The Yugoslav National Idea Under Socialism: What Happens When a Soft Nation-Building Project Is Abandoned? - CADMUS, EUI ...
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Nationalities Papers (2020), 1–20
doi:10.1017/nps.2019.121
ARTICLE
The Yugoslav National Idea Under Socialism: What
Happens When a Soft Nation-Building Project Is
Abandoned?
Tomaž Ivešić*
Department of History and Civilization, European University Institute, Firenze, Italy
*Corresponding author. Email: tomaz.ivesic@eui.eu
Abstract
Following Stalin’s interpretations of the Lenin’s thesis on the merging of the nations, the Yugoslav
communists first needed to “push” all nations to the same level of development. After the Tito-Stalin split
in 1948, the soft Yugoslav nation-building project was accelerated. During the 1950s, national Yugoslavism
was stimulated in a latent way through language, culture, censuses, and changes in the constitutional and
socialist system. By the end of the 1950s, the Yugoslav socialist national idea reached its peak with the 1958
Party Congress. Nevertheless, with the economic crisis in the early 1960s, and the famous Ćosić-Pirjevec
debate on Yugoslavism, the Yugoslav national idea declined. This was evident on the level of the personal,
national identifications of the Party members, but also in the ideological shift of the Party’s chief ideologue
Edvard Kardelj. Yet, the concept of Yugoslavism was redefined in the second half of the 1960s without ethnic
or national connotations. Two Yugoslavisms were created: a socialist one propagated by the Party and a
national one that lived among the population in small proportions. Although the Yugoslavs were never
recognized as a nation, that did not stop them from publicly advocating for their national rights.
Keywords: nationalism; nation-building; communist; Southeastern Europe; national identity
Introduction
In December 2018, we remembered the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the first Yugoslav
state known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later renamed the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia. However, the Yugoslav idea can be traced back to the 19th century to the Illyrian
movement, which later developed into the first Yugoslav movement under the leadership of the
Đakovo bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer and the priest-historian Franjo Rački. They claimed that
Serbs and Croats were part of the same nation, while Yugoslavism could have served as leverage for
the unification of all southern Slavs into one political unit. While acknowledging cultural differ-
ences between Serbs and Croats, they simultaneously argued for a gradual elimination of these
differences, since a unified culture would be a bridge to political stability for the upcoming south
Slav state (Robinson 2010, 12).
When the south Slav state was finally established in December 1918, it stood as a starting point
for constant political disputes that lasted for more than two decades. This period is normally divided
into three distinct parts: 1918–1929, the period of the parliamentary democracy; 1929–1939, the
period of the royal dictatorship, when the King Aleksandar Karađorđević dissolved the parliament;
and the post-1939 period, after the Cvetković-Maček agreement and the establishment of Banovina
Hrvatska. Along the first two periodical divisions, Pieter Troch argues for the understanding of two
different versions of the integral Yugoslavism, which at first recognized only one Yugoslav nation
© Association for the Study of Nationalities 2020.
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 08 Jan 2021 at 11:32:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.2 Tomaž Ivešić
composed of three tribes (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), recognized also in the name of the Kingdom.
However, until 1929, the composite Yugoslavism, Troch argues, “allowed the coexistence of
Yugoslavism with other categories of national identification. Integral understandings of nation-
hood [between 1929 and 1939], on the other hand, refutes [the] overlap between categories of
national identification and argues that Yugoslav national identification cannot coexist with other
national identities” (Troch 2018, 1).
In 1929, the shift was visible also in the change of the official name from Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The concept of national unity was, in 1939,
replaced with the concept of “agreement,” when a separate Croatian identification was
acknowledged and Banovina Hrvatska was established (Jović 2003, 106–119). With this act,
the period of integral Yugoslavism ended and a the Serbian Question was opened (Đokić 2010,
270–285).
The last policy was valid until April 1941, when the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was attacked and
occupied by the Axis powers. During a very complex Second World War situation in Yugoslavia—a
civil war and a war of liberation with many different sides across Yugoslavia—the Communist Party
of Yugoslavia (CPY) took power. This takes us to the historical starting point of this article, which
encapsulates the post-1945 period and up to the late 1960s.
In this article, I argue that the Yugoslav communists—following the Leninist-Stalinist theoretical
and practical approach of nationalities policies—started a soft Yugoslav nation-building process
immediately after the Second World War. This socialist national Yugoslavism did not have a clear
definition during the 1950s, but its agenda is visible in many of the examples of cultural, linguistic,
economic, legislative and political reforms. The soft Yugoslav nation-building project was accel-
erated after the 1948 Tito-Stalin split, and it reached its peak in the late 1950s. However, due to
economic difficulties and public resistance against Yugoslavism in the beginning of the 1960s, the
concept of socialist Yugoslavism was redefined purely as a state and social identification, without
national or ethnic connotations. Thus, in the 1950s it moved from still acceptable Yugoslav ethnic
nationalism to a civic Yugoslav nationalism, now including non-Slavic peoples. On the other hand,
there was a small proportion of the public which took Yugoslav national identification for granted.
The division of Yugoslavism also coincided with the big political and economic reforms of the
mid-1960s, which acclaimed the national principle via the national key system. This new system
made it impossible for the Yugoslavs to be recognized as a nation. Consequently, this led to the rise
of the “old” and new national identifications (Croat, Slovene, Montenegrin, and Muslim national
rebirth) which filled the vacuum that was left after the abandonment of the Yugoslav melting pot.
