intergovernmental relations in a po-
Another common theme was the challenge of larized political climate. “The County was very
misinformation. “I wish I did a better job of unhelpful. They were just trying to stay out of
getting ahead of the misinformation. It was hard the spotlight.” Another manager responded,
because it was coming from so many different “The state should have been clearer in offering
places.” Another stated “I faced an avalanche guidance.” Finally, another concluded “We were
of criticism based on false information. I don’t on our own.”
think it is totally a COVID thing, I think it is
where we are as a society.” Finally, another con- Conclusions, Recommendations, and Re-
cluded “Our communication infrastructure was sources
lacking. People had easy access to bad informa-
tion, while our good information was impossible The COVID-19 pandemic challenged profes-
to find. sional managers throughout Wisconsin. Aside
from working to keep municipal services run-
What can the field of professional government ning while dealing with persistent staffing chal-
management learn from this experience? lenges due to illness, municipal managers were
attempting to craft a coherent course of action
We concluded our interviews by asking mu- while an unprecedented societal disruption
nicipal managers what the local government raged around them. Our analysis yields several
management field can learn from the COVID-19 conclusions and recommendations. Further-
disruption. A first unexpected lesson was an more, we note a number of related resources
overall state of low morale among professional that are available under each recommendation
managers. “An emerging trend is the changing area.
nature of management. The discounting of facts
and the rise of partisan politics at the local level Conclusions
is killing our profession. I got into this because I
want to help people, but currently there is more Local measures were mostly limited to informa-
downside than upside.” Another subject stated tion sharing and maintaining service delivery.
similarly, “Our mandate comes from trust, and
there is not a lot of trust out there today.” Yet Though a few larger municipalities did institute
another stated “I fear an exodus from the profes- their own public mask mandates and/or limits
sion.” on private business, the majority of respondents
indicated their efforts were geared at triaging
Other lessons include the importance of having information for public consumption. Those
an experienced network and staff. “I was saved efforts, however, were made more difficult
by having a cohesive leadership team.” Another by changing state and federal guidelines, and
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Whitburn Center for Governance and Policy Researchshortcomings in municipal communication in- The legal battles over COVID-19 policies eroded
frastructure. To put it another way, information public confidence.
from non-official private channels spread more
quickly than information from official govern- The confusion over the government response to
ment channels. Aside from sharing information, COVID-19 was magnified by the ongoing legal
municipal managers saw their main role as con- battles between the executive and legislative
tinuing to provide municipal services despite the branches of Wisconsin government. Local gov-
COVID-19 pandemic. Efforts to do so included ernments attempting to give consistent guidance
more virtual services, regulatory relief, and in- lost credibility when legal decisions quickly
creased flexibility with their staff. made their guidance obsolete.
Local managers made it up as they went along. Experience mattered.
Both survey respondents and interview subjects Though all respondents reported struggling with
acknowledged they underestimated the length the novelty of the COVID-19 disruption, those
and severity of the COVID-19 disruption. Ini- with more experience, and those with more
tial measures were designed to be short-term, experience around them, felt better about their
creating some confusion as the pandemic wore response.
on. Both the uniqueness of the pandemic, and
the fact that most municipalities were reliant on Recommendations and Resources
other government units for their public health
response, forced local managers to be reactive, Our survey and interview results did identify
rather than proactive, the longer the pandemic elements of success that can be replicated in
continued. responses to future crises. Professional managers
who had good preexisting systems of commu-
Who had authority for what was ambiguous. nication with their County health departments
Communication between governments was lack- and state legislators reported less role confusion.
ing. Similarly, municipalities with established con-
sistent means of communication with residents
At the start of the pandemic, local governments were able to get ahead of COVID misinforma-
were utilizing ordinances and statutes dating tion. Finally, managers who deliberately shielded
back to the Spanish Flu Pandemic of 1918. Rare- their governing boards from COVID politics,
ly used emergency declarations gave municipal and those with a clear articulation of their role,
managers some flexibility, but there was still i.e., minimizing service disruption, were able to
confusion over what local governments could or act more proactively and limit community con-
could not do in response to COVID-19. Fur- flict. Below are several recommendations, and
ther complicating matters was inconsistent and links to resources, to improve the local govern-
changing information flowing from the state and ment response to the next crises.
federal government. While a few respondents
reported good coordination between govern-
ments, most reported that intergovernmental
cooperation was lacking.
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Whitburn Center for Governance and Policy ResearchThere is a need to understand who is charge of structures facilitated and/or inhibited credibility
what before the next crisis. and trust in their collective pandemic response.