Leveling the Development of Nations in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
During and after the Second World War, the CPY was following Stalin’s interpretations of Lenin’s
thesis on the merging of nations. Although there are important conceptual differences between
Lenin and Stalin’s concepts of self-determination and secession (Jović 2015), they both argued that
in a longue durée process the merging (fusion) of nations would occur ( Lenin 1916; Stalin 1929;
Connor 1984, 388–391). After the October revolution in 1917 and winning the civil war, Soviet
Bolsheviks needed to rethink their position regarding the national question, since the old pre-1917
slogans (self-determination and repudiating colonization) suddenly became problematic. As noted
by Walter Kemp, this fact forced Bolsheviks to consolidate power by making “significant conces-
sions and compromises which contradicted prerevolutionary ideology,” perhaps especially in
regard to the nationalities policy (1999, 58). A regime committed to a classless society started
creating ethnic differences on an unprecedented scale (Suny 1993, 85–126), a policy known as
korenizatsiya (nativization or indigenization). Terry Martin named these Soviet nationality policies
the “affirmative action empire,” a systematical promotion of national consciousness of minorities at
the expense of majorities (Martin 2001, 4–9). Nationalities were given new national elites,
languages, books, and institutions to better understand the “communist language,” gain the same
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 08 Jan 2021 at 11:32:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.Nationalities Papers 3
level of development, and heal difficult relationships between the ruling nation (the Russians) and
the oppressed or exploited nations (Slezkine 1994).
The question is which Soviet experiences were to be applied in Yugoslavia. Nicholas S. Timasheff
(1946) answered the question with his thesis that Soviet leadership abandoned socialist values
during the 1930s. On the other hand, Francine Hirsh argued against Timasheff’s thesis of a “great
retreat” and described the policies of korenizatsiya as rapidly making nations so that these could
merge into a higher socialist identity. It seems that for the Yugoslav case, Hirsh was right: there was
no “great retreat” because the goal of the nationalities policies from the 1920s was not to create
nationalities per se, Hirsch argued, but to create them so that they would merge faster:
to transform feudal-era clans and tribes into nationalities, and nationalities into socialist-era
nations—which, at some point in the future, would merge together under communism. This
larger vision provides an important context for understanding the regime’s effort in the 1930s
to amalgamate nationalities into a smaller number of “developed” socialist nations (Hirsch
2005, 8–9).
Like in the Soviet Union, nationality rights remained an essential component of building
socialism also in Yugoslavia, as did the division between the ruling nation (Serbs) and oppressed
nations (Macedonians, Montenegrins, etc.) (Jović 2015, 24–25, 35).
The theoretical approach in this article is based on the Terry Martin’s modification of the three
(A, B, C) phase theory of Miroslav Hroch (1985), and is based on the Soviet case of korenizatsiya.
Phase A starts with small elites researching cultural and linguistic historical attributes of a non-
dominant group. Phase B consolidates the national elites that are arguing for the creation of a
nation-state, which ends with phase C—the mass movement. Using the example of the Soviet
Union, Martin claimed that the Soviet leadership seized all three phases and introduced phase D:
“establishing a new language of the state and a new governing elite. […] Just as party leadership was
needed to lead the proletariat beyond trade union consciousness to revolution, the party could also
guide national movements beyond bourgeois primordial nationalism to Soviet international
nationalism” (Martin 2001, 15).
Thus, Martin’s theoretical approach is also useful for the Yugoslav case; however, since there are
some differences, a practical example is needed. Like in the Soviet Union, Yugoslav communist
elites initiated phase A during and immediately after the Second World War, creating new national
elites and granting or recognizing national rights, institutions, language, and culture to five nations.
This decision had roots in the changes of the CPY’s stand on the national question in the second half
of the 1930s and the shift of Comintern’s tactics regarding the popular front (Haug 2012, 37–58;
Banac 1984, 338–339; Vlajčić 1979, 157–161).
In November 1943, during the second meeting of the Anti-Fascist Council for the National
Liberation of Yugoslavia, five nations (Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians)
were given national rights. This proclamation was also used as an argument for endorsing the
communist movement among the ranks of the small nations. It was also stated that they would live
in a federal state, however the final decision regarding the Kingdom or the Republic was left to the
after-war will of the people. National rights and the equality of languages were written into the 1946
constitution, which also included Chamber of Nationalities as a protector of national equality inside
of the Federal People’s Assembly (Petranović and Zečević 1985, 695–661, 783–786).
This Party principle of equality was crucial since the Party elites controlled or hoped to control
phases B and C. With controlling phase B, they could have pushed it away from the bourgeois
nationalism into the “international nationalism.” With the control over the mass movement, which
was national in form but socialist in content, the movement was less problematic and would
represent less of a threat for national conflicts that would likely have been the case with bourgeoisie
nationalism (Martin 2001, 15–18, 430). Furthermore, the socialist masses would present a foun-
dation for a new “community of peoples.” From here, we can move to Martin’s phase D.
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 08 Jan 2021 at 11:32:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.4 Tomaž Ivešić
Although the phase D works well with the Soviet case, it fails in the Yugoslav, and, hence,
requires further refinement, since the Yugoslav leadership went further than Soviet in creating a
national (Yugoslav) socialist identification. Hence, in addition to Martin’s D phase, a three-phase
nation-building project is introduced.
This process is described in the words of the Czech historian Michal Kopeček:
First, the phase of liquidation of the major antagonisms inside the nation and its external
relationship following the socialist revolution that along with guaranteeing the principle of
equality of nations enables the creation of the socialist nation. Second, the further develop-
ment of socialist nations resulting in the leveling of their development and third, the final
stage of the confluence of the nations leading ultimately to the origins of the worldwide
communist society (Kopeček 2012, 131).
In the period between 1945 and 1948, CPY started the second phase of leveling the development of
nations, since the first phase was already reached with a socialist revolution. The equalization was
understood in all spheres of life: culture, language, politics, and economy. In the economy, these
policies were particularly visible in the division of the surplus of labor that went from the more
developed republics (such as Slovenia and Croatia) to the underdeveloped republics in the south. All
nations also established national institutions in their republics—some of them for the first time. In
Slovenia, a national library was established, as well as a national theater, while the Academy of Science
and Arts (established in 1938) gained a “Slovenian” adjective in its name by 1948 (Gabrič 1996).
In post-1945 Yugoslavia, the majority of the work had to be done in the Socialist Republic of
Macedonia (SRM), since the Macedonians were recognized as a nation for the first time by the
Yugoslav communists in 1943. In the first three years following the war, the first Macedonian
orthography and a dictionary of the Macedonian language were published. They established a
Macedonian national theater and opera, while the first movie with Macedonian subtitles was
screened in 1946 (Troebst 1997, 254).
Although the final phase of merging started slowly—visible in the examples of all-Yugoslav
institutions—and at the same time as the second phase, the Tito-Stalin split in 1948 drastically
accelerated the aspirations of the Yugoslav leadership (Banac 1988). This was necessary, since the
Cominform members that sided with Stalin started to create provocations on the borders by
manipulating (their) Yugoslav minorities (namely, Bulgarians and Albanians).1 With the confron-
tation of the imagined and real Stalinists in Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav leadership risked the
consequential emergence of ethnic conflicts. In Autumn 1950, three expelled Serbs (accused of
being Stalinists) from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia visited Serbian
villages in Croatia and agitated farmers for civil disobedience, arguing that Serbs were neglected in
Croatia (Višnjić 2003, 295–363). With the partial success of the agitation, the Yugoslav communists
realized that unity was at risk and that the merging of nations needed to be stimulated.
Along with the concept of “brotherhood and unity” (Jović 2003, 119–134), the concept of a
Yugoslav socialist patriotism as the pillar of the “new Yugoslavism,” first put forward in a paper
delivered by Milovan Djilas at the 5th Congress of CPY in 1948, became increasingly important.
Djilas argued that the love and devotion to the homeland should go beyond the “bourgeoise
nationalism” of Serbs, Slovenes, Croats, and others. However, trying to differentiate between the
socialist Yugoslavism and the interwar integral Yugoslavism, Djilas swiftly added that this new
Yugoslavism would not eliminate “national fillings” (KPJ 1948, 268–269). The concept of a
Yugoslav socialist patriotism was elaborated by Slovenian ideologue Boris Ziherl in the early
1950s, who argued that Yugoslavia was now the “homeland” of the Yugoslav working class—a
higher “synthesis” of the “national homeland” of individual nations (Ziherl 1950, 14–15). Never-
theless, the final goal of the socialist movement was the removal of all (primordial) nations in the
process of merging, as Ziherl lectured in the early 1950s at the CPY’s graduate school—Institute of
Social Sciences2 in Belgrade (Ziherl 1952, 533). Only a year later, Edvard Kardelj, the main CPY
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 08 Jan 2021 at 11:32:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.Nationalities Papers 5
ideologue, published a revised chapter of his 1939 book Razvoj slovenskega narodnega vprašanja
(The Development of the Slovenian National Question), for which a second edition was published
in 1957. In the article from 1953, Kardelj explained that the merging of the nations will happen only
after all national oppressions were eliminated and with the full evolution of nations (Kardelj 1953,
27), thereby following the first two steps of creating socialist nations as described above by Kopeček.
The Soft Yugoslav Nation-Building Project
In the 1950s, a soft nation-building project was taking place in Yugoslavia (Grandits 2008; Ivešić
2016; Ramet 1984, 54–55), although the concept of Yugoslavism was not clearly defined and was
ambiguous (Brunnbauer and Grandits 2013). Aleksa Djilas argued that Yugoslavism was against
nationalism; it was a form of internationalism and (socialist) patriotism, manifested by the post-
WWII expulsion of the German and Italian minority (1991, 163–180). It was because of the soft
nation-building project that the constitutional and economic changes happened in the 1950s. Of
course, there are also experts on Yugoslavia that do not agree with the thesis of a (soft) nation-
building (e.g., Milosavljević 2003; Bakić 2011).
Political scientist Francine Friedman reflected on the Yugoslav soft (as optional) nation-building
in the 1950s:
The withdrawal from Stalinism and the search for a specifically Yugoslav form of socialism
were also reflected in the changing Yugoslav view of nationalism. Although it still wanted
ethnic particularism to fade, the Yugoslav leadership was aware of the sensitivities of the
various national groups and sought to nudge them toward less defensiveness. The leaders
introduced the concept of Jugoslovenstvo (Yugoslavism—one Yugoslav nation). Mindful of
the chauvinistic Serbianism recalled from the Yugoslav Kingdom’s attempt to impose
Jugoslovenstvo, the Yugoslav Communists were careful to introduce a somewhat similar
policy as an option rather than a demand (Friedman 1996, 153–154).
By taking this approach, I will argue that the Yugoslav socialist nation-building was not a
classical one (as those in 19th century Germany or Italy) but, as Friedman noted, an optional soft
nation-building that introduced a different, non-forceful concept of a national socialist Yugosla-
vism. One of the most important sources where the soft nation-building project could be traced are
the speeches made by the highest political actors in Yugoslavia. Since an excellent analysis was
already made on the example of the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito (Marković 2001; Banac 1990), I
would like to discuss Milovan Djilas, who was, until January 1954, one of the most prominent
intellectuals and high Party officials in Yugoslavia. In October 1953, “spontaneous” protests broke
out all over the country, demanding the allotment of the city of Trieste to Yugoslavia. Djilas, wrote
an article for the Party’s main newspaper, Borba (The Struggle), arguing that the protests were the
most visible proof of the rise of socialist Yugoslavism and that the old primordial national identities
were becoming less significant:
In many cases, this is happening in the way that the old forms (Serbian, Croatian, Slovene,
Macedonian and Montenegrin) are filled up with new content—Yugoslavism. Future to be
Serb, Croat, etc., will start to think and feel Yugoslav. This is this new emotion, this new
atmosphere, this is that big, the biggest, that was created and what is still creating under the
influence of life itself. Communists sowed the right seed, which has retained, and which is now
growing and ramifying even on its own.3
At the same time, there was also an election campaign for the Federal Assembly taking place
throughout Yugoslavia. Djilas expanded his ideas two weeks later at a political rally in Banja Luka:
“This new generation, does not only live like Serbs, Croats, etc., but like Yugoslavs as well.