Pending their findings, structural changes may
Inconsistent, fast changing information fur- be warranted.
ther eroded trust in government during the
COVID-19 response. The scope of local gov- Some resources that may be useful for explor-
ernment authority, and the balance between ing opportunities for city/county coordination
state and local authority during a public health include:
crisis, needs to be clarified. Determining where
authority lies via the courts during the midst of • COVID-19 Recovery Clearinghouse: The
a pandemic simply did not work. Who is charge National Association of Counties (NACo)
of what is less important than all stakeholders features critical resources for counties, in-
knowing and accepting where authority lies. cluding allocation estimations, examples of
county programs using federal coronavirus
A number of entities provide trainings relevant relief funds, the latest news and more. NACo
to this issue. For instance: and the National League of Cities is also
committed to exploring ways local govern-
• Local Government 101: Important Basics: ments can collaborate and address the needs
The League or Wisconsin Municipalities of residents now and in the future.
(LWM) hosts a 1-day workshop, providing a
basic framework for governing to both new There is a need for experienced emergency man-
city and village officials and those who want agement professionals.
to brush up on their knowledge of local gov-
ernance. Participants learn about city and Municipal managers, particularly those serving
village powers including municipal home smaller populations, often lacked the expertise,
rule, hear about how to recognize and avoid and did not have the staff, to adequately respond
conflicts of interest, go home with a quick to the public health aspects of the COVID-19
tutorial on municipal budgeting as well as disruption. County health departments were at
how to run a meeting and finish with an times helpful in filling this gap, but more often
overview on managing public works proj- than not managers reported a lack of experi-
ects. ence responding to the unique aspects of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Of course, the unprece-
Need for authority to align with activities. dented nature of the pandemic contributed to
this lack of experience. Moving forward, it is im-
Several municipal managers mentioned it was portant that emergency management response
confusing to be in a position of implementing is prioritized in the training and hiring of local
public health policies when their public health government leaders.
department was housed at the County level.
Municipal leaders were put in a position where Another training program for local government
public pressure demanded action beyond their managers offers two tracks that are relevant to
subject area expertise. It is important that this need:
municipal managers and County leaders exam-
ine the extent to which existing public health
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Whitburn Center for Governance and Policy Research• Local Government 101 Online Certificate its toll on municipal managers and employees.
Program: Offered by the International City/ On the manager side, increased mentoring of
County Management Association (ICMA), less experienced leaders is needed to prevent
this interactive online certificate program an exodus from the profession. On the employ-
immerses participants in the special chal- ee side, increased attention to mental health
lenges that confront local government man- services, the exploration of more flexible work
agers today. Taught by experienced managers arrangements (i.e., allowing more remote work),
and experts, it is designed to impart real-life and municipal sponsored leadership training
experience, best practices, and sound advice could help ensure the next generation of munici-
in the areas most important to a manag- pal leaders do not leave local government.
er’s day-to-day role. There are two tracks
to choose from: the Disaster Preparedness The Wisconsin City/County Management Asso-
Track or the Equity and Inclusion Track. ciation currently offers two programs to active
members that can begin to address this need,
Improved communication systems. such as:
Non-official communication channels, like com- • Senior Advisor Program: The purpose of
munity Facebook groups, proved much more this program is to make the counsel, experi-
efficient than official channels, like government ence, and support of respected, retired man-
newsletters and social media pages, during agers of the profession available to individual
the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Local members. The program is designed to help
governments were often using their resources to with personal and professional issues and
correct misinformation rather than proactively not to provide any form of technical assis-
educate their residents. Local managers need to tance nor to solve substantive problems in a
examine how they disseminate information, and local government.
adopt new modes of communication and pro- • ICMA Coaching Program: Coaches can help
cesses that mirror the ways in which residents members chart a path in local government,
actually consume information. find information they need, and guide them
to the answers to difficult career questions.
A number of articles released by ICMA also Coaching offers value for people at any stage
speak to this area, such as: in their careers by providing coaches with
the opportunity to see their situation and
• The Coronavirus and Your Crisis and Emer- opportunities from a fresh perspective.
gency Response Communication Plan
• Getting More from Social Media for Pan- In conclusion, there are concrete lessons to be
demic and Disaster Management learned from the failures and successes of the lo-
• Getting Your Message Out: 10 Communica- cal government response to COVID-19. Calling
tion Practices for Changing Times attention to these lessons can lead to substantive
changes that better prepare local government
Need to address morale in the public workforce managers for future crises.
and the professional manager profession.
The stress of the COVID-19 pandemic has taken
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