Yugoslavia breathes with one set of lungs and beats with one heart. Comrade Tito and our old
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 08 Jan 2021 at 11:32:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.6 Tomaž Ivešić
communist’s lifelong dream is coming true—a brotherhood community is becoming something,
that already lives; for our people, the Yugoslavs, it would be impossible to imagine a life without
her.”4 Serbian writer and member of the Serbian People’s Assembly Dobrica Ćosić also wrote in his
diary about the protests as being the sign of Yugoslav patriotism since only Slovenes and some
Croats lived in Trieste, whereas citizens across Yugoslavia protested (2000, 35–36). Therefore, the
population of Serbia and Macedonia “imagined” being a part of the same political community as
those from Trieste (Anderson 1983).
In the fields of language and culture (as allegedly objective criteriums to determine a nation
based on Kardelj’s definition of a nation), several significant changes occurred in the 1950s. In 1954,
a Serbo-Croatian language was established under the watchful eye of the Party with the signatures of
prominent Croatian and Serbian linguists, writers, and other “cultural workers” (Banac 1991, 99–
100; Bašić 2007). The so-called “Yugoslav criterium” in culture was discussed increasingly among
writers (Gabrič 1995, 320), until it turned into a public debate between a Serbian writer Zoran Mišić
and Slovenian literary historian Drago Šega. He opposed Mišić’s arguments for a Yugoslav
criterium, which would ultimately lead to a unified Yugoslav culture (Peković 1986, 242–243).
However, Mišić received support for his idea inside the Central Committee’s (CC) Ideological
Commission of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (CPY renamed in 1952).5 Hence, one can
see that the principle “national in form, but socialist in content” was upgraded in culture. It was
important that the national form would be Yugoslav.
The constitutional and socialist systems also changed significantly during the 1950s. In January
1953, a new constitutional law shifted the holders of sovereignty from nations (1946 Yugoslav
Constitution) to the “working people,” while the Chamber of Nationalities stopped existing as a
separate chamber of the Federal Assembly. It became part of the Federal Council—the biggest and
most important chamber of the Federal Peoples’ Assembly—without any power or jurisdiction
(Režek 1998, 153).
In his speech introducing the new Constitutional law, Edvard Kardelj, “father” of all Yugoslav
constitutions, presented his view of a new socialist community in which language and culture were of
no importance.6 Although Kardelj stated that a Yugoslav nation would not emerge, it is necessary to
distinguish Kardelj’s specific political langue (Pocock 1987, 21), and to determine what Kardelj wanted to
say with a careful selection of words. On the occasions when Kardelj wrote or talked about the non-
emergence of a Yugoslav nation, he always added a formulation: “in the old meaning of the word”, “of a
classical type” or a nation in “a bourgeois sense of the word” (1957). These formulations were certainly
connected to Marx’s idea of a “communist nationhood,” emphasized by Martin Mevius, who pointed out
the famous sentence from the Communist Manifesto: “The working men have no country. We cannot
take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy,
must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is so far, itself national,
though not in the bourgeois sense of the word” (Mevius 2009, 382; italics added for emphasis).
In 1957, Kardelj published the second, revised edition of his famous Razvoj slovenskega
narodnega vprašanja (1939), to which he added a long preface. In this book, he argued with Stalin
and gave his definition of a nation:
A particular community of people arising by the social division of labour in the epoch of
capitalism, in a compact territory, and within the framework of a common language and close
ethnic and cultural similarity in general (Kardelj 1957, 34).
Furthermore, Kardelj also claimed that a nation was created as a necessary answer to the
organizational structure of the division of labour, which was enforced by the capital. The division
of labour would be an important factor for the countries that were heading toward socialism. As
Kardelj pointed out: “In its very essence, the national question is certainly a question of the whole
society, while it is organically tied with the social relations of the epoch of capitalism and with the
transitional period from capitalism to socialism” (Kardelj 1957, LXXIV).
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 08 Jan 2021 at 11:32:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.Nationalities Papers 7
Yugoslavia was also in this “transitional period.” In this context, republics as national units
performed no progressive economic function in the Yugoslav system. Therefore, the only option for
a nation suitable to the first condition of his formulation was Yugoslavia. As Ramet argued, Kardelj
allowed a (socialist) “state-nation” to be “formed on the basis of a unified market within the context
of a unified polity” (1984, 54). The merging would thus not happen through the assimilation but
through the withering away of nations. As Kardelj argued, the forthcoming epoch was the epoch of
the general merging of nations, though not in a classical 19th century assimilation but as the
historical necessity of withering away (1957, 349). Those nations that were similar in culture and
ethnicity—like the Yugoslav nations—would merge faster and more tightly.
Although Kardelj’s preface was and still is open for different interpretations due to the dialectics
(Režek 2005; Ramet 1984, 55) and some historians interpreting Kardelj as a Slovenian nationalist
(Pirjevec 2011, 449–450), there were intellectuals already in the 1960s who understood Kardelj’s
writing as interpreted in this article. Notable are a Slovenian writer from Trieste, Boris Pahor (1966;
1967a), who attacked Kardelj on several occasions regarding the merging of nations, and high Party
officials, such as Miko Tripalo.7
Only a year later, after Kardelj’s book was published, the LCY’s delegates gathered in Ljubljana
for their VII. Congress. Among other important decisions of the gathering, was the new LCY
program, which was the first to be accepted after WWII. In it they copied several paragraphs from
Kardelj’s preface (VII. kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije: Ljubljana 22-26 aprila 1958 (steno-
grafske beleške) 1958, 1055–1061). The Congress also included the notion of a “socialist Yugoslav
consciousness” and presented, Rusinow (1977, 106) argued, the climax of the campaign for the
socialist Yugoslavism (1977, 106). During the congress, some Slovenian Party members publicly
opposed the integrational wishes for the first time (Gabrič 1995, 330). This act was a sign of the
disputes which would take place in the early 1960s.
Socialist self-government was also an important factor in building a Yugoslav identification, but
an arguably bigger step was taken with the Commune system (introduced in 1955), which bypassed
the republics as potentially nationally risky units. Communes were designed as self-governed local
units, self-sufficient and self-sustainable (Kopač 2005). The fading away of national characters in
this new system could also be traced to a statement made by the above-mentioned Ćosić, who was
asked in 1955, how he would, as a member of the Serbian People’s Assembly, explain the commune
system to local voters:
I will speak of people growing together and unifying in the commune, which will affirm all of
the social and personal potential of the individual, so violence and force will become super-
fluous, so that democracy will replace the state, so that together they will be like the air that we
breathe, something that is understood, which is here and is not just a goal, so that through the
commune Yugoslavism will grow and the borders of republics will be erased, so that someday
people will write: I am a Yugoslav from such and such commune… (Miller 2007, 64).
Finally, the future Yugoslav socialist nation was also visible in the census of 1953, when the
“Yugoslavs–undefined” category was introduced for the first time. However, this was an oxymoron,
since if an individual declared themselves to be a Yugoslav they could not have been undefined,
especially since there was also a category of “nationally indifferent” (Dugandžija 1985, 66). The
Yugoslav category was used namely by nationally mixed parents for their children as well as by the
Muslim population of Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH), who did not have a separate category. In
1953, the Yugoslav category was chosen by just under one million individuals. Most of them (89%)
came from BiH and only around 64,000 were not Muslim. Nevertheless, more than half of all
“Yugoslavs” were aged less than thirty (Popis stanovništva 1953. Knjiga 1, Knjiga 1, 1959, 278–287;
Popis stanovništva 1953. Knjiga 8, Knjiga 8, 1959, 1–19). The Yugoslav category was introduced as a
separate one, as it was argued by high Party official Moša Pijade, for all the people who did not want
to define their national belonging in a narrow way. The Muslims were definitely part of a “Yugoslav
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 08 Jan 2021 at 11:32:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.8 Tomaž Ivešić
ethnic community.” Hence, Pijade could claim that such ethnic community already existed (Lučić
2013, 278–287).
The idea of a Yugoslav ethnic community was extremely popular in the 1950s. It was defined by
Croatian historian Ferdo Čulinović, who claimed that there were differences among the Yugoslav
nations, but, compared to Germans or Italians, they seemed as one, living on a compact territory
with similar languages, cultural ties, and ethnic ties (1955; 1962). Čulinović’s idea was upgraded by
Serbian historian and lawyer Milan Bulajić in 1964, who inside of the Yugoslav Association for
International Law advocated that “we are living in a process of creating a Yugoslav / socialist /
nation” (Bulajić 1964, 88). Both Čulinović and Bulajić presented their ideas in front of the Serbian
Academy of Sciences and Arts by the end of the 1964, before the turning point occurred.8 The
changes that happened or attempts of a change in the 1950s were focused on all aspects of the
objective criteriums that were—based on the Kardelj’s formulation—necessary for a nation to exist
(ethnicity, culture, language, social division of labor, etc.). Therefore, one can see the latent way of
how the socialist national Yugoslavism was promoted.
The Turning Point
There are several factors which can explain the shift that happened in the first half of the 1960s,
when the Yugoslav national identification was abandoned. Firstly, the opposition toward Yugosla-
vism grew among Slovenian intellectuals as well as leading Party members. This manifested in the
1961/62 public debate on Yugoslavism between Dobrica Ćosić and Slovene literary critic Dušan
Pirjevec, who attacked Ćosić’s view on Yugoslavism. Pirjevec attacked both Ćosić and his interview
published in Zagreb’s newspaper Telegram in January 1961, and the debate continued until
mid-1962. Pirjevec accused Ćosić of throwing his support behind “integral Yugoslavism” and
argued that he advocated for the elimination of republics. Meanwhile, Ćosić believed that Yugo-
slavism was a social category and that he was on the LCY’s ideological and political line (Miller 2007,
95–98; Cosovschi 2015). Ćosić had gained support from both Aleksandar Ranković (Minister of
Interior, head of the Yugoslav secret police) and Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito, while Slovenian
communists secretly backed Pirjevec. It was later found that Pirjevec’s articles were corrected by
Boris Kraigher, one of the leading Slovene politicians, a member of the CC LCY, and an authority
for ideological questions in Slovenia (Gabrič 1995, 345–347).
Secondly, from the beginning of the 1960s, Yugoslavia was in very bad economic condition.
While Tito and Ranković wanted to go back to the old Soviet-style system, Kardelj wanted to
enforce self-management. Since the hard-liners prevailed at the beginning, Kardelj was forced into a
corner but was ultimately saved by Slovene communists. This made a clear statement to Tito that
the confrontation with Kardelj also meant confrontation with the whole League of Communists of
Slovenia. Therefore, Tito backed off, since the risk to unity—the principle he most cherished—was
too high (Haug 2012, 175–181; Perovšek 1995, 285–289; Grandits 2008, 22). Consequently, this also
lead to Kardelj’s shift, who now defended the republics, abandoning the idea of a Yugoslav socialist
nation, because the fear of losing national rights was inciting nationalism in the republics (Haug
2012, 181–182). Kardelj’s shift was noticed also by the above-mentioned Boris Pahor, who
acknowledged Kardelj’s move from the merging of nations toward the “nation’s independence”
in 1964 (1967b, 119). The shift was also visible in the general political language of the Party
members, who stopped discussing the merging of nations and, instead, began using the term
“integration.” Finally, abandoning the merging of nations thesis was also possible because
the Slovene Party leadership—backed by the Macedonian and Kosovo-Metohija leaderships—
tactically triggered inside of CC LCY the legal status of the Yugoslav minorities abroad as well as
within. The initiative was successful, and the LCY accepted new guidelines regarding the legal
protection of minorities. They became a legal subject, which meant, a small but significant victory
for those opposing the idea of Yugoslav assimilation, since minorities could not have taken part in
this project (Kristen 2015, 107–108). Additionally, the 1961 census introduced a new ethnic
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 08 Jan 2021 at 11:32:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.Nationalities Papers 9
category for Muslims, weakening the Yugoslav ethnic category (Lučić 2016, 429–430), though some
war veteran organizations pressured people to declare Yugoslav identification during the census.9
All the above-mentioned reasons led to a turning point in the LCY’s stance on socialist
Yugoslavism and the changes of the socialist system. It began with discussion regarding the new
constitution, which was accepted in 1963. One of the most significant constitutional differences was
the return of the Chamber of Nationalities as a separate chamber in the Federal Assembly. In the
constitutional draft, Kardelj wrote that the Federation was not a framework for creating a new
Yugoslav nation. Instead, it was a community of free, equal, and independent nations that were
united because of their shared socialist interests. If this was the new interpretation of relations, what
did it meant to be a Yugoslav and did the ethnic component still matter? Could a member of a
national minority be a Yugoslav? Croatian leader Vladimir Bakarić explained that the old term was
inadequate because it contained a Slavic element. Based on the new constitution all members of the
Yugoslav community were also Yugoslavs (Haug 2012, 181–182). In his speeches, Bakarić
frequently defended that a “Yugoslav” was (only) state identification (Bakarić 1983, 209, 268).
Ultimately, the ethnic side of the Yugoslav identification was losing significance, which resulted
in a slow process of shifting the Yugoslav ethnic nationalism toward a Yugoslav civic nationalism
(Ignatieff 1995) based only on the state and socialist relations. This was also made visible in June
1964, during the preparations for the 8th Congress of LCY, when Kardelj met the group working on
relations among nations in Yugoslavia. In his speech, Kardelj pointed out the need to fight against
all nationalisms in the center and in the republics. He stated that communists in the center should
be more respectful toward national rights, while communists in the republics should always think
about the center. Kardelj also rejected the ideas about a “unified language” for the whole of
Yugoslavia as well as the reactions to this idea, believing it was too soon for this progressive idea
and that republics were just a “necessary evil.” Kardelj pointed out, for the first time, that these kinds
of discussions should be stopped in order not to provoke the “secure feeling” of national rights in the
republics. Furthermore, Kardelj also attacked the idea of a Yugoslav nation and argued that there
should be a clear difference between “integral Yugoslavism” and socialist Yugoslavism. However, he
did not elaborate on what the concept of socialist Yugoslavism was.10
From Kardelj’s speech, it is clear that his langue changed greatly in comparison to his forward in
Razvoj. He stopped using adjectives such as bourgeoise, classical, or “in the old meaning of the
word” when referring to the Yugoslav nation as well as the idea of merging of nations. Furthermore,
Kardelj mentioned integration only when referring to culture, meaning creating a socialist culture
that respected national cultures and their specificities.11
While Kardelj made a significant shift in his views regarding Yugoslavism, Tito remained
indecisive. In 1963, he was the main speaker at the Congress of the Yugoslav Youth, where his
speech left many confused because it was unclear what he wanted to say. He definitively moved
away from the merging of nations thesis, denying the creation of a new nation and arguing that
people with this idea were mixing up the concept of the nation with the state. However, when he
came to the point in his speech where he discussed Yugoslavism, Tito argued that being a Yugoslav
meant being a citizen of socialist Yugoslavia. Furthermore, he claimed that everyone could be what
they wanted to be and that nationality and citizenship were not contradictory (Sedmi kongres
Saveza omladine Jugoslavije 1963, 10–11).
Supposing that national belonging and citizenship were not contradictory to each other, that could
only have meant that Tito was in favor of a Yugoslav socialist nation. However, he openly discarded
the same idea during the 8th Congress of LCY in December 1964. He mentioned some individuals
“who had the confused idea that the unity of our people means the elimination of nationalities and the
creation of something new and artificial, that is a single Yugoslav nation, rather on the lines of
assimilation and bureaucratic centralization, unitarism, and hegemony” (Rusinow 1977, 167).
Communists who held lower positions and worked on the local level were left very confused. They
could not understand why the national question received so much attention at the Congress and did
not know if Tito’s speech marked a shift in the LCY’s stance on the national question.12
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 08 Jan 2021 at 11:32:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.10 Tomaž Ivešić
Table 1. Number of “Yugoslav - Nationally Undetermined” Members in the League of Communists of Serbia.
Year All members of the LC of Serbia Yugoslav—nationally undetermined %
1961 410,715 1941 0.47
1962 406,126 1726 0.42
1963 416,142 2811 0.68
1964 427,265 4256 1
1965 437,034 3647 0.83
1966 441,173 4249 0.96
This turning point regarding the national question was also visible within the Party. Using the
League of Communists (LC) of Serbia as an example, this case shows how the Yugoslav identifi-
cation was extremely popular among the Party members in the early 1960s. Although the census of
1961 in Serbia showed only 20,079 (0.26% of the total population in Serbia) individuals in the
“Yugoslav—nationally undetermined” category, the number of persons with this identification
inside the Party rose quickly between 1961 and 1964 (Table 1).13 Figures were at their highest in
1964. After that, there was a decrease or stagnation, which was arguably a consequence of the
decisions made during the 8th Congress.
This shift is even more visible in the example among the top brass of the LCY the “Yugoslav”
members of the Federal Peoples’ Assembly—who significantly changed their viewpoint. In 1963,
the “Yugoslavs” represented an astonishing 15% (101 individuals) of all Assembly’s members (670),
including all cameras. They were the second largest “national group” after the 227 Serbs. The third
largest group was made up of those “without an answer,” including 99 individuals. Croats followed,
consisting of 80 individuals. Only two years after the 8th Congress, the “Yugoslavs” decreased to 8%
(57 members). Furthermore, after the fall of Ranković, the number of “Yugoslavs” fell to 14 indi-
viduals in 1967, declining in the future.14
This apparent gap between the perception of the “common” Party members and the high-
ranking officials was strongly connected to the low ideological level among communists. Because
LCY membership was essential to a successful career, the Party was full of “careerist,” individuals
who were joining the LCY only for their own benefit. A survey made for the CC LCY in 1961 showed
all the flaws that came with these “Careerists.” The study noted:
From the 535 surveyed members of LCY, 63 of them never worked in a societal-political
organizations and organs, 273 of them never read a Marxist or any other political literature,
119 of them do no fully or partially understand the role of the League of Communists, 129 of
them did not read the Statute and Program of LCY, 84 of them are not active in organi-
zations and organs, while 106 of them think that they are not active enough in work as
communists.15
Redefining Socialist Yugoslavism
In the mid-1960s, LCY started to create major studies and analyses regarding the national question,
including socialist Yugoslavism. In November 1965, the Executive Committee (EC) of LCY claimed
that 99% of problems regarding interethnic relations were due to economic difficulties.16 This EC’s
meeting was seen as crucial because the Republican leadership had begun to prepare a careful
analysis of the national question, nationalism, and other problems connected with these issues. In
Serbia, the Serbian CC prepared a study on the relations between the LC and the statements and
activities made by individual communists. The document consisted of more than thirty pages of
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 08 Jan 2021 at 11:32:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.Nationalities Papers 11
analysis, with several attached papers, comments, and reactions made after the 8th Congress of LCY
in 1964 and after the 3rd Plenum of CC LCY.17
Among other difficulties surrounding the so-called “current situation,” the document also
mentioned confusion and misunderstandings concerning the concept of “today’s Yugoslavism,”
which should not have related to the old integral interwar Yugoslavism. The document stated
that by attacking everything “Yugoslav,” it could quickly turn into non-socialist propaganda,
since there were clear Yugoslav elements present, such as ethnic similarities and historical
aspirations toward unity. Despite these facts, interethnic relations in Yugoslavia were based
on socialist interests, while the main problem involved the misunderstanding of the further
development of nations throughout the world. It was presumed in the document that Yugosla-
vism could help with the gradual evolution of nations. Nevertheless, this would be “in today’s
conditions” only a mirage of a nonnational or supranational, from which the latter was a national
category. This confusion “resolves in sensitivity, reticence and exaggerated accent of the
national”18 in everyday life. In Serbia, this was visible with the prevailing opinion that Serbs
were in support of unity, while all others were labeled as separatists. This hegemony of a larger
nation over smaller nations reminded the small nations about the past integral Yugoslavism,
which resembled a shift toward a defensive stance of their national rights.19 In this manner,
nationalism was unintentionally incited.
The pressure for Yugoslav national recognition came from two directions. First, pressure came
from the Federal Statistical Office (Savezni zavod za statistiku; hereafter SZS), which demanded
the Yugoslav national category in the census of the “active population” in 1966, particularly for
BiH. Statistical experts declared that the LCY was “playing too much with definitions, which are
confusing,” while the Yugoslav nationality would be a solution. Some of them even opposed the
Muslim ethnic category, saying that they were “Serbs, some of them Croats” as well as that
“Montenegrins are also Serbs.”20 The SZS had a special session with the Federal Commission for
Interethnic and Interrepublican relations (Komisija za međunacionalne in međurepubličke
odnose; hereafter KMMO). During this session, the KMMO demanded statistical analysis of
the national structure of employees, clerks, federal and republican bodies, Party positions, and
other roles. Then, they compared them to the national structure of the population. Furthermore,
they proposed that other institutes (Institute of Ethnic Studies in Ljubljana, Institute of Social
Sciences in Belgrade, etc.) should check the laws, regulations, and other legal documents (statute)
to see how they affected interethnic relations. There was also a unique focal point dedicated to
Bosnian interethnic relations.21 Since no stenographical records exist for this meeting, it is
impossible to establish if the SZS personnel was criticized for their view regarding the Yugoslav
national category.
The second direction was, of course, public opinion—the “view from below.” The newspapers
played a crucial role in keeping the Yugoslav national idea alive, as detailed below. Here, the
focus lies on the “response of the individuals and communities on the transcripts” (Palmowski
2009, 15) of socialist Yugoslavism. In positive and negative responses, one can target the political
language of ordinary citizens and how the political language of the elites was used by “layper-
sons” to make arguments based on the “ideological line” and avoid being labeled as nationalists.
Finally, how much did people care for their old national and regional identifications, if they had
one, in relation to the “new” socialist Yugoslavism? Simply put, one should “examine how people
living within that [Yugoslav] system engaged with, interpreted and created their reality”
regarding socialist Yugoslavism. The discourse on this Yugoslavism was considered as a “never
completely known in advance” concept, that was consistently reproduced and reinterpreted
(Yurchak 2006, 18).
One of the best examples of the “view from below” are letters that were send to a Belgrade TV
station in 1966 for a special television talk show that was dedicated to interethnic relations. Many
letters mention the problem of national Yugoslavism. The common people (pensioners, soldiers,
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 08 Jan 2021 at 11:32:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.12 Tomaž Ivešić
students), some of them even semi-literate, could not understand why the LCY was against those
that identified as Yugoslavs in national terms. Listed here are various examples:
When will we once and for all be called Yugoslavs, for what we have been striving for during
the revolution and today through the socialist development? (member of JNA [Yugoslav
People’s Army] from Zemun)
Is there any bigger pride than to be a Yugoslav and why today and until when will this go on,
the emphasis on being Croat, Serb, Slovene, or some other nationality? The one who is a Serb,
Croat, Slovene, Montenegrin, Macedonian, or some other nationality, he is for sure also a
Yugoslav, and why today after more than 20 years these claims and emphasis? (a clerk and two
pensioners from Zemun)
If we are, as some say, nationally “non-revived” in which direction should we in the future
revive, especially we, the citizens of SR BiH, who can be justly called the Yugoslavs? (an author
from Zenica)22
Three letters had a more specific opinion regarding national Yugoslavism connected to the
questions of nationally mixed marriages and youth:
How to treat children from the nationally mixed marriage, which were grown up in the third
Yugoslav nationality. This are three influences (two from parents and the third in which they
were raised), but the last one is the strongest. (JNA member)
We have to be conscious that the descendants of parents, which are different nationalities, are
not and cannot be nor the nationality of the father, nor the mother. It looks like as if they are
true Yugoslavs, and that they cannot be classified in a nationally non-determine category, as it
is done nowadays in various statistics. (student from Zagreb)
Frequently there are anomalies of suppressing the right of declaring one’s nationality, to
young people, who identify of being Yugoslav in the full meaning of the word. The youth is
being called out—and this is happening from the accountable high positions—that their
understanding of the withering away of nationalism are utopian and unreal, but on the other
hand, they are forced to identify with the belonging to only one nation, even when this feeling
is already surpassed. (student from Belgrade)23
The popular response, although limited to the common LCY members, can also be seen in the
analysis of the debates inside Belgrade city’s sections. In a report from one of the meetings, many
communists did not understand why the national question was given so much attention at the 8th
Congress of LCY in 1964. The majority of LCY’s organizations did not start with debates on this topic.
On the other hand, where the debates on the national question were organized, they were dominated
by everyday life examples of chauvinism (which nation liked to work more or less, who came to
Belgrade from where, etc.) and with the problem of Yugoslavism and national identification. During
the debates on Yugoslavism, there was much confusion and misunderstanding, while the Yugoslav
identification was seen as a “negative character, without considering the reasons of this opting and
their main actors. […] A fear was expressed, claiming that the Yugoslav concept was a prescribed one
since it could be identified with unitarism, and because behind the demand for Yugoslavism one can
understand it, as a demand for the creation of the Yugoslav nation.”24
Another discussion on interethnic relations—organized by Belgrade’s cultural-educational
community on April 9, 1965—is also telling. The main speaker was Serbian Secretary for Culture
and Education Milan Vukos. In his paper, he presented the official views of LCY on the question of
interethnic relations, arguing that every nation had the right to develop freely. It was a frequent
occurrence that some individuals argued in the name of Yugoslavism to overcome national borders.
Yet, they did not realize that this had a hint of unitarism to it. Therefore, Vukos claimed, as Lenin,
that they must fight for the free development of all nations because this was the only way for
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 08 Jan 2021 at 11:32:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.Nationalities Papers 13
the development of national cultures to come together by free convergence. Yugoslavism would
enrich national cultures with “those elements that are common, Yugoslav and beyond—universal to
all humans.”25
Several “cultural workers” participated in the discussion. One of them argued that they should
not abandon the Yugoslav idea because the whole concept was not yet fully understood by the way it
was being presented at the 8th Congress. Another participant criticized the debate regarding
Yugoslavism: “When we are talking about Yugoslavism, we characterize it negatively; because we
say that Yugoslavism is not this and that, but we do not say what Yugoslavism is, we are, therefore,
not developing a certain constructive content.”26
A third discutient argued they needed to clarify Yugoslavism in Serbia and the great Serbian
chauvinism because the latter was often linked with Yugoslavism, as if Serbs wanted to impose their
interwar Yugoslav idea on others. This argument was invalid to him since the Yugoslav idea was
based on cooperation, which existed even before the creation of Yugoslavia:
Even if there were, in the near past, many missuses of Yugoslavism and Yugoslavia from the side
of Serbian bourgeoise and Serbian politicians, then I do not count myself accountable in 1965 for
any sins of Milan Stojadinović and Dragiša Cvetković [both were Prime Ministers of Yugoslavia
in the 1930s] or anyone else. In the last 100 years, on the basis of the Yugoslav idea and the fight
for Yugoslavism, everything progressive was gathered in Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia; there
are well known actions of the Yugoslavs like the bishop Strossmayer, cooperation between our
Academies of Science and Arts, between our high school and cultural workers, cooperation
which led to the first Yugoslav exhibition in 1904 (four Yugoslav exhibitions of art were held
before the Yugoslav state was established; however, only one exhibition was created after the
creation of Yugoslavia); in this fund, which is named Yugoslavism, and which we want to get
rid of, although we have not studied it well enough and took from it everything positive, there
are many, just like this positive examples of cooperation, regarding which also Vukos was
talking about and which need to be for us a role model in the future.27
In his response to the above-mentioned comments from the audience, Milan Vukos claimed that
Yugoslavism was not a reactionary thesis if it was based on the 8th LCY’s Congress. This Yugoslavism
could be achieved through the unification of economic, political, cultural, common socialist goals of
all the people of Yugoslavia, and other interests.28 Nevertheless, the comments from the public
pointed toward at least two crucial problems: (1) Yugoslavism was not a clearly defined concept and
(2) there was no differentiation between the positive (meaning progressive) and negative historical
aspects. These two problems were addressed by the federal KMMO in 1965 and 1966.
At the federal KMMO meeting in June 1965, High Party Official Veljko Vlahović presented his
concerns regarding Yugoslavism and the youth. He pushed for a systematic analysis of everything
that was said about Yugoslavism and stated that it was necessary to understand the youth better
because there was a specific positive reaction to Yugoslavism among them. In the eyes of Vlahović,
todays Yugoslavism had nothing to do with the interwar Yugoslavism because the youth did not
know Maček, Korošec, or Stojadinović, the Croat, Slovene and Serbian political leaders from the
1930s. Thus, he argued that the negative connotations were coming from older generations,
especially communists, that were shaped by the interwar period.29
This is crucial to understanding the turning point in the Yugoslav national question. It was the
older interwar and partisan generation that decided to get rid of the ethnic and national connotation
inside Yugoslavism once and for all. They could not escape the historical memory that shaped them
into becoming communists, unlike the youth who had a clean start.
After the meeting in April 1966, a document titled LCY and the Problem of Interethnic Relations
was written by the federal KMMO and Yugoslavism was defined as a socialist identification open to
non-Slavic peoples. So, the term had nothing to do with ethnicity. In the same definition, the
concept of the class remained an important concept:
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 08 Jan 2021 at 11:32:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.You can also read
